ARTICLE VIII.

ON THE METHOD IN THE HISTORY OF THE EARLIER CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

BY HERR MAX BESSEN, PRIVATDOCENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HALLE, GERMANY.

Under this heading appeared, in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* (Vol. xiv., 1871), an Article, by Prof. Dr. Albr. Ritschl of Göttingen, which contains so many important and suggestive thoughts that it will well repay an effort to make its contents accessible to wider theological circles. The occasion of the Article was the appearance of Fr. Nitzsch's (Professor in Giessen) Outlines of the History of Christian Doctrine (Part I., The Patristic Period, 1870). We might expect that Ritschl, the eminent author of the Rise of the Old Catholic Church (2d ed., 1857), and of the History of the Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation (vol. i.), would present fruitful views upon that period of doctrinal development. In undertaking to give here the principal thoughts of Ritschl's Article, we do not purpose to abide closely by the order there followed. Our object is rather to designate clearly the new points of view which Ritschl establishes for the examination and methodical treatment of the earlier history of Christian doctrine, and to do this with constant reference to Nitzsch's work.

In respect to the arrangement of material, Nitzsch himself departs from the usual track. He holds that it is unnatural, and contradictory to the actual course followed by the Christian dogmatical thought of the church Fathers, to begin, in a one-sided and abstract way, with the doctrine of God, and to reach the central subjects of church faith — Christ and the church — only when we are midway in the historical task, or even later. Thus, while we find in Neander and Baur, for example, the following order: theology, cosmology, anthropology, soteriology, doctrine of the church and the sacraments, eschatology, Nitzsch begins with a special section on the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ and on the doctrine concerning the church, as the two moving subjects in the development of doctrine in the patristic period. True, he then treats all other doctrines according to the customary plan.

Ritschl recognizes a certain advance in this, and yet brings weighty objections against it. Certainly, we must not suppose that the moving questions in the development of doctrine have at all times arranged themselves according to the order of the loci dogmatici, which the theologians
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries followed in the division and arrangement of their material. If the office of the History of Doctrines is to lead us to understand how the church reached a completeness of form in her idea of truth, in her grasp of the true conception itself, and in her system of views, then the history must guard against an identity of scheme for every period. For the scheme to be used in each period must be formed according to the characteristic feeling of the period, and its central efforts. If we now start from this general principle, and view with Ritschi's eyes the divisions of Nitzsch's book, we find that his very title deserves severe criticism. According to the title, he proposes to discuss the Patristic Period. This period extends, according to Nitzsch, from the end of the apostolic age to the middle of the eighth century, and thus includes Augustine and Dionysius the Areopagite. This division is related to the fact that Nitzsch gives to the idea of the church, already, in the beginning of the patristic period, an importance which she did not obtain in the theories till Vincentius of Lirinum, nor in practice till Augustine and Dionysius the Areopagite. At the same time, it is true that everything in the earlier patristic period tends towards this idea. Nitzsch justifies the prominence he gives to the doctrine of the church in placing it beside that of the Person of Christ, thus (Outlines of the History of Christian Doctrine, p. 230): In the opinion of the church, then, the mediatorship of Christ required another new mediation between Christ and the believer; for the object of faith is not Christ in himself, but the Christ who is present to the believer. But this new medium was given, through the working of the Holy Spirit, in the church, that is, in the empirical, the lawfully-constituted church under the management of the apostolic episcopal office. But the church, in this sense,—that is, as objective principle of salvation,—is not looked upon as objective supplement of that which Christ is to us, until the mediaeval period. And, moreover, it was Augustine who essentially turned the idea of the church into this direction. He was thus the formulator of the programme of mediaeval Catholicism, and especially of the papal international policy. For, as Nitzsch himself shows, in detail, Augustine so distinguishes between the civitas Dei and the civitas diaboli, or terrae, that he finds in the Catholic church the kingdom of God which has existed, separate from the earthly kingdom, since the fall. And this earthly kingdom is the state, as Augustine saw it before him in the Roman empire of that time. Now, just as the church, as civitas Dei, is the organism of good, on the principle of the righteousness which pleases God, so, in Augustine's view, the state is the community of men, on the principle of sin. It was not Gregory VII. who first set forth this idea; it comes from Augustine, as the counterpart of the conception of the church as the kingdom of God. In this light, now, the views of Augustine upon inherited sin and absolute predestination gain their true meaning. It is customary to regard these as the groundwork
of the reform line of thought, and to see in Augustine, as it were, the father of the Reformation. And, in this connection, it is premised that he regards inherited sin as the motive to repentance for the individual descendants of Adam, and makes grace have respect to the individual consciousness of election or of justification. But this is incorrect. With Augustine, the idea of the absolute grace stands inseparably related to the episcopally governed church as the kingdom of God. His view of inherited sin, likewise, stands connected with his theory that the state is the organism of sin. This estimation of the church as the present kingdom of God, and of the state as the kingdom of the devil, belongs, along with its consequences, to the principles of mediaeval Occidental Christianity, and comes in this way into the history of doctrine. And so it is not wise to separate the history into a patriarchic and a scholastic period; but we must have, first, an old Catholic period, and then a mediaeval. And this latter must begin for the Latin branch with Augustine, and for the Graeco-Byzantine with the Areopagite. Augustine is closely related to the scholastic period by his conception of the church; but he stands clearly separated from the teachers who preceded him.

The history of the Christian church, starting from the apostles, begins with the expectation that the return of Christ—that is, of the kingdom of God—would occur very soon. As the Christians began to arrange themselves in the world as a religious body with settled forms, they were ever ready to make room for the kingdom of God, which they thought to be dependent on the return of Christ in his glory, and on no other conditions. In the course of events this expectation suffered, of course, many modifications. Against Montanism, it was decided that the nearness of the kingdom of Christ gave no just occasion for making church discipline stricter, or for giving it up altogether. Against a Judaeo-Christian tendency in the expectation, the spiritual character of the kingdom of God was established. The period of persecutions was not adapted to strengthen love for the earthly home. On the other hand, the adoption of Christianity into the Roman empire by Constantine worked of necessity decidedly against the eschatological tendency. But it was Augustine who first converted the hope for the millennial kingdom of Christ into faith in the church as the present kingdom of God. He thus gave to the church that absolute importance which she had not at all possessed in the preceding period, because her historical development and the estimation of her essential conditions were controlled by the prevailing eschatological tone. Therefore the idea of the church appears in Nietzsche's book in a wrong light; for he does not treat of eschatology till the close, whereas it should stand at the beginning. Eschatology is not in its place at the close, until we begin to view from Augustine's stand-point, namely, that the kingdom of God is the church. Regarded from this point, the future relations of the saved are merely necessary consequences of existence in the church.
It is evident that the self-consciousness of the church had not risen so high in the old Catholic period that the church could contain the objective security of salvation, as it did with Augustine. This is shown especially in the principle laid down that those who were fully excommunicated were not denied all prospect of eternal salvation; but this was left dependent on the judgment of God concerning their penitence.

What must now, in accordance with the foregoing, be our course, as we proceed to seek the proper position of the conception of the church in the complex of the old Catholic Christianity? We may not define her, in this period, as offering an exclusive objective security of salvation. That came later. But she is to be treated, in her history, as the fellowship of Divine worship, of prayer, of offering; and, at the same time, this fellowship is an apprehending subject — apprehending God, Christ, and itself. Thus she apprehends dogmatically, containing in herself, as she does, all the conditions necessary for the operation of theologians in the technical sense of the term. Now although, undoubtedly, the dogmatical efforts of that period were occupied with the apprehension of the person of Christ, in which men sought to comprehend that union of Divinity and humanity which effects the bringing of the human race to the divine life, still, this intellectual work would be performed only on the presupposition of the fellowship above described — the fellowship of divine worship and apprehension of God; that is, the church must be presupposed. Accordingly, the history of doctrine in that period must discuss the doctrine concerning the church before proceeding to Christology.

This doctrine of the church separates into several subdivisions. The office of the church as fellowship of apprehension of God is subordinate to the conception of her as fellowship of divine worship. But the discussion of the church as fellowship of divine worship includes the doctrine of offering; that doctrine reaches in this one of offering its climax. Now, in the Catholic view of the Lord's supper, the idea of offering is made more important than that of sacrament. In the Lord's supper the thank-offering of the assembly of believers itself finds complete expression, or that of the Son of God, whose body is that assembly. Therefore the Lord's supper, as offering of the church, and so as means of self-sanctification for her, presupposes the church. But the sacrament of baptism, on the other hand, must be treated as a presupposition to the conception of the church in order to explain how the Christian body of divine worshippers comes into existence. The decisions made concerning the authority of the sacred writings and tradition must be closely connected with the idea of the church, and are to be treated before Christology, because the church uses and confirms them in her theological labors on Christology. Further, the doctrines of God and the world belong also to the presuppositions which the church must make in her Christological work — in her effort to assert and explain the Divinity of Christ. Nitzsch treats of
these, after discussing the Christology, under the titles Theology and Cosmology, among the various particulars of the church system of doctrine. Now, in the first place, both must be treated before Christology, in connection with the idea of the church. For in the Logos-Christology was sought the union of God and the world, therefore these two ideas must precede. Then, secondly, they may not be discussed separately. For the oldest Christian theology, in its conception of God and the world, rested on what had been handed over from the later Platonism. But Neo-Platonism arrives at its idea of God by saying: The distinctive marks of the world — viz. variety, limitation, fixedness — do not belong to God. That is, Neo-Platonism says, God is not the world. Therefore the conception of God cannot be understood without that of the world. The two are correlates, and for this reason theology and cosmology may not be treated separately.

How shall these and other relations be properly arranged from the point of view which we have obtained, namely, according to the principle that the church felt herself to be the Christian fellowship of divine worship, and of apprehension of God in Christ? The old Catholic church, as perpetrator of apostolic Christianity, had to contest her existence against three powers: in opposition (a) to heathenism, (b) to heretical Gnosticism, and (c) to Judaeo-Christianity. The development of doctrine in that period must be described in its antithetical relation to these three powers, in order to give the impression of liveliness. Now the history of doctrine links itself immediately upon the theology of the New Testament. The question, therefore, arises: how shall that New Testament theology be brought into account in writing the history of doctrine? Nitzsch justly designates faith in Jesus as the Messiah, as the fundamental Christian dogma in the thought of our Lord, and in that of the apostles, or as their starting-point in building Christian doctrine. With the apostles, this faith in him as Messiah took on the form, that the Messiah is at the same time the Logos, the Design of the world as the Bearer of the kingdom of God and the central Cause of the world. Nitzsch neglects, however, to point out in the New Testament theology a connecting point for the conception of the church. Of course, if he is right in saying that the mediæval idea of the church was also that of the old Catholic period, then every good Protestant will expect to find a complete break between this period and the apostolic; and, moreover, it would have been Nitzsch's duty to formulate this break. But such a break is not to be found. As has been shown above, in the old Catholic period, the matter in hand is always the conditions under which the church is formed, as the assembly of true worshippers of God, and works out the theological knowledge therewith connected. Now the apostles' letters are all busied with this very topic. The apostles, who were themselves the first generation of the Christian church, saw that church already formed before them. Christ remained present in their thought
as the exalted head of the community of those who worship God and hope for reception into the future kingdom. The projection of the kingdom of God into the future, expressed in the eschatological tone of the old church, was occasioned by the apostles; for their use of language is in very few cases aimed to show that the exercise of moral duties and the culture of virtue bring the kingdom of God directly into being, even in the very present itself. When we find, now, that the conception of the church was tending already, in the second century, towards an over-estimate of forms of regulation, then we observe that the historian of doctrine has to describe exactly how the episcopate, in the opposition against Gnosticism and Montanism, attained to powers whose validity gradually restricted the religious attributes of the body of believers, and brought in its train that Catholic type of idea of the church, held by us Protestants to be contradictory to the character of Christianity.

The exposition of the conception of the church in the old Catholic period, where she is a body peculiarly worshipping God, and apprehending God and salvation in a peculiar manner, must therefore be linked upon a recapitulation of New Testament theology, by means of an exact distinction made between the position of Christ going before the church and standing over it, and the position of the apostles as representatives of the church which had been founded. The development of the Christology, however, must follow the exposition of the conception of the church.

We have now, therefore, to point out the course of development of the Christological dogma in that period. The importance attached by the ancient church to the doctrine of the person of Christ, was attached to it, not as an isolated doctrine, but as the expression of the value of the whole religion. Nietzsche is therefore right in giving that doctrine prominence as a leading article of dogma; but he should not have separated the subject of the two natures, that of the Holy Spirit, and that of the Trinity from the discussion which relates to the Divinity of Christ. The point of importance to the ancient church, for religious and also for intellectual grounds, was the Divinity of Christ. But the solution of the problem was not complete until the Divinity of Christ, as the substance of this man, was explained by the union of the two natures, and till this Divinity was reconciled with the oneness of God by the idea of the Trinity. Nietzsche has here made a mistake; but, on the other hand, he has justly portrayed the early forms of Christology in their proper connection, and in accordance with the more recent researches. The doctrine of the Divinity of Christ which is based on the idea of the Logos gained the victory over two other modes of representation, which are usually held to be utterly unauthorized and heretical. These are, (1) that which finds the human element to be the essential one in Christ, that is, the Nazarene-Monarchian view; and (2) the view which asserts that the Divinity is the essence of Christ, without making a clear distinction between him and the Father,
i.e. the Monarchian-Patristic view. Certainly Clement of Rome, the real Ignatius, and the Letter to Diognetus had no theological aim when they suffered the human side of the conception of Christ to disappear entirely in the simple and unreserved assertion that he is God. And yet it is acknowledged that here lay the root of the view held by Praxeas, Noetus, and Calliopus, whose absurdity was termed Patrismianism by the later opponents. It is also to be borne in mind that this view was protected even at the time of the strife against it, by the direct or indirect authority of the Roman bishops Victor, Zephyrinus, and Calliopus. It is a token of the victory of the Logos-Christology, that this same Monarchian school accepted the Logos idea so early as the middle of the third century, through Sabellius. The exactly opposite view, viz. that Christ is essentially human, had, undoubtedly, likewise the right of citizenship in the early church, for it corresponds to the genealogies in Matthew and Luke, and is distinctly expressed in the Nazarene Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. The fact of this original right of citizenship is much more plainly seen in the predication of the attribute of birth from the virgin, for this corresponds to the rule of faith which had become established in the second century. So when Artemon and the two Theodoti were excluded from church fellowship because of their profession of this belief, they could point with good right to the fact of the unchallenged existence of the belief within the church from the time of the apostles. Moreover this line of belief must have come to condemnation through the efforts of the representatives of Patristic-Monarchianism, for Victor and Zephyrinus are named as the deciding opponents. Over this school of Christology also the Logos idea gained the victory, inasmuch as Paul of Samosata had to incorporate that idea into his view of the essential humanity of Christ. Both these schools of Christology, just described, lost, in open controversy, their right to existence in the church. But there is still a third line of Christology, of which traces appear in the second century, and whose roots may be followed back into the New Testament. It grew into a form in a measure analogous to the Logos-Christology, and in the growing prevalence of this latter it disappeared without any effort at resistance. Nitzsch characterizes it (p. 190) as the view of the "Shepherd" of Hermas; and its substance is, that on the one hand, the human personality of Christ is indeed to be recognized as his substance, but that on the other hand the pre-mundane Son of God, the Holy Spirit who created the world, and who is the highest archangel, became man. The tendency of this view is undoubtedly the same as that of the Logos-Christology of such a one as Justin; but his process of arriving at it would be different. It arose, undoubtedly, from the view concerning the Man whom God anointed with his Holy Spirit and with power (Acts x. 38), and was most nearly related to the Gnostic substitution of the Aeon Christ for the Holy Spirit, which from Cerinthus onwards was taught with the serious modification
that the connection of the Aeon Christ with the Man Jesus lasted only from the baptism up till the period of the passion. The view of the Essene-
 Ebionites, as reported by Epiphanius, is also to be classed here, viz. that Christ was the incarnation of the highest archangel. Finally, we may not
 pass without notice, in this survey of the early forms of Christology, the
 Ebionite representation of Christ as the primitive man (Urmensch). In
 this view there is also a leaning toward a supernatural acceptation.

All of these views may be reckoned among the early Christological
 forms, for the distinction between the later orthodoxy and heresy may not
 be applied to the Christological efforts of the second century.

In order, now, to see what system is gained from the above discussion
 for the history of development of doctrine in the ancient church, let us
 take a summary view of Ritschl’s and Nitzsch’s plans. Ritschl’s plan
 for the history of Doctrine in the old Catholic church is as follows:

I. Prolegomena.

§ 1. The consciousness of Christ concerning himself as the Son of
 God, and as the Founder of the community of the kingdom of God.

§ 2. The faith of the apostles, the primitive community, in Christ as
 the exalted Head of the community.

§ 3. Judaeeo-Christianity.

§ 4. The heretical Gnosticism.

II. The Church as worshipper of God, and specifically as apprehen-
sing God in Christ.

§ 5. Eschatology.

A. Catholic Christianity in its opposition to heathenism.

§ 6. The proof of the truth of Christianity [With recognition of the
 religious groundwork in heathen humanity].

§ 7. Demonology [Discussed to show the actual falsity in heathen
 religion].

B. Catholic Christianity in its opposition to Gnosticism.

§ 8. The doctrine of tradition (rule of faith) and holy scripture.

§ 9. The doctrine of the unity of God’s nature.

§ 10. The doctrine of the world, particularly of its creation through
 the Logos.

§ 11. The doctrine of man.

C. Catholic Christianity in its opposition to Judaeeo-Christianity.

§ 12. Christianity as the new law.

§ 13. The doctrine of the freedom of the will and of active sin.

§ 14. The doctrine of baptism.

D. The attributes of the church.

§ 15. Unity [Through the apostolic quality of its episcopate].

1 This paragraph does not formally represent opposition to Judaeeo-Christi-
nity, but is rather correlate of every view in which Christianity is a law, and
therefore, also of the Catholic view of Christianity as new law.
§ 16. Holiness [In opposition to the schismatic treatment of cases of discipline].

§ 17. The offering in the Lord's supper.

§ 18. The standard of truth of articles of faith which the church laid down against those heresies which accepted the same rule of faith with her [Development of the rule of faith, which contained at first only what was received from apostolical tradition, being thus limited in its contents. At length the rule became that principle of tradition, not limited in respect to contents, which was obtained by agreement of the bishops in council].

III. Development of the Christological dogmas.

§ 19. The humanity the essential element in Christ [In both gradations of the view, viz. the origin from human parents, and the birth from the Virgin. Down to Paul of Samosata].

§ 20. The divine nature the basis of the human appearance in Christ [Down to Sabellius].

§ 21. The essential element in Christ a principle of revelation differing from God the Father.
   
   (a) The Essene-Ebionite idea of the primitive man.

   (b) The Holy Spirit, or the heavenly Christ, or chief archangel.

§ 22. (c) The Divine Logos as principle of the world the essential element in Christ [Down to Origen, inclusive].

§ 23. The homoousia of the Divine Logos in Christ [In opposition to Arianism, to Marcellus, and Photinus].

§ 24. The ideas of reconciliation, and of the redemption of mankind from the devil by the God-man.

§ 25. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit [In relation to God and to the Logos].

§ 26. The doctrine of the Trinity [Down to the final settlement by Augustine].

§ 27. The doctrine of the humanity of Christ, his homoousia as Logos being presupposed; or, the doctrine of the two natures in the unity of the person.

The arrangement given by Nitzsch, in his Outlines of the History of Christian Doctrine is as follows:

Prolegomena.

1. The fundamental Christian dogma, or the point of departure for the construction of Christian doctrines [Belief in Jesus as the Messiah].

2. The idea of the kingdom of God and that of the Messiah as the common bases of Judaism and Christianity.

3. The specifically Christian acceptation and development of the idea of the Messiah by Christ and the apostles, and the baptismal formula.

I. How the foundations were laid for the old Catholic church doctrine. In this section the principal opposing elements are described.—
Ebionism and Gnosticism, in their various modifications and stages, down to the establishment of the Rule of Faith as the expression of the Catholic dogma.

II. The development of the old Catholic doctrine.

A. The factors in the development.

Under this heading are led before us, first, the Greek church teachers, from the Alexandrian school of catechists down to John of Damascus; then, the Latin church teachers, down to Gregory the Great and Isidore of Seville.

The discussion proper of doctrinal history begins with:

B. The results of the development.

(1.) Establishment of those dogmas which form the general groundwork of the consciousness of the Christian church and of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the faith.

1. The doctrine of the Divinity of Christ. Development thereof, down to the Arian controversy, and the establishment by the church of the homoousia of the Son with the Father.

2. The doctrine concerning the church. Here is set forth the importance of this doctrine for the old Catholic church, in the sense above explained, and its development till towards the end of the fourth century, inclusive of the Donatist controversy.

(II.) Establishment of the formal criteria of orthodox church doctrine.

This section treats of the Rule of Faith as the decisive norm, and of the remaining norms of church doctrine, of the holy scripture, of secret tradition, and prophecies; further, of tradition and inspiration; and finally, of the principles respecting the criteria of orthodoxy, as Vincent of Lirinum fixed them.

(III.) Establishment of those dogmas which represent the more particular elements of the church system of doctrine.

1. Theology (the doctrine concerning God).

a. The being of the Deity absolutely considered. Here are discussed the existence of God, the possibility of knowing him, his essence, and attributes.

b. The being of the Deity as manifest in revelation. (His own nature and his relation to the world.) Doctrine of the Trinity and of the person of the historical Christ.

In this section is given, also, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit previously to that of the Trinity, and then the doctrine of the relation of the human to the divine in the person of Christ down to the Monothelite controversies and John of Damascus.

2. Cosmology (doctrine of the world). The three paragraphs of this section are headed: Creation of the World, Providence and Theodicy, Doctrine of Spirits.

3. Anthropology (doctrine of man). In this section are first discussed
the constituent elements in man; the mode of origin of the individual human soul; the nature of man as the image of God; the fundamental attributes of human nature (freedom and immortality); then human nature and sin; the doctrine of sin held by the Greek and Occidental Fathers; and lastly, the controversy connected with this between Augustine and Pelagius.

4. Soteriology (doctrine of salvation). This section contains the following paragraphs: the objective founding of salvation by Christ (doctrine of redemption and reconciliation); the conditions of subjective appropriation of salvation; the doctrine of freedom and grace, and the Pelagian controversy; semi-Pelagianism; the means of appropriation of salvation; baptism; the Lord's supper.

5. Eschatology (doctrine of future things). The material belonging to this section is divided into the condition of the individual between death and the resurrection; the second coming of Christ and the resurrection; the general judgment.

On comparing the two systems together, we observe, besides the divergences above grounded, that Ritschl's plan includes only the doctrinal-historical material of the old Catholic period; while Nitzsch treats, under the title The Patriotic Age, the time from the end of the apostolic age down to the middle of the eighth century. In accordance with this difference, the Pelagian controversy and semi-Pelagianism, for example, which Nitzsch discusses under anthropology and soteriology, would be placed by Ritschl in the second, i.e. the mediaeval period; beginning with Augustine for the Latin branch, and for the Graeco-Byzantine with Dionysius the Areopagite. The reasons for this, as respects the conception of the church have been already given above. But if Augustine's views of inherited sin and grace can only be understood when we remember that he regarded the church as an objective saving institution, then it must be that the erroneous views of Pelagius, which Augustine opposed, had also a relation to the value of the church; and this relation must be elucidated. By his assertion of unlimited freedom, Pelagius wished to emphasize the value of the fulfilment of the Christian law. Now, Catholic Christianity, from the beginning, moved in equilibrium, as it were, between the pole of active fulfilment of the law and that of dependence on the grace precedent in baptism. So when Pelagius extended the idea of freedom so far that he held all grace to be only a support of freedom,—and that, too, in the form of instruction,—when he denied to infant baptism the character of means of forgiveness of sin, he disturbed that equilibrium which was a fundamental condition of Catholic Christianity. Augustine's aim, in the doctrine of inherited sin which he opposed to Pelagius, was solely to enable baptism, in the case of infants, as well as of others, to be regarded as a means of forgiveness of sin. By this doctrine Augustine denied
freedom in the sinful state, and the natural consequence was that freedom in the state of grace was sacrificed for the absolute power of predestination. The idea of absolute predestination was, however, modified, inasmuch as it was made to relate, not to the individual as such, but to the church as an objective saving institution. This view determined Augustine’s conception of the sacrament and of predestination. The sacrament signifies incorporation into the church as the body of Christ and the kingdom of God. Justification unites together the precedence of grace and the form of freedom as the ground of active fulfilment of the law, or of any kind of merit. Thus he laid the foundation for the soteriology of the middle ages in the Occident which was built upon the idea of the church as the objective saving institution. But we have not thus completely exhausted Augustine’s significatura of grace. When, in pious self-contemplation, he suffers all merit to vanish before the all-absorbing worth of precedent grace, he means by grace in this train of thought the personal will of God towards the subject. This idea runs through all the mediaeval church as counterpoise to the tendency towards the idea of merits, till it breaks through the boundaries of Catholic Christianity in the Reformation. Therefore the central dogma of the second period would be the objective significance of the church as a saving institution, in distinction from the eschatological tendency of the old Catholic period.

This significance of the church as a saving institution comes into application more especially:

(1) In the mediaeval doctrine of the sacraments. Here are to be considered: the propagation of the Augustinian idea of the sacrament; the increase of the number; and especially, lastly, the production of the doctrine of transubstantiation in the Lord’s supper, and the elevation of the pœnitentia into a sacrament. For in these two latter points the representation of God by the organs of the church is realized in respect to omnipotence and omniscience.

(2) We have to show how the doctrine of the supreme authority of the church contains those ideas on the ground of which the Roman primate exalted himself over the episcopate, and undertook to concentrate the representation of God in himself. This development was occasioned by Augustine’s view that the church is the civitas Dei.

(3) Here must be set forth that relation between church and state which gave expression to the idea of the primacy in God’s stead. The determinate form of this relation was a direct descendant of the principles of Augustine. That it had dogmatical value is confirmed by present history; and therefore it must be set forth in the history of doctrine.

The discussion of Augustine’s influence on the Occidental church ought to be preceded by a statement of the system of Dionysius the Areopagite,
who was as much the leader of an epoch for the Byzantine church as Augustine was for the Occidental. The church is to him, as it is for Augustine, the objective saving power vested in the hierarchy and the sacraments. But in his statement of the significance of the church for salvation, the importance of the liturgical element preponderates. And in this liturgical interest the Greek church has been resting ever since Dionysius. The preponderance of attention paid by the Greek church to manner of worship has produced a relation between church and state exactly the reverse of that formulated by Augustine. The church was subordinated to the state, and the Byzantine emperor was clothed with ecclesiastical attributes. But the analogy between Dionysius and Augustine appears again in the fact that the position established by each for the church — namely, that of an objective power for salvation—allows to theology no other form than that of traditionalism. For the church can be a saving power only on the ground that she is the absolute holder of truth and the objective limit of the knowledge of God and salvation. In this traditionalism, again, we find the explanation of scholasticism and mysticism. For we recognize, for example, the mediaeval character of Tauler's mysticism, not only in its regular use of the Lord's supper as the occasion for the mystical exaltation, but also, more generally, in the direct relation subsisting between the effort after a present enjoyment of the contemplation of God, and the idea that the church is the present kingdom of God.