Our obligations to a good book are so great, that it seems an ungrateful office to criticise it. Our first acknowledgments of excellence are lost sight of, when we come to dwell on an error, or point out a deficiency. Yet it seems to be the proper duty of a critic, with brief and candid reference to the strong points of a work, to pass to the consideration of such portions of the topic as he hopes to correct or enlarge in their presentation. While justice is a cardinal quality of criticism, the critique is not written for the author, but for the theme; and should bring to it some farther light. The Nation, by Mr. Mulford, has excited very considerable attention, and received highly commendatory notices. The ground of this appreciation lies in a very central and substantial merit: we wish in the outset to attach the highest importance to it, as we may seem later to overlook it. Mr. Mulford regards the nation as an organic force to be understood and explained in its own nature and growth. He is everywhere at war with a formal and mechanical conception of the state. Every theory is instantly brushed aside that refers its origin, form, or rights to outside, external conditions, things subservient to it; and the eye is directed to the forces of social, national life wrapped up in the nation itself. His presentation, therefore, has great unity and vigor, and rests on the cardinal and ultimate features of the case. His nation is spherical, knit together by one sufficient and central force. This is the aspect it bears, as concentrated, through every layer of right, duty, and sovereignty, in the

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spiritual nature and conjoint growth of those who compose it. Yet, while thus ensphered in itself, it is united in a living way. It is not a single force, but a multitude of spiritual forces, organized in one consistent and complete life, that lie at the heart of the nation, taking its growth in an historic way under that control. The work, then, is one of a thorough and philosophic spirit, and follows its own bent without deviation or compromise. It would be strange if so radical and decided a method did not at once disclose many important truths, and also fail sufficiently to qualify and complement them. This, we think, is the fact. The theory, in substance correct, is too rigid and inflexible; is pushed beyond its true limits; does not accept sufficiently the modifying effects of external causes. While no living product can be understood without a full recognition of the wonderful powers of life, it also seeks explanation in the external circumstances which condition these powers, and sets up with them a complicated system of actions and reactions. A nation is the product of a protracted struggle between an inner organic force and external conditions, which accelerate or thwart it; and thus the state, as an existing fact, requires for its comprehension a recognition not less of formal than of substantial elements. While the life works outward, its conditions work inward, and the interior and the exterior mutually restrain and limit each other. We shall proceed to point out instances of this excessive emphasis of one element, and of its effects.

In the first chapter, he says of the nation, in successive sections, that it is founded in the nature of man; is a relationship; is a continuity; is an organism; is a conscious organism; is a moral organism; is a moral personality. These assertions should rest in the fourth proposition — society is an organism. All beyond this is an unwarrantable strain put upon language with no answering advantage. It is only in a modified, reduced meaning that we can say of the state, that it is organic; but when we speak of it as a conscious person, our language entirely overlaps the facts, and the
deductions from such a principle must be very insecure. There are various degrees of organic force. In the strongest, most typical, and definite use of the word, an organic being is one which, by interior living forces, builds up a body composed of organs mutually dependent and conjointly constituting a single and complete life. In this strict sense, the nation is not an organism. Its members mutually modify each other, are interdependent, and, in fulfilling their individual ends, necessarily unite in the common success of the state. But this organic junction, if we so call it, is affected by forces which spring from, and centre in, the members. There is no power above them all, and pervasive of them all, which necessitates the exact position and office of each, unites them in one integral body, that cannot be diminished without mutilation, or enlarged without disease; and which knows and defines its members only in their ministrations to itself. This central, formative power, which does not spring from the members, nor is lodged in them; which works them up to a definite office, and combines them under a distinct and definite type, has no analogon in the nation. We do not object to calling the state an organic product, nor to making this the initial idea in its study; if, however, we suppose this language to carry with it such force, that the nation, like the human body, can be regarded as an independent, complete, necessary and self-sufficient organism, ruled by one constructive power, expressed under the word life, we push the language beyond the facts, and lay ourselves open to the entrance of many subtle errors.

The state is organized by the coalescence and mutual modification of its members. It has no fixed, invariable type, no given dimensions, no exact product; but will reach variable, and more or less defective, results with each new set of conditions, and will combine a thousand, ten thousand, ten thousand thousand, as may fit the exigency. Of this lower organic force there are abundant manifestations. Physical things, as rocks, when grouped, modify each other. Temperature, pressure, exposure, are affected by their mutual
relations. A forest combines and modifies the trees and plants which compose it. Flocks in a pasture instantly alter the conditions of life for each other. Scholars in a school establish a feeble organism by their mutual influence. The inhabitants of a city coalesce in tastes, arrange in reference to each other their pursuits, and establish municipal regulations, the necessary result of their relationship. The nation with more varied and urgent interdependencies compacts itself in character and spirit, frames itself together in political and civil institutions which arise in a voluntary involuntary way under the powers and conditions from time to time dominant. Civilized nations, as higher units, are organized among themselves in a like way by the necessary action of inevitable relationships. In each of these cases, there is organic force, but very different in degree, while in all of them it falls below that which we find in the living body. When this interaction is so feeble as to produce very slight and inconspicuous results, we are slow to term it organic. No one would call a pile of stones an organic product, because they modify each other, and undergo changes due to their relative position. If we were to be rigid in the use of the word "organic," we should be compelled to confine it to cases in which interior, supervisory, common power wrought under and for itself a definite product. In this sense the state is not organic. It is divisible, indefinite, variable forces that unite under external conditions to constitute it.

Much more evident is it that the nation is not a conscious, moral personality. It has no consciousness but that of the persons who compose it; no morality but their morality; no personality but their personality. We may as well call an Arctic expedition a conscious moral person, as thus to speak of a nation; since its actions, like those of a nation, are of a conjoint, organic character. To use language in this fashion is to force down words, not to carry up ideas. The word will finally sink and imbed itself in the thoughts according to the gravity of the idea we have laid upon it. Call the nation a person, and we shall shortly require a new word for the true persons who compose it.
This tendency to extreme statements runs all through the work; its excellences and faults are both found in connection with it. Because of this constant unscrupulous thoroughness of the method, this railroad engineering of ideas, we shall be compelled to confine our attention to scattered illustrations, leaving the general remark that there are everywhere kindred instances. A second example of this extreme tendency of thought is found in the author's view of the origin of the nation, treated of in the fourth chapter. This view springs from the initial idea already presented, and partakes of its ultra character. "The nation has a divine foundation, and has for its end the fulfilment of the divine end in history. . . . . There is no human ground on which it can rest. They who are intrusted with it, hold it as the representatives of the nation, and as the ministers of the divine purpose in the nation. The President and the Congress, as the Crown and the Parliament, rule by the grace of God. The elements which are manifest in the government of the nation, in its moral being, can have only a divine ground. The power, which is in the people, forming the nation, is over the people, and while the individual acts in the government of the nation, it is over the individual, and he is subject to it; and this is a power which is and can be in the nation only as it is a moral person, and is derivative from God." This statement seems to be needlessly objectionable in form. If it does not involve the divine right of kings, it does that of rulers. As a final reference, the devout mind will indeed look to the constructive and permissive will of God; but a statement of the origin of the authority of government more explicit, instructive, and generally acceptable is that which refers it to the constitution of man, and the conditions under which that nature finds development. There is involved in this reference no theological opinion: hence men of the most diverse religious views can meet upon it. Moreover, a point of much greater importance, it directs attention to that by which, and by which only, God expresses his will as regards any specific nation. To say of any state that its excellence
and authority are the gift of God tells us very little. It does not distinguish between those governments that rule by force, and those resting in the choice of the people; between those in the last stages of decay, and those in the freshness of youth. On the other hand, to affirm that the authority of the nation springs by the necessary energy of natural and moral forces, from the circumstances which constitute it, turns the eye at once to a scrutiny of these conditions, and to a determination of the harmony of the nation with them. That government, that state, and that only, be it an empire, a monarchy, or a republic, has a right to be, which stands in the best attainable harmony with the conditions under which it exists; with the interests of its subjects, and the possibilities then and there open to them. To talk about the will of God with no knowledge of those conditions which alone contain and express it, is a sort of dogmatism that can give no guidance whatever. Nor can we anywhere refer to some ultimate ideal government or nation as a standard. We must divine the times, and in that divination our success lies. A given government is a growth from a given soil, and finds its authority, its justification, in the exigencies of the case; in its relative power to do a good work. The ability to do good is always a sufficient reason for doing good, since it is grounded in the inmost nature of things.

Again, in the sixth chapter, speaking of the right of property, the author says: "The right to property and the possession is therefore in personality, and the existence of property is of the gift of God. ... The ground of the right in the existence of property, and of the right to property, is in the vocation from God in the world, of the individual and of the nation." These and kindred assertions settle nothing. How property should be held is not defined by them; whether real estate shall be open to indefinite acquisition; whether one individual shall hold absolutely against all other individuals; whether the ownership of land shall be exclusively vested in the nation and individuals enjoy it in common, or in rental from it. These and like questions must be settled, and that
not absolutely, but for each time and nation, by an inquiry into individual and common interests; and that settlement is the best which gives the surest, fullest conditions of growth. That which settles the forms under which property is to be held, settles also the right of holding it, and this guiding principle is the highest attainable good. The individual, that is the representative, typical individual, will, under the best, and therefore the most just, ownership of property, have given to him the largest opportunities of development; and this fact is its own sufficient justification, and the sufficient justification of all that is involved in it. Nor can we excuse ourselves from the labor of searching out, in an experimental, tentative way, what that form of ownership is, and then establishing it. Ownership in any given nation is right or wrong as it meets or falls short of the possibilities then and there open to the individual. The excessive and exclusive landed possessions of a few in Scotland and England are wrong, and increasingly wrong, because they more and more obviously interfere with the well-being of the many. To speak of the will of God in this connection conveys no clear idea, till we are farther told, that the expression and guarantee of that will are found in the prosperity of the masses. We are thus thrown back on the inquiry already indicated.

We refer to a single other example of extreme statement. Mulford denies freedom to any action which does not lie in the line of its right use. It is not in a momentary choice, in an alternative between right and wrong, it is the realization in man, through his own self-determination, of his true being. We see no gain but much loss in thus giving words a new meaning in the face of common use. The ethical discussion would require to be remodelled to be suited to this nomenclature. Nor is freedom, in this sense, any more consonant with politics than with ethics. The new meaning casts no new light upon the subject, but merely embarrasses and trips language. A nation is free in common speech whose people, in questions of government, have the alternative of right and wrong before them.
This tendency to a radical, unqualified idea, which pervades every portion of the work, and which we cannot sufficiently set forth by these few examples, results in various practical difficulties. It gives an unduly theoretical and abstract cast to the views presented. We have no objection to theories. Good theories are the skeletons of facts, and most instructive in their government. A theory is theoretical only as it is partial, incomplete. It thus becomes in a measure opposed to the facts. We employ the two adjectives, practical and theoretical, to express this varying power of interpretation, this degree of application of any view to the phenomena it would expound and govern. The theory of the nation by Mr. Mulford is in this sense theoretical. It runs too high above the facts, or moles too low beneath them. It does not thread them, penetrating the eye of each exactly, as it is able. It brings forward its one supreme principle; if this does the work, as it often does, very well; if not, the work remains undone. The author seems to feel that the sun has risen, and that there is small use in lighting the dim candle of experience to search out here and there a corner. The notion of the moral being of the nation does the work, and a new reiteration of this fact is better, therefore, than to run over again musty precepts and experiments in government to see what modicum of truth may possibly linger in them.

The theoretical force which a single idea assumes in the mind of the author is seen in his treatment of political freedom. This freedom is secured in the establishment of rights, and these rights are founded in human nature. "They are inherent; they are written in the law and the constitution of the being of man." With this solution of the problem in mind the author brushes briskly aside the empirical or practical guides to what political freedom may actually embrace. "Mr. Emerson says, it, political freedom, is the largest liberty compatible with the liberty of every other man. But freedom is not described in this external limitation, nor is the freedom of one the restriction of the freedom of another. . . . The largest freedom in each is consistent with the same in
all. This conception empties freedom of all moral content, and it would be constructive only of a formal, not a real freedom. It could not be the postulate of the freedom of the people in its organic and moral being and relations in history” (p. 123). We are not satisfied with this method. Rights are doubtless inherent in men under a given constitution of society, but this fact, the fact of “organic and moral being,” as Mr. Mulford delights to call it, is no sufficient explanation of what these rights are under specified circumstances. The precept of Mr. Emerson may cast light on this point, and help to determine what may be allowed in one citizen, since we decide this question more readily when we ask, what can be allowed in all citizens. An equality of rights kept in view helps to explain the rights of each. Nor is it true that the largest freedom of each is consistent with the same in all, unless we have attached to the word freedom a restricted meaning; and so limited, the assertion ceases to be an answer to Mr. Emerson. If freedom means, as the author would have it, the doing of that, and that only, which is in harmony with the rights of the party, his freedom of course does not interrupt a like freedom in his neighbor, because the narrow definition has excluded the conflict. Our lexicography, however, gives no light, and we must still inquire what is allowed by freedom? — what does as a right inhere in the moral constitution of society? And in answering this question the principle stated by Emerson is of service. We see by it that liberty must not consume itself, and that the individual must be put on a footing with his fellows before we can define his privileges.

This constant limitation of theory by rules of a purely empirical character is seen in the matter of suffrage. The age of twenty-one is defined by no inherent necessity or unswerving fitness. One at eighteen is wiser than another at twenty-eight. The age designated gives us a rule of empirical form and practical convenience. So is it with the period of naturalization. Some foreigners are ready as soon as they land in this country to partake of the right of suffrage; some
are never ready; they remain forever foreign to the spirit and purposes of our institutions.

With a like peremptory, theoretical force does Mr. Mulford set aside every limitation of the right of suffrage. He says: "The representative government is therefore constituted in the representation of the people, in the realization of its moral being. It is the representation of persons. The right to vote is the right of every person who is a member of the nation. It is the birth-right of freedom. It is the right only of a person, that is, one in whom there is the realization of personality, one whose action is self-determined, one who has the consciousness of law and of freedom in the self-determination of his own spirit, and in that alone is the power which can shape the course and destination of the state" (p. 225).

Mr. Mulford seems in this language at once to grant and to deny universal suffrage. We leave the reader to judge whether a practically sufficient test could be found in the phrase, "one who has the consciousness of law and of freedom in the self-determination of his own spirit." It would certainly yield more amusement in the use than either a property or educational test. How many of our citizens would be able to stand by their consciousness of law and freedom in self-determination, it would be interesting to determine. The truth is, universal suffrage of all normal adults, male and female, is the ultimate goal of liberty; but who shall vote in any one nation, or whether any shall vote in it, must be decided by its development. A property test may be a convenient, serviceable safeguard; and if that be a fact, the fact justifies the law. We, too, believe in the force of nature,—the organic nature of the state, but in it as expounded by the particular conditions before us.

We give one more instance of this light-footed theoretical tendency. In speaking of the powers of the nation, legislative, executive, and judicial, he says of them that they are organic, co-ordinate, co-extensive, correlative. To this, with the exception of the word co-extensive, we make no objection. But hurried on, as usual, by the force of his idea, he speaks
too lightly of the aid furnished in fixing the scope of the three classes of powers by the idea of a balance between them, a system of compensations and restraints. Such a system certainly does not express the true theory of their origin, nor of their central relation to each other; this is one of mutual aid, but it does as certainly greatly guide us in the details of their construction. By constitutional force and interdependence they do as certainly check as aid each other; and aid by limitation as well as by completion. We may, therefore, in their right formation, bear in mind the one fact as well as the other. Restriction may be more external, more incidental, than mutual support; but for that reason it may be easily seen, and furnish a rule more readily applied. Exclusively used it may give a formal and mechanical conception of the state; but applied wisely it will lend practical direction of great value. This the author so far sees as not to wholly reject it, though theoretically disparaging it.

A second consequence of the singleness and severity of the idea on which Mr. Mulford relies is a tendency to dogmatic assertions. We understand by dogmatism the reiteration of one doctrine or dogma without sufficient proof, or the needed qualifications. Of this we give an example taken from the chapter on the nation in its relation to other nations. "The science of international law has its foundation in the being of the nation as a moral person .... As the nation is constituted as a moral person, it cannot abdicate its responsibility, which is given in its being, and can, in its ultimate determination, be responsible to none on earth, but only and immediately to God." Here is your dogma certainly, the nation as a moral person; and the too limited and authoritative conclusion, the nation is responsible to God only. War, except as a brute struggle, means the responsibility of one nation to another for at least a portion of its action. There is a responsibility between and to nations, exactly as between individuals, and for the same reason, to wit, the need of it. Hence international law, and we look for the time when this law shall find a judicatory and judicial enforcement.
Again, in the chapter on the nation and the individual, he thus justifies the sacrifice of the individual to the nation: "The unity which subsists with the sacrifice of the individual for the nation, as it is formed in the manifestation of the law of the highest moral unity in the life of humanity, can proceed only in the conception of the being of the nation as a moral person. It cannot consist with mere individualism, in its principle or result; and it is abhorrent that the sacrifice of those who had the higher moral spirit — the worthier going forth in their prime with joy and trust — should be counted only to serve the private and special ends of the individual, and to secure or promote their pleasure or possession; and when the names and sacrifice of these are kept in the memory of the people, it is abhorrent that any should regard the nation as existent only to subserve their private and special interests and ends. But this is the necessary assumption of individualism." Here, as ever, we have the talisman of a moral person, and the unestablished assertion that this alone can justify the sacrifice of individuals to the common good. Strike out the words "private and special," in the above extract, — for the author has no right to them, — and remember that by the individual is meant the typical individual — the individual that often enough repeated makes the nation, — and the exact opposite of what is then asserted seems to us obviously true. One, two, ten men may sacrifice themselves for one thousand, ten thousand, an hundred thousand, and find their excellence in so doing. Nay, entering on this liability of sacrificing themselves for the nation, they sacrifice themselves for themselves; since they, too, live in and by it.

We offer one more among the many illustrations the work affords: "The nation can meet the forces with which it has to contend only as it realizes its own moral being, and recognizes its origin and end in God" (p. 381). If the author had confined the assertion to the first clause, and intended by a realization of its own moral being a hazy, half-unconscious experience and relish of its own power and proper
good, we would have accepted it. As it now stands, in its unrestricted, emphatic form, we regard it as dogmatism.

Occasionally this positive temper forces the author into a position in which he overleaps his own conclusions. Thus he says: "The nation in its necessary being can have its origin only in the divine will, and its realization only in that." If this language is to be pushed at all into any real significance and force, it supersedes the freedom and growth of the nation, on which Mulford has everywhere insisted. Moral growth and freedom find their characteristic in the fact that they spring from the spontaneity of the individual, and are pushed out by no forces back of themselves. The only sense, therefore, in which a free nation, a nation developed under its own impulses, can have its origin and realization in the will of God, is that of permission; and the statement sinks back into a truism for the devout mind.

An idea held in so exclusive and unqualified a way leads in time to barrenness. One feels this as the work progresses. We have seen, again and again, the scope of the work open to it, and we come, as we read on, to be increasingly impressed with the necessity of more enlargement—of the introduction of new conditions and considerations to meet the complexity of the facts before us, and the perplexity of conflicting theories. The single, vigorous, germinal conception acts alone, like light in a vacuum. It gives a solid beam of radiance, piercing the darkness, yet calls for an atmosphere to scatter, reflect, and mellow it, that it may bring a genial and sufficient illumination to every object. The author abides in his solid beam, and shoots it, like a bolt, at every adversary. The effect is often very happy. Mole-eyes are closed in an instant; merely mechanical theories disappear, like a spider's web whose dew-drops the sun has drunk up; social contracts and formal concessions are seen to be either altogether hypothetical, or with no force in themselves. This admirable work of the author's in dazing empiricism, and exploding its feeble theories, we have not dwelt on. For this impression the book must be read. We
insist only that the conceptions of the author are not so constructi

ve and varied as they should be, because he does not sufficiently recognize the conditions under which, the forces with which, his own forces are to build the national structure.

The style of the author seems to us a product of this tendency of his mind, and to aid it. We should term it a stilted and technical one. Its technicalities do not belong to any art or science, but to the writer's thought. Words have passed with him a little from their ordinary use and relations; and thus his own mind glides along them with less opposition and obstruction than would arise to the theory, if expressed in a perfectly simple, familiar, intelligible form. A peculiarity of style, a restricted and semi-technical use of words, assist a thought that tends to restriction and extravagance. A slight haze surrounds the idea; the newness of the expression lends to it a deceitful freshness; it seems fairly set going on its own railroad line of logic, and we do not bring it into close contact and comparison with the familiar thoughts and common sense of men. The author, moreover, when he has achieved this seemingly vigorous utterance of an idea, finds it reacting on his own mind with new force, and exercising an unrelenting rule over it from its throne of language. After we have made an idol, we are quite sure to bow down to it with increased devotion. Mulford's style has in it just enough of idiosyncrasy, strangeness, and fictitious taint of philosophy to wilder the mind, and sometimes to unduly please it with the supposed results. We give one or two brief illustrations:

"For rights in the nation are the asserting and the positing of personality, in the external sphere, through its self-determination, which is its freedom. They are the process in which personality affirms itself, and attains recognition in the nation" (p. 73). "Political rights are those rights which are instituted in the moral process of the people as an ethical organism. . . . . Political rights include the right of every person who is a member of the nation to the actual determination of a person in its destination" (p. 100). "The
will, defined in an abstract and formal conception, and divested of personality and its subsistence in it, allows no freedom, and when thus divested of its content it is without freedom also” (p. 109).

This method of expression would seem to have grown up from an intensely private thought—a mental growth which had suffered little contradiction or modification from other persons. It is but just to add that there are some very bright points in Mr. Mulford’s work as a mere matter of composition, some very happy references.

We have spoken of the theoretical, dogmatic cast the work receives from the intensity and singleness of the author’s mind. This fact has also imparted to the conception of the nation an ideal cast. It is not so much any nation that has been, or that is likely to be, that is spoken of, as a vision of a perfect nation that hovers before the mind, defines the principles of its own being, and lures on the imagination through glowing description. This is seen both in the captions and the contents of chapters. Some of the former we adjoin: The Nation the Institution of Rights; The Nation the Realization of Freedom; The Nation the Antagonist of the Empire; The Nation the Goal of History. In each case we are ready to add the adjective “perfect.” The perfect nation, and that only, is the realization of freedom, the antagonist of the empire, and the goal of history. It is of such a nation that the author is speaking, when he says, in anarchy and oppression and violence and crime there is the negation of its being: “As the nation is called to be a power in history, it is in the realization of its being the Christian nation. It is this in its necessary conception. It has not in its option the alternative to determine whether it shall be, but yet shall or shall not be this, but its necessary realization is the Christian nation.” He then proceeds to force the facts under this narrow statement, in this fashion: “The nations of the ancient ages, Judea and Greece and Rome, in their historical calling, held in their ongoing toward the coming of Christ, the fulfilment of the divine purpose” (p. 368). There
is a great deal of explanation that consists only in the expansion of the meaning of words. This is of that sort. In the first place, every nation must be Christian. Yet Greece and Rome were nations, hence they must be Christian nations; yes, we have it—they were Christian by virtue of an ongoing toward the coming of Christ. To such nonsense does a tension of words—an India-rubber stretching of language—lead us.

The true idea, though overworked and not sufficiently sustained by complementary forces, is found in The Nation. We take it to be this in substance: Men by constitution grow in families; families by economic, social, intellectual, moral constitution, grow in nations. Nations find their justification, the basis of internal rights and external authority in this nature, this necessity of things; in the organic force which creates them. A particular nation must look for its justification in the manner in which it is meeting its own actualities and possibilities. Monarchical or republican, its foundations are the same, the present condition of the people, and the stages of growth open to them. Every nation is therefore left, and must be left, in the light and the darkness of contemporary facts to feel its way through them, with much halting, many a slip and fall, toward each higher state; its diligence defined every instant by its whereabouts, the obstacles it has overcome. The nation has no moral being or ultimate goal, aside from the individual and his prosperity. The individual represents, covers every sensitive, moral point in the nation. There are no other centres from which rational, moral acts can go forth; none to which good can return. The responsibility of a nation is a responsibility which must be visited on its rulers, on its people, or visited nowhere; its rewards are enjoyments that must return to its members in their individual susceptibilities, or find no contact with the earth. The nation, as itself a separate, generic, moral person, is a pure fiction, a personification, a return of realism, a hunting up again of that generic being that lies back of general terms, that
horse that is neither this nor that horse, but every and no
horse; that sweetness which is neither of honey nor sugar,
but is of them both. One may give force to a thought by
thus clothing it with a definite personal word; but it is a
device of rhetoric, not of logic. Men in every common
relation, on ship-board, in a hunter's camp, in a commercial
corporation, do and must organize themselves by the very
force of different adaptations, varying duties, and common
interests. By a like necessity, families must become the
nation; but in neither case is some second thing created,
something which, as a partially independent entity, reacts
for ends of its own on those who called it up. This idea of
the nation as a constitutional necessity, a primordial force,
a common-stock life to those who compose it, the result at
once of a union and division of labor, like the coral rock to
the polyps who fashioned it, needs to be traced under all the
varying conditions which the purposes it has to subserve,
and the circumstances under which it struggles forward,
impose upon it. Mr. Mulford has seized the main force, not so
well the limitations which other forces bring to it. His atti-
tude of mind is one that refers everything to inborn power,
to genius, and little or nothing to the sunlight and soil
under which and on which genius grows.

We have in The Nation the work of a devout, enthusiastic
mind, full of insight, headlong in conclusion, capable of
overthrowing much, and also making ready to build much.
From minds endowed with these vigorous, intuitive faculties
good things are sure to come; sometimes great things are
thus given us.

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