ARTICLE XI.

DR. HODGE AND THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.

BY REV. ENOCH POND, D.D., PROFESSOR IN BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

It has long been understood that the Princeton theology differs somewhat from the standard orthodox theology of New England. These points of difference appear in the volumes which Dr. Hodge has recently published, and will be carefully noted by New England readers. On some few points, we are sorry to say, the author has misapprehended the views generally prevalent in New England, and (of course without intending it) has misrepresented them. He will be glad to be set right on these points, and a principal object of this Article— which is not intended as a review—will be to expose some of these misrepresentations.

Dr. Hodge speaks of President Edwards, Dr. Hopkins, and Dr. Emmons, as leaders in those explanations which he deems erroneous. But he goes on to say that "for many years their systems of theology had great influence in this country." Now, it is true that their systems have a great influence, more especially in New England. Their theology, modified more or less to meet the views of individuals—is what is currently known as the New England theology. In speaking of misrepresentations, therefore, I shall not confine myself to the three great leaders whose names have been given; but shall include with them those, in general, over whom, as Dr. Hodge says, their writings have had "great influence"—those who would be willing to be regarded as Edwardeans. I premise this remark, and hope it may be remembered.

1. Dr. Hodge imputes to his New England brethren his own definition of the word "benevolence," which definition to us appears imperfect and unsatisfactory. "By benevolence," he says, "is meant the disposition to promote happiness." To this definition he constantly adheres, and assumes that we do the same. And his mistake, in this respect, is the source of much misapprehension as to the views prevalent in New England. We do not limit our idea of benevolence to the simple desire to promote happiness, nor do we see any good reason why he should. According to its etymology, the word signifies a wishing well (bene volo) to its object; a desire for its good—its highest good. This is the sense given to the word by lexicographers. In this sense the word is constantly used by the most respectable New England theologians. If the object of benevolence is a

1 Systematic Theology, Vols. i. and ii. 2 Vol. i. p. 433. 3 Vol. i. p. 427.
merely sentient being, it may not look beyond its happiness; because happiness is the only good of which such a being is capable. But if the object is an intelligent being, a moral being, benevolence seeks above all its moral good, its highest good, and not merely its happiness. This, we insist, is the full meaning of the noble word, "benevolence"; and we regret that Dr. Hodge should use it in a lower sense, and especially that he should impute that sense to us, and then charge upon us conclusions, drawn from his restricted sense of the term, which are as abhorrent to our principles as they can be to his own.

2. One of these conclusions is, that we "regard happiness as the greatest good, and hence that the desire to promote happiness is the sum of all virtue." On this ground, he says, "we confound the right with the expedient, and make expediency the ground of moral obligation." "The principle on which this theory is founded," Dr. Hodge goes on to say, "was propounded in a posthumous treatise of President Edwards, in which he taught that virtue consists in the love of being. This principle was adopted and carried out by Drs. Hopkins and Emmons in their systems of theology, which for many years had great influence in this country." 1

How far President Edwards was from holding the sentiments here imputed to him will appear in the following extract from his treatise on the "Nature of Virtue"; the very treatise to which Dr. Hodge refers: "A truly virtuous mind, being under the sovereign dominion of love to God, does above all things seek the glory of God, and makes this his supreme, governing, and ultimate end; consisting in the expression of God's perfections in their proper effects, and in the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and the communication of the infinite fulness of God to the creature; in the creature's highest esteem of God, love to him, and joy in him, and in the proper exercise of expression of these. And so far as a virtuous mind exercises true virtue in benevolence to created beings, it chiefly seeks the good of the creature, consisting," not in its highest happiness, but "in its knowledge or view of God's glory or beauty, its union with God, and conformity to him, love to him, and joy in him. And that temper or disposition of heart—that consent, union, or propensity of mind to being in general, which appears chiefly in such exercises, is virtue truly so called, or in other words, is true grace and real holiness. And no other disposition or affection but this is of the nature of true virtue."

In another Treatise, Edwards not only says, but argues at great length, that "the great and last end of God's works is but one, and this one end is most properly and comprehensively called the glory of God." 2

As before remarked, Dr. Hodge was led into the misapprehension above stated as to the sentiments of Edwards and his followers concerning the last end of God, and the chief end of man, by imputing to them a false

and restricted sense of the word benevolence. We do hold that benevolence, in the full sense of the term,—universal, impartial, disinterested benevolence,—enters into and constitutes the root and basis of all holiness. This is the love which is said to comprise the entire character of the Supreme Being: "God is love." This is the love which the Scriptures represent as "the bond of perfectness," "the fulfilling of the law," and on which "hang all the law and the prophets." The divine law, in the most summary expression of it, requires nothing but love. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The love here spoken of as constituting the essence of all holy obedience must be a spiritual and not a natural affection; and what form of love is it? The love of our neighbor cannot always be the love of gratitude; for this is exercised only towards a benefactor. Neither can it be always the love of complacece; for this is exercised only towards holy beings. We cannot, should not, love complacecntly a totally sinful being. The love about which we inquire can be no other than love of benevolence—universal, impartial, disinterested—fixing upon God supremely, complacentlv, as infinitely the greatest and best of beings, and running out impartially towards all other beings, according to perceived worthiness. This is the love with which "God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life." This is the dywarp, the love spoken of by Paul in 1 Cor. xiii., without which all religious pretensions and performances would be vain. "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not love, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing. And though I give all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing."

Believing, as we do, that benevolence enters into and constitutes the essence of all holiness, if we accepted Dr. Hodge's definition of benevolence, we should say,—what he insists we do say—that happiness is the greatest good, and the desire of happiness the sum of all virtue. But rejecting his definition, and adopting one as much above it as the heavens are higher than the earth, we avoid his conclusions about expediency and utility—conclusions which we detect as sincerely as himself, and which we have labored all our lives to refute.

3. Dr. Hodge further misrepresents the New England theologians, in charging upon them the belief that "sin, and the present amount of sin, is the necessary means of the greatest good; and that good, in this connection, does not mean moral good, but happiness." This misapprehen-

1 Vol. i. p. 438; Vol. ii. 147.
sion, like the last, results from his imputing to us his restricted definition of benevolence. He reasons for us in this wise: "As God is infinitely benevolent, so he governs the world to promote the greatest possible amount of happiness. But a vast amount of sin actually exists and is tolerated under his government. This, therefore, must, in some way, tend to happiness, and is to be regarded as the necessary means of the greatest good."

Now we will not say that no New England theologian ever made use of the expression here imputed to us. But we do say that, to the best of our knowledge, neither President Edwards, nor Dr. Hopkins, nor Dr. Emmons, ever used it. It is not a current phraseology with us. It is not an admissible phraseology. Sin is not a necessary means of the greatest happiness, or of the greatest good in any sense. It is not a means of good at all. The word "means," is relative. It stands related to some end, and must have a tendency to promote that end; else it is not, in any proper sense of the term, a means. But sin has no tendency to promote the highest good of the universe, or its highest happiness. All its tendencies are in the opposite direction. How then can it be a means of the highest good, or of any good?

New England divines, in general, do say that, in the wonder-working providence and grace of God, he may cause sin to become the occasion, in opposition to all its tendencies, of greater glory to himself, and of a greater good to the universe, than would otherwise be possible. And Dr. Hodge says the same. "The Scriptures teach," says he, 1. That the glory of God is the end to which the promotion of holiness, and the production of happiness, and all other ends are subordinate. 2. That, therefore, the self-manifestation of God, the revelation of his infinite perfection, being the highest conceivable or possible good, is the ultimate end of all his works in creation, providence, and redemption. 3. As sentient creatures are necessary for the manifestation of God's benevolence, so there could be no manifestation of his mercy without misery, or of his grace and justice, if there were no sin. As the heavens declare the glory of God, so he has devised the plan of redemption, "to the intent that now, unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known, by the church, the manifold wisdom of God" (Eph. iii. 10). The knowledge of God is eternal life. It is for creatures the highest good. And the promotion of that knowledge, the manifestation of the manifold perfections of the infinite God, is the highest end of all his works. This is declared by the apostle to be the end contemplated, both in the punishment of sinners, and, in the salvation of believers. It is an end to which no man can rationally object. "What if God, willing to show his wrath (or justice), and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory" (Rom. ix.
22, 28). Sin, therefore, according to the Scriptures, is permitted, that the justice of God may be known in its punishment, and his grace in its forgiveness. And the universe, without the knowledge of these attributes, would be like the earth without the light of the sun."

Now this is sound, scriptural doctrine. This is just as we hold and teach in New England in reference to the mysterious fact of sin's permitted existence. Redemption we hold to be the noblest and best of all God's works, because it makes the fullest and brightest display of his perfections and glories. His justice shines forth in redemption as it does nowhere else; and without redemption, there could have been no display of those winning, amiable, glorious traits of God's character,—his forbearance, long-suffering, mercy, and grace. But it is obvious that there could have been no redemption, had there been no sinners to be redeemed. Hence we see a reason for the permitted existence of sin, and for its connection with the highest glory of God, without supposing it to be a necessary means of the greatest good, or of any good. Creatures in heaven, it is likely, know now a hundred times more of God, and love and enjoy him a hundred times better, than they could have done had there been no redemption, and no sinners to be redeemed.

4. Dr. Hodge represents the New England theologians as denying, in any proper sense of the term, the justice of God,—resolving it all into considerations of expediency. "It is on this false principle," he says, "that the governmental theory of the atonement is founded. It admits of no ground of punishment but the benefit of others. If that benefit can be secured, all necessity of punishment ceases, and all objection to the dispensing of pardon is removed. If the fundamental principle of a theory be false, the theory itself must be unsound." Now it may relieve Dr. Hodge to know that we do believe in such a thing as justice,—justice commutative, distributive, and general; justice in the abstract, and justice as an attribute of personal character. We believe the justice of God to be one of his most essential and glorious attributes. "Justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne."

"But you hold," it is said, "that the justice of God is grounded in benevolence, and benevolence is the desire to promote happiness." To this we answer, that justice, in the abstract, is not grounded in benevolence more than truth or right in the abstract is. It is a fixed quantity—the exact measure of desert, whether of good or evil. Justice, as an attribute of personal character, which is no other than a disposition to be just, is a form of benevolence; but not in the low, restricted sense of Dr. Hodge. The justice of God, considered as one of his moral attributes, is that which determines him to seek his own highest glory and the greatest possible good, by laying judgment to the line, and righteousness to the plummet, and meting out to his intelligent creatures reward or punishment, ac-

1 Vol. i. p. 485.  
Dr. Hodge and the New England Theology. [April,

cording to their deserts. And this is benevolence in the largest and best
signification of the term.

5. Dr. Hodge represents his New England brethren as "ignoring, or
explaining away," all those scriptures which speak of "Christ as a priest,
as a sacrifice, as a propitiation, as an expiation, as the substitute and rep-
resentative of sinners; as assuming their place, and sustaining the curse
and penalty of the law in their stead."1 Now, strange as it may seem,
we are not conscious of "ignoring or explaining away" one of these
scriptural representations. Certainly, we do not ignore them; for they
are almost constantly on our lips,—constituting the staple of our sermons,
our theological discussions, and our prayers. Nor do we desire or attempt
to explain them away. We may not explain them in precisely the same
manner as Dr. Hodge; but we use the terms, without shrinking or flinch-
ing, in their full and proper sense, as employed by the sacred writers.
They are the pabulum on which we feed, and by which we live. They
set forth our only foundation of hope. We accept of Christ as the great
High Priest of our profession, who has offered himself as a sacrifice, a pro-
pitiation, an expiation, for our sins. We accept of him, as having assumed
our place, and borne the curse of the law in our stead. In the sense of
Dr. Hodge,—though we do not accept his definition,—we believe that
he endured the penalty of the law for us. What is the penalty of the law,
as Dr. Hodge describes it? "By the words penal and penalty, we express
nothing concerning the nature of the sufferings endured, but only the
design of their infliction. Suffering, without any reference to the reason
of its occurrence, is a calamity; if suffered for the benefit of the sufferer,
it is a chastisement; if for the satisfaction of justice, it is punishment.
When, therefore, we say that Christ's sufferings were penal, or that he
suffered the penalty of the law, we say nothing as to the nature or the
degree of the pains he endured. We only say......that they were de-
signed for the satisfaction of justice. He died, in order that God might
be just in justifying the ungodly."2 Now we trustfully and joyfully accept
all this. We believe that Christ suffered and died for the satisfaction of
justice. He died that God might be just in justifying the ungodly. Still,
we prefer to regard his sufferings as a substitute, a full equivalent for the
penalty of the law, rather than as the penalty itself. The penalty of the
law is not anything, everything, that may be endured because of sin, but
is a definite sentence or denunciation—'The soul that sinneth, it shall
die.' The wages of sin is death,' eternal death, a death standing in im-
mediate contrast with eternal life. It is the punishment inflicted on the
rebel angels when they sinned in heaven, and will be inflicted on the
finally lost in the great judgment-day. It is that from which Christ de-
livers his own people. "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the
law, being made a curse for us" (Gal. iii. 13). Christ does not redeem

his people from all suffering because of sin, in this life, nor from temporal dissolution, but from spiritual and eternal death, which is the proper curse and penalty of the law.

The proper penalty of the law, too, as it seems to us, can be suffered only by the transgressor. It fastens upon him, and him only. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." A substitute may suffer a full equivalent for the penalty — one that shall satisfy the claims of justice as well; but not the penalty itself. Such are some of the reasons which lead us to regard the sufferings of Christ as a full equivalent for the penalty of the law, but not the proper literal penalty. Still, according to Dr. Hodge's description of the penalty, we have no objection to the thing intended. Our objection is only to the name.

6. Dr. Hodge, like other theologians of his class, represents us as holding that the moral affections are under the direct control of the will, — which he denies. "It is universally admitted," he says, "because a universal fact of consciousness, that the feelings and affections are not under the control of the will. No man can love what is hateful to him, or hate what he delights in, by any exercise of his self-determining power." In other words, no man can call up an internal exercise or affection, by a simple act of the will. Now, strange as it may seem to Dr. Hodge and his friends, we believe this as fully as he does. These internal affections are exercises of the will, and cannot be called forth by a previous exercise of will. This is not the way in which any of the exercises of the will are produced. We cannot call up one executive volition by another, more than we can produce love or hatred in this way. Our voluntary exercises of every class, whether external or internal, transient or permanent, are put forth in view of motives, and under their influence, and not willed into existence one by another. A man concludes to change his business, or his course of life. Now this change, though voluntary, is not produced without thought and inquiry, by a single self-determination. But the individual supposed considers the subject for a time, looks at it in all its bearings, weighs the motives one way and the other, and at length comes to a decision. There is another man whose mind is exercised on the subject of religion; he knows that he is not a friend of God; that he has no delight in his character and service; but he is dissatisfied with his present position, and is led by the Spirit to think more deeply and truly of God. He thinks better of him, gets new views of his character and ways, and begins to love him. In the language of the Psalmist, he "thinks upon his ways, and turns his feet unto God's testimonies." Now this change is voluntary, as really so as that of the man who changed his

2 Dr. Hodge defines conversion as "a voluntary turning of the soul from sin to God." — Vol. iii. p. 14.

Vol. XXX. No. 118. 48
business; but in neither case was the new exercise or volition called up by a previous one. In both cases, it was put forth under the influence of motives. And in both cases, the change itself may have been instantaneous; although a preparation for it may have been going on in the mind for a considerable time.

We wish our friends, who seem to differ from us with regard to the voluntary nature of our moral affections, could understand us more correctly. They persist in saying that a change in the affections cannot be voluntary, because the new affection is not produced by a direct exercise of will. But no one supposes it is so produced. No voluntary exercise is, or can be, produced in this way. We merely say that our moral affections are put forth voluntarily, under the influence of motives or moral considerations, in the same way as all other exercises of will.

7. We only add, under the head of misrepresentations, that Dr. Hodge misapprehends, and of course misrepresents, the views of Dr. Emmons. "With Dr. Emmons," he tells us, "God is the only cause. Second causes, so called, whether material or mental, have no efficiency. God creates everything at every moment; all volitions and mental states, as well as everything external." 1 Dr. Emmons is here represented as holding that "God creates everything at every moment," and consequently that the works of preservation and creation are identical. Now, we know that Dr. Emmons did not thus teach; for we once heard him deny the statement in the strongest terms. If President Edwards did make such a statement and say that "God's preserving created things in being is perfectly equivalent to a continued creation, or to his creating things out of nothing at each moment of their existence;" * still Dr. Emmons uses no such language, but condemned it in decisive words. He once remarked to the writer of this Article: "President Edwards here makes me think of a strong horse in the mud. He thrashes about at a great rate; but with every move sinks deeper in the mire."

In another passage, Dr. Hodge represents Emmons as teaching that "the soul is a series of exercises created by God. There is no such thing as the soul — no self, but only certain perceptions, which succeed each other with amazing rapidity." 2 Other writers have ascribed to Emmons the same doctrine. Dr. Dwight, in particular, has devoted a whole sermon to the refutation of this theory — referring, undoubtedly, to Emmons as the author of it. 3

In regard to this, I remark, that in all the writings of Dr. Emmons, published and unpublished, I have never found the sentiment here imputed to him. And, in all my personal intercourse with him for many years, I never heard him express it, or anything which implied it, but very much which implied the contrary. And hundreds of his personal friends and

---

4 Dwight's Theology, Serm. 94.
pupils would unite with me in this testimony. The Rev. Dr. Ide, his
son-in-law, and the editor of his works, says: "Whatever may be thought
of the philosophy of Emmons, or the propriety of the phraseology
which he has occasionally used on this subject, his own language itself—
even that which is used in connection with the passages thought to indicate
the opinion in question—is sufficient to prove that he intended no such
thing. When he speaks of perception, reason, memory, conscience, and volu­tition, as properties of the soul, does not his language irresistibly imply that
there is a soul to perceive, to reason, to remember, to feel moral obligation,
and to will either right or wrong? Can any one seriously think that such
a man as Emmons ever believed that perception is a possibility, without a
soul to perceive? That there is, or can be, any such thing as reasoning or
reason, without a soul possessing the faculty of reason, or carrying on the
process? That there is such a thing as moral sensibility, without a soul
actually discerning between good and evil? Is such a thing as memory
conceivable, without a soul capable of recalling what it has previously
seen, heard, or known? What is volition? What did Emmons believe
the volition of man to be, but his soul loving or hating, choosing or
refusing? Those who, in view of all the facts in the case, can persuade
themselves that Emmons denied the proper being of a soul, while he spoke
thus of its properties and acts, must either believe that he was destitute
of common sense, or show that they themselves are wanting in this im­
portant instinct."

Dr. Emmons may have said (though we never heard him say as much
as this) that we are conscious of nothing but ideas and exercises, or the
operations of our own minds—that whatever we know as to the substance
of the soul we gather from other sources besides that of consciousness. And
many others have said the same. But that Dr. Emmons ever taught that
"there is no such thing as the soul, no self, but only a series of ideas and
exercises which succeed each other with amazing rapidity," we believe to
be a totally unfounded representation. And we hope that, from a regard
to the ninth commandment, good men will no longer say it, or believe it,
until they can find some positive proof in the acknowledged writings of
Dr. Emmons that it is true.

It follows, from what has been said as to Dr. Hodge's misapprehensions and
consequent misrepresentations of the New England theology, that he really
differs from us of New England much less than he thinks he does. The dif­
tinction between us is chiefly in words. Dr. Hodge believes that "holi­
ness, or moral excellence, is a greater good than happiness, . . . . as much
higher as heaven is higher than the earth." And so do we. Dr. Hodge has
the following excellent remarks respecting the last end of God in all his
works, to which every theologian of the genuine New England stamp will
say, "Amen": "In the Scriptures we are explicitly taught that the glory of

God, the manifestation of his perfections, is the last end of all his works. This is the highest possible end. The knowledge of God is eternal life. It is the source of all holiness and all blessedness to rational creatures. In the Bible this is declared to be the end of the universe as a whole; of the external world, or works of nature; of the plan of redemption; of the whole course of history; of the mode in which God administers his providence and dispenses his grace; and of particular events, such as the choice of the Israelites, and all the dealings of God with them as a nation.

Dr. Hodge holds, with us, that sin is not the necessary means of the greatest good; while we both agree that, in opposition to all its tendencies, sin becomes, in the providence of God, an occasion of greater glory to himself and of good to his creatures than would otherwise be possible. Dr. Hodge believes in the justice of God — that there is such a thing as justice, as distinct from expediency, and that God is just. And so do we. Dr. Hodge regards Christ, in his priestly work, as "a sacrifice, a propitiation, an expiation, the substitute and representative of sinners; as assuming their place, and sustaining the curse or penalty of the law in their stead." And with all our hearts we accept the same. In Dr. Hodge's sense of the word "penalty," we believe that Christ suffered the penalty of the law for us; although, for reasons before assigned, we prefer a stricter sense of the word "penalty," and regard Christ as having borne a full equivalent for the penalty, rather than the penalty itself.

Dr. Hodge does not believe that our internal affections are under the direct control of the will, so that we can will up the affection of love by a simple exercise of self-determination; and neither do we. No exercise of the will can be willed up by a previous exercise. This is not the way in which voluntary exercises are produced.

Dr. Hodge teaches that the sinner's inability to love God "does not arise from the loss of any faculty of the soul, or of any original, essential attribute of nature. He retains his reason, will, and conscience. He has the intellectual power of cognition, the power of self-determination, and the faculty of discerning between moral good and evil." Now this, again, is just what we believe; and this we call the sinner's natural ability to turn to God and do his duty. Natural ability has respect to faculties; moral ability, to dispositions and inclinations. On this point, as on many others, Dr. Hodge agrees with us in all but the name.

On supposed differences of opinion and theological controversies growing out of the different meaning and use of words, Dr. Hodge has the following excellent remarks: "The same statement often appears true to one mind, and false to another, because it is understood differently. This ambiguity arises partly from the inherent imperfection of human language. Words have, and must have, more than one sense; and, though we may define our terms, and state in which of its several senses we use a given word,

1 Vol. i. p. 567.  
yet the exigencies of language, or inattention, almost invariably lead to its being employed in some other of its legitimate meanings. Besides, the states of mind which these words are employed to designate are themselves so complex that no words can accurately represent them. We have terms to express the operations of the intellect, others to designate the feelings, and others, again, for acts of the will; but thousands of our acts include the exercise of the intellect, the sensibilities, and the will, and it is absolutely impossible to find words for all these complex and varying states of mind. It is not wonderful, therefore, that men should misunderstand each other, and fail in their most strenuous efforts to express what they mean, so that others shall attach precisely the same sense to the words which they use. 1

Admirable hints and suggestions these. By duly heeding and observing them, how often would good men find that their differences and disputes were more about names than things—a strife about the meaning of words!

ARTICLE XII.

RECENT WORKS ON PREHISTORIC ARCHAEOLOGY. 2

BY REV. G. F. WRIGHT, ANDOVER, MASS.

The subject of Prehistoric Archaeology still suffers from two embarrassments; first, from the reckless haste with which many of the uniformitarian school in geology jump to extreme conclusions concerning the early date of man’s introduction upon the earth; secondly, the too reverent pertinacity with which some Christian scholars hold to the current schemes of biblical chronology.

The two works mentioned below represent the latest phases of the inquiries relating to man’s antiquity, and are in the main moderate and judicious in their tone, especially the work of Mr. Evans. Since the publication of Lyell’s Antiquity of Man much progress has been made, both in adding new facts and in sifting the evidence on which previously discovered facts had been accepted. The human bones found in the cave at Aurignac, in France, and those from the caves of Engis and the Neanderthal, in Belgium, are spoken of now with far less confidence than

1 Vol. ii. p. 279.