

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

LECKY ON MORALS.¹

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INSEPARABLE from each other as are morality and religion, the true principles of ethics, appreciated and embraced, are a great help to practical religion, while in many ways they modify or help to form our theological opinions. On the other hand, false or inadequate conceptions of morals, such, for example, as do not carry us beyond the ethics of interest, would lead us to treat religion and Christianity as *means* of human enjoyment, instead of subjecting man through religion and Christianity to the service of his Maker; and would satisfy us with a theology that makes the good of the individual or the created universe its highest thought and ultimate end! For instance, how different, how much more healthful, the influence of Cudworth's "Immutable Morality," which, instead of adapting the law of right to the sinful weakness and inclinations of man, vigorously refutes the popular notion of a conventional standard of right and wrong, and makes moral principles as changeless as the throne of God, and alike binding upon all, compared with Paley's system, grounded in happiness and drawing its sanction from personal interest. The former tended to purify the moral atmosphere

¹ History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne. By Wm. Edward Hartpole Lecky, M.D. In 2 vols. D. Appleton and Co. 1870.

by raising men's minds from themselves to God and immutable truth ; while the latter has actually exerted a very powerful and pernicious influence in fostering the spirit of utilitarianism through all the relations of life. In fact, whatever view of morals we hold, this must needs have a wide application and influence.

But in our day, as might be anticipated from the bold claim of naturalism and positivism that they contain the whole of truth, we have morals and Christianity treated as *natural* agents among many others in the development of mankind. It follows as a legitimate consequence of rejecting the supernatural, that men must be confined wholly to the sphere of nature, and that whatever comes under the name of morality will perforce conform to laws by which nature works. A very plausible method for this is, first to assume Christianity to be an agent for promoting public morals, and then to look at the external features of moral development.

Whether or not this was Lecky's conscious design we need not here affirm. But in his *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne* he treats mainly of the moral condition of the Roman empire *before* and *after* it became nominally Christian, and with the intent, apparently, of showing thus the influence of Christianity as an agency, bad or good or mixed, in civilization. The design of the writer, which is not so clearly enounced as to prevent one of his critics¹ from pronouncing it "doubtful," is, where he proposes to state objections to the inductive theory of morals, intimated to be "to define and defend the opinions of those who believe that our moral feelings are an essential part of our constitution, developed by, but not derived from, education"; and then to inquire into the "order of their evolution, so that having obtained some notion of the natural history of morals, we may be able to judge how far this normal progress has been accelerated or retarded by religious or political agencies."²

We ought also to observe what the preface indicates : the

¹ See *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1869.

² Vol. i. p. 34.

importance attached by the author himself to his long chapter on the natural history of morals, and the relation which it is evidently designed to bear to what succeeds. After saying that "in addition to the type and standard of morals inculcated by the teachers, an historian must investigate the realized morals of the people," and giving us to understand this to be his aim in examining the moral history of Europe between Augustus and Charlemagne, he adds: "As a preliminary to this inquiry, I have discussed at some length the rival theories concerning the nature and obligation of morals, and have also endeavored to show what virtues are especially appropriate to each successive stage of civilization, in order that we may afterwards ascertain to what extent the natural evolution has been effected by special agencies." It would thus appear that Lecky himself regards the introductory discussion as the key to his subsequent history. It is for this reason that we must reach the author's unsatisfactory treatment of Christianity through his view of morals; and although it is in the interest of the former, Christianity, mainly, that the book should be critically examined; its entire drift in the direction of modern thought may be better appreciated, if we first understand, so far as he gives us the data for doing this, his views of ethical principles themselves. This is all the more important, since we are to find here his rule or standard by which to measure the facts of history.

Lecky makes a simple classification of theories, distinguishing *ethics of interest* and *disinterested morality*, as before him Cousin had done in his lectures on "The Good." This classification might be objected to on psychological grounds.¹ But it is convenient as enabling the author to put into the first class all moralists, who more or less directly regard happiness as the *summum bonum*. It should be observed, however, that with Lecky, with whom the intellectual element everywhere predominates, *the mode of apprehending the rule* becomes the basis of division. Hence his two classes he denominates *inductive* and *intuitive* morals.

¹ It were well if all theories of morality could be tested by, and made to conform to, a true psychology.

The inductive moralists, since they have a sharp eye to the consequences of their conduct, might also be styled *utilitarianists*. Although they set forth their views in a variety of ways, they agree in looking for a reward, and in calling upon the understanding as judging from experience, to decide whether this or that is best as means of securing the desired result. Thus Bentham says: "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question."¹ According to Locke, "Moral good and evil is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law whereby good or evil is drawn on by the power of the law-maker. Good and evil are pleasure and pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us." Hobbes, with his uniform clearness, expresses his view thus: "I conceive that when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it, he does nothing else but consider whether it is better *for himself* to do it or not to do it." And again: "Even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty is his goodness to us." Waterland puts the case in this manner: "To love God is, in effect, the same thing as to love happiness, eternal happiness; and the love of happiness is still the love of ourselves." And Mill affirms that "happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct."

These are different expressions for a theory of morals essentially the same, and which our author may very well denominate inductive; for, according to Bentham, "Vice may be defined to be a miscalculation of chances, a mistake in estimating the value of pleasures and pains. It is false moral arithmetic."²

¹ References to the original authors are given sufficiently in foot-notes to Lecky's History, so that for this and the following none are added.

² And if we take Lecky's estimate of the moral character of intellectual error as elsewhere expressed, we see that the obligation to be moral in this sense cannot be very great; "considered abstractly and by the light of nature, it is as

Now, we can heartily endorse the most of what Lecky says in objecting to the ethics of interest. For one thing, against the acknowledged protest of its advocates, utilitarianism is rightly called a *selfish* system. "It is not, I think, a strained or unnatural use of language, to describe as selfish or interested, all actions which a man performs in order to avoid suffering or acquire the greatest possible enjoyment. If this be so, the term selfish is strictly applicable to all the branches of this system."¹

Again, moral instinct and language as expressing the native and honest convictions of mankind, condemn utilitarianism, by making a sharp distinction between honor, justice, rectitude, and their equivalents, on the one hand, and such terms as prudence, sagacity, interest, and the like, on the other. "Selfish moralists," says our author, "deny the possibility of that which in all ages and nations, all popular judgments pronounce to have been the characteristic of every noble act that has ever been performed. A selfish act may be innocent, but cannot be virtuous; and to ascribe all good deeds to selfish motives, is not the distortion, but the negation of virtue. A feeling of satisfaction follows the accomplishment of duty for itself, but if the duty be performed through the expectation of mental pleasure, conscience refuses to ratify the bargain."²

unmeaning to speak of the immorality of an intellectual mistake as it would be to talk of the color of a sound." Vol. ii. p. 201.

¹ Vol. i. p. 32.

² Vol. i. pp. 35, 38. Cousin, in discussing this subject, says forcibly: "He who inscribes on his banner the name of right, by that alone interests us. . . . The idea of right is a universal idea, graven in shining and ineffaceable characters, if not in the visible world, in that of thought and the soul." . . . "Individual consciousness, conceived and transferred to the entire species, is called common-sense. It is common-sense that has made, that sustains, that develops languages, natural and permanent beliefs, society and its fundamental institutions. Grammarians have not invented languages, nor legislators societies, nor philosophers general beliefs. All these things have not been personally done, but by the whole world — by the genius of humanity. Common-sense is deposited in its works. All languages and all human institutions contain the ideas and the sentiments that we have just called to mind and described, and especially the distinction between good and evil, between justice and injustice,

It may be objected to the ethics of interest, further, that, in order to be virtuous according to its reckoning, careful estimates in detail must be made of the consequences of our actions; and in order to prevent the possibility of mistake, so high a degree of intelligence would be required, that we might well despair of attaining it, or, of virtue either, if only attainable through it. Our knowledge and application of "moral arithmetic" must determine our advance up the scale of virtues. "It is obvious," says Lecky, "that if virtues are only good because they promote, and vices only evil because they impair, the happiness of mankind, the degrees of excellence or criminality must be strictly proportioned to the degrees of utility, or the reverse. Every action, every disposition, every class, every condition of society must take its place on the moral scale precisely in accordance with the degree in which it promotes or diminishes human happiness."¹

Besides, if happiness is my end, who shall determine to what extent or in what way I am to seek it? I shall soon, on any such theory, find the obligation to be subjective as well as the rule. And it is not so strange that Lecky should question whether utilitarianism could thoroughly vindicate either chastity or an unswerving adherence to truth; for when we put virtue into the market, it must go to the highest bidder. Its value is what it will fetch. Virtue is valuable because useful; a kind of good, to be sure, a quite indispensable thing, since happiness cannot be bought with any other commodity; all is price; nothing is *worth*. On the other hand, say that virtue promotes happiness, or that happiness is impossible without virtue; is this the same thing, or does it follow, by whatever shift, that human conduct is virtuous simply *because*, and only *as*, it promotes happiness? Seek virtue directly and for itself, then you do not fail of the end you

between free-will and desire, between duty and interest, between virtue and happiness, with the profoundly rooted belief that happiness is a recompense due to virtue, and that crime in itself deserves to be punished, and calls for the reparation of a just suffering." — *Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good*, pp. 226, 227.

¹ Vol. i. p. 40.

seek, and with it you have what you do *not* seek directly — harmony, peace, happiness. This is the order: virtue for its intrinsic worth and because of its immediate obligation, and without stopping to estimate the consequences of this, that, and the other; happiness, or rather blessedness, is the result or reward that follows unsought; it is like Bunyan's "palace Beautiful," which the Lord of the way "has erected for the relief of weary pilgrims."

From what we find true of Lecky's treatment of the ethics of interest, what he calls inductive morals, we should hope to find him taking a firm stand in what he denominates *intuitive* morals. But he is here much less satisfactory. It is but just, however, as we make the transition, to give him due credit for an appeal to consciousness against utilitarianism. In doing so he raises a question in natural theology worthy of consideration, viz. whether we can prove the supreme goodness of God from an induction of outward nature. "The reality of this moral nature," he writes, "is the one great question of natural theology, for it involves that connection between our own and a higher nature, without which the *existence* of a first cause were a mere question of archaeology, and religion but an exercise of the imagination."¹ The thought involves the existence not only of a moral consciousness, but of a *consciousness of God* also. This fully admitted, we are bound everywhere to recognize, in our philosophy as well as in our lives, a *personal God*. We may thank Lecky for saying this, although he has failed, as we think, to construct his history of morals in accordance with it. And whether we agree or disagree with him in his assertion, that no proposition can be more palpably or egregiously false than that the most virtuous course is invariably the most happy one — a question which, on the theory of utility, it might take not a little of Bentham's moral arithmetic to determine; still, we may well endorse his words, when he says: "That men have the power of preferring other

¹ Vol. I. p. 59.

objects than happiness, is a proposition which must ultimately be left to the attestation of consciousness; that the pursuit of virtue, however much happiness may eventually follow in its train, is in the first instance an example of this preference, must be established by that common voice of mankind which has invariably regarded a virtuous motive as generically different from an interested one."¹ And we cannot but regret that his book should not be, in its total impressions, according to the principles of that higher consciousness in man which speaks for God and immutable truth.

In maintaining the theory of "natural moral perceptions," our author feels it needful not only to answer the objection, that all moral judgments may be resolved into considerations of utility, which, as already said, is most satisfactorily met by an appeal to consciousness, moral approbation being peculiar in kind, distinct from any enjoyment resulting either from animal gratification, intellectual acquirements, or aesthetic taste; he also feels it needful to meet the objection which rests upon the diversity of moral judgments in different nations and stages of civilization, what it is said could not be explained on the supposition of an intuitive moral faculty. Such facts are referred to as these: that some savages kill their old parents; that infanticide has been practised without compunction even by civilized nations; that the best Romans saw nothing wrong in the gladiatorial shows; that slavery has been sometimes honored and sometimes condemned. Now, it may be true that some of these are intellectual rather than moral judgments, and "special circumstances" may have something to do in directing the judgments; but we are not relieved of the difficulty without making a careful distinction between the conscience as having to do with *motives*, and the practical judgment as applying principles and directing the conduct under the imperative of duty; nor can the objection be satisfactorily met till this is done.

Lecky comes nearest the truth when he says: "The prin-

¹ Vol. i. p. 70.

cial difficulty, I imagine, which most men have in admitting that we possess certain moral perceptions, arises from the supposition that it implies the existence of some mysterious agent like the *Daemon* of Socrates, which gives specific and infallible information in particular. But this I conceive to be a complete mistake." So far, very well; but instead of distinguishing the elements of personality — the *reason* as apprehending the rule, the *conscience* as applying it in its highest form of obligation, and the *will* as embracing or refusing to obey the law of right; he gives the following as his exposition of the intuitive theory of morals; "All that is necessarily meant by the adherents of this school is comprised in two propositions. The first is, that the will is not governed exclusively by the law of pleasure and pain, but also by the law of duty, which we feel to be distinct from the former and to carry with it the sense of obligation. The second is, that the basis of our conception of duty is an intuitive perception, that among the various feelings, tendencies, and impulses that constitute our emotional being, there are some which are essentially good and ought to be encouraged, and some which are essentially bad and ought to be refused." But from all that Lecky admits or affirms, he does not properly recognize, as we think, either one *immutable rule of right* as seen by the reason, or award to man a capacity of true *moral self-determination*. Let us first ask, what is Lecky's conception of *human freedom*. Man, according to him, possesses emotions of duty which are intuitive, and should be, like all other faculties, regarded as constitutional. And, as we have seen, he affirms the will to be not governed exclusively by the law of pleasure and pain, but partly by the law of duty, which is distinct from the former and imposes obligation. The peculiar view of the author as to the law of duty we shall consider presently. Just here we are concerned with that vital point in ethics, the freedom of the will as a constitutional endowment of man.

The answer we bring to this question must determine

¹ Vol. i. pp. 101, 102.

whether we do or do not award to man a true moral freedom; viz. "Does the will originally possess the capability of freedom whereby it is distinguished in kind from all the activities of nature, which is throughout bound, 'governed,' by the law of cause and effect?" For if man, in the very make and constitution of his soul, has not this higher freedom, no matter what his instincts or his superior knowledge when compared with the brute creation, he is not morally free. Can Mr. Lecky give the affirmative answer to the above question? Interpreted by himself throughout, and not by some words here and there that might seem to imply the opposite, he certainly could not. And be it observed, this is not the only instance in which he seems to say in one place what is elsewhere unsaid, or what at least the work taken in its total bearing will not allow us to take in its full and ordinary sense.¹ But to proceed; if our author had taken and held firmly the true position in respect to moral freedom, he must, in doing so, have worked out of the natural into the spiritual realm, of which alone morality has any right to be predicated, and to which alone freedom belongs. Had he done this, his exposition of ethical principles might have been distinct and in all parts self-consistent; and the criticism now demanded of his treatment of Christianity would doubtless have been unnecessary. But far from doing this, he seems instead, to be disposed to bring man, with all his capabilities, after having recognized his higher instincts, wholly into the sphere of nature.

This demands that we consider Lecky's moral standard with which his moral types are closely connected. Evidently, for one thing, he does not recognize an *objective* standard in the divine reason or the divine revelation. This appears when he goes out of his way to make certain abuses of Christian doctrine appear odious, wherein he gives pre-intimation of his treatment of miracles in another connection. He is

¹ One of his English critics thinks it a charm of Lecky, that you know not in one part where he will take you in another. It might better be called, in such a work, *penumbra veritatis*.

careful to attack most violently exploded dogmas, such as consubstantiation and the damnation of infants; and yet he has no doubt some men are still in such a state as to consider it more irreligious to question the infallibility of an apostle, than to disfigure by any conceivable imputation the character of the Deity.¹ He also thinks "a dogmatic system which is accepted on rational or other grounds and *supported by rewards and punishments*, may teach a code of ethics differing from that of conscience,"² As if there were no retributive element in the conscience, which certainly does respond to the scripture law of retribution. Now, it is one thing to hold that reason may legitimately examine the *evidences* for the divine authority of scripture, but quite another for human reason to take upon itself to say *what as to matter* should be revealed. This last is to make the finite reason the standard and criterion of truth, and to deny both the need and possibility of a revelation from God alike binding upon all. Such a standard would not so well agree with our author's notion of a progressive morality as his interpretation of what he calls an original moral faculty.

Nor does he give us one common, immutable standard as affirmed in the reason, although his advocacy of intuitive morals would lead us to presume he was about to do this, at least. He says that, according to his theory, "the moral unity to be expected in different ages is not a unity of standard or of acts, but of tendency."³ After this remark, we shall not be wrong if we assume that his "moral types" are intended by him, whether it be perceived by his readers, or not, to play a very important part in his interpretation of the history of morals. We should, therefore, if possible, here understand the author's key. "The prominence of each school," he says, "may be regarded as a mental phenomenon, due, in a great measure, to predispositions resulting from certain conditions of society."⁴

¹ Vol. i. p. 99.

² Vol. i. p. 101.

³ Vol. i. p. 103.

⁴ In a certain sense this is true; so is it also true that a utilitarian morality is connected with a sense-philosophy, and that psychological opinions have very much to do with morals, both theoretical and practical. It may be likewise said

It is affirmed that there is a perpetual change in the standard which is exacted, and also in the relative value attached to particular virtues. But, while Lecky attributes the changes of standard, etc., largely to intellectual agencies, he nevertheless declares it to be "one of the plainest of facts that neither the individuals nor the ages that have been most distinguished for intellectual achievements have been most distinguished for moral excellence, and that a high intellectual and material civilization has often coexisted with much depravity." In setting before us the types of morals, he will tell us that the Christian type is the glorification of the amiable, as the stoic type was that of the heroic, qualities; for which reason Christianity is more fitted than stoicism to preside over civilization; for the more society is organized and civilized, the greater is the scope for the amiable, and the less for the heroic, qualities.¹

A passage from the chapter on the "Pagan Empire" may, perhaps, enable us better to appreciate how important and useful to our author are his moral types: "The history of Roman ethics represents a steady and uniform current, guided by the general conditions of society, and its progress may be marked by the ascendancy of the Roman, the Greek, and the Egyptian spirit. . . . Stoicism placed beyond cavil the great distinction between right and wrong. It inculcated the doctrine of universal brotherhood; it created a noble literature and a noble legislation; and it associated its moral system with the patriotic spirit, which was the

that an absorption of the mind in natural science—as is now strongly advocated by some—has two tendencies, both of which are very undesirable; (1) to discard the higher ideas of reason and beget a sense, if not a materialistic, philosophy; (2) to destroy religious reverence and a due regard for moral law. This influence of the study of natural science does not escape the notice of Lecky. "In a few minds the contemplation of the sublime order of Nature produces a reverential feeling; but to the great majority of mankind it is an incontrovertible though mournful fact, that the discovery of controlling and unchanging law deprives phenomena of their moral significance, and nearly all the social and political sphere in which reverence was fostered has passed away" (p. 149). But the fact, mournful as it is, is a part of the *natural history of morals*.

¹ Vol. i. p. 164.

animating spirit of Roman life. The early Platonists of the empire corrected the exaggerations of stoicism, gave free scope for the amiable qualities, and supplied a theory of right and wrong suited not merely for heroic characters and for extreme emergencies, but also for the characters and circumstances of common life. The Pythagorean and Neoplatonist schools revived the feeling of religious reverence, inculcated humility, prayerfulness, and purity of thought, and accustomed men to associate their moral ideals with the Deity, rather than with themselves.”¹

Now, let us observe what may be found in this finely wrought passage when examined by the help of what is said elsewhere. First, as the type of character of every individual depends partly upon innate temperament, and partly upon external circumstances, so there are various influences operating in society at different periods to develop the various types, “which it is the duty of the moral historian to depict.” Secondly, through the various causes operating to produce the different types, it results that the *quantum* is about the same in different individuals and periods. “History is not a mere succession of events, connected only by chronology. It is a chain of causes and effects.” And, doubtless, according to our author, the causes and effects operate in the *natural* history of morals just as everywhere else. But let us strictly notice what results from this “chain of causes and effects.” “There is a great natural difference of degree and direction in both the moral and intellectual capacities of individuals; but it is not probable that the general average of natural morals in great bodies of men materially varies. When we find a society very virtuous, or very vicious, when some particular virtue or vice occupies a peculiar prominence, or when important changes pass over the moral conceptions or standard of the people, we learn to trace in these things simply the action of the circumstances that were dominant.”² Thirdly, as from the last statement might be anticipated, we are com-

¹ Vol. i. pp. 352, 353.

² Vol. i. pp. 352, 353.

pelled to define Lecky's standard of morals to be the standard of society; that is, the type is the one best suited to the time. "As a man may be deficient in any virtue, and yet in other respects be moral and virtuous; and as a character may be perfect in its own kind, but no character can possibly possess all types of perfection; so all that can be expected in one ideal is, that it be perfect in its own kind, and should exhibit the type most needed in its age and most wisely useful to mankind."¹ With Bentham public opinion is the determinant of actions. How much does Lecky fall behind him, when he says: "Apart from positive commands, the sole external rule enabling men to designate acts, not simply as better or worse, but as positively right or wrong, is, I conceive, the standard of society."

Thus we have this learned writer's key, which appears not to be one that must be set to a definite number, as a "safe-key," but one that, like a "pass-key," will readily adapt itself to any door of a public house. But this standard is false, as it is variable. For if there is such a thing as morality at all, it must have an invariable, immutable standard, however much moral duties may change in their aspect; one, too, which of right is to regulate society, and that by first prescribing—or, rather, by itself being—the rule of rectitude for all society. Such a principle in its nature gives unity. Had it been consistently held and applied throughout, this work might have been a unit, which now, however, wanting the principle, wants the unity also.

And we may not unjustly complain of the author, that, having so well expressed the invalidity of what he calls inductive morals,—utilitarianism,—and after having affirmed it to be his purpose to advocate intuitive morals, he brings us by an ambiguous course to a position from which, instead of seeing what we had a right to expect, we are able to discern, after all, nothing better than inductive morals ingeniously decorated by him with a new veil.

¹ Vol. i. p. 163.

In passing to Lecky's unsatisfactory treatment of Christianity in his history of morals, — what we trust the criticism already made will prepare for and make more intelligible, — it is readily conceded that, through a multitude of facts, graphically presented, as if for a full and fair induction, he makes many valuable suggestions, and raises theories at least plausible. And yet his writings, under the show of great candor, are calculated to mislead in their total impressions as to the true nature and influence of Christianity. Indeed, to criticise fairly such a work is difficult; partly, because of its doubtful aim; partly, from the want of a fixed standard, according to which its opinions are promulgated; and partly, because things are said in one connection which seem not to comport well with what is said in other connections; not designedly, of course, but rather because the "standard of society" changes, we suppose.

It is not our aim, as it could hardly be profitable, to follow Lecky in detail. We desire the rather to mark certain features in which this work, taken in its total impressions, is unjust to Christianity. As already said, our author treats of the condition of the Roman empire, both before and after it became nominally Christian; and, although we could not accept his philosophical or theological stand-point, we might very well make our starting-point his transition to the conversion of Rome to Christianity, which is made in his best style, and indicates somewhat the drift of his work: "The moral improvement of society," he writes, "was now to pass into other hands. A religion which had long been increasing in obscurity began to emerge into the light. By the beauty of its moral precepts, by the systematic skill with which it governed the imagination and habits of its worshippers, by the strong religious motives to which it could appeal, by its admirable ecclesiastical organization, and, it must be added, by its unsparing use of the arm of power, Christianity soon eclipsed or destroyed all other sects, and became for many centuries the supreme ruler of the world. Combining the stoical doctrine of universal brotherhood, the Greek predi-

lection for the amiable qualities, and the Egyptian spirit of reverence and religious awe, it acquired, from the first, an intensity and universality of influence which none of the philosophies it had superseded had approached. I have now to examine the moral causes that governed the rise of this religion in Rome, the ideal virtue it presented, the degree and manner in which it stamped its image upon the characters of nations, and the distortions it underwent.”¹

After reading the long chapter on the moral state of the Pagan empire which precedes the above quotation, and comparing it with what is said in the third and fourth chapters of the morals connected with the ascendancy of Christianity, in the implied contrast, we feel that the impression left in respect to the morality of Pagan Rome is too favorable, while that of the morality of Christian Rome is too unfavorable in comparison. This is here our first point of criticism.

In depicting the pagan morality, the author sets forth abundantly the high-toned instruction of teachers of morals, such as Cicero, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, Plutarch, etc., who abound in such sayings as these: “If you do anything to please men, you have fallen from your estate”; “A great man is not the less great when he lies vanquished and prostrate in the dust”; “That which is beautiful is beautiful in itself; the praise of men adds nothing to the quality”; “We do not love virtue because it gives us pleasure; but it gives us pleasure because we love it”; “All vice should be avoided, though it were concealed from the eyes of gods and men.”² These moral sentiments, which would do honor to any time, and are more elevated than many now taught, might indicate a high tone of public morals, were it not for the well-known fact that the precepts of the moralists were not extensively practised. Indeed, our author himself says that there was a “broad chasm existing between the Roman moralists and the Roman people.” “We find a system of ethics, of which, when we

¹ Vol. i. p. 356.

² Vol. i. pp. 195, 196 *passim*.

consider the range and beauty of its precepts, the sublimity of the motives to which it appealed, and its perfect freedom from superstitious elements," — from these Lecky does not, as we shall see, regard the Christian morals as free, — "it is not too much to say that, though it may have been equalled, it has never been surpassed." And yet, high and spiritual as was the conception of duty, "the philosopher with his group of disciples, or the writer with his few readers, had scarcely any point of contact with the people."¹ This want of contact with and influence over the popular mind, it may be observed in passing, is in striking contrast to the popular influence of the teachings of Christianity.

Just here distinct attention should be called to Lecky's glorification of stoicism. He dwells with peculiar delight on its elevating, invigorating influence, its unselfish ideal, its subjugation of the affections to the reason, and the noble patriotism which it engendered. He also speaks of it as if, in his view, it furnished to Christianity the "doctrine of universal brotherhood."² Now, that the brightest feature of pagan morality appears in its stoicism, and that its noted teachers and best characters were imbued by its spirit, we are not disposed to deny; but that its practical influence was as great and salutary as this writer represents, we are not prepared to believe. Least of all did stoicism beget a universal brotherhood. This was first fully taught, as a practical doctrine, by Jesus Christ. It is realized only through the influence of Christianity, which, unlike all other systems, knows how to recognize and perfect the individual, while it raises all to a higher and genuine unity. Paganism, when it undertook to use man for anything further than his isolated individualism, would subordinate him to the interest of the state or emperor, and because the state or emperor needed him. It did not know how, with all its stoical wisdom, to harmonize personal freedom with true civil freedom; much less, to reach beyond "my own Rome," and grasp the true idea of a common humanity. It is Chris-

¹ Vol. i. pp. 307, 308.

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² Vol. i. p. 356.

tianity which teaches the doctrine of a universal brotherhood; this alone, since it enables us, as nothing else does, or can, to harmonize individual interest and patriotism and philanthropy, through those spiritual bonds which unite us as one before a common Father and Redeemer.

It is true, also, whatever the moral principles taught, or however high at any time the tone of morals may have been, that there was a great deterioration before the empire became Christian. This fact is recognized by Lecky. "We find," he says, "a society almost absolutely destitute of moralizing institutions, occupations, and beliefs, existing under an economical and political system which inevitably led to general depravity, and passionately addicted to the most brutalizing amusements." And again: "Such were the influences which acted, in turn, upon a society which, by despotism, by slavery, and by atrocious amusements, had been debased and corrupted to the very core."¹ This fact, it may be noted, — whatever it may declare as to the conservative influence, or the want of it, in pagan morals, — shows that Christianity did not plant its first seeds in a highly developed and moral community, when it took in hand the conversion of the Roman empire; but that its task was to revivify a society which "by despotism, by slavery, and by atrocious amusements had been debased and corrupted to the very core."

Thus, notwithstanding the concessions made, we think the total impression left in regard to the natural morals of pagan Rome too favorable. This will still further appear in the comparison, if we look at the other side of the picture. While speaking of the moral character and influence of Christian Rome, or of the church after the empire became Christian, Lecky, indeed, finds much to commend. The high conception formed of the sanctity of human life, the protection of infancy, the elevation and final emancipation of the slave classes, the suppression of barbarous games (the most important Christian influence exerted upon society is

¹ Vol. i. p. 355.

thought to be the extinction of the gladiatorial shows) — these, together with “the creation of a vast and multifarious organization of charity and the education of the imagination by the Christian type, constitute together a movement of philanthropy which has never been paralleled or approached in the pagan world.” The movement has also been favorable to the promotion of happiness, and in determining character not less.¹ Nor yet can we be unmindful of the great missionary labors performed by the church at a later period.²

On the other hand, the author, having, as must be confessed, an excellent opportunity for portraying the evils of celibacy, asceticism, and ecclesiastical bigotry, avails himself of his opportunity, and occupies much space in setting forth these excrescences and their unhappy effects; which, however, must be here passed by, although his array of facts leaves an impression which can hardly be appreciated except by reading them in their connection.

Now, are we to suppose, whatever comments and concessions Lecky may make, that he intends, all things considered, to give the preference to the later morality? In one passage he gives us quite clearly his opinion on this point, which, in fact, is not very different from what his “moral types” might have led us to anticipate: “She [the church] exercised for many centuries an almost absolute empire over the thoughts and actions of mankind, and created a civilization which was permeated in every part with ecclesiastical influence. And the dark ages, as the period of Catholic ascendancy is justly called, do undoubtedly display many features of great and genuine excellence. In active benevolence, in the spirit of reverence, in loyalty, in co-operative habits, they far transcend the noblest ages of pagan antiquity, while in that humanity which shrinks from the infliction of suffering they were superior to Roman, and in their respect for chastity to Greek, civilization. On the other hand, they rank immeasurably below the best pagan civilization in civic and patriotic virtues, in love of liberty, in the number and

¹ Vol. ii. p. 107.

² Vol. ii. p. 261.

splendor of the great characters they produced, in the dignity and beauty of the type of character they formed. They had their full share of tumult, anarchy, injustice, and war; and they should probably be placed in all intellectual virtues lower than any other period in the history of mankind.”¹

And thus, when we have read and compared all that is said, in the two volumes, of the pagan and of the Christian morality, we feel that their author regards it as right to take the church as the exponent of Christianity.² We certainly cannot think him unwilling to have this conviction prevail; and we are sure he would not have us think of Christian morality as, on the whole, superior to pagan morality.

We find Mr. Lecky's history further unsatisfactory, and this in its bearing on Christianity, because of not recognizing the cycles of civilization as these appear from a true historic point of view. One long cycle, including Thebes, Carthage, and Rome, was passing away with the decay of pagan morality. A new one was introduced, with the introduction of Christianity, differing from the former in its principles and its method, as well as in the seat of its principal development. The former was that of the Mediterranean states; the latter, that of the Atlantic states. Mommsen, in the introduction to his *History of Rome*, presents this thought so well that, while we use his words, he shall be authority for the position here taken: “The distinction between ancient and modern history, therefore, is no mere accident, nor yet a mere matter of chronological convenience. What is called modern history is, in reality, the formation of a new cycle of culture, connected in several stages of its development with the perishing or perished civilization of the Mediterranean states, as this was connected with the primitive civilization of the Indo-Germanic

¹ Compare in Vol. ii. p. 44 and p. 148, with pp. 15, 16.

² The church *should* truly represent the Spirit of Christianity. Lecky implies that it does; that it *did*, notwithstanding its corruptions, during the period of which he treats. This is not fair, because not true.

stock, but destined, like the earlier cycle, to traverse an orbit of its own. And yet this goal will only be temporary. The grandest system of civilization has its orbit, and may complete its course; but not so the human race, to which, just when it has reached its goal, the old task is ever set anew, with a wider range and with a deeper meaning.”¹

But the author of the *History of European Morals*, although this history extends from the last epoch of the Mediterranean cycle to the dawn of the new and Christian type of civilization which was to characterize the Atlantic states, does not recognize — perhaps his naturalistic stand-point would not allow him to appreciate — the fact of the transition from the one kind of civilization to the other, or the important difference between the two. At least, his treatment of the subject indicates that he would regard the later as a development from, and modification of, the earlier civilization. Hence the complaint that no more of the old was preserved — that Christianity did not immediately rebuild the decaying civilization.

Is it not in accordance with this view of development from the past, that, while Lecky finds Christianity for a long period too weak to regenerate Europe, he should make the pagan literature of antiquity and the Mohammedan schools of science the chief agencies in resuscitating the dormant energies of Christendom?² How could he so overlook or

¹ Mommsen's *History of Rome*, Vol. i. p. 24.

² In the passage referred to (Vol. ii. p. 17, 18), the author while giving his opinion on the point in hand, also affords some intimation of his opinion of theology and the church. “If we desire to form a just estimate of the realized improvement, we must compare the classical and ecclesiastical civilizations as wholes, and must observe in each case not only the vices that were repressed, but also the degree and variety of positive excellence obtained. In the first two centuries of the Christian church the moral elevation was extremely high, and was continually appealed to as proof of the divinity of the creed. In the century before the conversion of Constantine, a marked depression was already manifest. The two centuries after Constantine are uniformly represented by the Fathers as a period of general and scandalous vice. The ecclesiastical civilization that followed, though not without its distinctive merits, assuredly supplies no justification of the common boast about the regeneration of society by the church. That the civilization of the last three centuries has risen in most

ignore the fact that a new life appeared in the Atlantic civilization when the Reformation arose on Europe, when the doctrine of the grace of God was again preached, and when the New Testament was circulated, by the aid of the printing-press, and put into, or restored to, the masses, with the consequent knowledge and diffusion of its principles and precepts?

Let us not mistake the intimation here given that that modern culture, zealously advocated by many, is rather of the pagan than of the Christian type. The one treats man as the product of nature, and would educate him by natural agencies; the other recognizes man as spiritual, related to a personal God, and capable of being influenced by supernatural agencies. It also recognizes the Christian religion as divine, and the most efficient power in the advance of civilization, and essential to the true elevation of the race. If, then, we desire to return to paganism, let us discard Christianity, and adopt that "culture" which, in the view of some, is "demanded by modern life."

We are thus prepared to state another and radical defect in the history before us; viz. the assumption that Rome was converted and Christianity propagated by natural agencies, and without any help from the miraculous or supernatural. Or, in other words, Mr. Lecky represents Christianity as

respects to a higher level than any that had preceded it, I, at least, firmly believe." To what is this due? Lecky will tell us: "But theological ethics, though very important, form but one of the many and complex elements of its excellence. Mechanical inventions, the habits of industrialism, the discoveries of physical science, the improvements of government, the expansion of literature, *the traditions of pagan antiquity*, have all a distinguished place, which, the more fully its history is investigated, the more clearly two capital truths are disclosed. The first is, that the influence of theology having for centuries numbed and paralyzed the whole intellect of Christian Europe, the revival, which forms the starting-point of our modern civilization, was mainly due to the fact that two spheres of intellect still remained uncontrolled by the sceptre of Catholicism. *The Pagan literature of antiquity and the Mahommedan schools of science, were the chief agencies, in resuscitating the dormant energies of Christendom.* The second fact is, that for more than three centuries the decadence of theological influence has been one of the most invariable signs and measures of progress."

successful in converting the Roman empire through what he would call natural agencies, and hence, by implication, would have Christianity so regarded in civilization.

Nothing, perhaps, can better show the author's unfair treatment of the Christian religion than to bring together his positions, which, as gathered from his history and bearing on this point, are substantially as follows: Causes existed, without any help from the supernatural, for the entire transformation. "It may, indeed, be confidently asserted that the conversion of the Roman empire is so far from being of the nature of a miracle or suspension of the ordinary principles of human nature, that there is scarcely any other great movement on record in which the causes and effects so manifestly correspond." "Never before was a religious transformation so manifestly inevitable. No other religion ever combined so many forms of attraction as Christianity, both from its intrinsic excellence and from its manifest adaptation to the special wants of the time." "One great cause of its success was that it produced more heroic actions and formed more upright men than any other creed; but that it should do so was precisely what might have been expected."

In fact, it was quite strange that, *at the time*, the power of the new religion should not have been better appreciated. "That the greatest religious change in the history of mankind should have taken place under the eyes of a brilliant galaxy of philosophers and historians, who were profoundly conscious of the decomposition around them; that all these writers should have utterly failed to predict the issue of the movement they were observing; and that, during the space of three centuries, they should have treated as simply contemptible an agency which all men must now admit to have been, for good or for evil, the most powerful moral lever that has ever been applied to the affairs of men, are facts well worthy of meditation in any period of religious transition."¹ But this makes the matter so easy that the author would deserve little praise for solving a riddle that others in

¹ Vol. i. p. 359.

their ignorance had failed to solve; and he admits it to be a surprising fact that the barbarous nations should have been converted to Christianity as they were. "Still more wonderful," says he, "is the rapid conversion of the barbarous tribes. Of whole tribes or nations it may be truly said that they are absolutely ignorant of the cause of their change. Unfortunately this, which is one of the most important, is also one of the most obscure, pages in the history of the church."

And yet a sagacious observation and application of natural laws will explain all. The nations converted to Christianity, "disconnected from old associations, bowed before the majesty of civilization; and the Latin religion, like the Latin language, though with many adulterations, reigned over the new society." More particularly "the doctrine of exclusive salvation and the doctrine of demons had an admirable missionary power. The first produced an ardor of proselytism which the polytheist can never rival; while the pagan, who was easily led to recognize the Christian God, was menaced with eternal fire, if he did not take the further step of breaking off from his old divinities. The second dispensed the convert from the perhaps impossible task of believing his former religion; for it was only necessary for him to degrade it, attributing its prodigies to infernal beings."¹ It might be well to ask, just here, whether Lecky really believes in the validity of the doctrine of an "exclusive salvation," and, if not, whether he would seriously affirm that the great missionary power of the church really lay in the promulgation of a doctrine wholly groundless. And when he says: "To a world, in fine, distracted by hostile creeds and colliding philosophies, it [Christianity] taught its doctrines, not as a human speculation, but as a divine revelation, authenticated much less by reason than by faith," we would like to ask, again, whether this learned author believes in a religion whose authority and power over men lie in its being a "divine revelation"? or, whether "a religion under

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 190, 191.

pretence" of deriving its authority directly from God, is simply what he holds the Christian religion to be? and so, whether the power of the Christian religion lay in its *reality*, or in its *pretence*?

The force of these queries will more fully appear when we find how he regards the miracles connected with the introduction of Christianity. When Mr. Lecky says that, "like all great religions, Christianity was more concerned with modes of feeling than with modes of thought," if he means with the character and the life, rather than with speculation, then we agree with him. But the religion of the New Testament is very far from being indifferent to modes of thought; it would affect the character and life by rectifying the intellect. In other words, Christianity is a doctrine,—a very definite and positive doctrine,—as well as a life.

The following deserves careful notice, as combining something of truth with more of error in one short paragraph: "The true cause of its success was the congruity of its teaching with the spiritual nature of mankind. It was because it was true to the moral sentiments of the age, because it represented faithfully the supreme type of excellence to which men were then tending, because it corresponded with their religious wants, aims, and emotions, because the whole spiritual being could then expand and expatiate under its influence, that it planted its roots so deeply in the hearts of men." Now, that the teachings of Jesus Christ are adapted to the spiritual nature of mankind and correspond with our religious wants, is true; but history shows but too plainly that they did not meet with a popular reception on this account. But the moral sentiments of the age were very far from being one with the gospel; nor was the supreme type of excellence to which men were then tending, the Christian type. It is not true, therefore, that Christianity became successful because "true to the moral sentiments of the age," or because it "represented faithfully the supreme type of excellence to which men were then

tending." But Lecky knows of only natural agencies, and admits nothing supernatural.

His treatment of miracles, however, is instructive. They were generally accepted. "Christianity floated into the Roman empire on the wave of credulity that brought with it this long train of oriental superstitions and legends. In its moral aspect it was broadly distinguished from the systems around it; but its miracles were accepted, by both friend and foe, as the ordinary accompaniments of religious teaching." This is, then, why miracles were pretended. But "to suppose that men who held these opinions were capable, in the second or third centuries, of ascertaining with any degree of just confidence whether miracles had taken place in Judea in the first century, is grossly absurd; nor would the conviction of their reality have made any great impression on their minds at a time when miracles were supposed to be so abundantly diffused."¹ This, surely, is to dispose of miracles summarily, if not satisfactorily.

And, of course, with miracles in general, *the great miracle of the incarnation* must be discarded, and, with the incarnation, that positive Christianity which Lecky is somewhat troubled to treat as a natural agent. And yet a positivist or naturalist has in his system no place for miracles. And why should he trouble himself to examine the evidence on which they rest their claim. On the other hand, a supernatural religion cannot be appreciated from the mere standpoint of nature; nor can its working and its results be apprehended aright, if separated from its principles.

But, observe how the absurdities and non-realities of Christianity become, nevertheless, according to our author, real forces in the natural world. He sees that the teachers of this new religion "enforced their distinctive tenets as absolutely essential to salvation," and he affirms that they *thus* "assailed at great advantage the supporters of all other creeds which did not claim this exclusive authority." And this — although by him it must be regarded as utterly ab-

¹ Vol. i. 397, 398.

surd — this teaching of the gospel as the only salvation, he holds to be one leading cause of the rapid progress of the church.¹ He also affirms that “Christianity floated into the Roman empire on the wave of credulity that brought with it this long train of oriental superstitions and legends,”² referring to miracles. Behold, then, the result — the world converted by miracles which in themselves were not realities, and by a claim which in itself is unreasonable!

And yet, from his point of view, how could this writer see that a religion revealed from heaven should and must be positive, and appeal to faith; be exclusive, and claim the assent of all? or, that precisely by being the one and doing the other, it exerted an influence and begat a morality peculiarly its own? And, not recognizing the fact that God has in the gospel of his Son proclaimed an evangel, and provided a supernatural power which is to revolutionize the world, he could not present, as he has not presented, the legitimate influence of Christianity — separating it from its human imperfections, and thus making it the vital element of the new civilization of the Atlantic states, which, because of this vital element, we denominate Christian.

It is refreshing to turn from such a treatment of Christianity as connected with civilization, and read these words from Guizot, who in the historic spirit and a knowledge of the world's history is certainly not inferior to the author of *European Morals*: “Who but will acknowledge that Christianity has been one of the greatest promoters of civilization? And wherefore? Because it has changed the interior condition of man, his opinions, his sentiments; because it has regenerated his intellectual and moral character.”³ And, while speaking of the immense advantage to European civilization, during the fifth century, of a moral power resting on moral convictions, he says: “Had not the Christian church existed at that time, the whole world must have fallen a prey to mere brute force. The Christian

¹ Vol. ii. p. 202.

² Vol. i. p. 397.

³ Guizot's *History of Civilization*, Vol. i. p. 26.

church alone possessed a moral power; it maintained and promulgated the idea of a precept, of a law superior to all human authority; it promulgated the great truth which forms the only foundation of our hope for humanity."¹

The want of comparing the two systems of morals, pagan and Christian, in their fundamental *principles*, might be further urged against the history before us. This has appeared hitherto, but, as bearing on Christianity, especially, deserves, in concluding this criticism, a distinct notice. If Lecky aimed at giving us the fruits of the two systems, he has succeeded much better in showing how these sprang from their principles on the pagan, than on the Christian, side; while it is in their principles rightly represented that the true difference appears.

Now, we cannot be just to Christianity without regarding it as a *system of instruction of a unique and peculiar character*, which instruction is intended for the life, and which through the life reforms society and gives tone to public morals. While being examined at the bar of Pilate, Jesus

¹ Guizot's History of Civilization Vol. i. p. 54. We cannot refrain from quoting from many that might be selected, the following passage, that may be found in Vol. iii. p. 198: "It is in the alliance of intellectual liberty, as it shone in antiquity, with the intellectual power as it showed itself in Christian societies, that we find the great and original character of modern civilization; and it is, without doubt, in the bosom of the revolution effected by Christianity in the spiritual and temporal orders of thought and of the exterior world, that this new revolution has taken its origin and its first point of support." It is a fact for which we should be grateful, that the author of the "History of Civilization," when apparently through with the work of a long and useful life, employs his setting sun in defending Christianity against the assaults of naturalistic infidelity.

Of that book which is, and ever has been, the authority and instrument of the church, Coleridge says: "For more than a thousand years the Bible, collectively taken, has gone hand in hand with civilization, science, and law; in short, with the moral and intellectual cultivation of the species, always supporting, and often leading the way. Its very presence as a believed book, has rendered the nations emphatically a chosen race; and this too in exact proportion as it is more or less generally known and studied. . . . Good and holy men, and the best and wisest of mankind, the kingly spirits of history, enthroned in the hearts of mighty nations have borne witness to its influence, have declared it to be beyond compare the most perfect instrument, the only adequate organ of humanity." — Coleridge's Works (Shedd's ed.), Vol. v. p. 611.

said: "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth" (John xviii. 37). He bore witness, in word and deed, to the guilt and ruin of sin, on the one hand, and to the need and possibility of human salvation through a divine interposition, on the other. His disciples were to be witnesses of that truth which has *Himself* as its centre and validity. And it is certain that the apostles did preach salvation through Christ alone (Acts ii. 32-39; iv. 12; xx. 21). For the doctrines which they believed and taught, and which they held dearer than life, they were persecuted, and their principles became the seed of the martyr-church. And whenever it has been a power and life-giving in its influence, awakening and directing the moral instincts of society, this has been due to the pure doctrine of the gospel being embraced and taught by the church.

Had the author of the *History of Morals* started in his estimate of Christianity as a civilizing agent with the facts of the gospel history, he might have found these connected with, or themselves becoming, doctrines — constituent and inseparable parts of the Christian system. Finding — what the most thorough criticism, if it be candid, must admit — the gospel narrative credible, it would also follow that the recorded miracles, performed in the name or wrought by the direct power of that unique Person who is the leading character of the New Testament history, cannot be separated from it without destroying its integrity and impeaching its veracity. And, moreover, this "Christ of history" must be what he claims to be, and hence must have come into the world to save sinners, and this by bearing witness to God's holiness and man's guilt. And so of the *need* of redemption, on the one hand, and of the *fact* of redemption accomplished in his own person, including pardon, justification, and life, on the other. From this position, who can help seeing that these two cardinal truths — man ruined by sin and saved by the supernatural grace of God — have always constituted the life, power, and leavening influence

of the true church of Christ on earth? Having come so far, it had then been easy to eliminate from the genuine principles of Christianity those excrescences which had in various ways connected themselves therewith, and by which for a long period those principles were obscured. Nor could it have been difficult to perceive the salutary influence, operating directly and indirectly upon society, of the great central doctrine of the New Testament at the time of the Reformation; in which case one could hardly find it necessary, against the light of history, to affirm the pagan literature of antiquity and the Mohammedan schools of science" to be "the chief agents in resuscitating the dormant energies of Christendom." Nor would it then be needful to treat a belief in human guilt and future retribution as groundless, nor to declare theology to be in the way of civilization, nor to disregard the objective evidence on which this theology is based and the divine authority for the principles of Christianity, nor to speak of the preaching of an "exclusive salvation" as if this were groundless. Least of all could it have been required, after having rejected the supernatural as an agent in the conversion of the Roman empire, — then, both to admit and declare the preaching of this exclusive religion, with its rewards and punishments, its attestation by miracles, and its authoritative appeal to faith in divine revelation, to be, after all and in fact, a most important reason for the spread of Christianity. Such inconsistency might have been avoided by coupling the legitimate fruits of the gospel with its principles. Indeed, had the test of principles been applied, the contrast between the pagan and the Christian morality — if this was the leading aim of the writer, and very little is accomplished if it was not — might have been made clear and impressive with a tithe of the illustrative facts employed, which now, for want thereof, tend rather to obscure than illustrate truth.

The words of the great Neander have much force, and they may, perhaps, suggest the reason why Lecky could not appreciate — and not appreciating could not represent — the

true nature and influence of Christianity: "To understand history, it is supposed that we have some understanding of that which constitutes its working principle; but it is history which furnishes us the proper test by which to ascertain whether this principle has been rightly apprehended. Certainly, then, our understanding of the history of Christianity will depend on the conception we have formed to ourselves of Christianity itself. Now, Christianity we regard not as a power that has sprung up out of the hidden depths of man's nature, but as one which descended from above, because heaven opened itself for the rescue of revolted humanity — a power which, as it is exalted above all that human nature can create out of its own resources, must impart to that nature a new life, and change it from its inmost centre."¹

To conclude this criticism, — for we do not speak of the chapter on the "Condition of Women," — we may express our opinion that the work will doubtless be read, partly because of its entertaining style and matter, and partly because it so thoroughly falls into the current of modern thought, which ignores the supernatural in behalf of naturalism; and for these reasons it will mislead. But, if Christianity is from God, and is capable of vindicating itself as such; and, if truth is consistent, and destined to triumph over inconsistency and error — then a work so unsatisfactory psychologically, logically, and morally, — so unsatisfactory as this is historically, theologically, and religiously — must soon give place to something better.

¹ Introduction to Neander's Church History.