In one respect the work before us is open to serious exception. Herr Nippold is a "liberal," and as such revolts from anything that savors of a positive faith. He does not see that orthodoxy can be anything else than compulsory; he is unable to conceive of a mind that in perfect freedom, under the blessed influences of the Holy Spirit, accepts and obeys the revealed gospel of Christ. "Bondage," and yet "liberty," simple submission to a creed coalescing and becoming coincident with entire freedom both of belief and life,—these are among those mysterious harmonies which, verified as they are by the experience of every Christian heart, pass, like the co-existence of predestination with individual responsibility, beyond the range of the comprehension of the world. Hence it is that so often we hear the view incidentally taken by Herr Nippold in one of his closing sections—that whatever sets up an authoritative standard, in matters of faith at least, opens the way to Rome. Now, in one sense, this is nothing more than Luther's well-known


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saying, that there is a pope in every man's belly; and if it be limited to this, it is a position that all must admit. Every man, if he follow his natural instincts, will be a pope if he can. And this holds good in things ecclesiastical, as well as in things practical and domestic. The Methodist class-leader who patronizes no Christianity that is not Methodist, and sees nothing Methodist that is not Christian; the Presbyterian elder who makes his self his creed, and his creed an anathema; the Episcopal neophyte, who believes himself the holy catholic church that can never err, and who treats his bishop with the most abject professed veneration and the most insolent practical contempt—each of these assumes papal powers, so far as his little opportunities will allow. Nor can we stop here. If the pope is incarnate in any one, it is in those by whom "free-religionism," as it is called, is most clamorously maintained. Some months since was published the life of a "liberal" Unitarian clergyman, who, having obtained a chaplaincy during our late war, used the powers it gave him to take military possession of a Southern pulpit, and there, as he exultingly tells us in his diary, to "force" the reluctant people to listen to the theories, political and social, which he was pleased to call the gospel. A regiment stood without; a prison or a gibbet rose in the perspective. It would be disloyal to fly from the loyal preacher who thus took possession; and thus he was able, as he felicitated himself, to ruthlessly assail the most cherished convictions of his hearers' hearts. Now, this was the "compelling to come in" of Pope Innocent, with but a slight variation; the variation being that in one case the compulsion was to hear that everything the church taught was true, while in the other case the compulsion was to hear that everything that the auditory believed was false.

Nor can we exempt Herr Nippold himself from the same embarrassing charge. Of all others, when we remember his pretensions and protestations, he ought to be the last to have nestling in him an embryo pope; but when we scrutinize closely his bearing, we cannot but see that appearances are
very much against him. Notwithstanding his creed of universal liberty, there are ominous shudderings observable in him, and ill-concealed mutterings of reprobation, when any one comes athwart his vision who believes more than he is pleased to believe himself. It is the "pope" of human nature that more or less fully occupies each of us. It is the same pope that, under the guise of rampant liberalism, is concealed in the person of even Herr Nippold. In this sense, it is true, orthodoxy embodies the pope; but it is orthodoxy only so far as it is burdened with our corrupt nature, and in this respect orthodoxy and heterodoxy stand on the same ground.

But the position which we have thus criticised fills, we are bound to say, but a very small and unimportant place in Herr Nippold's treatise. The object before him is one of deep interest; and he has bestowed on it not only exhaustive historical labor, but acute critical skill. He has undertaken to meet the boasts of the Romish Propaganda, that there is a great moral movement among devout Protestants towards the Romish see; and he has performed the work by taking up the list of converts published by Rome, so far as Germany is concerned, and explaining, in each case, the motives and circumstances of conversion. The examination is so interesting, both psychologically and theologically, that we now propose to sum up its general results.

It is Nippold's theory that the last century, which ended in 1830, may be divided into two almost equal eras—the first, that of liberal advance, culminating with the French consulate; the second, that of conservative reaction, culminating with the short-lived triumph of Bourbonism and of the Holy Alliance. In the first of these eras, liberty, if we may use the expression, was in the air. Men caught it as if it were an epidemic. Philosophers, scholars, preachers, even courtiers, such as those who crowned Franklin with laurel, and waltzed Louis XVI. into war, were alike infected by its spirit. In the second of these eras conservatism seemed to emit the same universal infection. It was not
merely conservatism shuddering at the horrors of the French revolution; but it was conservatism in another and better phase. Legitimacy — such was the term happily hit upon by Talleyrand at the Vienna Congress — was the antithesis not merely of the popular license of the French republic, but of the military autocracy of Napoleonic imperialism. Legitimacy, therefore, was a safe and commodious refuge, not merely from the excesses of too little government, but from the excesses of too much. Into it rushed the enthusiastic rationalists of Germany, with patriotic banners flying, singing Körner’s insurrection songs. Into it tottered the stupid retrogressivism of England, led by Percival and Liverpool, and followed by the English middle classes as a mass. It was not merely a refuge for the romanticism of Burke and the feudalism of Chateaubriand, but for the enlightened comprehensiveness of Canning and the majestic constitutionalism of Stein. That the latter were grossly mistaken the event showed; and soon they achieved their escape. But into the common ranks of reactionism they for the time went; for the temper was one which for the moment pervaded almost all phases of European political life.

But did not the same temper enter into the church? Herr Nippold maintains, and maintains truly, that it did; and he asserts, further, that this temper, when morbidly developed, was the cause of many perversions to Rome. These perversions, arising from this reactionary spirit, he carefully analyzes, and reduces them to the following heads:

I. Die mit der Gegenwart zerfallene Geburtsaristokratie (Politische Romantik).
II. Die romantische Dichterschule (Poetische Romantik).
III. Die romanisirenden Kunstschulen (Kunstlerische Romantik).
IV. Die restaurative Rechtslehre (Juristische Romantik).
V. Die rückläufigen Tendenzen in Lehr-und Nährstand (Sittliche Romantik).
VI. Die moderne Orthodoxie (Theologische Romantik).

Taking Herr Nippold’s classification, therefore, the various ways to Rome may be thus described:
I. Political Romanticism; II. Literary Romanticism; III. Artistic Romanticism; IV. Juristic Romanticism; V. Social Romanticism; VI. Religious Romanticism. Or, viewing these tendencies as in their origin reactionary, they may be ranged as:

1. Disgust with the Political Present; 2. Disgust with the Literary Present; 3. Disgust with the Artistic Present; 4. Disgust with the Social Present; 5. Disgust with the Moral Present; 6. Disgust with the Theological Present.

At some of the "disgusts" which are above enumerated we propose, guided by Herr Nippold, for a few moments, to glance.

1. *Disgust with the Political Present.*

For, complete as was, apparently, the restoration of legitimacy by the Congress of Vienna, the second-class princes and nobility of Germany felt, even at the outset, that the ground on which they stood was insecure. The liberation-war (Freiheits-krieg) had evoked a popular element ominously like that which had destroyed Louis XVI., and which had driven into exile the French noblesse. Without this popular aid the battle of Leipsic would not have been won. It was this that gave such splendid enthusiasm to the German arms, as well as such immense accessions to the German armies. Without this Austria and Prussia would have remained second-class powers, while the minor princes and nobility would have continued the obsequious satellites of Napoleon. They owed their release from this fawning slavery to the people; but they did not feel comfortable at the alliance. The monster, it is true, had rescued them; but the monster might devour them, if he were not restrained; and, besides this, anything like a partnership in power with such a creature was odious. And then, again, intelligent statesmen, such as those who then guided the Prussian and Austrian courts, were not slow in giving as their opinion that "legitimacy" must throw off its feudal incumbrances; that the exclusive social privileges of the nobility must be moderated; that some deference, at
least, must be paid to popular rights. And then, in addition, the dangerous idea of German nationality was looming up, and was understood to be encouraged by the Prussian court. It was not a feudal nationality, such as that of the old Roman Germanic empire, that would be thus instituted; it was not a nationality in which the people would have no power, the emperor but little, while all real authority would be vested in princes and nobles. But it was to be a nationality, either military or popular, by which the nobility, as a class, would be humbled; by which the lesser principalities would be absorbed; and by which all power not possessed by the people would be vested in the central executive. It is no wonder that, under such circumstances, those who would be thus victimized should have objected. And it is no wonder, also, that, as this idea of nationality gradually approached realization, this objection should have become clamorous. The only way to meet the danger was to restore the old safeguards; the only way to prevent absorption was to restore feudalism—feudalism in church, as well as in state. In every petty court, Protestant as well as Romish, in every forlorn and decayed castle, whose inmates, incapable by their traditions of any useful labor, were living in impoverished pomp, the same cry arose: "The spirit of the age is degenerate. Prince and noble are shorn both of power and respect; the only course is to go back behind the Reformation, and restore the Middle Ages as they were. We must have back the old empire, and, of course, we must have back with it the old pope." ¹

Naturally enough did herds of the supernumeraries whose privileges were thus threatened turn wistful eyes to Vienna.

¹ Voss thus expressed this cry: "For the welfare of Germany we need unity of ecclesiastical, as well as of secular power, as in the mighty Middle Ages, when emperor and pope could keep an impious rebel in proper check. It becomes all officers of the empire to reverence the emperor and imperial law; it likewise becomes all faithful and orthodox believers to reverence the pope and the canon law. The secession of Luther and Zwingle have destroyed the unity of empire, as well as of church, have weakened Germany, and have checked true civilization."
and to Rome. Naturally enough did their bleatings shape themselves into moans over the demoralizing character of progress; on the ruin which would prostrate everything, if the old rights of the nobility were not restored; on the pastoral charms of the Middle Ages, when the peasant was a simpering hind and the lord a maudlin despot. Naturally enough did sympathetic Jesuits hurry up, at these cries of distress, and whisper into the ears of the alarmed and impotent train that their safety was to rush from the disorganized, revolutionary present back into the fold of the secure, primitive past. There they went, hurrying as fast as they could to antiquity, stimulated and comforted by their Jesuit guides. There is the list of them. It is published by Rosenthal and Rohrbacher, the pamphleteers of the Propaganda. It is reproduced by Nippold. Princes and princesses, noblemen and noble ladies, how proudly are they arrayed in all their ribbons and banners by their Romish leaders! And with what imposing circumstantiality are their pedigrees sounded by their heralds, as they approach their goal! Reigning princes, consisting of that branch of the Coburgs which was to repair its ruined fortunes by marriage with Romish princesses! Mediatized princes, who awoke after the Congress of Vienna, and found that their subjects and their territory had, during the revolution, gone from underneath them! Counts and countesses, barons and baronesses, each accompanied, no doubt, by a due proportion of chamberlains and ladies in waiting! There is something pathetic in the procession, as, in the due order of their rank, they pass before us in their poverty, their dethronement, their fantastic reactionary demeanor and attire, bidding their adieu to the nineteenth century, and betaking themselves to the tenth. But, touching as the picture may be, we are amazed that the Propaganda should unfold it. They left, because they could not tolerate the present, and were not tolerated by it; and to cite them as an illustration of the tendency of the present to Rome is certainly as extraordinary as it would be to appeal to the
flight to England of American loyalists, after the Revolution, as a proof that the United States were struggling to get back under the British crown. And no Protestant can gaze on these high-born converts without a feeling of satisfaction. Some of them were absurd and doleful; others were absurd and frivolous. Some were men of true chivalry, but as mad as Don Quixote; others were selfish adventurers; but in one respect they agreed,—their pretensions were so monstrous, and their system so diseased, that the atmosphere congenial to them would be insupportable to ordinary healthful life. Whatever else the installation at Rome of such anachronisms may prove, it certainly does not show that Rome is a harbor of refuge for the representatives of modern political thought.

2. Disgust with the Literary Present.

It is a great reproach to German literature that at the time of the first Napoleonic tyranny so many eminent German thinkers should have withdrawn into epicurean seclusion, or should have been willing to treat of any subject except those which directly related to the national life. It was natural that by such men the real and the present should be ignored; since, if they touched at all on the real and the present, they could scarcely avoid noticing the mean sycophancy with which their princes fawned on their conqueror, or the odious oppressions the conqueror imposed on the land. So, to escape such themes, Fichte lost himself in subjective idealism; and Goethe fell into raptures over Chinese and tea-roses; and Fouqué discoursed about shadows and water-nymphs; and Jean Paul devoted his inimitable genius to the immortalizing of whatever was grotesque enough to be impossible. Soon this extravagance became contagious, and there arose a school of "Romanticists," as they were called, each of whom selected from the mystical past some ideal lady of fancy, to whom he consecrated his exclusive regards. Some personified, for this purpose, the genius of heathen mythology; and among these we are sorry
to remember that Schiller was for a time enrolled. Others vowed their devotions to the purely poetic element in primitive Christianity, making it the mistress to whom their lances were pledged. Others sighed, like Rousseau, at the feet of a sentimental philanthropy, whose real children were sent to the poor-house, while its imaginary brotherhood was idealized into an Arcadia. And others, conspicuous among whom were Friedrich Schlegel, Müller, and Werner, dedicated themselves to the chivalric service of the saints of the mediaeval church.

It is said that there are Spanish convents in which the nuns, compelled to live in idleness, take to the dressing and fondling of dolls. We certainly all of us know how surely a divorce from active and real life engenders extravagant and capricious humors and enthusiasms. And the Romanticists had divorced themselves most effectually from all that was real and present; and, by long association, their particular extravagancies were so imbedded in them that when the public mind was restored to a healthy condition these extravagancies had become a second nature, and could not be got rid of. So it was with Schlegel and his romanticism about mediaeval heroes, princes, and saints. Wherever he went to lecture,—and for lecturing his natural gifts were great,—this romanticism stuck to him; and to some parts of young Germany it was inexpressibly heavy; to others, inexpressibly grotesque. He went to Cologne, under the shadow of whose dome, and in the centre of whose feudal memories, he could at least expect deference; but at Cologne he was unnoticed by all that savored of active, present life. Only ancient “Catholics” attended his lectures; only Jesuits uttered his praise. So he himself writes, and so writes his wife, in letters since published, in which with the greatest bitterness they denounce the realism of an age that shut its ears to the Romanticists, and refused to listen to their songs. He was wretchedly poor; and when we recollect the gallant extravagance with which he originally pranced forth on his early tournaments, and the popular applause which then
greeted him, we cannot but be saddened on viewing the desolation and want into which he fell. And yet there is truth, as well as point, in Gervinus's remarks, when, after narrating the dissolution of the Romanticists, and after mentioning the retreats in which these superannuated enthusiasts found shelter, he says: "Some who, like F. Schlegel, Müller, and Werner, removed to Vienna, made their new creed [the Romish] remunerative, and derived from it not merely repose, but income." To each of these forlorn fugitives comfortable offices were assigned. They found, what elsewhere they could not have found, sympathizers and co-groaners and supporters; they were rescued not merely from the ridicule which the veteran and inveterate Romanticists encountered in the practical circles of the living present, they were rescued, also, from starvation. That they should thus have been comforted and entertained was but right. The amazing feature is, that the Propaganda should now put forward the Romish absorption of the literary Romanticists as a proof of the Romeward tendency of modern thought. It is as if we should point to the owl creeping into a dark hole, as a proof that birds shun the light. The Romanticists of this school crept into Rome, because in the open world they were shunned as obsolete by the practical, and tittered at as ridiculous by the unthinking. They crept into Rome, because their sight had been so long adjusted to the phantoms of an unreal life that the daylight of the real and the practical was to them a blur and distress.

3. Disgust with the Present in Art.

So far as architecture is concerned, the question is easily solved. The dispute is an old one; it is that between the eye and the ear as the avenues of instruction — which is to be the subordinate? Are buildings for public worship to be constructed in the way which will best enable thought to pass through the ear by way of language, or in the way that will best enable it to be displayed to the eye by means of pictures? Now, between the two systems, the first is the
Protestant in the construction of churches, and the second, the Romish. The first says: "Give me a building in which the preacher's voice can be best heard by the largest number of persons." The second says: "Give me a building which will itself, through the eye, most deeply impress the religious sensibilities, and which will afford the most effective and imposing stage for the spectacles of the altar and the processions of the nave, and for the numerous statues and pictures by which religious truths may be symbolized." Now, while fully admitting the claims of architecture as an art, — while fully admitting the powerful influence on the imagination of noble and richly-adorned buildings, there can be no doubt that between the two ways of communicating thought, that by picture or figure and that by word, the former is the mark of a more barbaric and ignorant, the latter of a more cultured and mature, age. The teaching of picture or spectacle is limited to but a few combinations of expression; is stiff and inflexible, and cannot be varied, as can the preacher's speech, from day to day and from moment to moment, to meet the worshipper's wants; is expensive and almost unattainable in its better phases, and approaches to the ridiculous in the lower; and is liable to draw forth, instead of the worship of heart and soul, sometimes a sensuous worship, sometimes worship that is merely sentimental, sometimes gross idolatry. Feel as tenderly as we may the charms of art, we cannot but see that to subordinate, in this respect, the ear to the eye, is to push worship, if not the worshipper, back into a grosser and more barbarous age. That an architect, filled with enthusiasm for his art, should revolt at the Protestant demands in this respect, should not surprise us. Plainness, if not ugliness, seems inseparable from all buildings whose object is the easiest transmission of the voice. Nor is it by any means clear that when the end is to impart unbroken the current of thought, columns imbedded with statues, niches rich with pictures, do not tend almost as much to distract the attention as they do to break the sound. Westminster Abbey can only be made fit for public
worship by letting down heavy sheets of canvass, which cover up the historic walls, while they shut in the speaker's utterances; and, though we may reproduce Westminster Abbey for other purposes,—as a national monument, or as a great and sublime work of art,—yet when an audience-chamber is to be effectively constructed, something like these canvass-sheets must be invoked. Protestantism, therefore, affords but little field for ecclesiastical architecture, while Romanism opens a sphere in which it can lavish its richest treasures, can exercise its sublimest genius, can win its most glorious reward. We need not wonder, therefore, at the tendency of ecclesiastical architects towards Rome, or towards those high ecclesiastical theories by which the Romish idea of worship is adopted. But with all personal deference to such men,—with the highest appreciation of architecture as a means for elevating the public taste, and of making almost perpetual certain grand rudimental ideas in patriotism, and even in religion, we have to say that the disgust of ecclesiastical architecture in this respect with Protestantism is a disgust with the nineteenth century; is a disgust with printing and common-school education, which have made nine tenths of our population more approachable through language than by picture; is a disgust with the necessary conditions of this age and country, as distinguished from the obsolete conditions of four centuries ago.

And so with painting. The objections of the Reformers to pictures as incidents of public worship arose not merely from what might be considered an overstrained interpretation of the second commandment,—not merely from the shock which men of severe taste and high religious tone must receive from the hideous or absurd representations of things sacred by which three fourths of the continental churches are disgraced,—but from an intuitive sense that the era which was opening was to be an era, as has just been stated, in which men, by the force of living words, and not through the un-plastic and often false picture, were to be brought to know God. We cannot, indeed, blame those great
painters, who, absorbed with enthusiasm for their art, desirous of making that art the minister not of sensual life, not of inanimate nature, but of religious thought, have revolted at this stern decree, accepted, as it has been, as one of the fundamental maxims of Protestantism. There is no law, no matter how wise, but has its dark side; and undoubtedly there is this dark side to the law of which we speak, that it silences, as it were, in the sanctuary, the ministry of painting, so far as painting undertakes to exhibit dogma. But in view of the great principle we have just stated,—in view of the fact that where there exists one picture capable of giving a true conception of the gospel, or of Him from whom the gospel springs, there are countless myriads which pervert that gospel, and exhibit our blessed Lord and Master in false or grotesque or even odious lights,—in view of the fact that the worship thus directed is thus often erroneous and almost always gross,—we feel that the decree is right, and must be rigorously maintained. We look, it is true, with sadness on Overbeck, on Schadow, on Vogel, on Veit, on the long train of their scholars, as they leave the Evangelical German church, and join that of Rome. They were not frivolous men, nor men superannuated and fantastic, as were the patrician reactionists, whose perversion has already been recorded. Overbeck, the leader of the artistic Romanticists, was a compound, as Mr. Hilliard well says, of painter, gentleman, and monk. He was severe and pure as a man, and as an artist mighty and sublime, standing in the noblest contrast to the dissolute race of painters whom he succeeded. His quarrel with them was a right one. He was right in saying that Raphaelism and Titianism had been pushed into a sensualism of subject and of coloring which both enervated art and demoralized

1 Archdeacon Hare, in his charge of 1843, speaks of similar migrations from the church of England: "One man became a Romanist (in Germany), because he admired the knights of the Middle Ages; another, because he admired the pictures of Perugino and the earlier works of Raphael; others, because they admired the architecture of our ancient churches and cathedrals. How strong this latter temptation is we have seen of late in England."
the artist. He was right in saying that to portray the graceful and the lovely alone was not the sole, or even the highest object of art. But he was wrong, even artistically, when his reaction became retrogression, and when, in recalling the sublimer theories of the pre-Raphaelites, he thought himself bound to revive the stiff drawing and the rude colors by which the pre-Raphaelites were marked. And morally, also, were he and his disciples wrong in their quarrel with Protestantism, because in this respect they also quarreled not with Protestantism, but with the century in which they lived and the higher conditions of the faith to which they were devoted. Ungenerous it would be to say that they left the evangelical church because the evangelical church closed its sanctuaries to their pictures, while Rome enshrined these pictures on its altars. But right is it to say that they went to Rome because Rome perpetuates the conditions of sensuous worship and scenic instruction, while these conditions Protestantism rejects. Their disgust, also, was not simply with Protestantism, but with the age we live in and the culture this age has reached.

4. Disgust with the Social Present; 5. Disgust with the Moral Present.

Here we rise to a still higher class of converts, following the gradual ascent we began, as we previously passed from the romanticism of the retrogressive aristocrat to the romanticism of the retrogressive artist. It is impossible to view without an increased tenderness of interest the men whom Nippold arrays before us under the last-mentioned heads, and the men who under similar influences have fled to Rome in our own land. The "disgusts" we have now to treat of are those of noble, though really unsound, minds. We can arrange in certain well-known classes those German perverts here introduced to us; and we can find, with slight variations, the same classes among ourselves. The general cause is heart-sickness and exhaustion from unrest, whether social or moral; and the motive-power of the perversion is
the belief—a belief utterly delusive, as we will presently show, but to a diseased understanding not unnatural—that certainty and rest and peace are to be found in a system where the external and formal is declared to be perpetual and immutable. The unrest which leads to this romantic moral reaction is of various kinds. There is the unrest of society—the turbid tossings of the great social sea, tossings which make an earthly haven, if there be such, the object of such fond desire. And there is also the apparent godlessness of the life about us; the misery, the crime, the uproar which it is so easy to attribute not to the want of inner principle, from which they really spring, but to the want of a vigorous external church. Such are the conditions from which men like Brownson in America and Adam Müller in Germany have turned to seek in the Romish church that rest which it is not the divine will should be found anywhere short of the heaven of peace and of joy. And then there is that feeling of alarm which is caused by the spectacle of governmental or popular interference with general ecclesiastical institutions. Several cases of migration from this cause in Germany are detailed by Nippold. In England it was Lord Grey’s measure for the consolidation of Irish sees, in connection with the reform bill, that first brought Dr. Newman and his immediate associates—so Dr. Newman has recently told us—to the conclusion that they could no longer remain in the English church. And then what is called the sect spirit is constantly impelling nervous and morbid minds in the same direction. The very exuberance with which, in a free country, religious individualism manifests itself,—the tendency to disintegration, and to the erection of new communions, in which sometimes in the most extravagant relief are brought out the antagonisms and prepossessions of their founders,—all this, which, deplorable as it is, is but a rank growth of early, unrestrained life, a growth of excessive vigor, which as maturity approaches, and the uniformity of settled society diffuses its cohesive influence, will give way to more symmetrical development,
all this alarms the timid and morbid, and prompts them to seek some ecclesiastical fold where form, at least, is stable, and where the outside, at least, is at rest.

Now, there are two remarks to be made as to this temper. The first is that conservatism does not necessarily involve immutability of form or frame. On this topic, the following striking observations of Bluntschli, as quoted by Nippold, are worthy of study:

"The ideas which we have to combat have neither the glow of youth nor the ripeness of manhood; they are essentially effeminate. Chief among these is the longing for rest and stability. The theory that these were to be the prime objects of society was proclaimed, after the reaction of 1815, as the highest grade of political wisdom, and was falsely stamped with the name of conservatism. But the true conservative is far too powerful and too active to love rest for itself. He desires restoration, it is true, but it is such restoration only as sleep gives after a day's toil. But the absolutist views this stability as the highest good—a good that secures all the enjoyments of life. He loves rest as rest. In this idea of stability, on the other hand, the conservative sees an ignoring of the necessary motion of life and of the unavoidable changes of things. When nations are exhausted, either by revolution or by war or by any great labors and exertions, then, naturally, they are for the time disposed to rest, seeking, as it were, sleep. This is absolutism's opportunity, and this opportunity it can most adroitly use. The absolutism of the last century was not reactionary, because it paved the way for the transition from the Middle Ages to the conditions of modern life. But the absolutism of the present century is reactionary, because it opposes its antiquated conceptions and fancies to the youthful energies of a new era. It neither understands nor likes the present. Its thoughts are turned backward to the lost paradise of clerical and aristocratic mediaevalism.

"The absolutist exults in the claim that he reverences law and establishes order. But his law is without life, and his
order without freedom. He elevates the form of law over its spirit, and exaggerates the mere technicalities of the letter. If the choice is open to him between right and might, he chooses the latter. For might permits no doubt, and therefore tolerates no agitation.

"In the order of the Jesuits we find absolutism developed in its most dangerous and its most portentous phase. It is characteristic that Jesuitism should have sprung up in the last absolutist period of the Middle Ages; should, during the following centuries of absolutism, have become dominant in so many Roman Catholic countries; should have fallen contemporaneously with the diffusion of modern light in the European horizon; should have been restored contemporaneously with the attempted restoration (after the Vienna treaty) of pre-revolutionary life; and should now be the armed antagonist of modern life, protected by the absolutism of courts, partly from fear, partly from sympathy."

In view of the fact, stated by Nippold, that almost every representative of morbid reactionary conservatism — almost every pilgrim for an illusory ideal of repose who takes refuge in Rome — ends with the adoption or the vindication of Jesuitism, the following gains peculiar significance: "In an army the principle of mechanical obedience to authority is necessarily accepted. By the Jesuit, however, this principle is transferred to religion in a manner that annihilates the freedom of the members of the society and makes them the involuntary instruments of an exterior will. The ostensible object of the order is personal holiness, evangelization, submission to the divine will. In its members it destroys, by careful discipline and mortification, all individual ambition. But, in truth, its object is the absolute control and absorption of society to serve its own purposes; and the ambition of its members it consolidates and nerves into the insatiable ambition of the aggregate order — an ambition which would both enslave men's souls and absorb their wealth. Jesuits can never be free men. Instead of principles, they have
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maxims; instead of settled laws, a secret, elastic casuistry; instead of the open deed, the concealed intrigue."

But there is another view, in which we advance a step further than the acute thinker whom we have just quoted. The rest and harmony which are attained by a submission to Rome only extend to the surface; they do not subdue the inner perturbations of the soul. This the following considerations will show:

Time, as Lord Bacon says, is the greatest of destructives; and truth must be constantly employed in repairing the ravages which time makes. Thus time is uninterruptedly employed in changing the meaning of words; and truth must, therefore, from era to era, betake herself to maintaining the integrity of principles which otherwise would shift with language. "It would be manifestly desirable," says Archbishop Trench, speaking of such changes, "that these unnoticed obstacles to our seizing the exact sense of scripture—obstacles which no carelessness of our translators, but which time in its onward course has placed in our way—should, in case of any revision, be removed. 'Res fugiunt, vocabula manent.' This is the law of things in their relation to words, and it renders necessary, at certain intervals, a readjustment of the two." Thus time, at the advent of Christ, made obsolete the terms "priest" and "sacrifice," except so far as they were types of the one High Priest, eternal in the heavens, and his perfect sacrifice on the cross. The church of Rome, in clinging to the absolute form, has been the destructive assailant of the essential principle. Here Rome is the agitator and the radical; but the Truth, the conservative.

So with regard to the Orientalisms of the New Testament, which now, when used literally, are shorn of the spiritual meaning in which they were originally applied. Time, in transferring the Gospels, so far as concerns ourselves, from Oriental to Occidental use, has given these terms the hue of a gross materialism, which the church of Rome has accepted and enforced. "This is my body," and so the
priest, Christ's successor, creates the Lord whom he succeeds. "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church," and so the faith is subordinated to the mutable and fallible successors of Peter, instead of the successors of Peter to the immutable and infallible faith which Peter professed. Here, again, is Rome the agitator and the radical, and the Truth the conservative.

So with regard to inspiration. Inspiration was a special and temporary gift communicated to the apostles, just as would be the case were a telescope of extraordinary powers placed in the hands of a body of astronomers, and then destroyed. In the latter case, it would be folly to predicate of succeeding observers an accuracy and authoritativeness they were no longer able to secure. The data which were obtained when the powerful instrument was in use must be taken as the basis of all subsequent calculation; it would be a destructive radicalism to submit these to the revision of the unarmed eye. And so it is with regard to the canonical scriptures. They were written when inspiration existed. When they were closed, inspiration ceased. In supplementing them by the utterances of uninspired men, Rome is the agitator and the radical, while Truth, in maintaining their sacred integrity, is the conservative.

So, again, it was a temporary condition of the church, at its founding, that its members should be grouped together in one close, visible organization, which, through the supernatural insight of the apostles, was made coincident with the communion of all sincere believers in Christ. The principles of faith and salvation are permanent and immutable; those of polity, which sprang from the supernatural insight and miraculous gifts of the apostles, were special and mutable, and were to be subordinated to the maintenance intact of the former. Hooker states this, when he declares: "So perfectly are these things [of faith and salvation] taught, that nothing can ever cease to be necessary; these [matters connected with the discipline of the visible church], on the contrary side, as being of a far other nature and quality,
are not so strictly and everlastingly commanded in scripture but that unto the complete form of a church polity much may be requisite which the scripture teacheth not, and much that it hath taught become unnecessary, because we need not use it—sometimes because we cannot.”¹ And again: “The rule of faith [quoting Tertullian] is but one, and that alone immovable and impossible to be framed or cast anew. The law of outward order and polity is not so.”² Rome makes the rule of faith mutable by subordinating it to what is now the peccable and mutable church. The Truth, on the other hand, makes the mystical church pure and perpetual, by subordinating it to the immutable and perfect faith. Here, again, Rome is the agitator and radical, and Truth the conservative.

So, again, as to usages and rites. “Nothing,” says Lord Bacon, “is so uproarious as a froward custom.” By which he means, we suppose, that there is nothing that produces so much disturbance and riot as the persistent enforcement of a custom that the body politic has outgrown. A boy whose parents should force him to wear through his boyhood his old child’s skirt may appear fractious enough at the absurd sight he presents and the awkward bandages in which he is swathed; but the real insubordinate element would be traceable to parents whose conservatism was so unique. The sheath which shelters the bud in its formation only crushes the flower when it begins to blow. The safety-valve, which must be kept down when the steam begins to form, must be opened when a high pressure comes, or the boiler will explode. Hood’s conservative old knight, who when the houses of parliament were burning, rushed to his seat, saying that he never would desert it, come what might, was not a conservative at all; he was an absurd radical, who pursued the fleeting form, deserting the essential substance; and yet Hood’s knight was but a type of toryism, such as that of Lord Eldon, which, in preserving the obsolete phraseology of the coronation service, would sacrifice

¹ Eccl. Pol., Book iii. chap. xi. 16. ² Ibid. chap. x. 7.
those great principles of reciprocal loyalty which that service was meant to express. For, while these great principles of loyalty remain steadfast, the crude symbols which form their expression in a nation's babyhood, must yield to well-weighed and exact sentences when the period of manhood comes. The college cannot retain the clappings and marchings and singings of the little pupils of the Kindergarten, nor parliament the monotone of the professor's chair. Hence it is that that which was necessary to convey instruction in the dark ages to barbarous and uneducated hearers now no longer quickens, but distracts spiritual thought. So, also, usages which were needed in apostolic times to protect the church when she was an outcast, are no longer appropriate when her worship has the support both of law and of public opinion. "It is not, I am right sure," said Hooker, in arguing with the puritans, who then took the position that all apostolic usage was jure divino immutable, while Hooker insisted that usage, even divinely directed, is mutable, and is to be changed so as to make it from age to age the fit exponent of immutable truth—"it is not, I am right sure, their meaning that we should now assemble our people to serve God in close and secret meetings; or that common brooks or rivers should be used for places of baptism; or that the custom of church-feasting should be renewed. In these things they easily perceive how unfit that were for the present which was for the past age convenient enough. The faith, zeal, and godliness of former times is worthily held in honor; but doth this prove that the orders of the church of Christ must be still the self-same with theirs—that nothing which then was may lawfully since have ceased?"¹ It is he who enforces a custom no longer intelligent and sensible who is "uproarious." The true conservative is he who seeks "the faith, zeal, and godliness" of apostolic times, and would adopt the forms and agencies by which this faith, zeal, and godliness may be best expressed.

Many like illustrations might be given; but between

Rome and the Truth the distinction may be generally stated as follows: Rome clings to the letter, and changes the essence as the letter shifts its meaning with time. The Truth clings to the essence, and adopts a new letter to express it when the old becomes obsolete or false. Or, to state the same proposition in another form: With Rome, doctrine is mutable, and organization immutable; with the Truth, organization is mutable, and doctrine immutable. Rome adds to or varies the volume of revelation, but declares its ecclesiastical mechanism to be infallible, unchangeable, and perpetual. With the Truth, the volume of gospel inspiration is complete, and by man its sense can neither be added to nor changed; but the hierarchy is fallible and imperfect, and is to be so moulded as to adapt it to the conditions of each particular country or age. In other words, while Rome presents stability of form, and hence instability of life, the truth presents stability of life, and hence flexibility of form. And, tenderly as we may view those who in seeking for rest ally themselves with Rome, we cannot but feel that from which they are reacting is not Protestantism merely, but a necessary condition of all life and truth.

1 Then, again, visible unity may be but that of a fagot, while mystical unity is that of the branches of the true Vine. The branches may be invisible, as the Vine is invisible, and the Husbandman who tends it is invisible. And yet the tie that unites the branches to the Vine, and makes them a living whole, is none the less essential because it is invisible. "In St. Paul's representation of the church, the unity of the one body springs from the unity of the indwelling Spirit; from the one Lord, who is the sole Head of his church; from the one faith, whereby it is united to him; from the one baptism, which is the initiation of that union; and from the one universal God and Father, who rules over all its members, and pervades them, and abides in them. In like manner, when St. Paul is speaking of manifold diversities of gifts and offices, and pointing out the necessity of these diversities, he at the same time declares that at the root of all these diversities there is a ground of unity, in that they are all the gifts and ordinances of one and the same Spirit. Here everything is spiritual; and when acting under this her heavenly Guide, the church will preserve the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." "When St. Paul is reproving the divisions at Corinth, he does not set himself up as a centre of unity; nor does he tell them that they must seek a centre of unity in St. Peter. He tells them that Paul is nothing, that Apollos is nothing, that Peter is nothing. But is his inference that they are therefore left to hopeless divisions? He does not say..."
6. Disgust with Orthodoxy.

It is at this point, as has already been incidentally mentioned, that we depart from Herr Nippold; and, in fact, apart from the considerations already mentioned, a scrutiny of the cases detailed by him in this portion of his work, shows that so far as the accessions from orthodoxy are concerned, reac-

that there is no foundation for them to rest on, nor that Peter is the foundation on which the church is to be built. He says merely that none can lay other foundation than that which has been laid already, and that this only foundation is Christ. In truth, this Romish inability to recognize the unity of the church without the help of a visible human centre, is only another instance of that miserable incapacity for faith in spiritual realities which, we have repeatedly observed, is the pervading character of Romanism.” — Arch. Hare, ut supra.

And, once more, all the analogies of society are against the idea that religious peace is to be secured by submission to an infallible judge. Rome says: “In every phase of society we must take our duties from others—the child from the parent, the servant from the master, the suitor from the judge.” But, as Archdeacon Hare well observes, the analogy points the other way: “Children need guides, and have fallible ones. Pupils need guides, and have fallible ones. Nations need guides, and have fallible ones.” And as in social matters, so in ecclesiastical. Nothing can be less peaceful than the clothing of authority with infallibility. The Highland chief who insisted on having his whole clan vaccinated by force, had right on his side, so far as vaccination itself is concerned; but to bring in by force troops of grown and even aged men, struggling, kicking, and screaming, in order to have the virus communicated to them, without explanation, was far more objectionable, and certainly far more riotous, than would have been the slower process of explaining to them what vaccination meant, and obtaining their free consent. The imposition of infallibility may produce peace in the same way that destroying the vital powers destroys pain. Or it may drive men off from religious controversy, just in the same way that imperialism drives men off from political controversy; but the result in the one case is spiritual, in the other political, degeneration. But, if it means the inculcation of doctrine by force, then the result is uproar not unlike that of the Highland clan to which we have referred. If doctrine be viewed as anything else than a matter of mere indifference, then there is nothing the soul resents so convulsively as the attempt to impose such doctrine on it by force. And so absolute submission by itself destroys true faith. But this “is not God’s mode of dealing with his human creatures. In the whole scheme of our redemption the help which is granted to us is to elicit a corresponding energy in us. The eye drinks in the light, and puts forth its faculty of seeing. So every truth communicated to the mind is the awakener and stimulater of an intellectual energy. Thus, and thus alone, truth becomes power. We are not supplied with leading-strings to draw us blindfold to the truth. But we have every help, each according to his need; and if we make a right use of
tion from orthodox severity was in no sense a motive power propelling to Rome. Let us examine this position a little in detail.

Take, for instance, the history of Scotland and of England. Undoubtedly the reign of puritan and of covenanters was followed by a reaction; but it was not a reaction Romeward. If in the days of the puritan and the covenanters, the letter was unduly elevated over the spirit; if there was a tendency to bind down the gospel by a series of minute ascetic observances, by which a temper of legal fear was substituted for that of faithful love, men did not seek relief by a recourse to Rome. The excess which they reacted from was that of undue restraint: that which they rebounded to was undue liberty. Because they found the bonds of the letter grievous, they revoluted also against the bonds of the spirit. Because that which was merely mutable—as Hooker so well taught—in the apostolic practice was unduly pressed on them, they discarded that which was truly immutable, that which was the eternal essence of the gospel of Christ. A reign of laxity and of rationalism followed; and it was not until men saw how perilous this laxity was, and how hollow this rationalism, that the reaction began towards Rome. Of course we do not class under this head such inconsistent bigots as James II., or such miserable time-servers as his courtiers; though, as far as there was any religious sincerity in them, they were impelled by disgust, not at that which was orthodox in the

what we have, and seek for more, under the guidance of God's Spirit, meekly, patiently, diligently, we shall assuredly have more and more of this truth made manifest to us" (Archdeacon Hare's Charge of 1800, p. 35). Infallibility shuts, close to the eye, the lid of the telescope of faith. But the truth lifts this lid, and bids us strain our sight through it, and, though our vision is fallible, and the telescope is fallible, yet in this way alone is Christ revealed. Then, again, by one of the conditions of our nature, just as an infallible principle reaches us only through a fallible form, so an infallible form involves a fallible principle. Rome offers an infallible form in the papacy, tendering a peremptory decision on every disputed point; but when we go back from the form to the principle, we find contradiction, intrigue, and corruption. The truth, on the other hand, confesses to fallible forms. Language changes, doctors vary, councils err; but above us, as a centre of unity, is Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.
puritan creed, but at that which was lawless in those by whom the puritans were followed. But we do speak of the cases of men of true piety who then, and subsequently, have passed from orthodox churches to the church of Rome; and what we have to say is that what took them over, was not disgust at the orthodoxy these churches cherished, but dread of the rationalism by which this orthodoxy was assailed. Those of this class who are cited by Nippold bear this testimony: “The atonement, the incarnation, were doubted, were imperilled; we sought refuge in a communion where they would be unquestioned.” It will be seen, therefore, that we have ascended to a still higher range than that which we reached in viewing the former “disgusts.” Those who now pass before us are serious, devout men, who feel that they must live by faith, and not by sight, and that in the poverty of this life of show and sense, it is the supernatural alone that can feed the soul. Christ as a reality is what they crave; and it is a sad thing that they should leave the region where he can be viewed directly by the spiritual eye, for that in which between him and the believer are interposed distorting ordinances or erring men. And yet so it is; and this class of refugees, seeing that out of Rome Christ is denied, fly to Rome as a secure retreat, just as would men, who, perplexed with the quiver and refraction of the noon-tide air, should hide in a dark cave in order to see straight. The doctrines of the Trinity and of the atonement, as we have seen, they find are attacked by the rationalist; therefore they go to Rome, in order to hold these doctrines in peace. And yet where could there be a greater mistake! For the doctrine of the Trinity is assailed in truth at Rome, not by denying the Godhead of Son or Spirit, but by adding the Godhead of virgin and saint. The assailants of the Trinity are enthroned at Rome; not indeed, in the persons of Socinus, arguing only for the schoolman, or of Hegel, rhapsodising only for the philosophers, but in those of the virgin, appealing to a whole humanity, and of saints, appropriating each suppliant. And of the atonement, the religious and moral bearings are re-
versed. By the Truth, the atonement is applied by Christ on the cross; by Rome, it is applied by the priest at the altar. Hence it comes to pass that that which is free in the gospel doctrine of the atonement is limited by Rome, and that which is limited in the gospel doctrine of the atonement is free in Rome. The gospel offers the atonement to all who approach in obedient faith. Rome limits it to those to whom the priest communicates. The gospel limits the atonement to those spiritually united to Christ. Rome enlarges it to all who are technically united to the church. And the consequences are tremendous. The gospel is deformed by reversing its conditions and man is imperilled by making his religion to consist in a submission of the lips, and not a conversion of the heart.

And then, finally, so far from theological certainty being secured at Rome, the late council has accumulated about the approach to the papal see a mass of doubts and difficulties the greatest that any religious faith has yet had to remove. Contrast, for a moment, the points of belief demanded by the gospel with the points of belief demanded by Rome.

By the gospel I am required simply to believe that Christ Jesus died to save sinners, and that such a sinner am I.

But by Rome I am required to believe, (1) that the "rock" spoken of in Matt. xvi. 18, was St. Peter, though the sense is non-natural, and though of the numerous primitive Fathers, including Origen, Crysostom, Hilary, Augustine, Cyril, and Theodoret, who have commented on this passage, there is no one who even hints such an interpretation; some of them applying the term to Christ himself, some of them to the body of the apostles; and yet, if I do not believe that the rock was Peter, I am anathematized; (2) that the "rock," in opposition to the consent of the early Fathers, and to all sound criticism, includes with Peter, his successors in the see of Rome; and if I deny this, I am also anathematized; (3) that Luke xxii. 32, where our Lord prays that Peter's faith fail not, contains an assurance of infallibility to Peter's successors, although such a view was not even suggested.
until the seventh century; and if I do not believe this also, I am anathematized; (4) that each single pope has been infallible, though popes have contradicted each other, and some popes have been deposed for heresy, and others have pronounced their predecessors to be heretical, and others have been dissolute sceptics; and yet, if I do not believe in this infallibility of each single pope, I am anathematized; (5) and then, if on the authority of the council which declares these anathemas, I believe all this, I must also believe that there has been an actual succession of duly consecrated popes from St. Peter's day to the present; though this involves the most laborious historical research in periods where the deepest obscurity prevailed, and the grossest fabrications abounded; (6) I must believe, also, that each decree of each of these popes is right, including the decree that condemned Galileo, the decree that declared America to be the perpetual fief of the kings of Spain, and the decree approving of the massacre of the Huguenots; for if I disbelieve in either of these decrees then the whole doctrine of infallibility falls: (7) and then, if I decide affirmatively all these points (and to decide either negatively explodes the whole system), and if in this way I arrive at a human tribunal capable of communicating to me this supposed certainty and rest, I find myself at the monstrous conclusion that the pope must first certify to me the existence of a God, before I can assure myself of the existence of a God to give authority to the pope.

In some of the Swiss lakes are still to be found traces of men who, to avoid the agitations of the mainland, formed for themselves dwellings built on stakes at some distance from the shore. It may have been that dread of a superior civilization drove them to this step; it may have been that desire for seclusion and rest made them seek an abode thus insulated; but if they thus sought quiet and security, quiet and security were not thus obtained. The enemies they thought to escape could pursue them still. The storms and avalanches that swept the shore descended no less fiercely on the lake. And then a peculiar danger was theirs. On
the land the solid earth was beneath them, and this, at least, could not give way. But on the lake their dwellings rested on a multitude of wooden piles; and if either of these should rot, or should be struck down by storm, or be cut by an enemy, then the whole edifice tottered. And not unlike this is the condition of the romantic retrogressionists who seek Rome for peace. They abandon the solid ground of simple, self-evidencing faith. And they take refuge on a theological platform which rests on hundreds of props, the destruction of either of which is the destruction of the whole. And on one if not all of these, the storm may any day irresistibly strike. And then comes the wreck of absolute unbelief.

ARTICLE II.

THE POSITION AND METHODS OF THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR.

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The progress of society depends upon men of intellectual strength and culture. The chiefs of the savage tribe are the strong men, like Red Cloud; but the wise man must take the place of the strong man before civilization is possible. These intellectual leaders need a special discipline. Hence the college and the university, not for the many, but for the few who have been endowed by nature with abilities for leadership. As the wants of society are various, there are a number of distinct departments of action for these educated leaders. Each department rests upon some permanent want of society. There has always been a necessity for a class of public men, in distinction from private — the leaders and teachers of men, physicians, lawyers, ministers, and interpreters of nature; men of poetic abilities, which are of power, as Milton says, "to imbreed and cherish in a great

1 This Article is the substance of an Oration delivered before the Alumni of the University of Vermont, August 3, 1870.