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THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JEWISH SACRIFICES.

IN the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for January, 1859, an Article appeared on Jewish Sacrifices. The Article which follows is meant as a sequel to that. The materials for it have been derived from the chapters of Bähr's *Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus* which relate to sacrifices. The writer undertakes to do nothing more than exhibit Bähr's views, assuming no responsibility as to their correctness.

Two classes of religious rites were prescribed in the Levitical law — sacrificial rites and rites of purification. The former were obviously the more important and significant; the rites of purification, for the most part, deriving their efficacy from the sacrifices with which they were required to be connected. It is with sacrifices exclusively that we are now concerned.

The origin of sacrifices is not to be referred to the time of Moses. They are known to have been in use in the patriarchal age, and even at a period yet more remote — that of Cain and Abel. And, indeed, the allusion to sacrifices as performed by Cain and Abel is in such terms as to give ground to the supposition that they were not then performed for the first time. In short, sacrifices seem to have been the earliest, the most general, and certainly the most significant form in which religious homage has been expressed. The form of the sacrificial rites, at the earliest

date at which we find any traces of them, is substantially the same as that which has prevailed in all subsequent periods. The objects meant to be offered in sacrifice were burned in certain sacred places. Yet, along with the general uniformity, some diversity was allowed. No fixed, definite rules were observed. Every man who offered a sacrifice did what the nature of the rite seemed to him to require, or what his own inward religious feeling prompted.

The Levitical law, which in general did away with whatever wore the aspect of caprice and arbitrariness, aimed especially to give a definite form to those rites in which its own significance may be said to have been concentrated, and which contained within themselves every element of religious homage—the rites of sacrifice. It laid down the most minute rules in reference to these; so that what had hitherto been most simple became much more comprehensive and more variously expressive. The most trivial features of these rites seem to have been very carefully attended to. Those who esteem all sacrifices as a mere outward ceremony, or as the outgrowth of superstitious views of the nature and character of the Divinity, will be apt to regard what we have here said was done by Moses as a step backward towards the darkness and ignorance of a barbarous age. But, unless we are to regard the whole Mosaic ritual as such a backward step, we ought not to regard what was done in relation to sacrifices in such a light. What the Mosaic law may be said to be in general—an instructor, a schoolmaster—the law of sacrifices may be said to be in a more precise and peculiar sense. By means of its nicely adjusted and comprehensive ritual, the law becomes a teacher of outward religion; preserving men from a comfortless, because a meaningless, superstition; prescribing to every rite its exact form and limit, and a real and momentous significance. It becomes, at the same time, an instrument of inward religious culture, by imparting a healthful religious knowledge. It is doctrine; but doctrine in the form of symbols, deeds, facts; just such as was most happily suited to the needs of the people and the age. As

associated with a ritual like that enjoined by Moses, as constituting its very substance, sacrifices, instead of being stigmatized as a step backward, should be viewed as a step in advance. It is true that sacrifices ceased at the time of Moses to be the simple rite which they had formerly been; but in losing their simplicity they sustained no damage. A thing does not, as a matter of necessity, approach the more nearly to completeness and perfection in proportion as it becomes simple.

Three points relating to the subject of sacrifices require a moment's attention in this place—the matter of the sacrifice or the object offered; the rites by which the offering was accompanied; the different purposes which the whole process was in different cases meant to effect.

The matter of sacrifices consisted partly of animals and partly of the productions of the soil. There arose from this the distinction of bloody sacrifices and those which were not bloody. Not all animals nor all vegetable productions were allowed to be used in sacrifices. The use of unclean animals was expressly interdicted; and of clean animals, oxen, sheep, and goats are particularly mentioned as suited to sacrificial purposes. It was required that the animals meant to be sacrificed should be of a certain age, and free from blemish or imperfection. In certain cases, also, the sex of the animal was fixed. It was sometimes permitted to substitute doves in the place of the animals usually offered. The number of animals proper to be offered, in particular cases was carefully stated.

The sacrifices not bloody consisted of fine meal of different kinds, and bread. Oil was to be mixed with the meal, or to be poured upon the cake. After the settlement of the Israelites in Canaan, wine was employed, as were also salt and incense; while honey and leaven were invariably forbidden. The sacrifices not bloody are to be regarded as mere appendages of the bloody; the quantity of the material used in them varying according to the kind of sacrifice with which they were joined.

The rites with which the offering was accompanied were substantially these: The individual proposing to offer a sacrifice presented the victim at the altar, and, having first solemnly placed his hands upon its head, put it to death. The priest then either poured the blood into a vessel, or else sprinkled it in different places, according as the particular nature of the sacrifice required the one or the other to be done. After the skin of the animal had been removed, the flesh was, in most cases, burned on the altar, either in whole or in part. What was not burned was afterward eaten, in some cases by the priest alone; in others, by the priest and the person by whom the offering was presented. In certain instances no part of the animal was eaten, but the whole was burned without the camp.

The purpose meant to be answered by sacrifices was in all cases substantially the same; and yet there was in some respects a variety — certain sacrifices having in view a special subordinate end; and in such instances the forms and attendant rites were so changed as to adapt themselves to this special purpose. In this way the Levitical law came to recognize four varieties of sacrifices or offerings — burnt-offerings, thank-offerings, sin-offerings, and trespass-offerings. There were certain rites which were common to all these varieties; such as the imposition of hands, the putting to death, the sprinkling of blood, and the burning. The sprinkling of the blood was in different cases performed in a different manner; a peculiar significance being supposed to be attached to each different mode. A peculiar kind of animal, also, was required to be used in each of these varieties.

It was not to be expected that the provisions of the Levitical law relative to sacrifices would escape the assaults of rationalistic criticism. A ritual so rich, a ceremonial law so copious and minute, with all its parts so thoroughly perfected, and adjusted to each other with so much exactness, it is maintained, ought not to be considered as the work of one man, and especially of one who lived at a period so remote as that of Moses. Some scattered portions, the

rude outline, may be referred to Moses; but it is impossible that it should have reached the finished form in which we find it developed in the Pentateuch before the reign of Solomon, or even before the captivity.

If we ask, now, for the historical basis of this criticism, the reply we receive from the older assailants of the Pentateuch is, that the silence of the Book of Judges in regard to sacrifices is sufficient proof that the law of sacrifices could not have been in force in the ages anterior to the judges. De Wette, however, who does not by any means rank among the gentlest assailants of the Pentateuch, disowns this argument. It is not at all certain, he alleges, that, because we detect no traces of sacrificial laws during the period of the Judges, we must hence infer that the sacrificial laws were not in force at the time of Moses. Our knowledge of the religious usages of that dark period is not sufficiently accurate to afford a foundation for any such inference. Rites may have been in use of which no record has been transmitted. In short, the non-existence of a law at the time of Moses cannot be argued from its non-observance at a subsequent period. Yet De Wette, with evident inconsistency, allows in some cases the validity of the very inference which he here condemns as illogical. But if a portion of the Levitical law may have fallen into disuse at the period of the Judges, on account of the abnormal character of that period, and still its Mosaic origin not be denied on that account, why must we draw a different conclusion in other cases which, to all appearance, are precisely analogous? By the application of what test are we to discriminate the Mosaic from the post-Mosaic portions of the law? No attempt to apply such a test hitherto has been successful. On the contrary, Bleek has shown (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1831) that certain parts of the Levitical law — the sacrificial precepts, in Lev. i.—vii., the law of the great day of atonement, the law relative to leprosy and its purification — could have been promulgated by no other person than Moses. His reasoning on this subject can be refuted only by violence.

Now, if we can succeed in demonstrating a close connection between those portions of the sacrificial law which can thus be proved to be of Mosaic origin, and others whose origin is in dispute, shall we not be justified if we trace these latter portions to the same source? This internal connection being demonstrated, one principle evidently pervading the whole law, we must either reject the Mosaic origin of the whole, or concede it to the whole. But the former of these two things we cannot do, unless we are prepared to deny the validity of all historical proofs in relation to any subject.

The particularity and copiousness of the sacrificial precepts of the Levitical law have been insisted on as an objection to its Mosaic origin. Traces of the frivolous spirit of the Pharisees, and the gnat-straining tendency of the Rabbins can, it is said, be detected in them. But, in the first place, even a hasty glance at the rabbinical commentaries of the Talmud will reveal too palpable a contrast between them and the Pentateuch to admit of their being supposed for a moment to have been composed at the same time, or by the same author. Again, the minuteness and copiousness of the Mosaic religious precepts is not a characteristic peculiar to them. It is a common characteristic of the religious statutes of ancient nations. It seems to have been conceived that whatever was to have the character of law must leave no room for inference, but must make specific reference to the most minute transaction to which it could be supposed to be related. A comparison of the religious laws of the Hebrews with those of other Oriental nations—the Persians and Hindoos, especially—will be greatly to the advantage of the former. Still further, the objection we are dealing with rests upon the supposition that it was the intention of Moses to inculcate a meaningless ceremonial. But if it can be shown, and beyond question it can be, that the Mosaic precepts are uniformly significant—that they are pervaded by a single vital principle, apparent even in the most minute particular—the objection derived from their alleged excessive scrupulosity will appear to have but little foundation.

An additional word may here be allowed as to the unity of authorship in the case of sacrificial laws of Moses. This unity is denied by many as being impossible. It would seem, however, to be somewhat adventurous to attempt to decide beforehand what Moses—a man by whose side as a religious legislator no other deserves to be placed—could, or could not do. A system of religious laws carried out so consistently as his, comprising so many parts, all most happily adjusted to each other, one would think might much more easily be imagined the work of one powerful intellect, than of many inferior intellects, working without concert, and at intervals of centuries. When De Wette, therefore, on the one hand, denies to Moses the authorship of the sacrificial precepts, and yet triumphantly vindicates the priority in point of date of the three middle books of the Pentateuch to Deuteronomy, he obliges himself to undertake the solution of this difficult problem: the composition at any time between the age of Moses and that of David—a period so abnormal in all its characteristics—of laws copious, compact, and consistent like those of Moses. This problem, it is not too much to affirm, he has not succeeded in solving. He attributes to Moses, as already intimated, the outline and rudiments of these laws, but maintains that they reached finish and completion gradually, and as the result of experience; that the priests, at different periods, employed their leisure in filling out an ideal, such as they hoped might in some subsequent age be realized. It can hardly be believed, however, that Jewish priests, in ages so rude and uncultivated as were those which elapsed between Moses and David, would have acquired any such idealizing tendency as is here supposed, or could have found leisure for gratifying it. It is much easier to believe that one man, standing relatively alone as a legislator, framed the Jewish sacrificial ritual, than that it was the work of priests, working at long intervals and without concert. The ritual, on this latter supposition, would be apt to have had a loose and disjointed character, instead of the compactness and consistency which are now so apparent.

Much stress ought to be placed on the internal unity which runs through this ritual—a unity which is very obvious when the real significance and importance of its various parts are discerned. When this unity comes to be discerned, the hypothesis of a gradual composition of the law, at widely remote periods, and by men of very dissimilar characters, will be seen to be untenable. Our inquiry, therefore, into the nature and significance of the Jewish sacrifices is, in this view, if in no other, one of no small importance. On this inquiry we shall now enter.

Aside from its bearing on the genuineness of the Pentateuch, this inquiry has a direct dogmatic interest; and it is somewhat surprising that it has hitherto received so little attention. The difficulties by which, beyond doubt, this investigation is attended, have not, as one might think would have been the fact, attracted theologians to it. Evidently biblical scholars do not suspect how much yet remains to be done in this field, nor what rich fruit the labor would yield. It need only be added that the inquiry will not be conducted to any profitable issues, unless the investigator adheres closely to the biblical text, and keeps in view the intimate connection in which the sacrificial rites stand with the whole Mosaic worship.

The law of Moses, as we have seen, prescribed four varieties of sacrifices, distinguished from each other by difference of purpose and by different attendant rites. One general idea, however, exists in the midst of all this diversity. Our present inquiry relates to this fundamental idea, common to all sacrifices.

What, then, is the meaning of the term by which, in the law of Moses, sacrifices are designated, both in general and in each of their varieties? This term is קָרְבָּן, for the matter of the sacrifice, and זָבַח for the act of offering. This common term must be supposed to refer to a common element present in all sacrifices. The stem from which both these words are derived, it will be observed, is the same as that of the word used to describe the special function of

the Jewish priesthood—that of drawing near to Jehovah and presenting the sacrificial victim, or causing it to approach the altar. Thus it is apparent that the notion of the priesthood is closely related to that of sacrifice—that the two are, in fact, identical. This notion is that of drawing near to Jehovah for the purpose of procuring fellowship, or, in other words, removing the ground of that estrangement between God and man which has been occasioned by sin, or, still further, for the purpose of rendering men holy. Sacrifices are to be regarded as the means by which this fellowship between God and man is made possible—by which holiness, or a fitness to approach God, is procured. One may easily see, therefore, how erroneous is that conception of the nature of sacrifice which makes its central idea to be the bringing of a present.

Supposing it to be conceded that the idea which we have derived from the term used to designate sacrifices is the true one, the inquiry may still be urged: In what way does sacrifice serve as a means of fellowship between God and man? How does it procure for the sinner a fitness to approach the offended Divinity? There must be, it should seem, a real or a metaphorical adaptedness in the matter of the sacrifice to the production of this effect.

The matter of sacrifices, it must be borne in mind, belonged either to the animal or the vegetable kingdom; and sacrifices, consequently, are either bloody or not bloody. The latter stood to the former in a relation altogether subordinate. They were not used at all in sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, and whenever used appear only as appendages, having no separate significance. The bloody sacrifices, therefore, as no one can doubt, were altogether the more important class. In them the nature and validity of sacrifices were most distinctly and fully exhibited; and to these alone will our attention be directed in the following inquiry.

Fortunately we have one explicit declaration, a careful study of which will render further investigation as to the fundamental idea of sacrifices well-nigh superfluous. This

declaration is found in Lev. xvii. 11. The eating of blood is here forbidden on this ground — that the life of the flesh is in the blood; and Jehovah goes on to say: "I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." This passage is specially important on this account, that it does not refer to one species of sacrifice in distinction from others, but to the bloody sacrifices in general.

There can be found nowhere else so explicit and satisfactory a statement as to what constitutes the efficacy of sacrifices. It is the key to the whole subject. That confusion of thought and conflict of opposing theories which now exist on this subject would, in our judgment, have been avoided, if writers had taken their starting-point from this passage, and adhered tenaciously to it. What we have to say in regard to it will be arranged under four heads.

We notice, in the first place, the prominence here assigned to the blood. The passage makes no allusion to the act of offering the victim on the altar, nor to its death, as being the means of atonement, but speaks of the blood as the essential thing, as if the shedding of the blood were the central point of the transaction. Throughout the ceremonial law a similar prominence is given to the blood. The imposition of hands, the putting to death of the victim, the separation into pieces, might be performed by the person who presented the sacrifice; but the priest alone had it for his task to receive and sprinkle the blood. The scriptures are very explicit as to this matter. So, too, no part of the sacrifice was allowed to be carried into the interior of the sanctuary, or into the immediate presence of God, except the blood; and that part of the altar — the horns — which was esteemed its most sacred part, and without which it almost ceased to be an altar, was directed to be sprinkled with the blood. It seems obvious, then, that the blood, and the treatment of the blood in the sacrificial service, were its most essential features.

The testimony of Jewish tradition on this point is very

full and positive. A sacrifice in which one who was not a priest should venture to sprinkle the blood would, on that account, lose its validity. The sprinkling of the blood is declared to be the root, the very essence, of the sacrifice. The standing Jewish rule is, that there can be no expiation except by blood. The great antiquity of this maxim appears from its occurrence in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Without shedding of blood is no remission." On this account the sprinkling of the blood and the offering of sacrifice are regarded as convertible expressions. It is not, then, the putting to death, but the shedding and sprinkling of the blood, which give to sacrifices their validity. The treatment of the blood is to be viewed as the very radix and principium of the act.

Again, the passage under consideration uses the term "atonement" to define the object and efficacy of sacrifice. This is the technical term used more frequently than any other in the Pentateuch for this purpose. Much, consequently, depends on the right understanding of this term. Its primary, and indeed its chief, meaning is to cover or conceal. "In all our inquiries into the various senses wherein this term is used," says Suskind, "and into the significance of the different ceremonies connected with the act of atonement, this fundamental meaning of the term must be kept in mind." The word occurs in its proper sense only in Gen. vi. 14. In *Piel*, usage has affixed to it the meaning "to atone." Atonement, therefore, in harmony with this statement, must, it would seem, be equivalent to the covering up or concealing of that which God cannot allow to appear in his presence. That which is covered, being no longer visible, may be said to have in effect disappeared, or gone out of existence. Hence, in Hebrew phraseology, to cover up is the same as to remove or annihilate. Thus, in Jer. xviii. 23, it is said: "Forgive not their iniquity, neither blot out their sin from thy sight"; as if the forgiveness of sin and the blotting of it out were convertible expressions. With the Rabbins the word which we translate "to atone" means to deny, or to consider as

not in existence. They denominate a wicked man "a denier of God," because he acts and speaks as if God were not in being. In the act of atonement, therefore, that which is offensive to God, that which creates estrangement between him and men, is put out of sight—in effect, annihilated. Here it may be remarked, in passing, that, in the passage under consideration from Leviticus, atonement is spoken of as the purpose of every bloody sacrifice, without any reference to the particular variety to which it may belong. The inference is, that the idea of atonement lies at the basis of all sacrifices—that it is their essential characteristic. Blood is shed and sprinkled in every sacrifice, and therefore every sacrifice is of the nature of an atonement. Those, therefore, fall into a grave error who confine atonement to sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, to the exclusion of burnt and thank-offerings.

Again, the passage under review not only specifies atonement in a general way as the chief purpose of sacrifices, but defines the term yet more precisely, by stating from whom the atonement proceeds, and to whom it refers. "I have given you," it says, "the blood upon the altar to atone for your souls," that is, "I have appointed the blood for this purpose; I have connected atonement with the blood." Atonement, then, may be said to proceed primarily from God, and to have for its object the souls of men. The scriptures express themselves on this subject in this way, perhaps, more uniformly than in any other. When the discourse is of atonement between God and men, and not between men and each other, the atonement is said to proceed from God. In the passage already cited from Jeremiah God is entreated not to blot out iniquity. When it is affirmed, as in the passage now under consideration, that the blood atones, we are to assign a meaning to the statement such as shall harmonize with the more emphatic expression "I have given it to you for an atonement." So, in the matter of the golden calf, Moses said to the congregation: "You have committed a great sin, and now will I go up unto the Lord; peradventure

I shall make an atonement." Moses does not mean to represent *himself* as atoning for the transgression of the people. He says, rather: "I will pray to Jehovah, and it may be that through my intercession I shall obtain atonement for your sin"; and he immediately goes on to implore of God its forgiveness. In the Jewish ritual, as it was finally established, Jehovah is not represented directly as atoning for sin, so much as the priest who sprinkled the blood on the altar. But it should be remembered that in this transaction the priest appears in his proper character, as a consecrated mediator, acting in the name of Jehovah and by commission from him, indeed, as his vicegerent. This is the reason for which it was held to be even impious for any one except the priest to sprinkle the sacrificial blood upon the altar.

It is God, then, from whom atonement proceeds. Its object is man, or rather the sin by which man has become defiled. So in the passage immediately before us, the phrase "your souls" is a substitute for the pronoun "you." The word "sin" is sometimes used to designate that in man which needs to be atoned for. Lifeless things are sometimes spoken of as the object of atonement, especially such as were used in ceremonial worship; but in these cases it is not the material objects, as such, which require atonement, but some ceremonial impurity which they may have contracted, or some transgression on the part of him by whom they may have been used, and which is represented metaphorically as really inherent in them.

It cannot be noted too carefully that, in no case, is anything in or belonging to God represented as the object of atonement. The uniform style of expression is, that man, or sin in man, is covered or atoned for in the presence of Jehovah; as in Jer. xviii. 23 God is implored not to blot out sin from his sight. The fundamental meaning of the word forbids that God should ever be considered as the object of the transaction described by it. It would be implied in any such use of the word that God was concealed, put out of sight, virtually

annihilated; or rather that there was something in God which required, on account of its moral impurity, to be removed from sight, just as we have already seen that, in Rabbinical phraseology, the term refers to the denial of God, or practical atheism. Jehovah is the Holy One; there can be no sin in him; there can therefore be nothing to conceal or cover up. The principles of the Mosaic economy would stigmatize as blasphemous such a use of the word in reference to Jehovah as would imply the concealment of anything in him. On the contrary, the principles of that economy justify the assertion that the Holy One, on account of his holiness, is at the pains of concealing whatever, without himself, is unholy; that is, destroying it, removing it from his presence. For this purpose he has given blood upon the altar, has instituted measures to annihilate the sin which prevents fellowship with him.

Besides the word of which we have already spoken as the technical term to describe the effect of sacrifice, other terms are sometimes used, though not so frequently. The word "cleans" is sometimes thus employed. It is very evident that the object of this act can never be anything in Jehovah. Its object must always be found in man. Another expression equivalent to those already referred to is "to bear iniquity." It is found in Lev. x. 17: "Wherefore have ye not eaten the sin-offering in the holy place, seeing it is most holy, and God hath given it to you to bear the iniquity of the congregation, to make atonement for them before the Lord." It is not the sin-offering which is meant to be represented as bearing the iniquity of the people, but the sin-offering is that by which the priests were to bear that iniquity; a phrase which, as before, signifies the act of removing or annihilating. It frequently occurs in this signification; see Gen. i. 17; Exod. xxviii. 38; Num. xiv. 19; Ps. xxv. 18. In the Septuagint, the word is translated in many cases by ἀφίημι. All the ancient translators of the Bible evidently understood the word to mean what we have now stated. In Lev. xvi. 22 the phrase is used concerning the goat to be sent into the wilderness,

on the great day of atonement. The high priest placed on the head of the goat the sins of the children of Israel, which was then said to bear them away into the wilderness.

The passage we have cited states for what end and by what means atonement is made by blood. The life of the flesh is said to be in the blood, for the blood atones by the life. These words have seldom been rightly understood, though the meaning would seem too clear to be easily mistaken. The Lutheran translation of the clause is: "The blood is an atonement for the life"; giving to the preposition "for" the meaning of "instead of." It is rendered in a similar way in the Septuagint; but this is contrary to the usage of the language, which in this respect is uniform. The Hebrew preposition translated "for," when used in connection with atonement and kindred terms, never means "instead of," but always, as in other connections it very frequently does, it points out the means by which atonement is made. Still more incorrect is the translation given by Gesenius and De Wette, "Denn das Blut versöhnt das Leben"; as if the life were the object of the atonement. The particle translated "for" cannot by any means be made to point out the object of atonement. Besides, according to this translation, the conclusion of the verse, "For it is the blood that maketh atonement," would lose its causative character: it would be a needless repetition of words given before. We must, therefore, unless ready to violate the usage of the language, thus translate the expression: For the blood atones by the soul. It is not the matter of the blood which renders it the means by which atonement is made, but the soul, the life, which is united with it.

This is a point of vital importance in reference to the whole subject of sacrifices. If the blood is the essential thing in every sacrifice, it is so because of the soul, the life, which is in it. The life, then, which is in the blood, in reality gives efficacy to the sacrifice. This statement is confirmed by the consideration that according to the passage before us, the object of the atonement effected through the soul or the

life residing in the blood, is the soul of the sacrificer himself. The soul of the thing sacrificed appears as the counterpart of the soul of him who presents the sacrifice. The two stand in a moral relation to each other. In order to a correct conception, then, of the efficacy of sacrifices, we are to inquire into the nature of the soul, or life. What is the soul in beasts and in men; and in what relation to each other do these stand in sacrifices?

The first part of this question finds a ready answer. The Hebrews meant by the term "soul" (נפש) the animal principle, both in men and in beasts, without which the body is a mere mass of inert matter. For this reason, the word is translated, as in the passage before us, by "life." In man, however, this principle, while in one respect it is identical with that of beasts, is in another of a higher nature. In man it is united on the one hand with the body, on the other with the spirit, and acts with power on both, as in this union lies our capability of passions and desires. As to it we are to trace the purely animal appetites of hunger and thirst, so also are we to trace to it the affections of love and hatred, joy and grief. It is the principle of all that in us which the New Testament means by the term *ἐπιθυμία*, and is in that sense the organ of the will. But since, as consciousness teaches, *ἐπιθυμία* is not pure, it follows that the root out of which it grows can still less be pure. In this respect, as being the source of impure appetites and desires, the life is rather the birth-place and instrument of sin; and as it has a vital connection with both body and spirit, it infects both with its own corrupt nature. By the power of this corruption, thus diffused through his whole system, man becomes estranged from an absolutely pure God. He aims to live, to labor, to find the proper gratification for his sinful appetites, independently of God. It is the principle of selfishness. Hence, by the Rabbins the term is often used in connection with the personal pronouns, as synonymous with self.

Calling to mind now, that sacrifice, as we have endeavored to demonstrate from the primitive use of its more usual

name, is the condition of restored fellowship between Jehovah and man, we see at once that it can serve this purpose when it covers up, virtually annihilates, that in man which has produced the estrangement; that is to say, has removed this innate selfishness.

The answer to the second part of our question, the relation which the life in the blood of the victim sustains to the life in him who presents the sacrifice, is somewhat more difficult. It is evident, on the one side, that there is a likeness, a sameness, between the two; on the other side, the sacrificial blood serving as a means of removing sin and procuring holiness for the sacrificer, it therefore presupposes an antagonism. The sacrifice must be received, then, as having a symbolic and a sacramental aspect; the former, on account of the likeness of the blood of the victim to the life of the sacrificer; the latter, on account of their antagonistic relation to each other. The reality of this symbolic character of sacrifice can hardly be questioned. That character belongs, by almost universal confession, to the Mosaic worship in general, and is apparent even in its minutest features. It must, then, be acknowledged to belong to that which constitutes its most important element, sacrifices. The symbolic character of sacrifices consists in this: the presentation of the life in the blood of the victim on the altar or the scene of the manifested presence of Jehovah, as a sign of the presentation of the life, that is, the self, of the sacrificer to Jehovah. As the bringing near to God of the blood of the victim in sacrifice is its death, so the life of selfishness, or that which is opposed to God, is in sacrifice given up, or dies. But as, in the case of man, this act is not a cessation of being, not anything merely negative, but a death which is in reality life in the highest sense — for the sanctification which is aimed at in this sacrifice to Jehovah, and the restoration of communion with God which is connected with it, is, according to the principles of the Mosaic dispensation, the true life — this death of the soul in sacrifice is the necessary condition of its true life.

The significance of sacrifice may, therefore, be thus described. The life, in the natural sense, the animal principle, which is the root of selfishness, and so of sin, is given up to Jehovah, that by its means the true life may be gained, holiness, communion with God, who alone in the most exalted sense truly is, because he alone is holy. The relation of the life in the blood of the victim to the life of the sacrificer is altogether that of substitution; not substitution in the sense of a formal change, of a transference of parts, or anything outward and material, but simply symbolic; so that the act of sacrificing, when that which it is intended to represent is not actually done on the part of the sacrificer, is altogether empty and vain.

General usage, in nearly every language, authorizes the view we have taken of the nature of sacrifices. The word "sacrifice" is well-nigh universally equivalent with self-denial, giving up of self; yet, unquestioned as is this symbolical character of sacrifices, it must not be made exclusively prominent. It represents only one, and the more subjective and negative, aspect of the notion of sacrifice. It represents a surrender on the part of man, but not an acceptance on the part of Jehovah, and the rendering back to the sacrificer of holiness, or the true life. In this last view the sacrifice gains what we have called its sacramental character. This sacramental character is made prominent in the law, and especially so in the passage in Leviticus now under consideration.

But—and this is now our most difficult question—can this sacramental character be ascribed to the blood of the victim? In the first place, the means of atonement must be distinct from him for whom the atonement is made; something indeed appointed by Jehovah, independently of man, for that purpose. Jehovah alone is absolutely holy, the fountain of holiness, and he only can prescribe the means by which in any case it can be acquired. May it not have been with a view to this, that in the Mosaic economy, the blood of man himself could never be efficacious as an atonement for his trans-

gressions. It is forbidden to be used for this purpose. The act would have been the worst form of idolatry. With the same view, the sacrificer himself could never perform the one act which constitutes the essential feature of the rite. That must in every case be performed by the priest, not as a mere man, but as the vicegerent of Jehovah. In the second place, it appears that while the means of atonement must be distinct from the sacrificer, it yet ought to be of a kindred nature; certainly not opposite or antagonistic. It must be, even though appointed for this purpose by a power wholly independent of man, yet so related to man as to be able to operate upon him—it must be essentially homogeneous, while specifically distinct.

The means of atonement, therefore, though fixed upon by Jehovah, by his own independent choice, is yet not chosen arbitrarily and capriciously. It is a means having an intrinsic adaptedness to the purpose meant to be effected. The relation in which it is to stand to man points out the object on which the choice must fall. That by which the life of the sacrificer is to be atoned for must be itself a life, in some substantial points of view, kindred to ours. But as the latter was the life of a beast, having as such no relation to man as a moral being, this is of a piece with the whole texture of the Mosaic economy. This has the characteristics of a material, imperfect dispensation, carrying in itself the seed of a higher and more spiritual dispensation, and pointing to that. The same was the fact with that outward, ceremonial worship, the most important part of the Mosaic dispensation; and also with the sacrificial blood, the most important element of the worship. These were all in themselves imperfect, incomplete, pointing to something higher and more spiritual than themselves. The blood of the sacrificed, in turn, effected only an external purification. The only complete and real means of atonement is the blood of Christ, the pouring out of which is in effect the giving up of that life, or soul, with which the Eternal Spirit dwelling in Christ was united.

Unless then we are ready to deny a typical character to

the whole Mosaic economy and ritual, we must ascribe that character to the shedding of the sacrificial blood, the most essential part of that economy. We are indeed to watch carefully against that outward and mechanical notion adopted by the older typologists, who overlooked the distinction between the blood and the life which was in the blood. It was the pouring forth of this which constituted in the Mosaic sense the shedding of the blood.

In order to a clear discernment of the typical character of the act now under consideration, we are not required to look at it from a point of view exclusively Christian. It may be discerned from a point of view decidedly anti-Christian. The Jewish theologians unanimously maintain that with the advent of the Messiah, sacrifices are to cease. He is to accomplish in the most perfect manner, the same object which sacrifices had in view. They virtually concede, therefore, their relative incompleteness, and of course their prophetic, typical character. The only difference between Jewish and Christian writers relates to the question, whether Christ is the Messiah, and not to the results of his advent.

Sacrifices, then, in accordance with the views now set forth, whether regarded in their subjective and symbolical character or the objective and sacramental, must be allowed to have, as their intended result, the creation of a fellowship between God and man. They must combine in themselves a subjective and an objective element, and this combination must appear especially in that act, the shedding of blood, which makes the very essence of the sacrifice. In so far as the blood, when it is poured forth, represents the soul of the sacrificer giving itself up to Jehovah, and, at the same time, when sprinkled upon the altar, the means by which the priest atones and sanctifies, one can discern the inseparable connection of atonement and holiness on the part of God with the giving up of the principle of life on the part of man. The former is conditioned on the latter. According to Mosaic conceptions, it would be equivalent to a denial of God's holiness, of the very essence of the divinity, if he were

to admit man to fellowship with himself, count him holy, without the giving up of the principle of self.

Sacrifices, moreover, are always to be considered as vitally connected with the entire Jewish theocracy, which was essentially a covenant with God, whose intended result was the holiness of the nation. Sacrifices were, therefore, in a narrower sense, all that that theocracy was in a wider and more comprehensive view. This connection must never be surrendered; a right apprehension of the nature of sacrifices cannot be arrived at, if one loses sight of this connection.

It is only needful in conclusion to advert very briefly to the relation of bloody and bloodless sacrifices to each other. They form in reality one whole; the latter, however, being subordinate to the former. The idea underlying both is the same. This identity is in a sense outwardly apparent; the body of the slain victim corresponding to the bread or meal or flour, the fat corresponding to the oil, and the blood to the red wine, which, like the blood, was poured out around the altar. On the strength of this identity, bloodless sacrifices were allowed to be used, in certain exceptional cases, as a substitute for the bloody. Still, though of kindred signification and effect, the relation of the former to the latter was always one of subordination.

We have attempted to show that the essential part of the sacrifice is the blood, as being the life of the victim. It is on this that everything turns. An analogy to this truth can be traced in the bloodless sacrifices. The life is said to be in the blood; but it should not be forgotten that the articles employed as bloodless sacrifices did in a very important sense contain the life, because they contained that which preserves and sustains life; and, on this account, the significance of the sacrificial rite, whether the material used were animate or inanimate, is substantially one and the same.