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or the rising up for condemnation. To say the least this is one mode in which a doctrine of the final resurrection may harmonize with Christ's words to the thief on the cross: "This day shalt thou be with me in paradise"; while at the same time the judgment-day is not robbed of its solemn significance. It remains an occasion on which Christ, in presence of the assembled universe, manifests the glory of his redemption, vindicates his honor, and with solemn pomp assigns to all men their eternal awards.

ARTICLE II.

THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, PROFESSOR IN WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

NO. VII.

MAN'S INTELLECTUAL CONSTITUTION, AND THE GROWTH OF SOCIETY.

LIBERTY is the central and peculiar power of man. By it he is cut off from all other things and forces, and put over against them. New and great powers are indeed necessary to give play and completion to this power; but it is liberty, a free will, which is the citadel of manhood, affording under the assaults of physical forces a sufficient retreat to a spiritual personality. The possession of this power divorces man from the rule of the material world. Whatever may be the current of events flowing on here, however far back they may have originated, or irresistible may be their sweep in the present, they flow not over him, save by submission and defeat. Liberty absolves man from the government of physical forces; it reserves him for a higher field, and therein gives promise of new relations, new dependencies. Though standing on the boundary of a nobler realm, it is easy for man, by the false and abortive exercise of his new faculties, to sink to the lower plane, and become practically a slave of

the physical conditions of life, though these, while affording a form of activity, limits, and bounds of liberty, have no necessary and indefeasible hold upon him.

A second power so closely united to freedom as to make this worthless without it, and the possibility of its very existence problematical, is conscience. Herein is given a new law to the new power removed from the reign of necessary forces. Those who accept the one faculty easily accept the other; as, on the one hand, the new power calls for its own its peculiar law, and this peculiar law, on the other hand, can find no opportunity of application without freedom. In the very constitution, then, of man, we have faculties which give promise of a new service, and fit him for a fresh set of relations. These relations, it is evident, must have a permanence and scope proportioned to the powers whose presence they recognize and whose development they promote. Direct, limited, and transient physical effects may be, as they are, simply and satisfactorily reached by physical forces and instinctive action; by the play of appetites and that appearance of reasoning arising by an act of memory in the association of ideas. If man were developed out of and into a material universe, he, like the lower forms of life, might easily and justly be woven into its strict government; he might by a few directly efficient or instinctively applied influences be wholly brought under its restricted and close-bound physical connections. For such ends and relations a moral nature would be a superfluity, an impertinence, and those who believe in this physical genesis and dependence of man usually and consistently omit in their philosophy his moral and free powers.

If these are to maintain the position which sound philosophy assigns them, we see that they make way for and claim the immediate and personal government of God. A moral nature can find no adequate, no exalting action, except in connection with a superior moral personality. By the very possession of conscience a moral government is established, above and beyond all merely physical liabilities, and is par-

tially administered in this world. The sense of guilt and of approval unmistakably present in the individual, echoed and enforced by kindred and often more declared praise and censure on the part of society, furnish the basis of a purely moral discipline, becoming more manifest and efficient with every step of progress. But this government, though actual, and in its lowest forms beyond the compass of simply physical and appetitive forces, is, nevertheless, merely incipient — the naked seed or spore of spiritual life. We have in it the clue and promise of the next stage of progress, the growth that lies beyond us. The possession of such powers in our intellectual furniture as conscience and free-will, sets us apart as subjects of a new, a spiritual kingdom; their present exercise discloses the commencement of another epoch of training, while their full, adequate development claims contact with the moral purity and personality of God, and a sufficient field for the unrestricted growth of forces so fresh and germinant. We are in the possession and use of that which is purely spiritual, which is in itself perfectly supersensual, grows by a supersensual law, and is trained by a spiritual government actually administered, though incipiently and obscurely in the world. A free-will, acting under the law of conscience, is strictly a supernatural phenomenon, which can in no wise be understood as a mere fragment of a system, but demands the whole sphere of the spiritual universe wherein to revolve, into which to be taken up and comprehended as the part of a fitting whole. These foundations of a spiritual kingdom in man's very constitution are the suggestion, the explanation, and the evidence of an invisible throne and authority. Man actually cuts into that superior circle; here lies a section, nay the centre, of his being, and he is compelled therefore to know it, to believe in it, and to feel its transcendent claims. The first and last effort of every false philosophy is to hide, modify, set aside these superior faculties, this present and visible seal and testimony of God's ownership in us and ours in him.

Not only do our intellectual faculties, but also the move-

ment of the mind in the growth of knowledge, indicate our relation to the spiritual world and its hold upon us. In all inquiries we of necessity start with faith; faith accompanies each step and closes the investigation. This is true even of the most physical, positive, and rationalistic forms of knowledge. Natural science can do nothing except through the testimony of faculties whose trustworthiness it has no method of verifying. All its conclusions are resolved into sensations and judgments, whose validity it must accept on their own simple testimony. So they affirm, more than this it knows not; deeper than this it cannot sink its shaft of exploration. The very existence of that physical world in which it is so busy, whose laws are to it so irrefragable, whose forces are so sweeping, it knows but by inference as the source and cause of its own impressions, its own sensations. Let faith in the correct, reliable action of the mind fall away, and the external world becomes a dream, distinguished from other dreams only by its greater persistency. Let faith fall below the normal mark set for it in our mental constitution by God, and the whole visible world disappears, the entire field of positive knowledge sinks beneath endless and shifting waves of unsubstantial phenomena; as to an observer on the summit of some mountain, the plain is lost beneath the driving clouds. Men may take what pleasure they choose in investigating these appearances, these beautiful yet perfectly unsubstantial, these apparently related but wholly independent, illusions, yet their own judgments concerning them will be but another mist-wreath, till they can establish their truth in faith; till by trust in the inevitable movement of mind they can bid these vapors to rise and disclose the substantial earth whence they spring, whose momentary veil they are.

And this faith, though it presents itself as faith in our own faculties, is virtually faith in God the maker of them. Here is an instrument furnished us; we may believe its images to be a concerted, consistent hallucination; or we may believe them to be counterparts of the facts, resting

like the surface of the ocean upon its depths; but it is a case in which proof assumes that form of belief termed faith in him who made the instrument, and gave it to us for purposes of knowledge, and not deception. Most manifestly we rest on the character of this instrument, the mind. We can only see through the eye, hear through the ear, understand by the judgment. Do we thus see, hear, and understand? The only affirmative answer that can be given is that of faith.

How inevitable and natural it is that a positive science that cannot verify one of its ultimate conclusions, that interests itself only in phenomena, that skilfully frames its definitions so as to make these to be all, and struggles to believe them to be all, has nothing to say of another, a future life; since it only knows this present life as a coming and going, a fleeting show in consciousness. What can we hope from an intellectual experience that, like a mirror, merely presents to the eye the accidental things that pass before it, and may be dashed down any instant, to the entire extinction of the space and the objects it seems, and only seems, to contain.

Nor can we have any belief in the permanence, the continuity of nature, any more than in its existence aside from faith. That things, forces, will remain as they are, implies that they are, and that they have in them abiding elements. That a series of appearances have followed each other in a given way can give no sufficient ground of belief that they will continue to follow each other in a similar way. The anticipation which it induces can only be an ungrounded habit of mind, a confirmed tendency, like that of a lunatic. If things are and indicate a plan, then we have reason to believe through our faith in the Author of all things, that this plan will be pursued, this line of action completed. We have no other reason to render for our belief in the permanency of nature, than the effect on the mind of its past continuity, unless by faith we ground that belief in the comprehensive and abiding will of God. Reject faith, and we are compelled to receive it again under the form in which the philosopher of unbelief, Herbert Spencer, actually takes

it back ; that what returns oftenest to the mind is thereby verified, becomes incontrovertible from the simple fact that that with which we would controvert it is weaker than itself. Thus faith, and with it belief, is resolved into an intellectual habit, the rutting into the mind of its ever-returning convictions, not good, or at least not known to be good, at the outset, but made so by repetition, as a road is defined by driving over it. Thus the trust at once due to our faculties is replaced by a pitiful repose in the pertinacity of a conclusion in itself unsatisfactory, sceptical philosophy is herein reduced, by its own confession, to the assertion that a lie persisted in is equivalent to the truth, and that it is impossible to tell whether so-called truth is anything more than this. Yet even in those conditions, faith is not escaped, it merely reposes on repetition, instead of on original trustworthiness. The true statement would seem to be, that the reiterated declaration of a faculty, in itself worthy of faith, makes us clear as to what its testimony is.

That in philosophy we start with faith as the indispensable condition of knowledge, is manifest. No philosophy can escape the fundamental condition of a concession of at least a portion of our faculties, since these furnish both the phenomena of the science of mind, and every step of the process by which they are constructed into a coherent system. Any philosophy, therefore, which refuses this faith is at once in air, and can neither construct its logical mechanism, or bring it to bear upon any point whatever. Those who have striven in this field to reduce faith to a minimum, have produced systems so slight, shadowy, remote, fantastic, that they have found no acceptance beyond the circle of a few adroit, professional metaphysicians, looking upon mental science as a field for skilful equilibration rather than useful knowledge—a cold, vague, airy, upper region, where adepts run on snowshoes without floundering.

The history of philosophy is a narrative of failures incident to too little faith, failures to grasp and accept simple facts in their simplest forms. Deny the notion of liberty, cease

to have faith in our first, our intuitive convictions, and proof becomes impossible. The mind, occupied with the necessary connections of the external world, approaching the problem of liberty through the false analogy of things bound in fixed dependencies, finds itself increasingly incapacitated to pass over the great gulf which divides the spiritual from the physical, and take position on those pure heights beyond. As the bird that never flies loses the power to fly, so the mind that works always and only through the links of causation is at length unable to find contentment and truth in any other form of explanation. It has narrowed its vision to that which it has exclusively contemplated. It mistakes the repose of habit, the conviction of familiarity, for the soundness of proof. Strangeness impresses it like error; an unusual like a false judgment.

Equally must the notion of right be accepted and obeyed in order that we may feel the full force of the argument which sustains it as a transcendental idea. He whose consciousness comes forward to testify to its immediate power, to its uncalculating and unselfish character, to the unmeasured stress with which it urges the mind, can find no grave difficulties in those proofs which establish its original and independent character. Proofs on such a theme as this must be felt through or by means of that clear, powerful, personal experience which capacitates us to discover them. It may be that we regard the right as the useful because we have made the obviously useful the right. We see moral questions in a moral atmosphere, and the atmosphere of the soul is dependent on its pervasive faith. The roseate hues of truth can only be caught by one whose sky is filled with morning light. A philosophical system is often as false a medium through which to view certain phenomena of the soul, as is a telescope an inadequate and perplexing instrument with which to watch the glories of a sunset. The mild light of heaven must be suffused through the soul that it may at once see and feel, and thus truly see the interior, luminous nature of spiritual affections. Indeed, emotions

are often to perception what papillæ are to touch; and the want of them is the numbness of the receptive organ. Nothing transcendent can be reached without faith; for what are the intuitions of the soul but the starting-points and vouchers of knowledge? Reject these, refuse faith, and you will find the vacant shell of knowledge, eaten out of unbelief, passed back to you as the true kernel of wisdom.

Yet more is this genesis of reason from faith manifest in the theoretical and practical growth of religion. Start with absolute scepticism, and we can reach nothing either in science, philosophy, or religion. Grant the validity of the testimony of consciousness in our logical faculties, and we reach an idealistic philosophy, and not religion, since the attributes and existence of God depend for their proof on intuitive faculties. Grant the validity of the inference by which the mind refers its sensations to an outside world, and we have the material of science and valid knowing of real being. Now, though we have taken a long step toward a religious belief and life, we have not reached them, since God is no more the object of perceptive than of merely logical powers. Still further, faith, credence, acceptance of intellectual action must find admittance before we are prepared to interpret and understand the universe through an infinite Creator. The movement is identical in character with that by which we are led to believe in the external world, and thus lay the foundations of positive knowledge; it involves no new principles, only the more extended application of old ones, a wider acceptance of the ideas furnished by the mind itself for the explanation of the world around it. No philosophy whatever, not even the most naked idealism, can lay aside all faith in the faculties and processes of the mind, and the most complete, most spiritual philosophy, recognizing in their entire complement the physical and personal agencies of the universe, requires no more than uniform, consistent, and therein rational confidence in the implanted constitution and laws of intelligence. It is more philosophical to accept these in their entirety, than it is to

be forced reluctantly to admit a part while arbitrarily rejecting the remainder. It is not the climax of philosophy to stand on one leg because it is a possible feat, when the body provides two with equal claims of admission to service. Such an application of the law of parsimony is absurd. If we find ourselves compelled to admit the soundness of the logical processes, the presence and applicability of such notions as those of space and time, — and without these we must fall flat, and cannot get upon our feet either in philosophy or science — there is no reason, to be drawn from above or below, from without or from within the mind, why this normal movement of faith should not be allowed to complete itself in the cheerful acceptance of our entire, mental furniture, of every mental solvent, of every explanatory idea, wrought with the same firmness into our intellectual constitution. Religion does not differ from science in resting on faith, but in resting at the centre on the entire circle of legitimate supports, instead of poisoning itself uncertainly, now on one, now on another. It may be worthy of German ingenuity to see what is the least possible surface, the minutest postulate, which will give one a footing in the quagmire of speculation, lifting the body above the slough, and to try by what rapid and dexterous movements here and yonder it can be traversed in diverse directions; but it is the part of earnest, working, practical sense to occupy and build on all the solid ground given in the mental world, knowing that one square foot must rest at length on the same rock as another, that of faith.

Nor is it any more a reproach of a believing than of a sceptical philosophy, that its convictions owe much of their depth and sense of certainty to the long familiarity of the mind with them, to the fact that it has been accustomed to rest upon them. The law of habit is as subtle, as powerful in its action on unbelief as on belief, and the philosophy of scepticism may deny the grounds of faith with increasing conviction and confidence, for no better reason than that the mind, from the long contemplation of one class of proofs and

distrust of another, has attached firm belief to the former and settled unbelief to the latter. It is plain, moreover, that a large and most essential class of religious proofs cannot but be wanting to a mind without the faith necessary to their reception. It is hardly possible for one to come to a full knowledge of the integrity, the high moral endowments, of a person from whom he has been alienated, of whom he has conceived a settled distrust. Such an one is necessarily cut off from the most convincing and immediate manifestations of a sound sympathetic life. Thus the scope and reach of religious truth, what it is in itself, in its ministration to the mental and spiritual activities, are of necessity hidden from one who will not receive it, who views it remotely, distrustfully. The phenomena of physical life, of sensation, sight, hearing, are explained from within on their own plane of actual experience; and not the less are those of spiritual life. The most satisfactory, rational, unanswerable, of all proofs, is that which springs from a rightly analysed experience. Men may reason as they will concerning a given remedy, they may come to the most positive conclusions that this or that effect cannot follow from it, yet a personal, carefully scrutinized, oft-repeated experience will overpower all antecedent reasonings. The highest religious truth, the purest traits of character, the most perfect repose of the affections, are in the judgments they call for like the finest works of art; perception and feeling are so interlaced in the right conclusion that one cannot dissolve away the tissue of emotion and leave the colorless skeleton of thought. To feel in each case is to perceive, and to perceive is to feel. The intrinsic power and glory of religious truth, its ability to do what it claims to do, can only be completely recognized by an actual inhalation of this breath of spiritual life that God breathes into his own. There is nothing new or strange in this. From the intoxication of a feast to that of an anthem, feeling must lend itself to perception, or there will only be the semblance of knowledge. Not to feel religious truth is to have the more mechanical conditions of sight, but

not the sensorium whereon to lodge the image. Derision, directed toward the higher truths of religion, like ridicule of superlative art, only betrays the poverty of the soul.

That all knowledge commences in faith is obvious from another point of view. What shall the links of reasoning lock into if not into the first staple-truths that God gives us? What shall we see except that which is ultimate, since we have no further organ wherewith to interpret sight? If the eye could start without its own conditions, could scrutinize itself, we should really need no eye, no conditioned and restricted sense. Knowledge is like an organic product. We must start with protoplasm, with an inscrutable cell. This granted it may feed on inorganic material, multiply cells, and throw them in complex living relations. We may delight ourselves with this order, but the unexplained postulate, life, remains everywhere with us. We secure the seen by allowing it to rest back on the unseen below it. Insist on positive knowledge, and your knowing becomes the most superficial possible. We may study the reflection from the surface of a stream, and overlook the stream itself, its depths, sources, issues, yet this mere film of truth reposes on that continuous flood. Little indeed shall we know if we only regard that knowledge which we perfectly know. The philosopher must mount on to the shoulders of faith, consciously or unconsciously, or the waters prove too deep for him, and he perishes in helpless imbecility. By leaving something behind us as unknown, we gain the opportunity of going forward, and finding at least a known sequence. On this in itself easy condition of faith do we gain the privilege of knowing anything. So far as we can search the knowing faculties at all, we do it later by a light which they themselves have given us.

Not only do our intellectual faculties in their very nature, in the faith their use involves, indicate a moral government — since there is no faith without a moral basis on which it may repose, — but also the order in which truth is unfolded in the progress of man looks to the same supremacy of re-

ligious forces. Man at first makes his own the type of all action. The free, personal, wayward element of liberty is that with which he is most familiar, and is brought, therefore, to the constant explanation of the real or imaginary facts about him. As a result of this pre-eminent sense of personal power, of spontaneous and reckless action, there will naturally arise many blighting superstitions, a belief in charms, magic, sorcery, and a readiness to accept on every occasion a supernatural source for any event in the least beyond the ordinary effects of known natural causes. The personal element first asserts itself, and while resulting in the credulities, the tyrannies of intolerant superstitions, it is nevertheless that which is first, most essential, most native to man. We may be ashamed of its follies, regret its usurpations, reprobate its cruelties, but we cannot, without ourselves doing far worse, without still more benumbing and wasting the spiritual powers, cancel this sense of freedom, and withdraw the light it brings to the universe. The most stupid excesses of the supernatural element, the veriest fetishism, or the malignant pursuit of witches, are no sufficient offset to its value. Better these than that man should succumb to nature, should know only the torment of hunger and raven like a beast. If the sense of personal responsibility and independent power could not be otherwise maintained, otherwise developed, then let us not regret these extravagances, this path so darkened by the night of superstition, so haunted by demons as to seem veritably and historically to lie through the valley of the shadow of death. Nor is it so certain that those intractable, barbarous ages did not herein find the only adequate agencies of restraint and discipline. Savage instincts are not to be bound and handled with the silken cords and cobweb fibres of humanitarian systems. It is not safe to be too sympathetic over the bloody bit that curbs the mouth of the restive brute. Crudity and cruelty are inseparable. More life and joy must follow more light and love, and, groping in the darkness, we must accept the painful instruction of hard blows and sharp points. It

is time for us to mistrust whether there is any bright and cheerful path for a race out of darkness and sin; whether the imagination of man evokes any more cruel deities than their passions require for their restraint; whether a less bitter evil would prove as rapidly its own cure. This sweeping by naturalists of all the faiths of the past into one refuse-heap of superstitions, of things useless and forsaken, is as unphilosophical as it is irreligious. These were real forces, having most potent and beneficial sway.

In the progress of knowledge a second element has been brought forward. We have traversed one hemisphere and reached another. The necessity and uniformity of natural law have become the controlling idea. This notion arrogates to itself the name of science, and laughs a contemptuous, incredulous laugh at magic and miracles, at all that rises, or strives to rise, above the plane of the natural into the supernatural. One inclusive, *a priori* judgment sweeps into limbo all as equally illusory, that hints at anything more than a strictly physical origin, from the tricks of a juggler to the works of Christ. Now I may not call this attitude which science is assuming with daily increasing clearness, between which and the old view, philosophers and theologians stand in all stages of transition, a superstition; yet it is as ill-founded, one-sided, and disastrous, as much to be deprecated in some of its features, as the worst credulity of them all. If either is to triumph over the other in the interpretation of the universe, let mind lord it over matter, not matter over mind. Let us have the downright atrocity of burning witches rather than the impossibility of sin, a theoretical impossibility, sure to end in a most incurable, irredeemable fact of sin. Liberty essentially a supernatural power, a personal Deity, an immediate providence, a divine revelation, are all submerged, lost forever in this cold stream of dead, irrational forces, sweeping down from the dreary depths of eternity, spreading on either side farther than the thought can reach, and ready to stretch with its sullen, heedless waves through all the future, through universal nature now

immortal; ready to drink up momentarily the snow-flake lives of men now hopeless of immortality. There can be no half-way work if this notion of physical forces is to have the entire field. Causes, mere causes, know nothing, and can tell nothing of God, of liberty, of a future life. We may float while we have life, on this boundless ocean of forces, but we ourselves are no more than the last bubble the waves have dashed into being, and will quickly dash out again — a thin film that holds air, reflects an image, and gives a pleasing play of colors, but hardly makes a drop in the eternity of waters.

If this is what is set over against superstition — and when materialistic scepticism shall find its logical completion, nothing more can remain — then let us be superstitious, frightened by magic, and pinched by sorcery, only so be that we may believe in ourselves, in liberty, in immortality, in our spiritual powers. This belief in nature is but one half the globe of thought, the further half, the half that gleams and is frozen in cold starlight, while the other, the nearer, the spiritual hemisphere basks in heat and is bathed in sunlight. Philosophy, justly so-called, comes forward to complete the growth of knowledge, not to divorce the present from the past, not to cut the roots which have grown in darkness, spare, attenuated in hard-pan, bent, flattened between rocks, but to draw forth, to draw upward into trunk and branches the essential, life-giving principle contained in them; to confront nature with man and man with nature, liberty with necessity and necessity with liberty; to complement the uniformity of natural with the versatility of a personal power, and to found a watchful providence on the grander, broader, more abiding provisions of physical law. How could this great work be accomplished, how could philosophy struggling for a foothold resist this current of unbelief, but for those firm foundations of faith, that inevitable reversion of man to himself, to his own conscious liberty, which, in previous centuries, have issued in so many and so gross superstitions? Here is not ground more for scepticism than for

belief, not more for denial than for affirmation. Commence your science by wiping the slate clean, by the obliteration of man's nature and history, and you have lost half the phenomena, half the conditions of the problem, and may cipher as you will, theorize as you will, you cannot restore yourself to wholeness, to soundness, in the result. In place, then, of that derisive order which, assigning the first stage of development to theology and the second to metaphysics, closes with positive knowledge, we would substitute, first, the unfolding of the personal element, second, of the impersonal element, and third, the balanced adjustment of the two, faith, science, and philosophy, the secure foundation of theology. Theology thus roots itself deeply in the past, yet is found in the last stages of growth the terminal bud.

As the scriptures become associated with opinions, and seem to imply them on various subjects in nature, the progress of science has, in more than one instance, necessitated the entire abandonment or marked modification of the views incidentally derived from revelation, or thought to be supported by it. Now no portion of belief that has once become connected with what the mind regards as infallible religious truths can be removed, can give way, without, for the time being, seriously affecting its faith. Belief is to such an one, in all its parts, a single structure, possessed throughout of equal strength. To discover, therefore, that one portion is beginning to fail before the assaults of science, is a serious shock to belief. The only alternative which weaker, more timid minds can find to absolute acceptance is absolute rejection. They are tempted to a blind defense of that which is indefensible, or to a precipitate and needless abandonment of the entire works as untenable. Revelation is thus involved, with a few, in the fate of every cobweb of opinion which has been spun about it or has become attached to it. If the world was not formed, as they supposed, in six days, then the wall is breached, and the citadel of faith will fall at the next assault.

Here we touch an intrinsic difficulty, not so much in

revelation as in the human mind. No scriptures can tell all things. Wherever the limit is set, there will occasion be given for false implications. Inferences will certainly arise, and will in men's minds have the same authority as the things directly taught—indeed, will cease to be distinguished from them. The form of truth must remain incomplete, partial; the substance, the kernel, is alone valid, vital. But the appropriate discrimination between the two, men will not make, cannot at once learn to make. When, therefore, an abandonment of a previous form of belief becomes necessary, they are disturbed and cut from their moorings; are set adrift on the stream of doubt. The difficulty is, they have made no provision for growth. They have reduced religious truth to a rote-rule of life, and wish to hold and use it in this form. They expect the seed to remain to-morrow exactly what it is to-day. They wish to garner it, not to plant it. When, then, the cuticle bursts, and a germinant point is obtruded, the process is looked on as one of disturbance, loss, and overthrow, not of accumulation and life. There is no growth without a change of form, without some decay; and these have not been contemplated as incident to religious truth. Dogmas that have been regarded as ultimate cannot show themselves mere data, premises for a broader, higher conclusion, germs struggling with a force too great for them, without creating something of the same confusion and consternation with which we should behold a mummy turning and tugging in its cerements. When we close discussion, and fix doctrines to a letter for all eternity, when we roll the stone to the mouth of the sepulchre, and seal it, a strange dismay overtakes us to find them stirring and instinct with life again.

Now growth, spiritual growth, growth of religious truth, is the most absolute claim of all, and, in the development of knowledge, the same forces of thought, the same reflective movements which awaken and disturb the mind are present to calm and reassure it. The power to present the difficulties implies somewhere, and calls forth somewhere, the

power to remove them. The inflexible notion of inspiration which under the appearance of protecting the truth is in fact strangling it, gives way; and we shortly find that we are all the better off without it—that a free, responsible play of thought, of interpretation, is more conducive to spiritual life and manhood than a stubborn effort to extinguish mental light under the darkness of the letter. We discover that spiritual liberty is better, safer, more wholesome than spiritual servitude.

Thus scientific cavilling and historic criticism give the believer a better grasp of the truth, a more profound penetration into its nature and office, and open for him the path into the noblest form of freedom. Babes may still be fed on the milk of precise dogma, may have their food measured out to them, lest they misfeed or overfeed; but manly strength claims, and can safely be allowed, a wider range, and, in the very necessity of self-selection and self-restraint, finds the true field of its faculties. Thus with speculative liberty comes the power to use it; and that action which seemed in the outset destructive shows itself constructive, developing a product containing all the life of the past, with a form and adaptations those of the time which has brought it forth. It is this very power to renew itself, to abandon the old, to slough off dead material, that saves revelation from actual overthrow, and makes it what it is—the Word of God, with the breath of his inspiration in it. Were it firm and inflexible under the attacks of unbelief, it would certainly in the end crumble under repeated blows into dust.

As it is, the world has not seen the time, in spite of all scientific, historic, and philosophic criticism, in which the real magnitude of the truths of the New Testament, their self-evidencing power, the divine proportions of its chief figure, have been so distinctly beheld, and so profoundly felt. The Spirit is giving life. The unessential incidents being stripped away, or put in their true relations, the eyes of all are directed to the essential, eternal, undeniable excellence of a Divine Personage and mission in the earth.

So also truths more interior to the revelation itself have had an order of development which reveals the divine government as woven logically, concurrently, into the very growth of the mind. The sense of justice must always precede that of grace, as much in the progress of the individual and of society as in revelation. The exuberance of youth, wayward appetites and desires, institute at once the demand for law. Not till self-government has laid down and established the great outlines of order is any concession of grace fitting, or, indeed, possible. Where there is no law, there is no forgiveness. It is the strength, the firmness, of the forces that have established and are maintaining order that render grace admissible, safe, desirable. So long as society is exposed to hourly violence, so long as general security has no guarantee, little can be said or thought of grace. Justice, law, are the ideas towards whose enforcement every effort must be directed. When the barriers of crime have come to be of granite, when they are deeply settled in the public mind, in civil and social institutions, then there spring up an opportunity and a desire for generous, gracious administration. Grace cannot even have the lustre of grace till it finds relief and outline on the dark back-ground of wrath, of divinely appointed justice eternally upheld in its claims. Sinai stands long before Calvary, in human history as in divine revelation.

The idea, also, of the fatherhood of God, of which modern thought boasts itself, and is sometimes almost willing to cast into the teeth of revelation as alien to it, is logically and safely reached in the development of human thought, only when his integrity, and the sternness and strength consequent thereon, have been previously learned. The child's first experience of the father, or rather the one which is to him the earliest, most stubborn, and noticeable fact, pertains to his authority. Kindness without this is as much a thing of course, and as little thought of, as sunshine. When firm government has been long felt, when its guidance and its restraint begin to find appreciation, then is the heart ready

to be deeply touched by the love and patience of this protracted oversight, ready to recognize and feel the warmth of paternal love. Kindness no longer seems a form of indolence, love a constitutional instinct, or indulgence parental weakness. Character finds, like the mountain, its rock-base, and we feel but the more keenly its gentle moods and the security of the calm retreat it offers. Thus, in the experience of the child, we have a fatherhood which is first manhood, a mountain whose sunny slopes are all backed and held heavenward by the sheer precipices and rugged sides bracing from the north. The love of God is the light and warmth of his integrity, his fatherhood the stretch of his authority and the steadiness of his control. Not till we have tested and struggled, as it were, with the moral strength of God, can we at all understand his parental affection.

A minor coincidence of development we mark in this connection, that, as fast as the telescope has enlarged to our eyes the universe, and rendered our earth, ourselves, our history, of proportionately little consequence, has the microscope, its almost necessary accompaniment, opened up beneath us the marvellous extent of God's providence, the surprising completeness of his care. If we are depressed by the one revelation, we find exaltation in the other. If the hand of God seems to overarch us afar off, we may yet see that it stretches tenderly beneath us, and that the declaration of the scriptures: "The very hairs of your head are all numbered," is not more explicit and cheering than the minute workmanship of the world.

Thus every movement of thought that seems adverse to faith brings with it its compensations, and leaves the truths of religion more glorious, more impregnable than ever. It is not that their old strength is left them, but that a new light is shed upon them and shines through them. The foundations are uncovered, and the constitution of nature and of man are found to be corner-stones of this spiritual structure; their otherwise opaque mass made translucent and glorious with the light that penetrates them from above,

and unites them to this one temple, this one cosmos of beauty and strength. An intellectual constitution thus reposing on faith, involving it as the foundation of science and philosophy, prospering inquiry in proportion as this its condition is freely recognized, bringing retribution to unbelief, and evolving anew the grounds of credence when these have been momentarily disturbed, reveals the stubborn, inborn strength of the religious element.

That society is under the government of moral forces, that throughout it furnishes a discipline to the moral nature, rewarding progress with new and easier conditions of life, and checking retreat at each successive point with a sterner and harsher regimen, are facts so obvious as thereby to lose much of their effect on the mind. It is one of those cases in which the law is so incorporated into nature, or, as we express it, so springs from the nature of the case, as to weaken or remove our sense of design. Society is the natural element of man, as the air is that of the bird, or water that of the fish. Here his nature finds play, and thence spring the influences which civilize and exalt him. Indeed, the supernatural element takes chiefly this natural form; and prophet, apostle, Saviour are the divine inspiration, the divine Word becoming flesh and dwelling with us.

Society cannot exist without law, government; and that government must be raised to the surface, must be conspicuous and tangible among men, little disposed to respect the rights of others. Tyranny — that is, the tyrannical tendency — is a multiplication of the interferences, an increase of the severity, of law, making it less dependent on the choice of those subject to it. Liberty is the reduction of these restraints, rendering them more and more submissive to the wishes of the majority of those whom they affect. The worst tyranny is better than anarchy, since it sets some limits to violence, while anarchy gives none. Anarchy, moreover,

tends to tyranny, gives opportunity for it, and a sense of advantage in it. In a period of violence, the strongest soon shows himself, and a preponderance of power is secured, enlarged, established. The principles and modes of action which belong to a lawless period are favorable to absolute authority, easily chime in with it, and do not suffer that growing, organized opposition which belongs to more reflective periods. The condition of society also prompts it to seek shelter in the speedy, irresponsible action of one man. When robbery and violence are imminent, when a state of war is a state of nature, the order and safety which are most adequate and easily maintained are those which rest in a single will, backed by immediate power.

As, however, the commercial and social aims and labors of men expand; as they come to cherish more and more complex plans; as the sense of ownership, of individuality, and of rights increases, the extent, severity, and irresponsibility of law and the lawgiving authority become more vexatious. The opportunity to choose ends and means, and the liberty to do all that one chooses, become highly prized. General security, moreover, becomes so well-established, so much a matter of course; the barriers of society are so well known and so strong, that the sense of danger hardly exists, and the restrictions and vexations of authority no longer present themselves as the price of safety. In this enlarged life of the individual come at once the occasion, demand, and possibility of liberty. The desire for free institutions, in that strength which makes it a formidable social force, will not be developed much in advance of those conditions of enterprise and self-control which render freedom feasible, desirable. The restless passions of men may occasionally precipitate progress, and bring forth an era of lawlessness in the name of liberty; yet even then, while a portion of the coveted end may be missed, there will be gains which shall go far to compensate the momentary losses of convulsion. Political institutions shape themselves in the main to the character of the social forces at work, and grow out of the

conditions over which they preside. Irresponsible punishment accompanies outrageous crime, susceptible of no other restraint than that of fear; severe law hems in blind and stubborn passion; and liberty is the pliancy of law to private enterprise, its concession to general integrity and safe-conduct. The liberality of law is the demand and the reward of social and moral development, and leaves men more open to that higher, more immediate government that God exercises over them. Freedom would not be useful before it comes. It comes when it is useful—when the internal life can, with some pressure and power, claim it, and thus show its ability to use it.

Another allied development, revealing the discipline of man's moral nature incident to the growth of society, is civil and criminal law. There are here four points of interest—the difference at different periods in the crimes recognized and punished, the change in the character of penalties, in the spirit with which punishment is inflicted, and the manner in which this growth has been achieved. The modern codes include a large variety of cases, especially those of a social and commercial character, which either had no existence in an earlier, ruder state of society, or found no recognition in the administration of justice. The protection thrown about contracts, conveyances, mercantile paper; around education, character, and reputation; the safety afforded not merely to person and property, but to the full enjoyment of pure air, free light, unobstructed ways, safe and seemly surroundings; the vested rights of imbeciles, minors, and widows; the perpetuity of eleemosynary gifts; the laws of inheritance, and international law, serve, with innumerable other examples, to indicate the great growth of civil and criminal law, the interlocking of the two, and the manifold directions in which the moral sense has been quickened, and society has accepted new duties.

The change in the character of the penalties inflicted is almost equally striking. The chief crime known to society, that of murder, among the German tribes, and very gen-

erally among other nations, was punished with a fine, as if the claim instituted was not so much that of society against the murderer for its own protection, as that of the father, the family, the friends, for the weakness and loss occasioned by the removal of one of their number. The feelings of the parties aggrieved, rather than the public weal, called forth justice. In exactly this spirit the master has always claimed a compensation for the slave killed, while the real crime, that of murder, has been overlooked. The sense, then, of criminality at this point has deepened, the punishment inflicted has become more proportionate and fitting, and been rendered in the name and in behalf of society. If we add to this such facts as the more severe and general penalties inflicted on offences against chastity, and the softening down of the penalties for trespasses against property, as theft and indebtedness, we see that the notion of guilt has undergone entire revision, and been brought to a much higher standard. The moral element predominates, and the vindictive, retaliatory spirit of law is subdued.

The third point referred to is the change of feeling with which punishment is inflicted. The savageness, remorselessness, and brutality of earlier times are either wholly removed or greatly mitigated. It is astonishing to us, with our present sense of justice, that the criminal, especially when the offence was but slight, should have become at once an outcast, without sympathy or protection; that the accused party should have been liable to torture; that the whole administration of law should have been marked by the most lawless cruelty, giving to the bailiff, jailor, and executioner a character and office most brutal and repulsive. The growth of humanity in this department, the displacement of the blindness and insensibility of the past with intelligent, firm, impartial, yet kind and considerate justice are obvious and undeniable victories of the moral sentiments. Wholesome food, healthy employment, adequate protection, and more or less of instruction have taken the place of scanty and offensive food, indolence, crowded and filthy apartments,

severe exposure, and entire inattention to intellectual and spiritual wants. In connection with this change of temper, the stocks, whippings, mutilations, and the various forms of torture have disappeared; fine and imprisonment have become the almost exclusive forms of punishment; and the death-penalty, in those few cases in which it is reserved, is inflicted in private. Punishment is no longer made a spectacle, nor does it often assume such a form as necessarily either to brutalize those who inflict it or those who suffer it. Criminal procedure contemplates the interests of the criminal as well as those of the community, and is especially gentle, even parental, toward the young, in whom are still germs of hope. The growth of a motherly instinct in society towards its offspring, displacing the hasty, hard chastisement, the indolent, revengeful ways of an overseer, with tenderness and consideration, is now indicative of a true social and moral life.

The last point to be noticed in this change is the method in which it has taken place. It has been the result of a slow and steady growth of the moral sentiments called forth in connection with the administration of justice and the pursuit of the common weal. While Christianity has come in to accelerate and sustain the movement, it has been grounded all along in the conscience, has taken its origin back of any form of religious faith, and has felt indirectly the higher motive working its way down through the moral nature. The exigencies of life have drawn forth legislative act and judicial decision, and thus developed voluminous law, permeated everywhere with moral principle, and giving an increasingly just system of ethical precepts. A continuous development, like that of Roman law, rooted in the remote past — unfolding by its own vigor and interior life a wonderfully varied, just, and complete code, extending this by its own applicability and excellence over those Western anarchical tribes whose violence had been the overthrow of the empire, and giving to modern Europe the germs of still further and fuller systems — affords a most marked illustra-

tion of the moral discipline at work among men. The way in which the successive systems of civil, canon, and common law have affected one the other—the older causing its influence to descend upon, or pass over into, the younger by virtue of superior excellence; the manner in which a freer form of practice, as that of equity, has been made to soften and complement ordinary procedure; the introduction of legal fictions, by means of which, without the modification of existing law, more complete justice has been reached; and, in the growth of common law, the silent arrest of unsound or unjust precedents by a new decision, furnish remarkable instances of the steady unfolding and growing precision of the moral judgments of men.

Another direction in which the moral growth of society is indicated is its increased coalescence, the interest it collectively feels in the masses, and the greater responsibility which it accepts in connection with them. Men have discovered that one class cannot be neglected save at the expense of every other. The squalor and filth of a caravan of devotees making their pilgrimage to Mecca become, through the cholera, a matter of universal concernment. The crowded, unclean tenements of a large city are, for a like reason, objects of general attention. The mechanic presses the inquiry why he cannot obtain a better compensation for his services, and finds an answer in the numbers and low condition of those who compete with him for employment. Without lifting the lowest, those next above them cannot be much elevated in social well-being; and thus on to the highest rank. Men are interlocked, as the links of a chain, and rise and fall together. The middle and upper classes also find that they must either suffer under the severe, absolute rule of a few; or, dividing government among themselves, be exposed to the restlessness and revolt of the many; or, extending suffrage to these, so educate them, so open to them laudable ambitions, as that the public interest may be, and may be seen to be, the common interest. The republican government of a corrupt

city quickly convinces every citizen that his property, his comfort, even his life depend largely on the well-being of the many.

The periods in which individuals so loom up above the masses as to concentrate all eyes, and contain in themselves the fortunes of a nation, are rapidly passing. The good conduct of the tradesman we patronize, of the mechanic we employ, the servant we hire, is often a matter of as much private and immediate interest to us as the trustworthiness of rulers, hemmed in, as they are, and held to duty by constitutions and conditions more powerful than any one man or clique. As much as the great have been reduced in influence, so much have the weak been lifted up; and while, as against the many, no one is strong, through and by means of the many there remains the opportunity of the highest strength. Persuasion, influence, which develop the individuality of all, take the place of force, which swallows up the many in one. Society is now the seat of thought, of power; and in it the greatest and the least are at work. To those who love the towering, often the desolate, peaks shot up of old in single lives by the volcanic, blind eruption of tribes and nations under one impulse, there may seem to be loss in this; but to those who rejoice in the diffusion of heat, light, life, the fruitfulness of the broad campaign, there will be seen in it great gain.

This growing unity in society reveals itself even in the follies of men; and fashion—a tidal wave of social mimicry, a fellowship of frivolous impulses—sweeps stately through a large share of the civilized world. In a more significant way dramatic, fictitious, and oratorical literature evince the increasing sense everywhere of the retributive and far-reaching character of social law. The Nemesis of remote, obscure crime, of inherent perversity, or of fitful impulse is habitually represented as pursuing the individual, in a consequential, inevitable way shaping after events; or, if for a time lost sight of, suddenly reappearing in ripe retribution. The novelist gratifies the critical moral sense of men by the

subtily with which he traces the threads of spiritual influence woven centrally into the fabric of life, and reveals them suddenly returning to the surface, giving it its pattern and figure. The poet delights us as he gives expression to a passionate sense of high endeavor, of reward, of retribution; while the orator holds us back by threatened justice, or urges us on by the assurance that the invincible forces of truth are with us. Thus is society more and more knit together by a clear recognition of the forces, the living forces, at work everywhere in it.

The moral nature thus called out in all states and actions of men should show, and does show, growth—that its law is felt more profoundly, felt in new and higher forms of life. Personal ambition, pride of family, pride of rank have been the motives which have impelled improvement and held the race fast in the gains it has made. The arrogant individual, the aristocratic class, the hated caste, have presented powerful obstacles to retrogression, and furnished the few the strongest of selfish impulses. In place of these, there are now substituted more and more, in the growth of democratic society, the love of knowledge, the love of personal excellence, public spirit, and benevolence.

The higher development of the moral impulse is also shown in a much more careful, unwavering, and honest pursuit of truth than ever before. Blind acceptance, fanatical advocacy, bigoted adhesion, dead, formulated dogma even defying the moral sentiments, are less prevalent than ever before. More minds desire to know truth, and earnestly and patiently bring their intellectual powers to its discovery. The love of truth in earlier centuries frequently expressed itself in the unreasoning, obstinate way in which alleged principles were held; in the cold, sceptical, destructive way in which they were attacked. Though something of both of these phases of action still remains, there has been a most manifest growth in a simple desire for truth, in a candid purpose to inquire into the grounds of belief, and find in them a personal basis for rational faith.

This sincerity and activity and fairness of research are a high development of the moral nature, and tend to emancipate it alike from overbearing dogma and dishonest scepticism. They are, in fact, the assertion of the right of conscience to use the intellectual appliances at its disposal, and to unfold its own life according to its own law; the assertion of the veracity and trustworthiness and immeasurable value of its own action in the face alike of doubt and dogmatism.

The same progress is also evinced in the increasing weight of a higher class of motives. The direct feeling peculiar to conscience, and by which it enforces its commands, is an inseparable sense of obligation. This power may be strengthened from below by a fear of the consequences of disobedience, or aided from above by a desire for moral perfection, the fruit of obedience. Giving way to the one class of motives, the moral imperative runs parallel with the dictates of self-love, and leaves the heart chiefly under its influence; uniting itself to the other, it gives the soul the freedom of a religious impulse, lifting it into a holy and spontaneous life. None can doubt that the latter tendency is gaining ground on the former, that persuasion is displacing coercion, that love is outstripping fear in the race of motives, and that excellence is oftener urged than interest. When the one form of motive is felt, it is hidden; while the other is constantly invoked, and made the ostensible ground of all our best actions. The persecutions and intolerance, the prominence given to present and future punishments, stand in obvious contrast with the broader charity now prevailing, with the bold relief given to the grace of Christ and the parental love of God. Herein lies a moral as much as a religious change. It is the sense of holiness, of virtue, which elicits love, and gives to pure character its hold on the affections. When the moral impulses push upward into the liberty of love, it is as unmistakable an indication of their health and strength as it is of their weakness when they sink into the paralysis of fear.

This growth of the race is denied by few; though there

remains much diversity of sentiment as to that in which it chiefly consists, and as to the causes which have produced it. Buckle attributes it exclusively, in its subjective element, to our intellectual nature, and gives little or no weight to the moral forces. Others seem to think that religious belief and the moral movements consequent thereon have greatly retarded progress, and that the rationalistic element has forced a development in spite of those religious impulses whose foundations are in the conscience. It is impossible so to separate moral from mental forces as to put the two in contrast, much more in antagonism. The moral sense is dependent on thorough thought, on just and complete reasoning, for its development. It does not assign adequately and finally a line of action by its own direct insight. It calls the mind to the task of tracing the consequences of conduct, of carefully investigating, of completely unfolding the relations of actions, its motives, its near and remote, its direct and indirect results. From this wide survey of the lines of influence it pronounces safe judgments. All the negligence, haste, partiality, and short-sightedness of our intellectual processes reappear in the verdict of conscience; since this faculty does not penetrate and expound actions with superhuman insight, but judges them as presented to it by the mind. It is not mere action, but action in its antecedents, consequents, concomitants, that conscience declares to be right or wrong; and for a knowledge of those conditions which make it to be what it is conscience relies on the judgment. Hence it is impossible to separate moral from intellectual growth, for the same reason that it is impossible to secure increasing clearness and justness in judicial decisions without progress in handling testimony, in legal facilities, acumen, and logic. The better exposition goes before the better verdict. That the discoveries of science and the growth of philosophy should accompany any great quickening of the moral nature is, if not inevitable, natural; since they furnish the conditions of broader, deeper, safer moral principles and precepts.

It is not in intellectual points, so far as these stand separate from the moral nature of man, that modern pre-eminence is seen; but in those features of society which especially reveal the moral temper. A broader, more general conscientiousness is a leading feature of modern, as opposed to earlier, times. Contrast the law of nations with the utter irresponsibility of former periods, the stronger amenable to no public sentiment in their handling of the weak. Accomplished Athens could, without compunction, slaughter and sell into slavery the entire population of a captured city; while Rome showed clemency or rigor, as suited her purposes. The general existence and great severity of slavery, without even the disguise of a prejudice of race or color, evinces a social sentiment totally distinct from that of modern Europe. The Lacedaemonians could adopt as a policy the assassination of Helots whenever they showed more character or bravery, or patriotism even, than was thought consonant with their position or the safety of the ruling class. Thus thousands who had made themselves conspicuous against a common enemy found their reward in the secret blow of the dagger. Think of a modern society resting on such a basis as this.

Or compare the pollution and sodomy of ancient Greece with the relative purity of most modern nations; the heartless punishments and the disregard of the weak which belonged to the Middle Ages, with the philanthropy of the present, cherished by multiplied and carefully collected facts, by the dry details of statistics, and the softening, sympathetic appeals of fiction. Every branch of literature bows to this labor of love—philosophy and song, the essay, the play, and the novel. Compare modern England with England of feudal times; and, though we see the extremes of society still far apart, they are comparatively fused together by the large, prevalent, absorbing middle class. There is a philanthropy and providence which reach to the bottom; the ferocity and arrogance of the higher, and the servility of the lower, classes are gone; and the mass of well-to-do citizens,

united by mutual respect and sympathy, form the strength of the nation. If we were to separate the more strictly intellectual results of action, as discoveries and inventions, from the moral spirit from which in many instances they have sprung, and the moral fruits they have yet oftener borne, we should have the merest husk and shell of modern life, not those features of pre-eminence which give promise of yet further progress in light, liberty, Christian love. Man's moral judgments have been corrected, and his moral sentiments deepened, by all this boasted growth; and this fact it is which makes it a ground of congratulation and hope. Whatever have been the causes of progress at work, they have all at length yielded the same fruit — an increase of personal rights, of humane sentiments, and of the sense of obligation to one's self, to the family, and to the community. These results show the forces to have been, under all their forms, profoundly moral. To break the bonds of superstition and dogma, to multiply physical comforts, and to give leisure, serve only to throw each individual the more strongly back on his own moral sense, to evoke from within the guidance that has been lost from without, and to turn a mere struggle for existence into one for position and character. All this is the resurrection of the moral life.

Another theory, finding most complete expression in the works of Herbert Spenser, accepts the fact of progress, and explains it as the necessary result of the organic forces at work. The moral universe unfolds itself as certainly and inevitably as, on the nebulous hypothesis, diffused gaseous matter is consolidated into a solar system. The simple necessarily becomes the complex. Idea after idea, class after class, institution after institution, find occasion for existence in the increasing heterogeneity of condition, and separate themselves in the interacting, ripening elements of the intellectual world. Fetichism must come; but it also must give way to more adequate ideas. Barbarism lies in the line of growth, and, by the exigencies of the very forces in it, takes the incipient steps of growth, divides industry,

establishes and improves its distinct branches, and thus passes into civilization.

Doubtless, if there is to be growth, these are the forms it must assume. The lower conception must give way to the higher; the undivided and unorganized must assume distinct, organic structure. But the question still returns, whether there are any such actually operating and efficient forces in mind and matter conjointly — forces whose type is the physical one, — steadily pressing development, pushing the race from stage to stage of progress? We cannot speak of the nature of the case; this is nothing but the forces at work, and for these we inquire. Where is found the law of development, the inevitable, gravitating power of the moral world, binding actions into fitting bundles, and giving all an orderly arrangement, organic offices and relations? The intellect alone can furnish no such force. This may guide movement, but does not implant it. Either our moral or our selfish impulses must be relied on; and if the latter, their self-sufficient growth must be shown, not as a coherent natural order merely, but as a constant, everywhere-present fact. If these forces sometimes miscarry, they may always miscarry; since they therein show that they lack the efficiency of a general law. Nebulous matter must always, or may never, condense into suns and planets.

How, therefore, does this theory of the necessary development of society comport with the facts? A primitive, universal, and extreme barbarism is assumed, and the present state of enlightened society is referred to it as its latest product. This statement of the facts not only starts with an hypothesis, not only overlooks the supernatural influences of Christianity, and refers modern thought to native and inevitable forces, it also forgets many significant events in the history of the world. A force common to the race must, as already urged, show a like tendency everywhere, or, by the want of such a tendency, forfeit its claims to universality and necessity. Failing of absolutely general causes, we are of course thrown back again on the search for special causes.

productive of the special results of European, Christian society.

Now, if we look at large portions of the world, as India, China, and Asia generally, we find society altogether stationary or on the retreat. Our nebulous universe is ceasing to contract; nay, worse, is actually expanding. The movement is reversed, and we can neither check nor explain it. We are drifting back into chaos and night; our inchoate suns are going out, our inchoate planets dissolving into gas; and our theory — worst of calamities — which was the mere outward statement of one line of facts, is, in the presence of another, a forgotten programme.

There is also gross barbarism in many corners of the world. Does it show itself as the germ of life, or is it quite as likely the cast-off husk? Are the nations of Australia, of the Pacific islands, of the extremes of the American continents, and of Southern Africa portions of the race sloughed off from more civilized centres in the early nomadic history of the race, evincing a tendency to degeneracy? Or are they, as by the theory they ought to be, fresh, independent centres, not yet thrown into rapid circles of evolution, waiting on the centuries for a self-developing social life? Geographic and linguistic relations seem to show them to be cases of dispersion and degradation. Civilization has constantly shown a tendency toward certain centres, leaving large territories unaffected, and pushing forward only here and there in rapid development. It has also repeatedly exhausted itself on the old ground, transferred itself to new fields, and become subject to a new class of specializing influences. These facts are consistent with the unequal, variable action of moral and religious forces, but not at all in harmony with necessary, universal, organic tendencies. Gothic character, Roman civilization, and Christianity are sufficient to explain European society; but no inherent, inevitable law of progress, equally operative in the Western as in the Eastern hemisphere, in Africa as in Europe, is adequate for this purpose.

This theory passes into a third allied one, that of utilitarianism. Neither of them rely on the conscience as a force in the growth of society; but, confounding the useful with the good, strive to evolve from self-love the impulse, the elements of progress. The intellect corrects the mistakes of selfishness, enlarges its view, and finally elevates it into at least the appearance of philanthropy and love. Against this theory, assuming a little more freedom of the emotional nature than that of development, there yet lie weighty objections. Its analysis of the moral constitution is unsound, confounding it with that to which it is most diametrically opposed, to wit, selfishness. Moreover, selfishness is to be softened down to rational, measured self-love; yet the work is to be done by selfishness itself. The means of transformation is an increase of knowledge. But every selfish impulse is intensified by activity, and the mind is correspondingly blinded to the higher good which lies in the opposite direction. The angry man does, indeed, experience the sufferings of anger; but that mere fact, aside from the rebuke and light of a moral impulse, does not compensate the blinding effects of passion, and its increased power through habit. We do not get a sufficient purchase against sin by simply becoming familiar with it. If so, sin, lust, appetite, are self-correcting—a statement contradictory of individual and national history. Evil would thus undermine itself, be divided against itself, and, at least in one half of it, or one aspect of it, cease to be evil, and become good—a transient phase of a life-impulse. That mere familiarity with vice, indulgence, without extraneous influence or moral appeal, overthrows or weakens sin, either in the individual or the community, is a doctrine as new to experience as it is to ethics. That the consequences of wrong action, our moral nature being as it is, are fitted to make a strong appeal to the conscience is very true; but it is most obviously not true that the intense selfishness with which man, according to this view, is supposed to start, will, as selfishness, arrest and improve itself. This is to ask vice to see, expose,

rebuke itself. The malignant man may become more cunning in the school of experience, not more loving. The feeble admonitions of mere experience will be swept away before the next strong wind of passion, like the leaves of an autumn forest. Each gust, moreover, is more uncontrollable than that which goes before it; and no lifeless truth can, in the meantime, so fasten itself, save through the conscience, as to withstand the coming blast.

Nor, as before urged, can it be shown that all right action does commend itself to self-love, aside from the support of the moral nature. It is the holy ambition, the supreme satisfaction of the moral nature, that gives quality to our best actions, flavor to our best impulses, and puts them in successful comparison with more restricted, prudent, self-seeking conduct. It is exactly the ethical sense, neither more nor less, which gives us the idea of a transcendent good, and enables us to find it in the generous, upward, faithful impulses of the soul.

The true theory of society we believe to be, that it is the field of very diverse influences; all of them exercising control, and tending in their combined result to progress. These are self-love, the sense of duty, and love. The dominant force among men hitherto has been self-love, usually showing itself as selfishness, and exceptionally appearing as a justifiable regard of one's own interest. Even this impulse, as aided by the ever-present, though usually suppressed voice of conscience, has shown a power under favoring circumstances to push nations, here and there, fitfully forward into civilization. It has not evinced the strength and growth of motive requisite to hold and enlarge the ground gained. Some new weakness, like that of luxury or arrogance, has uniformly been revealed as the fruit of this form of progress, and in sure sequence has turned the steps of nations backward, and left them to go down again by the way they came up. This is most natural, most inevitable, under the purely selfish impulse; since temptations increase with affluence, and the stringency of restraints diminish.

The period of thrifty, temperate, frugal virtues is passed, and no higher life comes in to replace with exalted motives these lower persuasives.

Love, on the other hand, is fitted to take possession of the soul most fully in its highest conditions of good, to find in the abundance of intellectual and physical possessions the means of its best satisfaction, and thus to establish the spiritual life on a higher, firmer basis with each step of progress. Under it the moral sense is no longer an irksome restraint, a bit and bridle, but through its approval the source of new, profound, and increasing pleasure. Thus the eye of desire is no longer turned backward but forward. The sense of satisfaction is ever on the advance, and the lower impulses both of duty and of self-love, are caught up and transfigured with their nobler, their divine companion, love.

Let us redirect attention to some of the conclusions now reached. Restraint, discipline, government, everywhere pursue men. Three parallel strata of law — self-love, duty, love — are ready to take under their respective control every rational agent as he rises upward or sinks downward. The sense of law is more clear and prevalent on the midway plane of action than either above or below it. The most obdurate sinner is, by his very sin, his very selfishness, caught in the strong net of law through utility, the quasi ethics of commerce, and made to feel the tight, and, if he struggles against them, the cruel, cutting cords of confinement. If man presses upward into love, if he reaches liberty, it is yet a liberty pervaded by law, everywhere ordered and organized by it. Whither shall I go from thy spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there.

There is a government everywhere exercised over men, and that too of moral forces. There is in human society an omnipresent probation of ever-changing conditions. Lower influences play into higher ones and strive to restore man to their government, yet are not able to take their place. The

lower, harsher discipline is practically a failure, save as it is complemented and completed by the higher. It is able to reserve man for the higher, to hold him back from indefinite descent, but cannot by its own strength complete any movement it may inaugurate. Selfishness keeps alive the sense of right. The selfish man is only the more quick to discern the obligations of others to himself, to call conscience to the task of censuring the delinquencies of a neighbor. What a cry does this impotent recrimination of man by man, this discernment of a good that none reaches, send up for divine interposition, for the granting of a life whose conditions are present, yet made of no avail by the helplessness of the will and the affections, — a limp, living body, waiting a new inspiration of strength.

The lower government of self-love, though with a heaven-wide diversity of motive, does ultimately and remotely strive after the same results as those sought by love. The criterion of utility or of duty or of affection will, if thoroughly and wisely applied, reach the same formal, practical end. There lies between them this difference. The lowest cannot establish, cannot practically reach, cannot theoretically justify its own conclusions, its own lines of conduct, without a recognition of the higher, the moral pleasure which follows their acceptance. Utility is lost, included, swallowed up in duty, and duty in the play of the moral affections. The issues that are constantly raised in the collision of man with man may call forth this or that theoretical exposition, may sharpen perception with the keen insight of interest, yet counter-interests so spring up in the path of progress, so darken counsels, so weaken the hands that execute them, so misdirect and misrepresent effort, that not till conscience and love are able with equal pertinacity to take up the struggle, can it find a hopeful conclusion.

Now the existence of this lower, incomplete government, working ineffectually toward higher ends, those proposed by the supernatural, the revealed government of God, and the power which the motives of the latter evince to gather up,

compact, and complete the tendencies of the former, show that the two are parts of one system, and are maintained in one interest. The supernatural complements the natural, with the same significance that life combines, uses, lifts up physical and chemical forces into its own sphere. All growth, civilization, science, philosophy, do as much for revelation as they do for the moral nature. The strength of Christianity renews itself in each successive struggle. Love, which is its essence, stands more strongly forth than ever before as its working power. The incrustations of dogma broken off have only laid bare the diamond of central truth. Revealed religion shows itself in most complete harmony with natural religion, with the moral sentiments, by itself calling for exactly the same development, by coming forth from each conflict with unbelief, with a clearer discovery of its own power, by sweeping away conclusions which obscure, weaken, or misrepresent it, by throwing off non-essential, accidental concomitants, and by a better, bolder presentation of its immutable principles. A natural government which struggles with the evils that oppress it, that works partial good with inadequate means, that checks when it cannot quicken, and punishes when it cannot redeem, that holds the race aloof from complete anarchy and night, and waits expectant on higher powers, is a tangible, moral fact, a veritable foundation-stone in a moral universe, a recognized beginning of that whose existence we believe in, whose completion we hope for — the kingdom of God. A revealed religion which furnishes incentives to action, working in the line of all below them, using them, lifting them into higher relations, and giving them the completeness of a new, a spiritual life, which exposes the fictitious, superficial growth of man and of society under purely natural forces, and does, with a deeper impulse, what these are only in vain striving to do, shows itself divine.