ARTICLE IV.

ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS BOTH NECESSARY, IN THEIR PROPORTION, TO TRUE REASONING.

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We may say a word of what is meant by the terms. In logic they are applied to the two modes of reasoning,—one by which you assume the conclusion and go back to the elements to prove it, as in algebra; and the other, by which you put the elements together and come to the conclusion last, as often in geometry. In both these ways wholes and parts are considered, and it is supposed that the contemplation of both is necessary to the integrity of our knowledge. In this Article, it is not so much the method we consider, as the importance of the two facts. What we have especially in view is:

First, When to understand a subject we dissect it into parts, and are so intent on the parts that we forget the primitive union, or when we exaggerate the separation.

Secondly, When the union is so complete as to generate a new simple idea, as the two gases in water, and we lose sight of the importance of the new unity.

Thirdly, When we affirm a thing which implies the denial of some opposite, as when it is said the soul is a chain of exercises, and it is implied we deny a continuity, and we neglect to ask what is the exact difference of the thing affirmed and denied.

And lastly, When our assertion or proposition floats between the objective and subjective, as when Locke said there was no heat in fire, or no color in the rainbow. To these four we might add, when we see a strange apparent deviation in the laws of nature which after observation harmonises, or when an all-inclusive principle takes in some
items which we at first suppose do not belong to it. In all such cases the synthesis of parts to a consequent whole gives great light, both in morals and material things.

We shall find, if we examine, that the natural course of all investigation in moral or material science leads us to exaggerate the power of analysis and to overlook the units from which we started. Thus, in dissecting a dead carcass, the first presentation is the body itself, and its constitution is to be found by dissecting it into parts. But there is always one difficulty,—life is gone, with all its active operations, before the work is begun. Hence the anatomist loses one of the essential principles whose nature he seeks. Exactly so it is with the human mind: we begin by surveying it as a totality; and the only way of advancing in our knowledge seems to be to take it apart; to arrange and inspect the elements; the laws of thought and the passions; but in all this we are departing from an instructive unity. A chemist surveys the imponderable substances. His whole effort and language is to insulate them. But they never did exist alone. Thus science in some degree deceives herself; she throws herself out of the domain of nature; she is continually tempted to depart from the first impressions of nature. Like Noah's last dove, she goes forth from the ark, to return no more. Now this is always misleading, when the primitive unity is the clearest item that we can ever afterwards find.

In the natural world it is found very difficult from the presentations of nature, to draw those minute borders to our conception which seem necessary to the precision of our ideas. What an atom is; how a vegetable differs from an animal; how a line of continuity differs from one of closely associated points, or whether points can touch each other, are questions which curiosity may ask, but the oldest experience can never expect to answer.

But all ideas are not of material things. These are only the designs of the Maker written with his great pencil in visible figures on a slate. There is a world of other ideas, which never can be represented by matter, and are to the
fountains of thought forever confined. Let us consider some of these. What is the nature of these ideas?

It may be well to begin with the mind itself; the Ego as it is now called. This we certainly ought to know; and a mistake here will certainly be likely to affect all our subsequent reasoning on mental subjects. Everybody knows that ever since the days of Locke the stream of metaphysical speculation has widely deviated from common sense. A common man, out of the schools and in the market, is inclined to wonder by what possible road of plausible speculative beings can arrive at so absurd conclusions. The evil it seems to me, to begin with the beginning, is the very false meaning that a man is taught to give to the first personal pronoun he ever probably used.

Dugald Stewart lays it down as a first principle that the mind never can directly see itself. Every man is himself shut up in a certain bag, and he can neither feel nor see himself, but by touching his substance from the outside. When I look for the Ego, I see not the naked thing itself, though I am that thing, but I see it clothed in the robe of properties. I must walk out and walk back in order to get inside of my own house. "The notions we annex," says he, "to the words 'matter and mind,' as is well remarked by Dr. Reid, are merely relative. If I am asked what I mean by matter, I can only explain myself by saying it is that which is extended, figured, colored, movable, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold; that is, I can define it in no other way than by enumerating its sensible qualities. It is not matter or body which I perceive by my senses, but only extension, figure, color, and certain other qualities which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something which is extended, figured, and colored. The case is precisely similar with respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence; but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition—operations which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man, too, is impressed with an irresistible conviction that all his sensations, thoughts,
and volitions belong to one and the same being—to that being which he calls himself: a being which he is led by the constitution of his nature to consider as something distinct from his body, and not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of its organs."

This paragraph is striking, as it shows that two fundamental errors naturally go together. The one is sacrificed to the many; the tree is destroyed as to its trunk, and resolved totally into its branches. The same postulate that requires that the soul should be a loose bundle of totally separable properties, requires also that a tree or a drop of water should be resolved into a collection of qualities. Hence came the conclusion of denying the unity to be anything. It was wholly unknown. It was inconceivable in thought and useless in philosophy. Hence Berkeley denied the existence of all substance, and our own Emmons made the soul a chain of exercises, regulated wholly by the Almighty power. This was strong reasoning from a very bold postulate.

It seems to us, that the whole of this representation is wrong. It is not true that we are not immediately conscious of the soul's existence; it is not true that we find it through sensation, thought, and volition. It is much more true that we find sensation, thought, and volition through the soul.\(^1\)

Suppose I stand before a picture. I see two things—the figures and the canvas on which they are drawn. Now, do I not stand face to face to the canvas and see it as clearly as the various figures drawn upon it? Indeed, this comparison is defective; it is not strong enough. Every man knows the

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\(^1\) This is, we allow, in opposition to high authority. "We know nothing," says Sir Wm. Hamilton, "whatever of mind and matter considered as substances; they are only known to us as a twofold series of phenomena; and we can only justify, against the law of parsimony, the postulation of two substances, on the ground that the two series of phenomena are reciprocally so contrary and incompatible that the one cannot be reduced to the other, nor both be supposed to co-inhere in the same common substance." See Supplementary Dissertation on Reid, Note A, sect. II. All we mean to say is, we should never have known what an apple was by seeing its qualities apart, not even by the most complete enumeration; we must see it as a unit.
fountain of existence better than the streams; he is in it; it is himself.

Let us enumerate some of the imperfect reasonings into which these assumptions lead us:

In the first place, this doctrine contradicts our consciousness. Consciousness is not a faculty, but a general power by which we recognize our own being. When we exercise any particular faculty — when we love, hate, hope, fear, — we are conscious that this exercise is not the whole soul; it is an affection, or work of the soul; it is a part, and implies a whole; and we are just as conscious of the whole as of the part: more so, because it is near to us. When we turn the eye in different directions we are conscious that it is the same eye, nor does the exercise swallow up the agent. *I see* is a familiar phrase. We should like to ask any one whether he understands the meaning of both these words. Does he not understand the pronoun as well as the verb? *The I as well as the see?* and whether he is obliged to wait until he has passed through the latter, as a door, before he reaches the former, which is the house. It has been observed that in all languages, however material, there are two words whose etymological origin is not material — the personal pronoun and the substantive verb. Language is a reflection of nature.

But, secondly, this false view of the unity of the soul and not being directly conscious of it, inverts the chronology of our knowledge. What we mean is, the knowledge of the intellectual and personal *one* was before the intellectual and personal *many*. You knew yourself before you knew your properties and actions. The subjective sensation is before the active. It is very true that we cannot remember our infant history and the order of our thoughts; nor can we agree with Dr. Reid\(^1\) and others, that it is of much importance to mental knowledge to remember this hidden history. But we can judge from the nature of things and tendencies. Let us take Lucretius’s account of the new-born babe:

\(^{1}\) *Introduction to his Inquiry, Sect. II.*
"Thus, like a sailor by a tempest hurled
Ashore, the babe is shipwrecked on the world;
Naked he lies, and ready to expire,
Helpless of all that human wants require;
Exposed upon unhospitable earth
From the first moment of his helpless birth;
Straight with foreboding cries he fills the room,
Too true presages of his future doom."

The first exercise then is pain; but pain may come through any of the five senses; it may come through the body or the mind. It is addressed to the whole man. Pain and pleasure are not the prerogatives of any section of our nature. Even the nervous system hands our sufferings and our enjoyments up to the Ego. Happiness is certainly personal. Though I have a weak memory, and can remember very little of the first three months of my existence, and nothing at all previous to my birth, yet some things I know with moral certainty. I know what part of speech it was that I first used; it was an interjection. It expressed probably some sensation of the whole little system; it was neither of hearing, seeing, feeling, or even tasting. Indeed the order of nature here seems in some degree to involve and presuppose the order of time. At least we may say, in an inquiry where none can recollect enough positively to affirm we may be justified from the only conceivable probabilities to deny.

But, thirdly, we will venture on a reason derived from a subject which is very puzzling, but whose very perplexity seems to us to shed light on this subject. We all know that time has been an object which has greatly embarrassed the metaphysicians. Augustine's remark has often been quoted: "If you had not asked me what it is, I should have known." Mr. Locke defines it to be the succession of our ideas. Cousin says it is that which is receptive of and measures this succession. But neither of these definitions exhaust the difficulty. If it is a succession of ideas merely, I can never know whether they are faster or slower. I have no standard with which to compare them; and if it is the mere receptacle of ideas it is still a very singular and recondite existence.
A few questions will bring the difficulty before us. What do I mean by equal portions of time? What do I mean by time moving faster and slower; or what do I mean by its moving equally? What is equable as applied to this subject? Where is the standard, and how do we compare the motions? Indeed what is faster and slower as applied, not to the apparent, but the absolute duration? What is absolute time? If the perception of time consists wholly in the succession of ideas, time is confined wholly to the individual, the words “slower” and “faster” have no meaning when applied to it; and the story of the Mohammedan doctor, and the Sultan who dipped his head into a tub of water, in the ninety-fourth number of the Spectator, is verified, namely, that ages may pass to one man’s perception which are only and instant to another. But from this error the truth which we are seeking emerges; namely, that we have a double consciousness; the one applicable to the exercises of the mind, the other to the mind itself; the one to the succeeding thoughts, the other to the Ego; the one more superficial, the other more deep; and hence we obtain the thing measured and the standard of measurement. We get the ideas of uniformity and diversity, of faster and slower, as applied to time. I am, suppose, in the senate chamber of Congress during some exciting debate; very eloquent speeches occupy the time; it gets to be late at night, and I am so interested that six hours seem to me like twenty minutes; and yet before I look at the clock I am conscious that my attention has been riveted, and that my ideas have flowed faster than usual; and yet I am conscious of my own deception. I know that the seeming time is not the true. How do I know it? The only answer that I can give is, the one and the many act together. The Ego is conscious of the uniform flow of time; the exercises are conscious of the apparent increase of its speed; and by comparing the one with the other we get the idea of degree—the faster or slower motion of that which cannot be faster or slower but with reference to some standard of comparison.

To illustrate, let us suppose a river and its channel to be
endowed, both of them, with a different but intermingled consciousness. The water is conscious of its flow, and the bed of its rest. If the water alone were conscious, without reference to anything else, it might flow faster and slower to any degree, and yet it would be a secret to itself never known. But as soon as a standard is introduced in a double consciousness, then the notion of degree necessarily arises. So it seems to us the Ego and its thoughts, affections, and qualities both combine in giving us the notion of time. I am conscious of duration. I am conscious of uniformity. I receive the whole idea of time; and this mysterious idea shows me the nature of my soul. My soul perceives degree in time; and time through the perception of degree shows the nature of my soul.

But, in the fourth place, we would observe this account of the soul and its faculties gives no good analysis, and no synthesis of itself or its powers. It leads to confusion both ways. When the chemist puts his two gases together to form water, and when he resolves water into the two gases, he triumphantly concludes from both the processes that he has given you the chemical composition of water. But this account of the soul leads to confusion both ways. I cannot analyze the soul, for without its properties I am taught it is nothing; and I cannot synthetically form an idea of the soul because I want a point of union. All the faculties of the mind heaped together, such as thought, design, volition, hope, fear, desire, etc., are not the Ego any more than a mob is an army, or a troop of atoms rolling in boundless confusion is a world. Besides, no union in the soul necessitates the conception of no union in the outer world. The confusion projects itself on everything about the primitive. If the soul be a collection of qualities, joined by some unproven and inconceivable tie, a thought will be a collection of simple clear ideas joined by a substratum of which neither the senses nor the reason give me a clear conception. Here is junction without union: clearness in the parts and confusion in the whole will supervene. Ac-
cordingly Locke tells us: "If any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us, which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein color and weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian, etc.," and then tells the well-known story, etc. He calls it an obscure and relative idea (Human Understanding, Book II. chap. 23). According to his philosophy, we first see, and with clearness, simple ideas, and then we put these together to form the complex ideas of rivers, trees, mountains, and houses; but the object becomes obscurer at every step of the combination, because the multitude is enlarged and the unity is lost. Suppose I have a row of gold beads placed tight together on a string, which they hide. I am told I may look at each bead and find in it a subject of perception and knowledge; but as to the string, it is hidden from the eye of the senses and reason, and is a proper subject of scepticism and distrust. Now, I contend, I never saw a row of beads in which the hidden string was not as obvious as the beads it held.

But, fifthly, this view becomes more doubtful from the wild conclusions we must deduce from it. It puzzled Mr. Locke himself as to personal identity, and he gave an account of it which destroyed its very existence. It led to the denial of the external world, and resolved the sun, moon, and stars, with all the choir of heaven, into a huge circle of mental phantasms. It made the soul a chain of exercises, not one of which had any certain connection. It led, we think, to the denial of power, resolving all its apparent manifestations into a series of sequences. It confused our conception of time. It was the cause of Edward's invincible motive which always governs the will, and therefore introduces an iron necessity.
For if we once separate all the parts of the soul, so as to diminish the unity in separating the faculties, the motive and the will may meet like two mental strangers, and the one may domineer over the other. The fallacy of that book is, as we conceive, that he separates the parts of the mind so completely from its unity, that the motive is an entirely different thing from the will; whereas there is a point of unity which modifies and perhaps annihilates his reasoning.

In a word, the parting point between modern metaphysics and common sense, where they begin to diverge until they come to mutually astounding conclusions, it seems to us, is here, that the metaphysician when he sees a tree, thinks he has but seen a number of simple ideas, which his wisdom has put together in a manner he hardly knows how, in a union he hardly knows what, so that the tree is a sort of bundle which wants, or has, an incomprehensible string to keep it together. That string he scarcely hopes ever to find; whereas the man of common sense sees the tree, and acquiesces in the first impression.

But, lastly, this view is questionable from the authorities which oppose it; and first, the authority of the scriptures. The danger is alluded to in a very simple way in the word of God. The apostle warns us (1 Tim. vi. 20), against what he calls "opposition of science, falsely so called; the very thing we have been contemplating. Science becomes false and dangerous to religion when one of its parts is set in a total opposition to another; at once an important thought and most happy expression. The same principle is involved in the sentiment (2 Cor. iii. 14): "But their minds were blinded; for until this day remaineth the same veil untaken away in the reading of the Old Testament; which veil is done away in Christ." On which passage Rosenmuller remarks: "The doctrine of Christ alone opens the true sense and design of the Mosaic law." Consider an old sacrifice as first presented in a naked ritual, and the glory that blazes around it when
its end is seen accomplished in Christ. The apostle regards all the ignorance of man (1 Cor. iii. 9) as arising from the fact that we know in part. In order to understand the true significance of human life we must join that part that lies this side of the grave to the infinite extension that lies beyond it; hence the Psalmist says: "When I thought to know this, it was too painful for me; until I went into the sanctuary of God" (Psalm lxxiii. 16, 17). Moses desired to see the glory of God (Ex. xxxiii. 13); not election, or sovereignty, or omnipotence, or his justice, or even his mercy; but all blended in his glory. In the first chapter of Genesis, God's creating power is not presented without his benevolence: he makes all things by a word; but when they are made, they are all very good. Our Saviour tells us: "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." In a word, the Bible always recognizes a constructive whole, which, bearing a logical relation to the parts, gives a correlative light, and makes the subject to be competently understood. God understands better than we, because he perfectly sees both.

We have profane authority to the same point. The categories of Aristotle, the great master of logic, have not always been understood. They are substance, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, position, possession or habit, action, passion. "It would be a loss of time," says Dr. Watts (Logic c. II. sect. 5), to show how loose, how injudicious, and even ridiculous, is this tenfold division of things"; but however imperfect the division, the design was certainly a reality. What is a category? What was the design? The design was to reduce logic to its simple elements, i.e. an incomplex proposition, of which all syllogisms must be composed; a category is an enumeration of the elements out of which a simple proposition must be made. Now mark, the enumeration begins with substance,—which is the very thing that modern metaphysicians deny, by making it a strange bundle of qualities, not knowing what ties them together—substance,
Oivia, of which the logical parts are quantity and quality; then comes relation, πρός ὦς, which is another whole, of which where, when, position, possession or habit (χειρ. to hold or possess), action, passion, are the enumeration of relations, or the parts; and his design is to reduce all reasoning to its simplest elements. A simple proposition must present a distinct idea as the foundation of all reasoning; and the idea becomes distinct by contemplating wholes and parts. Just consider the word "relation," or the two words in Greek πρός ὦς, what a whole it presents! what a whole it demands! One is tempted here to assert that God is omniscient solely because he sees the relation of the atom to all things, and of all things to the atom. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us; but all subjects present to us constructive wholes, i.e. all the elements of the concept in its substance or relations which go to complete our knowledge and make it our useful inheritance.¹

The moral and polite writers have acknowledged this principle, though they had no suspicion of its importance or extent. Rousseau was an accurate observer; but as little of a reasoner as we can imagine. The light of his mind was a flash of lightning, sudden, powerful, keen, penetrating, coming out of darkness and returning to darkness again, always surprising, never consistent; always contradicting our accredited teachers, but never contradicting any body half so often as himself. Now in his New Heloise, where he is writing of life and manners, he says (Vol. II. p. 123): "The study of the world is difficult, and I hardly know how it should be conducted. The philosopher is too remote; the man of the world is too near; the one sees too much for reflection, and the other too little

¹ The Categories of Aristotle have not always been understood. Strictly speaking, there are but two. First, substance, with its logical parts, quantity and quality; and secondly, relation, of the parts of which the rest are an enumeration, as when, where, position, possession (i.e. habit), action, passion. Here are two wholes—substance and relation, and all the rest are logical parts of these two; and the design seems to be to teach us the importance of both wholes and parts, i.e. synthesis and analysis, in forming the first elements of our reasoning.
to judge of the whole picture. Each object that strikes the philosopher he considers a part and is not able to discern either connections or relations it has to other objects out of his sphere; he never sees from his stand point their causes nor consequences. The man of the world sees all and thinks of nothing. The mobility of the object permits him only to glance at all, but to observe nothing; and the impressions are effaced by their mutual rapidity; and there remains to him of all he sees only a confusion that resembles the original chaos.” This seems to us a very profound remark. How is it illustrated in a mitigated degree in the papers of Addison and Steel in the Spectator; Addison was the philosopher; Steel was the man of the world; Addison, modest, retiring, almost bashful, had not seen half so much of society as Steel had. Dr. Drake remarks of Steel, the vast variety of characters he introduces: fops, chamber-maids, servants, mistresses, bards, sentimentalists, bad husbands and good; but he never completes the picture; he is never profound; he is almost natural; almost pathetic; almost witty; and he gets sometimes almost down to the central motive, but never quite; hence his pathos is a little sickish, and his wit produces rather a grin than a smile. Addison was far less wide in his observation, and far more profound in sounding the motive; as to his wit, one would almost suspect that he chose Steel for a partner on purpose to set off his own perfection; just as Ole Bull filled his orchestra with common fiddlers, because he felt that the united talent of America could not rise above a contrast.

Nothing is more delightful than to find an unexpected whole where the antagonisms seemed to be complete and forms separated. A new law of nature which harmonizes opposition; the unity of a plan; the constancy of nature in some of its apparent deviations, as for example the law of sex among the bees; all these unities, presented by nature in an infinitude of parts, give us the wisdom of God in its most extensive light, and teach us the importance of the double examination.
In Dr. Holmes's Address before the Boylston Medical Society of Harvard College, 1844, we find this sentence: "The diseases now known as tuberculous, were for a long period scattered and concealed under various disguises, which prevented their real identity from being recognized. In the Sympathetic glands tubercle was known as scrofula, in the bones, as white swelling; in the lungs, as phthisic; in various other internal organs, by no distinctive name whatever. Thus the tuberculous affections were separated at their natural point of union, and became joined to various other diseases to which their relations were wholly accidental. In the year 1810, for instance, when Bayle wrote his work on Phthisis, he recognized pulmonary tubercles as only one of the six forms of the disease," etc. Now here are two fatal mistakes: a true union missed and a forced one found; and how important were both the synthesis and separation.

It seems as if this method of regarding the mind as not an immediate object of consciousness as a totality, that is, that every man is a faggot made up of a bundle of twigs, consisting only of parts, has darkened our investigations both in the material and intellectual line. In both, synthesis is nothing; analysis is all. We are always dissecting—cutting up; we never consider the living object as one, all acuteness seems to consist in contemplating parts and components. But Bishop Butler tells us (Preface to his Sermons, page xii): "Every work both of nature and of art is a system; and as every particular thing, both natural and artificial, is for some use or purpose out of and beyond itself, one may add to what has been already brought into the idea of a system, its conduciveness to this one or more ends. Let us instance in a watch. Suppose the several parts taken to pieces and placed apart from each other; let a man have ever so exact a notion of those several parts, unless he considers the respects and relations which they have to each other, he will not have anything like the idea of a watch. Suppose these several parts brought together and anyhow united; neither will he yet, be the union ever so close, have an idea
which will bear any resemblance to that of a watch. But let him view those several parts put together in the manner of a watch; let him form a notion of the relations which those several parts have to each other—all conducive in their respective ways to this purpose, showing the hour of the day; and then he has the idea of a watch. Thus it is with regard to the inward frame of man. Appetites, passions, affections, and the principles of reflection considered merely as the several parts of our inward nature, do not at all give us an idea of the system or constitution of this nature, because the constitution is formed by something not yet taken into consideration, namely, by the relations which these several parts have to each other; the chief of which is the authority of reflection or conscience. Here are two extremes: we may attend to the whole to the neglect of the parts, or we may watch the parts and overlook the whole; now the tendency of all artistic investigation is to the latter extreme. It is in this line that common sense is sometimes wiser than learning.

In estimating the powers and faculties of our minds we must go from the whole to the parts, and the whole is often the clearest conception. The finest dust you can pulverize is an aggregate of infinite atoms, and hence an absolute atom is at an infinite distance beyond our conception.

The conception of present time is a very difficult one; you cannot insulate the present moment and stop it. While you are grasping it, it is gone. As Dr. Watts says:

"The present moments just appear,
Then slide away in haste,
That we can never say, they're here,
But only say, they're past."

From this fact comes another, that we cannot distinguish between memory and consciousness; that is, we cannot fix the shifting border. Consciousness is passing into memory while you are asking what it is; and you cannot go to a dining party, or chat with a friend but this deception is passed on your mind. The qualities of the mind are misconceived the
moment you separate them too much. As a fish begins to lose its beautiful hue the moment it is taken from the water, so any quality of the mind is misapprehended when it is torn from its native combination. Take the idea of volition and power; at first view they may seem to have no connexion; the one seems purely mental, and the other seems purely physical; and yet it is doubtful whether we could form the conception of the one without the subjacence of the other. We will to do some things which we cannot do; we will to do others which we can do; we will to lift a weight too heavy for us; we will to move an arm and it moves; and volition is revealed to us in its internal exercises and its external effects. It is revealed to us in the centre of all its concomitants. Without both power and the want of power we should not be able to know what volition is. They are correlativest—opposite lamps on the gate-post, shining and exulting in each others light. But power has a more extensive combination. Metaphysicians have been greatly puzzled since the days of Hume to account for power under the name of causation. How do you get the idea? How is it revealed to us? Hume answered the question in a way by which he meant to perplex us as much as he did when he asked it; and Sir William Hamilton is the least satisfactory when he grasps this problem. He reduces it to a mental impotence of ever conceiving anything new in the line of eternal causation. It is not our purpose to review or confute his theory. But we would ask: Has not this subject been darkened by its insulation—by taking analysis and neglecting synthesis? Our first idea of power arises from the exercise of our minds on our own muscles. This Hume hints; this Cousin adopts from M. De Biran, another French metaphysician.1 We will; we attempt a motion; it follows, or does not follow; and in either case it teaches us a lesson. But who does not see, if this be true, that the idea of power is revealed to us in its vast combination with all power? We should never know what personal power is, if it were not for resistance;

1 Elements of Psychology, chap. IV.
and what is resistance but an opposing power? So that the idea of causation is revealed to us in our own experience; but experience looking at a synthesis: "the word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart." We do not pretend that this clears up all mysteries; but merely to whisper a suspicion that this subject, like many others, has been darkened by that everlasting subtlety with which we have been taught to chase after truth in the analytic line.

But the worst influence that this partial method has had is on our theological investigation, in producing certain artificial antagonisms which always meet the mind in a state of exaggerated separation.

Whoever has passed out of Boston southward has seen the blue hills stretching along the horizon before him, beginning in Dedham and tapering down to the eastern sea. He must have remarked they are a ridge of eminences neither wholly one, nor wholly separate; but the lower parts mingle in one granite base; and it is obvious that the separation is different in almost every hill. The great blue hill stands apart from his fellows in sullen majesty at the head of the column; but as you proceed eastward, they lower their tops, and blend into one continuous ridge. Now suppose I want to contemplate or describe these little mountains; it is obvious, if I am just to nature, I must view them in their junction and in their separation. I should do great injustice to the great blue hill itself, if I should consider him as wholly separated from his eastern fellow. So in theology, we have no right to consider even contrasted doctrines apart any further than they are really separated.¹

¹ Cicero taught that all the virtues, though separated in thought, were joined in nature. Atque haec confunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. Nam cum ita copulatae connexaque sunt, ut omnes omnium participes sint, nec alia ab alia possit separari: tamen propium suum cujusque munus est, ut fortitudo in laboribus, periculisque cernatur: temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus: prudentia in delectis bonorum et malorum: justitia in suo cuique tribuendo (De Finibus, Lib. V. sect. 23). "This conjunction and even confusion of the virtues is yet separated by the philosophers in a certain way. For as they are all so involved and connected that all partici-
Let us record a few specimens of exaggerated antagonisms, the more misleading because they are not totally false. They are like the blue hills; they blend at the base.

The first we shall mention is one in which the separation is entirely total, and yet on one of the sides at least the parallel cannot be understood without reference to the other—we allude to matter and mind. We are told by Jacobi, in one of his late tracts, that "Nature conceals God; for, through her whole domain nature reveals only fate, only an indissoluble chain of mere efficient causes, without beginning and without end, excluding with equal necessity, both providence and chance. An independent agency, a free original commencement, within her sphere and proceeding from her power, is impossible. Working without will, she takes counsel neither of the good nor the beautiful. Creating nothing, she casts up from her dark abyss only eternal transformations of herself; unconsciously and without an end, furthering with the same ceaseless industry decline and increase, death and life; never producing what alone is of God and what supposes liberty — the virtuous, the immortal" (as quoted in Aids to Faith, Essay I. p. 38). Never was there a truth worse expressed than this, or more adapted to make a false impression; for such a nature is a violent avulsion from its real existence. It is never thus presented to us in the visible creation. It is as if we should see a chariot pass by us, and, contemplating one of the wheels as the sole object of insulated attention, as it passed, should say: it is the nature of that wheel to be constantly revolving; it is ever turning up one spoke after another; it is conscious of nothing and pursues nothing; it neither seeks the right road, nor avoids the wrong one; it exhibits constantly the passivity of action; it is an
unconscious wheel in motion. And yet, after all, such a separate wheel, though seen by an eye-witness on the spot, is a delusion of the mind; for the motion of the wheel comes from the strength of the horses, and its guidance from the discretion of the driver. And so of nature, the apostle tells us, with philosophic truth as well as religious information, that, "the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. i. 20). How accurate! We never see matter but accompanied with power, and directed power, and directed to a mental end. Organization is everywhere. Wherever nature exists there is a law of nature; and a law implies a lawgiver — a being who established and made it act to an end. Now if any one chooses to separate what God has joined together, that is, if he refuses to regard the synthesis which his mind must make, he comes to the oracle, and hears the enigmatic response without adding the indicated interpretation. Power is invisible, and directed power is a law; insomuch that some Pantheists have erred on the other side, and actually confounded the work with the workman, as the eloquent poet has said:

"These, as they change, Almighty Father, these
Are but the varied God."

So evidently is the mental mixed with the material in the visible creation that the ancient mythologists were obliged to invent an imaginary chaos (and Moses seems to justify them) as a point of contrast, to show what matter would be with no inscription of the mental written upon it. A perfect antagonism, where the two things are so antagonistic, seems impossible. The sands of Barca, flying in the whirlwind; the mud of the Nile in its wildest vortices, a raft blown down the Red river, are in all their circlings obeying a law; and the whole actual creation cannot afford us a momentary exception.

Some late speculations concerning the origin of species seem to us to be affected by excessive analysis to the neglect of synthesis; and the modern theories are the misleadings of
this unscientific separation. We are called to contemplate halves when we ought to regard wholes.

It is very obvious that those writers are unconscious materialists, or at least are seeking distinction and differences wholly in the material line. The material creation is never considered as being a mental transcript. It is perfectly obvious, if we look at the finest picture without regarding it as a transcript of certain images in the artist's mind, we shall not understand it. A blind man just restored to sight would not understand it. Now one of the most startling assertions of these new speculators, such as Lamarck, Darwin, and Dr. Hooker, is, that species among plants and animals has no foundation in nature. "In the very outset of the inquiry," says Lyell, in his new work on the antiquity of man, "we are met with the difficulty of defining what we mean by the terms 'species' and 'race'; and the surprise of the unlearned is usually great when they discover how wide is the difference of opinions now prevailing as to the signification of words in such familiar use. But in truth we can come to no agreement as to such definitions unless we have previously made up our minds on some of the most momentous of all the enigmas with which the human intellect ever attempted to grapple" (p. 388). Again, "What Lamarck then foretold (i.e. in his day) has come to pass; the more new forms have been multiplied, the less we are able to describe what we mean by a variety and what by a species." Astounding! The man that reads in his Bible that "God created great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly after their kind, and every winged fowl after its kind; and God saw that it was good," when a man is taught that the Supreme Intelligence saw no meaning in the words "after its kind," that all was a mass of obliterated lines and blended confusion, he wonders how our first impressions can be so completely reversed by our subsequent researches. If there is no difference between varieties and species, we see not why progressive knowledge may not deny the reality of the sexes, and throw all creation
into one heap of confusion. Now the difficulty arises, we suspect, from seeking all our knowledge in the material line. We subordinate the mental to the material, or rather we tear them asunder. All the distinctions of the mere natural world fade as we approach the borders that separate them. To a man that assumes a disintegrated materialism, genus and species, in all vegetable and animal nature, become indistinct the more he tries to be accurate. But when he sees the patterns in the material design he has a new star of direction, the borders separate, and the idea brightens. He forms his kind after the pattern shown him in the mount. A sword, a bayonet, a dagger, a knife, are recognized immediately, though they are all made of iron. We see a mental intention in the material organ. So likewise in nature, the moment we see intelligence behind the animated creation we have a new element of distinction. All these classes had a pattern, which existed in the forming mind, and they comport with and execute his great design. A cow differs from a sheep because God designed them for different ends. The first effect of putting the intellectual behind the material is, it compels us to look for genus and species in centres and not in borders; in the spot where divergency is completed and not where it begins. Genus and species are creature of the mind, and it is by the mind alone that they can be judged. But when you tear creation from its unity with its great author, when you look for species and varieties wholly in material manifestations, which it is manifest never can exist alone, you have first mutilated creation, and then been led to misunderstand it. What though I cannot always draw the line between an animal and a vegetable; what though the moluses may have very insensible varieties; what though a brute may approach in power a very stupid man? I see that the central idea of man and brute, vegetable and animal, are still eternally distinct. Where the stone is erected which separates Newburyport from Newbury there may be a grain

1 That is a materialism not united to a spiritual whole—a whole composed of matter and spirit.
of dust, which it is impossible to say to which it belongs. But who doubts for what purpose the stone was erected; and who doubts to what jurisdiction the opposite houses belong? The truth is, we never can survey creation insulated into materialism. It is an absolute nonentity. It will be regulated by law and governed by mind; and in that governing mind we see the best exemplification of its laws. God intended a deer for a deer; a lion for a lion. A lion and a deer are materialized ideas of an eternal mind. The intention is so blended with their natures that it is impossible to separate them. It is in this sense that it is no mysticism to say, we see all things in God. We certainly can see nothing apart from him. These were the true sages, of whom we can say:

"One deathless unity divine they saw
Behind the various vesture of the scene—
The soul in nature; nature in the soul."

The peculiar duty of the gospel demanded in this age is to recognize the brotherhood of man: "Go preach the gospel to every creature." Well, scientific men have said that the difference between the higher and lowest type of acknowledged man is greater than that between the lowest man and the most exalted beast. Yet how is it that these very terms have a meaning? Do we not, while we affirm, implicitly deny? Does not a man who recognizes the line deny it? Without the aid of science (which is generally a sharpened attention to bordering ideas), how is it that a man carries a mental intuitive pattern which seldom misleads him? The impassable line is inscribed within, and is not mistaken when it appears without. Suppose a plain Christian were to be commanded to preach the gospel to every human creature; would he in Borneo or the centre of Africa, ever be in doubt from the similarity or confusion of species? In all the blendings of nature the design is ever obvious and the mental line is ever distinct.

It was a question with the ancient philosophers whether the intellectual or material world was first,—whether our
ideas came from material patterns, or whether material things themselves were from intellectual patterns; and especially whether one could be understood without the other. Now what we contend for is this, that this recent question concerning the origin of species emerges in order to show the scope and importance of the old question. All the plausibility of the doctrine that species and varieties do not differ, or that species is an indefinite entity, comes from the silent assumption that material nature can exist apart from mental; that we are to seek the origin of species wholly in the operation of material nature. Now we deny this; for as Moses made the ark of the testimony according "to the pattern showed him in the mount," and the ark was always to be understood with reference to the celestial pattern, so we say, that all material nature is to be understood as imperfectly showing or shadowing out a primaeval pattern; and that species viewed mentally are to be viewed from their centre points, which are always distinct, and with respect to their final causes, which are often evident; and that synthesis is as necessary to our speculations on nature as it is to our best conceptions of the sublime subjects of religion.

As to the mutation of one species in another, all we can say is, that if it should be verified, it would not confound the existence of species and their eternal separation any more than the superinduction of a mind on the foetus from the womb confounds the idea of a man. The question of time and deduction would not repeal the distinctions of nature. Homer was a poet, though his genius grew from the imbecility of childhood. All the wonderful laws that are now adduced to supersede the use and the existence of miracle are only accumulated proofs of its possibility. They are visible histories of the separate acts of intellect on matter.

The divine character itself is necessarily contemplated by us in its various attributes; yet Magee, in his excellent work

1 That is, if we wished to prove the possibility of miracles, we should consider the laws of nature in their combination as the first proof.
on the atonement, thought it necessary to say: "Our error on this subject proceeds from our narrow views, which compels us to consider the attributes of the Supreme Being as so many distinct qualities, when we should conceive of them as inseparably blended together, and his whole nature as one great impulse to what is best"; and John says "God is love" (1 John iv. 8). There is a passage in Calvin, in which he anticipated a principle of Coleridge in his twenty-sixth Aphorism: "It is a dull and obtuse mind that must divide in order to distinguish; but it is still worse that distinguishes in order to divide. In the former we may contemplate the source of superstition and idolatry; in the latter, of schism, heresy, and a seditious and sectarian spirit."

1 Paul testifies to Jews and Gentiles repentance towards God and faith in Jesus Christ (Acts xx. 21). Quid igitur? says Calvin, An vera penitentia citra fidem consistere potest? Minimē. Verum etsi separari non possunt distinguī tamen debent. Quemadmodum sine spe fides non est, et tamen fides ac spes varia sunt; ita poenitentia et fides quamquam perpetuō inter se vinculo cohaerent, magis tamen conjungi volunt quam confundi (Instit. Lib. III. c. iii. sect. 5). What then? Can true repentance exist without faith? By no means. But although they cannot be separated, they must be distinguished. For as without hope faith cannot exist, and yet faith and hope are different things, so repentance and faith, although joined together by a perpetual band, yet their true character is to be conjoined without being confounded.

The glory of God is often placed in opposition to the happiness of the creature; and for some purposes and to a certain extent, this distinction is very important. It is well that our catechism commences by saying "that man's chief end is to glorify God." The happiness of the creature is neither so grand nor so comprehensive an object as the glory of him who made us. But what is the glory of God? God is the maker of the world; God is the ruler; and surely his glory never can be totally separated from the welfare of his

1 Aids to Reflection, Introductory Aphorism.
creatures. The glory of a righteous governor is, to make the good happy and to punish the wicked. You might as well think of separating the reputation of a painter from the beauty of all his pictures, as to separate the glory of God from the real welfare of his subjects: "Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit."

Yet I think we find some acute men have made this antagonism so complete, that we almost conclude the very essence of virtue is to crush the happiness of the creature beneath the absorbing state of the divine throne. We are indeed taught to say: "Let God be true, but every man a liar"; but we are not required to say, in order to make God glorious, let every creature be miserable. "For it became him for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory to make the captain of their salvation perfect through suffering" (Heb. ii. 10).

The agency of God versus the agency of man is another example. One extreme of this antagonism is exhibited in the doctrine of Spinoza, who makes God the only agent, and those German writers who, on the other hand, teach that the divine nature is only awakened to consciousness in the collection of finite intelligences.

Some lines in Cowper suggest a false antagonism existing in his mind:

"Some say that in the origin of things,
When all creation started into birth,
The infant elements received a law,
From which they swerve not since. That under force
Of that controlling ordinance they move,
And need not his immediate hand, who first
Prescribed their course, to regulate it now.
Thus dream they, and contrive to save a God
The incumbrance of his own concerns." ¹

No doubt the poet was very pious in his intention; but one wishes to ask him (what perhaps he never asked himself) how the two suppositions differ when applied to an infinite being, to whom one day is as a thousand years, and a thou-

¹ Task, Book VI.
sand years as one day? What is special interposition and what is eternal design when applied to the Ancient of Days? If when he touched the planets with his fingers, and they ran their course rejoicing, he foresaw their periods and their courses; if he merely adjusted the projectile to the centripetal force, so that ages should not produce the least deviation, if all contingencies are present to his eternal mind, how do the *semel* and the *semper* differ? In the perfection of God, this whole distinction is lost, and we must fix the opposition before we can condemn or approve the one opinion or the other. We must confess the longer we look at the two, the more we are confounded; and we resign the great problem to the discrimination of God.

In Dr. Emmons’s famous sermon on Exodus ix. 16: “In very deed for this cause I raised thee up”; it seems to us the paradox arises from presenting one limb of a false antagonism. The assertion is supposed to deny something. Now what does he assert, and what does he deny; and how does the asserted proposition differ from the one denied? After all his qualifications, what is it that God did in Pharaoh?

We might mention the soul a chain of exercises versus continuity; evil spirits working miracles independent of God; verbal inspiration as opposed to an infallible inspiration not verbal; — all assume or imply an antagonism carried to an extreme.

Christ died as a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice, as the Westminster Catechism teaches; but the younger Edwards introduced what has been called the governmental theory of the atonement. But how do they differ? An overwrought analysis that has wandered from its primitive union explains. They are different poles of the same central power. The very words “objective” and “subjective” explain the systems.

The doctrine of the divine decrees is an example. How God *forms* his decrees and how he *executes* them are two distinct questions. He executes them, so far as his moral government is concerned, through the free-agency of man. Here then is an important synthesis which he who denies
the existence of those decrees either cannot or will not see.

The doctrine of the perseverance of the saints is a remarkable example. It has been generally represented by all Pelagian writers as an exceedingly dangerous doctrine, tending to supineness, presumption, false views of duty, the gospel, and the grace of God. Now, if the design in teaching it be to crowd out all responsibility of our own, all watchfulness and prayer, and to rely wholly on an impression of intimated certainty of future salvation; if it teach men to reason, "because I was once a Christian I always shall be, whatever I do or wherever I wander," that is one aspect of the doctrine; but the old, earnest advocates of the truth certainly put in another element. Their watchword was that of Peter (1 Epistle i. 2): "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience." So in Romans viii. 29, 30. Indeed the very certainty becomes an encouragement to effort; it is the certainty of success that inspires the good man's activity. The Bible has more synthesis without analysis than our modern systems; our modern systems have more analysis with defective synthesis than the Bible.

One more example we present with trembling: The death of Christ accomplished, it is often said, not to produce our repentance but to make it efficacious. Most of the defenders of the doctrine of the atonement have felt themselves obliged to say that repentance is not enough to conciliate the favor of God; and this has been asserted, not by extreme men, but by the most moderate, such as Bishop Butler, Dr. Blair, Magee; and yet one instinctively asks: What object did Christ die for beyond repentance? and it is difficult to find one whose tendency is not to produce a deeper sorrow for sin. Did he die to satisfy divine justice; to vindicate the divine law; to support the divine government; to magnify the divine mercy; to supply the place of punishment when sin is pardoned? All these things derive their meaning (partly at least) by producing a deeper sorrow for sin. This is the objective of all the theories that have been devised. Is there
not, then, here an interlocking of our conceptions, which has not been fully recognized? Repentance is not enough; and yet the whole object of the atonement is to deepen our repentance.

Besides, there are so many passages in the scriptures where mercy is promised to him who confesses and forsakes his sins, that one is reluctant to disturb the simplicity of inspiration. And was there in fact any real repentance ever produced, but by the impression designed by the exhibition on the cross. When David says (Psalm li. 10): “The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit,” and when Paul says (Gal. ii. 20): “I am crucified with Christ,” do they not identify the great work in its origin and object, showing that they should not be separated any further than is necessary to complete our conception of the whole. As some say, a sunbeam never becomes luminous until it strikes on our atmosphere, so the death of Christ never becomes significant until we see its action on the sinner’s heart.

In all these cases, the words of Lord Bacon are verified: “A man that is of judgment and understanding shall sometimes hear ignorant men [may we not say learned men, too] differ, and know well within himself, that those which so differ mean one thing, and yet they themselves would never agree; and if it come to pass in that distance of judgment which is between man and man, shall we not think that God above, that knows the heart, doth not discern that frail men in some of their contradictions intend the same thing, and accepteth both? The nature of such controversies is excellently expressed by Paul in the warning and precept that he giveth concerning the same: ‘devita profanas vocum novitates et oppositiones falsi nominis scientiae.’ Men create oppositions which are not, and put them into new terms so fixed as, whereas the meaning ought to govern the term, the term in effect governeth the meaning” (Essay on Unity in Religion). It is a general error. Induction versus theory, or an anticipation, is an antagonism set before us in all philosophy. The late Mr. Buckle sets deductive reasoning in opposition
to the inductive. But can they be totally separated? Did ever a man make an experiment without some anticipation of what it was to prove? and when he analyzed that anticipation did he not always find it a deduction from some previous induction? In a word, when we look on the operations of nature we see facts embodied in laws, and laws accounting for facts; and nature, like the Nile, conceals her commencement in a fountain never found.

The whole universe is a collection of constituents; and all true philosophy, if it recognizes the parts, contemplates also the combination. It has been remarked by Sir James Mackintosh that the word "obligation" has been imperfectly explained by metaphysicians. What is the difficulty? Is it not that they have too much insulated it; and have not surveyed its combination with that whole to which it belongs? Let us take the definition given by Hutcheson; it is a part of benevolence. Put all the duties together, and they concentrate in love or benevolence. As Paul says, it is a knot of all perfections. If he does not fulfil, compels him to condemn himself. Benevolence is the prime matter without form; by which a lawgiver and subject, in different stations, from the same motive, must shape their purposes. Right and obligation may be correlative; where there is a right to command, there must be an obligation to obey; but they both run up to a higher unity. Suppose a God, suppose a government, and suppose benevolence in him, and he must manifest it by giving a law? And, as correlative to the facts on his side, suppose subjects, they cannot recognize his right to command without recognizing their own obligation to obey; and if they have no benevolence, even its evacuation leaves its own rights behind it. Thus is obligation illustrated by the totality

1 The Scotch Professor at Glasgow, Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. VII.
to which it belongs; and we confess we could explain this conception in no other way. It is a link in a chain; and our view is the least inadequate when the whole chain is before us.

Synthesis is important in interpreting the scriptures. It is an element of exegesis. The tendency of language is to become more and more specific, and, of course, in going back to ancient language the terms are more and more comprehensive. Take the word "prophecy" in 1 Cor. xiv. 1. What does it mean? We have no doubt it means just about what we mean now by common preaching. But how do you get at that meaning? By going back to a primitive generality. It originally meant speaking from and for God, whether inspired or not. It now floats down in the apostle's paragraph to the specific meaning of preaching the gospel. In Wetstein's Testament there is a note on 2 Cor. vii. 8 which suggests a comment. The passage is: "For though I made you sorry with a letter I do not repent, though I did repent;" on which the commentator says: Interpretes, qui putant, et consilium scribendi epistolam et ejus consilii poenitentiam, et poenitentiae poenitentiam ab affluat spiritus s. fuisse profectam, parum consentanea dicere videntur. "The interpreters, who think that the counsel of writing the epistle, and the sorrow that he did write it, and the repenting of his repentance all proceeded from the Holy Spirit, seem to utter things very little consistent." But why so? Where is the difficulty? Surely here is assumed an opposition of science falsely so called. Do the mutabilities in the human mind disturb the divine purpose in using them? The nurse in Shakespeare changes her structure several times in her speech (Romeo and Juliet, Act II. 4); but was the writer's design disturbed? See what Bishop Butler says on the abuse of miraculous gifts rebuked by Paul, 1 Cor. xiv. The imperfection of man does not exclude the perfection of a superintending God.

Let us briefly recapitulate. We begin by a misconception of our own being. The very personality of self is reached in an inverted and artificial way. Our consciousness, accor-
ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS.

According to the common doctrine, is not a primitive intuition but a bundle of faculties; and every unity in the material creation is a collection of qualities, united by a mysterious tie which no man has dared to explain. This opposes our natural conception, is confuted by many arguments, and inverts the chronology of our knowledge. It perplexes our views of time, and it gives an exaggerated importance to analysis; it overlooks the importance of synthesis, and finally it leads to great misconception in our religious reasoning.

The conclusion from the whole subject is, that the acutest analytic power may mislead you if it tempts you to pursue truths wholly in that direction, or even to exaggerate this single department. Unless you go from the one to the parts you never can explain; and unless you go from the parts to the one you never can understand.

Some objections are obvious: two occur from opposite sources. First, it may be said, if the whole be necessary to explain each part we never can know anything, because an absolute totality is beyond our conception; and secondly, on the other hand, it may be said also, that the suggestion is superfluous, because no mortal was ever so blind as not to see that a part implies a whole. As to the first, we have already answered it, by saying, by a whole we mean a constructive whole; that explanatory unity from which your analysis begins; and as to the second, how true is it that the very principle we are most ready to acknowledge is the very one which is most apt to be absent when needed most! Where do you turn your attention? Which element are you most apt to overlook? Here are two sign-boards on opposite sides of the road; one tells you whence you came, and the other how far you may go. Which inscription do you read with the most attention and remember with the most profit? Do you remember both?

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