THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL.

I. HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE THEORY OF THE SOUL'S PRE-EXISTENCE.

1. Theory of Pythagoras.

According to this philosopher, the body is the substance which is determined, and the soul is the principle which determines the body. The soul is more than mere number or measure; it has an individuality, different from that of the body, and is implanted within the body. Before its union with the corporeal substance, it had a troubled, dreamy life; after its separation from this substance, it will continue to live, and will wander through other bodies, in its process of purification. The human soul is an emanation

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1 This Essay is, in the main, a condensed abstract of an elaborate German volume, entitled: "Die Lehre von der Præexistenz der menschlichen Seele historisch-kritisch dargestellt, von J. Fr. Bruch, Professor der Theologie und Prediger in Straßburg." 1859. 8vo. pp. 211. An attempt is made in this Essay, not to give the exact translation of the words, nor to follow the precise line of thought, which have been adopted by Professor Bruch, but merely to give the substance of his treatise, in the order most appropriate for American readers.
from the world-soul, and its confinement in the body is a punishment for its previous transgression.

2. Theory of Plato.

The notion of the soul's pre-existence stands in intimate connection with Plato's doctrine of "ideas," and it illustrates his theory of the immanence of these ideas in the rational soul. It is well known that he drew a distinction between such thoughts as have for their object the empirical, sensuous, constantly changing, perishable, and such as have for their object the unchangeable, permanent, indivisible, divine. The former class of thoughts are the phantasies, and are the result of sensuous impression; the latter are the product of the reason, and are immanent in the soul, although they are first called out into consciousness by the sensuous impressions. They are the forms under which we must apprehend and reduce to oneness the object which, as presented by the senses, appears to be many and various. They are not substances nor powers, but yet they have an objective reality, so far forth as they represent the essential, the permanent, the divine, in empirical objects. These ideas are in the divine mind, as well as in the human. They are the unchangeable laws of his working. He has made the world according to them. The world, therefore, is a material realization of the divine ideas. Every nature bears in itself a divine idea, which is developed by means of the sensuous, empirical element. The world is an image of God, and there is a divine element in every object of sense. The sensuous is changing, but the idea is permanent.

Now as the ideas of a man are not of empirical origin, but precede the sensuous perception, Plato was forced to inquire: Whence came they? He was not familiar with the theory that they arise from the laws which regulate the acting of the soul; therefore he said: The soul brought these ideas with it from a previous life into the present one. In that ideal world in which the soul existed before its temporal development, it attained to the clear vision
of the divine ideas. God showed to the soul the nature of everything before the soul was united with the body. Hence all our knowledge of the general and the essential is a remembrance of what we knew before, but of what had been lost in the consciousness.

God created all souls at the same time. Each one is a development of a divine idea, and each was originally in an ideal state. It was essentially a pure intelligence; its entire activity was in thinking. It resided in a heavenly framework. Its present material embodiment was not necessary, but accidental. As the sensible world was created for no other end than to manifest the divine ideas, so the soul was made to develop itself in a body for the purpose of realizing some of these ideas. The design of its embodiment was, that it may, by contemplation of the world, obtain a clear vision of the divine ideas, consequently a clear vision of God himself, who is the original Idea, and at last a likeness to God, who is the original Good. In consequence of its connection with the body, the soul ceases to be a mere thinking principle; it becomes also a feeling and a willing principle; and these were spoken of by Plato as if they were three souls. Only the thinking principle, however, is imperishable.

3. Theory of Philo.

Souls are spiritual powers which have emanated from God, but are not entirely separated from him. They are like the rays which beam forth from the sun, and yet remain united with it. They are indeed of an ethereal, fiery nature; yet this ether is something different from matter; it has, as it were, a nature of spiritual light. Souls are a reflection from the divine Essence, and are destined to be inwardly united with God.

As the divine Being is strictly absolute, elevated above all finite existence, beyond all relations to the world, consequently without any predicates, he could not have created the world directly. Between the pre-exis
the supreme God, there is a world of the divine ideas, which are divine powers, and which taken together are the Word of God, the first-born Son of God, the divine Logos. These ideas, coming forth from the divine nature and made objective, and constituting a divine Person, are not merely the archetypes of finite excellence, but also the living powers that form the world.

There is no other existence except the supreme God, the divine ideas, matter, and the world, which is formed by the conjunction of those divine ideas with matter. Souls, then, originally belong to the class of these divine ideas. They are distinguished from other prototype ideas emanating from God, by the fact that they possess a certain independent existence, reason, and free-will. Their proper home is the air or heaven, where they dwell in entire purity and blessedness. Those who have maintained themselves in this state are the angels. But many souls allowed themselves to be attracted by matter, and entered into union with it. These are human souls, who are punished for this fall by an imprisonment in the body which corrupts them. From the first moment of their appearance in the material world, they are morally polluted and laden with guilt. Their great mission is to withdraw themselves, by their own exertion, from the defiling influence of matter, and to raise themselves, by steadfast striving after wisdom, to the pure vision of God, and to a consequent worthiness of being again received to their heavenly home.


This philosopher represents the Neo-Platonists, although some of them, as Jamblichus and Proclus, differ from him in some particulars. He supposed that the individual human soul is a product of the general World-soul, which is an emanation from the original reason, which itself is an emanation from the One. God is the One, the First, elevated above all imperfection, all change, therefore above all conditions. Consequently, while the author of all being,
he has in himself no being, no entity, no nature; while the source of life, he has in himself no life; while he originates all thinking powers, he is not himself a thinking substance. The Reason, which is a reflection from God and inferior to him, comprehends all things in an ideal form, and remains in an eternal, changeless vision of itself. The World-soul is related on the one side to the Reason, from which it springs, and on the other side to Matter. It perceives in the Reason the ideas for Matter, and so becomes the principle which forms the world.

By its own internal movement this World-soul produces a multitude of individual souls, which live originally in the supersensuous sphere. Many of them, however, unable to retain this height of pure existence, sink down into the material substance, and become the principles of the formation of the world, and of the order pervading the world. Human souls are those which have descended from their heavenly abode, and have formed for themselves bodies, which are henceforth as their prisons and fetters. Their descent into matter was on the one side an act of necessity, and on the other an act of free will, and therefore of moral guilt. The great office of human souls is to break loose from matter, to free themselves from its stains, and to reach that union with God which will liberate them from all self-consciousness and all separate personal existence.

5. Theory of Origen.

Some of the early Christians believed in the soul's pre-existence. The Alexandrine Fathers were particularly inclined to this doctrine by their reverence for Plato and by the influence of Neo-Platonism on their general theological system. Origen was among the foremost in defending the doctrine, although he was original in the reasons which he assigned for it. He founded it on the great disparity of condition in which men begin their earthly life. Some have rich endowments, physical and mental; others have meagre gifts. Some are born to outward prosper
pitiable state. Whence this difference? If it be ascribed to the unconditional will of God, then God is partial. It cannot be reconciled with his righteousness, unless this inequality of condition be ascribed to a difference in the conduct of souls during a pre-existent state. The divine perfections required him to make all souls equal at first. All were created pure, but all did not retain their purity. Many sank into sin; some more, others less deeply; and therefore they were punished according to the degree of their transgression. Those who kept themselves most pure from all contact with evil were assigned to the highest rank, and are called thrones, powers, dominions. Those who stood next in purity are the angels, some of whom have been invested with shining bodies, and run their course as the stars of heaven. Those spirits who sinned most flagrantly are the devils. An intermediate class are the spirits who sank into sin, yet were not altogether lost in it. These were sent to the earth and united with corporeal bodies. Their condition here corresponds with the degree of their guilt. God, the eternal and unchangeable Good, has no other will than that the fallen souls return to their pristine state of purity and blessedness; and he has made the material world as a means of their gradual purification. In the process of purifying themselves by their earthly discipline, they are aided by the souls who remain uncorrupted. Those who succeed in this process go, after death, into the home of ethereal bodies, where they receive from higher spirits disclosures of truth which were hidden from them on earth, and where they pass through various stages of purification, until they become worthy of the clear vision of God, and are welcomed into perfect blessedness. The winding up of the whole is, that all souls are brought back to their original state of entire equality.


In the Western church the authority of Plato was less than in the Eastern, and according
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sition to the Platonizing theories of the soul's pre-existence. Tertullian was foremost in this opposition. If we had an existence previous to our earthly one, he said, we should have had some remembrance of it. Although he believed the soul to be simple, indivisible, imperishable, yet he did not deny that it is in a sense corporeal; different indeed from the body, but extended through it, diffused through all its members, having a form invisible to the physical eye, yet perceptible to the mind. Our souls, being propagated like our bodies, are derived from one source—the spirit which God breathed into Adam. Hence the moral corruption which entered human nature by the fall of the first man is communicated, as the soul itself and as the corporeal nature are communicated, from parent to child.

It is true that the pre-existence of souls continued to be maintained, as by Nemesius, bishop of Emesa in Syria (380); Synesius, bishop of Ptolemais (410); and the religious poet Prudentius (405); still it continued to encounter opposition, and became more and more disreputable on account of the growing unpopularity of Origen throughout the Western, and at last the Eastern, church. The assertion that God made the world on account of souls that had fallen into sin, and that the body was formed for the mind after the fall, was thought unseemly and unscriptural. Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, Jerome, and Augustine opposed the doctrine decidedly. It was definitely condemned by the synod of Constantinople, which Justinian assembled (538) for the purpose of putting an end to the authority of Origen. This council decreed:

"Whoever upholds the fabulous notion of the soul's pre-existence, and of the consequent restitution of things, let him be anathema.

"Whoever maintains that the creating of the whole intelligible world was a producing of spiritual natures, without any bodies, and without any matter, without number and without names, so that they all formed a unit by means of their identity in substance and power, and of their union with God the Word, and their knowledge of him; but that, tired of the vision of God, they corrupted themselves, and according to the degree of their sin received finer or grosser bodies, and also certain names, as among the
higher powers there is a difference of bodies and names, so that some are made and called cherubim, others seraphim, others dominions, thrones, and angels — and so on through all the heavenly orders — let him be anathema.

"Whoever maintains that the sun, moon, and stars belong to the unit of the intelligible world, and by their corruption have been made what they are, let him be anathema.

"Whoever maintains that those spirits in whom the love toward God grew cold were united with gross bodies like ours, and were called men, but that others who sunk to the lowest degree of wickedness, were united with cold and dark bodies, and were made and called demons, spirits of evil, let him be anathema."

7. The Jewish Theories of Pre-existence.

For a long time after the above-cited decrees, the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence found but little favor in the Christian church. It continued, however, to retain its hold on the Jewish mind. On the one hand, the Talmudists believed that the nature of man is twofold, comprising body and soul; that all souls were created at the origin of the world, were kept in a place called "Guph," and were taken thence at their appointed times to be united with their respective bodies. On the other hand, the Sabbatists believed that the nature of man is fourfold, comprising the body and three souls. The lowest of the souls is the principle of animal life (Nephesch), which begins its existence when the body begins, and ceases to live when the body ceases. Ungodly men have no other soul than this mortal one. But even this becomes immortal if it be united with the two higher souls, both of which are emanations from God, and continue to live in Paradise. The highest, purest of these two is the Neschamah; the soul intermediate between the Neschamah and the Nephesch is the Ruach. Only good men are endued with both these souls, and are so endued at different periods of time.

8. Theories of Creationism and Traducianism.

From the sixth century, the contest raged between the notion that human souls are directly created by God and
the notion that they are propagated from parents to children. The former of these notions seemed to be demanded by the simplicity of the soul's nature, and by the tendency of the notion to counteract materialism. The latter seemed to be favored by its fitness to explain the doctrine of original sin. The scholastics decided in favor of Creationism, and this has been the prevailing theory of the Catholic church. Protestantism has been inclined to favor the Traducian theory, as more coincident with profound convictions of human sinfulness. The authors of the Concordat Formulary, however, favored the doctrine that God, after the fall, creates the soul, no less than he created it before the fall.

9. **Theory of Kant.**

This philosopher revived the old dogma, although not in its old form, of the soul's having existed before time. His theory was a novel one, and it encountered much opposition. It was a legitimate result of his peculiar system of philosophy. His system rests on the essential distinction between "the thing in itself" (noumenon) and the appearance of the thing (phaenomenon). We do not understand "the thing in itself" (the noumenon), but we understand only the appearance of the thing (the phaenomenon). The soul as a "thing in itself" is exempt from the conditions of space and time, and is not subject to external causation; but as phaenomenon it is subject to the conditions of space and time, and to external causation. Man thus leads a mysterious twofold life; the one free from, the other involved in, the relations of space and time, of outward causality, and of the consequent necessity. The mind as a "thing in itself" is the necessary condition of its "appearance," of the "phaenomenon"; and this "appearance" is only the reflex of the mind as a "noumenon."

There is a marked difference between the theory of Kant and that of the ancients in regard to our timeless existence. They believed that this existence preceded the present in respect of duration; he believed that it preceded the form.
poral existence in idea only. They supposed that it was in a duration before the existence of the world; he supposed that it is before time, is without relation to time, is a pure conception of the intellect. They believed that the soul's previous existence is already past; he believed that it is an existence free from all the conditions of time, yet it is itself the condition of our existence in time.

Although Kant admitted the mysteriousness of this timeless existence, yet he supposed that we can derive from our moral nature some positive conclusions about it. The moral law pronounces an unconditioned shall; it thus vouches for the existence of an unconditioned power of will, which is entirely independent of outward causality, and is therefore itself a power of unconditioned causality. Duty presupposes freedom. Over against the sensuous instincts and inclinations, which have self-gratification for their object, the free-will asserts itself as a power to act independently of all sensuous impulses, and even in opposition to them, purely through the conception of the moral law. Reverence for the moral law is the only motive which consists with freedom, and which therefore has a moral nature. But as the whole world of appearances (phenomena) is under the law of necessity, as freedom does not consist with the sensuous nature of man, so freedom must be ascribed to man only as he “is in himself” not as he “is in appearance.” Only as noumenon is man free; as phaenomenon he comes under the conditions of causality, which is inconsistent with freedom. Therefore every determination of will, when it is passing into action, and becoming a phenomenon, loses the character of a free act, and is intervolved with an outward necessity.

Considering that man, as he “is in himself,” has a power of will which is independent of all sensuous inclinations and of all temporal causality, it would be natural to suppose that, as he “is in appearance,” he would conform his action to the moral law. He does not, however. He subordinates his moral to his sensuous impulses. Universally he has a
tendency to sin. Whence comes this universal propensity? It must have come from his own free act. But where was this free act performed? Not in time; for as far back as we can trace the moral conduct of man it is sinful. Then the origin of this evil tendency must have been his free act, performed in his existence before time. In this free act he subordinated his moral to his sensuous impulses; he gave himself this propensity to sin. In this free act was his fall. The fall occurred in that mysterious existence which precedes time. In order, then, to account for the early and universal prevalence of our propensity to sin, we must resort to the theory of a timeless existence of the soul. This process of reasoning conforms to the following principles laid down by Kant. "Hitherto men have supposed that all our knowledge must regulate itself according to the objects of knowledge; but on this supposition, all attempts to make out anything concerning these objects \textit{a priori}, by means of our conceptions, whereby our knowledge would be widened, went for nothing. Therefore let us inquire, whether we shall not come out better in metaphysical problems, if we make the supposition that the objects must regulate themselves according to our knowledge; a supposition more accordant with the desired possibility of obtaining concerning them an \textit{a priori} knowledge which is to decide something with regard to objects before they are given to us. It is in this case, as it was with the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, since he did not make progress in his explanation of the movements of the stars so long as he supposed them to revolve around the spectator, inquired whether he could not make better progress, if he should suppose the spectator himself to be revolving, and the stars to remain at rest." (Kritik, \textit{etc.} X. Sieb. Auf.)

10. \textit{Theory of Schelling}.

This philosopher distinctly recognized the fact, that all men have a tendency to sin. The tendency did not result from accident, nor from any free choice put forth in time.
Every man brings into the world with him his moral bias, and thus the acts which he performs in the world are the product of necessity. Every man feels that he has been from all eternity what he is now, and yet he feels that he is responsible for his wickedness. Therefore the wickedness must, somehow or other, have resulted from his own free choice. But this choice was not put forth in time; therefore it must have been put forth in eternity. It was put forth; it is not, as Kant supposed, a mere ideal abstraction of freedom from our present acts; but it is a past act; it was performed, not indeed as a personal, but as an individual choice; not indeed under the conditions of time, but it is to be viewed as a pure object of thought. Thus the deed which has determined the moral character of every man was antecedent to his life, not in the order of duration, but in the order of nature; and being out of the temporal sphere it is an eternal deed. Regarded as irrespective of time, the life of every man reaches back to the beginning of creation; it is outside of created things, and is a free and eternal beginning.

The following, perhaps, are the essential elements of the metaphysical system out of which Schelling draws his theory: There is in God an original reason for his being. This original reason has a tendency to develop itself, first, in that nature which is the Real in God, and which forms the eternal One. All things which are, are the self-revelations of the absolute. This original reason has a tendency to develop itself, secondly, in that which is the Ideal in God, the divine light, the divine love, the divine understanding. This Real and this Ideal form the ground of the divine existence. From the same ground springs the finite understanding, the finite love, the finite free-will. In the sphere of nature the Real and the Ideal are not absolutely identified. The Real prevails over the Ideal, and the principle of self-love reigns. The Absolute is completely evolved, first of all in man. In man the full power of self-love is developed, and also the full power of the ideal principle, of
light, of benevolence. If the ideal principle uniformly prevail in him, if he be, as he was destined to be, unconditionally guided by the light, the understanding, the love, then is he Spirit, and God is Spirit within him, and man thus attains his true personality. That which is truly divine in man, and which answers to the divine personality, is permanent, and will merge itself again into the Absolute. That which is not thus divine, will be annihilated at death. The great end for which God reveals himself is that the real and the ideal may be united perfectly, that the self-love may be subordinated to the love of the universe. But it is only in man and by man that this process of divine revelation is consummated. The being of man, therefore, does not commence with his birth in time, but extends back to the beginning of creation. In that being which preceded time, and which is a pure object of thought, was performed the free act by which man fixed his moral bent. As morally good, or as morally evil, he comes into his temporal life. He lives henceforth under the law of necessity. But this necessity does not prevent us from ascribing his wrong moral bias to him as his own fault. He is responsible for it because he originated it freely in his eternal being. He cannot now of his own strength reform himself. All improvement of his character must be the work of divine power, an effect of the divine magic. Whether the man will allow or will not allow this divine operation for his improvement, depends upon that decisive act which he performed in his original state. He, who in that eternal state decided in favor of sin, is naturally incapable of becoming better, because it lies in the very nature of sin to resist and repel the divine working to subdue it.


In some respects Müller does not, but in other respects he does, coincide with Kant. He founds his theory of Pre-existence on the two truths, that the will is free, and that sin universally prevails in the race. *Formal* freedom con-
sists in the fact that the will is able to act out its own nature, to carry itself through, to realize itself, to act as it chooses, without hindrance. In this freedom of will the man seeks his highest possible self-hood; his greatest possible individuality and independence. This freedom is therefore a conscious self-determination, which involves and implies the possibility of an opposite self-determination. This power of contrary choice does not constitute freedom, but is inseparable from it. The freedom includes a contingency, which, however, must not be confounded with accident.

The existence of this formal freedom is proved by the fact that the will is bound to obey the moral law. It cannot obey the divine commands unless it have the power to disobey them; for without the power of disobedience the obedience would not be free. It is, then, essential to the freedom of the will that the will have the ability to sin; to put itself out of harmony with the moral commands, and thus with itself and with God. This ability to sin is given to man with the design that he should, by his own self-determination, always keep himself from realizing it in act, and also that he should by his own free self-determination, put an end to the ability itself. The created personal agent must begin existence in a state in which his will is not determined; so that he may by his own act bring himself into a state in which his will is determined. The will must have a formal freedom; but it could not have this freedom if it were not able, by its own act, to determine itself, so that from this determined state, the moral character of its individual acts would result with infallible necessity. At the starting point of the will, it has a freedom which is not an inward necessity, but involves the power of the contrary choice; at the landing point, it has the freedom which is identical with necessity. In this way the formal freedom goes over to the real freedom.

All the voluntary acts which man performs during his present life are attributable to himself, and we feel compelled
to praise or blame him for them. This fact necessarily presupposes his formal freedom. But an unconditioned freedom is not found in his present acts. There is no unconditioned self-determination in his temporal life; neither is there an undetermined will,—all his acts are affected by his previous disposition; and for this disposition we are compelled to hold him accountable, because it is the result of antecedent acts, which in their turn were occasioned by still previous dispositions, which, as these are blameable, must have resulted from some original choice. That choice, that act of primitive self-determination, as it has certainly been performed, and as it is not performed in the life which we now experience, must have been performed in an existence antecedent to this. In that existence, which is not within the sphere of time, the man must have passed from an undetermined state into the state of moral determination which forms the mysterious back-ground for all his subsequent volitions.

In that pre-existent state the souls were not exalted to the perfect knowledge of God and of all truth, nor to unalloyed blessedness, nor had they mutual relations to each other, nor were they so far distinguished from each other as they are in their material life, nor were they exposed to the influence of sensual appetite. They were under a law requiring them to determine their wills in harmony with the will of God. That they did not obey this law is obvious from the fact that sin is rooted deep in the nature of men, and is chargeable upon them as its guilty authors. They are indeed allured to moral evil by the circumstances of their earthly life; but why do they not resist these allurements? They are led into sin by their dispositions; but these dispositions are sinful, and must therefore have sprung from some predetermining act of the will. When could this act have been performed? As far back as the most feeble glimmering of consciousness can reach, we find the sinful inclination, which is the prolific origin of an innumerable multitude of sinful acts. Then the decisive choice
which resulted in that inclination must have been put forth antecedently to our material life, in that obscure, mysterious existence which is out of the sphere of time. It was not a sensual, but it was a purely spiritual, and a purely selfish choice, and it is this selfishness which controls all the acts of unrenewed men.

It must not be imagined, that Müller's theory pretends to account for the existence of all sin, as mere sin. He does not profess to answer the question: Why did souls in their timeless existence, when they reposed in God, and were lost in the intuition of their infinite author, and were free from all outward solicitations to disobedience,—why did they separate themselves from God and array themselves in opposition to his law? Müller refers this original self-determination to the spiritual self-hood of the human person. A creature who is capable of holy love must also be capable of sin. Inseparable from the nature of a mind which can act freely is that property of the mind by which it can be tempted to act wrongly. As the existence of sin is mysterious, even in our empirical life, so it must be the more mysterious where the pure will becomes impure by its own self-determination, and performs its first act—makes the very beginning of iniquity.

Müller does not suppose that all the souls existing in a timeless state fell into sin; for if they all fell, then their apostasy would not seem to have been their free act. Some of them, by their own self-determination, exalted themselves from their state of created purity to a state of free holiness; while others departed from their Maker so completely as to exclude from their temporal life every inclination to good. Thus there is some real ground for the representation that there are angels and devils. We likewise know of one human will which in its original self-determination retained its union with the will of God. For if original guilt and the power of sin had followed our Saviour into his temporal existence, his uninterrupted and undisturbed harmony with the law of God could not be explained.
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12. Theories of Rückert and Fichte.

According to Rückert, the origin of sin, as a free determination of the will, cannot be accounted for; because in order to account for it, we must ascribe the sin to some cause, and if we ascribe it to a cause, we cannot regard it as a free determination; and if it be not free, it is not sin. Still we may account for the universal prevalence of sin in our race, by supposing that only such souls entered into the race as have transgressed the law in a previous state of existence. This ideal state was more exalted and perfect than the present. There is no decisive proof of any such pre-existence of souls; therefore no scientific system can be securely grounded upon it. Still we adopt many theories which do not rest on a strong foundation; and as this theory affords certain advantages for explaining the universal prevalence of sin, it may be adopted until some decisive objections are brought against it.

The theory of Fichte has some resemblances to the theories of Kant, Schelling, Müller, and Rückert. He believes, however, not in the pre-existence of the soul (the psyche, seele), but in the pre-existence of the spirit (the pneuma, geist).

II. The Nature of the Human Soul.

It is evident that the question of the soul’s pre-existence must depend somewhat on the question of its nature. What is the essence of that which is supposed to have existed before the origin of the bodily organism?

1. The Representations given of it by Hebrews who wrote before the Captivity.

They regarded the body as so important a part of man that they used the phrase “all flesh” to designate the human race. Still they recognized one, or more than one, living principle distinct from the body, and designated it by

1 Gen. vi. 13, 17; vii. 15.
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The words nephesch (נפֶּשַׁ), ruach (רוּחַ), and neschama (נשמה). These three words have originally a physical meaning, and denote breath, breeze, wind, as πνεῦμα is derived from πνεῦ, animus from ἀνεμός, spiritus from spirare, and geist originally denotes breath, wind.

The nephesch was regarded as the condition of life. While it remained in the man he was a living soul. We read: He went to save his soul, i.e. his life; Let us not kill the soul, i.e. take the life; He destroyed all the souls in the city, i.e. took the life of all the persons there.

The breath was regarded as the first thing which gave evidence of the soul or life, and was called nephesch; thus, when the breath departed, the soul departed from the body. As the life goes when the breath goes from the body, so the life leaves the body when the blood leaves it; hence the Hebrews regarded the nephesch as existing in the blood, and they spoke of the blood as the life, the soul. Hence they were forbidden to eat the blood of animals. It seemed horrible to nourish their own bodies with that which formed the soul of other bodies. Hence the murderous shedding of one man's blood was punished with the shedding of the murderer's blood. The sin-offering and the trespass-offering involved the same principle: the life which had been forfeited by sin, should have an atonement made for it by the life, i.e. the blood, of the animal offered in sacrifice.

The physical life or soul, the nephesch, was presupposed not only in the physical functions, but also in the spiritual activities. Thus we read not only of satisfying the soul with food, but also of the soul's knowing, loving, rejoicing, etc. Accordingly the word nephesch was used to denote the

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1 Gen. ii. 7.  
2 1 Kings xix. 3.  
3 Josh. x. 28, 35, 37, 39.  
4 Gen. xxxv. 18; 1 Kings xvii. 21.  
5 Lev. xvii. 11; Deut. xii. 23.  
6 Gen. ix. 4; Lev. xvii. 12; Deut. xxi. 23.  
7 Lev. xvii. 11.  
8 Gen. ix. 5, 6.  
9 Prov. vi. 30.  
10 Prov. xix. 14; Prov. xix. 2; Sol. Song i. 7; Deut. vi. 5; 1 Sam. i. 15, etc.; Isa. lxii. 10.
whole person, as “if your soul were in my soul's stead,” i. e. if you were I. Hence we read of the dead soul, i. e. body, person, and even of the soul (nephesch), as a corpse.

The two other words (ruach and neschama) are evidently synonymous with each other. Thus we read: “my breath (neschama) is in me, and the spirit (ruach) of God is in my nostrils; and the spirit (ruach) of God hath made me, and the breath (neschama) of the Almighty hath given me life.” These two words refer to the same principle, which is designated by nephesch. They are used in parallelism with nephesch, thus: “With my soul (nephesch) have I desired thee in the night, yea with my spirit (ruach) within me will I seek thee early.” They are used, like nephesch, to denote the physical principle in man. We read: “My breath (ruach) shall not always remain in man”; “Thou takest away their breath (ruach), they die.” They are likewise used to denote the spiritual principle, as: “There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration, breath (ruach) of the Almighty giveth him understanding”; “The spirit (neschama) of man is the candle of the Lord.”

But although these three words refer to the same object, they yet refer to it in different relations. Nephesch is the principle of life, so far as it is considered immanent in the body; ruach is the same principle so far as it is considered a product of the divine spirit, a creature of God; neschama is the same principle considered as breathed into man by God, and manifesting itself by the human breath. Therefore nephesch is the life of the flesh; the vital principle remaining in the blood, the living soul; but neschama is used when the writer alludes to the breath of life; and ruach is more commonly used when allusion is made to spiritual operations as such. It is the spirit (ruach) of God

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1 Job xvi. 4. 2 Num. vi. 6. 3 Num. v. 2.
4 Job xxvii. 3; xxxiii. 4. 5 Isa. xxvi. 9; see also Job xii. 10.
6 Gen. vi. 3; Psalm civ. 29; see also 1 Sam. xxx. 12; 1 Kings x. 5; Job xxvii. 3; xxxiii. 4; Deut. xx. 16; Josh. x. 40.
7 Job xxxii. 8. 8 Prov. xx. 27.
9 Lev. xvii. 11. 10 Gen. ii. 7.
which moved upon the face of the waters, and breathed into man the breath of life.

It is true that spiritual operations are often referred, in the Old Testament, to the physical organs; and it is remarkable that those parts of the Old Testament which were written before the captivity do not refer these operations to the nerves, or brain, or head; but to the physical heart, and to the lower intestinal system. In the book of Daniel, which was written after the captivity, we find the first allusion to the head as an organ of mental operations, but then only in reference to visions. The Hebrews regarded these organs, however, not as actually percipient and volitive, but merely as instruments of the soul which gave them life. Still we suppose that, before the captivity, the larger part of the Hebrews had only confused and dim ideas of the soul's nature, and regarded it as originally breathed into man's nostrils, and as being itself a kind of air. They did not have clear notions of the pure spirituality of God himself, but spoke of him as having a spirit, as working by his spirit, employing it as an instrument.

Particular individuals had more refined notions than prevailed among the common people, in regard to the pure spirituality of God and of the human soul; but the notions prevalent among the common people were such as threw a veil of obscurity over the state in which the soul existed after death. Doubtless the early Jews believed that the soul was immortal, but their ideas were confused in regard to the kind of life which it would lead. For, in their view, the spirit came from God and went back to God. It was breath which God inspired into man at first, and which he would call back to himself at last. Still the soul was identified with the body, and when the body went down to the grave, there seemed to be danger that the soul would go with it. Thus we read: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in sheol;" "Thou hast de-

1 Dan. ii. 28; iv. 5, 10; viii. 1, 15.
2 Lev. xxvi. 11; Psalm xi. 5; xxxiii. 6; Job iv. 9.
3 Job iv. 15; 1 Kings xix. 12.
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livered my soul from the lowest sheol;' "Shall he deliver his soul from the hand of sheol."1 The spirits of the dead were often conceived of as shadowy forms, and their life as clouded and dreamy. Sometimes indeed the inhabitants of sheol were represented as enjoying an intense life; but it may be said, in the general, that men are indebted to the New Testament for just and pure ideas of the soul's spiritual nature and distinct personality.

2. The Representations given of the Soul by Hebrews who wrote after the Captivity.

The book of Ecclesiastes speaks of man and beast as both going to one place, as having one breath (ruach);2 and although it describes the ruach of man as going upward, and as returning to God who first breathed this spirit into man,3 yet in one passage it shrouds in obscurity even this distinction between man and brute.4 The Son of Sirach represents the spirit as departing from the body at death,5 but as retaining only an inactive kind of life.6 The Book of Wisdom speaks of the soul as breathed into man by God, and as therefore merely lent to him.7 On the other hand, it intimates that souls existed before they entered the body, and even then differed from each other in moral characteristics.8 It also describes the soul as oppressed and imprisoned by the body.9 This description implies that the

1 Psalm xvi. 10; lxxxvi. 13; lxxxix. 48. [Here, as elsewhere, not only Bruch, but nearly all the German writers on the Jewish theories of the soul, mistake a popular form of representation for a scientific theory, and overlook the fact that both European and American Christians use words which, when literally interpreted, imply that the soul is not purely spiritual. These words, however, are not to be literally interpreted; and while we habitually imagine the soul to have a form, and to occupy space, we know that the imagination is not accordant with reality. We often imagine the corpse to be sentient; we often speak of the body as a soul; but we do not mean to be understood as actually believing that our fancies or words correspond with the scientific truth.]

2 Eccl. iii. 21; xii. 7.

3 Eccl. iii. 21.

4 Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 39.

5 Ecclesiasticus xiv. 14–16; xxii. 11; xxxviii. 21; xlv. 19.

6 Wis. Sol. xv. 11; xii. 1; xvi. 8, 16.

7 Ecclesiasticus xii. 19.

8 Ecclesiasticus ix.
soul has a distinct personal nature. Therefore the righteous soul is represented as "greatly rewarded" after death, in the presence, in the hand, of God,\(^1\) while the unrighteous is "in sorrow."\(^2\)

* Philo describes the soul as a personal monad, proceeding or breathed out from God, a fragment of God, yet abiding in the closest union with God. It bears the impress of the divine form. Although this philosopher defined the soul as a spirit, it is doubtful whether he considered it as perfectly immaterial, for he often portrayed it as an ethereal nature, formed of the same matter which constitutes the substance of the stars and the angels. He even represents God himself as having the nature of light.

The influence of the Alexandrine philosophy was felt by the Pharisees of our Saviour's time. They believed fully that the soul is a personal substance; that the body is not essential to the human being, but that the soul constitutes the man; that after the soul is separated from the body, it will retain its existence, its feeling, its personal nature; that sheol is not peopled by shadowy forms, but by spirits. After all, it may be doubted whether the Pharisees had attained the conception of the soul as a purely immaterial substance.


The teachings of the New Testament in regard to the nature of the soul, may be inferred from the fact that it describes the spirit as the principle of consciousness and personality, and as that peculiar nature of man which is allied to God.\(^3\) So far is the body from being a necessary integral part of man, that it stands related to the spirit as an earthen vessel,\(^4\) as an earthly tabernacle,\(^5\) in which the spirit dwells. The spirit is essentially different from the body,

\(^1\) Ecclesiasticus iii. 1 - 6.  
\(^2\) Acts xvii. 28.  
\(^3\) Ecclesiasticus iv. 19.  
\(^4\) 2 Cor. iv. 7.  
\(^5\) 2 Cor. v. 1.
and is perfectly immaterial.\(^1\) It is therefore not subject, as all material nature is, to the law of decay.\(^2\) Existing now as an individual person, it will continue after its separation from the body to exist as an individual person.\(^3\) Souls which have passed into the blissful immortality are called "the spirits of just men made perfect."\(^4\) At some time after the departure of the spirit from the body, it is destined to unite itself with a glorified body, adapted to the higher sphere on which it will then have entered.\(^5\) Thus the New Testament excels the Old in making the fact clear to the common people that the spirit is, in its own essence, a person, and that it is perfectly immaterial.

In order to designate this higher nature of man, the New Testament employs two words, psyche and pneuma. Some have inferred that it here agrees with Philo and the Platonic school in ascribing to man three elements, the body (σῶμα), the principle of animal life (ψυχή), and the principle of the higher life (πνεῦμα), on which principle of thinking, feeling, and willing depends our relationship with God and our susceptibility for spiritual influences. But on a more accurate examination of the passages\(^6\) which appear to favor this supposition, and of other passages relating to the theme, this appearance of trichotomy vanishes, and the principle of animal life seems to be essentially the same with the principle of spiritual life. There is only one substance, which in its relation to the body, has one name, and in its relation to the highest processes of thought has a different name.

As the word nephesch in the Old Testament, so the word psyche in the New, is chiefly used to designate the vivifying principle of the body, the source of sensuous desire, that which turns the σῶμα into σάρξ.\(^7\) Therefore the adjec-

1 Luke xxiv. 37; John iv. 24; Acts xvii. 28; 1 Cor. xv. 50.
2 1 John ii. 17.
3 Heb. xii. 23.
4 Luke xxiii. 46; Acts vii. 59; Phil. i. 23.
5 1 Cor. xv. 42, sq.
6 1 Thess. v. 25; Heb. iv. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 44.
7 Matt. ii. 20; vi. 25; xx. 28; Luke xiv. 26; John x. 11, 15, 17; xv. 13; Acts xxv. 26; Rom. xi. 3.
tive ἀληθινὸς designates a man who is governed by the sensuous, animal principle. As the Hebrew nephesh was used to denote the whole man, so was the Greek psyche: "and the same day there were added unto them about three thousand ψυχαί."

On the other hand, the Greek pneuma corresponds with the Hebrew ruach, and denotes the principle from which the spiritual life proceeds. It often denotes the principle of holy life, and is then opposed to σάρξ, as: "Walk in the spirit (πνεῦμα-τί) and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh (σάρκος)." If ye, through the spirit (πνεῦματι) do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live," Hence the adjective πνευματικός designates a man who is governed by a spirit enlightened, strengthened, and sanctified by the Holy Ghost, with whom the man is inwardly united. As the word pneuma denotes the principle of the whole moral and religious life, so it comes to denote the inclinations of man, whether they conform to or resist the divine will. Therefore the spirit (πνεῦμα) of bondage is opposed to the spirit (πνεῦμα) of adoption; the spirit (πνεῦμα) of fear to that of love. When the soul is considered as the thinking principle, it is sometimes called νοῦς, and ὁ ἐσώ ἀνεξαρτησιος.

That the two words psyche and pneuma refer to one, and only one, substance in man, is evident from the fact that they are used interchangeably with each other. Thus the word psyche sometimes denotes the principle of the higher spiritual life, as, "For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul" (ψυχή). "Seeing ye have purified your souls" (ψυχάς), etc. "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul" (ψυχή). Thus also, the word pneuma sometimes denotes the principle of inward life, as, "The body without
the spirit (πνεύμα) is dead." Thus again, deceased persons are sometimes called ψυχαί, and sometimes πνεύματα.

4. Representations given of the Soul by Pantheists.

Pantheism represents the soul either as a mere attribute of the universal substance and a correlate of extension, or as a vanishing point in the eternal process of the evolution of the Absolute. It opposes our consciousness, because, first, it denies our individual personality. Every man knows that he is not a universal existence, but a concrete, individual being. This knowledge is involved in the idea of the ego, and this idea is the fundamental condition of all thinking, feeling, willing. When a man says ego, he distinguishes himself from all outward realities. Although we constantly feel the influences of the objective world, we are conscious that we are essentially different from that world, and have the power of making it in some degree serviceable to us, in promoting our own ends. The great distinction between a man and a brute is this: a man chooses his end, and acts for this rather than for another which he might have chosen; a brute is necessitated to act for a definite end, and has no choice in regard to it. As we know that we are different from the outward world, so we know that we are different from God; that we can oppose him, transgress his laws, work against his purposes. Even our love to him implies our difference from him; for love can arise only between two natures congenial with each other, and drawn to each other, but each of them enjoying his own individual being.

Pantheism opposes our consciousness, secondly, by denying the freedom of the will. A person is one who thinks, wills, and acts for an end. But no being can act for an end unless he is free. Now the freedom of the will is a fact guaranteed in our very consciousness; it cannot be, as it

1 James ii. 26; Luke viii. 55.
2 Compare Acts ii. 27, 31; Rev. vi. 9; xx. 4 with Luke xxiv. 37, 39; Acts xxii. 8, 9; Heb. xii. 9, 23; 1 Pet iv. 6.

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need not be, theoretically proved; nor can it be made uncertain by any process of reasoning.

But, thirdly, Pantheism opposes our moral consciousness in denying the moral distinctions; or if it recognize the difference between good and evil, virtue and vice, merit and demerit, it must ascribe to God himself all the error, sin, and crime under which man suffers, and here it opposes our religious consciousness. But all truth has its ultimate ground in consciousness. Pantheism then must be groundless, for it does not agree with our consciousness, and indeed in its fundamental principles denies the possibility of personal consciousness.

5. Representations given of the Soul by Materialists.

Materialism regards the soul as a power dwelling in the very essence of matter, or as a power springing from the intermixture of material substances in the human organization, or, as the last result, the highest potency of the process in which organic nature makes itself subjective. The materialism of the present day regards all phenomena as reducible to matter and force; it regards the processes of thinking, feeling, willing, as the workings of the material force; it recognizes no distinction between matter and substance, but regards all substance as material.

It is a clear and fundamental principle that out of all combinations of matter, however fine and complicated, there cannot rise a development which surpasses the force dwelling in the matter itself. Now what we call spiritual developments do surpass this force. First, the consciousness of the ego as a concrete unity, cannot be explained as a result of physical force. This force is either mechanical or physical or chemical. How can any such power account for the mysterious doubling of the soul, its looking in upon itself, its dividing of itself into subject and object, and its unceasing comprehension of both subject and object into a perfect unit, the ego? The consciousness of self is a real wonder. It cannot be freed from mystery; for we cannot
go behind it, for it is the ultimate fact, the last foundation of all our knowledge. We do not have it when we enter life; we have only the faculty for it then, and we gradually attain the knowledge of ourselves, after we have received certain impressions from the external world. Even the processes of vegetable life cannot be accounted for on the theory of mechanical or physical or chemical forces alone. These forces do not manifest themselves until the life ceases, and then they produce the decomposition of the plant. Therefore, the processes of vegetable life cannot be explained, except by supposing a peculiar power, superior to the powers of mere matter, and this peculiar power resides in a peculiar substratum. Far less can we explain, on any even the most refined theory of materialism, the wonderful fact that the soul divides itself into subject and object, voluntarily looks in upon itself, and remains the one ego, the perceiving and the perceived principle.

Secondly, the continued identity of the ego cannot be accounted for as the result of mechanical, physical, or chemical forces. These forces are perpetually changing. The material particles which compose the body are continually disappearing; yet the youth looks back upon his childhood, and the old man looks back upon his youth, and perceives that the ego has retained its identity, amid all the fluctuations of that material substance and those material forces with which it has been connected.

Thirdly, the higher operations of the mind cannot be accounted for on the supposition that they result, however remotely, from material forces. In these operations the mind shows itself to be independent of matter, and to have control over it. The mind penetrates the world, rises to principles which include the solution of the problems of the world and of life. In its process of generalization, the mind shows itself to be independent of space and time. It derives conclusions from premises, and then follows the guidance of these conclusions in detecting material phenomena previously unobserved. The mind forms ideas of truth of
beauty, of moral goodness; and these ideas are not derived from the outward world. They spring from that idea of God, which is immanent in the soul, and in which man finds the highest unity of his knowledge, the final solution of all problems of life and of the world, the highest principles for determining his own voluntary action, the light, the inward firmness, and repose for which he has so deep a longing. Is it possible that this idea of God, and all the ideas involved in it, can be a result of material organism or of material life?

In exact parallelism with thought is the voluntary act of man. The will of a brute proceeds from blind impulse; the will of man rises in successive gradations from its dependence on sense until it subjects to itself all animal desires. Man has wants superior to those of his physical nature. They correspond with the pure ideas which spring from the ego, and have no relation to matter. Man longs after the true, the beautiful, the morally good; and as God is the substantial truth, the beauty, the moral goodness in absolute perfection, man longs after God. He finds in himself the power to determine his voluntary action by these pure ideas. This is the free-will, by which man, instead of being subject to nature, makes nature subject to himself. Is it possible that a will thus exempting itself from the laws of necessity can be the result of matter, which is always bound by those laws?

Mediating between thought and volition are the feelings. It is through the feelings that intellect acts upon will, and will upon intellect. They give to our life its highest power, fervor, and richness. Some of them are in the sphere of sensation, and are governed by our physical being; others, such as joy in the possession of wealth, of fame, of dominion, etc., rise higher, and are influenced by reflection; others rise higher still, and are independent of our physical being; they attach themselves to our loftiest ideas, and to the volitions determined by those ideas; they are the feelings of joy in view of truth, the aesthetic feelings, the moral,
the religious. When man, thinking and willing, has raised himself up to these exalted ideas, and has entered into inner, harmonious connection with his Maker, he has found the union of all his faculties and sensibilities in God; he has found that peace of God which the world cannot give, and that true godliness which no change of outward relations can take away. This godliness is the product of inward freedom. How is it possible to derive from the forces and laws of material substance those pure, sweet, holy feelings which are elevated above our sensuous nature, which unfold themselves out of the loftiest ideas, and out of the volitions determined by these ideas, and which continue until the dark hour of death?

6. The true Representation of the Soul.

Materialism and Pantheism agree with each other in denying the personal nature, the separate, individual substance of the soul. But what they deny is the real truth. The processes of thought, willing, feeling, result from a concrete, individual substance which is essentially different from unorganized matter, and which remains the same amid all the fluctuations of the sensuous organism, and which hereby gives a pledge that it will continue to live after the dissolution of the body. This substance, this distinct peculiar monad, develops itself in the animal life, in all the functions of animal life, in the origin, the development, and the preservation of the material organism. We are conscious of but one life in us; the spirit is the soul; the ego which manifests itself in thought, feeling, willing, announces itself as one and the same principle with that which by the nerves of sensation informs us of the outward world and of our corporeal states, which also by the nerves of motion sways the physical members, and uses them for accomplishing its own designs. It is only by supposing our spiritual and animal life to be developments of one and the same substance, that we can account for the influence of the body on the mind, and of the mind on
the body; all the disturbances of our organic life causing disturbances in our spiritual life, and the spiritual functions re-acting on the organic, so that sometimes by the spiritual energy alone the organic disturbances are quelled, and the animal life brought back from its abnormal to its normal state. The soul, then, develops its activity in two spheres: it works in the darkness of unconsciousness as a natural power, forming and animating the material organism; and also, having been awakened from its original slumber by the outward world, it works, in the light of consciousness, and in the permanent feeling of its own oneness and identity, as the principle of thinking, feeling, willing. In the unconscious sphere it constructs for itself a body, by assimilating certain materials derived from unorganized nature, and it preserves the play of the life which animates that body. In the conscious sphere it lives in an immeasurable fulness of thoughts, feelings, and volitions, which form, as it were, its spiritual body, and the methods of its self-revelation. Working in the animal sphere it is the ψυχή of the New Testament. Working in its ideas, feelings, volitions, it is the πνεῦμα of the New Testament. Thus do philosophy and revelation agree.

III. Critical Review of the Theory of the Soul's Pre-existence.

1. The Ideal Pre-existence of the Soul.

God is the author of the world, and accordingly the world is a revelation of himself. As the human mind mirrors itself forth in its own thoughts, realizing themselves in acts, so God mirrors himself forth in his ideas, which are realized in the world. As his ideas have a unity, so has the organism of the world. As his ideas are infinite, so are his acts eternal. Not only does he know the creatures which now exist, but also those which will exist. The idea of the human race was in his mind before the idea was made objective on the earth. Every individual of the race is

1 Rom. i. 19, 20.  
2 John v. 17.  
3 Gen. i. 26.
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represented by inspired men as having existed from eternity in the mind of God; even the moral and religious condition of every man, his eternal destiny also, are included in the divine foreknowledge. This foreknown life is the ideal pre-existence of the soul, and is taught in the Bible.

2. The Real Pre-existence of the Soul.

1. This Real Pre-existence Not Taught in the Bible.

By the real, as distinct from the ideal, pre-existence of the soul, we mean the existence of it in the created world, and not in the uncreated Mind. Origen interprets the parable of the householder who "saw others standing idle in the market-place," as referring to souls who had not yet been sent into the world. It is not wonderful that an allegorizing interpreter like Origen should find a proof of pre-existence in such assertions as that Jacob and Esau were objects of the divine love or hatred before they were born. The Cabbalists derive an argument in favor of this doctrine from the statement that the "spirit returns unto God who gave it." In the song of Hannah we read: "The Lord killeth and the Lord maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave (sheol) and bringeth up." But it is evident from other passages, that this verse refers to deliverance from the gates, the borders of the grave, from the danger of death, not from sheol itself. There is an utterance in the Apocrypha which does declare the soul's pre-existence; where Solomon says: "I was a witty child and had a good spirit, yea rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled." This idea, however, is foreign from the purely Jewish method of thought, and sprang from the Alexandrine-Jewish philosophy, the incipient traces of which are found in the Book of Wisdom.

1 Acts xv. 18; Rom. iv. 17; Psalm cxxxix. 16; Jer. i. 5.
2 Rom. viii. 28–30; Eph. i. 4; 2 Tim. i. 9; 1 Pet. i. 1, 2.
3 Matt. xx. 3.
4 Rom. ix. 11.
5 Ecc. xi. 7.
6 1 Sam. ii. 6.
7 Psalm lxxxix. 16; lxxxvi. 13; ix. 14.
8 Wis. Sol. viii. 10, 11.
But that not even one trace of this theory is found in the inspired scriptures, has been admitted by even Julius Müller. He attempts to explain the biblical silence on his favorite doctrine, by saying that the Bible does not teach philosophy. But this silence ought to be explained on the ground that his favorite doctrine is contrary to the general teachings of the Bible. In the Mosaic record of man’s creation, there is not the slightest hint of man’s soul having existed before the body was formed. The creation is absolute. As God forms the corporeal nature, so he forms the principle which animates that nature. The breath of life comes from him. It is the same divine breath (ruach) which the Old Testament describes as the universal principle of life in the world. The New Testament agrees with the Old in always describing the act of creation as the one act of absolutely creating both the body and the soul at the same time.1

§ 2. THE REAL AND TIMELESS PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL IS CONTRARY TO REASON.

We ought to inquire first of all, whether the ante-temporal or ante-mundane existence of the soul be conceivable or not. If it be conceivable, then we may inquire whether the facts of our moral life can be explained on no other supposition than that of such pre-existence. If they cannot, then we may regard the supposition as needed for completing the biblical account of the soul’s history. We must distinguish between the theory that the soul exists before time, has a timeless pre-existence, and the theory that the soul did exist before it entered on its temporal state before the world was formed. The present section is devoted to the theory of the soul’s timeless pre-existence, which is a pre-existence only in a figurative sense. This is the theory of Kant. It is founded on his great principle, that time and space have no objective reality, and are only subjective forms of our sensuous perception. Consequently we perceive the world without us and the world within us only as they are pre-

1 Matt. xix. 4; 1 Cor. xi. 9; xv. 45; 1 Tim. ii. 13.
sent to us under these forms, and we have absolutely no knowledge of material or mental substances as they are in themselves. Man as a Phenomenon appears to exist in space and time. As a Noumenon, as he is in himself, he does not exist in space and time. Now his freedom belongs to him only as a Noumenon. In the sphere independent of space and time he performs that decisive act which causes his inclination to sin, and this inclination brings upon him a guilt which he cannot shake off.

Now we agree with Kant in affirming that our ideas of space and time are forms of sensuous perception. If they are not so, then they must be generalizations formed from experience; empirical notions formed by abstracting from our sensuous perceptions. But that these ideas are not derived from experience, is evident from the facts that they are presupposed in every possible perception; that we cannot divest our minds of them; that we cannot imagine any bounds of time or space, nor any limit of their divisibility; that we know a priori, or can demonstrate, the truths relating to time and space, whereas we know the truths of experience only a posteriori, and cannot have demonstrative evidence of them.

Still we differ from Kant when he teaches that space and time are nothing but subjective forms of sensuous perception, and have no objective reality. We cannot conceive of any necessary form of thought which has not some object corresponding with it. If there were nothing objective, answering to our ideas of space and time, we should never have these ideas. The eye alone would not give us vision; there must be light. The ear alone would not give us sound; there must be the vibration of the air. The idea of beauty is not the product of experience; it is of subjective origin; still we should not be conscious of the idea if there were no object corresponding with it. Neither should we be conscious of our subjective idea of moral goodness, if the idea had not an objective correlate in the act which is called good.
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It is an error to suppose that thought and real existence are identical. Existence is real because it is independent of thought. On the other hand, we can think of objects which are not real. Still, thought and reality are in most intimate correspondence with each other. All real existence can be apprehended by the mind. Whatever so contradicts the laws of thought that it cannot be apprehended by the mind, does not really exist. The ideas which we form a priori are afterwards justified by experience: They have led sometimes to empirical discoveries which were confirmed by experiment. Thus our conviction is strengthened that our ideas of space and time have their correlate in a real existence.

What this real existence is to which our ideas of space and time correspond, we cannot easily say. Everything finite is under the relations of time. There cannot then be a timeless existence of the soul. Such an existence cannot be conceived of. Even Kant himself contradicts his own theory, by affirming that in its ante-temporal being the soul is free, and it then puts forth the moral choice which decides its temporal destiny. But freedom cannot realize itself except in a succession of acts, and that moral choice which decides the temporal destiny of the soul was put forth. This succession and this putting forth of a choice involve the idea of change, and thus of time. Schelling also speaks sometimes of an existence and of an act which preceded the temporal existence of man, which belong not to time but to eternity, and which yet go through time. Now such an existence and such an act cannot be timeless. It is a contradiction to say that a thing belongs to eternity and not to time, and yet comes forth in time. Julius Müller also contradicts himself in some of his remarks concerning this theme. He speaks of men in their timeless existence as recognizing their own individual nature by looking into the nature of God, and seeing their humanity reflected from it. But is not this an act which presupposes change, and therefore time? He teaches that in this mysterious pre-existence,
the soul performed an act which has shaped its temporal destiny. But this act, by which the soul came out of an undetermined into a determined state, implies great changes, and all changes are inconceivable unless there be time. Thus is the idea of the soul's timeless existence self-contradictory.

13 The real and ante-mundane existence of the soul is not supported by reason.

The majority of believers in the soul's pre-existence agree in advocating, not the timeless, but the ante-mundane being of the soul; not its existence out of the relations of time, but before the changes and successions of time. They differ among themselves, however, in various particulars. Some, as Plato, Philo, and others, believe that the soul in its ante-mundane state was far superior in excellence and blessedness to the soul in its mundane state; while others, as Fichte, Julius Müller, and others, adopt the theory, which is far more consonant with modern science, that the soul in its previous condition had not attained its full personality, and had only a potential life. Some believe that the spirit is the highest potency of the soul, and is one principle with it, and of course that both had an ante-mundane being, while others, like Fichte and Julius Müller, believe that the soul and spirit are distinct principles, and that the spirit did, but the soul did not, exist before the body.

But we need not now spend any time in proving that the soul and spirit form one ego, nor that the spirit's consciousness is first awakened by its relations to the external world. If the spirit did exist before its union with the body, it must have existed in an unconscious state. The only theory, then, which we need to controvert now, is the theory that the soul had an ante-mundane existence which was unconscious, merely potential—a germ life, in which were all the faculties, but not the full reality of the human person. It must be confessed that this potential pre-existence of the soul is not in itself inconceivable. It contradicts no law of thought. As the plastic principle of the seed-corn...
sands of years, until the outward conditions of its development appear; as there is reason to conjecture that the earth conceals within itself innumerable germs of organic natures which will gradually, as circumstances evolve them, shoot forth into visible life, so the soul-monads may have existed potentially for a duration surpassing our thought, and may commence their development as soon as they are connected with bodies, the relation of the soul to the body being essential to the awakening of consciousness. We are willing to confess that there is something magnificent in the thought that, before the first conceivable moment of time, God created and endowed all souls, and placed them in such relations to each other as to fashion the future history of mankind, and that he then so constituted and disposed all things, so arranged all their laws and forces that plants and animals should appear at the proper time and place, and that there should unfold itself a vegetable and animal kingdom diversified in the highest degree, yet having an inward connection and just proportion of all its parts, and forming one great completed whole.

It is no objection to this theory of a potential pre-existence, that we have no remembrance of it; for memory begins with consciousness. We cannot remember the scenes of our earliest childhood. Still this unconscious pre-existence is only an hypothesis, to which we should not have recourse unless there be irresistible reasons compelling us to sanction it. We will proceed to examine the alleged reasons:

a. The variety of conditions in which men are placed at their entrance into the world is no reason for the hypothesis of their pre-existence.

We confess that when we look at the infant who was born a cripple, or an heir of poverty and wretchedness, we are prompted to inquire: What great sin has this child committed, to occasion its being introduced into such a life of misery? and wherein have other infants been less guilty, to occasion their being introduced into life with sounder
bodies and in the bosom of happier families? But these are superficial questions. A deeper examination answers them thus: If the outward relations of life depend on the degree of guilt incurred before birth, the men who were born into the state of the direst penury must have had the most sinful dispositions, and the men who were born into the state of greatest physical comfort must have had the most innocent characters. But our observation proves that such is not the fact. The Bible represents our earthly lot as depending on an ordination of God; but it never represents that ordination as depending on our ante-mundane guilt. Thinking of the old Jewish theory, that all individual suffering proceeds from individual guilt, and of the Alexandrine theory, that the calamities to which men are born proceed from the guilt which they contracted before birth, the disciples of Christ asked him whether the unfortunate man was born blind because he had sinned before birth, or because his parents had sinned. Jesus replied: “Neither hath this man sinned nor his parents, but [the man was born blind] that the works of God should be made manifest in him.”

He was born blind so that Jesus might exhibit his divine power of working miracles; then, so that Jesus might, through the aid of these miracles, secure a faith in his redemptive mission; finally, so that the kingdom of God might be established on earth. This special case, then, teaches the general principle, that the variety of conditions into which men are born springs, not from the greater or smaller degrees of sin committed before birth, but from the plan of God to develop his own kingdom.

This biblical teaching corresponds with the sound lessons of reason. If all men were born to the same state and relations, physical and mental, there would be a bar to all excitement, effort, striving, contest, and conflict; to all progress from the lower to the higher, to all development of resources, to all human history. Out of the unequal conditions into which men are introduced at birth, spring their

1 John ix. 3.
wants, their living interchange of thought and feeling, the gradations of society, the diversities of trade and office, the reciprocities of help, the pressing forward in improvement, the uninterrupted progress in unfolding the human character, the ever increasing development of the kingdom of God on earth. Therefore has Jehovah ordained this stimulating inequality in the original states of men. History teaches that minds come forward as they are required by circumstances, and at extraordinary periods extraordinary minds present themselves, who not only concentrate in themselves the power of the race as it has been already developed, but who have the force to press the development still further onward. History also teaches that these minds are formed, and their resources are brought out, by the external relations into which they are called at birth, and through which they pass in subsequent life. Minds are fashioned for circumstances and by circumstances.

But the question presses yet: Why is one man appointed to serve his race through adversity, and another through prosperity? How have those who are depressed from their very birth merited their depression, and how have those who are exalted from their very birth deserved their exaltation? Another key to unlock this difficulty is found in the doctrine that there is a future life, in which all the crookednesses of the present life will be straightened out. That God will make all needed adjustments, is evident from various scriptures, and particularly from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, and from some of the Beatitudes.1 Our moral feelings require that all which is oppressive here be rectified hereafter. The Bible also assures us that God will recompense men according to their various degrees of virtue, and with all due allowance for the differing degrees of power originally given to different individuals, for their differing opportunities to improve themselves, for their deprivations, pains, conflicts, and for all the circumstances which hindered the unfolding of their natures. There is no other doctrine

1 Luke xvi. 19, sq.; Matt. v
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than this which can relieve us when we reflect not only on the natural inequalities of condition into which men are born, but also on the moral inequalities; on the fact that one person is, from his earliest childhood, encompassed with influences which tempt him to vice, while another person is exempted, as far as possible, from these temptations, and is blessed with multiplied advantages for progress in virtue. Jesus has solved this enigma by the significant words: "Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required; and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more." The future life will be one of unending progress; and the soul which has pursued a course of improvement here, and been retarded in this course by the obstacles of its earthly lot, will have an opportunity for increasing improvement in the life to come.¹

b. The rise of our a priori ideas affords no reason for the hypothesis of our pre-existence.

The Platonists believed in two principles of things: the one being particular, manifold, mutable, and perishing—an object of empirical knowledge; the other being universal, characterized by strict unity, unchangeable, unperishing—an object of the a priori ideas. These ideas are necessary for recognizing this principle; and they must have been brought by the soul into the present from an antecedent life.

At the present day, every judicious philosopher agrees with Plato, so far as to recognize the a priori ideas, and thus to deny that the mind of the infant is a tabula rasa. The mind is controlled by certain laws or forms of thinking immanent in it. Logic is the science of these laws or forms of thinking. Ethics is the science of the laws or forms of moral feeling. Every object in nature has its own laws, immanent in that object. Thus there is a law by which bodies attract each other; there are laws of cohesion and of

¹ Luke xii. 48.
² Professor Bruch makes various remarks on this theme, which indicate his leaning toward some such theory of restoration as that adopted by Origen.
repulsion; there is a law by which a plant builds itself up according to a type lying in it. Why should not the soul have its laws? In the darkness of unconsciousness it does form its own body according to a type given it by its Creator. All its sensuous perceptions and its intellectual operations are conformed to fixed laws. There is no purely empirical knowledge. All knowledge which we obtain \textit{a posteriori} is the combined product, on the one hand, of the working of the outer world, and on the other hand, of those forms of sensuous perception which are immanent in the spirit. Then, our \textit{a priori} ideas, although not derived from experience, are yet unfolded on condition of our past experience and are applied to matters of experience. Thus our ideas of truth, of beauty, of virtue, are applied to the world without us, although they originate from the world within us. The idea of God comprehends under it all natural objects, and all the phenomena of life. There must, then, be a close correspondence between the laws of the spirit and the laws of the outer world. Thinking and being answer to each other with the most wonderful exactness. They are both revelations of God. Hence \textit{a priori} thought often anticipates the phenomena of existence, and afterwards is confirmed by those phenomena.

But Plato and after him Descartes fell into a grievous error when they represented our \textit{a priori} ideas as \textit{inborn cognitions}. There are no inborn cognitions slumbering in the mind, and first awakened by outward experience. What man brings with him into life is nothing else than indwelling powers, and laws binding their activity. All the knowledge which we have is acquired in our earthly life, and is the product of these powers regulated by these laws. What are called our \textit{ideas}, as distinct from our generalizations, do not at first lie ready formed in our souls. They are as really acquired as are the notions derived from sensuous perception and abstraction. The soul develops them from its own activity; which corresponds with the laws which are immanent in it. They are not developed until the soul has
matured its powers to a degree sufficient for unfolding them. It is deceptive, then, to represent our learning and knowing as a mere remembering of what we had learned and known in a previous state. It does indeed appear sometimes as if the ideas which rise in our minds were the mere waking up of dark, slumbering reminiscences. This appearance results from the fact that the ideas had previously floated before our minds, and been forgotten, and now present themselves with a brightness of evidence which surprises us. There is not the slightest evidence that the ideas had ever presented themselves before our entrance into this world. Therefore there is not the slightest evidence from these ideas that we ever existed in a previous state.

c. The moral condition in which men are born, and in which they continue, is no reason for believing in their pre-existence.

There are two divisions of this argument in favor of our pre-existence. One is derived from the mere fact of our sinning. But it is now admitted even by such men as Julius Müller and Rücker, that it is impossible to account for the existence of sin as a mere fact. To account for it is to assign a cause which produces it. Now if any cause produces it, then sin comes under the law of cause and effect, and that is the law of necessity. But if sin be necessity, it ceases to be sin. The very idea of guilt presupposes freedom.

The second division of the argument is derived, not from the mere fact, but from the universal prevalence of sin. How happens it that all men sin, when every man is free to be holy? Rücker and others have answered this question by asserting, that only those spirits became men, who had sinned in a previous state. Their character in the present world is traced up to their sin in an antecedent sphere, thus: every wrong act must have sprung from a wrong inclination; but this inclination must have sprung from a preceding wrong act. Thus we pursue our history backward, until we find that we have the sinful inclination at the earliest
period of our earthly existence. It must then have sprung from a sinful act preceding our earthly existence. This inclination is called sin, because it is, first, the result of sin, and secondly, is the inward motive to sin.

We have been surprised at the fact that, while men have accounted for sin by tracing it back to a pre-existent state, they have not accounted for theoretical error by the same process. The mind has an instinctive love of the truth; it was designed, constituted for the truth; still it has a prevailing inclination to credit what is false. It costs man earnest labor to ascertain the truth, his progress in it is dilatory; but he learns error with ease, and he advances in it with great rapidity. He not merely fails to believe the right, but he positively believes the wrong propositions. Positive error has dominion over men. Not only the uneducated populace, but the most learned scholars adopt a mass of prejudices and positive blunders. Now, why does man thus give himself up to the sway of error, when his destination is to receive the truth? Is it said that at his very entrance into the world he finds himself encompassed with a multitude of wrong motives, which in the lapse of ages have made themselves popular? But how happens it that so many errors have been accumulated in past time by men who were created with such strong instincts for the truth? Why does every man, though endowed with magnificent powers for learning the right principles, fail to exercise these powers; and why does he cherish faith in so many wrong principles, and cling to them with so great tenacity? Is it said that theoretical error results from sin? It does often, but not always. There are many sins which do not spring from wrong belief, and there are many wrong beliefs which have no influence on practical life? We cannot, then, account in these ways for men's inclinations to believe in what is false. Yet we have never heard that any philosopher has resorted to the theory that man's first act of believing an untruth gave a wrong direction to his mental powers, and as they have this wrong direction when he first
enters the world, therefore this first act of believing an untruth must have been performed in a pre-existent state!

Is the present moral state of man explained by Kant’s theory of a timeless pre-existence? We have already shown that this theory involves a self-contradiction. But even if it were not so, we cannot believe that the origin of human sinfulness could have been in that timeless state. For in that state men were free from the influence of sense, and of associates infected with sin. How, then, could they have been led into sin? and into such a sin as has produced our deep-rooted inclination to evil? It is unreasonable to account for the wrong which we now commit under the influence of sense and of evil companions, by supposing that it sprung from a wrong which we committed when there was no such corrupting moral influence! This is to explain the easier by the harder.

Is the present moral state of man explained by the theory that we apostatized, not in a timeless state of being, but in a state which was under the conditions of time, and yet previous to the existence of man on earth? This theory, also, branches out into two divisions. One is, that in this previous existence we were blessed with clear views of duty and of God. But here we ask: How could we have been tempted to break up our intelligent, rational, joyous communion with our Maker? We could not have been tempted by sense, for there was none; nor by evil companions, for there were none. If men say, with Origen, that we were tempted by Satan, then we ask: How was Satan himself drawn into sin? If it be difficult to account for the apostasy of men, how much more difficult must it be to account for the apostasy of a higher order of beings? Why did not perfectly virtuous and blessed spirits resist his temptations? Why did God allow him to tempt us? Thus are our difficulties increased rather than diminished by this endeavor to explain our sinfulness in our present circumstances, which peculiarly tend to encourage it, by supposing that our sinfulness began in far different circumstances, which peculiarly tended to discourage it.
Admitting that countless minds did apostatize in that ante-mundane existence, how can we suppose that their first departure from God produced at once a deep-rooted sinful disposition? Would not the wretchedness occasioned by the first sin; would not such allurements to goodness as had been operating on those blessed spirits, have brought them back from their first wandering, and restored them to their former harmony with God?

The theory that men apostatized in an ante-mundane existence generally winds up with the supposition that they were transferred to this world, and invested with a corporeal nature, in order that they may recover from their apostasy and enter upon a course of purification. But the influences of their present sensuous nature, and of their present evil companionship, are exactly fitted to prevent their restoration from their apostasy. If they were to be purified from sin, they would have been retained in a sphere where the influences favored that purification, and not removed to a sphere where the influences opposed it.

A second division of this theory is, that the sinful act which decided our moral character was committed in a previous state, not of conscious activity, but in one of unconscious and merely potential life. To this we reply, that all moral action presupposes a knowledge of the divine law and the freedom of the human will. In an unconscious state there can be no such knowledge, no such freedom; therefore no moral act can be performed; least of all, a moral act which determines the whole moral character of men during their entire existence on earth.

Again, the moral argument for our pre-existence would lead us to believe in an infinite series of sinful acts performed by man. He puts forth a wrong volition; this must have resulted from a wrong bias; this wrong bias, being culpable, must have resulted from wrong volition preceding it; but man was born with this wrong bias; then the preceding volition was put forth in a previous state of being. This is the argument. Now, on the same principles of reasoning, the wrong volition put for
of being must have resulted from a wrong bias; and that from an antecedent volition, and so on in an infinite chain of biases and volitions. At the end of the argument we are just where we were at the beginning of it; the same difficulty remains, and is only pushed back from the present to an antecedent sphere of being.

The argument derived from our moral condition at birth, in favor of our pre-existence is thought to be confirmed by the Bible. We accede to the statement of Julius Müller that the inspired word represents human wickedness as consisting, not merely in the individual sinful acts which we perform, but also in that moral corruption which dwells in us permanently, and which is the origin of our sinful volitions. But does the Bible teach that this corruption does not originate in our temporal existence. Müller appeals to the words¹: "The imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth;" but these words do not imply that the evil imagination is grounded in a moral corruption which at man’s entrance into life on earth has already taken up its abode in him. He quotes the verse,² "I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me;" but certainly this verse asserts nothing more than that the Psalmist’s parents were sinners like himself. Müller places the chief weight upon the passage,³ "and were by nature (φύσει) the children of wrath, even as others." But if we examine this passage in its connection we shall find that the word φύσει is explained by the words immediately preceding it in the second and third verses, and also by the eleventh and twelfth; and it must refer to the sinful state which is described in those four verses, and in which both Jews and Gentiles actively place themselves before their conversion to Christianity, and before their entrance into the state of grace which is conditioned upon that conversion.

Thus far we have reasoned against the theory of pre-

¹ Gen. viii. 21.  
² Psalm li. 5.  
³ Eph. ii. 3.  [For a further development of the biblical argument, see pp. 697–705 above.]
existence, on the assumption that the facts of our moral life cannot be accounted for on any other theory. But is this assumption just? Let us examine it. We admit the universal sinfulness of man. The holy scriptures prove it. Experience confirms it. Whenever we first come in contact with a man, we believe *a priori* that he is sinful. There has been on earth only one exception to this general law of depravity. We admit also the natural inclination of all men to sin. Paul, in the seventh of Romans, refers to this inclination, which is awakened and excited by the law. Who has not recognized it in his own experience? It manifests itself in tender childhood. It originates the difficulty of performing a good act, the facility of performing a wicked one. It is the reason why we follow a wrong more easily than a right example. When we reflect on the wealth of the moral powers with which we are endued, and on those tendencies to virtue which result from such powers, we are amazed at our inclination to sin; and it would be disgraceful to science did we not inquire for the origin of this inclination. This is the great problem.

We may solve the problem by supposing that our first evil inclinations arise in the natural process of human development. While the soul is under the law of unconscious necessity, it is neither to be praised nor blamed for anything moral. But as soon as it has come out from under that law, and entered the sphere of consciousness and free-will, the soul is to be blamed for its evil inclinations. It is to be blamed for that want of energy in the free will, which want is the occasion of the soul's not struggling as it should struggle against the evil inclination. It is to be blamed for those wrong volitions which give new power to the inclination. Still this involuntary inclination is not blameworthy in its first principle; it is not in itself, and in the distinctive meaning of the term, sinful. In order to be sinful it must result from a free act. But if such an act had been performed, it must have been performed in a pre-existent state, and we have shown this theory to be a pure fiction. We
must, then, distinguish between the first uprising of this inward inclination to evil, and the form which the inclination receives in consequence of the action of the free-will. It is metamorphosed from a power of nature to a sinful feeling, by the entrance of conscious choice. At its first uprising the inclination is a result of a natural necessity, and therefore cannot, in and of itself, be sinful, in the strict sense of that word. It becomes guilty when we enter into conscious, personal life, and because we passively allow ourselves to be governed by it, instead of contending against it with the requisite energy, and holding it within its due bounds by the legitimate use of the free-will, which has gradually ripened out of the state of a faculty which could not be exercised into the state of a power which is actually exercised.

The following is the natural process of development in which sin has its origin. The spirit is not a foreign substance added to the soul, but is identically the same substance with it. The soul becomes spirit when it rises out of the dark sphere of animal life, where it acts as the plastic principle of the body, and comes into the domain of conscious thought and free-will. Ascending into this rational domain, the immaterial substance does not cease to be the organizing principle of the body, but it superadds new functions to those which it previously exercised, and it develops itself more and more until the principle of animal life is controlled, permeated, and glorified by the principle of rational life.

Considered as belonging to the sphere of nature, man does not differ from other creatures belonging to the same sphere. He has many impulses which together take root in one permanent, fundamental impulse, which is the love of life, of corporeal life. As every satisfaction of a physical want is immediately followed by a sensation of physical pleasure, so all man's impulses, while he continues in the sphere of nature alone, go out after that which is agreeable to sense. In that sphere, too, all his impulses are concentrated upon
himself. He knows himself alone; therefore he is the central point of the whole world. The strict law of his life is to withdraw himself exclusively into himself, and make all his movements converge in himself, the whole animated but irrational nature stands under the power of blind egoism. So long as the child is in this first stage of his earthly being, and all his powers are under the dominion of necessity, he lives for himself alone. But we do not blame him for this egoism more than we blame a mere animal, which, because it cannot become spirit, and therefore cannot develop itself into a free agent, does not come forth from this egoism, and cannot withdraw itself from the power of the impulses after sensual gratification. But by degrees the soul of the child begins to raise itself above its mere plastic activity. It experiences a wonderful, though a gradual change; awakened by influences of the outer world, it begins to think and to will. Its thought and volition are connected together by feeling. These three operations are illumined by self-consciousness. Thus the soul begins a new life. In some individuals the soul develops itself into a spirit more easily and more rapidly than in other individuals. But we can discover no limit to the child’s progress in this unfolding of his spiritual powers. They are capable of an endless perfectibility.

Now at the moment when he rises from the sphere of the soul into the sphere of the spirit, from his unconscious to his conscious state, from his condition as an individual to his condition as a person, he disentangles himself from the law of necessity and becomes a free agent. His sensuous impulses are no longer the only ones which stir him. The

1 Professor Bruch does not attempt, but regards it as impossible, to answer the question: “When does moral agency commence?” and also the question: “When does the child begin to sin?” He is satisfied, however, that the child is not an actual sinner till some time after birth. He even goes so far as to query whether the first acts which the child commits, during the earliest glimmerings of personal consciousness, are sins; for at the first dawning of personality the moral convictions and the freedom of the will are not strong enough, he thinks, to resist the forces of our psychical life.
spirit as well as the soul is penetrated with a strong desire for various forms of good. This general desire of the spirit is divided into many particular desires, and the good to which they tend is adapted to the dignity of the spirit, and has nothing in common with the mere sensual delight of the soul. This higher nature of man has impulses which direct it to God. It is under laws which do not, like the laws of nature, operate by constraint, but they appeal to free-will, prompt the person to strive after those forms of good which have an absolute worth, to become free from egoism, to love his fellow men, and to love God.

But when the person has emerged from his merely psychical into his higher state, he has not thereby ceased to be a soul as well as a spirit. His natural being lies at the basis of his spiritual. His sensuous impulses remain in full force when the rational impulses begin to stir him. Hence we need not wonder that a sharp conflict breaks out between his lower and his higher principles of action. His psychical being has great force, and it continues to crave sensual pleasure and to concentrate its interest in itself. It must, then, oppose those impulses which prompt him in his spiritual being to love his fellow men and to love God. Man yields to his lower nature. He follows the sensuous rather than the spiritual desires. Here is the origin of sin. The sensuous impulses themselves are not sin, because they are necessary. The natural inclination which tempts the will to choose wrong is not blameable in and of itself, for it first rises in the soul without any permission of the will that it should rise. It becomes blameable when the person has reached that stage in which he might resist it, and does not: in which he might confine it within fit bounds, but does not; in which by voluntary sinful acts he strengthens it. This voluntarily omitting to control and to transform his inclination is a moral act, and is imputed to him as sinful. This it is which lets the inclination itself appear sinful, notwithstanding the origin of that inclination is in the dark domain of natural life. Thus we may account for the first
act of the child's sin, by supposing it to be occasioned in the natural process of the soul's development, and therefore we need not resort to any theory of the child's pre-existence.

But a new difficulty presents itself. How can we account for the fact that all men, save one, have yielded to their evil inclination? We cannot explain the universality of human sinfulness on the ground that the will is free; for the freedom of the will would give as much reason to anticipate the universal purity as the universal impurity of men. We may in some degree explain this prevalence of sin in the following method. When the powers of man's spirit are first developed, the impulses of his lower nature are in full sway; and in order that the spiritual powers may prevail over the psychical impulses, it is needful that all the external influences should be in favor of virtue, or at least not opposed to it. But the external influences are unfavorable to the predominance of the spiritual powers over the lower impulses. The very best education is imperfect. The highest wisdom of man indicates no method of avoiding the temptations with which every child is surrounded at the beginning of his moral life. These inducements to iniquity, which are inwrought into the very spirit of the times, may be traced from one generation to another, until we come to the earliest age, and of that age we read: "By one man sin entered into the world." The disobedience of our first parents, then, laid the foundation for the evil influences which have pervaded society in all times.

But how did the first sin originate? Mere philosophy cannot answer this question. It can indeed refer us to the fact, that before the spiritual powers had been strengthened by exercise they were too weak for preserving the due balance between themselves and the natural impulses. Theology favors the supposition that in the primitive state of our first parents they had some peculiarly powerful temptation, which was for them what the corrupting influences of society are for us. This supposition is confirmed by the
Mosaic record. The serpent there described is a symbol of this powerful temptation; but the full meaning of the symbol we cannot explain. We must then leave as a mysterious fact the moral disobedience of our first parents. Nor is it necessary to account for this fact, in order to refute the theory of human pre-existence. We do not claim that all the difficulties attending the origin or the prevalence of sin can be cleared up by our explanation of the process of the soul's development, but we think that this explanation may be more successful than any other in removing the difficulties of the subject.

d. There are no anthropological grounds for believing in the pre-existence of human souls.

We might here close this treatise, if Fichte had not drawn our attention to the individual personality, the peculiar spiritual endowment, which he calls the *genius*, dwelling in every human being. He thinks that the origin of new individual spirits is like a process of spiritual "generatio equivoca"; that, while a man derives from his parents his intermediate, sentient nature, manifesting itself in temperament, in peculiarities of disposition, and in all those characteristics which originate from the fancy (in the generic sense of that term), yet he does not derive his spirit from his progenitors. This spirit must have a transcendental ground. It must originate from a principle which is not the effect of earthly causes, but which introduces a new spiritual nature into the visible sphere. This spiritual nature, this *genius*, comes from the eternal world of real causes or grounds. Its entrance into this sphere of being is like the first introduction of an organic structure into the visible world. This *genius* is an existence as really *sui generis* as is any new species of animals which appears for the first time in the kingdom of created nature. But there is this difference: the animal species imprints itself upon innumerable single specimens, and can therefore be reckoned as only a part of nature, while the very essence of the *genius* is such that it appears only once, and works, and thus helps directly to
produce history, instead of being merely introduced into the history of the creation, as is the animal species.

This theory of Fichte rests on the assumption that the soul and the spirit are two distinct substances; but we have already proved that the spirit is only a higher development of the soul, and is the same substance with it. Fichte says that there are peculiarities of the spirit, the genius; so there are peculiarities of the soul, the natural disposition, the temperament. There is a classification of the temperaments, and there are innumerable degrees in which those of one class approximate to, or recede from, those of another class. The difference of men's temperaments occasions a like difference in their styles of thinking. A person of sanguine temperament has a different order of spirit from a person of phlegmatic or melancholic temperament. His spiritual processes are dissimilar. Fichte remarks that the differences of genius among men affect the course of history; so do the differences of humor and disposition. He says that the peculiarities of temperament which appear in parents appear also in their children, and seem to be inherited. The same may be said of spiritual peculiarities. The children have the same which the parents have, and there is as much reason to believe that the higher as that the lower faculties are transmitted from one generation to another.

Fichte's doctrine of pre-existence rests on his theory of the original positions of the parts of the universe. If we understand his theory, it implies that all these parts were complete at the very origin of the universe, that no new substance comes into being, and that all the changes which occur in the universe are changes in the position and relation of its pre-existing parts. He supposes that material organizations are a theatre for the manifestation of souls; that these souls are the counterparts to those organizations, and are presupposed in them. He supposes that the gradations of souls are numberless, and that the human soul is only to be viewed as the apex of them all. Now it appears to us that, in order to be consistent with his theory, Fichte
ought to have believed in the pre-existence of the human soul as well as of the human spirit. Still his theory need not have led him into a belief that the soul had a conscious existence. He believed in the original germinal being of the parts of the universe. But we have already seen that we can derive no moral explanation of our early sinfulness from the supposition that the soul pre-existed in this undeveloped and merely potential state.

To the question whether the immortal part of man be transmitted from parents to children, we are unable to give a confident answer. We can only affirm, on grounds which have been previously stated, that the theory of transmission is more probable than any other. It has been generally maintained in the church that every soul is directly created by God. But this is a highly improbable supposition. It implies that certain creative acts of God are dependent on the will of man, and is thus inconsistent with the absoluteness of the divine dominion. The origin of that principle which forms the life of human bodies, is analogous to the origin of those principles which form the life of other organized bodies. If we suppose that the soul of man must be directly created by God, we are bound, in consistency, to suppose that the vital powers of other organized beings are directly created by God. For the main distinction between the soul of man, which forms his animal life, and the principles which form the life of other organized bodies is this: the human soul is a plastic substance which has the power of developing itself into a spirit; but those other principles have no such power.