chastely; not in his good works and deeds of charity, whereof he had done many; but removing them far out of his sight, and receiving the benefit of Christ by faith, he said, I have lived wickedly, but thou Lord Jesus dost possess the kingdom of heaven by double right; first, because thou art the Son of God; secondly, because thou hast purchased it by thy death and passion. The first thou keepest for thyself, as thy birth-right; the second, thou givest me, not by the right of my works, but by the right of grace. He set not against the wrath of God his own monkery nor his angelical life, but he took of that one thing which was necessary, and so was saved."

ARTICLE III.

LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT ADJUSTED.

BY REV. L. P. HICKOK, D. D., UNION COLLEGE.

How may we attain the thought of a being who is personal, creative, and at the same time infinite and absolute? This general question, in some way, underlies all the speculations which, through varied processes, eventuate in theism, pantheism, atheism, and universal scepticism. Its comprehensiveness and complication of difficulties can be appreciated only after long and patient toiling for a solution. From the first dawning of philosophical thought, it has engaged and exhausted the powers of the human mind more than any or perhaps all other speculative inquiries, with which philosophy has been conversant. The position thus attained enables us, now, to look back upon the track gone over, and forward in the sure direction, to a satisfactory answer. The impassable limits, which have hitherto seemed to lie directly across the path, will be found in truth to be only guiding and
conservative lines on each hand, with the open way, between, to the recognition of a personal and absolute Deity, without hesitation or contradiction. It is practicable accurately to adjust the limits of religious thought.

In the compass which may be allowed to this Article, an outline of the subject with little detail is all that can be attempted; yet will care be taken to make the investigation clear and plain. The general method needs first to attain the present state of speculation on this question, and then to indicate the steps yet to be taken for a full solution.

Two prominent names may be used as the representatives of the present aspect of the discussion, viz. Sir William Hamilton, whose views may be found by our readers in the edition of his Works edited by O. W. Wight: Philosophy of the Conditioned; and Henry Longueville Mansell, B. D., in his Bampton Lectures: Limits of Religious Thought.

Hamilton gives the distinction between the infinite and the absolute, by calling the first "the unconditionally unlimited," meaning that which is beyond all limits, and "the unconditionally limited," meaning a whole beyond all conditions. When then, from any point, we seek the immensity of space on all sides; or from any instant, the eternity of time up and down its successions, we are in pursuit of the infinite; when we take the immensity of space or the eternity of time as each a concrete whole, we assume to have the absolute. So, also, with the changing phenomena of nature: as we go up the series for its origin, we are in search of the infinite; and as we take the whole in one, we assume the absolute. To follow events, through all causes, up to a First Cause, and find the many in the One, is a search for the infinite; and to take any cause to be the first, as already possessing the many in the one, is an assumption of the absolute. In opposition to both the infinite and the absolute, stands "the conditionally limited," meaning that which is limited by, and related to, something other than it, and which is to be known as "the conditioned."

Hamilton still further teaches, that thinking is possible only by distinguishing one from others, and which is a con-
ditioning of that thing by limits or relations; and thus "to think is to condition." We can think nothing, and therefore can know nothing, which is not limited or related; and therefore the infinite and the absolute must lie beyond the laws of thought and knowledge. They are, each, one and simple, viz. a whole beyond limits, or a whole including all limits; and there is nothing, besides itself, to limit either, or to stand in any relation to it. The conditioned is, therefore, the only field for thinking and knowing; while a philosophy of the unconditioned is impossible. The infinite and the absolute are negations, conceived only by thinking away and abstracting the very conditions by which thought must itself be realized. They are "the negatives of the conceivable itself."

Mansel is a disciple of Hamilton, and has availed himself of the acute analyses of the master, yet applying the laws which limit thought after his own independent manner. This is to take the infinite and the absolute and subject them to the processes of logical thought, and run them out to the contradictions and absurdities which necessarily follow.

His starting-point is with the true conception of God as necessarily including First Cause, the Absolute and the Infinite. As First Cause, he produces all things and is produced of none. As Absolute, he has existence in himself, without any necessary relation to another. As Infinite, he is beyond all limits, and can receive no additions. He then logically and very abundantly shows that these cannot meet in one and the same being, nor that the being can be a person, or a creator, without the most insoluble contradictions and intrinsic absurdities.

A first cause cannot be absolute, for it cannot be cause except in relation to its effects; whereas, the absolute must be without relations. If it be assumed that the absolute exists first as absolute, and afterwards becomes cause; then could the being not have been infinite; for he becomes other than he was, and has passed out of his former limits. But suppose the absolute to be cause: then must the cause be freed from all necessity; for a necessary cause can be neither in-
finite nor absolute. The cause must then be voluntary, and volition must have consciousness. But consciousness can be only of the relative as subject and object; and any assumed identification of subject and object, in an absolute, would throw the absolute beyond consciousness, without volition, and under necessity, and so neither the infinite nor the absolute. We have then, in his own words, the inextricable dilemma: "the absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious; it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The one and the many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus, alike, incomprehensible." — Bampton Lectures, p. 79.

Suppose the absolute to be, it cannot become cause; for causal action, voluntary or necessitated, must be either a higher or inferior state than quiescence, and the absolute has gone into a state of more or less comparative perfection, and so not the absolute. Again, the relative cannot come into being; for, if distinct from the absolute, it comes from a non-existence, and the thought is self-contradictory; and if we say it is the same as the absolute, then has not the relative been yet generated, and creation is simply the absolute still, only in another mode. He says: "The whole of this web of contradictions (and it might be extended, if necessary, to a far greater length) is woven from one original warp and woof, namely, the impossibility of conceiving the coexistence of the infinite and the finite; and the cognate impossibility of conceiving a first commencement of phenomena, or the absolute giving birth to the relative. The laws of thought appear to admit of no possible escape from the meshes in which thought is entangled, save by destroying one or the other of the cords of which they are composed." — Bampton Lectures, p. 81.

Then, on "the opposite side," in reference to the mental laws under which they are formed, it is argued that con-
Consciousness implies *distinction*, and this implies *limitation*; the infinite, therefore, cannot come into consciousness except as a self-contradiction. Consciousness, also, implies *relation*; the absolute, then, cannot come as relative object to the subject of consciousness, without self-contradiction. Consciousness, also, is subject to *laws of time*, as successive and continuous. But what succeeds another must be finite; and what is continuous must be made up of parts, and grow in completeness with the addition of each, and be never the infinite. So the first act of the first cause, as creative, would be the first point of temporal succession, and there must then be a consciousness of a phenomenon in time and a cause out of time, and thus a consciousness at once out of time and in time. Myself and my thought must be limited and related, each by and to each; and thus, as limited and related, personality cannot become either infinite or absolute in a consciousness, without direct absurdity.

Thus, in the negations of Hamilton and the self-contradictions of Mansel, all thought and knowledge of God as infinite and absolute, as personal and creative, become utterly empty and vain, and we can help ourselves in our religious wants and experience in no way by any processes of logical thinking. But inasmuch as the logical intellect runs itself into no contradictions in thinking within the province of the finite and the relative, and only attains these empty negations and absurdities when passing over into the region of the unconditioned, we are hence to learn that the limits of human thought are fixed between the conditioned and the unconditioned, the natural and the supernatural, and that we can think and know truly and validly on this side, but are scourged with doubts and delusions whenever we set our foot upon the other side. Within the limit, the human intellect is strong and sure; it was designed to work only here; to operate practically, not speculatively; and is only weak and deceptive in transgressing its laws. Thought is only for the phenomenal; we must rely on something else for the unseen and immortal. And as religion, both in its object of worship and its end of hope, has its relevancy
mainly to the unseen world, so thought is specially limited in the truths of religion, and we are to renounce the use of reason here and substitute faith. "In this impotence of reason we are compelled to take refuge in faith, and to believe that an Infinite Being exists though we know not how, and that he is the same with that Being who is made known in consciousness as our sustainer and law-giver." — Bampton Lectures, p. 127.

It becomes thus a momentous, a vital question for humanity: How shall we find a warrant, in the negations of thought and the self-contradictions of knowledge, that this faith can save us? Nothing can now be of so much importance as an assurance, from some quarter, for the validity of this ground of faith. We need to look carefully to itself and its entire connections to see how firm a resting-place it may afford. Hamilton finds his ground for faith in one way, and Mansel in another; we shall need to give to each a separate examination.

We will first examine this ground for faith as laid for us by Hamilton. His analytical result, that both the infinite and the absolute are beyond the reach of the logical understanding, is doubtless correct, and a very important attainment. Neither can be presented in logical thought except by thinking away all limits and relations, and that must leave only a negation in the consciousness, for the elements of an object of thought are thereby taken away. We may as well attempt to think a figure bounded by two straight lines, or a cause acting upon nothing that shall condition the effect. If there is no other intellectual function, we have nothing else but to make the most of faith. Hamilton does this in his way thus:

The infinite and the absolute are both in themselves single and simple, and thus are each inconceivable, but they are distinguished each from each, and therefore nothing hinders from thinking that one of them may be in the non-being of the other. Yea, not only may be, but, from their mutual repugnance and opposition, one must be in the absence of the other. Space and time must each possess either infinite
immensity, or absolute totality; and nature, also, must be an endless series, or an entire universe. From the logical law of contradiction or excluded middle, that of two opposites only one can be, and that one must be and no third thing can come between, it follows, that either an infinite or an absolute being is logically necessary. "The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other to be equally possible; but only as unable to understand as possible either of two extremes, one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true." — Wight's Hamilton, p. 157.

In this way reason is assumed to be "weak but not deceitful;" and, while we cannot trust in its direct action to secure any object for our knowledge, he would have us trust in this principle of logical contradiction to secure an object for our faith. "We are thus taught the salutary lesson," he continues, "that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence; and are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and the finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." We in this are furnished with a basis for a belief that God is, though we can have no thought what he is.

Hamilton supposes that he has herein solved the difficulties presented in the antinomies of Kant, of whom he says that "he endeavored to evince that pure reason, that intelligence is naturally, is necessarily, repugnant with itself, and that speculation ends in a series of insoluble antilogies. In its highest potency, in its very essence, thought is thus infected with contradiction, and the worst and most pervading scepticism is the melancholy result." And then of himself he says: "If I have done anything meritorious in philosophy, it is in the attempt to explain the phenomena of these contradictions; in showing that they arise only when intelligence transcends the limits to which its legitimate
exercise is restricted." — Hamilton's Lectures, Appendix, p. 647.

Now that this can give no secure warrant for faith is evident as follows: 1. The faith is made to rest on a process of thought which is as truly beyond its law as that of the knowledge which has been rejected. We can think and know within the limits of the conditioned, and the process will be neither "fallible nor mendacious;" but contradictions and absurdities, and thus a negation of all object, come when thought transcends the conditioned. And yet this whole work of laying a basis for faith is a logical process which is made to go on and complete itself in a conclusion beyond the legitimate boundary, and quite over within the region of the unconditioned. We are warned not to trust the logical thought for our knowledge, but we put our faith upon the logical thought that can appear nowhere else except in this same delusive region. If the logical process is not valid for attaining either the infinite or the absolute, because carried on beyond the region of the conditioned, then surely that process which must take them as given, and apply the logical law of contradiction to them, must still more transcend the safe limit.

2. The infinite and the absolute are mere negatives of thought, and yet they are to be taken as positive realities in our faith. If we could legitimately take and safely rely upon the logical process of the excluded middle, in this region of the unconditioned, we could only embrace one of them in our conclusion as a self-contradictory negative. The infinite and the absolute are possible in our thought only as such negations, and the exclusion of either by the logical law can only leave the other for our faith such as it was in our thought, and thus our faith can embrace nothing other than such an absurd and empty Deity. But no man's faith can be satisfied in such an object any more than his knowledge could before have been. And elsewhere Hamilton shows that he supposes the faith should embrace more, for he says: "We are unable to think the divine attributes as in themselves they are; we cannot think God without
impiety unless we also implicitly confess our impotence to think him worthily, and if we should assert that God is as we think or can affirm him to be, we actually blaspheme."—Hamilton's Lectures, Appendix, p. 692. The logic on which faith rests can give only a negative, but quite inconsequently the faith assumes a positive.

3. If a ground were in this given that could sustain a positive existence, still that existing being could not be a God both infinite and absolute. The logical law of contradiction can, at the best, only give one, and must exclude the other. But can any man's faith stop short with one to the exclusion of the other? Is it not necessary that we believe God to be both without beginning of days and that he inhabiteth eternity? that he is unbounded fulness, and that also he filleth immensity? If so, the ground is utterly unsatisfactory; it only can sustain one, and cannot at all indicate which one, while our faith needs both.

The basis for faith is then just as unsound as it would be for our knowledge, and in what it is assumed to sustain we can find only half we want. In taking for faith either the infinite or the absolute, we transgress the legitimate limits of thought, and then in taking both the infinite and absolute, we annihilate the law of contradiction, which gave the only ground on which we could take either. Surely the human intellect is not here, as Hamilton has assumed, merely weak; it is, as Kant found and affirmed, wholly self-repugnant. The only result which Hamilton's analysis can reach is, that the logical faculty he uses can do nothing with the problems of the infinite and the absolute. It runs them both into contradictions and negations, and can as little supply a ground for faith as for knowledge. In the very act of faith there is the contradiction to logical thought. It becomes not merely a trusting beyond thought, but directly against thought; not a faith that God is, while unable to think how he is; but a faith that he is, while neither the thought nor the faith can take him as any other than the absurdity of a self-contradictory negation. We must, on this ground, not merely erect our altars to the Unknown God, but to a God,
the knowledge of whom and the faith in whom must alike be self-repugnant.

We will next examine the ground of faith, as understood by Mansel. His elaborate exhibitions of the contradictions and absurdities to which a logical process must run in attempting to reach the infinite or the absolute, and especially in applying these to God as First Cause, a personal Creator and moral Governor, are both conclusive and important. But his assumption that in this the human intellect is impotent and limited only, and not also deceptive, is, like Hamilton before him, a mistake, if only the logical process is apprehended, and from which much evil follows. This logical process, alone, can in no way free itself from these absurdities; and then the support to faith, wherever placed, must itself necessarily encounter all the danger from such proved and admitted contradictions. We must be able to correct these antinomies of the understanding by a higher faculty, or no possible basis for faith can stand secure against the charges of credulity or superstition.

Mansel, at the outset, assumes that God is both infinite and absolute, and thus at once cuts himself off from all reliance for faith upon Hamilton's principle of logical contradiction or excluded middle, which can admit only that God is infinite or absolute. He hardly seems, himself, conscious of this disagreement; and, at times, makes a hesitating use of what might seem to be similar to Hamilton's ground: "The attempt to construct, in thought, an object answering to such names, necessarily results in contradictions; it proves our impotence, and it proves nothing more. Or rather, it indirectly leads us to believe in the existence of the infinite, which we cannot conceive; for the denial of its existence involves a contradiction no less than the assertion of its conceivable." — Bampton Lectures, p. 110.

In other places he alludes to man's dependence and subjective need of a God on which to rely, as some source of authority for faith. "Man learns to pray before he learns to reason; he feels within him the consciousness of a Supreme Being, and the instinct of worship before he can argue from
effects to causes, or estimate the traces of wisdom and benevolence scattered through creation."—Bampton Lectures, p. 115. But the direct and abiding reliance for faith, with Mansel, is not a logical nor a philosophical basis, but the interposition of the Bible. A divine revelation, in its express declarations, constitutes that ground on which he would have us place our faith, against all the weakness or the contradictoriness of human reason; and this appears all through his lectures. While he exposes the contradictions of all processes of thought beyond the limits of the phenomenal world, and assumes that these contradictions are but the evidence of a weakness that comes from the rashness and waywardness of speculation, he yet admits that these religious themes can have no place in thought but under such contradictions, and that "in this impotence of Reason we are compelled to take refuge in faith," and this faith must rest on the direct declarations of scripture. We are, here, in a more hazardous position than on the ground of Hamilton; since not a logical law, but an assumed declaration from Heaven, is put over against direct, and admitted, and even inevitable contradictions of logic. We must believe either with no thought and no object, or with a contradictory thought and an intrinsically absurd object. We must believe either without thinking, or against thought if we do think; for, on these points the logical faculty can think only in contradictions. The inherent antinomy of the understanding which Kant found and Hamilton boasted to have solved, comes out in all its necessity and with all its perplexity.

Great and good as is the service rendered by Mansel in bringing out, so glaringly and extensively, the necessary absurdities, when the logical faculty is set to expounding the problems of the infinite and the absolute; the danger perhaps more than counterbalances it, when he sets the Bible directly over against the contradictions, and makes our faith in it to stand in direct and necessary conflict with our thought. No matter how much it may be repeated, that the thought is unlicensed and transgressing its proper limits, it is the only
way admitted that we can think on these topics; and the alternative presented is faith without thinking. Instead of recognizing, in such a dilemma, that there must somehow be, here, a gross fallacy, and carefully going back to a deeper psychology to discover and remove it, he goes intrepidly and, we think, quite rashly on in the interposition of revelation, and demanding faith in it, while he allows and proves that, if reason be permitted to speak at all, it must be against it; and then himself finds and allows the following consequences, resulting from this method of sustaining faith:

1. Truth must differ with different orders of intelligence. Truth is relative to the subject only, and not any property in things themselves. What is truth to a man, may be very different from truth to an angel or God. Just as the phenomenon must be modified by the organ, and the taste of the same viands may be pleasant to one and disagreeable to another; so, the fundamental truths of philosophy and religion may be one thing to the human intellect, and another thing to angelic intelligences and to God. There can be no standard and test of even ultimate truths, but only the general consent of the specific order of intelligence; and, though the highest conception of truth would be that which is true for all intelligences, yet we can know nothing of such truth, and only that which is common to the human intelligence. "Truth, therefore, in relation to man, admits of no other test than the harmonious consent of all human faculties; and, as no such faculties can take cognizance of the absolute, it follows that correspondence with the absolute can never be required as a test for truth. The utmost deficiency that can be charged against the human faculties amounts only to this: that we cannot say that we know God as God knows himself; that the truth of which our finite minds are susceptible may, for aught we know, be but the passing shadow of some higher reality, which exists only in the divine intelligence."

—Bampton Lectures, p. 147. Thus God and man can have no communion in the same truths; and therefore the infinite and the absolute, though absurdities and contradictory negatives to us, may be positive and consistent realities
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2. Then is the Bible only an accommodation to our faculties. The infinite and the absolute can, in no way, be brought within our thought; and thus God, as he is, can in no way be revealed to us. To give him as he is, would at once contradict our reason; and therefore the representations made of him must conform to our powers of apprehension. And as this must be true of God himself, so also of all that relates to a future state of being: to our minds all these truths of the eternal and spiritual world would involve absurdities; and not merely transcend our thought, but stand self-repugnant in our thought. They must therefore be presented to us, in the Bible, not as they are, but as we can apprehend them. "There are two modes in which we may endeavor to contemplate the Deity: one, negative, a vain attempt to expand consciousness to the infinite; the other, positive, viewing the object as accommodated to the finite capacities of the human thinker."—Bampton Lectures, p. 131.

3. The attributes of God are, in our faith, different from the reality. We have God represented to us under the forms and passions of man; but these are not for the purpose of assisting us to raise our minds to any true conceptions of the divine attributes, for they cannot be, in God, such as they are in humanity; and no communication can be made to us that shall give the truth. The representations of these attributes are only for a practical use, but not for instruction in truth. That any truth should be communicated here, would oblige us to be able to apprehend the divine attributes in the contradictions of their absolute being.
"If there be any who maintain that they can conceive justice, and mercy, and wisdom as neither existing in a merciful, and just, and wise being, nor in any way distinguished from each other; these, and these alone, may aspire to correct revelation by the aid of philosophy; for such alone are the conditions under which philosophy can attain to a rational knowledge of the infinite God." — Bampton Lectures, p. 225.

4. It also involves that, while God's moral government rests on an absolute right, yet that this must be wholly different from our morality. Right with God as much transcends our thought as does the infinite and the absolute, for his right must be both infinite and absolute. If we should attempt to attain and follow it, the morality must not only be different from ours but contradictory to our human ethics.

"That there is an absolute morality based upon, or rather identical with, the eternal nature of God, is, indeed, a conviction forced upon us by the same evidence as that on which we believe that God exists at all. But what that absolute morality is, we are as unable to fix in any human conception as we are to define the other attributes of the same divine nature." — "God did not create absolute morality; it is coeternal with himself; but God did create the human manifestations of morality when he created the moral constitution of man, and placed him in those circumstances by which the eternal principles of right and wrong are modified in relation to the present life." — "We cannot from our present point of view examine the same duties apart from their human element, and separate that which is relative and peculiar to man in this life, from that which is absolute and common to all moral beings." — Bampton Lectures, pp. 186—188.

On this ground are to be interpreted many of the mysterious providences and requisitions of the Bible; such as the sacrifice of Isaac, the destruction of the Canaanites, etc., which are only the cropping out of the divine morality within our phenomenal experience, and which are shocking to our ethical perceptions, but which are the true and right-
eious exhibitions of God's deeper absolute morality. And just as miracles reveal a hidden power deeper and stronger than nature, so these surprising and shocking workings of the Deity are only "Moral Miracles," revealing the hidden absolute right which deeply underlies the morality of the divine government. "In both, the Almighty is regarded as suspending for special purposes, not the eternal laws which constitute his own absolute nature, but the created laws which he imposed at a certain time upon a particular portion of his creatures."—Bampton Lectures, p. 212.

5. It induces a disparagement of natural theology and the internal evidences of revelation. The logical process can only pass up and down the perpetual series of cause and effect, and can never pass beyond, and thus all attempts to find a first cause, and apprehend any liberty and personality in it, necessitates perpetual contradictions. The true argument for a Deity from his works is hereby precluded, and all modes of worship and grounds of dependence and hope are shut off from all support by natural reason. Natural theology is in this way lost. And on the same grounds of contradiction and absurdity necessarily induced, in applying personal attributes to the absolute and a moral character that the human mind can recognize, we are unfit well to say, from the things revealed, anything about the evidences for a divine origin of the Bible. Miracles and prophecy must be the great sources of evidence that God has spoken to men, and we cannot help our faith from the consideration of what has been spoken. We are too incompetent to say anything about what is reasonable to be revealed, to admit that we should put any dependence upon our study of internal evidences. The position taken would, indeed, exclude all such evidences entirely, and the manifest undervaluing of these proofs in the Lectures shows the necessary tendencies of the speculation, though restrained as yet from their full effect.

6. It places the believer and the sceptic in the same position; they only deduce different conclusions from the same data, while that of the sceptic is the more consecutive. All reasoning about the infinite and the absolute necessarily
leads to self-contradictions, and so far as thinking can go, the whole terminates in unavoidable absurdities. Yea, there must at last be admitted an inherent antimony and self-repugnance in the human understanding. All are forced to this conclusion and come at length together in this position. The sceptic says: I can bring my thought to no other result, and I must here doubt all about these matters; I cannot but be sceptical whether there be any absolute. The believer can only say, even so; I stand on your logical position; but you should hence conclude as I do, namely: whether we apply the infinite and absolute to nature as in philosophy, or to God as in theology, it is all the same. We must believe in both cases, if we believe at all, against logical contradictions and absurdities. I desert reason and rely on faith, specially in theology. Have faith in philosophy so far as you can, but for your immortal soul's sake have faith in religion. But here the sceptic far more conclusively answers: I cannot stop thinking and logically concluding. You believe in both philosophy and theology because you do not reason; I do reason, and therefore can have faith in neither. Yea, I find my very understanding in its logical processes self-contradictory, and I am shut up to universal doubting. My very faculties for knowing deceive me, and there is no longer any possible ground for either knowing or believing.

7. The only logical escape from this scepticism is into either Atheism or Pantheism. All logical thought of the infinite and the absolute induces contradiction, and thus doubt. But in this complete distrust, you say: 'I must have some relief, and, as opposites, one must be true.' You first seek for the infinite. In every new position you take, you find the infinite still beyond. You can never reach the one; you can only keep adding to the many. No amount of multiples can be the infinite; no counting of links can find an origin for the whole chain. You have concluded in Atheism. Dissatisfied with this, you assume some link, arbitrarily taken, to be the first and make this your absolute. You follow down through its successive dependent events
and seek to get the many from this one. Each is condition for the conditioned below it; the consequent was in and came from the antecedent; and nothing can anywhere be that is not some form of this primal antecedent produced to a consequent. The whole chain can be only different modes of existence for what was once the first. The ongoing living power has lived on through all. You have concluded in Pantheism; and the most athletic logical thinker cannot leap out of it.

Here, Mansel interposes revelation. Believe in a personal God on the ground of a Bible confirmed by miracles. You assume in the miracles you have found the infinite and absolute God, and this is his accredited word of life to man. You would fain rest on the veracity, love, and mercy of the God herein revealed. But the first reflection when your faith is tried must be, that the very God whom I have been supposing to have wrought the miracles, is a necessary contradiction and self-absurdity in the very thought. And no rejection of the miracle against any evidence can be so contradictory to reason as the admission of the infinite and the absolute together in one first cause. You are necessarily driven back again from the ground of your faith to atheism, pantheism, or universal scepticism. So far, then, are we from relying on a Bible tested by miracles, that we cannot find ground for faith in a God that might work the miracles. The God must first be, and then the miracles and the attested Bible; but you have proved that the very thought of such an existing God is an absurdity. If you keep to your logic, you are helpless. If you discard what you here call reason, you have a faith which is only blind credulity. No man can stand contentedly here. No religion can give peace which rests at last on such sliding sand. The application of much indignant rhetoric, and strong demands for a factitious humility, in both of which the Bampton Lectures abound, cannot help us. The abundance of logic here tried, that was to silence the infidel, has annihilated the foundations for faith, and confirmed the scepticism. Indignantly does the Lecturer declaim against the pantheist: "Personality
with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting the absolute nature of God as he is, is yet truer, grander, more elevating, more religious, than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in which men babble about nothing under the name of the infinite and the absolute;" and yet may not this pantheist very courteously reply: 'But, my dear sir, is not your whole book filled with this babble about the infinite, and showing it to be a mere "nothing," though you urge it upon our faith as if it were a reality? And then, too, what if "personality be truer, and grander, and more elevating than these barren, vague, meaningless abstractions?" yet have you not yourself been proving to us, that this very application of personality to the absolute is a most unmitigated absurdity?'

The grand difficulty, all along, is with these over-hoovering shadows of the infinite and the absolute. The very thought of them is self-contradictory; and if you had the infinite, it would be as meaningless as unlimited void space and time; and if you had the absolute, it would be only a first cause conditioned in its very constitution, and necessitated to one order of development. And then if you attempted to put both in one being, you would have the augmentation of two contradictory processes—a contradictory bundle of logical contradictions, and in which your logical faculty itself would be given over into the jaws of an all-devouring scepticism. Say you, then, you will get along without recognizing any absolute? But that will be trying to get along without God. Say you, you will then rest this contradictory thought of the absolute upon faith, and will go to a miraculously attested Bible as your ground for believing that he is? But your contradictory absolute God must be believed first to be, before you can have the miracle to confirm the Bible, which is to reveal that such a personal God exists. Yes, but then you retort upon the sceptic and say, you are as badly off in your denials as I am in my affirmations; you can have no philosophy if I cannot have my theology. To all this, that sceptic fairly answers: "Very true, but with this quite significant difference; my scepticism lives and your faith dies
on these self-contradictions. And now what can Hamilton and Mansel, what can Kant and all the critical philosophy here do more? Can it satisfy any dependent dying man to say, you must have faith where your reason contradicts? even if it contradicts as much for your faith as against it? Can such faith sustain when trouble comes, and the light shines on its foundations?

That teaching, then, is weak and treacherous, which sends out its disciples to meet infidelity and to succor and guide the inquiring with no other and better preparation than this. The point of difficulty, and thus the place for relief, is precisely in this vague, shadowy, shifting notion of God as the infinite and the absolute. No infinite and absolute, then no God. A self-contradiction in each, and a double absurdity in putting both in one, and then eminently no God. We must have both the infinite and the absolute; and we must have them without inherent contradiction and absurdity; and this cannot be through any possible agency of the logical understanding. The German critical school has at last, in Hegel, exhausted all the powers of analysis the human understanding can employ. Hamilton and Mansel have shown the necessary result in contradictions and negations as clearly as demonstration can teach us. Thanks to the German critical school for exhausting the process, and thanks to Hamilton and Mansel for showing that this exhausted process is utter negation; "a running through the sieves of the Danaides into the abyss of nothing." We have no more work to do in all this region. The giants have been here and piled the mountains together. None of us can do this work better, nor make here for ourselves a higher point of observation. And yet from the clear transparent top, we can see nothing of the true absolute. All we can catch is a delusive mist which we can neither penetrate nor make up its outline; and we may be permitted to rejoice that at length it is made sure that all this intense search has been a looking in the wrong direction.

Let us put ourselves upon another course of inquiry. The limits of thought, we now find, are directly in the face
of our progress, and shut us back from faith as well as from knowledge. When the human mind clearly sees the condition in which it is thus put, it cannot rest. There is in it the irrepressible claim for access to its God, both in thought and faith, and the instinctive conviction will by no speculation be abolished, that there is, and must be, some way to the presence and knowledge of an infinite and absolute God without meeting a negation or a self-contradiction in his place. The human mind is not shut up to absurdities in the place of truth. The use of the right faculty will give the true solution. Whence comes this want of a God? Whence this yearning for faith? Not from the sense—the faculty which brings the phenomenal world into forms: this does not need anything save its own functions and the objects it constructs into forms. The eye may never be tired of seeing, nor the ear of hearing; but the eye wants nothing but to see; nor the ear, but to hear. The sense never seeks to leap beyond its own province. And just so of the faculty which puts the phenomena together into things. The understanding needs nothing but the function for thinking in judgments, and connecting qualities as inhering in their substances and events as adhering to their causes. It may never tire of thinking, but it wants nothing but to think. Given an unobstructed way back and forth, along the connected series of conditions and conditioned, and the understanding is satisfied. The logical faculty never seeks to rise above its major term; it wants only to be permitted to draw its conclusions through its minor from its major. Neither the sense nor the understanding are crying for a God, nor yearning for faith in his being. These faculties for knowing are content in and with nature; and, as exercised together in all the animal creation, they work wholly self-satisfied without a God in either their knowledge or their faith. It is the unmistakable evidence of the possession of a faculty other and higher than either the sense or the logical understanding, when we hear this irrepressible cry for a God, and find this unappeasable yearning for faith in his being and goodness. And now this part of our being, which thus cries and yearns,
must alone be put to the work of knowing and trusting its object. All the difficulties above exhibited, have arisen solely from this, that our rational and immortal being wants an infinite and absolute God, and faith in his being and goodness, and only the functions of the sense and the logical judgment have been put to the task of attaining them.

This want comes from altogether another and a higher source than the agency that has been sent to help it. Hence, and only from this, the logical contradictions and absurdities of the infinite and the absolute, and the incessant "babble" of the sceptic and the believer about them. Nor can these babel voices be harmonized into one speech, until we cease all attempt to settle the matter by the conditioned connections of logic, and bring in the distinct agency of a higher and more comprehensive faculty. We can, by this, attain an infinite and an absolute which shall neither be absurd in themselves, nor contradictory to each other when put together in the one personal Jehovah. A true rational psychology must be introduced, and in this there will be found a sufficient resource for the difficulty, and a valid critic for determining and adjusting the true limits of religious thought.

We shall here put, in the shortest compass, what has a direct bearing on the questions of the true infinite and absolute.

One peculiar and specific function of the human intellect is its capability to give limits. In the exercise of this function we can construct, or put within limits, any portions of space, and thereby make figure, and any portion of time, and thereby make period. We can possess no figure nor period, in pure space and time, without such a constructing act. I can draw any line in space, and thus surround and limit any portion of space, and I can pass along up and down any successions in time, and thus begin and end, and thereby define, any portion of pure time; and, in this way, all possible figures and periods may be constructed. But such figure and period will not somehow come to me in void space and time, unless I so define them, and thus make them, by my own intellectual agency. And so, also, when any color is
given in the eye, I can make the intellectual action pass all around it and get its shape, and when that color changes or varied colors come and go, I can also make the intellectual action fix the limits of before and after, and thereby have its duration in a beginning and an end. But no organic sensation will have its shape or its period in my consciousness, except as, by my own intellectual action, I so construct it. No distinct colors in the eye will have definite shapes, and no passing succession will have definite periods, unless I so construct them for myself. I can have distinct color on a distant sign-board, but I cannot read the letters, unless I can attentively construct and thus define them. The universal law for knowing any figure or period is, that the intellectual agency must conjoin the contents within limits. This intellectual function for conjoining and thus constructing forms in space and time, belongs to the sense, and the result is an immediate beholding; whether the object be a pure mathematical figure, or an empirical appearance.

Now, whenever I make such a constructed figure, I have with it a space; and when I have a constructed succession, there is also a time. But thus far, as we have now gone in the sense, the figures and periods I perceive are my figures and periods, and the spaces and times, in which they are, are solely my spaces and times. The pure diagram, say a mathematical circle, is constructed and then lost, and the subjective space in which it is, comes and goes with it. The figure, and the space in which it is, are both mine. No other intellect can commune with me in the same; he can only construct, and have for himself, the similar. And just so with the organic sensation; it is in my organ, and has my constructed shape, and stands in my space, and no other intellect can have, in any of these, the same but only the similar. And so with the conjoining of limits in time. Each mind must have its own forms in its own spaces and times; and the spaces and times are as truly his, and not another's, as the forms are his. Each mind can determine whether its forms, and spaces, and times are pure or empirical, by determining whether they are purely mental or experienced in
the organ, but by no sense-construction can any one say that his clearest phenomena and their spaces and times are other than subjective. We can, in the sense, determine no outer world, and no one space and one time as common to all, but only as significant in each for each.

And now, in this subjective world of forms and phenomena, every mind will see that the largest form he has yet constructed, leaves still the opportunity for a larger; and the constructing faculty finds no hindrance nor constraint, and has no occasion to ask for the infinite, which still lies beyond its furthest construction. The sense is completely satisfied in its unhindered constructive agency, and never seeks to find whether its province be infinite or not, or its objects absolute or not. It can propound to itself no such problems.

Again: another distinct and peculiar intellectual function is the capability to put phenomena together and make out of them a connected order of experience. If I think a force to exist that will exclude all else from its place, except as it is removed; and then, that such impenetrable space-filling force is occasion for impressing each separate organ after its peculiar manner; and, that all the phenomena I have constructed into forms, were the varied modes in which the different space-filling forces had affected my organs; I could then refer all such phenomena to the action of those forces upon my organs, and I should at once judge these phenomena to be the qualities of these substantial forces. If, again, it be thought that these substantial forces are invaded by, or combined with, others distinct from them; and that such interferences induced varied substantial changes, making varied organic impressions, and thus varied phenomenal constructions; I should then, at once, judge these passing events to be the products of such changing causes. Such changes of substances, giving varied phenomena, secure that the series of events must stand connected, through these causes, into a determined order of experience. Such putting of the substances under the qualities, and of the causes between the events, is the proper and distinctive work of the under-
standing; and this discursive connection is wholly another work than the defining construction above given in the sense, and is a judgment according to sense. The sense-construction gave phenomena; the understanding-connection gives things in a determined order.

And now, when such permanent substance gives its qualities, their organic impression and intellectual construction are my own; but that same permanent substance also impresses the organs of others, and these other intellectual agencies construct their phenomena as their own; but all must refer the impressions, and thus the constructions, to the same permanent substance and the events to the same causes; and therefore, though each have their own experience, yet the experience of all is the same one determined order. The spaces of each will be determined from the same space-filling substances, and the times in each will be determined from the same time-enduring causes; and thus to all there will be one and the same space and the same ongoing of time in common. The objective substances and causes will secure that all the subjective spaces and times shall be alike. We could never so determine one common space for all, except through such objective substances; nor one common time for all, except through such objective causes; and that we do determine space to be one space in common for all, and time to be one time in common for all, is abundant proof that the substances and causes are the same to all, and thus proof for a real objective world, giving its own changes as the occasion for a common experience and a common history of nature.

With this objective world of changing events, any one may make his progress and regress down and up the series, and he will be thinking the same nature of things and possessing the same space and time in common with all others that may follow out these connected judgments. The logical understanding will here find its connecting agency unhindered up and down the series of events in nature, and feel no constraint nor imprisonment in the universe it traverses, and can never need to inquire for an infinite beyond its fur-
Limits of Religious Thought Adjusted.

If, then, man had no higher functions than the sense and the logical understanding, he could have nothing to do with the infinite or the absolute. The sense may never go beyond its own constructions, nor the understanding beyond its own connections, and we could never want nor suppose anything beyond the flow of conditioned successions. A God and immortality, religion and faith, would be words and thoughts as unmeaning and irrelevant to us as to the animals. Our psychology would be only the sensuous physiology of the brute. That man needs a God, and yearns for faith in his being and benevolence, is an abundant evidence that he has an intellectual capacity distinct from the sense and the understanding, and above them both.

The eye cannot see itself, nor determine from its own perceptions anything about its structure or its acts. That we can get and apply optical principles to vision is an evidence that we are more than merely sense percipients. That we can determine the processes of constructing in limits, and connecting qualities in things and in an order of experience, evinces that we are intelligent above and beyond all that sense, and any faculty of judging according to sense, can secure. We rise above the processes of the logical understanding, and see through them and over them; we subject them to our insight, and bring them within our comprehension; plain proof that we have a distinct and higher function for knowing; and this peculiar function we know, specifically and distinguishingly from all other intellectual faculties, as the reason.

Hamilton denies that the reason with Kant is anything radically different from the understanding, and affirms that "the idea in the reason is only the conception in the understanding sublimated into the inconceivable; reason only the
understanding which has overleaped itself." This is mainly true. With Kant, the understanding is the logical process passing through single syllogisms, and distributing through the minor in a conclusion what was before given in the major term. The reason is only the process from one syllogism to another, and a mere march through indefinite pro-syllogisms, to find a first, or the absolute, which it can never reach. It is really the demand for the absolute, unrecognized as the claim of the reason and only put as a regulative conception primitively in the human mind, and then the logical understanding sent on the vain chase up the endless ladder of pro-syllogisms to find it. The Kantian reason is no true apprehension of the Platonic reason, and has no insight nor comprehension. The true reason is that function by which we overlook and penetrate both the functions of conjoining in the sense and giving limits, and of connecting in the understanding and giving things and series of events, and thus it determines what is necessary to them in their principles, and thereby comprehends and expounds them. That we have this distinctive function capacitates us to be philosophers, and that we can philosophize about the infinite and the absolute capacitates us to be theologians. It is this part of our being only that calls for a God and wants faith in his government, and it is the work of this faculty alone that can answer and satisfy this call. Even a revelation from God can be addressed only to and received by this part of our being, and without it our Bibles were as well given to the brutes.

It is solely because the truths of the infinite and of the absolute have been kept from the reason, and degraded to the processes of the logical understanding, that they have been made to present such paradoxes and contradictions. The contained has been set to measuring the container, and the medium for connecting has been taken as the compass for comprehending, and it need not be surprising that such absurdities have followed, and that all forms of scepticism have grown bold. We would here, then, apply ourselves altogether to the use of this distinctive intellectual function, the comprehending reason.
The intellectual process of construction in the sense, would never suggest to itself the attempt to construct all of space into one, and all of time into one; this faculty is abundantly satisfied in that it has no hindrance to its constructions. But the insight and oversight of this process by the higher function of the reason, at once suggests the want of a common space and a common time for all constructing beings. How may all commune, in the common experience of things and events, in one space and one time? If the constructing sense be put to the task of answering, we can, by the reason, see at once that it must be, and why it must be, vain. The constructing act can be only in and for its own consciousness, and the spaces and times in which it makes its limits and forms can be only its own subjective spaces and times, and thus the merely sense-agent is as truly shut up to his own spaces and times as the mind that dreams. But this inseeing and overseeing function can at once determine, that if some permanent substance be given which may occasion all sense-constructions, in all sentient beings and organs, to describe its outlines, then all will have one common figure and one common point from which to go out and estimate bearing and direction; and thus all subjective spaces will stand in conformity with one and the same common space. And also, if this substance have its causal changes, then all will construct the same events in the same ordered successions, and all the subjective times will stand in conformity to the one common time of these successive changes. The common space and the common time, in which all the beings of sense participate, will come only in and by the universal constructions of those sensations which have been occasioned by the common substances and causes. Take away these permanent substances and their changes, and you doom every man to be shut in upon his own separate constructions, and to dream on alone; but place all where these permanent substances and changing causes may act in common upon their sensuous organism, and they at once commune in one space and one time. The one nature makes the one common space and time for all; and
their communion in this one space and time, and their participation of experience in one history, are their valid proofs for a real objective world. The reason only can attain this one common space and time, and show how they can so be without an error or absurdity; while, if the sense be put to this work, through its constructions, or the understanding through its connections, nothing but contradiction and delusion can follow. With this one space and one time in common to all men, and the one history of nature's ongoing, we are prepared to see the only remaining step that must be taken, to put us face to face with a self-consistent infinite and absolute Being.

There must be the clear idea of what is necessary, in order that a cause for such a nature and its one space and one time may be truly First Cause. The understanding-conception of a cause can never be a first cause; and the attempt to put the logical function of the understanding to the attainment of such an idea, would lead to all the self-contradictions already so fully noticed. This conception of cause always carries with it an inherent constitutional efficiency which gives its own nature to it, and makes it specifically what it is, and makes it also necessary that it should go out in its own order of development when occasion is given. It must go out into effect, and in one order of effects, according to its inherent nature. It can only give a development of its own constitution, and can put forth nothing new, but such alone as it already possesses in itself. Here there can be no first; for, let us assume any cause we may as first, the very conception of the cause has already a constitution, a nature, an inherent characteristic of efficiency, which determines necessarily what must come from it. The very thought of it demands that another should have been there, and given to it its essential peculiarity. It is a cause already caused, and it would be a self-contradiction to speak of it as first cause.

The higher function of the reason takes this understanding, conception of cause, and subjects it to its own insight, and at once sees what is necessary that it may be first cause. The efficiency must have, in its essential being, the ideals or
archetypes of all possible existence, and in this the competency to go out in action, not merely in one way without an alternative, but in all possible ways. There must also be self-knowledge and self-estimate of intrinsic excellency of being, and thus an exact seeing that which is due to and worthy of itself; and in this the competency to decide, which of all possibles it behooves, for its own worthiness' sake, should be taken. In this we have self-hood, the mind's capability to stand self-separate and self-balanced, and originate acts from within its own being with no dependence on an outer and an other. It is taken out from all necessity and which has no alternative, and in its self-sufficiency is truly cause in liberty. It has self-law and directory in the imperative that sounds through its whole being for his glory's sake, and is thus a personal cause. And now, when we recognize this personal Being, in his proper position as Creator and Governor, we shall also see that he is truly infinite and truly absolute.

In his own being, there is nothing for organic impression, and thus nothing for sense-construction, which may give one common space from the same substance; and also nothing for understanding-connections, which may give one common time from the same order of cause and events. He has truly nothing for sense and logical understanding, and is thus wholly independent of space, time, and nature. Place, period, and change are wholly irrelevant and insignificant words as applied to him. These can have no meaning except as an objective nature is. From what he sees his own glory or moral worthiness requires, and in accordance with that archetypal pattern which is determined for his glory's sake, he puts forth such efficient action as shall fix a force permanent and substantial, and thus making an existence in what else was an utter void. Such existing substantial force gives, at once, occasion for impressing organic senses, and introducing sense-constructions, and in the ongoing changes introducing also understanding-connections. A common space and time and history of events are all given in it. The sense and the understanding functions may here
go to their work, and find all their respective objects. Per­ception and thinking in judgments may here begin. A crea­tor, and a cosmos other than its creator, have both a real being. Here is the place for determining a true and com­plete rational cosmology; and when the scientific world shall be ready to study it thoroughly, and appreciate it hon­estly, such true and complete rational cosmology is already substantially and intelligibly furnished to their hands.

Put, now, the contemplating mind which is to study this creator and his works, within the cosmos he has created. In his search for the creator he must go out of, and get beyond, the cosmos in which he lives. If he set the logical understanding to work within, he will find all the contradic­tions, in going through space and time for the infinite and the absolute, which have been so fully exposed by Hamilton and Mansel. He will be preposterously striving to compre­hend nature, and nature's space and time, by carrying his measures up and down within nature and its space and time, and this work the comprehending reason can beforehand see must be absurdity and emptiness. But instead of this connecting process within nature, he takes the process for comprehending nature within the supernatural. He may begin in nature, and he looks for that which did not come from nature, but which must have been put within it. A miraculous counteraction of nature; a geological testimony of some new organic species originating in and not from nature; and the working of moral agency which can resist and go against the current of nature; all these may be sources for determining a beginning within nature, and proving the being of a causality which does not belong to nature; and which, by the harmony of the new introduced events with nature, proves, also, itself to be the author both of the new events and nature. In these originations within nature the reason sees the plain footprints of the Deity, and at once rises to the contemplation of a personal Jehovah, above and independent of the works of his hand in nature. He knows him to be truly infinite, for he is at once out of nature's space and nature's time, and can be limited by
Neither. As the maker of nature, he gave both nature's space and nature's time to be. He knows him also to be absolute, for he originated from himself those primal forces in which nature's substances began, and by which nature's causes and events commenced their flow. Nature's places and periods are wholly irrelevant to him, who determined them, in the bringing of nature itself to stand out in the void where nothing, not even the one common space and time, yet was. The reason, thus, overlooks both nature and nature's space and time, and finds the independent God, who has made them all to be. His infinity and absoluteness are without contradiction or absurdity, and reduce themselves to no negations by abstracting the conceivable from them, for he positively stands unbounded by any spacial and temporal limits, and unconditioned by any of nature's substances and causes. Here is left no room for scepticism, for there is here no conflicting thought. There is no place for pantheism, for a personal creator is found, and the cosmos is an origination from his agency, and not the mere development of God himself into another mode of being. Atheism also is wholly excluded, for a personal God, creator and governor, infinite and absolute, has been fully recognized.

In the presence of this Deity there is awakened the feeling of humility as a dependent creature, and of self-debasement as a sinner, which is consciously reasonable and salutary. But that factitious humility, urged upon us under the assumption of our weakness and limitation of faculties, but which is really the self-contradiction of the intellect, and the demand for faith which can be only credulity and superstition in such a mind, can never be morally wholesome. It is a feeling that irritates and corrodes the spirit, and sours the disposition. True humility before the true God covers the face in reverence and adoration, and to the sinner secures contrition and confession, and inspires hope and praise.

With this self-consistent and clear idea of God, we can also see that his revelation of himself, either by his works or his inspired word, can find no hindrance from the intellect.
nor obstacles from conflicting thought to the full exercise of an enlightened and intelligent faith. It is manifestly our highest worthiness and blessedness to believe, obey and trust the accredited messages of such a God, for nothing tends to weaken but all we know tends to strengthen our confidence. Our thought and our faith accord with and reciprocally sustain each other.

And the true limits of religious thought are also fully found and fairly adjusted. We know how, completely, to correct the antinomies of the sense and the understanding, and to put their processes of constructing and connecting on each hand, that they may guide us through and out of nature’s conditions, and the common space and time of nature, to the plainly apprehended infinite and absolute above them. Here the self-existent Jehovah dwells, limitless and relationless, so far as it regards all the measures and changes of nature. The phenomenal and the logical have no applicability to him, and only the inner principles of the rational direct his counsels. “He is a Spirit, and those who worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.”

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ARTICLE IV.

THE TWOFOLD LIFE OF JESUS CHRIST.

BY REV. J. T. TUCKER, HOLLISTON, MASS.

A complete human culture requires the true embodiment of the two great forms or modes of life to which we give the names of Godhead and Manhood. These are everywhere inseparably intertwined in moral and spiritual relations; and no advance can be made in fulfilling the designs of a rational existence except on the basis of a just understanding of what God is and man should be. The ideal