ARTICLE I.

DR. HICKOK'S PHILOSOPHY.

There is given, below, a list of Dr. Hickok's works, in the order of their publication. Unless we incorrectly estimate their intrinsic worth, they represent the highest attainments in speculative thought which the American mind has yet reached; and if we are not mistaken respecting the increasing force of their influence, they promise to found a school of philosophy with a prominent and permanent place in the history of the world's speculation. But that it may appear whether this is an undue judgment, we propose to furnish a summary of their leading principles. To obtain the clearest view and arrive at the most satisfactory decision

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*Empirical Psychology*; or the Human Mind as given in Consciousness. By the same. Second edition. Same publishers. 1857.

Dr. Hickok’s Philosophy.

respecting them, we need to pass each work in review, in an order somewhat different from that of its publication.

The Empirical Psychology should be first noticed. This is the science of the human mind as given in consciousness. It is a science, because it presents us as objects of knowledge certain truths in an orderly classification; it is an empirical science, because these truths are the facts furnished by experience and observation; it is not a pure and exhaustive science, because the principles, whereby alone the facts can be rationally expounded, neither experience nor observation can give. The field of empirical psychology is thus limited altogether to the developed facts of mind. The developing principles can have no place nor be recognized here except as the actual exercises and convictions which they induce, may become phenomena within the light of consciousness.

In treating of the functions of the mind, there is one fact so immediately before us, and of such intimate relations to every mental exercise, that it claims our first attention. The mind, though supernatural, is mysteriously linked with the natural world. It is tabernacled in the flesh, possessing instincts, appetites, and emotions in perfect keeping with a fleshly or animal nature, yet never losing that rational endowment wherewith it is not only above nature but radically different from anything that the animal is, or can become. Where the point of union is, or in what it consists, we need not inquire; but that it is something which essentially modifies every exercise of the mind, is an all important fact for our psychology.

The mind united with the body is constantly receiving impressions and modifications from nature. The variations of climate and soil, the influence of food and dress and employment, habits of in-door confinement or outward exposure, and the social conditions in which man is placed, all induce peculiar varieties of mental experience. These influences are so great that mankind in different parts of the globe are not only separate in space, but have important distinctions in character. Thus we have different races of men, where the permanent type of humanity has assumed
phases greatly and permanently modified by the outward forces working upon it. The agencies which have thus divided the human family, together with the influence exerted upon each other by these divisions themselves, need to be clearly apprehended, that the mental phenomena induced by them may be rightly understood. Again, the particular bodily organization influences the individual mind. The difference of sex, the different prominence or force of the nervous, the muscular or the digestive organizations inducing the differences of temperament, will secure an equally prominent difference of character. Bodily weakness, as immaturity of development in childhood and youth, sickness and sleep, as well as the reaction of body and mind upon each other, are constantly varying the phenomena of mind, and must be taken into account in the solution of some of the most important problems of mental experience. These points are, therefore, the first topics of discussion in Dr. Hickok's *Empirical Psychology*.

Looking at the mind as thus connected with nature, and inquiring into its facts, there are certain truths which meet us at the threshold. While the mind itself does not appear in consciousness, its permanent existence and unchanged identity are facts which consciousness clearly reveals. The mind is, and though experience cannot affirm what it is, it declares it to be something more than an exercise or an idea. The exercises of the mind arise and depart; ideas come and go, but the mind remains a perpetual bond and receptacle, wherein all its exercises and ideas are connected and contained. Through all changes it abides the same, itself superior to every change. Again, mind is essentially self-active. Though bound to nature, and modified in so important a degree by this connection, yet consciousness testifies that its agency is properly its own. It originates its own exercises. If outward circumstances are the occasion of these, the mind is their originating cause. If in any case influences may be imposed upon it, whereby the mind undergoes changes in which itself is merely passive, it has still a capacity to act from its own causality and can spontaneously originate its
own changes. Still further, the mind is able to separate itself from all its objects. Besides the facts of its own permanent and self-active existence, it knows that something other than itself is, and that there is a separating line between them.

But these "General Facts" do not give us the mind at work. Preceding and conditioning all self-conscious activity, there must also be what Dr. H. calls "Primitive Facts of Mind." These are sensation, consciousness, and the mind's spontaneous production of itself into the general states preparatory to its specific activity. The mind as self-active produces itself into several different general states, each of which becomes a capacity for specific single exercises. These general states, are three: the intellectual, the sentient, and the voluntary. As every mental exercise may originate in one or another of these general states, and may thus be classified as an act of knowing, feeling, or willing, we have here given to the one mind, the three leading and comprehensive functions of the Intellect, the Susceptibility and the Will.

The Intellect has three distinct modes of knowing. These are the Sense, the Understanding, and the Reason; terms more precise and comprehensive, and hence better fitted than any others in use to express the facts of an intellectual agency. As each of these functions differs from each other in kind, so the objects attained by one can never be interchanged and must never be confounded with those cognized by another.

The Sense is more than sensation. The latter is simply the affection of the bodily organism, or the change therein which the action of some object induces. It is thus not a knowing, but merely a receptivity for something to be known. To know what is given in sensation, there must be some peculiar function, which should be recognized in empirical psychology as a distinct operation of the intellect. This is done by calling it Sense, which is, thus, the faculty for attaining cognitions through sensation. But as the bodily organism receives impressions from external objects,
so the mind affects itself in all its varieties of internal action. And as the affection, in a bodily organ, is an occasion for perceiving a color, a sound, or a smell, so it may be said that these affections in the mind furnish the intellect its proper means or occasion for the perception of a thought, an emotion, or a volition. The sense thus may be distinguished as external or internal, whereby respectively the phenomena of the outer and the exercises of the inner world become known.

All the objects of sense are directly known. The mind immediately beholds them. They are thus real and known in their reality. Yet are they only the qualities of things, not the things themselves. Though the appearance is real, nothing is known to the sense but that which appears. There is no similarity of a color and fragrance, or of a thought and emotion, which could suggest to the sense that the two might be connected in one. The objects of the sense are all single and separate and fleeting. They come and go, one after or with another, but there is nothing in any number which can bind them in unity, and nothing in any one which can perpetuate itself in an unvarying sameness. No thought or emotion can stay in the consciousness for any two moments the same; and no affection in the bodily organ can constitute a perpetual sensation without a perpetual repetition.

But it is a fact of consciousness that we know more than this. Phenomena and events are known in their connections. The fragrance and the color belong to the one rose. The thought and the emotion arise from the one mind. The phenomenon or exercise, though perpetually repeated, has a perpetually remaining ground. Though this never appears, it is known to be; and the mind which has this higher cognition needs, in order to attain it, some higher function of the Intellect, radically different from the Sense. This is given in the Understanding. This faculty connects, into their permanent substances or causes, the separate and fleeting objects of the sense. It is properly an understanding (substan, standing-under), in that it furnishes a substantial sup-
port to qualities and events otherwise groundless. While the object of the sense is a mere aggregation, that of the understanding is an inherent coalition; while in the sense the object appears, in the understanding it is thought; while the sense perceives, the understanding judges. To carry out this work of connecting or judging, especially in the logical process that dispenses with all objects of sense and uses only the pure understanding, we need the use of various subordinate intellectual functions. Thus we have the Imagination, Memory, Conception, Association of ideas, Judgment, and the Faculty of logical inference, all of which are so many distinct modes wherein the understanding exercises its peculiar agency.

But there is a field of knowledge which the sense cannot enter nor the understanding survey. The very exercise of the understanding in connecting, ignores everything which shall comprehend. The qualities cognized by the sense are bound up, by the understanding, in their substances and causes, which it also, in turn, binds up together into one nature or universe. The understanding can know nothing above or free from the connections of nature. All its cognitions are but links in the endless succession, and it plods its weary way without ever attaining a first or a last wherein it can rest. While all the qualities for the sense must have their ground for the understanding; yet this ground is, to the latter, only something sufficient to explain the qualities, and needs also to be explained by something other than itself. The understanding can see in the soul only an assumed cause for its exercises, and in God only the soul of the world.

But the intellect calmly and clearly denies this limitation of its knowledge. It knows something free and divine, which is not merely in nature, but above it; which does not simply connect the world, but comprehends it; which does not need anything to stand beneath it, but is as self-supporting as it is all-embracing. The function of the intellect for attaining this knowledge is the Reason. This faculty, by an immediate insight, sees absolute and eternal principles,
and comprehends nature in the necessary laws which the principles determine. It is the organ for Art, Philosophy, Ethics, and Theology, not one of which could be a possible object of knowledge unless the intellect were gifted with some faculty higher and different in kind from either the sense or the understanding. Since these three functions are sufficient to account for all the facts of knowing, they comprise the full power of the intellect.

The susceptibility differs as radically from the intellect as feeling differs from knowing. Yet, like the intellect, it exercises itself in various modes, each of which differs in kind from the others. There are, first, the feelings which man has in common with the brute. Certain instincts, appetites, and natural affections, though greatly modified in the human susceptibility, are yet the same in kind with those which the animal possesses. Such are the instinctive shrinking from pain, the appetite for food and drink, the love of the parent for the child, and many others. Since all these grow out of our animal constitution, they may be appropriately referred to the Animal susceptibility. But the objects known by the reason, awaken peculiar feelings in which no animal can participate. As the animal has no endowment wherewith it can rationally know, so it cannot commune with man in any rational emotion. The beautiful, the true, and the right or good, have their absolute being in the reason, and the emotions they inspire are for rational beings alone. Such feelings can be appropriately referred to none other than to a Rational susceptibility. All the feelings, thus classified, belong to the constitution of man as animal or rational. He has them because he is made to have them from the original structure of his being. But there are others which do not inhere in any constitutional endowment, but belong only to the spiritual disposition which the rational being assumes. The intuition of the right will carry the feeling of obligation to the good and the bad man alike, simply because each is thus constituted; and yet how exactly opposite the love and the hatred with which it is also accompanied in either case, and which is not at all deter-
mined by the rational constitution, but altogether by the free disposition. An entirely distinct kind of feelings must thus be recognized, belonging, not to the rational spirit as directly beholding absolute truth, but as consciously disposed towards some end. The function of the mind exercised in these feelings may be appropriately named the Spiritual susceptibility. An objection⁠¹ that these feelings are not found in the nature of the being, and ought not therefore to be classified under a distinct and separate division, is futile; for the spirit is itself supernatural, and hence must have experiences of feeling that are not constitutionally inherent, and are therefore forever distinct in kind from that which flows either from an animal or rational constitution. When a man, as a rational spirit, has disposed his spirit towards some end, he shall possess a new susceptibility for feeling, which can in no other way be attained; and as all men have such disposings, an empirical psychology must note and carefully distinguish the feelings which ensue. These prove to be among the most important and controlling in all human experience. They are none other than the feelings of the heart as distinct from those of the constitution. That such a susceptibility has not been accurately distinguished and classified, has vitiated, and must not only leave incomplete, but render incorrect, all psychological systems in which the analysis has been neglected.

With an intellect to know and a susceptibility to feel, we have the occasion given to execute in the attainment of ends. This introduces the third grand function of the human mind. The impulses of instinct and appetite may move towards specific ends, and, when under such motives one end is taken rather than another, the source of the executive act may be termed will. But if there be nothing but the impulses of appetite to prompt, and nothing but the end of happiness to be sought, the will can have no alternative in kind to its execution, and the whole is as really within the necessity of nature as any series of nature’s causes and

¹ N. A, Review, April 1857, p. 369.
effects. Where the choice is only between degrees of happiness, there is no choice, but the highest degree must necessarily be taken. The brute will is as truly without an alterum as any mechanical power. But this is not so with man. He has the endowment of a rational spirit which can see what is worthy of itself as something altogether different in kind from the demands of animal impulse. With this capability to see what is due to his own excellency of being, there is in man the motive to secure it for his own worthiness' sake in the sight of himself and of other men and of God. This places within himself a counter-check to nature; it gives him an alternative in kind to all natural gratification, and though all of nature should be on one side and for eternity, man has in this, that which can take the other side and which enables him to gain and keep the worthiness and renounce and despise the happiness. Herein is a will in liberty and only in the possession of such an alternative in kind is there any conception of personality or any place for responsibility. The human will is thus in a true sense a capacity for election or choice. It places man above all animal and physical causes, and makes him as truly a person and an agent in liberty as an angel or as God.

The will is thus separate in kind from the intellect and the susceptibility. Though it cannot be said to have any distinct functions, there may be permanent distinctions in the forms of its working and the products it secures. Thus we have "immanent preferences" or inward choices that were never intended to be put into overt action; a "governing purpose," or that for which all subordinate volitions are exercised, and "desultory volitions" or such as come in, and for a period turn aside from, without renouncing the governing purpose. All these have responsibility; the first because they lie within the real character or disposition; the second because as it is, so is the character; and the third, because if against a good purpose, they show a deficiency of energy for the good, and if against a wicked purpose, they are but an action in mere constitutional humanity.

The end for which the mind exists is the perfection of its
own being and working, and thus the securing its own and
its Maker's approbation. The end of the animal nature is
happiness; the end of the spirit is spiritual worthiness or hol-
iness; and the end of man as both animal and spiritual is to
keep happiness always subordinate to holiness. The last
general division of Dr. H.'s *Empirical Psychology* is occu-
pied with the inquiry concerning the capability of the human
mind to attain this end. After considering the whole sub-
ject of power, through all theories of cause and effect, the
conceptions of necessity and contingency, and natural and
moral inability, the conclusion is clearly sustained that the
human mind is naturally competent and morally impotent
to attain perfectly its end in the worthiness or dignity of its
own character.

In preparing this work, Dr. Hickok evidently did not aim
to furnish a series of essays upon Memory, Imagination,
Association, Judgment, etc., wherein every function of the
mind should be treated singly according to its comparative
importance and use in human experience. Had this been
his object, we should have expected a very different book
from the one before us. His plan seems rather to have been to
discriminate each fact of consciousness so clearly from every
other that it shall stand out distinct in its own identity, and
at the same time to reveal each in so harmonious a connec-
tion with all the rest that the vital unity of the mind's whole
experience should be ever before us. It is equally the merit
of the book that it has undertaken no more and accom-
plished no less than this. Anything narrower would seem
obviously defective, while a wider discussion of the different
mental functions, however interesting and valuable for other
purposes, would be not only needless but an actual incum-
brance in an introduction to the study of the human mind.
Some prominent facts, as language and the enjoyment of
the ludicrous, Dr. H. does not specifically notice. This is
an omission which may profitably be supplied in future edi-
tions. Such a want, however, is not a serious defect, for the
clear classification of mental phenomena here established is
sufficient to teach the careful student how to identify and
how to connect these and all other facts which his consciousness reveals.

The attainments in Psychology prepare us for the study of Moral Science. What is the highest good for man? What are his rights and duties? These questions, which lie at the basis of ethics, cannot be satisfactorily answered without some accurate and profound knowledge of the human mind. Inextricable confusion shall ever prevail in ethical discussions where the clear distinction between the natural and the spiritual in man is not seen and followed. There can be no morality unless grounded in what is rational or spiritual. However earnestly the attempt be made to limit its particular province and find its ultimate ground in a nature whereof man and the animal alike participate, every such effort must everywhere and always be ineffectual. If man were only an animal of a higher type, and more refined degree than the brutes around him, he could attain no better good than the gratification of his sentient wants, and contemplate no other end than the happiness which such a gratification should bring. The supreme law which should then give him all his rights and mark out for him all his duties, should be the greatest amount of happiness to be gained for himself or for the whole of which he is a part. But can the validity and authority of such a law be urged? Not to dwell here upon the obvious and common objection that it makes virtue and vice mere matters of expediency, and resolves good and evil into a simple question of profit and loss, there is a profounder difficulty relating to the very basis on which such a law of prudence must rest. For if the question be asked: why this law? or in what ground does it inhere? no satisfactory answer can be given. The law of prudence can have no absolute principle. The happiness to which it directs must vary according to the constitution of the sentient nature which is to receive it, and this can be varied by infinite power to an infinite extent. Such a rule is therefore completely the product of power, and might makes all the right that it can reveal. A system of ethics derived from it can be only an economy for a par-
ticular class of constitutional beings, and must necessarily vary with the different subjects and different natures for which it is made. If they are so constituted as to be the most happy themselves in conferring happiness upon others, then benevolence should be the rule, but still only as prudential, and binding the subject only because he found himself in the midst of such a constituted nature of things. A code of morals resting upon such a ground is at the best only a calculation of expediencies, and the practice of virtue in its purest form is only the struggle after happiness as the highest good that can be attained. A brute does nothing less than this, and man if only animal can do nothing more.

But virtue, as its etymology imports, has a worth which belongs to itself, distinct from the advantages which it secures. Not only the profoundest thinkers of the race from Plato onwards, but the race itself in its common consciousness has recognized a world-wide difference between what is right and what is expedient. There is a good of moral worthiness which is of wholly another kind than sentient happiness, a good which is absolutely sumnum bonum, and with which no conceivable application of power can bring any other good in competition. But the knowledge of this as well as its attainment belongs wholly to what is spiritual. While a true psychology will reveal man's spiritual or supernatural endowment, a valid system of ethics will be grounded wholly within this higher sphere. Nothing has an intrinsic worth save what is spiritual; and nothing other than this can give rights and duties absolutely inalienable and inflexible. To be a spirit is to be a moral being, and to do

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1 "Virtue is independent of the desire of happiness, because, as Plato first remarked and Cicero repeated from him: The gods are not called good because they are happy, but they are happy because they are good. It is still more absurd to estimate virtue as mere utility, since it cannot receive its equivalent from any, not even a divine reward. Moreover, why should God reward virtue if it be not in itself good and worthy of desire? In this case He has delight in virtue only because He rewards it! And we, on the other hand, regard Him as worthy of adoration only because He arbitrarily dispenses reward and punishment!" — Jacobi, von den Göttlichen Dingen.
that and that only which is due to spiritual excellency, is the
supreme rule for all moral conduct. To be worthy of moral
approbation in his own sight and in the eye of every spirit,
is man's supreme good. To fulfil the claims which the con-
sscious demand of his own inherent dignity imposes, is his
first and last and highest duty. Here is a rule which is
moral and not prudential. It can urge its claims, if neces-
sary, in the face of all prudence, and demand for its own
sake that virtue be sought even if no other good should fol-
low. If the soul were to seek to fulfil such a claim for the
sake of some ulterior end, as though it would be holy, because
and in order that it might thus be happy, the very claim, that
holiness be sought as an end in itself, and not as a means to
anything further, would be violated and the soul, instead of
gaining its moral approbation, would be consciously de-
graded. Here is an absolute rule for the whole spiritual
world. It does not change with changing circumstances.
It is not subjected to diminution or increase of weight or
authority by aught which could come in conflict with, or be
added to itself. No power can make or modify it, for it
must hold authority over all power. The Maker of man
will find His rule for making and governing, in this same
consideration of His own intrinsic dignity and glory.

This absolute rule Dr. H. applies to all voluntary action,
and with it surveys the whole field of moral ends and uses.
The "System of Moral Science" thus evolved is clear and
full, but does not require a particular representation here.
The great strength of the work lies in this attainment of the
absolute and ultimate rule of right, and its chief beauty con-
sists in the clear and constant application of this fundamen-
tal law to every human relation. The objections¹ to the
rule, that it analyzes right into other elements simpler than
itself, that it gives man an original merit, and that it makes
the actual subjective feeling the sole test of right, have
already been ably and conclusively answered,² and need no
further notice.

² Presbyterian Quarterly, Dec. 1855.
The Empirical Psychology and the Moral Science are designed as text-books in academies and colleges, and, for teaching how the mental facts given in consciousness stand together and make a responsible agent, and how an absolute principle of right as a universal rule builds up a complete system of ethics, they contain what is needed and leave little else to be desired. They are no compilations of scattered facts and opinions, gleaned from different sources and held together only by some external bond of connection, but are the original embodiment of one living thought which pervades them both, and gives to each a true and vital unity. As text-books they are singularly adapted to quicken the student and give him mental breadth and vigor.

The Rational Psychology is in a higher field, and designed for a higher purpose. It aims at the effectual overthrow of all philosophical scepticism. Coinciding in some particulars with the Critick of pure Reason,—as every exhaustive treatment of the subject must do—it differs totally from that work in its grand result. While Kant affirmed that the peculiar problems of metaphysics lie outside the province of philosophical knowledge, and that thus the being of God, the soul, and the universe could never be positively proved, Dr. Hickok maintains exactly the contrary and presents a demonstration that these objects have a valid being and lie within the sphere of true knowledge. To show the success of this demonstration would require us to repeat the cardinal ideas of the Rational Psychology, but as this has already been done at considerable length and with great clearness in these pages,3 we may now omit it. For the same reason an extended notice of the work is not here needed. It is sufficient to remark that the groundwork of the whole discussion, which also gives to the philosophy its method, is the attainment of the idea how an intellectual agency must work in order to the various forms of knowing, and then the gathering of the facts of knowing in order to see that their actual law fully corresponds to this necessary

3 Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan. and April, 1851.
idea. The three forms of knowing, are the sense, the understanding, and the reason, and in each of these the necessary idea and the actual law are found in exact accordance. This rational determination of every intellectual process of knowing gives us a complete psychology whereby we come to the full knowledge of the knowing agent, and gain a position for determining the validity of all that is known and thus for excluding scepticism from the entire field of human speculation.

As the *Rational Psychology* stands at the head of Dr. H's productions in the order of their publication, so it lies at the basis of them all, in the establishment of the principles which have entered into the structure of each. The foundation and germ of all Dr Hickok's philosophy are seen in the third part of this book. It is here that he establishes the doctrine of the Reason, the highest faculty of the soul, whereby man comprehends himself and nature. In this comprehending power, there is the grand distinction between nature and the supernatural, and the infallible declaration of man's freedom, morality, and responsibility. It lies in the very being of Reason that there is a soul, a God and immortality.

There could hardly be a grander undertaking than that which the *Rational Cosmology* proposes to accomplish. It aims at the instauration of a new and true science of universal nature. Experience and observation can never furnish a pure and satisfying science. Great as are the merits of the inductive philosophy, and readily conceded as these should be, still, there belongs to it a two-fold and radical deficiency. On the one hand it has nothing to quiet the scepticism that may ever attach to any induction of the whole, where all the parts have not been attained, and on the other, its very induction cannot rationally expound the facts from which it is drawn, but is only another statement of them in a more general form. Thus, e. g. it is no rational explanation of the fall of an apple, to say that it follows a law which the tides and the planets likewise obey, for this is only a comprehensive affirmation respecting the whole of what had been
observed respecting the part, while it explains neither the part nor the whole. The connection of the terrestrial and celestial phenomena, thus discovered, is indeed of vast interest, yet this does not answer the inquiry of the rational mind, which still asks, not simply for the fact of such a connection but for the living principle which has made it so. If it be said, as the ultimate result to which science can reach, that the law of gravity means simply the uniform way in which God acts, and that a similar statement must be made for every law of nature, this is simply the conception of a Deus ex machina, which only removes the difficulty one step further, but does not destroy it. This introduction of the Deity to cut the knot which we could not untie, is a fact just as barren of all rational significance as the one we had before, and our question is still unanswered. When such a question becomes too pressing, it is very easy to try to evade it, by talking, on the one hand of the weakness of the human powers, as though it were presumptuous to push their inquiries so far; and, on the other, of the glory of experimental science, as though its results could promise the solution of every problem, yet it is not easy to quiet that rational seeking, which no greatness of human infirmity can stifle, and no attainments of experimental knowledge can satisfy. Reason can only rest in what is rational, but as the generalizations of the inductive philosophy approach no nearer a truly rational ground than do the particulars which they propose to explain, the human mind cannot desist from pushing its inquiries for something beyond.

It is the object of the Rational Cosmology to answer these inquiries by gaining the ultimate position for all science and philosophy. But what is this position? Obviously a sufficient explanation for the facts of nature must be found in something higher than the facts themselves. Facts cannot explain each other. Nature cannot expound itself. The light which shall make intelligible that which is made, can only come from that which is unmade. In other words, a true and satisfying science shall find a meaning for every fact in some rational principle, and a ground for all facts in
a rational author. While it is obvious that nothing but this could ever perfectly satisfy the inquiring mind, it is equally manifest that in this every question should be fully answered. The highest demands of the reason should rest in what is supremely reasonable. Can we then attain such a position? This is affirmed in the *Rational Cosmology*, and the position itself is not only sought, but is, we are confident, actually reached.

The introduction shows that no fact can be explained, except as determined through some rational principle, and then in a rapid review of the leading philosophic systems of the past, it is seen how completely the most of them have neglected this truth, and how from their point of view, no theology nor philosophy is really possible. "It is a marvel and a reproach" says the author in a vigorous passage, "that the world's philosophies are, to-day, all radically materialistic; holding all being as fact, or constitutionally natured; and are thus necessarily, in the end, Atheistic or Pantheistic. Seen from a comprehensive point of vision, they invariably and inevitably lead logically out to a complete exclusion of an absolute, personal, supernatural being from human knowledge and even from human conception. The reason of universal humanity calls for and acknowledges, an unbegun, unmade and supernatural Beginner, Maker, and Finisher of all that has a nature; and the Christian heart worships a Jehovah, whose sovereignty and authority lie underived and solely in the absolute behest of His own reason; while all speculative philosophy has come to ignore and deny every conception which cannot be brought within the connections of the logical understanding and subjected to the determinations of some constitutional nature. The conception of a Being who may begin from Himself, and create objectively to Himself, without finding Himself caused to do so by any previous conditioning, seems utterly to have fallen out of all philosophical intelligence. Where is the philosophy, which can logically from its method, present a God to our acceptance as a *causa causans*, without being thoroughly a *causa causata? Who
seems to feel any shock at the absurdity and impiety of talking about the nature of God and the nature of the Divine Will, as if the awful prerogatives of the supernatural could be brought and bound within the conditions of the natural? Our religious consciousness is clear and complete for an absolutely supernatural; our philosophic consciousness is, dogmatically or in its own supineness, trained to the restrictions of a relatively conditioned nature of things. It is among the strongest evidences of the deep and permanent working of the immortal reason within the soul, that notwithstanding the wide-spread prevalence of a philosophy everywhere sinking the Deity to a fact, there is yet the growing power of a religion which worships Him as an unmade Spirit, in spirit and in truth. How much more rapidly may the knowledge and the worship of the true God spread, when philosophy herself shall become converted to, and baptized in, a Gospel theism!" "What then we need for a truly rational theology is the conception and complete recognition of an absolutely supernatural Being—a God for the rational soul, and not conditioned to the physical necessities of the logical understanding. . . . Such theology may then be safely laid as the starting point for a true rational cosmology, and in which may be embodied a thoroughly comprehensive and conclusive philosophy."\(^1\)

As thus a clear idea of an absolute Creator and Governor is essential for any intelligent approach to a rational cosmology, the first chapter of the work is occupied with this. It is an independent demonstration of what was accomplished in a different form in the third part of the Rational Psychology. With a searching scrutiny, every attempt that has been or can be made to gain a conception of the Absolute, is here examined. All the efforts of the sense or the understanding, in this direction, are shown to be necessarily futile. The nature of the case à priori determines that "to both the functions of the sense and the discursive understanding, all attempts towards the conception of an Abso-

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\(^1\) Rational Cosmology, pp. 52, 53.
lute involve an absurdity and must ever rest under an utter impossibility, while the reason is directly competent to state and expound the whole problem. The rational conception of the Absolute is that of a self-existent and self-determined Deity, who is absolved from all obligations to anything without Himself, and who is and was and is to come complete in His own fulness. Such a Being is able to create, not from the craving of a want, nor from the control of a necessity, but in pure freedom and out of regard for His righteous glory. While the understanding asks perpetually for some new link in its chain of endless successions, and traces up its train of causes, till it requires a cause for the Creator as truly as for creation, reason calmly rests in the knowledge of One who borrows no leave to be, nor to act, but who is and who works from His own self originating and self determining completeness. No explanation of nature will be satisfactory which does not recognize such a Being as its Absolute Originator, who, while the eyes of all wait upon Him in complete dependence, is ever supreme, and independent of all that is made.

Having attained this idea of the Creator, we are prepared to seek for that of creation itself. Can we gain this? In other words, is it possible for us to know how God has created the universe? Let us not be appalled by the grandeur of the undertaking, but reverently endeavor to know if He who has given us a reason that seeks, has not also endowed us with a power that shall find. The question is: how shall such a Being as we have conceived the Creator to be, make a world that shall have an objective and real existence in space and time? If we look at His own pure activity, we can see nothing in its simple exercise that can ever determine space or time. There can be no up nor down, no here nor there, no now nor then, except in reference to some point or limit through which all the relations of space and time must first be determined. But our conception of the Creator excludes all such points or limits from Him. To

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1 Rational Cosmology, p. 58.
make it otherwise, would be to bring Him into nature, and give to our philosophy, again, only a Deity who is deprived of His absolute being and throne. Is there, then, any conceivable way that there should be a creation in space and time, except as the pure spiritual activity of the Creator should be limited by Himself. Whether or not we can conceive of this, yet must we admit that in truth it has been done, unless creation be infinite. Let us then closely fix the eye upon this limitation, and see if it do not contain the solution we seek.

To make the conception more clear, let the simple activity of the Creator be considered as two-fold. The point is thus more readily apprehended, but is in no wise different. Let there be conceived two spiritual activities meeting each other in a direct antagonism. Each shall thus limit the other, and their meeting shall constitute a point of mutual resistance. This point, if clearly apprehended, is seen to be something fixed. As the activities which have caused it continue, other points gather around it as a centre, and may be determined in their positions by their relations to it. We can now speak of space and time; for, while every point that shall be generated by the antagonisms, has its place in relation to this centre, every movement that shall occur among them has its period in reference to this beginning. We may now also speak of creation as a fact. God may thus be conceived to have made something objective to Himself, and which has a real being in space and time. But what is this something? Are we thus aided at all in our knowledge of the actual world? A clear view of what is thus far before us shall answer this question. The conception of spiritual activity limiting itself, or of two spiritual activities meeting in direct counteraction, is the true conception of force. A force is either a dynamic which pushes or pulls, or a static which holds itself at rest, involving in both cases counteraction, complex action, action and reaction. This, however, is not involved in, but is even contrary to the conception of a simple spiritual agency. Such an agency has no "where," that it might be conceived to pull from; nor
"there," that it might be conceived to pull to; nor any "here," in which it might be conceived to hold itself at rest. "It could be determined neither to any time nor place; for it has no constant, from whence the determination might begin nor where it might end."1 "It is only as it meets some opposing action, and encounters an antagonist, that we come to have the notion of force."2 "In neither of the two activities can there be the notion of force, but at the point of antagonism force is generated and one new thing comes from the synthesis of the two activities. . . . In this, position is taken, and there is more than the idea of being, which the simple activities each have; there is being standing out, an existence; being in re, reality, a thing. Let then, an indefinite number of such positions, contiguous to each other, be conceived as so taken and occupied, and a space will thereby be filled and holden; an aggregate force will maintain itself in a place; and a ground is given on which other things may rest. A substantial reality here exists. This antagonism may be conceived to be of any degree of intensity, and the substantial ground will hold its place with the same amount of persistency, and stand there permanent, impenetrable, and real. Nothing else may come into its place until it has itself been displaced. It is not inertia, but a vis inertia, a force resting against itself, and thus holding itself in place. It rests because it has intrinsically an equilibrating resistance."3

Such a force, thus originated, is matter in its simplest form. Matter is force, and not a mere dead something, into which forces are projected. Because, if we look closely, we shall see that this dead something, which fills out the ordinary sense conception of matter, must not only be forever unknown, but could never have a real existence. For how could it ever be known? Matter, in the common conception of it, could never make any impression upon an organ of sense. Such an impression must be from some efficiency; and it is this, and not the powerless matter, which

1 Rational Cosmology, p. 93.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. p. 94.
therefore becomes the object of perception and of knowledge. Neither could matter, as thus conceived, ever have a substantial existence. For, how could there be a substance, which yet has nothing that can stand under any quality? Or how could anything be said to exist, which has nothing that can stand out in any sense? If, then, we dismiss the ordinary conception and retain the notion of this efficiency, we shall find that such a force, which does all that matter is ever said to do, is matter itself. Matter is force, a definition to which we should also be led by a strict conformity to the etymology of the word.

But the question: how, where force is not, may it begin to be? has yet been only partially answered. "Force cannot come from utter emptiness. Nor is it now to be apprehended as produced from some antecedent force, and thus a propagation or production from some force already created. Forces may change their modes of manifestation indefinitely, and this will be but the progressive development or successive births and growths in nature itself; but we now want the conception of nature's origin."¹ "Take then the Idea of the Absolute, already attained, and within the pure spiritual agency of his being there is no force; no antagonism or counter agency. Simple spiritual activity takes no positions, fills no space, puts within itself no limits from whence we can begin to determine places and periods. Spaces and times are here wholly irrelevant, and as there is no fixing in place and moving in successions, so nothing of impenetrable substances and series of physical causes can be thought as lying and working on in the Godhead. But in the knowledge he has of his own supreme excellency of being, there is an end in his own dignity and glory ever before him. He knows what is due to himself, and nothing can intervene that he should not be true to himself. He remaineth faithful, he cannot deny himself. He sees that it behooves him, as a right consciously due to himself, to manifest himself in creation. Under such ethical behest,
and not at all before the impulse of any constitutional craving, God arises to the work of creation, and becomes a beginner and author of an existence which before was not. Solely from the reason, and not from any want as if he too had a nature, God puts his simple activity in counter agency. He makes act meet and hold act, and in this originates an antagonism which constitutes force; a new thing, a something standing out for objective manifestation, and holding itself in position as a reality distinct from his own subjective simplicity. This force fixes itself in position; holds itself at rest; and so far from being inert, its very existence is a *vis inertiae*, or a force actively holding itself still. . . . The simplicity of the spiritual works on still undisturbed within the Deity, for no conditions of the material reach back of the point of counter agency. In matter is force, or the physical, and all its necessitated efficiencies work downward in their destined sequences, but above matter all is still spiritual, supernatural, the free ongoings of spontaneous activity directed upon the end of its own dignity or glory. . . . The creation of the material is from God; its genesis is in him; its perpetuation and sustentation is from the continual going out of his simple activity; but this material is not God, nor at all competent to rise, from its imposed conditions, into the place of the Absolute. The Logos, or Divine working word, is *in* the world; is the life and light of the world; and yet he was in the beginning with God, and ever is God, while the world is not he, but his creature."

It must be acknowledged that here is a complete science of what matter is, and how it began to be. There is no inquiry for the rational mind to make beyond this. Such a conception, if attained, is self-satisfying and self-sufficient. Reason can rest in the free originations and rational products of the Absolute Reason. It would extend our Article beyond proper limits, to follow out in detail the development of these principles, as exhibited in the work before us. We need only to say, in general, that to the antagonism

1 *Rational Cosmology*, pp. 100—102.
already mentioned, Dr. H. adds what he calls a diremptive force, which acts at the same centre, with energies that work away from each other, and by combining with, and loosening or dissolving the antagonism, give occasion for the indefinite composition and resolution of forces, and thus for the perpetual modification of matter. As thus conceived, matter has within itself a law of progress and development, and the insight of the reason is directed to discover, from the eternal idea of working forces, what are the facts and laws which these forces must determinately bring out. In the primal idea of matter there are seen the determination of the principles of motion, the ensphering of matter, the ratios of gravity, the rate of falling bodies, the action of magnetism, electricity, heat and light, chemistry, crystallization, world formations, and stellar distributions,—all inherently given in the primal introduction of the material forces, and necessarily coming out in their progressive development. The addition of an assimilative force, which works in matter through successive superinductions, as vegetable, animal, and human life, gives us the complete attainment of the rational principles of an orderly material universe and its organic inhabitants. Having attained these, Dr. H., in the third chapter of the Cosmology, finds that the actual laws of the universe, as given in the facts of experience, are just such as are necessarily determined in these eternal principles. Thus with the laws of material sphericity, gravity, magnetism, electricity, heat, light, chemical and crystalline activities, solar systems, cometary movements and the galactic and nebular phenomena. Very extended, striking, and convincing conformities of principle and law are shown everywhere to abound through nature.

An Appendix discloses a striking conformity of the results of the Rational Cosmology with the Mosaic account of creation, showing that the successive epochs in the Cosmological generation of the heavens and the earth are, necessarily, in the same order as the work accomplished in the days of the Bible history.

It is thus seen that this work reconstructs the basis of all
science, or rather it furnishes a basis where there was no sufficient foundation before. Instead of experimental research, tracing one fact to another in the endless and unsatisfactory generalizations of the inductive philosophy, we have here the clear insight of the reason directed to the rational author who has made all things, and to the rational principles according to which they were made. It would be high praise to say of a book with such an object, that it has not palpably failed. But every careful student will be able to affirm more than this. We are greatly mistaken, if there be not found in the book itself the clear evidence that the author has been successful in his grand aim. Even if it shall appear that some of the facts adduced in the third chapter, do not warrant his interpretation, this could only prove an error in some particular employment of his principles, while it would invalidate neither the principles themselves nor their general application.

If we now ask for the general point of view in Dr. Hickok's philosophy, from which the whole field embraced in these works should be contemplated, we find it in his distinct and peculiar conception of spiritual activity. The understanding has to do with nature, and is bound within the necessities and connections of nature's causes and effects. All philosophical investigation by this logical function alone, must be partial, blind, and wrong. It can have no eternal principles for its facts, no liberty for its agents, no immutable rule for its morality, and no absolute personal God for its theology. In all the works of Dr. Hickok, the insight of the reason, as distinct from the deductive or the inductive logic of the understanding, is constantly apparent; and instead of an empty detail of facts barren of all possible explanation except as they are made to stand in a dry arrangement in some logical order of classification, we have here a psychology, a morality, and a cosmology for spiritual being and apprehension. The *Empirical Psychology* puts its facts together and shows us an organic and living personal agency in the one rational spirit that works in and through them all. The *Moral Science* has its immutable imperative in the in-
trinsic excellency of spiritual being itself, and a perpetual motive in personal worthiness of character that should and may hold in check all prudential motives in mere happiness. The *Rational Psychology* details the necessary elements *à priori* for such spiritual personality, and puts them together in the Idea of responsible humanity, and the Idea of absolute Deity, while it also finds the proof of such human personality in the free originations of man, and the proofs of the absolute Deity in the manifest originations of nature and in nature. And the *Rational Cosmology* determines, from such spiritual activity, both how matter can begin to be, and how it can orderly go on in intelligent development to an ultimate consummation of universal nature in the rational ends and uses designed for it. It remains now for Dr. Hickok to give us a *theology* whose principles shall be as absolute as those which prevail in the works already before us.

That Dr. Hickok represents the highest and most permanent type of American thinking we have little doubt. The deeply seated feeling of an increasing number, that his writings satisfy a want not otherwise supplied; the comprehensive range of his principles, and the facility with which their application can be carried to the highest problems respecting nature, the soul and God, as well as the singular accordance which his philosophic direction is seen, as soon as it is pointed out, to have with the profoundest drift of American activity in other respects, embolden the prediction that, if American philosophy is to have a history, the course of its stream and the bulk of its waters can appear in no other channel than the one he has indicated.