ARTICLE I.
RHETORIC DETERMINED AND APPLIED.¹

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An orator has ceased speaking. The audience are just recovering themselves from the spell in which for hours they have been bound, and are now slowly and thoughtfully passing away from the place of concourse. Every countenance expresses the power which the speaker has had over the emotions of the soul, for the whole retiring audience carry away the impress given by his eloquence.

Here, then, is just the point for the philosophic observer coolly to take in the whole scene, and determine that which is the radical peculiarity in it. Within a few hours, at the most, all this effect has been produced. This mass of mind came together various and isolate; it has gone away assimilated and fused into one. Every mind knows that its whole transformation during this period has been by the power of eloquence, and yet probably few of that audience can say precisely what that wonderful power is. It is not many things, but one thing; not a composite, but a simple. Like the force which unites nature, it is one, though everywhere diffused; like the life of the body, it ener-

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gizes in every part and yet is everywhere a unit. What is it? How shall we attain it and express it?

The theme which we propose in this Article is: RHETORIC DETERMINED AND APPLIED; and the first part of the design demands a direct answer to these inquiries. It must be determined, What is that simple force which is the whole life of eloquence? The way to the answer lies through a careful analysis, and we have no choice but to attempt leading you by that path, even though it shall prove somewhat arduous and dry.

There has manifestly been the presence of pure logic. Every judgment has had its logical form, and has been attained according to a necessary and universal law which must regulate all thinking. No mind can connect its conceptions into propositions in an arbitrary manner. All intelligence has its conditioning law, and mind must think, if it think at all, according to fixed processes of concluding in judgments. It cannot conceive of phenomena but in spaces and times; it cannot combine qualities but in their substances, nor connect events but in their causes. Thinking is what it is, and not feeling nor willing, not walking nor eating, in virtue of the necessary forms which determine it. Quite irrespective of the thought itself, as a judgment formed, there must be the antecedent pure form which conditioned it in its connections and conclusions.

But all thinking is not in one order. Conceptions are connected in various ways and come out to their own peculiar conclusions. We may call these judgments analytic and synthetic, and distinguish the different connections of the predicates and subjects in their copulas as categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive; but no matter what the thought, there is a determinate number of pure forms, in one of which it must come out as a judgment, if the mind makes any conclusion at all about it. Such pure forms as conditioning all thought, and thus themselves prior to the thought, give occasion for a pure logic, which must be necessary for all thinking.

But has this pure logic done the work in this wonderful transformation? Has any form of thinking been the soul of this eloquence? Manifestly not. For when we look carefully at the logic, we see that it has had a master. It has been used. The power is not in it; there has been a power over it, making it to do another's bidding. One form of thinking fits a particular end rather than another, and the logic we find has all along been
used with the nicest adaptation. The logician can go over the whole ground, and take up every pure form of thought, and put it at once into its own category in logical science, and may thus give in detail the entire logical construction precisely according to the logical facts. But this determination of logical fact will, by no means, determine the rhetorical reason. The mere logician cannot say why this form of a judgment was put here and another there. And yet any one can see that the logic has been used. Make any change in the form of thinking in its place, and the eloquence of that place at once vanishes. The logic is not the eloquence, it has been only the servant of eloquence. A higher power has had dominion over it.

There has also been pure grammar. Every thought has had its own verbal expression, and every judgment its grammatical construction, according to previous necessary rules of speech. Thought cannot make its arbitrary modes of expression; language is its dress, and it must be put on in a determinate manner. From the inner nature of thought, it must clothe itself in speech after necessary and universal forms.

Thought is a purely spiritual essence. In whatever logical form, it still has no significance but in the hidden consciousness of the thinker. That it may be of any outer signification, it must take on a body and reveal itself in some external expression. But this mode of expression is determined for it in the logical form of the thinking itself. A hypothetical judgment cannot express itself categorically, nor a categorical judgment express itself disjunctively. No matter what the symbol for the thought, its connections of agent and object, time and number, relative and antecedent, etc. must necessarily and universally determine its mode of expression, and thus all language which expresses thought must have the same necessary rules. No peculiarities of any language can take it out of the universal laws for all language. There is an occasion for a pure universal grammar.

But has this grammatical arrangement of speech done this marvellous work? Again, and for the same reason, we say, manifestly not. The whole grammatical expression has itself been controlled. The fixed rules of universal grammar have all along been observed, but all those modifications, which elegance, force, clearness and facility of apprehension admit, have been freely used. A power back of the grammarian has been perpetually at work, making its selection of terms, arrangement of sen-
tences, modulation of whole paragraphs, and even building up
the entire oration from beginning to end, without any consulta-
tion with or regard to him. An end has been sought which,
from the position of the grammarian, could not have appeared
in his whole horizon. That particular sentence would have
parsed as well in some other mode of expression, and that whole
paragraph might have had another mode of construction equally
grammatical; but if you should change either, the eloquence
would at once evaporate. The grammar is not the eloquence,
but the eloquence has thrown its living power into the grammar
and made it to take on such forms of expression as its own high
design had determined for it.

Again, there has been complete discourse. The thought of the
speaker has been put into language, and, as thus standing out in
its symbol, the audience have come to it and taken the thought
from it. There has thus been a communication between the
consciousness of the speaker and the separate consciousness of
each hearer. The thought of the orator has been made common
to him and his audience. He has gone to his form of expression
and put his thought there, and they have come to this form of
expression and taken the thought away with them, and thus by
this discursus through the common symbol, a complete discourse
has been effected.

But mere discourse, though complete discourse, rests solely on
logic and grammar. Logical thought in grammatical expression
is all that the most perfect discourse requires. When the thinker
has grammatically expressed his thought, and the receiver has
come to this expression and taken the thought, the discourse is
complete and the whole work consummated. An algebraical
nomenclature, or a cartouch of hieroglyphics give occasion for
complete discourse. But surely this communication from the
orator to his spell-bound audience has not been mere discourse.
He has not merely hung up his dry thoughts in his grammatical
sentences, and the audience come there and taken them out as
so many separate bones of a skeleton. Every thought, as they
have received it, has gone into their souls glowing with the ora-
tor's life and spirit. His soul as well as his intellect has been
transferred to them.

There has, then, been direct address. The orator did not make
his thought his end, nor the expression of that thought in gram-
matical language; he had his audience directly in his eye. His
whole aim was to hit them.
A man may soliloquize, or use speech merely as a repository of his thought, and in such outer expression he has no design to put his thought over into other minds. Another mind might casually find the expressive symbol and take the thought from it, and it would thus become complete discourse; but the author of this speech had no design to communicate, and no regard to any other mind when he made it, and thus no sympathy of his mind with others can be got out of it, nor can any warmth of the author's intention be imparted by it. No matter what thought the expression may embody, nor how much emotion the language may describe, the author had no regard to any other mind in his speech, and though it may be very expressive speech, it cannot be eloquent speech.

The orator had other minds directly in view; he put his thought into speech with the intention that it should pass most readily, through the expressions, out of his mind into theirs. He directly addressed them. The very intention to communicate involved regard to the end he would attain by the communication; regard to the peculiarities of the audience; and regard to the place and circumstances where the communication was made. His intention was to lodge his thought the most directly and effectually in their minds, and he must have had regard to all these peculiarities through the whole speech, and so have used everything in it that his thought might go over through it with the greatest facility. This determined the logical form of the thinking, the grammatical mode of expression, the whole arrangement of the language through which he meant his thought should flow over out of his mind into theirs. It determined also his whole manner, his tone and emphasis, his attitude and gesture, the look of the eye and the expression of the countenance. He used everything for this grand purpose, that he might put over what was in his whole mind, of thought and emotion, and will into theirs the most easily and completely.

This is address — discourse modified by the speaker's intention to communicate. A living principle runs through it, and makes the whole quick and powerful. Every word is spirit and life. One force has created the whole product. Invention, arrangement, composition, elocution, the entire action, have all grown out of one spirit and come up into one life. The living intention of the speaker to throw what was within himself into them, has vitalized the whole process, and, as great thoughts and glowing
emotions went successively over, this has kept up the vital connection, and the whole has gone as a quickening power into them, assimilating each to each and all to the orator.

And now this, we say, is the life and the soul of eloquence — the intention that takes the thought, forms it, clothes it, and directly addresses it to the minds of others. This intention uses logic and grammar, symbol and style, tone and gesture, for its own purpose and at its own pleasure, and makes all the difference there is between a dry deposit of thought in the coldest symbols, and that eloquent speech in which the thoughts breathe and the words burn. Eloquence is living address; speech glowing with the quickening intention of the speaker. The fervor of the eloquence will be proportioned to the glowing thought and ardent emotion to be communicated, but the intention to communicate will always give the proper tone to the eloquence which the theme demands. In this is its whole life and power.

And now, this living intention in address, acting itself out and pouring itself into the consciousness of others, which is eloquence, may be made the subject of observation in three ways. We may study the laws by which this intention to communicate can be best effected, solely that we may know them, and in this we shall have science; or, for the purpose of applying them to any particular example that we may estimate it, and in this we shall have a critique; or, for the purpose of teaching and discipline, and in this we shall have art.

This observing and studying eloquence as a subject is rhetoric; and thus rhetoric admits of its being considered as a science, a critique or an art. The precise field of rhetoric is thus definitely circumscribed. It covers all that province over which the living intention in address may traverse.

We thus determine what rhetoric is, and the definite field which it occupies, but this determination will be more completely effected if we show the exclusion of some things not seldom confounded with it.

It excludes philosophy. The speech of the philosopher, as such, is not address. He studies his forms of expression only to give clearness and fulness to his thought. His system or treatise is solely an offshoot from his own intellect, without regard to any peculiarities in others. He does not shape and address it to minds, he matures and elaborates it from his own, and then hangs it up high and dry for any who will to study and attain.
There is no shaping it as if easily to insert, but the speech is used solely that it may completely express the thought. Thus philosophy gives no occasion for eloquence.

It excludes poetry. The poet studies expression only to disclose his own emotion. He makes his speech from the overflowings of his own soul. He has no regard to others, and is solicitous only to find vent for what is within himself. His fire would immediately be smothered and die, if he must be studying the peculiarities of other minds to see how he could kindle their emotions. Sufficient to him that he makes his own come out and then let any who participate in the common humanity come to his verse and appreciate it as they may. If the overflowings of his own soul do not move men, the poet has no power over them. He never tries to move by eloquence. An eloquent poet and a poetic orator, each alike manifests an insufferable impertinence.

It also excludes all fine art. In music, painting, and sculpture, the effort of the artist is to give expression to his own sentiment. His ideal, which is the creation of his own genius, is within him, and his task is to put its expressive form upon some outer material. He does not address any mind, he solely embodies the product of his own. He thinks nothing of implanting, but only of representing. We may talk of his "expressive canvas," or his "speaking marble," or his "touching tones" of melody and harmony; but all this means only that the embodied ideal of the artist greatly moves us, and not that we discern any indication that he turned his mind's eye aside for a moment from the work of expressing his inward creation, to the reading of our minds and studying how he might lodge it within our consciousness. He studies nature, not any observers or auditors. He will not look off from nature to us in order to find what we may think we want, and then shape his product to fit our prejudices, or easily adapt itself to the apprehension of our less cultivated taste and less experienced imagination. He seeks to satisfy himself, not us; if we cannot come and take his work just as it is, and read his grand idea in it, this may be very much our misfortune, but it is none of his care.

But the carefulness of the orator is seen in precisely that point where the artist excludes it. His work is not merely to get out his thought, but by all means to get it over into the minds of his hearers. He closely studies them, and adapts his whole work
to them. He accomplishes nothing as an orator if he does not transfer his conceptions into their minds. Thought and emotion merely as expression, as embodied and represented for show, is nothing to him; if his sentiment does not easily flow into their souls, and his fire burn also in their bosoms, he cannot be satisfied.

Thus it is that philosophy expresses truth, fine art expresses sentiment, but eloquence transfers both. All may be discourse, as communication through a common symbol from mind to mind, but science and art have no intention so to shape as to transfer, while the whole life of eloquence is solely in that intention. The philosophy, the poem, the painting, the statue, the tune, may all stand out in their expression solitary and alone, but the oration will always have both the speaker and the hearers within it.

We may also add, that, though eloquence does not exclude, it strongly reluctant all reading. The reader may address an audience. He may labor with the deep intention to transfer the thought of his embodied speech into their minds, and infuse its whole expressed emotions into their hearts, and this will give to his tones and emphasis, his look and gesture something of the semblance of eloquence. But in the best reading we always distinguish at once between it and eloquent speaking. The form of thinking and mode of expressing are already made up for the reader, and his intention to transfer finds both logic and language already stubborn facts which he can no more alter. He must adapt himself to them, and cannot now adapt them to any peculiarity which his address may demand. The powers of invention, arrangement and composition are shut up; everything here is finished, and must be taken as it is; and the whole movement of the reader betrays everywhere this want of freedom. He cannot read with the natural ease that everywhere appears in his talk. Good reading is not like good speaking. The reader must take the form of thinking and of expression as they are already given and conform himself to them, and not as the speaker does, freely make them conform to him; and this trammel of the logic and grammar will also cramp and hamper every other activity. His elocution and oratorical action will all be constrained and modified by it.

There may be other compensating advantages to the reader, and such as may make it expedient that his address should be
that of precomposed speech, but these advantages will not be in the rhetoric. The constraint will be less after much familiarity with the composition, and least of all when the speech is the reader's own, because he can then adapt himself to its thinking and expression the most readily; but still the order of the adaptation is inverted; he is fitting himself to his speech, not fitting his speech by his intention. That embodied speech is the most natural possible, where the author has composed it for the occasion and the audience, and thus with the intention that it shall be transferred at a future hour; yet when this shall be flowing over from speaker to hearer pretty completely and even interestingly, it can still only be eloquent reading, and not the free grace and ease of eloquent speaking. In perfect eloquence, the intention to transfer the speaker's soul to his hearers must work unconstrained through all the process, and modulate itself as unconsciously and spontaneously in thought and word as in tone and look.

The field of rhetoric as art, in which must be the culture of eloquence, has thus been both definitely and exclusively determined. We have still before us the remaining portion of our design in rhetoric applied.

The orator's intention to transfer will be greatly modified by that which is to be transferred. Such intention will always modify thought and speech, elocution and action, and will thus always give eloquence; but the thought and sentiment will also react upon the intention, and so modify it, that the eloquence induced will be necessarily very various. We shall find this application of the intention in address to be so affected by the matter which it carries over, that it may vitiate the whole activity and make it to be only a spurious and forbidden eloquence; and of such as is legitimate and genuine we shall find that the order of application gives entirely distinct species of eloquence. Rhetoric, thus, has as deep an interest in a true application as in an exact determination.

We can come to the intelligent apprehension of rhetoric applied only as before through an analysis; but if in many respects quite as profound, yet may the process be made shorter than the former, and will to most minds pass through a region of more intrinsic interest.

A philosophical treatise is but the repository of the philosopher's thinking and conclusions, and thus as knowing no audience
has no eloquence. But the philosopher may take the attitude of a teacher, and use speech as address, that he may instruct and convince, and, so far as this intention to transfer his conclusions to others modifies his discourse, so far there will be eloquence. In this way Plato has many passages truly eloquent. But such eloquence is ever calm and unimpassioned. It uses no ornament but for illustration, and deals only with the intellect. It may be an essential part of the most impassioned address, but only as conviction is made the basis for earnest persuasion. The application of the orator's intention is, however, to some higher point than instruction and conviction, and designed to move to action; but this not as the result of authority, and only through freedom. The orator is not in the place of sovereignty to command, and ordinarily not merely in the place of the teacher to instruct, but, as man with man on common ground, to excite and persuade. His communications must be adapted to reach and excite those common susceptibilities of human nature which prompt to action. His intention in address must thus apply itself to the practical susceptibilities of mankind. This is the great field for applied rhetoric, viz. the human susceptibilities which prompt to action. In this field we are to follow out our analysis and find the legitimate and the discriminated application of rhetoric.

Man's animal nature has many craving desires and wants, which may be summarily comprehended under the one name of appetites. These are common to man and the brute, and the difference of degree in man makes no distinction in kind. These appetites may be reached in man by speech, and so addressed and excited as to move powerfully, though impulsively, to action. A speaker may make his whole appeal to these constitutional appetites, and present such conceptions as shall stimulate them the most intensely. One man may be regardless of any other consideration than simply to gain his own end, and use any appetite that will bring others into his designs the most surely. In doing this he may be eloquent, but the rhetoric which should teach such eloquence would be immoral, and properly characterized as a satanic rhetoric. Another man might refrain from the more gross, and appeal only to the more select and refined appetites, the natural sympathies and sentimental feelings of mankind. But this would still be an application of the intention disallowed and reprehensible. Eloquence has no license to apply itself to the appetites or natural sympathies which are
common to man and the brute. Such application, even to the
more select wants and sympathies, degrades the orator and
debases his hearers.

Viewed only in a rhetorical and not in an ethical light, it is a
spurious eloquence. It ultimately defeats its own end and sub­
verts its own interests, for no man will approve of himself for
yielding to it, nor respect the speaker who used it. He may
delude once, but he becomes a noted man after that, and is dis­
trusted and avoided by even bad men. So the old rhetoricians
and sophists, who taught how to gain any end by speech, ulti­
mately became powerless and run their own art into the ground.
When eloquence has been suspected and condemned, it has
always been in this view of its application, and it is worthy
of condemnation always in such a mode of its application. No
genuine orator has any business with the animal feelings and
sympathies of humanity. If he does not rise higher in the appli­
cation of his address, he is only leading men as the cattle are
led, and thus brutalising them and degrading himself. No rheto­
crion may go to the animal nature of man for his topics, and no
orator apply his address to appetitive wants and sympathies.

Experience, in all these animal appetites, may have given
occasion for deducing general rules from general consequences.
As things are, such and such a course has been found attended
by its own happy or unhappy results, and thus a rule of highest
happiness has been attained. As men carry out their individual
choices into execution, it has been found that one interferes with
those of others, and "the sovereignty of the individual" must be
restrained for the freedom of the whole by the sovereignty of
the whole, and the rule of public liberty has been thus attained.
Such a course of national polity has been found to
subserve the highest productive, mercantile and commercial
prosperity, and thus the rules of political economy have been
found. These general rules, controlling and restraining individ­
ual appetite, give to us the higher practical principles of utility,
prudence, liberty, economy, etc., and thus an opportunity to apply
address to the matured judgments of mankind, and not to their
particular appetites and sympathies.

As the expedient and the prudent, there is here a legitimate
application of the speaker's intention. He may thus appeal to
the judgments of men in the interests of public utility and lib­
erty. He can thus touch no cords of moral conviction and obli­
gation, but he can lead men, by the judgment of what is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, to exclude much suffering and secure much enjoyment. Here is the broad field for all secular rhetoric, teaching the eloquence of the bar, the senate and the forum, in reference to the legal rights of property, liberty and public prosperity.

But man knows himself as more than animal; and more than appetitive interest generalized into the expedient and prudent; even as existing in a rational spiritual personality. In clearly knowing himself, he knows that the appetites of the flesh should be subjected to the imperatives of the spirit, and that “the law in the members” must be held in subjection to “the law of the mind.” As “the spirit of a man knoweth the things of a man,” so man comes to know intuitively in himself what is due to himself, and therefore what will debase and what will dignify himself. In this, and in this only, he has “a law written on his heart,” and “a conscience accusing or excusing.” Here is the point where he transcends the animal in kind, and not degree alone, and rises to the moral personality. He has a spring from this imperative within, to hold himself steady against all the clamors of natural appetite without the spirit, and thus the capability and the obligation “to keep his body under and bring it into subjection” to this higher dignity of the spirit. Here alone is man’s prerogative of freedom and moral accountability.

Thrown into society with other spiritual beings, he finds at once a higher law than prudence and greatest happiness, even an inner behest that he should act for his highest worthiness. He knows that it is far more to him to be good than to get good, and that he should hold what makes him and his fellows happy, wholly subservient to that which shall make him and them holy. He has a law above happiness, determining for him when only he may be happy; a law above prudence, determining for him when prudence itself is duty; a law above kindness, determining for him when even his benevolence is right. Here originate the grand ethical ideas of the good, the just, the right; imperatives awakened at once in the view of spiritual dignity and excellency, and revealing how terribly debased the man has become, who has sold the immortal freedom of this spirit in bondage to the flesh. Here is no generalization from experience and deducing general laws because experience is so, but here is a higher position disclosing how experience itself ought to be.
These grand moral ideas are for the speaker to apply in his address, and he rises at once from the field of secular into the sphere of moral eloquence. When at the bar, or in the halls of legislation, we have been listening to the eloquence which rests its appeals upon utility, and has rung the changes upon security of property, and popular rights, and public liberty, until all interest is worn to weariness; how, like the voice of a trumpet, does it rouse every soul, when some great statesman rises and takes us back to those original foundations on which all political rights of property and happiness and liberty repose! How, on every side, are kindled the deep convictions of inalienable responsibility, as this eloquence rises into the morally sublime in applying these grand ideas of immutable morality, and lets us see that all political right is but an empty name, if it does not stand upon the eternal basis of justice, and that all laws are tyranny, and all constitutions but usurpation, if they are not righteous!

But still, even deeper than the wants of man's ethical being, there is the conviction of dependence and helplessness which leads him out necessarily to feel the want of an absolute protector. The soul cries out for God, and cannot rest without a Deity to trust, to worship and adore. He is formed to be a religious being, and he can no more stifle these religious, than he can his ethical, susceptibilities. His spirit must find some presence within which he uncovers himself with awe, and where he bows with reverence, or he knows he has fallen from his proper sphere and is wandering as a lost and wretched outcast. His consciousness of sin gives consciousness of condemnation, and hence come all the wants of pardon and redemption. Thus, here come out all the great religious truths of God, a Mediator, an atonement, a gracious justification, and a heavenly mansion prepared by a Saviour. Revelation fully discloses all these great truths which the fallen soul is asking for, and a Divine agency applies these truths to sanctify where this fallen soul feels its helplessness, and thus a broad field of truth and motive is laid open, which is to be preached to every creature. Here is the field of sacred eloquence.

The pulpit has nothing to do with the secular interests of an audience; and, though it may introduce the grand ideas of ethical right, and show their harmony with revealed duty, yet is its address bound by its very position, as well as by the commission given by the Master, to "know nothing else but Jesus Christ
and him crucified." Man's religious nature cannot come out acceptably to God, in his fallen condition, except through God's appointed mediation. The sacred orator can thus be only the Gospel preacher. In his intention as address, there can be allowed to him to apply only Gospel themes, and all his eloquence must be exhausted in getting over evangelical truth from his own consciousness into the consciousness of those that hear him.

Sacred rhetoric has thus the teaching of eloquence in the highest sphere of applying address. It deals with themes which are the wonder of angels, and to be the eternal study of glorified saints. It gives more power to the pulpit over the practicable susceptibilities of man than the bar, the senate or the forum. Its themes will keep their hold upon public attention and interest when all others are worn out. The love of Christ will still constrain, when wealth and patriotism and freedom, and even pure morality fail to move.

With this apprehension of rhetoric as both determined and applied, we will close by alluding concisely to some of its results, when thus faithfully used. Both because it is of the highest kind of eloquence, and also from the place and occasion, it will be appropriate to confine our attention to the pulpit, and look at some of the results secured to the preacher by an exact rhetoric as we have now determined it.

This intention in applying appropriate truth as address, gives a principle which will run through the whole system of rhetoric and bind up all its parts in order. The art of rhetoric will rest on exact science. The law for transferred thought in address will expound every rhetorical rule, and control in the whole rhetorical culture and discipline. This will be for the rhetorical teacher fully to explain and use, but we may here very cursorily indicate what some of its prominent results must be to the preacher.

1. It will secure that the preacher always have a distinct aim. Eloquence is always a means and not an end. The orator is altogether absurd, if he makes himself to be eloquent solely for eloquence's sake. His work is to transfer thought and sentiment from his own mind to others, but this for a distinct design. As its very first condition, rhetoric sternly demands a definite end to be reached in this intention to communicate thought. The intent in addressing can possibly have no steadiness and persist-
easy, except as it reaches on and takes hold of some fixed object to be attained by it. Why labor so completely and clearly to implant your sentiment in another mind, if nothing is to be gained by it?

The very first thing which a determined rhetoric demands of the preacher is, that he propose some definite object to be gained in every address he makes. What absurdity to be eloquently giving over truth to an audience, and yet mean nothing by it! Intent in transferring, with no intensity of purpose to execute any result thereby! The hope to do good in general by preaching, and yet not to aim at some specific good in every sermon, is a solecism. A rhetoric truly determined will effectually exclude all the vague and pointless harangues, which so often usurp the name and the place, and waste the sacred time of a Gospel sermon.

2. The preacher will thus always have thought. How ridiculous, in the light of a true rhetoric, to be gravely and laboriously intent on putting over something into other waiting minds, and yet have absolutely nothing in your own to transfer! The object to be attained first having been fixed, the next thing is to get the right truth to reach it. Nothing at all can be accomplished by the most eloquent speaker, if he have only mere words and gesture. The thought must put itself into words, and the intention to lodge it in the hearer's mind must prompt every gesture, or the whole rhetorical action becomes a mere dumb-show. Words are but the dress of thought; and how idle to spend the time in setting forth costly clothes, when there is no living body and limbs to put into them! The speaker has not any possible use for words until he has first got thoughts, and the fitting words can only come, as the energy of the struggling thought prompts them. If the living, quickening idea does not go over into the hearer's mind, the whole time and labor are spent to no purpose. The mere passing of empty buckets from hand to hand must be a very profitless and tedious employment, hardly worth the effort to seek doing the thing elegantly.

A true rhetoric will not let the speaker open his mouth until he has been deeply thinking. It strikes dumb all mere prating, ranting, empty declaiming; and only opens the sacred desk to such as have a mind rich in Bible truth, and a heart warm with evangelic emotions. The word of God must be in the preacher as in the old prophet, "a burning fire shut up in the bones, so
wearying with all refraining that he cannot stay." It may be only thus "from the abundance of the heart that his mouth speaketh."

3. The preacher will always have unity. Many sermons are manifestly built up from the outside. The rubbish is cleared away and a foundation prepared, the materials are collected and shaped, the framework is put up by the application of plumb-line and measuring-rule, and thought after thought is spliced on or framed in with tenon and mortise, and the whole is finished according to the model given, or by following out consecutively the arbitrary directions. There is a very common view of rhetoric which so teaches to make sermons, and which is doubtless some better than to throw the raw materials into a promiscuous heap together. A mechanical unity is attained, and the application of square and compass perhaps detects no deficiencies nor redundances. The sermon is quite according to rule, but is wholly a mechanical product, and may be taken to pieces and its parts framed into any other sermons again at pleasure.

But the rhetoric here determined gives a very different process and secures a very different unity in the result. The sermon grows into shape. The intention in the address has singleness of aim and adaptedness of thought, and works in and through the whole to one issue. One life originates and develops the whole product. One germ with all its rudimental elements grows up to maturity, under the control of an inner law which determines what its form must be and when its growth must stop. There will be a vital unity. You might as well seek to take the life out of one plant and make it to develop itself anew in another, as to make a proper rhetorical life develop itself dividedly. Its working is all from the inside, and the vital force perpetually energizes in the living intention, and makes thought and word, plan and style, voice and look and act, all to come out completely, and all to stand together in symmetry. The sermon is one, and the delivery is one with it.

4. The preacher will always be earnest. When any mind has its clear plan, which is a distinct end and a plain way to get it, it works at once spontaneously and joyously. But of all employments, the work of putting over thoughts and sentiments from one mind into others, is the most intensely stimulating. Let a determined rhetoric prevail with the speaker, and he can be no other than a sincerely ardent and earnest man. He has his end
clearly in view, and that end is one in which judgment and feeling, conscience and reason, all harmonize. He has got his truth for the time and the place, for the people and the duty he would bring them to fulfil, and his way to the issue is to throw his own convictions and emotions in this truth, with the truth itself, over into their souls. In this position he cannot be a dull and dry speaker. His rhetorical life becomes one with his natural life and his Christian life, and all glow and burn within him. The action of his thought on the audience, and the reaction of their kindling interest in his theme, and the soul conscious of the teeming thoughts and emotions yet to come, and panting to attain the good end at which he is constantly looking, it will be impossible to check the growing enthusiasm. The man, the Christian, and the orator within him, all combine to make him earnest.

5. The preacher will always be natural. He is controlled by his own intention in his address, and the earnestness with which he puts over his thoughts to gain his end gives him no opportunity to borrow; no leisure to look about for models to imitate; no interest in any work of self-criticizing, to see if he is coming up to some ideal standard in his own imagination. He is intent and absorbed in the one work of transfusing his deep convictions and emotions through the audience, and he cares nothing about himself, thinks nothing about himself, but works spontaneously, earnestly, naturally, right onward to his issue. The logic and language, the style and elocution, are all prompted from the native impulses within him, and there can be no affectations, no awkward constraints, no conceited blandishments of style and manner, no tricks of voice or look or "start theatric," as the clap-trap expedients to catch applause and force himself into popular notoriety. His one end has but one way to it, and he goes on right manfully and earnestly, and thus naturally, till he reaches it.

6. The preacher is always appropriate. The place and the people, the occasion and the circumstances have all been consulted in the fixing of his aim and the selection of his theme, and the intention to give his thought over to his audience, spontaneously shapes all his speech and its delivery directly to the end in view. His whole address is to the thing in hand, and, in his earnestness to reach it, he will be impatient of all superfluous and impertinent matter. He will want nothing that is not appro-
riate and auxiliary to his main design. He has no good sayings laid by, which he can turn aside to bring in; no bright thoughts and fine figures kept in store, that he ostentatiously patches on to his sermon; but his mind is so intent on his main end, and so absorbed in the work, that, spontaneously, the most fitting words and expressions come up into use; the most apt tones and gestures suggest themselves; and he employs them all naturally, gracefully, and thus appropriately. His whole address is a living production, taking in and assimilating all that is congenial; and casting out and sloughing off all that is dead and cumbrous.

In closing, we add, that such a preacher will always be effective. God may in sovereignty send his Spirit where he will, and bless the preaching which is not, in any eminent sense, eloquent. But, usually, the special influences of the Spirit follow the most direct and earnest preaching. The eloquence, which the above determined and applied rhetoric teaches, is directly adapted to the nature of the human mind. It conforms to all the conditions of free intelligent agency, and runs directly in the lines prescribed for associated interest and sympathy. It has a power of its own, and, so long as the human spirit is true to its own laws of feeling and action, it must recognize the force of a living intention which quickens and energizes the address that is made to it. The glowing thoughts in burning words which come full from the ardent soul of one man, and pour themselves into the kindling minds of other men, must greatly move and interest them. And especially those Divine words which the preacher utters, that "are spirit and life," must take hold upon the sensibilities of sinful men. Those great truths of pardon, redemption, justification, and final glory, cannot reach the consciences of depraved and condemned men, in the power of this eloquence, without at least arousing and alarming them. Man's moral nature, though fallen, answers directly back to such appeals, and even stupidity is startled, and carnal security is made to be afraid. The preacher discharges his conscience in thus fulfilling his commission; the guilty are alarmed; and we may confidingly pray and expect, that God will effectually work by his own Spirit, and "give the increase."