

# Theology on the Web.org.uk

*Making Biblical Scholarship Accessible*

This document was supplied for free educational purposes. Unless it is in the public domain, it may not be sold for profit or hosted on a webserver without the permission of the copyright holder.

If you find it of help to you and would like to support the ministry of Theology on the Web, please consider using the links below:



Buy me a coffee

<https://www.buymeacoffee.com/theology>



PATREON

<https://patreon.com/theologyontheweb>

[PayPal](#)

<https://paypal.me/robbradshaw>

---

A table of contents for *Bibliotheca Sacra* can be found here:

[https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles\\_bib-sacra\\_01.php](https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_bib-sacra_01.php)

THE  
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,  
NO. XXXV.  
AND  
AMERICAN BIBLICAL REPOSITORY,  
NO. LXXXVII.

---

JULY, 1852.

---

ARTICLE I.

OBSERVATIONS ON MATTHEW 24: 29—31, AND THE PARALLEL  
PASSAGES IN MARK AND LUKE, WITH REMARKS ON THE  
DOUBLE SENSE OF SCRIPTURE.

By M. Stuart, lately Professor of Sacred Literature at Andover.

[Concluded from p. 355.]

We have now gone through with the minute examination of the whole passage under consideration. We have seen that, first of all, a literal sense, as insisted on, is impossible; in some cases even palpable absurdities would follow from it. In the second place we have seen, that all the phraseology here employed, is applicable, and is actually applied, to political, civil and natural changes and overturns. Most of it is applied to events even far less consequential and significant, than the destruction of the Jewish capital and commonwealth; and this, not in one or two instances merely, but in many passages of the Old Testament. Of course, the allegation that the destruction of Jerusalem is immeasurably, yea infinitely, *below* the magnitude of an event to which such language as is now before us must necessarily be applied, has no foundation in the usage of Scripture. The simple answer to the allegation is, that *fact* shows it to be incorrect; for it is a fact that such language is actually applied by the sacred writers to the describing of events inferior in importance to the final catastrophe of the Jewish nation. The proofs of this, ample ones, have already been laid before the reader. The way is perfectly open,

then, for the application of the passage to the destruction of Jerusalem, so far as the diction and style are concerned.

Here comes up, now, the question: What says the *context* and the course of thought? We have also made inquiry in part, as to what answer is to be given to this question. The discourse was prompted by no inquiries about the general judgment. Jerusalem was the only theme which prompted it. The coming of Christ to punish the Jews and the end of the Jewish *aión*, are questions intimately connected with the main one. The whole course of thought is such as relates only to the generation living at and immediately after the death of Christ. The first part, vs. 4—28, terminates with the invasion of Jerusalem by the army with *eagle*-ensigns. The destruction itself is yet to come. The eagles are gathered around the corse, but they have not yet devoured it. Then follows the devouring. Emblems of this are drawn from the darkening and fall of the heavenly bodies; from terrific appearances in the air; and from the bitter lamentations and agitating terrors that ensue. The coming of the Son of man, with his mighty host in splendid array, closes the scene. The particulars of what is consequential upon his coming, are not told. Every reader must spontaneously know, what such a threatening array against the enemies of Christ and the church would of course accomplish. A *σαινῆσις* here is expressive eloquence.

Finally comes the deliverance of Christians from their danger and terror. The great Shepherd "*gathers them* in his arms, and carries them in his bosom." Here then is a complete *tout ensemble*, a beginning, a progress, and an end. What more is needed then to commend the exegesis which I have been defending?

On the other hand; if the *general judgment* be the only theme, then how imperfect, how incomplete is the representation! Not a word of the *wicked* being summoned to the judgment; nothing indicating that *all nations* are to appear before the Son of man, or even that he ascends the judgment-seat. Only the *righteous* are gathered. But it is not even said for what purpose, provided we interpret in this fashion. In the other method of interpreting, all is easy. But, on other ground, there is a sudden defection of the half finished transaction. Three parables foreign to the immediate subject then supervene; and after these, there commences an account of the judgment-process. Here moreover (Matt. 25: 31 seq.), the righteous are *again* congregated along with the wicked (*πάντα τὰ ἔθνη*), and then separated from them, and so each party are respectively adjudged. For what purpose, then, we may well ask, on this ground of interpretation,

was the previous "gathering of the elect" in 24: 31? It is a question which its advocates are bound to answer; but one which De Wette blinks out of sight. He says merely, that believers, according to 1 Thess. 4: 17. 2 Thess. 2: 1, are first to be assembled around Christ. Be it so then; but we ask again in this case (and this question he has not considered), why is there a *reassembly* described in 25: 31? The righteous had already been assembled; how came they to be scattered again among the wicked?

This whole scheme, then, is full of crudities and incongruities. It maintains impossibilities. It insists on leaving pictures half made, or an abrupt desertion of them in this state. It introduces matter, which the subjects urged on the attention of our Lord, by the questions of his disciples, did not comprise. And if there were no other reasons, these are enough of themselves to justify the abandonment of such a scheme of exegesis.

But there are other reasons, and if possible weightier ones still, for abandoning it. These are comprised in the *limitations of time* which precede and follow vs. 29—31. We come now, last of all, to the examination of these limitations.

The first limitation is made by *εὐθὺς*, at the beginning of v. 29. It is conceded that the *transition* to the judgment-scene is made here, and that all which precedes, pertains to the destruction of Jerusalem.

What says the next (29th) verse? "*Εὐθὺς, immediately* after the affliction of those days, the sun shall be darkened," etc. That is (if the alleged views of the application of what follows are correct), *immediately* after the destruction of Jerusalem comes on the general judgment. But they labor strenuously to show, that *εὐθὺς* does not here import *immediate sequency* in time, but is equivalent to *suddenly*, or rather to the Latin *inopinato, unexpectedly*. It is then, as is supposed, the *unexpected* nature of the event, which is marked by *εὐθὺς*. But what says Mark? *Ἐν ἡμέραις ταῖς ἡμέραις μετὰ τὴν θλίψιν ταύτην, in those days after that affliction*, viz. of Jerusalem. But this, it is said, "is *wholly indefinite* as to time, indicating only the latter days [viz. those] of the Messiah." But if it be ever used with such a latitude of meaning (which is doubtful), it surely is not so here. To the words *those days* is added the limiting or defining clause, *after that affliction*, showing that a generic sense of *those days* is out of question. The days that *follow the affliction*, are of course the days in question, and no others; for then there would be no specification of time at all. Who was there that would not know, that events in general which were to come after the destruction of

Jerusalem, must come of course in the Messianic period or latter days? What other period was there than this? On the contrary, the events of vs. 29—31 were to come in *immediate sequency* after those before described. In this connection it should be observed, that Luke (21: 25) has omitted all distinction or any notation of time, and relates the whole as one continuous matter. By so doing, he does not disagree with the other evangelists. They have merely taken pains expressly to say, that the things predicted in Matt. 24: 29—31 will follow the others in rapid succession. But Luke takes this for granted, and makes therefore no break in his narration.

As to all attempts to show that *εὐθὺς* means *inopinato*, they are altogether in vain. An appeal is made to the Heb. *בְּרִיחַ*, rendered *εὐθὺς* by the Septuagint. Well, so rendered, I should say; for *בְּרִיחַ* is the adverbial form of *פָּרַח*, which means *in the twinkling of an eye, subito*. And so *εὐθὺς* is well chosen. Schleusner, Passow, Rost and Schmidt are also appealed to, to show that the Greek word is equivalent to *plötzlich, speedily or suddenly*. Full truly in respect to *time* it is so; but *εὐθὺς*, be it remembered, never dismisses the signification of *suddenness* as to *time*. The word *unexpectedly* has nothing to do with the sense of *straightway, immediately or suddenly* in respect to time. Kuinoel's Comm. on Mark 9: 15, is a poor specimen of *grammatical* interpretation. *Εὐθὺς* there does not, as Schleusner supposes, qualify *ἰδών*; if it did, it would immediately precede or follow it. It looks back to Christ's *coming to his disciples*, as mentioned in the preceding verse (so our English translation), and it expresses the idea, that "*forthwith [upon that coming], the multitude, when they saw Jesus, were astonished;*" Mark does not say why, but probably it was because they knew that he had been absent from his disciples (as the preceding chapter shows), and his appearance, therefore, filled them with amazement. In fact, it is in vain to seek for *authorities*. I have looked through the whole of the eighty cases, in which *εὐθὺς* is employed in the New Testament, and examined their connection. I cannot hesitate now to say, that not one of them justifies the version by *inopinato*. In some few cases, this sense would give a meaning not bad in itself; but even these cases are those where the *suddenness* of the event is the ground why it is *unexpected*. But this alters not the word *εὐθὺς* itself. Its very derivation indeed shows, that it has nothing to do with the meaning of *inopinato*. *Εὐθύς* (the root) means *straight, straightforward, direct*, and the like. So *εὐθὺς* means *straightforward* in point of time, and corresponds very exactly to our word *straightway*

or directly. The latter word is the veriest counterpart possible of the simple meaning of the Greek word *εὐθείως*; for its first meaning is *straightforward* in respect to *space*, and its secondary meaning *straightforward* in respect to *time*, i. e. immediately, forthwith, straight-way. There is not a word in the New Testament whose meaning is more clear and certain, than that of *εὐθείως*.

De Wette says: "*Εὐθείως* designates *everywhere* a more or less rapid sequence; and there is no doubt, that according to Matthew the coming of the Messiah was to follow immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem. Hammond, Paulus and others, *arbitrarily* translate it *unexpectedly*; Schott aims to obtain the same meaning, by the suggestion that it is an error of translation [by the Greek translator of Matthew] in rendering *εὐθείως*. But not only is this not allowable on exegetical ground, but there is moreover nothing gained by it. *For how can any one persuade us, that between v. 28 and v. 29 there is such a huge interval, as between the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of the world as we view the matter.*" Thus far De Wette. Nothing can be plainer, in philology, than that he is here in the right.

Where are we then, in respect to our present attitude? Just here, viz. that the events of vs. 29—31 are *closely connected*, in point of *time*, with those predicted in vs. 4—28. As I view the subject (and my reasons for this view have already been given), this close connection in *time* is grounded on a close connection in the sequence of *events*. All then is easy and natural in respect to *εὐθείως*. We have no philological impossibilities to achieve — no *hincinzezesiren* to practise. But in the other method of exegesis, we have first the Saviour, teaching the contact of the judgment-day and the destruction of Jerusalem, and the apostles believing in his prediction and proclaiming their belief. It is impossible to avoid it. The *specific limitations* of time prevent the application of the principle of prophetic interpretation contended for. De Wette makes a slight attempt to remove the difficulty, in respect to the Saviour. "Probably," says he, "neither Matthew nor Luke has transmitted the speech of Jesus with verbal exactness; yea, perhaps they do not at all give the first original apprehension of the apostles. It was very natural that they, and still more that their disciples, caught at the expectation of the Lord's coming with such animated feeling, that they brought nearer together those relations of time which Jesus had left in the dark." In other words: 'He will not venture to charge ignorance and error directly upon the Saviour, but he has no difficulty in supposing that the evangelists might err, and in this case did err, being led away by their

excited feelings and wishes, rather than guided by sobriety of judgment.'

I shall enter into no defence of the Evangelists, on this occasion. There they stand in their simplicity and majesty, three of them relating the same discourse in various ways, discrepant somewhat as to manner, but altogether concordant in matter. In respect to the point in question, viz. *immediate sequency of time*, they perfectly accord. No one of them makes a break in his discourse, at v. 29. No one separates this verse by even a mark of transition from the preceding matter or subject, except by the usual and familiar *δέ*. How came this union? If Christ said anything on the subject in question, and the *original* hearers rightly understood him in what he said (as we may suppose to be the case), how comes it that some of the Evangelists at least did not get intelligence of their views, and give us a hint of it? Yet, as would seem, they all agree in giving us wrong views. Neander, as usual, concedes such a position pretty much in its full length and breadth. In all such cases, in his *Life of Jesus*, he never undertakes to defend the Evangelists against the attacks of Strauss, and the imputation of discrepancy and contradiction. He concedes to Strauss that they were sometimes mistaken as to historical and chronological matters, and sometimes even in regard to doctrines which he would call unessential. Schott, Olshausen, Hahn, Ullmann, Umbreit and (as I believe) Tholuck, and at last even Hengstenberg, either concede the same thing, or keep silence in regard to it on certain occasions, i. e. make no opposition to it. Neander, too, in his *New Testament criticisms*, stands on the ground taken in his *Life of Jesus*; criticism which, though less able than De Wette's, approaches very near to it in point of spirit, respecting the matter in question. I would hope, however, that I have sufficiently shown, that *philology* not only does not demand this of us, but that it does not even permit us to go in such a path. As to *theology*, the *authority of the New Testament* is at an end, when it is once shown that Christ, or the Evangelists, embraced and taught error, either in matters pertaining to religion, or in historical matters which stand intimately connected with it. I would not consciously accommodate my *exegesis* to my *theology*; for there is no security of attaining scriptural truth when we do that. But I have a strong conviction that simple philology, apart from all *à priori* conclusions, marks out our road on the present occasion, and makes it quite plain before us.

Thus much for *εὐθὺς* at the beginning of the passage under consideration. Let us now look at the context in the sequel. "Now,"

says the Saviour, "learn the parable [i. e. an appropriate parable which would show at what period the things predicted would be accomplished], from the fig-tree. When its branches are tender, and the leaves are putting forth, ye know that the summer is nigh. Even so ye, when ye see *all these things*, know *ὅτι ἔγγυς ἔστιν ἐπὶ θύρας*, i. e. that [he] is near, at the door," vs. 32, 33. Our version puts *it* instead of *he* before the predicate, *is near*. Erroneously, as it seems to me, for the meaning plainly is this: 'You may know, when you see all these things, that my coming [see the question of the disciples about *παρουσία* in v. 8] has then taken place. I am already near, I am at the very doors.' Of course, then, the events predicted are the indexes or proofs of his *presence*, *παρουσία*. But here again our translation (which I have followed above) misleads. *Παρουσία* means *not coming*; it means *presence*, *being present*, as is plain by referring to its root *παίρμι*, *I am present*. The taking place of *all these things* so as to be *seen*, is of itself complete proof of the presence (not ocularly visible presence, but presence in the scriptural sense) of Christ. Observe that the Saviour does not say that *some* of these things predicted are to take place, before Christ will come, but that when *all* of the things predicted shall have so taken place as to be seen by the disciples, then is there sufficient evidence of his actual *παρουσία* in the sense intended. Now the *all*, beyond any question, includes of course what is described in vs. 29—31. The disciples then, according to the exegesis of some, were, *in seeing all these things*, to see the general judgment, for they were a part of its proceedings. The bare statement of the matter, in this light, is its own refutation.

Still, the simple imagery of the fig-tree was somewhat too indefinite to satisfy the mind of the speaker. He therefore adds another clause, in order to make it more definite: "*Verily I say unto you, this generation shall not pass away, until all these things take place.*" In other and equivalent words: 'I solemnly assure you that all these things shall happen, before the present generation shall become extinct.' "Not," says De Wette, "this generation of the Jews; not the generation of the apostles (Paulus); but *exclusively the generation of men now living.*" His explanation is doubtless correct. Such is the ordinary meaning of the phrase, in established usage.

A mistake has been made by an altogether erroneous view of the meaning of *this generation*. The apostles were no more particularized by it, than other classes of men then living. Multitudes of persons then living, did witness the destruction of Jerusalem;



for it was only about thirty-seven years after our Saviour's words were uttered.

But we are not yet through. The verb *γένηται* may mean *begin to be*. *Γίγνηται*, with *lota* in the first syllable, is the Subj. Pres. from *γίνομαι*; of course, we may render the word, *shall, may, or must, take place*. According to either way, the taking place of *all these things* PRECEDES the end of the then present generation. This is enough for our purpose.

That the verb *γίνομαι* sometimes means *outstehen, to take rise, to commence existence*, no one will gainsay. But no one can look into a Concordance or a Lexicon, without being satisfied that this is but a small portion of the meanings of *γίνομαι*. One needs but to look into Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, to see that *γίνομαι* has for its original meaning the sense of *happening, occurring, becoming, taking place*, and the like. *To be or to be born* comes next; and then *to commence being*. Nothing can be more incongruous, than to apply this last sense to most of the examples where *γίνομαι* and its derivatives occur. E. g. Luke 1: 5, *ἔγενετο . . . ἰσραὴλ τις*, "a certain priest *began to be*." V. 8, "It *began to be* (*ἔγενετο*), while he was performing the office of a priest," etc. After the message of the angel to Zacharias, the latter expresses his incredulity. Gabriel then tells him, that he should be dumb *ἄχρι ἣς ἡμέρας γένηται ταῦτα*, i. e. until the time in which these things [his praeternatural conception and birth] *shall begin to be*. What kind of sense would *begin to be* make here? So v. 23 we must read: "And it *began to be*, when the days of his public service were accomplished." So John 1: 6, "A man *began to be sent* from God," etc.

The question still remains: Which of the senses of *γίνομαι* has the passage before us? Let us look, then, at the like of it. Matt. 5: 18, "Until heaven and earth pass away, not one jot or tittle shall pass away from the law, *ἕως ἃς πάντα γένηται*, i. e. until all *shall have been fulfilled or completed*." What would be the meaning of *begin to be fulfilled* here? But the case now before us is still plainer. Here are, according to this exegesis, two sets of events, separated by thousands of years; God alone knows how many, but we ourselves know that nearly 2000 years have already separated them. The proposed plan of interpretation, then, would bring out the following result, *viz.* that the general judgment was *to begin to be*, before the decease of the generation then living. There is no avoiding this result. If all the events were but one series, one *tout ensemble*, one continuous train of things, all having some bond that might make them a *unity* in the

view of the mind, then *begin to be* would not be an impossible sense here. It might be even a probable one. But to speak of the general judgment as coming into union, or into a unity, with the destruction of Jerusalem, while the two events are dissevered by thousands of years not yet numbered, would be very strange to my apprehension. Let it be noted, that the events are not only dissevered by boundless years, or it may be even ages, but they are altogether *dissimilar*. The visitation and punishment of the Jews were temporal; they pertained to the present world, as one of its occurring events. But the general judgment is a spiritual and celestial transaction. In the case of Jerusalem, the *coming* was to chastise the wicked; the *future coming* will be to judge the righteous and the wicked to their final doom. Had the second supposed series of events been another merely temporal occurrence or calamity, then some kind of unity as a whole could be made out. But not so now. There is no intercommunion between the two events, and therefore they cannot properly be associated. How then can the general judgment, yet thousands of years distant, *have begun to be* during the apostolic age? Nothing can be more forced than such an exegesis.

Look at it in another light. Jerusalem, according to the proposed exegesis, was not threatened with entire destruction during the lives of the then present generation, but only assured that it would *begin to be* destroyed. Is it possible to acquiesce in such an interpretation?

If Christ had said *τὰ πάντα γένηται*, or *πάντα γένηται*, simply, it would be more feasible to make a kind of compound whole, under these generic expressions. But when he says *πάντα τὰ πάντα*, *all these things*, he plainly means that each particular thing, viz. the very particulars that he had before named (*τὰ πάντα*), should each and all take place before the demise of the generation then living. If these particulars, then, are very diverse, both as to the *nature* of the things concerned and as to the *time* when they are to take place, and yet *all of these* are to be accomplished, what else can we conclude, than that the day of judgment is closely connected with the destruction of Jerusalem, and was immediately to follow it? On such a ground, De Wette is undoubtedly in the right, when he attributes misapprehension and ignorance to the apostles. Give him his premises, and sound logic will oblige us to come to his conclusions.

What follows v. 34, in respect to "this generation," shows that the Saviour had predicted only what was *speedily* to happen. The disciples were cautioned to "watch," and always to keep on the watch. Why? Because the specific time, i. e. the day and hour, was not

revealed, nor to be revealed. The coming itself, and also the coming before the end of the then existing generation, was made quite certain by the declarations of Christ. But the specific "day and hour" neither man nor angel knew, v. 36. Consequently it behoved all to keep on the watch, for the signs of the times. The faithful servant, who keeps on the watch, will be amply rewarded whenever his Lord shall come. Negligent and revelling servants will be severely punished.

All this is apposite, on the ground which I have taken; but on the other ground, to what would it amount? Just this: 'Keep on the anxious watch, expecting Christ will come, for some thousands of years hereafter, he will come to final judgment.' This is the real amount of the warning, on this ground. It cannot be said, that Christ or the disciples were ignorant of the fact, that the general judgment was far remote. If they were not ignorant, then these exhortations, on the ground of such a motive, wear very much the appearance of a pious fraud. De Wette liberates the apostles from this, by supposing them to be ignorant of the real time of the end, and then that they might honestly warn others in accordance with their mistaken apprehensions. I hardly know which to choose, between these two schemes. The first assails the simplicity and sincerity of the apostles; the other subjects them to the reproach of ignorance. I am heartily glad to know, that there are critical, philological and theological reasons enough for rejecting both of them.

One word as to the connection between Matt. 24: 29—31, and the disclosures in chap. 25: 31 seq. De Wette says, that the subject of vs. 29—31, viz. the general judgment, is there broken off, and is resumed again in 25: 31 seq. But the parables of the ten virgins and of the talents intervene. I am unable to imagine that these are a mere digression in one and the same discourse; and that the theme broken off is then resumed again in 25: 31 seq. There is something so incongruous in all this, so contrary to the Saviour's usual method of discourse, that I am unable to give credit to it. In the latter passage, everything is congruous and homogeneous. It has a beginning of its own, a progress, and an appropriate end. In itself it is *teres atque rotundus*. What has this gathering together of all nations, good and bad, to do with the gathering merely of the elect, in 24: 31? How are the righteous to be *twice* gathered? For what were they gathered the first time? All these and other insuperable difficulties thrust themselves in the way of the interpretation which I am opposing. I call them *insuperable*, because I see no effectual way of removing them.

What a deal of discussion and frustrated efforts, a simple view of Matt. xxiv, had it been early and constantly entertained, would have saved interpreters and theologians, is manifest on a moment's reflection. Thousands of sober readers, anxious to get at the truth, have been misled by want of a familiar acquaintance with the tropical diction of the Scriptures, and especially of the prophetic parts of them. It strikes them, that such imagery as Matt. 24: 29—31 employs, cannot be meant for any mere temporal or worldly occurrences. Yet how entirely is this conviction refuted, by the actual and frequent application of the like or the same language to occurrences of this nature, in the Old Testament Scriptures! Every discerning and scrutinizing reader will concede, that the Old Testament is the source from which most of the tropical language of the New Testament is obviously drawn. We have seen above, that every expression of this nature in the passage before us, has its parallel in the Old Testament; and this, in cases where a *literal* meaning is out of all question. What necessity for it here then? None; as I have already said. But I have gone beyond this, and shown, at least as it seems to my own mind, that there are so many critical, exegetical, aesthetical and doctrinal objections in the way, as to render the exegesis which finds the general judgment in vs. 29—31, altogether improbable, if not impossible. Whatever victories Neology, or the *double-sense* theory of interpretation may achieve, I apprehend it will be a long time before they will be able to celebrate an ovation here.

I believe that the Bible, the *whole* Bible, is a revelation from God; a revelation made in human language, and intelligible to us, if it is at all intelligible, only by being interpreted according to the laws and principles of human language. Any rule above this, presupposes or assumes inspiration in the interpreter. The Bible is a book written by men, and for men — for all men, under the expectation that they can read and understand it. Otherwise it is no *revelation*. It follows, of course, that, if the laws of human language are to be applied to its interpretation, it stands, in this respect, on the same ground as all other books. It contains, of course, many things which other books do not. But this alters not the *nature of the language*, in which its disclosures are made. The language is used *more humano*.

Let me put one question, then, and ask for a candid ingenuous answer: What other book on earth, written for grave purposes and in order to give instruction, ever requires or admits a *double-sense* theory of interpretation. A book of riddles or conundrums might, to a certain extent, admit of this; but the Bible is not such a

book. If I admit a double-sense of the same words in the same passage, then one of these senses is an *occult* sense, not conveyed by any natural meaning of the words. How are the unlearned, then, or even the learned, to get at this *occult sense*? If the words do not naturally convey it, it must of course be guessed at, or merely conjectured. But to what *test* shall we bring the occult meaning, in order to decide whether we have rightly obtained it? We cannot appeal to the *language*; for the very resort itself to a *double* sense is a confession, that the words do not, in their natural and ordinary meaning, yield such a sense. Are we then to be cast on the foggy ocean of conjecture? Is there no difficulty in sailing with surety there, where we have no sun, nor stars, nor landmarks, nor lighthouses to guide us on our course? Long since have I endeavored to steer my little barque out of that ocean of mist and obscurity, and sought for something visible and palpable to guide me. I find it at least more comfortable, to sail on a clear than on a beclouded expanse of waters, where I can see the buoys and the headlands and the lighthouses, and know where I am, and how I ought to steer.

Three plain principles cover the whole ground. (1) The case of *simple prediction* in the Old Testament, which is *de facto* fulfilled, according to something related in the New. This needs no illustration. But,

(2) A *πλήρωσις* or *fulfilment* of something said or related in the Old Testament, by the *happening of a like thing* under the New. In this case the matter stands thus: What took place of old, takes place for substance afterwards, either in the same way, or in a higher and fuller sense still. Hence it is called a *πλήρωσις*, i. e. a *filling out* or *completing*, namely of what had already commenced. The second event belongs to a series which ranks under the same category as the first. Thus, in Hos. 11: 1, the prophet says: "When Israel was a child, I loved him, and called my Son out of Egypt." Here now is no *prediction*, but merely and simply a historical declaration. Yet in Matt. 2: 15 it is said, that this passage was *fulfilled*, when the infant Jesus was carried to Egypt, in order to avoid the rage of Herod, and was brought thence by the command and aid of the angel of the Lord. Now how was this a *fulfilment* of Hos. 11: 1? Not because that was *prediction*, and this was *accomplishment*, in the more usual sense of the words. Not because there was in the simply historical declaration of Hosea, an occult *ὑπόρρησις* or *under sense* which was prophetic; for who, in ancient times, would ever imagine any such thing, while merely reading Hosea? No; it was because that in the

second case, an occurrence took place *like* the ancient one. God's son (Israel) had of old gone down to Egypt and lived there in exile. He was redeemed from that condition and brought out from the country by extraordinary Divine interposition. So in the later occurrence. God's Son in a higher sense had gone down to Egypt, and dwelt there in exile. He was brought thence by Divine interposition. Here then was a real and true *πλήρωσις*, i. e. a *filling out*, a *completion*, by a like event. Nor was this all. The latter case was plainly of a higher and more important nature than the former. In this there was a *πλήρωσις*, then, i. e. something done in the way of a *completion*. The case in question, the exile and the deliverance, had its acme or consummation in the person of Christ. Why then should the Evangelist hesitate to say, that what Hosea relates *ἐπιπλήρωσθη*, was *fulfilled, completed*, in the person of Christ?

Like this is a large portion of the *πληρώσεις* of the New Testament. An intelligent reader need not hesitate or blunder here. The simple question before him is, not whether there is a *fulfilling* in the first sense of the word, but whether there is one in the second; not in our usual sense of the word *fulfil*, but in the sense which the *Jews* gave to the corresponding Greek word. The last is the only thing necessary to be known, in order to remove every difficulty. But here is no *double sense* of Hosea's words. There is merely the repetition of a thing, or an occurrence, like that which Hosea relates.

So is it with the weeping at Bethlehem (Matt. 2: 17, 18), on account of the slaughtered infants, when compared with what Jeremiah declares in 31: 15, in respect to the wailings at Rama. And so is it with many of the *fulfillings*, to which the New Testament appeals.

(3) There is one more *πλήρωσις*, which completes the covering of the whole ground. It is, where a principle or proceeding of the Divine government, or a doctrine, is asserted or illustrated in the Old Testament, and a new illustration or confirmation of it takes place under the New. The case in Matt. 2: 23 furnishes an instance substantially of this kind. "He shall be called a *Nazarene*," is said to fulfil what was spoken by the prophets. Yet no such passage is found in the prophets. But there is in them what is equivalent to this, viz. the declaration that "he [the Saviour] shall be despised and rejected of men," that "he will not be esteemed by them," that he will be "as a root out of a dry ground" (Is. lii.); that he will be "a worm and no man, a reproach of men, and despised of the people"

(Ps. 22: 6). Or, if any one may choose to rest the stress of the fulfilment here on the appellation *Nazarene*, then does Isaiah say, that “a נָצַר (branch) shall spring from the roots of Jesse” (11: 1). But if we adopt the first method of explanation, then the declarations respecting the Messiah as rejected and despised, i. e. the truths thus taught, are illustrated and confirmed in the case of his becoming a *Nazarene*; for such an one was contemned by the Jews.

Isaiah's declaration (42: 1), that “the servant of the Lord should not strive nor cry, and that no one should hear his voice in the streets,” was fulfilled when Jesus, after having performed a notable miracle, charged the multitudes around him not to blazon it abroad (Matt. 12: 16). The position of the prophet, that he should be gentle and unassuming, and indisposed to vaunt himself, to celebrate his own fame, or to challenge the public gaze, was illustrated and confirmed by the demeanor of our Lord on that occasion. This is one of the species of *fulfilment*, and one by no means unfrequent.

With this third class I would reckon those cases, in which there is some principle of the Divine government developed, and this principle is afterwards again developed. In this way a passage in the Old Testament may have, or rather may comprise, an *apotelesmatic* sense, i. e. one of *after* or *final* accomplishment. The thing is what can take place more than once. The matter described in the Old Testament may teach a Divine principle, or lay down a rule, which may have accomplishment, i. e. completion or fulfilment, just as often as, and whenever, a thing occurs that illustrates and confirms it; in other words, a thing which teaches the same principle or rule. Or the Old Testament may declare something which is indicative of the conduct and character of wicked men, and the like thing afterwards *fills out* (fulfils) this declaration. E. g. in Zech. 11: 13, the prophet represents thirty pieces of silver as the price which the Jews gave, in the way of contempt for him and his services. In Matt. 27: 9, 10, the priests and elders gave Judas thirty pieces of silver, in order to procure or purchase the death of Christ; thus showing both their malice and their contempt. This is called *fulfilling*, by the Evangelist. And why not, when Jesus was sold in the same way, for the same price, and for the like purpose, as had before been the case with the prophet?

But I must forbear. After a long and anxious and often repeated investigation of this interesting subject, I have satisfied myself, that the principles now developed will cover the whole ground of reference to fulfilment in the New Testament. In these principles there

is no double sense; no *ἐπιπόσια*, in the sense in which that word is usually employed and understood. But there may be an *apotelesmātic* view or sense of a passage in the ancient Scriptures; and this is the case whenever a proceeding or a principle is reillustrated or reconfirmed. This makes out no *double sense*, but a fuller and more complete exhibition of the one and simple meaning of the original. Well may it be named a *πλήρωσις*.

The ground of mistake, in cases of this nature, lies in a wrong or imperfect view of *ἐπιληρώθη* and *πλήρωσις*. The reader often gives to it only the first and most obvious meaning, viz. that of simple fulfilment of a historical prediction, i. e. where a thing or occurrence is foretold, and afterwards happens literally, or is historically accomplished. Of course a reader in this condition, wherever he finds an *ἐπιληρώθη*, deems it necessary to find a corresponding *prediction* of the thing said to be *fulfilled*. Consequently, such a text as that in Hos. 11: 1, "When Israel was a child I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt," which contains nothing to all appearance but a simple historical description of a past occurrence, is tortured to elicit from it some confession of an occult sense, a pregnant meaning, a *ἐπιπόσια*, i. e. a sense *lying under* the surface. Without this, it is supposed that *prediction* cannot be made out; and if not, how can there be a *fulfilment*? And so of all the cases that rank under the second and third divisions which have been designated above. A *ἐπιπόσια* becomes necessary, in all such cases, whenever a *fulfilment* is spoken of.

How much plainer and easier all this is made, by the exegetical principles above brought to view and discussed, seems to my mind very obvious. On the ground proposed, the question is not, whether there is a proper literal prediction and a fulfilment, in the common *English* sense of these words; but whether there is a *πλήρωσις* according to *Jewish* or *Hebrew* view of this matter. Let us guard against confounding these two things; for this it is, which occasions nearly all the difficulty in most minds. We should aim *διακρίνειν τὰ διαφέροντα*, to *distinguish things that differ*. If the Jews very frequently gave to the word *πλήρωσις*, *fulfilment*, as applied to any passage of the Old Testament, the wide latitude of signification which has been stated and illustrated above, then no Jew would be misled by such passages in the New Testament, as speak of *fulfilment*; and speak of it in many cases where a properly prophetic *prediction* is not to be found. He of course spontaneously gave to *πλήρωσις* the wider sense needed; and whether it was the taking place merely of



an occurrence *like* some ancient one, or a new illustration and confirmation of an old truth or declaration, it was, in his view, a real and proper *πλήρωσις*. Why should we not concede to him the familiar usages of his country? And if we do, and then study well the nature of the corresponding texts of this class in the Old and New Testaments, there can be no serious difficulty in the way of a sober, diligent, earnest and accurate inquirer.

It is to be deeply regretted, that we have not, in our language, any full, adequate and impartial discussion of this great subject. The minds of beginners in hermeneutical study, as I have had abundant occasion to know, are greatly perplexed with regard to it. No wonder at this, when they carry along with them the stunted and merely English notion of *fulfilment*, in which they have been educated. I have known several cases, where shipwreck of the faith has ensued upon such doubts. The *double sense* of the Old Testament words some inquirers could not see so as to believe in it; nor could they satisfy themselves that others were able to make it out without guessing. They found themselves called upon by the common mode of exegesis, to launch on a boundless ocean (for such, *conjecture* must be), and this without compass, or sun, or stars, or even rudder, to guide them. The next step was to revolt at the whole, and go over into the neological position. This, as we have seen, is to take *fulfilment* only in its first and limited sense; then to regard the apostles as believing in the mystic or secondary sense, and arbitrarily adopting and pursuing it; and last of all, they put such exegesis to the account of *ignorance* and *prejudice* in the apostles and primitive disciples. The Neologists everywhere appeal to this *Unkundigkeit*, i. e. *unknowingness*, of the apostles and primitive Christians, as direct and satisfactory proof of their lack of inspiration. They ask us with a smile which is more than half contemptuous, whether the *dicta* of such men are *authoritative* and *binding* on the rational and enlightened inquirer? And of course we may expect to find them as they are, that is, strenuous defenders of the position, that the apostles believed in and taught the *double sense* of many a passage in the Old Testament Scriptures.

Their scoffing would be no good reason, in my view, for abandoning anything which I believed to be true. But for myself, I must tread under foot the fundamental position, that *the Bible is to be interpreted by the usual laws of language*, before I can adopt the double sense. No other serious book on earth contains or exhibits such a sense. It was the Oracle at Delphos, which gloried in the art of

predicting in such a way, and practised it. But this will not serve much to commend the practice to simple-hearted Christians.

At all events, the simple principles of exegesis, relieve us of most of the difficulties in question. And far, very far, are they from leading us to "repudiate the authority of the New Testament writers." I know of no such tendency in them. On the contrary, we see what use is made of the opposite principles by the Neologists. It does not seem meet to put this armor into their hands, if we can fairly and honorably avoid it. Above all, if we can honestly avoid mystical meanings, obscurity, *ὑπόνοια* and guessing, in sacred things, and come out into open day, where our path is plain, and our landmarks are in distinct view, I do not see why we should hesitate as to adopting the principles that I have labored to defend. After all that I have seen in others, and experienced in my own mind, I am unable to perceive how we can avoid being driven to and fro, while we are in a state of mere conjecture as to an *under sense*, or what can prevent our being tossed on every wave of doctrine, when we are cut loose from the sheet-anchor of simple historico-grammatical and common-sense exegesis.

Paul has given us a notable passage (Gal. 4: 22 seq.) of the tropical use of Old Testament history, which is pregnant with instruction. He is speaking of the *bondage* of the Jews under the yoke of ceremonies and sacrifices imposed by the Mosaic Law, and of the spiritual freedom of Christians under the Gospel. He illustrates the case by a parable or comparison drawn from the history of Abraham's family. Abraham, he says, had two sons, one by a bond-woman (Hagar), the other by a free woman (Sarah). The one was a son in a merely natural way, the other in the way of promise, i. e. promise of preternatural conception and birth. He then subjoins: *ἀτινά ἐστὶν ἀλληγορούμενα*, which things are allegorized, i. e. an allegorical signification is attached to them for the purpose of illustration. He goes on to state the allegory. These two sons symbolize the two covenants. The son of Hagar, a bond-woman, answers to the Law at Sinai which is productive of bondage; for Hagar is here made the representative of mount Sinai in Arabia, and being a bond-woman, her progeny follows of course the condition of the mother. In the same way Hagar is also the representative of the then literal Jerusalem, whose children were at that time in bondage. But Isaac, the heir of promise and born preternaturally, represents or corresponds to the spiritual or Christian Jerusalem, the heavenly city, which, like Isaac and his mother, is free from the law of bondage. When Paul adds, that "this Jerusalem is the mother of us all," he means to carry through

his comparison. Sarah the mother was free, and of course her progeny were free. The Jerusalem above, which she represents, and to which all true Christians belong by a new birth and a new birthright, is free from all legal yokes and ceremonies. Consequently her children, i. e. those born in her, inherit her freedom.

This is one of the most striking cases of allegorizing, that occurs in the New Testament. Indeed, Paul has gone so far, on this occasion, that he has deemed it advisable to caution the reader, by expressly reminding him that he is speaking *allegorically*. Plain enough is it, indeed, that such is really the case; for who ever thought of attaching to the story of Sarah and Hagar and of their respective children, a *ὑπόνοια* like that which the apostle now suggests in the way of declared allegory? And what do we or can we mean, when we say that this simple history in the Old Testament, has, and was designed to have, a concealed and mystical sense? No; a reader in ancient times could never have thought of such a thing. The whole gist of the matter lies in a small compass. The history in question had furnished facts that might be made the basis of an analogy or parable. The apostle selects them for this very purpose. He tells his readers that he is doing so, i. e. that he is *allegorizing*. Nor is this all. His allegory is striking, and, as he has employed it, very significant. At all events it was adapted to strike the *Jewish* mind with great force; for the Jews of that day, and afterwards, dealt very freely with allegory; as the writings of Philo Judaeus abundantly show. But no part of its force depends on finding a *ὑπόνοια* lying under the simple names of Sarah and Hagar, of Isaac and Ishmael. No reader could of himself ever have conjectured, that *Sarah* meant not only the person of that name, but also *Jerusalem above*; or that *Hagar* meant not only Sarah's bond-woman, but also mount *Sinai* and moreover the *literal Jerusalem*. In fact, the apostle has put the reader on his guard against *mysticizing* in this way. He tells him expressly, that these things are *allegorically* employed. This is enough. Wherever *resemblance* can be traced, there is a foundation for allegory. Here the resemblance is striking, because the persons proposed in the history are characters of much interest and importance, the two mothers being the sources of two great nations, still living, and separated from themselves and from all the world besides.

The main difficulty in this case has been made by the supposition of a *ὑπόνοια*, and then by concluding that the apostle is making out of the case before him an *argument* to prove the spiritual freedom of

the Christian church, instead of the vivid *illustration* of the corresponding antithetic relation between the Old Covenant and the New. There is no *logical ratiocination* here; none is designed; but there is rhetorical *illustration* and confirmation. Sure I am, that our minds would be left quite unsatisfied with any *logical process* in this case, when it must rest on the assumption, that Sarah in the original text means the Jerusalem above, and Hagar that below. But we can look at the two cases as standing on the ground of analogy or allegory, and not only find no difficulty, but even find the parallels to be striking. To a Jewish mind, it could not fail of being highly impressive.

I have selected this example from Paul's writings, because of its apparent difficulties; and I know well, from experience, how the mind is troubled, and how it wanders in the darkness of uncertainty, so long as the true point of view is missed, from which we ought to survey the whole ground. This point once reached, the mists below begin to scatter, until, like the famous *Fata morgana*, they entirely vanish before the rising of the morning-light.

I have often been tempted to wish, that such a hint as Paul has here given about his *allegorizing*, might have been elsewhere suggested. It would have prevented a world of mysticism and extravagant speculation and phantasy, besides liberating many honest minds from doubt and obscurity. But still, I do not think complaint on this subject would come with any good grace from us, so long as the Bible is put into our hands in languages that are intelligible, and in a style that needs nothing more to be understood, than a sympathizing heart and a well-informed critical and common-sense power of exegesis. So long as we read the Bible as mere Englishmen or Americans, and remain unacquainted with its peculiar idioms and usages, as well as with the objects to which it refers, and the history of the times in which it was written, just so long shall we find dark places in it, and even make them still darker, by forcing our own views upon them.

The remedy for the evils of doubt and oscillation is a pious heart, a sound judgment, an accurate knowledge of Scripture-language, a sober and consistent view of hermeneutical principles, and unwearied diligence in the study and comparison of the Old Testament and the New. The "wondrous things" out of God's holy word, which we daily beseech him to show us, should include only those which the Bible itself discloses, and not the unseemly excrescences and fantastic wonders which we may thrust upon it.

In view of the many difficulties that beset the subject of New Testament quotations, and the application of them, I deem it of great

importance, that the beginner in exegetical study should be freed from his embarrassments, and led in a path on which the light is shining, and where is little or nothing that will perplex him as to finding his way. A few simple principles, well digested and thoroughly understood, will serve as an effectual compass, when mist or night may supervene. The whole subject lies within a moderate compass, and might be satisfactorily and effectually exhibited in a short course of Lectures. One can scarcely tell, how many conceits and whimsies and phantasies the *double sense* has developed, when indulged in by ardent and visionary interpreters. The *ἰνóρoια* or *occult sense* becomes immeasurably more important than the plain, obvious and common-sense meaning; and he who is most expert in finding or making secondary and occult senses, thinks himself the most expert interpreter. Paul had no very good opinion of *occult* senses. He says (1 Cor. 14: 19): "I had rather speak five words in the church by my understanding, that I might instruct others, than ten thousand words in an obscure language."

---

## ARTICLE II.

### THE PLATONIC DIALOGUE THEAETETUS — WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE EPISODAL SKETCH OF THE WORLDLING AND THE PHILOSOPHER.

By Tayler Lewis, LL. D., Prof. of Greek, Union College, Schenectady, N. Y.

THE Platonic dialogue entitled Theaetetus, is a discussion of the question: *What is knowledge?* an inquiry which will appear profound or superficial, according to the aspect under which it is viewed, and the habit of thought in him who contemplates it. What is knowledge? What do we *do*, or *suffer*, when we are said to *know*? or, in other words, is there a knowledge of knowledge itself, just as there is a knowledge of those things which are ordinarily regarded as its objects? The principal speakers are Socrates and a boy on whom he is represented as trying his maieutical powers in the parturition, development, or bringing to the birth, of the right idea with which the soul travails in the attempt to answer the great inquiry. The youth