spire or plant. Let only a few days pass, and nature will be found to have put on, as if by rapid creation, a gorgeous, luxuriant vegetation. So under the able and godly preaching of the word, without apparent, incipient movements or manifested causes, all invisibly and noiselessly, will a rich moral scene frequently be discovered to have sprung up and spread itself abroad to greet and gladden Christ's deserving servants. All godly ministers shall reap if they faint not. Rejoicing shall they come bearing sheaves, golden, ripe, abundant.

In respect to private Christians, it is a just expectation that they bear much fruit. The religion they profess being remarkable for its outward, striking, important effects, certainly labors, sacrifices, re-formations, moral progress should be ever understood to be inseparable from their lives. Imbued with the energetic, enterprising spirit of Christianity, where they find in the great moral field no harvest, they will push the plough, scatter the seed, cultivate, protect and make one; when they find one already ripe, they will put in the sickle with a strong arm and bind up the sheaves. Great things are to be done; they will go forth and do them. Life weareth away; what their hand findeth to do, they will do quickly and with their might.

ARTICLE VII.

REMARKS ON THE IDEA OF RELIGION;
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS, BY D. KARL LECHNER, CHAPLAIN OF THE INSANE ASYLUM AT WINNENTHAL.


[This Article is from the last number of the Studien und Kritiken for 1851. In giving it an English dress, considerable condensation has been attempted and a few passages altogether omitted, as unimportant to the subject. By the preparation of this treatise for the press, an endorsement of all its thoughts and shadings of thought is not intended; it is presented to the readers of the Bibliotheca simply as an able discussion of a most important question, and as showing the present tendencies of the German mind in its sounder theological
circles. On the subject of the active and passive will, and on the relations and forces of the church as a Divine organism, its complection is Lutheran; but the position that religion is a life supernaturally and divinely imparted, and that the appropriate sphere for the workings of this life is in and through an organized kingdom of God, no evangelical theologian of whatever school will deny.

Is religion a certainty of the understanding, of the feelings, or of the will? Is there a single side of the soul’s life into which, as an element of the same, it can be inserted? What is the relation of religion to other manifestations of this life? And how from the idea of religion, can all those circumstances, activities, ordinances, etc. which are necessarily connected with it, be developed? On such and such-like questions, numerous inquiries respecting the nature of religion have latterly turned. Especially from the time that rationalism and supernaturalism began to desert the theological field, two views have stood forth in opposition to each other, that of Schleiermacher, which explains religion as something belonging to the feelings, and that of Hegel, which maintains it to be a kind of knowing. The contest between the two need not be considered as yet completely settled. Both systems have always a number of valiant champions on the plain, and the efforts to transfer the scientific strife to another domain, though in some respects important, have been attended with no durable result. The doctrine of Schleiermacher, especially, demands the concession, first, that on the psychological ground which forms the basis of its idea of religion, a dogmatic system has been erected, which may be considered the fullest scientific apprehension of Christianity, contemplated from the position of the evangelical creed, yet given, and second, that its fundamental thoughts more than those of any other system since Kant, have penetrated into the common views of Christian life. A notion of religion which resolves the whole system of dogmatics into statements respecting the devout frames of the Christian mind, and thereby destroys all security for the objective truth of the same, must certainly meet with great opposition on the side of an objective science. It is readily confessed that in this way scientific theology would be in danger of entirely losing its value, because faith in the foundation of it would be grounded, not on something existing without itself, absolutely certain in and of itself, but on a mere inward persuasion. The school of Hegel, under such circumstances might boast, not without reason, having rescued the honor of science, for it has been acknowledged from the beginning as unquestionable, and might be
proved with dialectic demonstration, not only that the absolute which forms the object of religion, is something absolutely certain, but also that an adequate knowledge is essential to the human spirit. It was not yet clear, however, what position should be accorded to religion in distinction from philosophy, when both had to do with a knowledge of the absolute. In the first place, religion was held for an incomplete form of philosophy; this form, also, was considered unessential, though without any intention to represent its real meaning as unessential. But further investigation made it evident, that this supposed difference between meaning and form was a mere delusion. It was evident that religion must be conceived of, both in form and meaning, as an indispensable member of the whole intellectual life, and so be considered equivalent to philosophy, or, the equivalence of its meaning must be allowed. On the principle of consecutive thinking, the former was impossible, for, according to the fundamental principles of Hegel, which both in form and meaning embrace an essential knowledge of the absolute, this knowledge was the province of philosophy alone. Feuerbach, consequently, sought room for religion in the lower forms of intellectual life, and found it in the fancy and soul. These, moreover, yield only their lowest activities for the production of religion. For the soul was in his view only the place for the peculiar, selfish emotions of man, for which fancy might furnish the material; so that religion at last was nothing more than the satisfaction of the finite necessities of man, consequently differing only in degree from fleshly lust. This is the extreme point at which religion can still be allowed the name of science, and beyond which nothing further deserving of attention has been undertaken.

We must not, however, pass by in silence an attempt which has been made in the Hegelian school, though from the outset, with entirely different premises. It is the treatise of Tzeller, in the Tübingen Theological Annals of the year 1845, in which at first this theoretic idea of religion was entirely set aside; the effort to assign one of the three acknowledged intellectual powers to religion was given up, and religion was defined as a pathological relation of person to person. In the meanwhile, this scholar of Hegel found it impossible to keep in the new track. According to him, the object of religion is the intuition of God. But this he knew not how to define better than as a perfect knowledge of God. Thus his investigation slid off into the old track, and that too, just as quietly as if nothing had happened. But Tzeller is not the first, who has attempted in vain to escape the magic circle of those three fundamental faculties. Many
a one before him, through the coordination of the three powers or through the invention of a fourth or in some other way, has striven to break the scientific connection, and the consequence has been that they either explained nothing, or before they were aware of it, fell back again into one of the three tracks already mentioned. As in other cases, so here, conclusions may be drawn from the past in respect to the future. The history of theology and philosophy shows that every one who has thought seriously upon the nature of religion, has come to the conclusion, that it consists either in knowing, feeling or in acting. If, in order to give a greater certainty to the definition chosen, any one should prefer to represent religion as not belonging exclusively to either one of the intellectual faculties, but partially embracing the others, the result would be the same in this as in every other vivid perception. To philosophize is, indeed, an action of the understanding or of the reason. But who could philosophize without repeated acts of the will to do it, or without a feeling of pleasure, resulting from the action of the understanding? The question then is just this: What in reality is religion? In which side of the subjective life does it have its root or its seat, as some express it? This question cannot be passed by. Religion is actually a manifestation which proceeds from the human soul. Room must be made for it, therefore, whether it is included in one of the faculties already known, or in some new power discovered for it. Now it is very remarkable that, up to the present time, neither course has been successfully taken. We might be allowed, no doubt, to enumerate in their order, the various efforts which have been made to reach the true idea of religion—and to subject each attempt successively to an examination—from the Church-fathers down to the Reformation, and from thence through Bacon and Descartes to Schleiermacher and Elwert, Hegel and Tzeller, Twesten, Nitzsch, etc. Whoever knows the history of our science, even in a moderate degree, will be readily reminded of the peculiar course the religious idea has already passed through. With the discovery of each new system, religion has been accordingly transferred to a different section of the intellect, and so, very properly, personifies in itself the restlessness of scientific development. As far as collecting and examining views already historical is concerned, much has been done in several recent treatises, especially in that of Elwert, published in the Tübingen Theological Annals in 1855. And our learned predecessors need not be surprised, if we take the liberty to avail ourselves occasionally of their labors. But, at the same time, we hope by a more
extended discussion, by drawing a sharper definition of what has already been brought forward, to render science some humble service. We shall endeavor, therefore, first of all, to subject to a new examination the three psychological explanations of the nature of religion.

As to the proposition, that religion cannot consist in knowing, it is perfectly evident that equal degrees of knowledge may exist together with very different degrees of devotion, and that so the rule of Schleiermacher will apply, viz., That which does not form the measure of a thing in its variations cannot be received as its real measure. This assertion has a scriptural foundation in 1 Cor. 12:6, where the gift of the γνῶσις is represented as conferred upon one and not upon another (except in an inferior degree); while at the same time the religious character of the person does not bear a corresponding proportion, as the Apostle expressly adds ἡ γνῶσις ̔ἐγγίζει. It must be confessed, on the other hand, that such a relation exists between knowledge or cognition and devotion, that a certain degree of knowledge, for instance a knowledge of sin, is absolutely necessary to devotion. Devotion indeed, not unfrequently arises from intelligent thinking, especially among men constitutionally adapted to intellectual action, and that too even where the mental faculties are not disproportioned to each other. Among such persons, it is worthy of remark, that their devotion is affected by their knowledge, more than by anything else. The sermon, for example, which in others excites the liveliest emotions, influences them chiefly through the instruction which it affords, and they are best edified by discourses of a scientific character. Common experience also teaches, that knowledge and devotion have more to do with each other, than the reasonings of the followers of Schleiermacher would lead us to suppose. But of much more importance is the teaching of the Scriptures, where, for example, Christ says, John 8:31: ἐὰν ἴδητε ἐφήματα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἐμοῦ, ἀληθῶς μαθήται μου ἐστί, καὶ γνῶσις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἡ ἀληθεία ἐλευθερίαν ἔχεις. It is undeniable, that here knowledge is set forth as the root of Divine life, of true freedom, whatever meaning you may attach to the word ἀληθείας. The truth, to which clearness of thinking unquestionably belongs, is not so much felt as known and understood, just as light is not felt but seen. Of the same import is the passage, John 17:3, where Christ sets forth the ἐν ἀληθείᾳ as consisting in a knowledge of the only true God, and of Jesus Christ whom he has sent (γνῶσις). Passages of similar meaning may be brought forward in great numbers. They are found not only in the four Evangelists, but also in the writings of Paul, for
instance, 1 Cor. iii, also James v, and elsewhere. Should any one say in opposition, that here the sacred writers are speaking of a living, that is, of a practical knowledge, of a knowledge which implies action, the peculiar nature of religion as here set forth would still continue to consist in thinking, the practical part being only a property or result of the intellectual. Besides, no critic of the Schleiermacher school could instead to divest knowledge of its living nature in order to make an impassable gulf between it and religion. Otherwise, not only must the possession of religion be denied to a great part of Christendom, especially to the pure Christian Gnostics of the Alexandrian church, to all the speculative mystics of the Roman and German churches, but a circuitous mode of interpretation must be adopted, for a great number of Scripture passages, such as even the peculiar exegesis of Schleiermacher would not justify. Letting these results stand as preliminaries, and engaging to attempt, further on, a solution of apparent contradictions, we now proceed to the second question, viz. Does religion consist essentially in action?

If religion is action, say they, then it is either equal to morality or not. In the latter case, both would be equal to a third or one be subordinate to the other. Now religion cannot be a part of morality, otherwise there would be a morality which is not of a religious nature. Nor can morality be a part of religion, for everything which is religious is also moral. In case of their equality and common subordination to a third, the difference is only in form, religion and morality being only different expressions of one and the same meaning. But there may be moral actions which are not religious. The same action may proceed from religion or be performed without religion; and in the same person there is frequently a different degree of morality and religiousness.

If we have rightly understood these statements, that is at last actually received which was at first rejected, viz. that there may be a morality without religion, and consequently a religiousness without morality. This they will not expect us to confess. A religiousness which is not moral does not deserve the name, but is a degeneracy and perversion of the nature of religion.

But ought we not to distinguish somewhat between the not moral and the immoral? Such an inquiry is proper where the question turns upon the contrariety of things belonging to the impersonal and the personal life. But within the dominion of the personal and self-conscious spirit, such a separation is wholly unknown. But in fact, there is a peculiar difficulty in thus setting religion and morality as
opposites to each other. Man has everywhere and for a long time been accustomed to work scientifically, with both names and with the conceptions corresponding to them. But what shall we say if it should appear necessary to subject these elements themselves which they receive as given positions to a more careful investigation before they can be applied to the operations of thought, and it should become apparent, that by this means only, a position is obtained on the firm ground of a clear conception?

What, then, properly speaking, is morality? It appears to us that by it is commonly understood the irreproachable character of outward conduct, conformable to the law of good, so far as this conduct proceeds from an inward principle. In this case legality, in which the latter addition, viz. inward principle, is wanting, forms the contrast to morality; and then morality, by which is signified, not an objective law, but the inward intentions corresponding to it, has those inward intentions for its measuring rule. Morality is good action for goodness' sake. Legality is good action for the sake of some advantage, or what in principle amounts to the same thing, action to which one is impelled by fear of a penalty. Works of human love, for example, when they are actually done out of love to man, and not for the sake of some honor or emolument, also professional fidelity, frugality, etc. may be considered as belonging to morality. If this is morality, then of course there is little difficulty in showing that moral actions can just as well spring from a pure, natural emotion, as from religion, that is, from faith, love to God, or generally speaking, from man's relation to God. Otherwise you must deny to loving an enemy, to professional fidelity, etc. by an atheist, not only its actual value, but in the end indeed its actual being; and such like actions where they do not spring from a sense of religion, must be considered as absolutely not moral. But under these circumstances, what becomes of Christian ethics? If the first is actually and essentially different from the other, then we have no less than three kinds of morality, viz. that which is independent of all religion, that which springs out of any religion whatever, and that which belongs to the Christian religion. According to this, Christian ethics might properly have three or at least two parts, one common to it with heathen religions and at the same time with downright infidelity, and another peculiar to itself. To the latter might be attributed, for example, prayer in the name of Jesus, participation in the sacraments, in the work of missions, and the like, for which there is unquestionably a place in Christian ethics. To the former, on the other hand, belong all those actions
which one not a Christian performs, when he does them out of an inward principle. Now to distinguish these two kinds of morality from each other, we propose to use the word "moral," for all that which is commonly connected with morality, but to designate the peculiar morality of the Christian religion by the title of super-moral, after the example of a high-sounding term in dogmatics, where in like manner it is usual to speak of the rational and the super-rational. This does not entirely relieve us, however, from difficulty, for we shall have to find a similar distinction for the externals of Christian morality for which we have no designation at hand. Indeed we are in the same condition that supernatural theology formerly was. For any one might reasonably ask us whether this super-moral were something moral or something not moral; whether morality without this super-moral could be a whole and independent existence, or whether by the incoming of the latter quality an essential change was experienced, and the like? We are not in a position to remove these objections.

But this is not all. Morality, say they, is good action proceeding from an inward principle. What, then, is inward principle? Fear of punishment, desire of gain, are one kind of inward principle. It ought perhaps to be called such a principle as lies in the very nature of the case. But in the nature of human free-agency, the principle is unquestionably included, that every action is attended with a corresponding consequence, good with a good, evil with an evil consequence. For all that appears, then, thus far, fear or venality might be an inward principle. We are not willing to regard the subject from so low a point of view as to consider the consciousness of having done good as no reward, the acquisition of substantial advantage as the only motive to right action, and so esteem sickness as a greater punishment than an evil conscience, nay, even disconnect the latter from the idea of punishment altogether, and exclude a good conscience from the idea of advantage.

The question here arises: does an action cease to be truly moral, when it springs from a desire for the blessings of everlasting life, yea, for the approbation of God, or, on the other hand, from fear of everlasting punishment, of exclusion from the presence of God? These, however, according to the commonly received ethical idea, are not internal principles. Here the formula is again forced into service that you must love and do good, for the sake of the good, and that such conduct is morality, in the fullest acceptation of the term. But we know, indeed, no proposition so much adapted to bring con-
fusion into moral philosophy and build up the scientific edifice, not upon a sandy foundation, but right into the fog, as this. For in the first place, the question would be, whether love to the good in its highest personal essence, that is, love to God, and the act of good for the sake of God, may not be a higher form of morality than love to a mere abstract idea of good. Secondly, it might be very difficult to explain how a man could be in a position to do good for the sake of the good. For no one performs an action merely to have done it—that would be to act without an object—but he has some end in view; either that humanity may be improved, and then he performs his action not out of love to the good but for humanity's sake; or that he himself may be improved, in which case he has done good for his own sake, out of love to himself and not out of love to the good. In view of this and similar consequences, resulting from the distinction usually made between religion and morality, we cannot agree with the fundamental principle of the above mentioned explanation. The case is the same when we carefully consider the individual action belonging to the department of morality. Science, as it appears to us, falls into a great error when it considers actions, usually esteemed as morally good, the common property of all those who possess the powers of a free moral agent. Duo si faciunt idem, non est idem. This is nowhere else so true as it is here. The moral actions of a Christian are distinguished from those of a person not a Christian, not merely in the form, or through the incoming of a peculiar element as religious feeling, but "toto coelo;" for they have an entirely different beginning, middle, aim and end. The atheist, for example, who bestows alms by the power which the natural man possesses of doing a thing or leaving a thing undone, at his pleasure, does it for the relief of a temporal necessity, and consequently that both his own temporal welfare and that of the receiver, may be benefitted thereby. In the latter case, his action rests on love to the creature, which takes precedence of love to God, in principle excluding it altogether; and the consequence is, so far as it depends upon the giver, that his own eternal salvation is imperiled, the peculiar honor of God neglected, and the whole Divine arrangement of the world is destroyed. The Christian, on the contrary, so far as he acts like a Christian, bestows alms out of love to God, to which love to the creature is absolutely subordinate; bestows alms in consequence of, and according to, the working of the Holy Spirit in him; bestows them for the promotion of the glory of God, and then, secondly, for the relief of distress; bestows them, finally, with the
actual consequence that God's name is honored thereby, and his own eternal salvation promoted. The work of a Christian differs from a similar work performed by an infidel, not merely in respect to the person for whom it is performed, but differs in its inmost nature and substance, the two things, indeed, having nothing in common but form and name. It is not, however, asserted that he only is in a position to do good, who has become conscious of a Christian life within him. Moral good, in its concrete reality, in other words, the Holy Spirit, so far as it produces free actions conformable to the law of God, is an objective power, which is also efficacious, in the preliminary stages of moral development, and must be acknowledged paramount, wherever human action depends on a principle of life not in opposition to the Holy Spirit. Nor is it difficult by this means to perceive correspondencies to the true good, in other words, a reflection of Christian morality, in some who are destitute of the Christian life. In such cases, however, inward independence in moral action, proper free-agency which is conditioned on the living communion with God, and is the essential, fundamental principle of good action, is wanting; so that the scientific result is always the same. But in contemplating this result, we hold that the question, whether the nature of religion consists in action, cannot be lost sight of, so long as you adhere to the rationalistic or deistic idea of morality, so long as you do not limit the expression morality, and place the living Christian idea, which we express by the word righteousness, as the only scientific idea, in its place.

However the aforesaid question may be viewed, we are still unable to answer it in the negative. When, for example, admission to the kingdom of heaven is made to depend upon doing the will of God, the essence of religion is clearly placed in action. Still more to the point is the expression of John: do the truth, compared with another, the truth shall make free. The expression of James, that the man shall be blessed in his deed, may be taken perhaps as the most decisive proof-text, for the practical idea of religion. Moreover, no one will doubt, that sin is a practical conception, nor that conversion, implying an entire change of the whole religious condition, is brought about by an act of the will. Is it even evident that no manifestation of the religious life, certainly no progress in the same, can be thought of,

1 In a similar way, the Christian is subjected to the influence of the unsanctified part of his nature, so that his works and feelings proceed partly from mere nature, and are consequently of perishable value, and partly from nature intermingled with grace.
except as connected with, conditioned on, and produced by some action. Progress in knowledge, for example, is conditioned on a determination to the same, and the degree of this knowledge depends upon the strength of this determination; so prayer, the production of artistic exhibitions, such as songs, orations, and the like. Thus we have neither in the Scriptures nor in experience, any reason for supposing that religion does not consist essentially in action.

Because in the school of Schleiermacher, religion can neither be knowledge nor action, its disciples infer, as the only thing that remains, that it belongs to immediate self-consciousness; in other words, to the feelings. Feeling and consciousness are not properly the same thing; but by the word consciousness, we mean something deeper, more comprehensive, than by the word feeling. But it is also evident, that consciousness, as often as a definite psychological application is made of it, might be transformed again into feeling, and so both be nearly synonymous. We, therefore, shall make use of the latter expression in which the Schleiermacher doctrine first received an intelligible form. Religion, say they, is feeling. Proof: in the first place, universal intuition, when it relates to the heart. This accords with the old Lutheran definition; according to which, religion is essentially dilectio Dei. But love is a feeling; so also repentance, remorse, dependence on God, joy in God; all these are manifestations of pious feeling. Furthermore, prayer and devotion, which bring to view the proper nature of religion, are of the same character. Most evidently, it is added, the correctness of this apprehension becomes apparent in states of higher devotion, as trances, visions, speaking with tongues, all which are evidently set forth in the New Testament, as belonging to the highest degree of religious perfection. There is then no pious condition, in which feeling might not exist, while there are those in which knowledge and action have but little if any influence. As to the objection, that in this, religion would have a purely subjective character, it is answered, that knowledge is not purely objective, nor can it be denied, that religion, in order to permeate the whole being, should be defined as subjectively as possible.

By this explanation, we are brought against the peculiar fashionable obscurities and errors of the times, the avoidance of which is of the highest importance to theological science. We here refer especially to the ideas of love and prayer just presented. We affirm that love is not strictly a feeling. On the contrary, it is the highest kind of action, the most powerful and comprehensive operation of will.
For it consists in the coming forth out of the proper I, in an entire renunciation of the I, in itself considered, in the giving one's self away to another person or assemblage of persons. It is wishing to be and to live in others, and a course of action corresponding thereto. Love is never necessarily itself a feeling. It is indeed, according to human experience, conditioned on a feeling of want. But this is not the case with God. On the contrary, you have to suppose that in the creation of man, through a resolution of Divine love, such a relation of God to man was first established, that in consequence, God, without his fellowship with man, would experience a sense of want. In like manner, must the sense of want among men be awakened by a resolution, so that the giving one's self away to another being precedes all sense of necessity of thus giving one's self away, and the former never can be fully explained as arising out of the latter. Love is further accompanied by feelings of joy, blessedness, etc. But these feelings are not one and the same as love. It may indeed be accompanied by feelings, which are contrary to its own nature. For it is characteristic of love to strive after a perfect harmony, between the loving and the loved. If this harmony cannot be reached, then love is accompanied with a feeling of dissatisfaction which appears in the form of an all-consuming restlessness. But love itself is not consequently diminished, but perhaps becomes stronger than ever. Love may come to the determination to renounce the beloved object, without itself ceasing to exist, so that a rest follows, which has nothing in common with the desire of love. Even when love has attained its desired end, it is by no means an absolute feeling of satisfaction, but the feeling of anxiety, of sorrow, etc., is connected with the most perfect abandonment of self to the object beloved. If now such various feelings can be connected with love, and the several kinds of feeling rise and fall again, without love itself undergoing any essential change thereby, then it is certain that love itself is not synonymous with feeling, but it is something which transcends feeling, which controls it; in other words, love is an act of the free-will.

Similar remarks may be made respecting prayer. This is used in our later science in a sense the most subjective possible, and we must say in a sense the weakest possible. If prayer is nothing more than an expression of devout feeling, then it is either an expression of anguish, of want, or of joy and contentment, according to the momentary character of a person's state of mind. Certainly it could not be an address, arising from a determination to pray in consequence of an express command of God, without any reference to the presence
or the absence, the strength or the weakness of inward emotion. The same may be said of striving and wrestling in prayer, especially as it occurs in times of temptation; for we fight against hostile powers, not by feelings, but by acts of the free-will. But prayer is really a very active exercise. So far as it utters itself in supplication and intercession, it is the expression of an earnest desire, and so it is a manifestation of will. A good man who finds himself unable, in obedience to the Divine command to break down his own will, prays. He endeavors to make the will of another subservient to himself, just as the person who commands, only not in the same way. So it is with prayer. Its design is, to give the will of God a definite direction towards our salvation; also to make his will serviceable to the human will, and consequently to exert a definite influence upon the Divine government. This idea of prayer is not too bold, but as all the exhortations and promises enforcing the duty, and especially as the history of Jacob's wrestling by night, go to show, it is the simple Scriptural idea; and it is one of the principal faults of the doctrine of Schleiermacher, that the true idea of prayer has been so completely abandoned.

This false conception of the nature of prayer appears somewhat more plausible when applied to adoration, thanksgiving, etc. But this plausibility has no foundation except that in adoration feeling becomes a very powerful element of the devotional exercise, it being a high form of spiritual manifestation, and therefore including within itself a high degree of mental concentration. But adoration is in itself likewise an act of the will, in one of its highest exhibitions. For it is the giving one's self away to God, the declaration of unconditional submission, and that profound reverence which is his due. Hence, also, these utterances of the spirit in the Sacred Scriptures are represented as an offering, consequently removing them from the circle of mere feeling. What, on the contrary, in modern speech, is understood by adoration, or as it is more commonly expressed, by devotion (we here distinguish between the modern sentimental use of the word, and the true Christian use of it), is a condition, in which the natural man commits himself intentionally to his obscure religious feelings, and in this obscurity finds enjoyment. Prayer, then, in its twofold form, need not be looked upon as proceeding from a consciousness of want on the part of man. Pure Christian prayer has a different origin. It is the fruit of obedience to a Divine command: Thou hast said, Seek ye my face,—Thy face, Lord, will I seek, Ps. 1. Ask and it shall be given you,—I will that men pray in all places, etc.
And out of this obedience, arises an independent inclination, which, however, constantly needs to be enlivened, and newly awakened by the spirit of obedience.

They say further that repentance, confidence in God, etc. are feelings and are of a religious character. That this, however, as respects repentance, is not the case, we have striking evidence in the repentance of Judas. There is no need of any knowledge of God in order to experience some forms of repentance. It may exist in an atheist as well as in a Christian. Confidence in God is of course a religious feeling, and joy in God is also a Christian sentiment. But can a dogmatic view of God, received objectively from Him, be less religious in itself considered, than these feelings? Finally, it is evident in respect to these feelings, that religion, when essentially feeling, is also a matter of fact; as this cannot be denied, it is sufficient to establish the proposition in question.

If a person should now bring forward ecstasies and visions to prove that religion consists in feeling, the case may be examined on its own merits. Vision is a peculiar kind of supernatural percipieny, which can hardly be brought under the common psychological nomenclature, but belongs rather to the theoretic departments of intellectual life. Ecstasy is not a mere elevation of feeling, but according to the words, 2 Cor. 12: 3, εἰς ἐν σῴματι, εἰς ὅλα, κ. τ. λ., is such an extraordinary departure from usual conditions, and appears so completely disconnected from customary religious development, that it cannot properly be taken into the account. The case is different in respect to speaking with tongues. That this is a purely religious phenomenon, in which thinking and acting predominate, almost in opposition to feeling, cannot be denied. According to Paul, this gift has merely a selfish, personal value, and does not belong to the highest conditions of the religious life.

Finally, we have a word more to say against the doctrine in question, drawn from the commonly received view of religion, as a matter of the heart. Warmth, inwardness, animation, with which Divine truth is received or expressed, and by which it can be commonly ascertained whether religion may be a matter of the heart or not, is represented as always belonging to the feelings. But experience does not indicate that where there is the greatest warmth, there is always the highest degree of religion. On the contrary, there are innumerable examples of highly excited and by no means hypocritical feeling, in connection with which may be found an unexpectedly small measure of the otherwise necessary charac-
teristics of the religious life; for example, knowledge, conscientious-
ness, etc. On the other hand, frequently a singularly moderate
measure of feeling, a certain coolness of the understanding hides from
view a very strong and pure devotion. As to the second case, it
need not be overlooked, that the expression "heart" is applied just
as correctly to a high degree of courage, spirit of enterprise, and the
like. No one would understand by a hearty warrior, a man full of
feeling. The expression "heart" denotes here nothing more nor
less than the centre of the soul’s life, the concrete expression of
life, without regard to its psychological analysis, or its more external
parts.

While almost all the arguments, according to which religion con-
ists in feeling, have by degrees disappeared, there are certain oppo-
sing considerations which must not be passed over in silence. First
of all, is the fact that, while the term feeling is never found in the
Scriptures, its meaning is rarely found in them. What comes near-
est to it are such expressions as these: joy, rejoice in the Lord, etc.,
sorrow, godly sorrow in distinction from the sorrow of the world, but
especially the term blessedness. Of these expressions, only the lat-
ter occurs so frequently, and in such clear positions, that we can
make any use of it in our investigation. It must, indeed, be shown,
that blessedness and religion are essentially the same. That such is
not the case has been already proved. For prayer to Christ, for in-
estance, which brings blessedness along with it, only as a conseque-
cence or as an attendant feeling, but does not involve the idea of blessed-
ness, can be offered without this feeling. Nor is it by any means
ture, that a person is religious in proportion to his happiness, but on
the contrary, there is frequently much religion where there is but
little joyous feeling. Religion, then, is not the same thing as blessed-
ess or happiness, and so in this respect is not feeling.

In the next place, out of this aesthetic idea of religion arise many
highly suspicious consequences. If religion were feeling, then the
fine arts, when employed on religious subjects, would furnish the
highest form of religion, higher even than prayer, preaching and
improvement of the word, the sacramental supper, etc. For art is
neither a matter of the will nor of the understanding, but of feeling,
because it has to do with beauty. Accordingly, the chorals of Lu-
ther would be more religious than his sermons; a piece of passion
music or an "ecce homo" superior in this respect to the discourses
of Augustine; St. Peter’s church at Rome would express more devo-
tion than the magnificent religious service performed in it. Then
further, according to a commonly received opinion, the female sex live more in feeling than the male sex; consequently female piety would be a higher expression of religion than masculine piety, which concerns itself more in objects of knowledge and action. And when through advancing years feeling subsides, and everything, even that which is of a religious nature, comes to be considered more as an object of reflection and action, piety would diminish. It would become less and less as age increased, till its very spirit might go to the grave with the form that contained it. With such an idea of religion, the entire order of the religious life would be reversed. Indeed, so long as feeling is taken in the sense of Schleiermacher, or in the polemic sense of the Hegelian school, religion itself is in fact destroyed. For if feeling is the proper seat of religion, then, as has been frequently remarked, in opposition to Schleiermacherism, the rise of a theology and of a Divine service would be impossible. That feeling cannot be described in words and ideas is an acknowledged proposition. As the most it can do, it may suffer itself to be translated into the peculiar language of feeling, poetry, music, and, most of all, the fine arts. But here it cannot bear the touchstone of truth, and finally turns out to be a failing as before. Moreover, it is not true that feeling really produces fellowship. That this is not the fact the Apostle teaches when speaking of the gift of tongues, 1 Cor. xiv. But in truth feeling is just as much repellent as connective. For, whenever there is a necessity for sharing joy and sorrow with others, the ultimate ground of this communication is not the advancement of an objective end, but the advancement of one's own life; while for the undertaking of a common enterprise, in which every one bears his own proportion, there would be no ground whatever.

We cannot forbear alleging, against the aesthetic idea of religion, a one-sided subjectivity. That religion must be subjective, and that knowledge cannot be purely objective, because both would then lose their vitality, we are far from denying. But the objective can become subjective without ceasing to be objective. For a civil law, though not arising from the feeling of an individual citizen, yet when heartily received by the subject, becomes of course subjective, while it still retains its original objectivity.

If, now, we were to draw a conclusion from all that has been advanced, it would be this: that religion might consist in knowledge as well as in action and feeling; in other words, in neither of the three. We are not at all aided by their mere juxtaposition. If one should imagine the elements intermingled in an equal proportion, the ques-
tion immediately returns, which element gives to the mixture its
proper character? Or what is the result of this mixture, the fourth
element, arising out of the three? Absolute equality of mixture,
is an indifference of elements, in respect to each other. Absolute
equilibrium is death in the spiritual as well as in the physical life.
An attempt has been made to discover a higher power than the three,
in which the three may be united. Such an attempt, for instance, is
the above mentioned treatise of Tzeller, to which before proceeding
further, we must return.

Religion, according to Tzeller, is neither action, nor knowledge,
nor feeling, but a pathological condition, in which everything turns
on the personal relation in which the human being stands to God.
It is a relation of person to person, of the finite subject to the absolute
subject, and through this condition, the various theoretic and moral
activities become religious. The great effort of the religious man,
according to Tzeller, is to become happy. This happiness consists
in an intuitive vision of God, a perfect knowledge of the absolute
Deity. Unquestionably the learned author, in these remarks, has
opened some clear and correct views respecting the nature of religion.
But, as we have already remarked, and as might have been supposed
from the word, knowledge of Deity, he is treating of something com-
prehensible, viz. of knowledge. The end of religion is an adequate
knowledge of the idea of God, which, according to his opinion, can
be reached only by philosophy. If that is the end of religion, its be-
ginning, its thus far concealed root, is no other than knowledge.
While one treats in religion about the knowledge of an idea, he does
not treat of a person; for, that a person is not an idea and an idea is
not a person, even an Hegelian — from the view of the distinguished
author — will not at this day presume to deny. For the peculiarity
and independency of religion has here also as little continuity as
elsewhere in the department of the Hegelian school. Moreover,
Tzeller does not hold to the universal, philosophically inherent ne-
cessity of this knowledge of God as being a form of religion. For
of what use is a lower form when there is a higher one in which it
must be swallowed up? Can a want find place in the perfect to lean
upon the imperfect? or shall that want as an absolute demand of
personality be allowed to remain as an unexplained matter of fact?
Where, then, is the absolute law of philosophy?

But indeed with those first most excellent remarks, only one side
of religion comes into notice, and the investigation, if it had gone
further, in the first beaten track, would have returned to the usual
result. First of all, we must demand an explanation, how that pathological condition may be considered psychologically. Where the discourse is psychological, we imagine a σώφροσυν, a suffering, a susceptibility or something of the kind. Now a man is susceptible either while he perceives something, or while he allows some object to affect his desire, or while he is conscious of his own condition, as an individual or in connection with the whole, being determined by some person without. In which of the three last elements referred to is a person pathologically conditioned? We abide by the most conclusive of the expressions of Tzeller, that blessedness consists pathologically in this, that a person becomes conscious of his condition as it is determined by his relation to God, as being a condition corresponding to his nature. But in this case, religion seems to approximate feeling, and we stand again at the threshold of the idea of Schleiermacher. If it is said that neither of the three are meant, as Tzeller originally maintained, but something which comprehends the whole man, the expression "pathologie" stands in the way. For religion includes not merely conditions but also activities, such as conversion, which under the given suppositions ought not to be considered as a pathological condition.

But what is of more importance, to be happy is not the exclusive interest of religion, nor even its highest interest. The practical, that is to say, the pastoral application of religious truth, may express the nature of religion, as though it were the chief care of man to obtain a sure hope of everlasting life. But science has reason enough in Scripture, as it has in common religious life, to seek out a still higher position. This is evident from the arrangement of the Lord's prayer, and of the ten commandments. If the commandments having reference to the being, name and kingdom of God, are first put down, then those which direct individual and social life; and if in the second instance prayer is offered for hallowing the name of God, for the coming of his kingdom, for the doing of his will in heaven and on earth before the subjective need of forgiveness of sins, deliverance from temptation, etc., is thought of, then it cannot be denied that this by no means accidental arrangement must furnish the right point of view for the explanation of the religious idea. Accordingly, the effort of the religious man is not first, and still less exclusively, to obtain his own salvation, but that God may be honored and his will may be done. Of course, the latter includes the former. For whenever the human individual does not prevent nor pervert the forth-going of the kingdom of God by opposition thereto, the blessedness of humanity as a whole, is nat-
Remarks on the Idea of Religion. [April,

urally furthered thereby. It may be said that the honor of God is secured, not only in them that are saved, but also in them that are lost; hence prayer for hallowing the name of God includes a confession that his name ought to be hallowed in the wicked, by their condemnation. But in the thought of hallowing the name of God is included also the thought of human salvation. The objective brings the subjective along with it; the former indeed produces the latter. The same however is not true of the subjective in relation to the objective, for it is not only possible but actually happens, that, for example, an individual prays for the pardon of his sins, without thereby and without therefor having a desire that the will of God may be done in the universe, and the kingdom of God universally established. But to return.

It is evident that, according to those passages which are used for the explanation of the religious idea, something more than a mere subjective perception must be obtained; an objective point of view must be found. How high this objectivity rises in the Scriptures, we have a remarkable instance in the earnest desire of Moses expressed in Ex. 32: 32: "Forgive them their sins, if not, blot me also out of thy book, which thou hast written." And in the words of the Apostle, Rom. 9: 3: "I could wish myself accursed from Christ, for my brethren, for my kindred according to the flesh." Here, if anywhere, the highest degree of the religious life is in the right place. Such expressions must be understood as the almost superhuman concentration of all the powers of the religious life, or else as insanity. Still more conclusive is the thought expressed in Gal. 3: 13, where Christ becomes a curse for us, that the blessing may be conferred upon the heathen. While in the case of Moses and of Paul, etc. there is but a momentary thought of the renunciation of their own blessedness for the sake of that of others, in the latter case there is the actual accomplishment of this renunciation. One shrinks with awe from receiving the words in this amazing sense. Schleiermacher's doctrine of the untroubled felicity of Christ, is entirely destroyed by it. But we cannot explain the deepest conceptions of Scripture on this point in such a way as to exclude the idea of real truth. Much better does our opinion, agreeably to the expression in Galatians, agree with the words of Christ on the cross, in which he represents himself as being forsaken of God, and with the nature of the agony in the garden of Olives, and also with Heb. 4: 15, where, according to the evident meaning of the author, an actual forsaking of Christ on the part of God is intended, though this forsaking is to be under-
stood only as an actual withdrawal of heavenly felicity by a Divine act. Consequently, until a more satisfactory explanation of these very mysterious words is given, we claim them, in their full extent, on our side. Moreover, it appears to us that those expressions of Moses and Paul first find their true explanation, when we perceive that the actual banishment of Christ from God may serve for the real foundation of them. Perhaps we ought to add that, if what those men desired, had not actually been fulfilled in Christ, both of them would have attained in their thoughts to a higher degree of self-renunciation than Christ himself had attained in his act. Finally, there remains to us the passage, 1 Cor. 15: 28, where the θεὸς τὰ νάσα ἐν νασῷ is spoken of as the ultimate end of believing desire, in the realization of which a condition is brought to view, where the individual with his salvation completely in God ascends or descends, so to speak, in him. Whatever meaning may be given to this forever unsayable passage, thus much is evident from it that, when the whole work of God is completed, believers together with Christ will then be united in a manner far transcending anything which has yet fallen within the circle of human consciousness.

If, now, we place together such Scripture passages as these on the scientific scale, numerous explanations of religion by Tzeller and others—which rising on the ground of a Scriptural theology are included in it—will be found too light, and it will appear in the course of our investigations, that the objective phenomena of religion demand much firmer foundations, in order to be applied to the construction of a valuable religious science. But that we have until now remained so far behind the demands, which the subject itself makes upon us, must not be attributed as a fault to individual philosophers and theologians, nor even to science itself. Tzeller's idea of religion, as also the Hegelian, and that of Schleiermacher, and others like them, are the offspring of their times. They are not merely the scientific setting, but they are the scientific reflections of religion, as it actually and practically existed at a given period. Theology and philosophy have described to us just what and only what they saw. We do not overlook the fact, that this scientific mode of viewing the subject, together with the phenomena of life out of which it springs, has struck its roots too deeply into the soil of our times, has spread too far abroad, and gone up too completely into the highest branches, to leave it possible for another system (which is just as much the result of an entirely altered state of the public life) to secure reception in the wider circles, or even to be clearly set forth or carried out.
to its logical results. In the meanwhile, we wish to collect such materials for a new construction of theological and philosophical science, as have been produced by the powerful revolutions of our later history, and to express our thoughts about the form of the contemplated construction. Perhaps we may hit the right point, or at least give an impulse to further inquiry.

If we now put together the various attempts at the transformation of the religious idea as they have lately been made, there appears in them a threefold effort, through which a threefold defect of the commonly received notion may be corrected. Religion has been defined as a life, to avoid the one-sidedness of the psychological idea, according to which it would consist in knowing, feeling, or acting. It has been defined, again, as a fellowship, to avoid the one-sidedness which would belong to it, if taken as a property of the individual life. It has, finally, been defined as an act of God, to avoid the one-sidedness which would belong to it as proceeding from man, instead of the source of all existence, religion not excepted. By uniting these points of view, thus far considered important only in an individual way, a key may be found for solving our problem. We begin the argument with this last point.

There appears, indeed, in the first place, no reason why the idea of God should not be put forward in religion as well as in everything else which has to be referred to its ultimate cause. Religion is indeed a phenomenon which belongs to the nature of humanity; but as humanity is produced by a Divine act, so is religion. The Pauline proposition, that we are not sufficient to do or think anything as of ourselves, but that our sufficiency is of God, and the other proposition, that it is God who worketh in us both to will and to do, must furnish the starting point for our idea of religion. Religion is an act of the Holy Spirit—or an act of God. Instead of rising from a knowledge of the individual life to a knowledge of the collective life of Christian fellowship or of the church, and from thence to a knowledge of God and his more perfect manifestation, we receive the idea of God, as the fundamental principle of all religious knowledge, and descend from that to the idea of the church, and finally embrace the whole religious life in all its parts. This latter method should be taken as the foundation of the former; the objective view of religion serves for setting forth the subjective, not vice versa. Religion is a Divine act, a well considered and predetermined manifestation by God of himself in humanity. Hence the possibility of explaining the fellowship of humanity with God. This fellowship with God
can no more be explained from the nature of humanity nor indeed of the individual man, than the idea of God can be developed out of the idea of man. The existence of God is the cause of human existence. Consequently, fellowship with man must be first comprehended in the idea of God, not fellowship with God in the idea of man. That this is so will be seen when we have proved the first part of the position. Our affirmation is, that the knowledge of God is first, self-knowledge, second. Humanity comes through the knowledge of God to its self-knowledge, and not through self-knowledge to the knowledge of God. The phenomenon, the obvious development of self-knowledge, not the nature of this entity, is now before us. If out of the fact of self-knowledge, the fact of the knowledge of God might be made to follow by logical development, then the latter would be only a property, an element of the former; the original would be only a part of the derived.

“I am; I am, but not without God; therefore God is.” That would be the conclusion of which this view is the foundation. But while I consider the idea of God, and refer it to the idea of the Ego, I invert the conclusion; the absolute and actual being is God, for my being is only possible and a subject of thought under the supposition that God is. So the supposition becomes clear, God is; but because my being is actually connected with the being of God, it follows that I also am. Self-consciousness cannot be equal to a consciousness of God, still less predominate over it, but must be subordinate to it, both in idea and fact.

If such is the case with these two opposing ideas, we must look for something intermediate, namely, the idea of religion, to connect them together. The reference of the I to God in human self-knowledge, as in human life generally, comes not through the idea of the I, but first through the idea of God, the former being derived from the latter. Concretely expressed, the fellowship of God with man is not established by man, but by God; out of this divinely established fellowship of God with man springs then the fellowship of man with God. The influence of this apparently little change becomes obvious, as soon as we understand how to apply both the one perception and the other to the development of some theological opinion. If you proceed in the way marked out, there will be no difficulty in the explanation of such facts as the incarnation of Christ, the operation of the Divine Word, the Church and the sacrament. Religion is a fellowship established by God between himself and humanity. The incarnation is a miraculous act, foreordained in the Divine arrangement of things, and in fulness of time accomplished, by means of
which act, fellowship with God broken off by man, or neglected, might be restored. The Word is a divinely appointed and necessary means for the foundation, construction, and vitalization of this fellowship. The same is true of the sacraments, only with this difference, that here God makes use of certain natural elements to accomplish his purposes. The church, considered as an organized whole, is a fellowship established or renewed by the Divine act. In all applications of this idea, the grand characteristic, without which these subjects cannot be understood, is the Divine act.

If now we seek to derive the same ideas out of religion as viewed by Schleiermacher, we stumble at the very first step. "Religion is an absolute feeling of dependence." But, can we derive out of this absolute feeling of dependence the incarnation or the sending of the Holy Spirit, even though we add to it a reference to Jesus of Nazareth? In other ideas, for instance, that of prayer, of repentance, of faith, etc., the derivation can be made without an apparent deficiency of logical consequence. But to the idea of religion now set forth, everything which forms an essential part of theology, is directly referred; as in jurisprudence every subject is referred to the established idea of law.

The same is true with the Hegelian idea of religion as originally presented, where religion is set forth, in the form of its presentation, as the knowledge of the absolute; also with the opinion of Tzeller, according to which, religion is a pathological relation, relating exclusively to man's happiness. Never can it be shown that the Lord's Supper originated in consequence of any conceivable development of human reasoning. Nor is it possible for the church to refer its origin to man's desire of happiness. The latter supposition would be an absolute contradiction to historical fact, according to which the church is an ordinance of the Son of God, a fellowship founded on his authority, and sustained by his agency. The former case is positively absurd, and affords nothing better than a scientific contradiction. The ideas above mentioned are actually not derivable from the system of Schleiermacher and Hegel, but are forced in, wherever there is a convenient place for them. Whatever might be developed out of the fundamental principles of the aforesaid schools, there would be, for example, in the Lord's Supper, only the desire of a person feeling himself absolutely dependent on Jesus and referring his dependence to the supper, and the effects which the ceremonial produces upon him, etc. And when, finally, Hegel considers worship as an activity which is to be referred to no other than this same concrete principle, it is easy
to see how entirely insufficient such a view of the nature of religion is, for the scientific construction of religious doctrine, when the very last trace of the influence of God upon man is excluded from worship and religion.

We hope, in what has been said, we have so clearly explained ourselves, that we shall not be charged with holding to a view of religion, by which God himself would be designated as religious. When we explain religion as an act of God manifesting and imparting himself to man, we do not say that this act of God himself springs from religion, but only that religion is created by this act. When God is the author of religion, he is no more on that account religious than he is worldly, because he has created the world, or human, because he has made man. The misunderstanding through which our principles might be reduced to an absurdity, rests on a change of religion, from the objective to the subjective sense, and will be entirely removed further on, when we come to speak about the expression, "Religion itself." But the scientific claim, hitherto set up, speaks for itself.

Next to this first and principal claim we have a second to make. We have from the beginning avoided the expression, religion is a fellowship of God with man, and have used instead the word, humanity. This word, man, seems to us here wholly insufficient; for neither in creation nor in redemption, nor in the termination of the world, has God to do with this or that creature, in his individual capacity, but he has to do with an articulated whole, with an organism, with the individual members of this organism only as they are members of it, or if not members, then only as they are capable of becoming such. We imagine the creation of man not in this way, that God willed to call into being a certain limited number of individual personalities, in his image; but in this way, that from the beginning the question is about the presentation of a humanity which, considered in a downward direction, in its ever recurring totality, should make out the head, the middle point and the connection of that part of our creation which is not in the Divine image, but, in reference to what is above on the contrary; should be bound mutually together as an articulated whole, through its communion with God, and that too whether this connection may have been already completed in itself, or, on the supposition of an apostasy, by the incarnation of the Son of God. We think of the idea of the Divine image in man, not as if every man in his individual capacity were a complete image of God; this would be too atomical and mechanical.
God's creation partakes much more of a universal life; the organic is an essential characteristic of his work from the greatest down to the least. It is not easy to see how a perpetual series of individual human creations would promote the revelation of God, when every new specimen would be merely a repetition of the preceding. We should rather say that every individual man reflects the Divine image only in part, the complete manifestation being realized only in the sum total of humanity, including every person from Adam and Eve down to the end of time. It is therefore easy to understand why a series of human generations must rise and fall in order to bring the thoughts of God into manifestation. Here then we have a sufficiently complete point of view for the historical development of humanity. It would moreover be entirely impossible, that the perfection of God should be mirrored in a single human being. This is conceivable only of that being who stands at the head of all humanity. Every other individual of the human race reveals only a part of the Deity. But wherever a part is truly present, the whole being connected with it is in some sense present also; hence it is not improper to say that every man is an image of God. As this must be confessed of individual persons, it is also true of individual families, tribes, nations, so that every people must be considered as a partial representation of the Divine being, but the whole human race together, the perfect representation. This is just what the Sacred Scriptures say of the relation of the church as a whole and of every individual member of the church to Christ. In every individual Christian, Christ must be formed; but in every one, as many passages show, especially those where the church is called the body of Christ, he must be formed in a peculiar, partial manner, in a manner which requires all the other members to complete the formation. The church, as a whole, not the individual Christian, is the body of Christ, as appears from 1 Cor. 12: 12. Exactly in this New Testament view, may be found the biblical justification of the sentiment we have expressed concerning the image of God. For the church is not something absolutely new but only the carrying out, through Christ, of the original plan of Divine manifestation, ordained from the beginning. Humanity was originally destined to be what it has since become through Christ, and such it would have been if the apostasy had not intervened. In this we say nothing new, but maintain the pure biblical thought, that redemption is a second or new creation.

Humanity is thus out and out a body. According to this, we do not consider the progress of renewal in Christ as it is carried forward
by the Word and ordinances, as if here and there an individual was newly created and appended to the existing whole, with which previously he had no connection; but, because every man and every people is already a member in the great body politic of humanity, but this body is dead through the apostasy so that every new member brings death in a spiritual sense along with it, our question, therefore, generally speaking, respects the reviving of the body. The proper original power of humanity to produce personalities, that is to say, manifestations of God by his image in man, must be restored. The soul of humanity, or what is better, its spirit, its pneumatic power, must be awakened, new-created, in order that its organizing activity may be able to act again, as the body of Sarah was quickened anew, that it might be able to bring forth a human person in the natural sense. This comes to pass, through the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Through this act of God, the power of spiritual generation is restored again to the unfruitful body of humanity. The restoration commenced in an appointed organ of the body, in the people of Israel, and the body thus quickened in this most important organ, becomes the first community. But by means of the articulated connection in which the whole humanity stands with the people of Israel, and this people again with the first fruits of the same, and by means of the living connection between these first fruits or the new humanity and its head, Christ, the whole humanity is ideally, or if you please, mystically, vivified again. For Christ is not merely the life of Israel but of the whole world. Humanity is now transformed into the church. Humanity as such is renewed, not merely a small part of the individual persons belonging to it. From the very moment when Christ took away death reigning in it according to its nature, and imparted to it for the second time its original principles of life, the renewal began.

If now we compare these propositions with the commonly received view, it will not be difficult to perceive the difference. The common view takes its rise from man as an individual, develops the various sides of his being, according to which he needs the complement, in order to realize his conception, that is, in order to become as an individual what he as an individual might become, and out of this necessity, explains the social union constituting the religious fellowship which we call the church. Humanity, according to this, is not originally an inseparable articulated whole, to which every individual man belongs, as a limb belongs to the body, and in which every one feels himself to be a limb of the body, but it is at first only a general
idea, and becomes an actuality only by these scattered limbs moving together through a common attraction in orderly march — the monades uniting by pre-established harmony — till out of the intersection of the radii there arises a centre. The process would perhaps be the same as that by which the old atomic philosophy produced the creation of the world out of the unexplainable congregating of unnumbered primitive particles. The view we have advanced, makes the process like that in Ezekiel xxxvii, where the bones move and come together. In this parable, if you look beneath the surface, you find the very view which we have presented. First, indeed, the passage speaks only of a multitude of scattered fragments, which stand in no connection with each other, but the circumstance that they are the bones of the dead and so fragments which formerly existed together as they are about to exist again, brings us to the conclusion that before the mind of the prophet there was the form of a body when he contemplated Israel, in its original character. Besides, in this parable, there is no indication that the parts were brought together and quickened into life by any naturally inherent power. But Ezekiel speaks of a power standing above them, the breath of life, a soul, through which they are brought together again. In a word, it is our opinion, that in the fellowship of religion, in like manner, the whole preceded the parts. The quickening of the individual man must be considered as a consequence of the quickening of humanity. The founding of Christ's kingdom on the earth is the reason why individual men come into fellowship with God; the new birth of individual men, and the conduct of such men, springing out of the new birth, is not the reason for establishing Christ's kingdom and founding the church. If what we have now advanced is correct, it follows that, when you wish to explain the nature of religion, you will not need to speak of a fellowship between God and the individual man, but a fellowship of God and of humanity, and the relation of the individual to God can be understood only by its connection with the whole. We must not, however, understand this as if God could have no intercourse with the individual except through the medium of the whole. This would be an impracticable thought; for there must be somewhere a point through which the power and operation of God enters the whole, and that point can be no other than some individual man, through whom the Divine working passes on to the remaining members. If, now, in any instance this individual member should not be the head, but some humbler member, though a most important one, there seems to be no good reason why the working of God should
not come into the body total, through the humbler member, even though it be in a humbler way. This in fact is the case. God stands with every member of the whole, partly in a mediate and partly in an immediate relation. Every member to a certain extent, and according to its importance, can become the middle point for the whole. That is the conditioned independence of the individual upon the whole. On this account, you can properly say, that the relation in which the member stands to the whole body, may be dependent on the relation in which it stands to the head of the body, to God. But never can the individual member be organized with God, in a state of dismemberment, when, in such a state, especially as respects the head of humanity, Christ, it could not exist. But its fellowship with God is obtained by the restoration of its membership to the whole body of humanity; by means of the generating power again restored to the body politic through the Holy Spirit, the member is renewed according to its original destination. Thus much has been said to avoid a misunderstanding, to which we might be exposed by the above arrangement of individual and whole, and by the mediate connection with God which we have set forth.

We now proceed to the third point, the psychological question: To which of the intellectual faculties does religion belong? In the first place, it is evident that the question no longer turns upon the problem of bringing the idea of religion into a definite section of psychology. We have set forth religion as the result of a Divine act—an act which seeks the advancement of humanity as a whole, in its peculiar collective life. In this may be found our answer to the question in hand. Religion is neither knowing nor acting nor feeling. It is life, nothing more, nothing less than the life of humanity; not a certain form or expression of life, but the collected life itself. We limit the idea only by saying, that it is this life, so far as God has bestowed it, so far as it is a communion with God. For humanity depends, on the other side, upon its connection with the world, living in and with the world, being also a part of the world. This worldly side of the entire life of humanity, falls without the circumference of religion, and stands in opposition to it, under the name of worldly life; for this reason we might characterize religion by the expression, God-life, a term for the choice of which we have scriptural authority, in the words: Thou man of God flee such things, etc. The question no longer turns on distinguishing religion from single expressions of life, science, art, etc. For these are only forms of life, not the life itself; but religion is the actual concrete life of hu-
Remarks on the Idea of Religion. [April,

manity. God, the absolute life, lives in humanity, and humanity is God, just as the life of humanity on the side of nature lives in the world and the world in it. Religion and the being of humanity are in a certain sense completely identical conceptions. For being, indeed, is of two kinds, absolute being, having in itself the power to break through all limitations of time and place, in other words, eternity (immortality is too weak an expression), and conditional being or that which is perishable. The former only is properly and really being. Now the nature of humanity and man is to live forever, for eternity is involved in the very idea of God's image. But religion subjectively considered, is God's image, eternity; hence religion, in the absolute sense, may be designated as no other than the being of humanity. As soon as we separate the idea of religion from the idea of humanity, we destroy the latter unconditionally and entirely, just as we destroy the idea of conditional humanity when we take the worldly life away from it; and as it is with humanity as a whole, so is it with man as an individual. Man is religious, in other words, he is. A man who is not religious, is absolutely not. His being is the mere appearance of being, unconditional nothing in the outward form of something, death in the attributes of life. As now we would not raise the question whether human life consists in knowing or acting or feeling, and as it is self-evident that it embraces all three, it is equally clear, that the question ought not to be raised in religion. If religion is life and indeed the life of humanity, it may just as well be a knowing as action and feeling; science belongs to it no more than art, and art no more than legislation, government, etc.; they are all important to it.

The case is different, if we raise the question: whether, generally speaking, these three intellectual faculties (assuming that they have been rightly set forth), are equivalent to each other in the life, so that we must say, not only that religion is at the same time threefold and one of the three as much as another, but also, it is one in the same sense as another. The latter supposition is an impossibility. For, as we have said above, an exact mathematical equivalence of several forces working together in a life, would be the destruction of the very idea of life. Working and counterworking, attraction and repulsion, opposition, are essential to the life. But where there is opposition, there is no unconditional equilibrium; for while the one force rules, the other must serve, and in general the ruling must be more on the side of the one, the serving on the side of the other force. As certain as sound psychology shows that, generally speaking, one of the
intellectual activities assumes preeminence over the others, so cer-
tainly do we affirm of religion, that one of those three forces must, in a certain sense, be first, and make out the proper seat of religion, and so our first question returns again.

It might, indeed, beforehand, excite suspicion of our affirmations, if that question should appear altogether superfluous; for it is hardly supposable that science would continually return to this point, when it offers no scientific interest connected with the nature of our subject. But, in fact, the new problem has been somewhat changed, as we approach it from an entirely different direction. According to the former mode of treating the subject, the hypothesis of our investigation is simply the existence of the I, as that in which religion is, and it only remains for us to find the proper place for it in the I. Here, on the contrary, we come prepared with the idea of God, of creation and humanity, of redemption and the church, and have nothing to do but to find the connection, by means of which, the life of God and of humanity, and the life of the individual being, exist together. In other words, we ask, what is that activity of man through which the Divine act of founding a fellowship of life with man becomes and continues a reality, in every particular individual. So much is cer-
tain, the fellowship of life on the part of God cannot be caused or made possible through any preceding action, or preceding condition on the part of man; for it is coetaneous with the creation of man.

For a stronger reason, all religion begins with God. Religion originates in an unconditional and immediate act of God. Man was so created that at first he could not be anything other than religious. Consequently, there remains on the part of man only the receiving, the retaining and the improving of what was given absolutely by God. The absolute act on the part of God demands on the part of man, for its complement, nothing but an equally absolute sufferance of the act; the immediate inserting of life, an equally immediate permission for it to remain; the unconditioned gift, an equally unconditioned reception. Sufferance, permission, reception, however, are not move-
ments of feeling, nor movements of knowing, but of the will. It is passive volition which first produces, on the part of man, the fellow-
ship of life with God. This passive volition is nothing other than faith, or a free self-devotion to God, produced, however, not by a self-inspired determination, but by a divinely-inspired determination. We say, therefore, of the religious life nothing different from what we say in principle of the natural or worldly life. The act by which life is imparted to the natural man, demands likewise for its realiza-
tion a permission to be on the part of man. In this form, in the
form of passivity, personal life comes forward, moreover, when the
time of conscious free agency has come. The quickening of the man
depends on this, that he suffers himself to live, that he does not op-
pose the procession of life by violently resisting involuntary respi-
ration. Out of the passivity of the will, by means of which man does
not prevent his life, an active determination is developed to cherish
his life, just as in the life of God, out of this mere consent to be de-
termined, true free-agency or love is produced. We here come upon
acknowledged biblical ground, for according to Heb. ii, faith, trust,
confidence, absolute submission to God, is the fundamental activity
by which the good of all times stand in connection with God. The
cause of the apostasy is distrust, opposition to the Divine life-giving
and life-sustaining act. The means by which the human and Divine
communion is renewed, is the free but unconditioned sufferance of the
Divine act of redemption, in which absolute faith is the counterpart
of absolute free-grace. Finally, we accord in our representation,
with evangelical doctrine; for the doctrine of the evangelical church,
we mean the doctrine of justification by faith, expresses in different
words the same thing which we expressed, viz. that the reunion of
this fellowship with God consists on the part of man only in the un-
conditional, the absolute, reception of it.

Religion would consequently be psychologically defined a matter
of the will, and religion would be explained, not as an action, but as
the receiving of an action. For in the first place, σέβεσθαι, as its deri-
vation from τιμήσαι and its usage show, is not a purely theoretical
idea, but involves the practical. Knowledge as belonging to belief,
is something which passes over into the character, the will. Belief,
so far as it comprehends the subjective certainty of the truth of a
word, arises from the condition which the believer has received from
him who utters the word. In the second place, which is a point of
great importance, the preeminence we have given to the will,
does not exclude the other two intellectual activities. On the contrary,
the more important, as respects the personal life, an act of the mind
may be, the more completely does it involve all the other essential
faculties of that life; this is particularly the case with faith, because
if not the very highest, it is one of the highest expressions of per-
sonality. Faith, and every single act of faith, exists only in connec-
tion with the knowledge of its object, and is, generally speaking,
impossible without corresponding feeling, viz. the feeling of blessed-
ness. With the highest expression of will, viz. the suffering of the
work of God, the highest activity of the understanding and reason, viz. the perceiving and receiving of Divine truth, and the highest species of feeling, viz. the consciousness of unconditional union with God, is necessarily connected. By the prominence here given to the will, we are not to suppose that all the various characteristics of religion meet only in the element of will, but the other two elements have each a certain independence of their own. The acknowledgment and utterance of a religious truth is an expression of the religious life, without regard to the question whether the act of faith which stands in connection with it, and gave the first impulse to it, actually corresponds in its strength to the depth of that religious truth. The Christian minister, for instance, who stands in a living connection with Christ, can present the doctrine of justification by faith, in consequence of his knowledge of Scripture and his skill in logical reasoning, with almost perfect success, without having experienced the full power of the doctrine which he theoretically comprehends. The comparatively smaller measure of faith connects itself with a greater measure of intelligence; knowledge outruns faith and secures the corresponding strength of faith only through the subsequent further formation of the religious life. This is sometimes the case with scientific theologians, and even, though perhaps less frequently, with the preacher and pastor, called by his office to maintain the truths of his creed. It would, however, be great injustice to doubt the existence of piety wherever this incongruity appears. It is seldom, and only when a man of extraordinary powers, by means of understanding and imagination, is able to seize on the almost entire contents of Christian dogmatism — that knowledge without faith presents the true semblance of spiritual life. The same is true of the life of feeling. It is indeed possible and sometimes happens, that a man becomes enamored with the beauty of the Christian religion in some of its elements, as, for instance, Christian poetry and music, simply because, having a natural genius for these arts, his mind applies itself to the nearest objects of the kind, and thus a species of religious life is awakened and sustained within him. If, from this conclusion, it does not follow that Christian truth comes more closely home to such a person, and his devotion to God becomes more complete, but he continues to be enamored with religion by his love of Christian beauty, we have a case similar to that before mentioned respecting knowledge. And, indeed, this religion of Christian beauty is more common than the religion of theological science. This is evident from the multitude of artists, who without any experimental knowledge of
the truth, without repentance or faith, merely by the higher movements of a creative imagination, are able to produce works of art which actualize the religious idea and promote personal edification. Just so frequently does it happen that a person makes rapid strides in religious feeling, while knowledge and faith linger far behind. The paragons of this kind must be sought for chiefly within the circles of an effeminate religiosity. Finally, the will itself, the centre of the soul's life, faith in distinction from knowledge and feeling, may be developed in disproportionate strength, and so the partial independence of the soul's forces upon each other be brought to light. On the whole, this fact has been most unfrequently observed within the circle of sound intellects, and for the simple reason that with the normal vitalization of the centre, the animation of the other forces is connected. In the meanwhile, an uncommonly feeble organization of the cognizing faculty, and the same is true of the emotional faculty, may hinder a justly proportioned development. This is often the case in melancholy, mental imbecility and temptation. Here experience shows that, in a confused state of knowledge and feeling, the will is the only uninjured element, which not only furnishes a connecting point with the foregoing, but also, while great weakness and indolence of action in both the other departments is felt, makes rapid growth. The case is different from what has been said respecting feeling and knowledge; that activity of will should exist without actual life is not conceivable. Faith in God cannot, like knowledge or feeling, be received in a merely superficial way; entire consecration to God is under all circumstances the actual religious life. Religious life does not always exist wherever there is a knowledge of religious truth; nor does it always exist wherever there is a taste for the beauty of Christian fellowship; but always wherever faith exists, there is also an actual participation in this fellowship. And here it is evident, again, that faith must be looked upon as the proper centre of religious life.

One thing here must not be overlooked. We have placed the centre of the religious life in the passive will, correlative to which stands the active will, namely love, as the fruit of the passive. But here a relation may arise which does not correspond to the nature of religion. We refer to the presence of a religious love, which has not sprung from a corresponding degree of faith. Where this love is developed altogether without faith, there it is not at all of a religious nature, but belongs to the higher degrees of worldly love. But there is a real development of religious love, to which the foundation of a
complete, absolute devotion to God is wanting, and which, more care-
fully considered, appears to consist of a mixture of worldly love, with
the love of God. This is that form of religion in which fellowship
with God is sought, partly through the reception of the Divine
work, but still more in the performance of human works. To such
a form of the religious life, actual religion need not generally be
denied. It is evident, however, that the manifestation predominates
over the reality, that the appearance surpasses the truth concealed
behind it, and that, consequently, here also a change has taken place
in the relation of the religious forces prejudicial to religion itself.

If now we look back to the result of the positions established, we
can derive a new argument from them to show that religion is actually
nothing other than life, and that it cannot be placed by the side of
other similar phenomena, as science and art stand by each other and
are thus subordinate to a third and higher element. The relation of
these two forms of human life to each other, is entirely different from
the relation of either of them to religion. Wherever logical knowledge
and expression fail, there is no science. The reasoning form is such
an essential characteristic of science, that where it is even partially
wanting, as in dialogue and allegory, though designed to present
under these forms logical thought, the bounds of science have been
overstepped. Just so it is with art. Without beauty, as without the
definite form in which cultivated feeling and imagination express
themselves, there is no work of art. The beauty may be very de-
fective, but the idea lies at the foundation, even when the execution
in every respect contradicts the ideal. A didactic poem, however
beautiful, has no title to be considered a work of art, and if the mean-
ing of a play is brought into the form of a treatise, its artistic charac-
ter is entirely destroyed. If, now, religion were feeling, that action
of feeling or state of mind which we call religious, would cease to be
religious, as soon as it began to be exhibited scientifically, or in the
form of a treatise. But this is by no means the case. The thought
that God created the world, is a religious thought, whether it is ex-
pressed in the forms of rhetorical beauty, or in the noble strains of
the Oratorio, or as a scientific proposition. Remembering that an
act may be objectively religious, when not performed in a religious
spirit, we may say that the study of interpretation is just as religious
an employment, as the singing of a hymn, or prayer to Jesus, or the
writing of ecclesiastical canons or the guiding of a soul to Christ.
But whatever remains essentially equivalent to itself, though brought
into the most diverse forms of life, cannot be itself a form of life, but
must be the life itself.
The truth here explained is of great importance to a question, which has been latterly much discussed, the question about the difference between religion and philosophy. It is by no means a difference of form, which makes a thought now a religious and now a philosophical thought. Philosophy is manifestly a business of the natural man, as may be proved from this, that in the fullest and most perfect form it belongs to heathenism, whereas it did not belong to Christianity, before heathenism entered into the kingdom of God. For the Old Testament contains nothing which resembles philosophy, except in the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, etc., but is essentially of a theological nature. The case is different with Grecian theology. Grecian theology finds its explanation in the philosophy of nature, in which there are correspondencies to a λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, but nothing more. Hence philosophy has to do with the worldly life of humanity, the nature and laws of which can be known without Revelation. Its peculiar seat is anthropology; its most common and deepest principle is the Grecian πρῶται οικονομία. But while the worldly life, and the divine life are most intimately conjoined in the true humanity, and while the intellectual laws of the natural man, generally, not unconditionally, remain the same in a mind enlightened by the Holy Spirit, the laws of spiritual operation may be contemplated from a natural point of view, and thus habitually be applied to theology and so to religion. So far as philosophy has to do with purely natural objects, there is almost no opposition at all between it and religion. Only perhaps in the doctrine of the Trinity can the question arise, whether there is anything in this doctrine inconsistent with the laws of philosophical rationalization. But the certitude of the doctrine does not depend upon our answer to this question; as the doctrine was not deduced from the laws of thought, the critic is not here subjected to them. This is ground on which religion and philosophy come no more into contact than anatomy and politics. But the question must be referred to some ground common to both; in other words, to the philosophy of religion. On this account we must postpone the answer in part, till we come to investigate the idea and the title of this science itself. At present we only say that, when observation teaches that a person can be religious without thinking philosophically upon religion, and again, that philosophizing upon religion does not destroy but rather confirms it, it becomes evident that philosophy may be a form of the religious life existing in connection with other forms of the same. And while many think of religion without philosophizing upon it, religious philosophy on the other hand is a form of religious
thinking; indeed the peculiar form of a particular side of the religious life. Philosophy is either religious or not religious, that is, worldly; and religion is either philosophical or not philosophical. Consequently it is clear that religion and philosophy are not to be contrasted, but only a certain form of religion and a certain form of philosophy. Religious thinking which is not philosophical, is perhaps contrasted with religious thinking which is philosophical; and if religious thinking which is not philosophical should, generally speaking, and by means of a denomination a parte potiori, be called theology, then the question purely conceived becomes clear, how religious philosophy stands related to theology? If, finally, there is a form of philosophy which approaches peculiarly near to philosophical thinking upon religion, viz., the so-called speculative theology, the sphere of the two contrasted subjects becomes still more contracted while the question is put, how religious philosophy stands related to speculative theology? What is the difference between them? We must confess that we see none. If there is any, it must be this: that while religious philosophy undertakes to show, that the laws of thinking agree with the dogmas of religion, speculative theology turns the subject round and shows that the dogmas of religion agree with the laws of thought. But if we take in hand a religious philosophy and a speculative theology of the Hegelian school, it must be confessed, that even this difference cannot be maintained, but the two must be considered about the same, both in meaning and in form. Should it be said that speculative theology proves the dogmas of religion, but religious philosophy solves them, then it follows that the latter is not a form of religious thought, but of worldly thought, perhaps logic or anthropology, just as the latest Hegelian school considers religion anthropology and has resolved it into the same.

In the meanwhile, let us suppose again, in order to fulfil all righteousness, that philosophy, so far as it has to do with subjects of religion and religion, that is, religious thinking, are the different forms of one and the same meaning, the one being a lower and the other a higher form. According to the Hegelian school, and the same is elsewhere also popular, the proposition that God is triune, set forth in a sermon or in a book of devotion, might be contemplated as a religious proposition, that is, a proposition which belongs to a mode of representation. The same truth, expressed in a treatise of religious philosophy, would be a philosophical proposition. But wherein consists the difference? In the use of certain technical expressions of philosophy, as, for example, that it is the nature of the absolute to distin-
guish itself within itself, and in this distinction to be identical with itself. Every one sees that the use of such terms is not essential, even to philosophy; equally clear is it that a proposition does not cease to be religious whenever it is translated out of the vulgar dialect into the language of scientific abstraction. Who would engage to show the difference between the doctrine of the word of God, as contained in the prologue of John's gospel, and as expressed in some treatise of religious philosophy? Are not the passages in John speculative in form as well as in meaning? Are Schleiermacher's discourses upon religion composed in the form of philosophical thought, or in the form of religious presentation? Where is the boundary by which one of Jacob Boehme's books of devotion can be separated from Schelling's doctrine of freedom, or from Spinoza's mystical ethics, so that you can assign this to philosophy and that to religion? Perhaps it may be said, the difference lies in the connection and aim which is pursued in the utterance of a truth. But this would be an unsafe retreat; for it would bring us in the end to the affirmation, that a proposition would cease to be philosophical as soon as it should cease to appear in the connection of a treatise. Enough of this. We return to our original affirmation, viz. philosophy, religious philosophy, is a part, a peculiar form of religious life, and the difference between it and religion is, consequently, that existing between a member and its body, and like other members it has power to become a conditional centre of Divine life, while the leading member and first centre is the passive will or faith.

We call the passive will the first centre, and connect with it several centres in one and the same whole... In principle, we have done this already, as we have spoken of a conditional independence of the two other faculties of the soul, also of the active will in distinction from the passive. Here we must be allowed a wider range for considering a proposition of the highest importance in a historical respect.

It is, generally speaking, a law of life, that an organic whole has not merely one but several centres, poles, foci, which are of unequal importance as respects the whole. Corporeal life, for example, has not only the brain for its centre, but also the heart and organ of digestion. What, now, is the centre, which must act as such, which must, under certain limitations and at certain times, predominate over all the others, so that the centres of a higher class become subordinate to it? The brain, for example, becomes dependent upon the organ of digestion, loses something of its power of action during digestion and sleep, and no longer controls the other activities of the
system, or controls them only in a limited way; but the organ of
digestion is still an inferior form of the entire corporeal life, as the
organ of sensation and of motion is of a higher activity. These truths
are commonly acknowledged, though not properly considered and
applied. But another consequence growing out of them is not so
generally noticed: that with the wounding and debility of a principal
organ, life is not destroyed. The intemperate and untimely working
of a subordinate force produces, indeed, disorder, sickness, disease,
but not necessarily death. Just so is it in reference to the spiritual
life. For, first of all, according to the true idea of the life, the lead-
ing faculty, faith, does not always maintain preëminence. But the
religious life applies itself with more vigor occasionally to the other
powers; the passive will giving place to the active, the active to
knowledge, and knowledge to feeling. The remark will apply to the
life of an individual and the life of a community. This periodicity
is indispensable in religion. The activities of life bend now in this
direction and now in that, in order to restore the equilibrium at its
centre; and so long as this restoration is duly secured, the rising
and falling of the scales will not be injurious, but advantageous.
Experience teaches that individuals, as well as whole tribes and na-
tions, are organized apparently for the maintenance of some inferior
element, and to preserve it for the good of the whole. And, again,
history so changes, that from time to time a different form of life
takes precedence. Religious philosophy, therefore, must accommo-
date itself in a scientific respect, to the occasional development of the
religious idea. Accordingly, at one time, religion may be held in the
leading form of knowledge, because the life of the community applies
itself in that direction; at another time, feeling may take precedence.
If we overlook these truths, we must consider all the forms of social,
religious development, not excluding the most recent, as untrue or as
mere temporary forms. According to a religious philosophy which
takes its rise from the Lutheran creed, the Grecian, Roman and Re-
formed Churches must all be considered as mere perversions of the
religious life. All those forms of the religious idea, which present
religion as chiefly feeling or knowing, must be looked upon as mere
mistakes, notwithstanding religious science has been greatly promoted
by them and the discoveries made in these several schools are indis-
pendable as respects the future.

If, on the contrary, you overlook the first part of our proposition,
you will be brought to the impossible conclusion, that the perception
of religion which is peculiar to the female sex, must be transformed
into a masculine character, as it would have no independent authority of its own; while nothing is more certain than that this perception of religion must exist as long as the female sex exists. For the same reason, we must deny to the present time, which leans more to the rational perception of religion, all its importance to the religious whole; while it is unquestionable that the soil of the present is most fruitful in religious productions. These less perfect forms of religion are essential to the manifestation of its true idea. They have this advantage over the more perfect, that on account of their imperfection as a whole, they are the more perfect as parts, and to a certain extent afford a measuring-rule for the more perfect and the means of reviving them. They are not, indeed, in their want of perfection, a sickness or weakness, no more than feeling is a weakness of the will; but they can easily become so, more easily than the central force, if by excessive action they strive to impress their stamp upon the life generally. And if this excess reaches its highest degree, the consequence is the entire destruction of the life.

Now in the religious life of those individuals and nations which are adapted by natural organization to preserve the balance of religious tendencies, because they take up the religious life at the middle-point — faith operates to prevent this excess. The principal excellence of the persons and nations in question, lies, not in their cultivating this or that side of the religious life, but in preserving all its elements in just proportions. This kind of religious life affords, comparatively speaking, the greatest security that no essential part of the same will remain undeveloped or be suddenly curtailed in its development. We say comparatively speaking, for it is impossible to avoid some fluctuating, when the question turns on the precedence of life. The central direction will now incline to the one side and now to the other, as the magnetic needle points not exactly north nor exactly south, but trembles towards the west or towards the east. These fluctuations are proportionally small, and do not change the main direction. This regulating character has masculine piety in distinction from feminine or that of children and youth. The New Testament presents proof, and daily observation confirms it, that there is a peculiar susceptibility to religious influence, in the female sex. But the passive will inclines so much to the side of feeling, and this comes forth so strongly that religion confines itself in them almost entirely to their own persons, and does not manifest itself in the form of a discourse which produces life in others. Their relation to Christ appears to be chiefly subjective; but, personally speaking,
religion is worth more to them than to the other sex. But their dependence on Christ for the advancement of religion in society, is less perfect than their personal dependence, and the efficiency of believing women in the New Testament bears no proportion to their numbers. Not only do they make much less progress in religious knowledge, but their activity confines itself very much to works of love, in individual relations not affecting the community at large. Very different is the case with Peter, John and Paul. With them faith, in distinction from feeling, is the proper centre of their religious life, though in Paul there is a remarkable inclination to the side of knowledge, in Peter a disproportionate strength of the active will, in John a most perfect balance of knowledge and feeling. But each possesses all the forms of life in a considerable degree, and the normal condition of their faith may be estimated by the success which the quickening word wrought through them in wider circles of life, while, in the full flower of mercy-gifts of every kind, they manifested a high degree of improbability and a considerable strength of the passive will.

Such a relation, though in a different respect, exists between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. Both rest on faith, but the latter with a disproportionate leaning towards the department of knowledge. The consequence is, that knowledge, especially dialectic knowledge, is highly cultivated in the Reformed Church, but the department of feeling is almost entirely neglected, and faith is so limited and encumbered that, just at the point where the Lutheran Church is particularly characterized by a reception of Divine mercies, viz. in the Lord’s Supper, the Reformed Church substitutes partly knowledge and partly self-activity, and injures religion at the very heart. The Lutheran Church, by inclining less to the department of knowledge, brings both knowledge and feeling to a more harmonious development, and thus secures a more judicious proportioned form.

What has thus far been presented, may serve to verify the psychological idea of religion, which we have maintained. But here we must not overlook the essential fact that religion has also a corporeal form, being as much affected by the outward and the material as mind is by the body. How different are the religious phenomena of this kind, in some circumstances, from what they are in others. Sickness or health, this or that kind of disease, this or that employment, climate, clearly occasion characteristic manifestations. Religion often produces a change in modes of speech, in the cast of the countenance, in the gestures of the body. To this corporeal form belong the water, the bread and the wine of the sacraments, and the resurrection of the body from the dead.
These facts, in the mere subjective idea of religion, as that of Schleiermacher, remain wholly unexplained and unconsidered. They are at best exceptions, and come into the idea by a sort of violence, if they do not destroy it altogether. On the contrary, these facts lie exactly in the track of our explanation. Out of a mere feeling of dependence, the idea of the world's renewal can never be deduced. But how easily can we derive it from an act of God imparting a life. The idea of personal life brings along with it the idea of body—the working of spirit on matter and of matter on spirit, the direct and indirect mastery of mind through the body over nature and the reaction of nature through the body on the mind. It is the nature of personality not merely to be a self-conscious spirit, but to have in it a self-conscious spirit standing in an important relation to matter, either personally connected with it, as in the case of man, or capable of assuming it, as in the case of the Son of God and the angels. We thus hold to a view of religion in which the resurrection of the body, miracles, etc., which stand as an irrefragable barrier against mere spiritualism, find a conceivable and appropriate place.

We come now in conclusion to the solution of a problem which goes to prove the actual necessity of our idea of religion. We are to show how this idea of religion comprehends all the branches of religious science within it. Possibly this may be considered our most dangerous rock, for we freely confess that the idea maintained by us is not adapted to the construction of a religious philosophy, as that science is commonly treated. Most clearly, we cannot say of the heathen systems of religion, nor of Mohammedanism, that they came from God or embrace an actual fellowship between Deity and humanity. They rest on a perversion of the divine idea, and include no act of God or living fellowship with him. If we must have a religious philosophy which embraces heathenism as a legitimate portion of it, Schleiermacher's feeling of dependence, or Hegel's self-consciousness, to which systems, by a distinction of degrees and kinds all that is merely subjective in religion can be reduced, would be better adapted to the purpose. But this becomes possible only by embracing an idea of religion of such a general and insignificant character, that, for conducting Christianity especially in its subjective parts out of the same, only a very narrow passage-way remains, while the objective, which is the most important element, reaches far beyond these limits, and brings us to the confession, sufficiently obvious at first blush, that Christianity is something much more than mere religion; otherwise we shall have a scientific idea of religion which fails
at the very point where it ought to be most perfect. Or if we would extend and animate the idea of religion so as to embrace Christianity, we should be driven to straits, in another direction, and have an idea too exalted for the heathen religions, and indeed exactly opposed to them. For if you place at the foundation of your inquiry about the nature of heathenism, not merely the oft-quoted passage in Acts xvii., but the more complete and extended one in Romans i., you have in heathenism religio a non religando or religendo. According to Paul, in this passage, heathenism in its noblest form, the Grecian, is a perversion and consequently a destruction of the idea of God. It proceeds not, like Judaism, from a partial development of acknowledged truth, towards a full reception of the same; but by degrees, sometimes through apparent progress, it goes on to a total loss of true divine knowledge, as is actually the historic course of heathen religions to this day. Of course there remain some traces of truth in false religions. How else could they rise, exist, advance, recede, yes, destroy themselves, if there were no element of truth in them? It is moreover not denied that individuals have sometimes risen in a religious respect above the communities in which they lived; but that which properly belongs to heathenism, its grand characteristic, is a lie! Consequently we must either cease calling Christianity religion, or else cease calling heathenism and Mohammedanism religion, and so give up the idea of a universal religious philosophy: we may still however philosophize about religion, about Mohammedanism and heathenism on the one hand, Christianity and Judaism on the other. We are also of opinion, that the name, religion, unscriptural, heathenish, radically subjective, uncertain in meaning, as it is in philosophical derivation, had better be applied exclusively to heathenism and Mohammedanism, and a different term, such as revelation or spiritual life, be used to denote Christianity. Religion would then have reference to the common relation of the human mind, we say not to God, for this would not be true of heathenism, but to some mighty supernatural being. In this way we might avoid that endless confusion of speech and idea, which has arisen from not making a proper distinction between the subjective and the objective, and from transferring the characteristics of the one to the other. Nothing would then prevent us from treating religious philosophy as preliminary to the philosophy of revelation, thus making a negative preparation for Christianity. Finally, the investigation about Judaism and Christianity would respect their original derivation, and this would form a suitable introduction to heathen religions as perversions of the
original revelations. Or, more correctly, when the philosophy of revelation, not merely of its proper self, but the perversion of it in all the various forms of the same, comes to be scientifically comprehended and put in contrast with Judaism and Christianity, then heathenism will form the reverse side of the philosophy of revelation. And as then, on the side of the divine-life process, the Old and New Testament fellowship follow their originals, so on the reverse side, gnosticism, Mohammedanism, pantheism, atheism, and all the manifestations belonging thereto, are included in heathen religion, and so two parallel series of historical revelation would arise, of which the one would be a development of the truth, the actual fellowship between God and man; the other, on the contrary, would embrace the perversion of the original revelation, would be an apparent development, and a final self-destruction. Thus the separation of that which does not properly belong together, would be completed, and at the same time the unity of philosophic examination would be preserved.

All the remaining theological sciences might be set forth without difficulty, as belonging to the idea which we have presented. Thus, biblical theology has to do with the scientific presentation of the truth imparted by God in that fellowship of life, received and understood by man, and, indeed, received in its original and proportionate form. Dogmatism would concern itself with the same truth, so far as it has been formed into symbolic propositions, and has become the foundation of ecclesiastical knowledge. Ethics has reference to the same truth, so far as it serves as a measuring-rule for the critical examination of the common and peculiar fellowship of life. Historic science would bring to view the continued series of Divine acts, and of human experience corresponding thereto, in which the living fellowship between God and man is truly unfolded. In the liturgy, we should seek to comprehend the Divine acts through which the fellowship of life existing in the community is partly propagated, partly renewed and strengthened, and the activities by means of which man receives this Divine action upon himself, and also the expressions of the self-acting will through which it authenticates the presence of that fellowship of life as organic in its relation to God. In ecclesiastical law, the Divine working might be considered as coming to utterance in the community through which this fellowship of life is regulated, conformably to the necessities of humanity, in its relation to the worldly life. The teaching of Christian art would bring us, finally, to an understanding of those acts of revelation by means of which Divine thoughts are expressed by human genius in the form of beauty.
If now, by our idea of religion, we gain this advantage, viz. that all the theological sciences come before us in a living and compact membership, whereas before there was scarcely room for one of them, and others were degraded to a place unworthy of them, it seems to be of the utmost importance that we attempt the construction of a theological system on this basis, viz. that religion, instead of being mere knowing or acting or feeling, or a combination of these three elements, is a life, a life of God imparted by Him, and in which all the elements of religion cohere.

ARTICLE VIII.
NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. Mornings among the Jesuits at Rome.¹

This work has, but a few days since, fallen into the hands of the reviewer, although it is the fourth edition, from which the title-page is here copied. It is a recent work; and it must have had a great run in England, to have already passed through so many editions. To these may be added at least one edition, in our own country.

The attentive and intelligent reader of the work will not wonder at its popularity. It discusses one of the most urgent topics of the times in England; and one which seems about to become deeply interesting to American Protestants. The importation into our country of nearly half a million of foreign emigrants in a year, and the fact that the great mass of them are Roman Catholics, are things adapted to take strong hold of a sensitive mind, whose sympathies are strongly on the side of Protestantism. In days that are past, our country has, for the most part, looked calmly and unconcernedly on the immigration of Romanists, because they were so few in comparison with our Anglo-Saxon population, who are attached to the cause of the Reformation. But now, when the Irish emigrants and their descendants begin to be reckoned more in number than their countrymen who remain in Ireland, it is time for this Protestant country to look about them, and try to discover, if possible, what are to be the issues of this matter. The Romanists, as is well known, from their own boastsings, are flushed with hopes of