ARTICLE VII.

NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY;
WITH COMMENTS ON A THIRD ARTICLE IN THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY AND PRINCETON REVIEW, RELATING TO A CONVENTION SERMON.

By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in Andover Theol. Seminary.

When Napoleon had made his majestic march to the Kremlin, and while he was retreating on a peasant’s sled in a storm, he uttered the maxim that “there is but one step between the sublime and the ridiculous.” We have been reminded of this incident by the late incursion of Dr. Hodge into our northern country, and his later precipitate egress. He advanced with the brave announcement that, “a man behind the walls of Gibraltar or of Ehrenbreitstein, cannot, if he would, tremble at the sight of a single knight, however gallant or well-appointed;” but he has now hurried back with the excuse, “There is another feature of Professor Park’s mode of conducting this discussion, which is very little to our taste.” He sailed up along our rock-bound coast and cried aloud, “A man at sea with a stout ship under him, has a sense of security in no measure founded upon himself.” After doubling and redoubling his course, and doubling it over again, he has sped homeward with the apology, “When we ran out of the harbor in our yacht, to see what ‘long, low, black schooner’ was making such a smoke in the offing, we had no expectation to be called upon to double Cape Horn.” We had said, in a plain way, that the same truths may be expressed in diversified forms, all reconcilable with each other. Our assailant rushed forward, with a seeming readiness to meet any foe man, anywhere, and proposed some of his own theories which he defied us to reconcile with our doctrines. We proved to him that his theories were not true, and that he himself did not believe them in his better moods. He now exclaims, “Where is this matter to end?—This is a great deal more than we bargained for.” And there is something rather ominous in the excuses which our antagonist has left behind him, for his very unexpected departure. After having publicly accused

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2 Ib. p. 693. The italics throughout the present article are our own.  
3 Ib. p. 319.  
4 Ib. p. 676.  
5 Ib. p. 676.
us of Rationalism, Schleiermacherism, Infidelity, profaneness, and, worse than all, "Pelagianism," he has retired because the discussion has assumed a "personal character!" 1 After having introduced various doctrines, to which we had not even alluded, and having attempted to prove some of his theories, he listens to certain New England objections, and then retreats with the words, "We regard it, therefore, as a matter of great importance, that such questions should not be open, at least within the church (i. e. among Christians), to perpetually renewed agitation!" 2 This is significant. But the most instructive sign is, that our critic has declined an answer to our first Reply, because he did not understand it; 3 and has declined an answer to our second Reply, because he did understand it, and its contents were quite familiar to him. 4 It is a singular fact, that he has written an Essay twenty-one pages long, for the sake of excusing himself from answering our last argument, which might have been refuted in a single page, if it could have been refuted at all.

And among the apologies assigned by him for abandoning his position, there is one which deserves a formal statement. Our Reviewer drew out a creed 5 which would have answered well enough as an amusing caricature of our faith, but which he dignified with the name "anti-Augustinian," and he represented us as actually believing that strange creed to be true. He contrasted it with another system which he called the "Augustinian," and which likewise he represented us as believing to be true. He even ventured so far as to introduce a quotation, with the regular quotation marks, and to charge it upon ourselves, in which pretended quotation we are made to say of the Augustinian creed, "Let us admit its truth, but maintain that it does not differ from the other system" [the anti-Augustinian]. "Both [creeds] are true, for at bottom they are the same." 6 He has ventured to accuse us repeatedly of having "declared," yea, of having "proposed to show" that those two creeds are "identical;" and only "different modes of stating the same general truths." 7 Now we affirm, that neither we nor any body else ever heard of that anti-Augustinian creed, until Dr. Hodge collected its discordant parts into one mass. No man, woman or child, not even "Pelagius" himself, ever believed it as a whole. It is no system at all, but a conglomerate of different schemes that contradict each other. Dr. Hodge himself has not dared to accuse any individual of believing it, except

the author of a late Convention sermon. And his courage failed even here; for he once confessed that, "so far as the present discussion is concerned, he [Prof. Park] may hold neither of these systems in its integrity, or he may hold the one which we believe to be true, or he may hold the opposite one;" 1 that is, he may attempt, "ex pro-

fesso," to prove that both are true, and still not acknowledge that either is true! We have once and again disclaimed a belief in that heterogeneous compound of errors mingled up for us by Dr. Hodge. We have pointed out some of its contradictions and eccentricities. 2 Had we deemed it worth our while, we might have resented the imputation of it to us, as at least an indecorum. But after all; and will the reader believe it? — Dr. Hodge retires from his self-sought discussion, partly because we do not confine our Reply to the incoherent creed which was originated by himself, and then injuriously imputed to us. 3 First, he requires us to prove a negative, viz. that his anti-Augustianian creed is not fairly stated: very well; we have shown that we favor no such compound of errors; that, as our creed, it is not fairly stated, and has no more to do with our faith than Mohammedanism has to do with our Reader's. 4 Or, secondly, he requires us to prove another negative, viz. that the nondescript creed imputed to us is not allowable: very well; we have shown that we do not allow it, and we challenge any man to name the individual who ever did allow it as a whole. Or, thirdly, he requires us to prove still another negative, viz. that he has not understood our theory: well, we have shown that we have harbored no theory like that which he has invented for us; 5 and he himself is sometimes compelled to admit, that he imputes it to us merely by his own inference, which we will not sanction. Or, fourthly, he requires us to prove that our theory is philosophical: well, we have abundantly shown that it is demanded by the philosophy of common sense, and that he himself is necessitated to believe it in his better hours. But what if we had shown none of these things? What if we had not even denied that we believe that creed, which was never made to be believed, but to be imputed? If the anomalous medley of errors which our

2 Bib. Sacra, Vol. VIII. pp. 604, 605, 624, 627, etc.
5 Ib. pp. 594, 596, 627, 628, 646, etc. The first fourteen pages of our second Reply, detail the only theory on which we have attempted to reconcile opponents, and this is a sufficient proof that we have never made use of the scheme which Dr. Hodge, by mistake, ascribes to Schleiermacher.
critic has been so kind as to devise for us be a logical result of our principles, he ought to have proved that it is so, instead of summoning us to prove that it is not. He ought to have produced at least one argument, to show that those errors grow up from our “three radical principles.” But when or where has he even hinted at so much as a single proof, that our principles lead into that medley? He has done nothing but assert that it is so; and now he has hastened out of the contest in which he promised to be so victorious, and can plead no better apology than that we pay very little respect to his mere, sheer assertions. And is it enjoined in the ninth commandment, that anonymous Reviewers load an author with conjectural and false accusations of heresy, and then make a bold request that he spend all his time in proving a negative, and none of his time in showing that his principles have been once and again avowed by his accuser,—avowed in words which have suddenly become ‘very little to the taste’ of the man who first uttered them? 1

1 One chief benefit of theological controversy is, that it manifests the comparative necessity which the disputants feel for misrepresenting each other. He who has the greater need of this malpractice, has the weaker cause. We have long thought that our Reviewer impairs the public confidence in his theological system, by the extreme to which he carries his misstatements of other systems. Thus, because we have said that some men, speculatively believing different creeds, do yet in practical life disown their differences and heartily agree, Dr. Hodge goes so far as to ask: “Has any one, before our author, ever inferred from these facts, that idealism and materialism are different modes of one and the same philosophy, or that Arminianism and Calvinism, Moravianism and Pantheism, are but different forms of one and the same theology?” (Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 692.) He thus implies that we have a more absurd theory than any body else, and yet his great object has been to stigmatize us as adopting nothing new, but rather an old Schleiermacherian theory! He overlooks himself; for a candid reader, instead of believing that we have ever represented Materialism, Arminianism and Pantheism as, in any sense, allowable, will believe that our critic was compelled to make such a misstatement, because he was unable to oppose us in a more honorable way. We have said far less to authorize this caricature of our views, than our critic has said to justify us in publishing him as a worshipper of the Virgin Mary. For, notwithstanding all his protests against our effort to show the practical agreement of good men, he goes so far as to declare his speculative agreement not only with New England divines, but also with Romanists; see Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 324, 677, 686, etc. If, then, we should portray our Reviewer as sanctioning all the puerilities of Rome, we should have a better pretence for caricaturing him than he has for having caricatured us; but we should dishonor our dogmatic faith, by betraying a consciousness that we cannot defend it, except by misrepresenting its assailants.

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But let us leave our author's ingenious reasons for not holding out in the contest which he began. In his last Reply, he has made some remarks on New England Theology, which have induced us to discourse on the same theme, with an occasional reference to that Reply.

In the preface to the first printed sermon ever preached in America, is the following sentence: "So far as we can yet find, it [New England] is an island, and near about the quantity of England; being cut out from the main land in America, as England is from the main of Europe, by a great arm of the sea, which entereth in forty degrees, and runneth up north-west and by west, and goeth out either into the South Sea, or else into the Bay of Canada." This "great arm of the sea" means the Hudson river; the "South Sea" means the Pacific ocean, and the "Bay of Canada" means the river St. Lawrence. Now it were about as easy to learn the shape of New England from the preceding account, as to learn the type of New England Theology from the statements which some of its recent opposers have deemed it wise to make.

We beg leave, therefore, first of all, to explain the term, New England Theology. It signifies the formal creed which a majority of the most eminent theologians in New England have explicitly or implicitly sanctioned, during and since the time of Edwards. It denotes the spirit and genius of the system openly avowed or logically involved, in their writings. It includes not the peculiarities in which Edwards differed, as he is known to have differed, from the larger part of his most eminent followers; nor the peculiarities in which any one of his followers differed, as some of them did, from the larger part of the others; but it comprehends the principles, with their logical sequences, which the greater number of our most celebrated divines have approved expressly or by implication. As German philosophy is not adopted by all Germans, and is adopted by some foreigners, so New England Theology is not embraced by all New Englanders, and is embraced by multitudes in other parts of the world. Its more prominent standards, however, are from these north-eastern States. It was first called New-light Divinity; then New Divinity; afterward, Edwardian; more recently, Hopkintonian or Hopkinsian. From the fact that Edwards, Hopkins, West and Catlin resided in Berkshire County, it was once called Berkshire Divinity. When it was embraced by Andrew Fuller, Dr. Ryland, Robert Hall, Sutcliffe, Carey, Jay and Erskine, it was called American Theology by the English, in order to dis-

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1 The Sin and Danger of Self-Love Described, in a Sermon preached at Plymouth, in New England, 1691, p.iii.
Hopkins, Edwards and Emmons.

1752.

criminate it from the European systems. It has been denominated New England Theology by Americans, in order to distinguish it from the systems that have prevailed in other parts of the land. In 1756, two years before the death of Edwards, there were, according to Dr. Hopkins, not more than four or five clergymen who espoused this new theology. In 1773, according to Dr. Stiles, it was advocated by about forty-five ministers; and Dr. Hopkins says that, in 1796, it was favored by somewhat more than a hundred. Still, even while it was thus restricted in its influence, it was distinguished as a system peculiar to New England. In 1787, Dr. Stiles mentioned as among its champions, the two Edwardseas, Bellamy, Hopkins, Trumbull, Smalley, Judson, Spring, Robinson (father of Dr. Robinson of New York), Strong, Dwight, Emmons. In 1799, Hopkins appended the names of West, Levi Hart, Backus, Presidents Balch and Fitch. We may now add such honored men as Dr. Catlin, President Appleton, Dr. Austin. Divines of this class were foremost in the Missionary enterprises of the day. They were conspicuous in the establishment of our oldest Theological Seminaries, as Andover and Bangor. They gave its form and pressure to our theological system. They were imperfect men. They did not harmonize on every theme, but a decided majority of them stood firm for the "three radical principles," that sin consists in choice, that our natural power equals, and that it also limits, our duty. Idle, idle is the late attempt to draw a line of demarcation between the elder Edwards, Bellamy, on the one side, and the younger Edwards, Emmons, West, on the other, with regard to these three principles. Hopkins was the beloved pupil of the first President Edwards, and through life, was the most confidential of his friends; was with him in sickness and in health, in the house and on journeys, by day and often by night. He was also an adviser and more than a brother to Bellamy. He was the teacher and a spiritual father of the younger Edwards, West, Spring, and he was an intimate friend of Emmons. He serves, therefore, as a commune vinculum between the elder Edwards and Bellamy on the one hand, and the "choir leaders" of the "Exercise Scheme" on the other. But in more than two hundred of his free, private letters, and in all his published works, we have sought in vain for the slightest hint that, on these radical principles, there was even an approach to a disagreement between the two classes. He reached out his fraternal arms to Edwards and to Emmons, and gave them both his approval and his blessing in their maintenance of these three doctrines, and he often expressed, as clearly as words can express, his hearty union with the forerunner.
and the follower. And all the theories which the original Edwardians and the later Cynics of the Exercise Scheme were harmonious in espousing, are parts of the New England system.

What worthy end, now, could our Reviewer aim to accomplish, by insinuating that we "regard the little coterie to which" we belong, "as all New England?" We belong to no party which has not been honored throughout the Christian world; but does our assailant dream that "all New England" must unite in the New England Theology? What! a single speculative creed for the Churchmen and Come-outers, the Presbyterians and the Quakers, the Baptists and the Swedenborgians, the Sub-lapsarians and the Supra-lapsarians, the Owenites and the Baxterians, the Burtonites and the Emmontes, of a community whose fathers were John Robinson and Roger Williams! We have never pretended that New England Theology is the dogmatic faith of every man, woman and child, or of a majority of the laymen, or even clergymen, of these free States. It has, however, been the faith of certain elect minds, whom New England has loved and will ever love to venerate.

We now proceed to say, in the second place, that the Theology of New England is marked by certain new features. We have seen that for a hundred years it has been called "new;" it has been opposed as new, it has been admired as new. All its designations which we have just repeated show it to have been new. The younger Edwards wrote an essay on the "Improvements made in Theology by his father, President Edwards." We do not mean to say, that the Edwardean school discovered principles which were never thought of before. They claim to have brought out into bold relief the obscurer faith of good men in all ages. They gave a new distinctness, a new prominence, to doctrines which had been more vaguely believed by the church. They produced new arguments for a faith which had been speculatively opposed by men who had practically sanctioned it. We say that Aristotle first discovered the syllogistic art, although Adam reasoned in syllogisms, whenever he reasoned at all. We say that Bacon first detected the law of induction, although Eve made obeisance to that law before she decided to eat the apple. We say that Longinus and Tully were among the first to find out the principles of rhetoric, and yet we are aware that all men, in all times, have known enough of those principles to comply with them in their

speech. He is called a discoverer who makes that palpable which had been dim, and shows that to be reasonable which had formerly been held by an instinct.

We might illustrate these remarks by referring to several doctrines, but we will confine our illustration to the single truth, that an entirely depraved man has a natural power to do all which is required of him; a truth which has been so clearly unfolded by the New England divines, that it properly belongs to their distinctive system. All unsophisticated thinkers, we are aware, have practically believed that a just God will not command men to do what they have no power to do; that he will not punish them with unending pain for doing as well as they can; that, in every case, physical ability is commensurate with obligation. In what sense, then, may so old a doctrine be called new? In this sense: the Edwardian school have made it more prominent and more effective than it has been made by some; have shown more fully than others have done its agreement with the truths of man's entire sinfulness and of God's decrees; have defended it against those metaphysical Calvinists who speculatively deny their own practical faith; have been the first to make obvious, prominent and impressive, the consistency of those two truths, which all good men have more or less secretly believed,—that a sinner can perform what a reasonable law requires of him, and that he certainly will never do as well as he can, unless by a special interposition of Heaven. They deserve far more gratitude for their originality in developing these truths, than Hume deserves for his originality in unfolding the laws of mental suggestion.

1 Dr. Hodge errs in supposing that our natural power to repent must be the same as a power to regenerate ourselves. (Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 682, 683.) The very term, regenerate, implies that there is a parent, and also a child distinct from the parent. It has a different relation from the term repentance. It refers to the renewing Father, as well as to the renewed offspring. To say that a man can repent, is as different from affirming that he can regenerate his soul, as to say that he can learn is different from affirming that he can impart knowledge to his soul; or as to say that he can go from one place to another is different from affirming that he can carry himself in his arms from one place to another. Dr. Hodge asks, "Where is the man who has ever regenerated himself?" We answer by asking, first, Where is the commandment which requires a sinner to regenerate himself? and secondly, Is there no difference between a man's actually doing what the law does require of him, and his being able to do it? There is a requisition that we make ourselves new hearts; but no requisition that we be born again, by a special divine influence; and it is one thing to have a power of obeying, and another thing to obey actually. Our Reviewer is not alone in overlooking these distinctions.
It has been lately maintained, however, that on this topic Edwards and his followers taught nothing which the Calvinistic standards had not taught with equal uniformity and consistency; that New England Divinity does not recognize a sinner's power to use his faculties aright, but simply recognizes the fact of his possessing a reason, a conscience and a will. When the word *able* is used in its literal and proper sense; a sense too simple to be made clearer by a definition; then, we are told, the Edwardean school believe, not that a sinner is able to use his capacities aright, but only that he is endowed with the above named capacities, distinguishing him from brutes. After all his past opposition to Edwards on the Will, Dr. Hodge now seems to believe that Edwards, "Bellamy, Dwight, and the other great men of New England," denied that "ability limits responsibility," and meant no more than that "since the fall man retains all his faculties of soul and body, and is therefore a free, moral agent."

Are our opponents right, then, in affirming that the far-famed "natural ability" of the Edwardean school means nothing more than the natural capacities of soul and body, and does not include an adequate power to use those capacities as they should be used?

1. This explanation is utterly inconsistent with the language of that school. It may agree with some of their expressions, but not with the rich variety of them. Our standards teach that, in the "proper sense of the terms," man *can* now repent, has now power to love. Do they say that a child, while it remains an *infant*, has power to speak, because it has the natural faculties of a speaker; that it can walk in its earliest days, because it has the natural faculties of a walker? Of what use is it to prove that man has the capacities of a moral agent, if he cannot use them in the right way? How can they be called power, in its only "proper" signification?

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1 This novel mode of explaining the Edwardean system has been advocated by several recent authors, and is here ascribed to Dr. Hodge on the ground of his assertions in Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 681—683, 685, 686, 693, 694. On those pages he gives in his adhesion to the great New England standards concerning the will and sin, and alludes to our own "hallucination." In the same paragraph which refers to our hallucination, he says, that the advocates of the "Exercise Scheme" were led to a "denial" of the doctrine that sin consists in sinning, and that the three radical principles which he has imputed to a Convention Sermon, were never "rejected" by any class of New England divines reputed orthodox, except the Emmons and the New Haven schools (p. 694). We presume that he meant here, as we hope that he has meant elsewhere, exactly the opposite of what he said; but it was not very opportune for him to speak of our own hallucination, in the very paragraph which combines so singular a want of carefulness, with so singular a kind of charity.
and yet in this signification Edwards often affirms that we have
power commensurate with duty. He refers not only to the existence,
but also to the degree and extent of our faculties. Thus he writes:
"We can give God no more than we have. Therefore if we give
him so much, if we love him to the utmost extent of the faculties
of our nature, we are excused. But when what is proposed, is only
that we should love him as much as our capacity will allow, this ex-
cuse of want of capacity ceases, and obligation takes hold of us, and
we are doubtless obliged to love God to the utmost of what is possible
for us, with such faculties and opportunities and advantages to know
God as we have." 1 The faculties must have opportunities enabling
them to act.

Dr. Bellamy teaches, in a volume which Edwards recommended,
that the heathen are without excuse because they enjoy "sufficient
means of knowledge;" that God's law is on "a perfect level" with
man's "natural powers and natural advantages;" "that if God looks
upon the advantages of the heathen sufficient, no wonder that he so
often speaks of the advantages of his own professing people as being
much more than barely sufficient, even although they enjoy only the
outward means of grace, without the inward influences of the Spirit;"
"and thus we see how all mankind have not only sufficient natural
powers, but also sufficient outward advantages to know God, and per-
factly conform to his law, even the heathen themselves." 2 By suffi-
cient outward advantages, Bellamy means all advantages except the
special interposition of God's Spirit.

What says Dr. Smalley? "It must, I think, be granted that we
do generally suppose a man's present duty cannot exceed his present
strength, suppose it to have been impaired by what means it will." 3
If, then, the strength of the faculty be lessened, the duty is lessened.
This strength of the faculty, and not the mere faculty itself, is power
"in the proper sense of that term." The faculty must be strong
enough to overcome all natural hindrances to right choice. Hence
Dr. Smalley often speaks of a "want of opportunity" as excusing the
sinner from blame. 4 Dr. Jonathan Edwards expressly declares that,
on his father's theory, men have physical power to remove their moral
inability; that is, they are able to do what they are unwilling to do." 5

1 Edwards on Original Sin, Part I. Ch. I. Sect. V.
3 Smalley's Sermon on Moral Inability, p. 5. Ed. 1811.
4 Smalley's Sermon on Natural Ability, p. 38. Ed. 1811.
5 Edwards's Works, Vol. I. p. 309. Dr. Edwards here, as elsewhere, affirms
Dr. Hodge has seen fit to inform us, that "the aberration of the advocates of the Exercise Scheme" on this topic "was in the direction of ultra-Calvinism."¹ Let us then go a little way in this ultra-Calvinism. The greatest of those advocates addresses the unregenerate thus: "You are as able to love God, as to hate him. You are as able to turn from sin as to continue sinning. You are as able to love God before you do love him as afterwards." He often says that unregenerated men are "as able to do right as to do wrong, and to do their duty as to neglect their duty; to love God as to hate God, to choose life as to choose death; to walk in the narrow way to heaven as in the broad way to hell;" "as able to embrace the Gospel as a thirsty man is to drink water, or a hungry man to eat the most delicious food;" "they can love God, repent of sin, believe in Christ and perform every religious duty, as well as they can think, or speak, or walk."² And this is the common representation of the "Exercise" school, and this, according to Dr. Hodge, is "in the direction of ultra-Calvinism." It certainly is an avowal of something more than a mere impracticable faculty.

Again, if natural ability be nothing more than the capacities of reason, conscience and disabled will, what then is natural inability? Is it the want of reason, conscience and disabled will? When New England writers affirm that man has not natural power and is therefore not required to become as holy as his Maker, do they mean that he has not the faculties of a moral agent? Dr. Smalley answers the question by saying, "Natural inability consists in, or arises from, want of understanding, bodily strength, opportunity, or whatever may prevent our doing a thing when we are willing, and strongly enough disposed to do it;" and also, "Persons who have ordinary intellectual powers, and bodily senses, and are arrived to years of discretion, and live under the light of the Gospel, labor under no natural inability to obtain salvation" [by faith in Christ].³ It is the common remark of

² Emmons's Sermons, Vol. V, pp. 154, 175. Vol. IV. pp. 352, 355—359, 361, 514. Vol. VI. p. 92. The authority of Dr. Emmons on this subject is very important. He was the brother-in-law of Dr. Samuel Spring, and agreed with that divine more nearly, perhaps, than with any other. "When Dr. Spring died, I lost my right arm," was a remark which he often repeated. The most munificent founders of Andover Theological Seminary were the devoted adherents of Dr. Spring, and admirers of his theology, and this was Emmonism.
the Edwardean school, that men have no inability to repent except their unwillingness, and this unwillingness is a sin, and sin is a voluntary act.

Our opponents are misled by confining their attention to one class of words, and using that class in its narrowest sense. When they read in Bellamy, for example, that the natural power to do right means "the capacities of a moral agent," they overlook his frequent explanations that "men's natural powers are adequate with the law of God, and so they, as to their natural capacities, are capable of a perfect conformity to the law."¹ We allow that, speaking in a general way, New England divines do often affirm, that our natural power is our natural capacity; but they do not mean to trifle; they employ the word capacity in its widest sense; they refer to a capacity which is capable of doing what is justly demanded of it; and not to an incapable capacity, which is nothing better than a natural incapacity, the very thing which they always deny. So when they speak of our natural powers and natural abilities, they mean abilities which are able, and powers which are sufficient to bear what is rightly laid upon them.² "Nothing can be plainer," says Emmons,³ "than that those who have a natural power to act, have the same natural power to refrain from acting;" hence it is obvious that he uses the terms will, choice, moral agent, in their fullest sense, and, so used, they imply not a mere faculty of will, but a faculty able to choose or to refuse the same thing. What if a man have powers utterly incapable of performing the part assigned them? Merely because he has ears, can he be required to hear the conversation of the antipodes? Merely because he has eyes, can he be bidden, on penalty of eternal death, to see the remotest star of the universe? And on the same principle, what if he have a power of will? Can he be justly required to put forth a choice equal to that put forth by an archangel, or to perform any kind of act to which his powers are naturally inadequate?⁴

¹ Bellamy's Works, Vol. I. pp. 106, 106, 109, 115, etc. etc. Dr. Bellamy here uses the word "adequate;" Dr. Hodge objects to this word above all others relating to the subject, and yet claims to agree with Bellamy. See Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII. pp. 681—683, 693, 694.
⁴ We had hoped that our Reviewer would attempt to explain the difference between the morality of requiring a man to love God when man has no real strength to do so, and the morality of requiring a man to love God with a greater degree of strength than belongs to man's constitution. See Bib. Sac. Vol. VIII. pp. 600,
The doctrine of New England is, that any powerlessness, in the original, literal and proper meaning of the word, is incompatible with obligation.

2. The new explanation which our opponents give of natural power, is inconsistent with the history of the disputes on the subject. President Edwards often says, that “no Arminian, Pelagian or Epicurean,” can even conceive of any freedom greater than he ascribes to man; “and I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form a higher imagination of liberty.” He has always been opposed by the assertion that, before the fall, men had more freedom than they have now; and that although in paradise they lost their liberty and power to obey, yet God has not lost his right to command. Here has been and is now, a dispute. Edwards affirms, that for men to have more than their present freedom is inconceivable. His opponents object, that they once had more and lost it. He says, that for men to have a power of freer choice than they now have, is as impossible, as for an animal in Terra Del Fuego to take a step always before the first step. His Calvinistic opponents reply, that this power which he ridicules was once possessed by Adam. What do they mean? That Adam had once a moral power to do right? But Edwards never disputed this fact, for this moral power is holiness itself. Do they mean that Adam lost the natural capacities of a moral agent? They disclaim such an idea. They must mean, therefore, that Adam had and lost the power of using his capacities aright; he lost his natural ability. But Edwards affirms, that the race have not a real natural ability as they ever had.

Again, the Edwardean affirms, that holy beings in heaven possess a natural but not a moral power to do wrong. Does he mean that they have the natural capacities of a moral agent? Then there would be no dispute. But there is a dispute. The Edwardean is reproved, and told that the blessed in heaven have no power to do wrong. Now does the objector mean that they will not (i. e. they have a moral impotence to) do wrong? The Edwardean agrees with

601. But our assailant has chosen an easier part, and has merely reaffirmed some irrelevant distinctions. See Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII. p. 681, 682. Does he really believe that the “civil good” of the old divines has any reference to the supposed holiness which exceeds our constitutional powers? If not, why did he flee to the misapplied distinction between “civil” and “spiritual obedience”? Our question still remains unanswered: What is the moral difference between punishing a man for not being virtuous when he is literally unable to be so, and punishing him for not being more virtuous than he is literally able to be?

1 Letter to a Minister of the Church of Scotland.
hym. Still, the objector persists in impugning the Edwardian, and denying just what the Edwardian affirms, that the spirits in heaven have a power to make a wrong use of their capacities, and this disputed power is natural ability. It is a singular phenomenon that our opponents ascribe to Adam in paradise, more liberty than to any other being in the universe. "The inhabitants of heaven," they say, "have no power to sin. Men and fallen spirits have, in themselves, no power to be holy. But Adam, being left to the freedom of his own will, had a power to do right and also to do wrong, and used his power in doing both!"

3. This new explanation of physical ability is disrespectful to the memory of our fathers. Many of them have supposed, that our national literature is honored by the Edwardian discriminations between physical and moral ability. And when the younger Edwards declared that before these distinctions were made, "the Calvinists were nearly driven out of the field by the Arminians, Pelagians and Socinians," did he mean that the tide of war was turned by his father's discovering man to be endowed with reason, conscience, and disabled will? And when Dr. Dwight was borne so high as to sing,

"From scenes obscure did Heaven his Edwards call,
That moral Newton and that second Paul,"—
[Who.] "in one little life, the Gospel more
Disclosed than all earth's millions kenned before,"—

did the bard thus exult because this "moral Newton" had found out that man, who was always known to be wilful, really had the capacity of will? And was it because this "second Paul" had detected a difference between the natural faculties of a moral agent, and the agent's inclination to use those faculties in a holy way, that another poet exclaimed on hearing of Edwards's death,

"Nor can the muse in deepest numbers tell,
How Zion trembled when this Pillar fell!"

Did several of our strong-minded fathers publish volumes of long-drawn, wire-drawn arguments, to prove that the possession of a will was not the same thing with true virtue, which is moral power to do right? Did they expose themselves to cavil and obloquy, and the charge of "Pelagianism," merely for the sake of proclaiming the discovery that impotent man was not a stone nor a brute, but was

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3 See first edition of Edwards on Original Sin, p. x.
elevated above both by rational and moral faculties? Robert Hall teaches us, that the "important distinction" between physical and moral impotence "was not wholly unknown to our earlier divines;" and adds "The earliest regular treatise on this subject it has been my lot to meet with, was the production of Mr. Truman;" and yet the learned minister of Cambridge questions even Mr. Truman's "claim to perfect originality." 1 Did the profound genius, then, of Robert Hall, pay homage to Mr. Truman for anticipating our own Edwards, in the discovery that man, since the fall, retains his human nature and that this is not real holiness? 2 And have our fathers not only been cheating themselves with this "hallucination," but have their opponents been gravely disputing what few skeptics on earth ever called in question before? No. The New England theory of the will is a distinct and philosophical, and therefore uncommon, exposition of the very common faith, that a sinner can do without help what he is justly required to do without help, and can do with aid what he is justly bidden to do with aid. The theory may well be called original, for its faithfulness to human nature and the divine government; a faithfulness, alas! how unusual in scholastic treatises. So far forth as the theory unfolds the before hidden teachings of conscience, it is a specimen of the New England system; the substance of which is old, like all truth, but the form is novel, because it is a luminous and harmonious development of ideas which had been confused.

In the third place, New England Theology is Calvinism in an improved form. It does not pretend to be a perfect system. Both Edwards and Hopkins reiterated the wish and hope, that their successors would add to the improvements which the Genevan faith had already received. Neither does our system profess to be original in its cardinal truths. It has ever claimed that these great truths are the common faith of the church; that they are recognized in many evangelical creeds; that Calvinism contains the substance of New England Theology, not always well proportioned, not seldom intermingled

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2 Although Dr. Hodge claims to agree with Edwards on the Will, he fails to remember that, according to Edwards, a moral power to do right is a disposition to do right, and the want of this power is a disposition to do wrong. With much emphasis, Dr. Hodge insists that, "since the fall, men are both 'indisposed and disabled' to all spiritual good." (Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 681.) This expression means, on the theory of Edwards, that men are both indisposed and disposed to all spiritual good. To be morally disabled is, with Edwards, only to be disinclined.
with the remnants of an erring scholasticism, and sometimes enveloped in inconsistencies and expressed in a nervous style. "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau." The substance of our theology is Calvinistic; here it is old. Much of its self-consistency is Edwardean and Hopkinsian; here it is new. It is not mere Calvinism, but it is consistent Calvinism. Instead of pretending to be an entirely new revelation, it has always professed to be a revised and corrected edition of the Genevan creed. As such, it was extolled by its early friends, and ridiculed by its early foes. That Hopkins was far from having an ambition to shine as the originator of an altogether novel creed, is apparent from the following modest words which he wrote in his eightieth year: "I believe that most of the doctrines, if not all, I have published, are to be found in the writings of former divines; viz. Calvin, Van Mastricht, Saurin, Boston, Manton, Goodwin, Owen, Bates, Baxter, Charnock, the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, Willard, Ridgley, Shepard, Hooker, etc. These, indeed, did not fully explain some of those doctrines which are asserted or implied in their writings; and many, if not most of them, are, in some instances, inconsistent with themselves, by advancing contrary doctrines." 1 It was in reference to his labor in fitting together the heterogeneous parts of the Genevan creed, that Emmons said, "I have spent half my life in making joints." Both he and Hopkins defended the substance of Calvinism earnestly and reverently; and the Genevan divine who now assails their memory, must be ignorant of their controversial successes, or careless of that grace which is called "the memory of the heart."

Let us now allude to a few particulars, in which the New England divines have been employed in straightening the crooked parts of Calvinism, and have loved to retain all its theories which could be made to hold together. A favorite New England idea has been, that the certainty of human action is distinct from its necessity. But this is Calvinistic; for the great Genevan himself has said: "By impossible I mean that which never was, and which is prevented from being in future by the ordination and decree of God." "There is no reason for cavilling at the remark, that a thing cannot be done, which the Scriptures declare will not be done." 2 "I will not hesitate, therefore, simply to confess with Augustine, that the will of God is the necessity of things, and that everything is necessary which he has willed, just as those things will certainly happen which he has fore-

1 Hopkins's Ms. Letter in possession of the author.
2 Institut. Lib. II. Cap. VII. § 5. See also § 21.
seen." An Edwardean never complains of such definitions, but only regrets that they are so often forgotten by the Genevan school, and that a necessity is merged into a fate.

So are New England writers satisfied with many definitions which Calvinists give of human freedom. In describing the liberty which is "inseparable from the will," that learned old Puritan, W. Perkins, says: "Liberty of will consists in a double faculty; the first is, that when of itself it chooses anything, it can also on the other hand refuse the same; in the schools, this is called the liberty of contradiction. The second is, that when it chooses anything, it can choose another or the contrary; and this is called the liberty of contrariety." We are often told by the Genevan divines, that the will is not determined to its volitions by a natural or instinctive necessity, as the sun is necessitated to shine, and the fire to burn, and the horse to eat grass or hay; but that our freedom involves the intellectual faculty or power to discern good or evil, the power of will to choose or refuse either, and also the strength to execute the choice.

What more can a New England theologian desire? Only one thing; that the Calvinists would not here, as elsewhere, disown their faith. But this they do; for they no sooner ascribe to us free agency, than they take it all back, and affirm that man is free only to evil, and has not the slightest degree of power to choose good. This free will, "inseparable from man," is yet said to be "injured and destroyed;" we have an "utter and absolute impotence to do right;" and, in the words of Boston, "our father Adam, falling from God, did by his fall so dash him and us all in pieces, that there was no whole part left, either in him or us," etc. etc. Now we affirm, that if it be possible for human language to express a contradiction (like iron-wood, αὐθεντικον), it does express one in the Calvinistic sentence, that (properly speaking) man must have the ability to choose between right and wrong, and yet has not "the least particle of ability" to choose right.

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1 Instit. Lib. III. Cap. XXIII. § 8.
4 See, for example, Bucan. Inst. Theol. Loc. XVIII. § 1. Thomas Boston gives a definition equally unlimited.
6 Dr. Hodge is indignant at us for quoting sentences in a Princeton Review, which are understood to declare that man has an adequate power of choosing.
It is to relieve evangelical doctrine from this strife with itself, that our divines have explained the sinner’s power of choosing right, to be consonant with the certainty of his choosing wrong; and the certainty of his choosing wrong, to be no literal necessity; and thus they have united the opposite poles of science into one attractive system. The process is a simple one, but nearly all discoveries appear easy to him who has once made them.

In their dogmatic theories, rather than in their practical faith, Calvinists have contradicted themselves with regard to the divine agency in producing sin. Inspiration declares, that God ‘hardens the heart of men,’ and ‘moves them to do wrong,’ and ‘puts a lying spirit within them,’ and ‘deceives them,’ and ‘creates evil.’ These intense expressions of a profound truth have been transferred into the reasonings of the Genevan school; and even the learned founder of that school, who was far milder on this topic than many of his successors have been, has yet sometimes written as if the servile words of inspired prophets were to be used like the exact phrases of a metaphysical creed. In reply to men of “delicate ears,” who choose to say that God permitted, rather than caused, the obduracy of Pharaoh, Calvin remarks, that “there is a difference between suffering a thing to be done, and actually doing it; and God sets forth in this passage not his endurance, but his power. It troubles me not to say, and confidently to believe, what is so often said in the Bible, that God brings the wicked into a reprobate mind, delivers them over to shameful vices, blinds their intellect and hardens their heart. It may be said that God is thus made the author of sin, and this is detestable impiety; but I answer, that he is not blamed in the least, when he is said to exercise judgment; therefore if the blinding of the mind be his judicial act, he cannot be charged with crime for inflicting this penalty.”

“What says the Spirit? Hardening is from God, that he may urge them on (praecipitetur) whom he designs to destroy.”

In his Commentary on Rom. 9:18, Calvin censures those men as diluti moderatores, who say that the hardening of the heart is a mere permission of wickedness. But the ablest men of his school often deny

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between good and evil; and for not quoting other sentences in the same Review which are understood to deny that man has such a power. But this indignation is unwarranted; for we expressly said, and our aim was to show, that the Review contradicts itself; and need we particularize all the instances in which its pendulum swings from one to the other extreme? Comp. Bib. Sac. Vol. VIII. pp. 600—602, with Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII. pp. 688, 689.


that God exerts any positive agency in the production of sin, and then contradict themselves, by saying that our passive nature is itself sin. Must not this nature have a creating and sustaining cause? Adam does not create it, nor Satan. It is created, then, by God. Calvinists believe that preservation is a continued creation, and they are driven to admit that our nature is constantly re-created by Jehovah, and yet the nature is sin. In this dilemma, they rush to a scholastic distinction which, even if it mean anything, avails nothing; and they affirm that God is the author of our nature as an essence, but is not the author of it as sin! Who then is the author of it as sin, or as a sin?\footnote{Each created human nature is itself sin. Then it is a sin. There are as many passive sins, therefore, as there are infants. Truly, we need a new language, or else New England Divinity.} It must have an author. Is man himself the personal cause of his passive iniquity, which exists before his own personal action?\footnote{Some reply, that we were the causes of our own passive sin, when we were in Adam. But there is yet wanting a personal cause of this sin, existing in ourselves as distinct persons.} Nothing is gained by saying, that nature often means disposition.\footnote{Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 684, 685.}

For, we ask, who is the author of this passive disposition? There is no way of covering up or retreating from the inference, that if our passive disposition, which we cannot separate from our infantile nature, be iniquity, or an iniquity, then the author of that disposition is the author of iniquity. And yet men who hold the premise, reject the conclusion, and deny, with emphasis, that He who made us, made also the nature, i.e. the disposition with which we were made! Seeing these theorists in trouble with their own hopeless incongruity, the New England divine went to their help, more than a half century ago. He taught that men must be the agents of all their own sin, and at the same time that God has made and placed them so that they will certainly and freely do wrong; that God never causes wickedness, in such a sense as renders it literally impossible for the sinner to avoid it, and yet that he never leaves the impenitent man in a state in which his wicked choices are uncertain. Thus is preserved the profound meaning of the declarations, that men harden their own hearts, and that God hardens them; and thus it is perfectly consistent to deny that Jehovah is the author of sin, and at the same time to affirm, that he so constitutes and circumstances men, that they will certainly do evil. The New England theory has been well expressed by the two Edwardses, thus: "The divine disposal, by which sin certainly comes into existence, is only establishing the certainty
of its future existence. If that certainty, which is no other than moral necessity, be not inconsistent with human liberty, then surely the cause of that certainty, which is no other than the divine disposal, cannot be inconsistent with such liberty."¹ Hopkins expresses this truth, when he says: "Something must have taken place previous to his sin, and in which the sinner had no hand, with which his sin was so connected as to render it certain that sin would take place just as it does."² Here is the substance of Calvinism, in the self-congruous form of New England Theology.

Were it seemly to smile, while writing so grave a theme, we should be tempted to do so by the tame English on which our Reviewer essays to get away from the logical results of his creed. He is so fond of using fervid expressions in his argumentative paragraphs, that he is often misled by them into errors from which he can extricate himself only by an unwholesome strain upon his mother tongue. At first he said with much apparent emotion, that our nature is "truly and properly sin."³ We replied, that if our nature be sin, the sin must have been committed by the author of our nature, just as the author of any actual sin committed that sin.⁴ Now what does our Reviewer rejoin? He gravely attempts to defend himself by the plea, which at the best would be unavailing, that the word nature, when it is called sin, means not essence, but disposition.⁵ Now sub-

² Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 106, new Edition. It is readily admitted, that this writer and a few others in New England, have sanctioned the phraseology that God is the author of our wickedness. But, first, this is not the common phraseology of our best divines; and secondly, it does not express, without much qualification, the real philosophy of our writers who employ it. They never mean that Jehovah is the author of moral evil, in any such sense as takes from man the full natural power to avoid every kind and degree of sin. They teach that our iniquity is as really our own, and as really our free act, as if God had never made it certain. They affirm that he never produces any sin which precedes or overpowers, or in any way opposes, our own choice, and that our choice remains as free as the choice of any one can be, on earth or in heaven. Such a phrase as 'God is the author of iniquity,' has recommended itself to them by its strength, and not by its philosophical exactness. It is unfaithful to their precise meaning, and belongs to the style of excitement and impression, rather than to that of calm discussion. It was Hopkins's reverence for Calvin, and his fondness for expressing his creed in the powerful language of inspired men, which led him to say that our sins are caused, when he meant that they are made certain, by the positive efficiency of our Sovereign. His phraseology on this topic has been improved by more recent divines.
stitute the word "disposition" for its synonym "nature," in our Reviewer's creed as first written, and see if it be, in his own language, "designed to state with all possible precision the intellectual propositions to be received as true." Here is the sentence: "It [Dr. Hodge's creed] acknowledges Adam as the head and representative of his posterity, in whom we had our probation, in whom we sinned and fell; so that we come into the world under condemnation, being born children of wrath, and deriving from him a nature [i.e. a disposition] not merely diseased, weakened, or predisposed to evil, but which is 'itself,' as well as 'all the motions thereof,' 'truly and properly sin!'"¹ Then our disposition, so strong to sin, is weakened, and even our disposition is predisposed to evil, and this predisposed disposition is, in itself, as well as its motions, sin. Who committed this sin? Did any divine ever use such language before? Can a parallel to it be found, except in our Commentator's exegesis of Rom. 5:12; which amounts to the doctrine that by one man all are punished, and because they are punished, they are punished, and so all men are exposed to punishment, because they are punished.² Is it wise for our friend to cherish so weakened and predisposed a disposition for technical terms, that he cannot tear himself from their net-work without maiming the idiom of our fathers? Would it not have been more consonant with the genius of an "easy English," for him to take up with what he calls "the last arrow in the quiver," i.e. the theory of a Convention sermon, and to confess outright, that his first affirmation was not what John Foster calls "the simple, general language of intellect,"³ but was too intense for the Reviewer's own "sober second thought."⁴

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 314, 315. ² Bib. Sac. Vol. VII. p. 625. ³ Foster's Essays, Andover edition, p. 192. ⁴ We are happy to confess that although Dr. Hodge has not recalled his assertion, Our passive nature is sin; yet in the creed which he gives in his last Review, p. 677, he has amended it; and he now says, that we are "by nature the children of wrath, infected with a sinful depravity of nature." The depravity is the disposition belonging to the nature. In some connections the word nature means disposition; but never in such connections as those in which our Reviewer used it. As Dr. Hodge has avowed his deference to the great Edwardians of New England, we commend to his notice a remark of the younger Edwards (Works, Vol. I. p. 483), that it is hard to conceive of a distinction between the authorship of an act and of the sinfulness of that act. How can Dr. Hodge conceive of God as the author of a disposition and not as the author of the sinfulness of it? Does not our Reviewer rush into two difficulties in order to avoid one? See Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 684, 685.
In the fourth place, New England divinity has been marked by strong, practical common sense. Its framers were remarkable men, invigorated by the scenes of an eventful era, and claiming our deference for their love of plain, wholesome truth. We might extol them as diligent readers. It is supposed that, on an average, Hopkins studied twelve hours a day, for more than half a century. He read in the original Latin the whole of Poole's five folios, nearly the whole of Calvin's nine folios, Turretin, Van Mastricht, and the standard treatises of English divines. For seventy years, Emmons remained like a fixture in his parsonage study, and like his brethren read "books which are books." Dr. West sat near his library so long, that his feet wore away the wood-work in one part of his room, and left this enduring memorial of his sedentary habit. We care not, however, to extol our divines as readers. Many of them had been disciplined for practical life. The younger Edwards, who perused Van Mastricht seven times, was noted for his wisdom in his intercourse with men. It was a blessing not to be despised, that some of our standard-bearers had been early trained to rural labors in a new country, and by this discipline they gained a healthy and practical judgment. Nearly all of them had been teachers of the common school, and Luther has well said, that "no man is fit to be a theologian, who has not been a school-master." They were married men, and thus were saved from writing like the exsiccated monks of the Middle Ages. That melancholy phrase, "He hath no children," could not be applied to our divines, as to many who have speculated in favor of infant damnation. Our later theologians, as Dwight and Appleton, were adepts in the philosophy of Reid, Oswald, Campbell, Beattie, Stewart; and this has been termed the philosophy of common sense. The tendency of literature, during the last hundred years, has been to develop "the fundamental laws of human belief," and has aided our writers in shaping their faith according to those ethical axioms, which so many fathers in the church have undervalued. A modern reviewer has termed these axioms the germs of infidelity; but without them skepticism is our only refuge. There has never been a more independent class of thinkers than our Edwardian theologians. They lived under a free government in church and state. Nor council nor university could awe them down. Hence they did not copy after other men, so much as exercise, and thereby strengthen, their own judgment. They were peculiar, also, in being called to write a theology for the pulpit. In general, divines have written for the schools; but our fathers wrote for men, women and children.
The Germans have wondered that several of our theological systems are in the form of sermons. It is a practical form, and it was designed to exhibit a practical theology. We can say of it, as of few other systems, it is fit to be preached. It has been accused of metaphysics, by men who distinguish between the sin belonging to us as natures, and the sin belonging to us inchoatively as bodies, and the sin belonging to us as persons. But the metaphysics of New England Theology is such as the yeomen of our fields drank down for the sincere milk of the word. It is the metaphysics of common sense. There are pious men, trained under other systems, who say in their creeds, that let man do whatever he can possibly do, there is no atonement available for him, if he be of the non-elect. But when these pious men are preaching to the non-elect, they hide this notion, "like virtue." We can hardly repress a smile, when we hear good old Thomas Boston at one time exhort his impenitent hearers never to commit a sin, at another time assure them of their utter impotence to do anything which is not sin, and after all say to them, "Do what you can; and, it may be, while ye are doing what ye can for yourselves, God will do for you what ye cannot." 1 It is because our theology has been practical in its aims, that it has been, more than any other system, devoted to the ethical character of the acts preceding conversion, to the wisdom of demanding an immediate compliance with the law, and to the scientific refutation of all excuses for prolonged penitence. Dr. Hopkins valued none of his speculations so highly as those in which he proved the duty of a sinner's instant surrender to God. 2

But let us illustrate the practical nature of New England divinity, and its agreement with the intuitions of a sound judgment, by a reference to its theory concerning the nature of moral evil. This theory is just what Dr. Hodge affirms it not to be, "that all sin consists in sinning; that there can be no moral character but in moral acts." 3 We regard it as a dishonor cast upon the faith of our greatest divines, to deny that it has been and now is characterized by the adoption of this simple truth.

1. The mode in which our Edwardean authors have reasoned on

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2 It were easy to trace the influence of this doctrine upon the missionary spirit which distinguished the early advocates of the New England creed, and also upon the revivals of religion in the midst of which that creed was developed, and to the furtherance of which it has conducted more than any other system.
the doctrine of ability, proves that they must have had the good sense to resolve all sin into moral acts. Even our Reviewer will allow that they believed sin to consist in some kind of violated obligation. They are understood, by nearly all their friends and foes, to have believed that ability is commensurate with obligation. And if any man admit that he is able and obligated to avoid all sin, he must either contradict himself, or else admit that he has no sin antecedent to his choice. For if the doctrine of power commensurate with duty be true, and if we be literally unable to do or to have a thing, we are not obligated to do or to have it. Now we are literally unable to have a well-balanced nature preceding our first choice. We are, therefore, not obligated to have it, and are not sinful for not having it. We are equally unable to avoid an ill-balanced nature preceding our first choice. We are, therefore, not obligated to unmake ourselves before birth and before our first act, and are not sinful in being born just as we were made by the Power which we could not resist. And not only is it true that our nature, antecedent to our first choice and beyond the reach of our faculties, is free from moral blame, but also if we cannot afterwards change it, and can only resist it, we are not blamable for not changing it, and are only blamable for not resisting it. And this is the consecutive theology of New England.1

2. That our Edwardean divines were practical enough to regard all sin as a moral act, is evident from their mode of reasoning on the doctrine of our Paradisiacal offence. According to their creed, we are never obligated to perform an act which we cannot perform, and therefore are never obligated to perform an act where and when we cannot perform it. Now we never could have obeyed a law in Eden; for we were never there. Of course we were never obligated to obey a law of that place, and therefore we never sinned in not obeying it. Again, we never could have obeyed a law at the time of Adam's dwelling in Eden, and of course were never bound to obey it, and thus were never sinful in not obeying it. Now we can no more prevent an evil make of our souls before choice, than we could have prevented an occurrence in Paradise. We might as justly be commanded to go back six thousand years and refuse to eat the apple, as we can be commanded to go back one week before birth, and unmake our natures. And if we are not sinful for Adam's offence because it eludes all our natural power, then, by parity of reasoning, we are not.

1 President Edwards often declares, that the kind of necessity which "the will has nothing to do in," "does excuse persons, and free them from all fault or blame." Inquiry on the Will, Part IV. Sect. iii.

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sinful for our bad moral structure before birth, because that eludes all our natural power. And so far forth as it is literally impossible for us in one instant to renovate our natural sensibilities, just so far forth are we free from sin in not renovating them, and are bound only to refuse the wrong indulgence of them. This is the consistent theology of New England.

3. The speculations of our Edwardean divines on moral agency, are a proof of their having adopted the maxim of common sense, that all sin consists in sinning. And here the great fact is, that they looked upon moral agency as essential to good or ill desert, and upon a moral agent as the only responsible being, and they frequently describe men as becoming sinners “as soon as they become moral agents,” and not before. Whenever they speak of the brutes, who “do not act from choice, guided by understanding,” or of anything “that is purely passive and moved by natural necessity,” they deny that such existences are sinful. According to Dr. Hodge, there is sin in “a nature which is incapable of any action; but according to the Edwardeans, men “are subjects of command or moral government in nothing at all, and all their moral agency is entirely excluded, and no room is left for virtue or vice in the world,” so far forth as there is no possibility of virtuous or vicious acts. In whatever degree men deny the existence of virtuous action, they “do evidently shut all virtue out of the world, and make it impossible that there should ever be any such thing in any case, or that any such thing should ever be conceived of.” Both Edwards and his disciples often assert, that if there be an act which precedes every act of will, it cannot be subject to any command or precept, directly or indirectly, and therefore cannot be either obedience or disobedience: “if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is wholly involuntarily; there is no willing obedience or rebellion, no compliance or opposition of will in the affair, and what sort of obedience or rebellion is this?” Now, a fortiori, if there can be no involuntary sinful act, there can be no involuntary sinful nature. Volumes might be filled with the repetitions which these men make of the assertion, that all sin is perverted free-agency, and that free-agency “consists in choosing, and in nothing else.” What says Dr. Dwight, with whom our Reviewer professes to agree on this subject? “Man is the actor of his own sin. His sin is therefore wholly his own; chargeable only to

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1 Edwards on the Will, Part I. Sect. V. and Part III. Sect. II.
2 Ib. Part III. Sect. IV.
3 Ib. Sect. VII.
4 Ib. Sect. IV.
5 Dr. William R. Weeks's Nine Sermons, p. 72.
himself; chosen by him unnecessarily, while possessed of a power to choose otherwise; avoidable by him; and of course guilty and righteously punishable. Exactly the same natural power is in this case possessed by him, while a sinner, which is afterwards possessed by him when a saint; which Adam possessed before he fell, and which the holy angels now possess in the heavens. This power is also, in my view, perfect freedom; a power of agency, as absolute as can be possessed by an intelligent creature. "1 "The advocates of the Exercise Scheme," whose aberration, according to Dr. Hodge, "was in the direction of ultra-Calvinism," 2 uniformly say, "When we talk of moral agency, we talk of some kind of action or exertion, and not merely of something which may be a foundation for action, and is yet perfectly and entirely distinct from it. When we speak of a person, or moral being, as the subject of punishment or reward, or as having in him desert of praise or blame, it is agreeable to the common sense and understanding of men, to consider him as in exercise, at least as having put forth some motion or exertion." 3

The standard Edwardean definition of law is, a rule of moral conduct. What other law is there to be transgressed? The standard definition of conscience is, the faculty to regulate moral conduct. What faculty is there to regulate a condition preceding choice? And where has obligation been described as anything more than a force binding to obedience? And what is obedience but activity? Here are facts, and they are more decisive than particular words and phrases, in favor of the proposition, that the New England Theology defines sin as the chosen rebellion against law, conscience and duty.

4. The speculations of our Edwardean divines on the nature of virtue, give evidence of their having adopted the sensible theory, that all sin consists in moral acts. Everybody knows their doctrine to have been, that the whole of virtue is comprehended in love to the Creator and his creatures; in "love to being in general;" and is not this love a voluntary act? Virtue is said to imply "consent and union with being in general;" 4 and what is consent but an act of will? It is said to consist in principle; but, says Edwards, "a principle of virtue, I think, is owned by the most considerable of late writers on

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1 Dwight's Works, Sermon 27.  
3 West on Moral Agency, Part I. Sect. 1. In the very first sentence of his Treatise, this "patriarch of Berkshire" says, that moral agency "consisted in spontaneous, voluntary exertion." See also Prof. Wines's Inquiry, passim.  
4 Edwards on the Nature of True Virtue, Chap. I. See also Hopkins on Holiness. Dwight's Sermons, 97, 98, 99.
morality to be general benevolence or public affection;" and is not bene-volence a voluntary feeling? And does not Edwards often say, that affections "are only certain modes of the exercise of the will?" His whole doctrine of the affections is, that they "are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul;" and that "true religion in great part consists in holy affections;" that is, in the more vigorous and sensible holy exercises.

But the objectors say, Virtue, according to Edwards, lies in "a good will." True, but what is a good will? It is, he adds, "the most proper, direct and immediate subject of command," "for other things can be required no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good will." Now what is the immediate subject of command? He says: "The first and determining act" of the will is that which "more especially" "command or precept has a proper respect to," and "this determining, governing act must be the proper object of precept, or none." This determining, governing act of the will, is, then, the "good will," in which moral excellence resides.

The objectors reply, that virtue, according to Edwards, lies "in the tendency and inclination of the heart to virtuous action:" but when he speaks thus, he means a voluntary tendency, and inclination, for he says that "one, even the least, degree of preponderation (all things considered), is choice," and also that the virtuous "habits or qualities, as humility, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, heavenly-mindedness," — "all these things are dispositions and inclinations of the heart." Now what are these dispositions and inclinations? In one of the most emphatic passages of his best treatise, Edwards remarks: "Whatever name we call the act of the will by, choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining, or being averse, a being pleased or displeased, all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to act voluntarily is, evermore, to act electively."

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1 Edwards on the Nature of True Virtue, Chap. VI.
2 Edwards on the Will, Part III. Sect. IV.
5 Edwards on the Will, Part III. Sect. VI. Ibid.
6 Edwards on the Will, Part I. Sect. I. When our theologians say, "Virtue is voluntary," it is idle for Dr. Hodge to interpret them as meaning, virtue "inheres in the will," but is not an exercise of it. He might as well represent them as thinking that the finiteness of the will is voluntary, for finiteness inheres in the will, or as saying that the existence of the will is voluntary, for existence belongs to the will.
It is, then, a settled principle, that in the Edwardean theology all virtue consists in the love of beings according to their value; that is, in the love of the greater more than of the less; and this love is an act. It is an act of the will, for, according to Edwards, the will is "that by which the mind chooses anything," and to love the greater more than the less is to choose the greater. Now the Edwardean theology has been shown to be self-consistent; and as virtue consists in action, so does sin. "It must be also observed and kept in mind, that sin, as does holiness, consists in the motions or exercises of the heart or will, and in nothing else. Where there is no exercise of heart, nothing of the nature of moral inclination, will, or choice, there can be neither sin nor holiness." "Sin consists in that affection and those exercises which are directly opposed to disinterested benevolence to being in general."1 Our Reviewer has suddenly announced his agreement with Dr. Dwight on the nature of sin. Now every one knows, that Dwight resolved all virtue into benevolence, and he therefore says, in consonance with himself: "Sin, universally, is no other than selfishness or a preference of one's self to all other beings, and of one's private interests and gratifications to the well-being of the universe, of God and the intelligent creation."2 "Selfishness consists in a preference of ourselves to others and to all others; to the universe and to God. This is sin, and all that in the Scriptures is meant by sin."3 Now if the word "preference" do not express an intelligent act, involving conception and volition, no word can express it.

Need we say more? Is it not notorious that certain Princeton divines have long been fearful of Edwards's theory of virtue, and have dreaded to admit it within their walls, lest, like the Trojan horse, it let out an army of Hopkinsian heresies, which they have loved to call "Pelagian"?4 They have known perfectly well, that

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1 Hopkins's System of Divinity, Chap. VIII. See also his Treatise on Holiness, passim. See also Bellamy's Works, Vol. I pp. 130 seq.
2 Dwight's Works, Sermon 80.
3 Ibid.
4 Dr. Miller, in his Memoir of Pres. Edwards, treats "the father of Hopkinsianism" with great urbanity, but expresses the opinion that if Edwards "had foreseen the use which has since been made of the doctrine of this Dissertation [on Virtue], he would either have shrunk from its publication, or have guarded its various aspects with additional care," p. 244. But Edwards adopted his theory of virtue while he was a member of Yale College; he wrote his Dissertation upon it three years before his death. It therefore contains his matured views. It is written with far more care than his Treatise on Original Sin. It was probably the theme of frequent conferences with Hopkins, who drew from it the conclusions so much regretted by Dr. Miller. Edwards was accustomed to subject all his works to the criticism of Hopkins, his nearest clerical neighbor.
if holiness be reduced to a disinterested love, sin will be reduced to a partial love, and if a consecutive logic has once resolved moral character into these voluntary acts, it will next infer an ability to perform or omit them, and this ability cannot exist, for it was believed in by "Pelagius."

5. That our Edwardian divines were practical enough to resolve all sin into wicked practice, is evident from their sharp discriminations between sin and the occasions of sin. Two of their most prominent doctrines have been, that the moral character of an act lies in the act itself rather than in its cause, and that the first occasion of wicked acts cannot be itself wicked. "If all sin," say they, "be caused by that which is sin, then sin exists as a cause, before it exists at all." If an active choice cannot be well or ill deserving, unless it proceed from a passive nature that is well or ill deserving, then its character lies not in itself, but in something antecedent to itself, and this is the error which the New England divines have regarded as subversive of their entire system.¹

They often speak of sin as literally belonging to "the native bent," the "dispositions," "inclinations," "propensities," "tendencies," "habits," "relish," "taste," "temper," of the heart. But these terms, when thus used by our most eminent authors, are designed to signify the acts which involve choice. Dr. Bellamy, whom our Reviewer describes as strenuous in his opposition to the doctrine that all sin consists in act, says "that sinners are free and voluntary in their bad temper," "heartily in it," "this evil bent of our hearts is not of his [God's] making, but is the spontaneous propensity of our own wills; for, we being born devoid of the divine image, ignorant of God, and insensible of his glory, do, of our own accord, turn to ourselves, etc.—from whence we natively become averse to God," etc.

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¹ For seven years, and to follow that great man's advice. It is on record that, in 1755, Hopkins and Bellamy spent two nights and a day with Edwards, in examining his kindred Dissertation on the End for which God created the World. Both this and the Dissertation on True Virtue were first published by Hopkins, seven years after Edwards's death. Is it at all probable, that so inquisitive a man as the original editor of these two works, had never conversed with Edwards on the consequences logically resulting from them? Can we believe, that so plain-spoken a divine as Hopkins would have built his system upon them, and not apprized his readers that his familiar friend, who drew out the promises, would not accept the conclusion? 

He approves of Mr. Stoddard's remark, that "self-love is the very root of original sin." He has left the following memorable words:

"These [sinful tendencies] are the earliest dispositions that are discovered in our nature; and although I do not think that they are concreted by God, together with the essence of our souls, yet they seem to be the very first propensities of the new-made soul. So that they are, in a sense, connatural; our whole hearts are perfectly and entirely bent this way, from their very first motion. These propensities, perhaps, in some sense, may be said to be contracted, in opposition to their being strictly and philosophically natural, because they are not created by God with the essence of the soul, but result from its native choice, or rather, more strictly, are themselves its native choice. But most certainly these propensities are not contracted in the sense that many vicious habits are, namely, by long use and custom. In opposition to such vicious habits, they may be called connatural. Little children do very early bad things, and contract bad dispositions; but these propensities are evidently antecedent to every bad thing infused or instilled by evil examples, or gotten by practice, or occasioned by temptations. And hence it is become customary to call them natural, and to say that it is our very nature to be so inclined; and to say that these propensities are natural, would to common people be the most apt way of expressing the thing; but it ought to be remembered that they are not natural in the same sense as the faculties of our souls are; for they are not the workmanship of God, but are our native choice, and the voluntary, free, spontaneous bent of their hearts. And to keep up this distinction, I frequently choose to use the word native, instead of natural."

President Edwards and Dr. Hopkins often speak of holiness as literally existing in our spiritual discernment, and of sin as literally existing in our spiritual blindness; but they mean a discernment

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1 For these and similar testimonies, see Bellamy's Works, Vol. I. pp. 97, 98, 153, 154. Vol. II. pp. 554, 555, 581. Dr. Smalley differed from Bellamy (as well as from himself), on this topic, at least in words. He says that there is a sin of nature, "so entirely independent of the will as to be requisite to" every wrong volition. He does not allow, however, that the sinful principle is dormant, but styles it an active principle.

2 Bellamy's Works, Vol I. pp. 138, 139. The treatise from which this passage is taken, is the one which President Edwards endorsed publicly. Dr. Nathan Strong says: "What we call a new moral principle, may also be called a new taste, relish, temper, disposition, or habit of feeling respecting moral objects and truth." "A temper, disposition, inclination, taste or relish, which are right or wrong, mean the same as a heart or will that is right or wrong." "The will, the heart, and the affections may in most moral and evangelical discourses, be used as words of the same meaning." Now what are the affections? "The sensible exercises of the heart and will are what we call the affections, such as love, delight, rejoicing, hatred, enmity, mourning, and all these are exercises of the heart." Sermons, Vol. I. pp. 103, 104, 105, 167, 168.
which involves a right choice, and a blindness which involves a wrong choice, and in the choice alone lies the holiness and sin. "It will be found on examination," says Dr. Hopkins, "that if practical judgment has any meaning, it intends something which implies a sense of heart or a degree of inclination or will." "Everything practical or that relates to practice, belongs to the heart or will." "Whenever, therefore, there is a practical judgment concerning anything that is presented to the mind, as the object of choice, that it is good, eligible and excellent, there is taste and choice actually begun." "By understanding, knowledge and wisdom, in Scripture, is commonly meant true holiness, which consists not at all in mere speculation, but in the exercise of a right taste and inclination of heart, in a view and sense of divine truth."¹ On the same principle, these divines often speak of our ignorance, stupidity, etc. as sinful, because these states involve a wrong "taste," "inclination," "tendency," etc., all of which terms are here used to denote exercises of will.²

There is, however, another sense in which our divines occasionally use the words, "taste," "propensity," "disposition," etc. They intend to denote by them not a choice, but a foundation for choice, and therefore not a sin, but an occasion of sin; an evil, not a wickedness. Thus Dr. Hopkins says, that in regeneration the Holy Spirit "begets a right and good taste, temper, or disposition, and so lays a foundation for holy exercises of heart." He then adds:

"It is difficult and perhaps impossible to form any distinct and clear idea of that in the mind or heart, which is antecedent to all thought and exercise of the will, or action, which we call principle, taste, temper, disposition, habit, etc.; by which we mean nothing properly active, but that from which right exercise of the will or action springs, as the reason and foundation of it, and without which there could have been no such exercise. Perhaps the real

¹ Hopkins's Two Discourses on Law and Regeneration, pp. 48, 50. Ed. 1768. This distinction between the neutral principles and the moral exercises of the soul, is the basis of Hopkins's distinction between regeneration and conversion.
² That Edwards generally uses the word inclination as synonymous with choice, or else as implying choice, and as distinguishable not from acts but from external acts, is evident from Part III. Sect. IV. and Part IV. Sect. I. of his Inquiry. That he generally uses "habits" and "dispositions" as synonymous with accustomed acts of choice, is plain from Part III. Sect. VI. of his Inquiry. When, therefore, he says in the Preface to his Inquiry, that "all virtue and religion have their seat more immediately in the will, consisting more especially in right acts and habits of this faculty," his meaning must be that holiness belongs primarily to the occasional and habitual acts of the will, and not to any nature distinct from those acts.
truth of the matter, when examined with true philosophic, metaphysical strictness, will appear to be this: that what we call principle, disposition or frame of mind, which is antecedent to all right exercise of the heart, and is the foundation and reason of it, is wholly to be resolved into divine constitution or law of nature. But this I leave to the inquiry and decision of those who are inclined to examine this matter to the bottom, seeing I have not room here to go into a more particular consideration of it; and, whatever is at bottom the truth of the case, nothing will be said on this subject that immediately depends upon it."

Does any one suppose that Dr. Hopkins would call this evil bias a real, or even original, sin? Hear him: "Original sin is that total moral depravity which takes place in the hearts of all the children of Adam, in consequence of his apostasy, which consists in exercise or act, as really as any sin can do, and therefore cannot be distinguished from actual sin." "This sin which takes place in the posterity of Adam, is not properly distinguished into original and actual sin, because it is all really actual, and there is, strictly speaking, no other sin but actual sin." Besides, the wrong bias which leads to wrong choice, is resolved by Hopkins into a "divine constitution or law of nature;" and did he believe that this is a real sin? Then

1 Hopkins's Two Discourses on Law and Regeneration, p. 38. Ed. 1768. Here is seen the substantial agreement of Hopkins with "the Exercise Scheme." The earlier advocates of that scheme believed that all our sin is occasioned by a law of nature; and gave as a definition of nature's law just what Newton and other philosophers have given; viz. "the established mode of divine operation." Edwards on Original Sin, especially Part IV. Chapters II. and III., gives the same idea of a law of nature.

2 Hopkins's System of Divinity, Chap. VIII. Here is but a single specimen of this author's mode of regarding Original Sin. Only a very small proportion of the best New England divines have dissented from it. After Hopkins's System was published, Dr. Jonathan Edwards wrote his freest criticisms upon it, and did not intimate the slightest dissatisfaction of himself or his brethren with the above named theory of Original Sin. It has had great influence on the New England clergy, as it pervades all the works of this good man. As early as 1787, Dr. Stiles writes: "It has been the tone to direct students in divinity, these thirty years past, to read the Bible, President Edwards, Dr. Bellamy, and Mr. Hopkins's writings; and this was a pretty good sufficiency of reading." He adds that the younger theologians were inclined to differ from Hopkins, in some particulars, but he does not specify the nature of moral evil as one of them. He says that none of the younger divines will "be equal to those strong reasoners, President Edwards and Mr. Hopkins." When, therefore, Dr. Hodge says, that "Bellamy, Dwight, and the other great men of New England, were no less strenuous than Edwards" in opposing the theory that all sin is actual and avoidable, he must have included Hopkins among these opposers, or else have used language inaccurately. Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 694.
he must have believed God to be not only the author but also the
actor of moral evil. Still further, he supposed that in regeneration
this bad relish is removed, and a good relish substituted for it; and
in conversion this good relish is exercised. But this good relish is,
of itself, no real holiness. According to him, it does not commend
the subject of it to the divine approbation. Unless it be exercised,
the man who has it as a passive quality, will not be saved. Hopkins
quotes an objector as saying: "If persons are regenerated before
they are enlightened and believe on Christ, what will become of
them? Where will they go, to heaven or to hell, if they die after
they are regenerated, and before they believe? It seems they are fit
for neither; their hearts are renewed, so [they] cannot go to hell; but
they are in an unpardoned, unjustified state, therefore cannot go to
heaven!" Now what answer does Hopkins make? Does he say
that this good, passive disposition will be accepted as a compliance
with the conditions of life? No. He only affirms, that the disposition
will be exercised before death, and the acting of it will, through
grace, entitle the agent to the promises. "And," he replies, "what
if a person who is elected to salvation dies in an unconverted state;
will he be saved or not? Let the objector answer this question, and
he will drop his objections, having fully answered it himself. His
answer must be, there never was, and never will be such an instance.
All that are elected shall be converted before they die." ¹

Dr. Bellamy expresses the same idea thus: "The promises of the
gospel are not made to the holy principle, passively considered, but
to its acts and exercises, even as the blessings of the first covenant
were not promised to that image of God in which Adam began to
exist, but to his active compliance with that covenant." Bellamy
then states the objection, that on his theory "a regenerated [but un-
converted] soul may be in a state of condemnation for a time, and
consequently perish, if death should befall him in that juncture." And
he answers the objection in the words of Flavel, by remarking
that the regenerated soul will be converted, i. e. the soul having the
holy principle will exercise it before death, and by this action will se-
cure an entrance into heaven. Death will not intervene between
regeneration and conversion.² Bellamy does indeed call this principle "true holiness;" but he calls it so only as it implies the certainty
of its being exercised. In itself; apart from its exercise, it is not a
true holiness which God will accept as a condition of salvation;

¹ Hopkins's Two Discourses on Law and Regeneration, p. 50. Ed. 1768.
² Bellamy's Works, Vol. II. p. 634.
nothing which he has ever promised to reward. But has he not promised to reward all that which is true holiness in itself? And, on the same principle, what kind of sin is that which in its own nature deserves no punishment?

But does the choicest friend of Hopkins and Bellamy sanction their theory of an inward, neutral occasion of holiness and sin? They derived their theory from him more than from any other divine. President Edwards often speaks of "kind affections" which "are implanted by the Author of nature" within all men, and which are "the fruit of God's mercy," and, of course, are not sin.¹ He speaks of "the common, natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, etc., which were in man in innocence."² He then says, that these principles being left "to themselves, without the government of superior divine principles, will certainly be followed with the corruption, yes, the total corruption of the heart."² "When God made man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind, which may be called natural, being the principles of mere human nature, such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions which belong to the nature of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honor and pleasure were exercised."² These inferior "principles, that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from, and inseparably connected with, mere human nature," were designed "to be wholly subordinate and subservient." But when the Divine Spirit left the soul, "the inferior principles of self-love and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone and left to themselves, of course became reigning principles." "The immediate consequence of which was a fatal catastrophe, a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man did immediately set up himself, and the objects of his private affections and appetites as supreme, and so they took the place of God."² Edwards needed not to state more clearly that man's voluntary wrong action, which was his first sin, resulted from a previous disorder in his involuntary principles. He adds: "these inferior principles are like fire in a house, which we say is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction."² Now is sin a good and very useful servant? If not, these principles are not sin; but Edwards adds, that "in consequence" of them, "arises enmity in the heart" against God. "And therefore as God withdrew spiritual communion and his vital, gracious influence

¹ Nature of True Virtue, Ch. VI. ² Original Sin, Part IV. Ch. II.
from the common head, so he withholds the same from all the members, as they come into existence; whereby they come into the world mere flesh, and entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles, and so become wholly corrupt, as Adam did.”

Can language express more decisively the truth that our lower principles, which left to themselves become the ineradicable occasions of sin, are yet in and of themselves not sin? This great father of New England Theology asks: “Is there anything in nature to make it impossible but that the superior principles of man’s nature should be so proportioned to the inferior, as to prevent such a dreadful consequence as the moral and natural ruin and eternal perdition of the far greater part of mankind?” And he answers his own question in this emphatic style: “If we are Christians, we must be forced to allow it to be possible in the nature of things, that the principles of human nature should be so balanced, that the consequence should be no propensity to sin in the first beginning of a capacity of moral agency.”

Here he not only asserts that our inferior principles of action might exist in a perfectly sinless being, but he sanctions the phrase that our sin results from a disorder, a wrong balance, a bad proportion of our sensibilities. These are Edwardsian phrases, and yet men who never read him with care, if at all, denounced them as “German” and “Pelagian.”

We are now prepared to notice a singular fact. The very reasons adduced for proving that our New England writers do not believe sin to consist in act, prove that they do thus believe. For example, the Treatise of Edwards on Original Sin has induced our Reviewer to say, that “the world-wide fame of President Edwards, as a theologian, rests mainly on his thorough refutation of” the doctrine that all sin consists in sinning, and that power equals and limits duty. It is true that, in some particulars, this treatise of Edwards is alien from the spirit of New England divinity, and contains a number of phrases incongruous with the prevailing style of Edwards himself. Still, it is the leading doctrine of that treatise, that all sin is an act, committed in our own persons, or else in the person of him who infolded us within himself. Why does the prince of metaphysicians make such gigantic efforts to prove that our sin is the same with Adam’s, not only “in kind” but also “in number,” if he deemed it right that we should be punished for anything other than our own action? He says that infants, as “all know, never committed any sin in their own

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1 Edwards on Original Sin, Part IV. Ch. II.  
2 Ib. Part I. Ch. I. Sect. IX. 
persons.”¹ Are they, then, guilty for a nature which, apart from its motions, is truly and properly sin? No; for he declares that they could be sinners no other way than by virtue of Adam's transgression,² and he expressly denies that the children of Adam “come into the world with a double guilt; one the guilt of Adam’s sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart.”³ — “The guilt a man has upon his soul at his first existence is one and simple; viz. the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the first corruption or depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as two things, distinctly imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God.”⁴ He repeatedly affirms, that “the first existing of a corrupt disposition” in the hearts of men, is the same identical thing with Adam’s first corrupt disposition; is the “extended pollution of that sin;” is “the consent and concurrence with it,” is a “participation”⁵ in it. Now what was Adam’s first sin but an act? Edwards says, that “the first evil disposition or inclination of the heart of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct from his first act of sin, but was included in it;” and as we are identically the same with Adam, so is our first evil disposition identically the same with his, and is not distinct from our first moral act. As Adam’s “guilt was all truly from the act of his inward man,” so is our guilt all truly from the act of our inward man; for our act is the same with his, just as the sap in a branch of the tree is the same identical sap which was once in the root.⁶ The idea of our literal oneness with Adam, is indeed a strange phenomenon in mental history, but so great a man as Edwards must commit great errors, if he commit any at all. For the sake of retaining the doctrine, that all our sin consists in our own active “consent of heart,” and also the doctrine that the sin of Adam is imputed to us, he seized on the astonishing theory, that as Adam’s rebellion was not imputed to him, until he had actively engaged in it,

¹ Edwards on Original Sin, Part II. Chap. IV. Sect. II. and Part IV. Chap. IV.
² Ib. Part II. Chap. IV. Sect. II.
³ These many similar quotations, are from Part IV. Chap. III. of the Treatise on Original Sin. If their author had been asked, whether we had the natural power of avoiding Adam’s sin, he would have said, that in the sense in which we committed it, we had the natural power to avoid it. Thus Andrew Fuller (Works, Vol. II. p. 472. Ed. 1845), cites the following objection to Edwards’s theory: “We could not be to blame, for what we could not avoid;” and replies, “Very true; but if the notion of a union between Adam and his posterity be admitted, then it cannot properly be said, we could not avoid it,” i. e. the sin in Adam.
so our rebellion is not imputed to us until we have actively engaged in it; and as we are one moral person with Adam, so our rebellion is one moral act with his; and, therefore, his act being ours is of right imputed to us as our act; and "the first existing of a depraved disposition in Adam's posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct from their guilt of Adam's first sin." But, the objectors reply, Edwards does speak of a confirmed evil principle as imparting a distinct additional guilt to the soul. True, but he adds, "this confirmed corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on his [Adam's] soul," and does the same on the souls of his posterity. But our opponents inquire, Does not Edwards speak of an evil disposition, propensity, tendency, which precedes our own personal action and is itself not only sin but also a consequence of the imputation of Adam's sin? No, we reply. Our opponents have mistaken a theory of Dr. Hodge, for the exactly opposite theory of our New England divine. Edwards reiterates his belief: "The first being of an evil disposition in the heart of a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve of the sin of his first father, as fully as he himself approved of it when he committed it, or so far as to imply a full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think is not to be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam's own heart in the act of sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation of his sin to himself, but rather prior to it in the order of nature. Indeed, the derivation of the evil disposition to the hearts of Adam's posterity, or rather the coexistence of the evil disposition, implied in Adam's first rebellion, in the root and branches, is a consequence of the union, that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity; but not properly a consequence of the imputation of his sin; nay, rather, antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of the heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent; as it was in the case of Adam himself."

Such remarks give a key to Edwards's otherwise enigmatical

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1 All the quotations in the text of this page are from Edwards on Original Sin, Part IV. Ch. III.

2 It is useless to pretend that Edwards uses guilt in these passages as denoting a legal exposedness, and not a moral stain; for he expressly declares that "men are really, in themselves, what they are in the eye of the law, and by the voice of strict equity and justice." Part I. Ch. I. Sect. III.
Treatise on Original Sin. When we read in it of our evil propensities, we are either to understand, first, that they are real choices, and thus real sins; or, secondly, that they are the effects of our having transgressed the law in Adam, and are thus metaphorically sins, just as our wrong outward actions implying a wicked motive are sins by a figure of speech; or, thirdly, that they are sinful by a like metaphor, as they are occasions of our personal disobedience to law; or, fourthly, that they are sinful by a double metonymy of cause for effect and effect for cause. How else can we explain many expressions like the following: "Man's nature or state is attended with a pernicious or destructive tendency in a moral sense, when it tends to that which deserves misery and destruction." This evil propensity is odious and detestable, "as, by the supposition, it tends to that moral evil by which the subject becomes odious in the sight of God, and liable as such to be condemned." It is "a tendency to guilt and ill-desert in a vast overbalance to virtue and merit." Part I. Ch. I. Whether our personal sins be induced by an inward propensity to them, or by animal appetites, etc., the occasion of those sins is pronounced to be equally "evil, corrupt and dreadful." Part I. Ch. I. Sect. IX. But are our animal appetites literally disapproved by conscience? Is it not plain that Edwards discriminates between real guilt and the guiltless occasion of it? 1

1 Against all such modes of interpreting Edwards, our Reviewer and others are fond of quoting his remark: "It is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition." Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 685. But why does Edwards make this obviously true remark? He is opposing a theory that our choices must be self-determined; that before a preference can be right or wrong, we must think of it, of its good and evil influences, and then must choose to exercise it, and must thus make the preference an effect of a foregoing choice. He denies, as we all deny, that we must choose to choose, that "thought, reflection, and choice must go before virtue, and that all virtue and righteousness must be the fruit of preceding choice." Treatise on Original Sin, Part II. Ch. I. Sect. I. He teaches, that virtue need not be preceded by a distinct choice, but that virtue is the "leading choice." Again, Edwards is opposing a theory that virtue and vice consist, primarily, in subordinate and imperative volitions, which do not involve the "leading choice." In his intense aversion to this theory, he says: "The act of choosing that which is good, is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good principle or virtuous disposition of mind." Treatise on Original Sin, Part II. Ch. I. Sect. I. But he here means by "good principle or virtuous disposition," precisely what he elsewhere means by the "original," "determining," "leading," "governing," "regulating act," or "choice." Inquiry on the Will, Part II. Sect. X. and Part III. Sect. IV. It is this regulating choice in which, primarily, virtue consists, and not in any choice preceding it, nor in any subsequent choice not including it.
It has been already stated, that Edwards's work on Original Sin is not a perfect exponent of what is now termed the Edwardean faith. Perhaps no two of our eminent theologians have adopted its theory of our sameness with Adam. Very few of them have imitated all of its intense expressions. It was written amid the constant alarms of an Indian war, under many embarrassing influences of its author's frontier parish, and with a constitution shattered by the fever and ague. Ill health prevented his revising it as faithfully as he had revised his other works, and when he had published only a few sheets of it, death ended his labors. Accordingly, it bears more signs of hurried composition than are to be found in some of his writings, which had lain by him for years. The principal regret which he is said to have felt in prospect of his untimely death, arose from his inability to modify some things which he had written; and there are several reasons to believe, that he meant to remove some verbal incongruities from the work which he had not finished with his wonted care, and which he had deemed it needful to publish with more than his usual haste. Were it not for his sudden decease, he might have explained a few remarks, which in the fervor of composition he had left unqualified, and thus he would have saved a class of men from wrongly imputing to him the error, that sin lies in something beside moral agency—an error hostile to the whole spirit of his creed.

In the fifth place, New England Theology is a comprehensive system of Biblical science. Hopkins says of President Edwards: "He studied the Bible more than all other books, and more than most other divines do." "He took his religious principles from the Bible, and not from any human system or body of divinity. Though his principles were Calvinistic, yet he called no man father. He thought and judged for himself, and was truly very much of an original."¹ What had an Indian missionary, on the very bounds of civilized life, to fear from church authorities? The distance of our fathers from the old world, made them cleave to the Word of God as their dearest standard. Who was ever more inwardly and thoroughly Protestant in

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¹ Hopkins's Life and Character of the late Reverend, Learned and Pious Mr. Jonathan Edwards. Ed. 1799. p. 47. It was Edwards's own opinion, that he had developed some new truths from the inspired volume.
his rule of faith, than Samuel Hopkins? He expounded the entire Scriptures three several times to his congregation at Newport. Altogether too sternly would he have frowned upon the remark of Dr. Hodge: "If the point assailed can be shown to be a part of the common faith of the church, then we think the necessity for further debate is, in all ordinary cases, at an end."\(^1\) Altogether too severely would he have reprimanded the spirit of this remark, as leading its author into the unreasoning dogmatism of Rome. The more recent divines of New England have felt a similar preference for the Bible above creeds. They have, accordingly, given such an impulse to Scriptural investigation as was previously unknown to the English world. Their mode of interpreting the sacred volume, is the only mode which will save consistent thinkers from Romanism. The principles of exegesis on which our Reviewer proceeds in defending a limited atonement, inability, etc., are the very same on which the Romanists proceed in defending the Real Presence and the Supremacy of Saint Peter. If he stands, they stand. Indeed, the hypothesis that all men sinned in Adam, had never found currency in the church, if the Vulgate had not mistranslated the ἐπίθετος of Rom. 5:12. The Calvinistic theories which oppose the New England Calvinism, are founded either on the scholastic metaphysics, or on a literal interpretation of oriental metaphors; and these are the fruitful sources of Papal error. Painful, indeed, is the violence which those theories have done to such clear sayings as, "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father;" and Christ is the propitiation, "not for ours only,

\(^1\) Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 677. There is a truth in this canon of our Reviewer. Yet he is wont to carry his reliance on church authority too far. In the present controversy, for example, his principal argument against us has been derived, not from the Word of God, but from the opinions of men. In citing these opinions, however, he has been unfortunate. He appeals to the Romanist standards on the nature of sin, etc. But the Council of Trent, at their fifth session, decided that our inborn proclivity to sin is called sin, only because it arises from and tends to moral evil, and "cannot hurt but him that consenteth to it." See Paul Sarpi's Historie of the Council of Trent, p. 184. See also Möhler's Symbolik, Theil I. Kap. III. § XIII. and Theil II. Kap. VI. § XCIII. Our assailant has labored with rare assiduity, to prove that we agree with Schleiermacher. Suppose that success had crowned his toils. What then? Has he shown that the great German is in error? He has merely appealed to authority, and said that "such men as Hengstenberg regard [Schleiermacher's system] as subverting some of the essential doctrines of the Gospel." Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 692. But Hengstenberg also says, that Dr. Dwight is a Rationalist, on the very topics now controverted; and our Reviewer avows that he agrees with Dwight on these topics.
but also for the sins of the whole world." Those artificial theories
are useful, so far forth as they are symbols of great truths. Viewed
as poetry and eloquence, they pertain to the form of presentation
suited to earnest feeling; but viewed as doctrines literally expressed,
they pertain to a theology of a "bewildered" reason, and not to the
theology of a sound head or heart. They may be regarded not as
true theories, but as the poetry and eloquence which give to accurate
statements a reader power over the feelings. The Princeton Re-
view has spoken, once at least, of "a true thought in a false ex-
pression." A rare merit of the New England system is, that it has
looked through the metonymy and the hyperbole of the oriental ex-
pression, and seized the "true thought" intended by it; while many
of its opposers have clung to the false theories which that expression
literally denotes. Those theories have often repelled the inquirer,
into infidelity. He has mistaken figures of rhetoric for a literal creed,
and has therefore revolted from that creed. The first sentence of
Dr. Smalley's sermon on Original Sin, betokens one grand aim of the
New England system, to preclude all occasion for infidel schemes, by
so interpreting the Bible as to make sensible men confide in it.

The New England system is not only scriptural, but is scriptural
science. Are its advocates condemned as too inquisitive? they do
search for the truth; as too metaphysical? they do reason against
a philosophy falsely so called; as too fond of novelties in speculation?
they do love to "grow in knowledge;" as too ready to examine the

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1 See Convention Sermon, Bib. Sacra, Vol. VII. p. 563. This sermon has
been represented as implying that certain doctrines literally expressed by words
like "Imputed and Passive sin," belong to the theology of feeling, and that the
New England faith is suited to the intellect only. One aim of that sermon is,
to show that these doctrines belong to the theology of feeling, when they are
viewed as symbols, illustrations, of the real truth; and that the New England sys-
tem will adopt all truth, be it expressed in the prosaic style fitted for speculation,
or the poetic style fitted for emotion. It will allow the theology of the intellect
and also the theology of the heart, which are the same substance in two forms.
The doctrines literally denoted by words like Passive Sin, Guilt of Adam's Of-
fence, and regarded as truths plainly expressed, do not belong to the right theo-
ology in either form. But the mass of Christians who contend for them, have not
practically viewed them as credible in a literal interpretation. One of the best
preachers in this or any age, has styled those doctrines, as they are treated by
the multitude, "the theology of the tympanum; for if the words which express
them tinkle well in the ear, they are loved, let them mean anything or nothing."
We have chosen to call them by a more reverential name, and partly because
the phrases suggesting them are associated with the venerable piety of ancient
days, and thus have a goodly sound.

2 Vol. XIII. p. 81.
foundations of their faith? they are not afraid of "open questions," nor of exposing their creed, in all its parts, to a rigid scrutiny. They know themselves to be imperfect. Free inquiry has made them humble; and can an arrogant temper, disdainful of all improvement, be either the seed or the fruit of science? They have borne much of abusive criticism. Two of their most eminent champions had not lain long in their graves, before they were publicly declared, even in the city of Brotherly Love, to have made their bed in hell. One of the men, thus humanly condemned, was the sainted Hopkins himself. But have our divines retaliated such calumnies? In reading the seven or eight volumes of Emmons, would any one suspect that he had ever been defamed? Would not the immortal ancestors of Dwight have frowned upon him, if, in one of his eleven volumes, he had returned railing for railing? The New England divinity can defend itself without personal vituperation, and in the purity of its argument it breathes the spirit of a divine philosophy. It has developed its scientific temper in systematizing those old truths on which, as a broad, deep basis, many varying superstructures have been reared. By its accordance with the sensibilities of our race, it authorizes an intelligent use of the tropes which those sensibilities demand; demand not as faded, but as rhetorical figures; suggesting their original images, but understood in their rational import. It unfolds the meaning and the fitness and the power of that style, in which we summon the blind, deaf, dead, and twice dead, to see, hear, rise, walk, and take heaven by violence; in which we assert that God sits, and rests, stands up, and returns to his place, rises betimes, and plucks his hand out of his bosom; is wounded and is comforted, grieved, afflicted, and eased; considers and wonders; turns violently and tosses his foe like a ball; is quiet, or jealous, or angry, or forward; punishes the innocent, and beholds no sin in the vile; exacts impossibilities from the weak, condemns them for a misdeed of their ancestor, and smites his hands together and causes his fury to rest; and whets his glittering sword, and yet is love without change and without end. All these expressions are found in the hymns of our worship or in the tracts which are welcomed to our houses, and they are all admired as symbols of the truth explained in our dogmatic treatises. In uncovering the profoundest philosophy that lies under the richest of the inspired poetry, and in illustrating the self-consist-

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1 "A slavish adherence to systematic divinity has much injured some of the finest passages of Revelation; and which were intended to be felt, rather than criticised." Jay's Exercises for the Closet, Oct. 21.
ent character of the inspired volume, our theological system claims to be a true science.

Because it is a science, it is comprehensive. A Unitarian opposer shrinks "with a feeling approaching horror," from the "stern and appalling theology" associated with the name of Hopkins.¹ A Calvinistic opposer, as early as 1817, mourns over the Hopkinsian Seminary at Andover, because the doctrines taught there "do, in their nature and necessary consequences, lead to the Socinian ground."² The vane of the Princeton Review points to Emmonism on one day as Pelagian, and on another day as ultra-Calvinistic. What is the source of these charges, that nullify each other? It is the comprehensiveness of the Edwardean scheme. This scheme unites a high, but not an ultra Calvinism, on the decrees and agency of God, with a philosophical, but not an Arminian theory, on the freedom and worth of the human soul. Its new element is seen in its harmonizing two great classes of truths; one relating to the untrammeled will of man, another relating to the supremacy of God. Because it has secured human liberty, it exalts the divine sovereignty; and its advocates have preached more than others on predestination, because they have prepared the way for it by showing that man's freedom has been predestined. They have insisted on an eternally decreed liberty, and on a free submission to the eternal decrees. Their faith ascribes to man a noble structure of mind, and sinks him the lower for abusing it. In reproving his wickedness, it exceeds all other systems; because it exceeds them all in unfolding the equity of the Sovereign against whom the subject, so richly endowed, has so needlessly rebelled. When its opposers think of its efforts to justify the ways of our Heavenly Father, they hastily accuse it of Arminianism; and when they turn their minds to its description of the Supreme, Universal Governor, they hastily accuse it of hyper-Calvinism. In these alternations between conflicting charges, they copy old replies to old theories, and misdirect them to a new doctrine. They overlook the element which Edwards disclosed to the church, the union between certainty and spontaneous choice. They forget the very genius of his system. This genius is, to blend the loftiest truths concerning the Creator, with the most equitable truths concerning the creature; to heighten our reverence for God, by disclosing his generosity to man, and to deepen our penitence for sin, by showing the ease with which it might have been avoided. A pious heart longs to glorify God;

² Willsom's Historical Sketch, p. 184.
a sympathizing heart would arouse men to free action; a comprehensive theology teaches in order to exhort freely, and exhorts freely in order to teach. If Cecil had been familiar with the New England scheme, he never would have felt the necessity of oscillating between his own speculative creed, and the speculative creed of his opposers. He betrays the disproportions of mere Calvinism, and its consequent failure to satisfy a practical Christian, in the following apothegms:

"The right way of interpreting Scripture is, to take it as we find it, without any attempt to force it into any particular system. Whatever may be fairly inferred from Scripture, we need not fear to insist on. Many passages speak the language of what is called Calvinism, and that in almost the strongest terms. I would not have a man clip and curtail these passages, to bring them down to some system: let him go with them in their free and full sense; for, otherwise, if he do not absolutely pervert them, he will attenuate their energy. But, let him look at as many more, which speak the language of Arminianism, and let him go all the way with these, also. God has been pleased thus to state and to leave the thing; and all our attempts to distort it, one way or the other, are puny and contemptible."

"No man will preach the Gospel so freely as the Scriptures preach it, unless he will submit to talk like an Antinomian, in the estimation of a great body of Christians; nor will any man preach it so practically as the Scriptures, unless he will submit to be called, by as large a body, an Arminian. Many think that they find a middle path: which is, in fact, neither one thing nor another; since it is not the incomprehensible, but grand plan of the Bible. It is somewhat of human contrivance. It savors of human poverty and littleness."

Mr. Simeon, also, whom the Princeton Review so justly extols, would have found the Edwardean scheme sufficiently copious and liberal to satisfy his many-sided heart, and to save him from adopting one speculative creed for one purpose, and an opposite speculative creed for another purpose. He says:

"Here are two other extremes, Calvinism and Arminianism (for you need not be told how long Calvin and Arminius lived before St. Paul). 'How do you move in reference to these, Paul? In a golden mean?' 'No.'—'To one extreme?' 'No.'—'How then?' 'To both extremes: to-day I am a strong Calvinist; to-morrow a strong Arminian.'—'Well, well, Paul, I see thou art beside thyself: go to Aristotle, and learn the golden mean.'"

1 Cecil's Remains, pp. 162, 163. Boston edition. There is nothing in a late Convention sermon that approximates to the license of these remarks; yet the Princeton Review says, "Cecil is one of our classics," and it recommends him as tending "to cure young men of the hum-drum or Blair method." (Bib. Repertory, Vol. XVII. p. 639.)

Is it possible to conceive, that either of the Edwards's, or Hopkins, or Emmons, would indite such an apology for Antinomianism or Arminianism? They dreaded each of these creeds, as an angel of death. Yet they have been condemned for sanctioning both; condemned, because they have been misunderstood; misunderstood, because their system is original and novel; original and novel, because it combines the one-sided truth which the Antinomian had distorted, with the one-sided truth which the Arminian had distorted; separates the two truths from the errors with which the Antinomian and the Arminian had intertwined them, and harmonizes the two into one capacious system; a system rigidly accurate in form, and still indulgent enough to allow many bold, hearty expressions of its own truth; a system the minutiae of which Calvin and Augustine would have consistently defended, if they had lived when the laws of interpretation and the philosophy of common sense had been as clear and prominent, as they have been during and since the time of the Edwards's.

In the last place, the Theology of New England is the only system of speculative orthodoxy which will endure examination; and it is, therefore, destined to prevail. It is impugned by men who are often forced to own its "radical principles." They are driven to it, and soon they disavow it, and then come to it, and leave it once more, and afterwards flee back to it, and as soon abandon it, only to return another time, and so forsake it yet again. Dr. Hodge often appears upon its ground, either as a friend or foe; and our only complaint is, that, in either capacity, he stays too short a time. In his onsets and retreats, he represents the character of all opposition to the truth. He writes condemnatory words upon our creed, and then we quote from him other words, in which he has uttered the identical sentiments which he now controverts. We produce against him the very Essays, from which he has mainly derived his fame, as an "accomplished Reviewer." He replies, that we impute to him Essays, "some of which [he] probably never even read."¹ This is to be re-

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 588. We have ascribed to Dr. Hodge's authorship, not more than four Articles in the Bib. Repertory, and those are the Articles which have been long admitted to be his, by "common fame;" an authority which ought not, since 1837, to have been "exceeding" from his remembrance. We have quoted other Essays, indeed, as expressing opinions, which he is known, from other sources, to entertain; but we have been careful to mention him as the author of not more than four, and those, the very Essays, which have been most unanimously imputed to him. Their spirit and style bear a marked resemblance to the spirit and style of his assault upon a harmless Con-
Vacillating Opposition to it.

He has enjoyed, for many years, the ovations of a party for those bold Reviews; and now, when their self-nullifying character is exposed, he never read them, "probably." For twenty years, has he been shining in borrowed plumage? The Conductors of the Biblical Repertory have virtually avowed themselves responsible for two of the four Essays which we referred to our assailant; and is he prepared to assert, that he was not then a Conductor of the work, which one of his admirers has denominated "Professor Hodge's Biblical Repertory?" He says, that we have "gone back twenty years," for the self-contradictions which we have collated from his reputed writings. What! Does "Gibraltar" crumble into the Mediterranean, within a span of twenty years? Has it come to this, "that those old walls, which have stood for ages, even from the beginning," turn out to be made of a substance, which will not keep so long as a third part of a man's life? This is a frail plea, since all the more important Essays, which we cited, have been re-published within five years, and are even yet applauded, as the very Ehrenbreitstein of our Reviewer's theology; a brittle theology, indeed, when the stoutest defences of it are not to be touched, because they were put up "twenty years" ago! Our critic has condemned us for having opposed the Augustinian doctrine of Imputation. We have adduced the most decisive words of renowned Augustinians, to prove

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1 See Dr. Brown's Law of Christ respecting Civil Obedience, Supplementary Notes, p. 17. See also Bib. Repert. Vol. II. p. 431.


3 Ibid. p. 319.
that our critic himself has often opposed it. He replies, first, that we are ignorant; and, secondly, that we quote authors of whom he has never heard. \(^1\) Yet these very authors are cited by Rivelus, as the standard-bearers of orthodoxy, and the Princeton Review has translated one part of their testimony, and expressed a desire to see the remainder "translated and published in a volume;" \(^2\) and just so soon as we have begun to comply with the wishes of that Review, it turns round, and protests that it never heard of the authorities, which it has recommended once and again. And in the same breath, it accuses us of turning a "corner," and performing a "pirouette." \(^3\) Rivelus "was the greatest theologian of the age," says that same Review, and the Treatise from which we have quoted our authorities, is the most celebrated of his works, and Turretin (Pars I. p. 691) has recommended it as containing the standards of orthodoxy; and still the Review has never heard of some of those standards, and advises us to read Turretin, and condemns us for having "read up," \(^4\) and pretends, withal, that its course is self-consistent. In our critic's endeavor to evade the responsibility of Essays, which have been so long regarded as the exponents of his dogmatic system, in his not having heard of the authors who have been so celebrated for avowing the old Calvinism in the plainest words, he has betrayed the vacillating character of the faith which he would set up against our own. We asked him for the bread of instruction; and he has given us back the stone of reproof, charging us with having misunderstood the Augustinian doctrine of Imputed Sin. But this very charge is a sign of his precarious position; for we have represented the Augustinian doctrine, just as it has been portrayed by Dr. Jonathan Edwards, Smalley, Dwight; by Neander, Brettschneider, Warbeinecke, Hahn, Hase, Knapp, Reinhard, Doederlein, Meier, Schott, and, indeed, all the more eminent theologians of Germany. \(^5\) But while Dr. Hodge avows his agreement with the old Augustinians, and denies that their doctrine involves an identity between ourselves and Adam, what is his reason for passing over, in ominous silence, their argu-

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\(^3\) Ib. Vol. XXIII. p. 687.
\(^5\) We have repeatedly asserted, that the doctrine of our having literally sinned in Adam, was the prevailing doctrine of the Augustinians, and that there were subordinate parties, who held other theories. See various theories stated in Hahn's Lehrbuch des christl. Glaubens. Theil II. § 81, Brettschneider's Entwickelung, § 89, vierte Auflage. Knapp's Theology, Art. VI. § 57 and Art. IX. § 76. Hase's Butterus Redivivus, §§ 82—87.
ment, that we are doomed not unjustly, but justly, to our earliest spiritual death; and therefore we deserve that death, and hence must have deserved it before we were visited with it, that is, before we were conceived in sin; and, accordingly, we must, ere we were shapen in our penal iniquity, have participated in Adam's offence? This is a standard argument. Our critic is logically bound to explain its origin and meaning. Instead of doing so, he busies himself in discoursing about Schleiermacher. The notable argument which he thus neglects, is useful in illustrating the old phrases, which pervade the Augustinian metaphysics. And why has not our Reviewer accounted for those phrases, if they do not, when used in philosophical prose, imply that we are morally blamable for Adam's transgression? Why do we read, in the most unimpassioned metaphysics of Calvinism, that "the sin of Adam is ours by propagation, by imputation, and also by participation," that "as children are a part of their parents, so children are, in a manner, partakers of their parents' sin" (Parens); that Adam's offence was "transferred," "brought over," "transmitted" to us as persons, because we had, as natures, previously existed and sinned in him."¹ The mental state which led philosophers to the use of these as logical phrases, is a marked phenomenon; it demands an explanation from our Reviewer. No wonder, then, that he threatens to retire from the controversy, unless we confine ourselves to his freshly compiled "anti-Augustinian" creed. Why has he forborne, in all his hundred pages against us, to write one paragraph on the astounding theories which have been formed, for explaining the mode of our participation in the sin of Eden? He avers, that the old Calvinists were guiltless of believing in our moral demerit for that offence. What, then, was the need of their herculean efforts to prove that we were voluntary in the primal transgression? What necessity was there for the doctrine of "spermatic animalcules," by and in which we, who have grown up from them, were contaminated in the person of our ancestors? What induced men to invent their phenomenal explanations of personal identity, if they did not regard the entire race as morally identical with the first ancestor? And why has our Reviewer, seeing these old doctrines rise before him in such a questionable shape, refused to look at them, and turned

¹ Bis. Sac. Vol. VIII. pp. 609—614. That many of these phrases were originally poetical, and are often now dissolved into the same, we have stated. But what is their meaning in logical formulas? How will our Reviewer interpret Gerhard, Loci Theol. Tom. IV. § 52, p. 316, and Marckius, Theol. Cap. XV. §§ 31, 32? He has quoted these authors, and therefore heard of them.
away his eyes to what he calls the "Paine light" in a Convention sermon, and imitated Tully in the "public-place," who "spoke Greek," while "those that understood him smiled at one another, and shook their heads." And why has the learned Reviewer been so unwilling to explain the difference between the Calvinistic doctrine of Imputed Sin, and that of Imputed Righteousness? There has been a difference. The tomes of Calvin and his disciples are pervaded by the sentiment, that the sin of Adam is imputed to us "deservedly," but the righteousness of Christ "undeservedly;" the former, "justly;" the latter, "gratuitously;" the one, "after and because we had sinned;" the other, before we had been holy. What does this difference mean? And over and above his eloquent silence on these grave questions, why does our critic shrink from confessing, that the old Calvinists believed in our moral identity with Adam? Why does he not believe in it himself? What if we could not have been present in that garden? "Power does not limit responsibility." What if we could not have known the law of Paradise? "We may sin without any knowledge of law." What if we did not act, in eating the apple? "All sin does not consist in acting." If we may be blamable for events which preceded our choice by one hour, we may be blamable for events which preceded our choice by six thousand years. And the only reason why our worthy critic recovers from the hypothesis of "ante-natal" sin, is, that he practically believes in the three radical principles, which he intermittently disapproves. Once overlook the axioms, that power must equal duty, that knowledge is essential to holiness or sin;—then, we have nothing to hold us back from the faith that we ought to have obeyed the law in Eden, and to have performed a thousand unknown and impossible deeds. Our assailant cannot write a page on this theme, without betraying his regard for those principles of common sense, which undermine his theories.

Take an example. He describes us as saying, that "a man is put to death by a sovereign act;" and he describes himself as gainsaying us by the assertion, that a man is put to death "with the trifling, intermediate links of guilt and just condemnation." But hold him close to this word "guilt;" he will at once try to escape, with the plea that he does not mean moral guilt: fasten him to the word "just condemnation;" he will struggle to get free, with the apology that he does not mean "morally just." What, then, does he mean? Nothing more than this: men, without any sin of their own, are subjected

1 Shakespear's Julius Caesar, Act. I. Sc. II.
to evil, because they are "exposed" to it, by Him who designs, in this exposure, to express his abhorrence of sin in Adam. This is the New England representation, in all things except its verbiage. The Reviewer does, indeed, call our first suffering "penal," and "judicial;" but he has divested these words of their moral import, and thus given up the theoretical life, while he retains the dead letter of the ancient system.¹ He has reduced the words to trifling ambiguities. Pregnant with meaning is his assertion, that he connects the first suffering of men with their previous state, by "the trifling, intermediate links of guilt and just condemnation."² They are trifling links, when he has burned out their pristine temper. On many other doctrines, as well as on this, he is led astray by his favorite words; and he alternately disclaims and acknowledges their ancient meaning. He builds up a platform of metaphorical terminology; but no sooner does an examiner step on it, than it caves in. It is out of joint, and will not bear the weight of a lexicon. It cannot stand. In the hour of trouble, its advocates always flee to the New England system. This system is sustained by argument, and not by suspicious intimations about Schleiermacher. It is a system which will bear to be looked at, and is not a theology of mere "Dissolving Views." The science of the world is in favor of it. The spirit and plain import of the Bible, are in favor of it. The moral instincts of the race are in favor of it. The common sense of common men, is in favor of it. They can be kept back from it, only by the incessant roll of a polemic drum, which alarms them by its discordant sounds.

More than thirty years ago, an eager antagonist announced, that "the grand enemy of truth, the most to be dreaded, because the most insinuating and the most to be opposed, is Hopkinsianism;" and that "a very large majority of the professors of religion in the United States, are either Hopkinsians or entire Arminians;" and he invoked the genius of Princeton against the creed which drew its life from

¹ In his last Review (p. 679), he represents us as saying, that the difference between the ancient theory of Imputation and our own, is merely verbal. He mistakes. We said the very opposite. We represented as merely verbal the difference between our theory and that which our Reviewer adopts in those better hours, when he abandons the old Augustinism.
³ Wilson's Historical Sketch, pp. 210, 215, 191 seq. On pp. 184, 185, this writer quotes the Pastoral Letter of the Synod of Philadelphia, dated Sept. 20, 1816, and warning the churches against "Arian, Socinian, Arminian and Hopkinsian heresies." According to Hopkins, he says (p. 158), "the atonement really amounted to nothing."
Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins. Nor was his invocation idle; for, many a time, has Princeton declared, that the evils of Hopkinsianism may be traced to Edwards, who is said to have rejected the fundamental doctrine of the Gospel. Only six years ago, it spoke of "that pitchy cloud of religious and philosophical heresies, that covers the land of the Puritans," and, after proclaiming that "the New England Theology has stood now almost a hundred years," characterizes it as "a system that had its origin in opinions, too much like 'another gospel;' although its teachers seemed, indeed, scarcely less than angels of God." ¹ But, "laborant, cum ventum ad verum est." The "northern heresies" are suddenly shut up to a "small coterie." "That pitchy cloud" has become no bigger than a man's hand. The stars that rose in the eastern sky, to shed disastrous light on half the church, have now only one "aberration," and that "in the direction of ultra-Calvinism." "The father of Hopkinsianism" now lies entombed in the confidence of theologians who once viewed him with dread. They have garnished the sepulchre of Bellamy, and embalmed "the other great men of New England." Through much tribulation, did those great men enter into the kingdom of truth. Their royal genius is now honored by their foes. Well, then, may we do homage to our fathers' memory. How can we be recreant to their faith, when its past successes are but an earnest of its future triumph?

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ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. PATMOS, AND THE SEVEN CHURCHES.²

This work is intended as a contribution to the Sacred Geography of the New Testament.

The modern name of Patmos is Patino or Patmosa (not Patimo or Patmosa, as in some of our helps); the ruins of Ephesus are near the Turkish village of Aja-soluk, thought to be a corruption of ἁγίος θεολόγος, 'Holy

² Patmos, and the Seven Churches of Asia; published by Rev. Josiah Brewer of Middletown, Ct. and John W. Barber of New Haven, 1851.