

cannot comprehend, we have therefore a right to pronounce impossible; then he has confuted himself; for the very facts he alleges forbid such a conclusion. For, if the genius of man has already "discovered the truth of what those who lived before him thought wholly impossible," what right has *our* ignorance or *our* impotence to dictate to our successors? At all events, if *he* has a right to pronounce impossible what he cannot comprehend, he must allow *us* the same right; and we must confess that, though the whole passage which we have transcribed may be very, very fine writing, we cannot comprehend at all what logical connection it has with the proof or disproof of the resurrection of the body; ergo, it is impossible it should have any such connection.

ARTICLE II.

THE SIN-OFFERING.

Translated from "The Mosaic Offering" of J. H. Kurtz, Second Division, Chapter IV. pp. 155—196, by Rev. David B. Ford, Canton, Mass.

[THE volume from which the following Article is taken, is properly a review of the more extended work of Dr. Baehr: "The Symbology of the Mosaic Cultus." It is much to be lamented that a work of so profound and varied merit, should yet be defective and erroneous in regard to some important points which the evangelical church holds especially dear. It will be seen by the readers of the following pages that Baehr recognizes nothing of a penal or substitutionary character in the Mosaic offerings. In his view, the imposition of hands signified merely the offerer's ownership of the animal and his willingness to give it up to Jehovah in death, and this willingness was yet more strongly expressed by his slaying of the victim. In the offering, the death of the animal was not the essential act, but only incidental to the principal thing—the sprinkling of the blood. The sprinkling of the blood (the principle of life) on the altar symbolizes the giving away of the soul or life of the offerer, and was thus an act emblematical of repentance, faith and self-dedication to God. "As the presentation of the blood of the animal is a giving away of the life of the

animal in death, so should also the natural, selfish life of the offerer be given away, i. e., die; but since this is a giving away to Jehovah, it is no more ceasing to be, but a dying which *eo ipso* becomes life." And this symbolical character merely, he would in like manner attribute to the death and sacrifice of Christ. Some of these false views are combated, and, we may say, confuted, by our author in the following pages. — Tr.]

"THE name of this kind of offering (חַטָּאת, properly, sin) points very distinctly and directly to its design. It has to do with sin, i. e., it aims at a removal, an expiation of sin. This, indeed, is the design of offerings generally; for the idea of expiation lies at the foundation of all the various kinds of offerings. If, now, any particular offering bears a name expressly derived from this idea, we may infer that it has reference not to sin generally, but specifically, i. e., to individual and distinct offences, and that to atone for these definite, individual offences is its more especial and exclusive aim." Baehr, Vol. II. p. 386. This view is perfectly accordant with our own previous investigations on this point. The question which now first claims our attention is, whether this expiation is available to every offence and to all sins without exception, or if not, what is the ground of this exception? An answer to these inquiries is found in Num. 15: 27—30, "If any soul sin בְּשִׁגְגָה (i. e., through mistake, oversight, inadvertently) he shall bring a she-goat of a year old for a sin-offering. And the priest shall make an atonement for him with the sin-offering on account of his sin (of inadvertence) before Jehovah, to make atonement for him, that he may obtain forgiveness. But the soul that doeth aught בְּרָמָה (with upraised hand, i. e., in malice, revolt, wilfully) the same blasphemeth Jehovah; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people." Of the same import is Lev. iv, the proper *locus classicus* of the sin-offering. If any soul sin בְּשִׁגְגָה against any of the commands of Jehovah, the same shall bring a sin-offering, vs. 2, 13, 22, 27. Thus, only those sins which were committed undesignedly, through inadvertence or precipitancy, could be atoned for by the sin-offering, while the sins of premeditation and malice were inexpiable. These last, since they partake of the character of rebellion and high treason against Jehovah, the King of Israel, must be punished with death. So strong were the claims of the theocratic-civil interest in these cases, that the sacrificial atonement and the reception within the theocratic communion consequent, thereto could find no place. The exclusion of such offences from the theocratic expiation was indispensably

necessary to the existence and permanency of the theocratic confederacy, which without this would be exposed to the workings of malice, licentiousness and caprice, and to inevitable failure. The *unpremeditated* transgressions of existing laws are not so destructive and ruinous in their tendency, and hence they appertain rather to the forum of one's conscience than to that of the civil jurisdiction.

Mosaism, however, goes still further, and even here evinces a most tender regard for the interests of morality. It recognizes even in those sins which are committed ignorantly and undesignedly that which is sinful and vile, and which separates from God. In unintentional murder the sin indeed does not consist in the act itself, but in the *אֲשֶׁר* which occasioned it; in the want of attention and vigilance, of foresight and circumspection from which the act proceeded. Even this want is a sin, a breach of the covenant, a violation of the command "Be ye holy for I am holy," and hence it excludes from the theocratic communion. But it is not a wilful, determined and premeditated violation of law, and the less the sword of civil justice is appealed to here, the more room is afforded for the institution of expiatory offerings.

Baehr, however, not satisfied with this view, (Vol. II. p. 387,) wishes to exclude not only intentional offences, but also all violations of the universal, moral law, all *moral* transgressions in the stricter sense, and, accordingly, would limit the atonement simply to theocratic offences, or, in his form of statement, to the "violations of the positive-religious law, which was given to the people of Israel." And this principle he applies not only to the sin-offering but to all the offerings, e. g., p. 405, and many times, especially to the trespass-offering, pp. 402, 403, 405, 409.

We must, however, at the very outset, protest against this division of the Mosaic law into the positive-religious (pertaining to divine service, ceremonial) and the universal, moral law. With such a distinction our catechism has indeed made us familiar, and there, as from the New Testament point of view generally, it may be correct; but from the Old Testament, especially from the Mosaic point of view, nothing can be more erroneous. We ourselves distinguish in Mosaism a permanent and a transient, that which is universally binding, and that which was obligatory only during the then present stage of development; but it is only the fulness of times, history, Christianity, which has taught and authorized us to make this distinction. To the Israelite there was no such distinction whatever; but the one was to him as binding as the other.

The universally moral is in Mosaism so interwoven with the positive-religious; so organically united with it in one, that it is this unity which constitutes the essential character of Judaism; and the dissevering or destruction of this unity would be the destruction of Judaism itself. Never and nowhere does the law make such a distinction, or authorize such to be made. Nay, from the fact that the universal moral laws stand in the midst of the purely positive-religious, and conversely, such a distinction is, in a twofold manner forbidden in the same breath. The *whole* law is theocratic and religious; for the King of Israel was also the God of Israel. Sleeping and waking, eating and drinking, all the occupations of life, the whole life with its manifold ramifications were all ordered under this theocratic-religious point of view. Every sin of an Israelite was a theocratic offence, since the person of the sinner and his obligation to holiness were both theocratic.

On the other hand, the whole law was of a *moral* nature. Even the positive-religious commands fell within the sphere of morality, for morality in its perfect form is holiness, and to this, the whole law had reference, as it many times expressly declares. An injury committed against the property, person or honor of a neighbor was as much a theocratic offence as the violation of any law of the cultus; for the Israelite stood to his neighbor in a more intimate relation than that of man to man, even in that of a covenant-member to a covenant-member. Hence the relation of one to another was a purely religious one, and a violation of the same was thus a religious, a theocratic offence. The transgression of a moral law was not only an offence against God as the King and Judge of all the earth, but also against Jehovah, the special King of Israel, and accordingly was a theocratic offence. Hence the strictly moral transgressions excluded from the theocratic communion as well as the specially religious,—murder as well as idolatry. And the Israelite regarded as immoralities not only theft and adultery, but also the worship of images and of high places, the profanation of the Sabbath, the neglect of circumcision, the violation of the laws of food, etc. Both these kinds of offences possessed in his view the same features, since the laws relating to both, were to him alike important and sacred.

Even from this general point of view, the theory of Baehr, which limits the sin-offering to theocratic offences in the narrower sense, appears to us untenable. Had this restriction been directly specified in the canon of the sin-offering, or if all the instances in which this offering was required had reference only to such positive-religious

offences, then and only then should we be obliged to acknowledge the correctness of his theory. But neither of these is the case. In Lev. iv, where the sin-offering is treated of *ex instituto*, it is stated with great distinctness, whenever the occasion for the sin-offering is mentioned, (vs. 2, 13, 22, 27) that for the undesigned transgressions of all the commands (without exception) an atonement by means of the sin-offering was both available and necessary, (אֲחֻזָּה מִכָּל מִצְוֹת הַיְהוָה.) What now can possibly justify us in limiting "all the commands of Jehovah" to the ceremonial laws? Or are not then the moral laws as much the commands of Jehovah as the laws of the Cultus?

In Num. 15: 22—24 the canon of the sin-offering is expressed if possible in still more comprehensive terms: "If ye have inadvertently transgressed any one of the commands which Jehovah spake to Moses, even all that Jehovah has commanded you through Moses, from the day when Jehovah gave commandment and thenceforward to your posterity," etc. Throughout both of these passages mention is made only of *sins* without any particular reference or special limitation. If now Baehr would endeavor in earnest to establish his theory, he must show that the words אֲחֻזָּה or אָחֻזָּה (and אָחֻזָּה) are used exclusively, or at least principally, of those offences which relate to the laws of rites and of worship. But this he cannot do; and thus even the name of our offering bears witness against him. If now in the few cases where the reasons for the sin-offering are specified, (especially in the Levitical purifications,) these reasons are in truth mostly of a positive-religious character, even this opposes nothing to those unequivocal passages which indisputably refer to *all* the commands. And especially is this the case, since the reason why the specification was made in these instances is, that, even according to that general canon for the involuntary states of Levitical impurity, which certainly were not *transgressions* of the laws of Jehovah, an atonement by means of the sin-offering would not be regarded as necessary.

The case of the *trespass-offering*, also, militates against this theory. Here, along with those sins which are of a positive-religious character, express mention is made of such as are manifestly of a purely moral nature, e. g., the embezzlement of another's property, the disowning of anything found, etc. From the close relation of the trespass-offerings to the sin-offerings, and from the explicit direction that for both there should be but one law, we are justified in predicating the same thing of the sin-offerings.

Let us, however, attend to the reasons which our distinguished opponent has advanced in support of his restrictive view. (1) First of

all, he urges the circumstance that both the selection of the animal, and the diverse application of the blood, depended on the theocratic standing of the offerer, and not on the magnitude of the sin to be expiated. With the diversity of the *material* of the offering, (for the high priest and the whole people a bullock was appointed; for the ruler, a he-goat; for the private individual, a she-goat or a sheep, and in special cases even doves. Lev. 4: 3, 14, 23, 28, 32. 5: 7,) there was also a similar diversity of expiative acts. In the sin-offering of the high priest or of the congregation, the blood was sprinkled in the holy place seven times towards the curtain before the capporeth (mercy-seat) and also on the horns of the altar of incense. In the offering of the ruler and of the private person, the blood came not into the holy place, but simply upon the horns of the altar of burnt-offering. Lev. iv. "From this results," as Baehr supposes, "the important conclusion: If the theocratic standing of an individual was the determining rule for the sin-offering, then also must the sin with which the sin-offering has to do, have a theocratic character, i. e., must be a violation not of the universal, moral laws, but of the positive-religious law which was given to the people of Israel." p. 387. Against this, we remark, in the first place, that the inference is by no means a necessary one. From the same premises we could quite as easily draw the directly opposite conclusion. If the sin itself makes no difference, but only the person sinning, it follows that this offering was of universal application, and available to all sins. Should we, however, concede the justness of Baehr's inference, it then could have no significance only as we limit the theocratic system to the cultus and to the laws of outward observances. If this restriction, however, is, as we have proved, erroneous, the conclusion founded upon it must also be false. That the diversity of the material and of the expiative acts had reference to the theocratic position of the offerer and not to the importance of the offence, or rather, that the degree of the crime was measured by the position of the person sinning, and hence that the sin was regarded under a theocratic point of view, we certainly wish not to deny; but, on the contrary, we maintain that each sin of an Israelite was a theocratic offence, and that this theocratic point of view was taken not from the sin in itself, but from the person who sinned. (2) "The same result, moreover, is in a measure obtainable from the Mosaic idea of offerings in general. Since the Mosaic offerings had respect to the covenant with Jehovah, so also must those special offerings whose design is *κατ' ἐξοχήν* to atone, have respect to those offences which relate to this covenant."

Even Bæhr himself has felt this argument to be unsatisfactory and inconclusive, and hence he well qualifies his assertion by the conditional phrase. That the decalogue was the basis of the covenant with Jehovah, Bæhr himself would be the last to deny, (Vol. I. p. 90 et passim,) and yet its commands are preëminently of a universal, moral character. Transgressions of these commands, then, were violations of the covenant with Jehovah; and thus from the given premises and by the same method of argument we arrive at a conclusion entirely opposite to that of Bæhr, viz., that the sacrificial atonement had reference chiefly to the universal-moral commands.

This argument, however, which in the form stated by Bæhr proves nothing, or rather the direct reverse of what it should prove, may be so applied as to constitute what would seem to be a conclusive proof against the universal applicability of the sin-offering which we have maintained. This objection we will anticipate by its statement and refutation. The sin-offering and the trespass-offering were first instituted by Moses, since they confessedly did not exist prior to his time. This extension of the sacrificial rite must be based on an extension of the law, and thus also of the knowledge of sinfulness. The extension of the law, however, consists in the addition of the positive-religious law to the universal, moral law which existed before the legislation of Moses, and hence it would seem to be clearly demonstrated, that the sin and trespass-offerings could refer only to the violations of these positive-religious laws. To this we reply, that the extension of the sacrificial rite is certainly determined by the extension of the law, but this latter is misconceived when regarded as consisting in the simply mechanical addition of the ceremonial law. This was not something absolutely new. Iken, notwithstanding the very limited accounts, has written two extended Dissertations *de institutis et caeremoniis legis Mosaicæ ante Mosen*. And we certainly have to presuppose far more copious developments of the religious principle than the ante-mosaic history has occasionally presented to our notice.¹

The Mosaic legislation, especially the Mosaic cultus, is no *deus ex machina*, but grew organically, though of course under the divine care, out of the religious cast of character possessed by Abraham and his seed, just as the flowers and fruit, under the influence of sunshine and showers, are developed from the seed-corn. Hence, in strict

¹ Much which is true and striking in reference to this subject, together with much that is groundless and false, is found in Bruno Bauer's "Religion of the Old Testament," in the first section of the second book, — The historical presuppositions of the law.

accuracy, the institution of the sin and trespass-offerings cannot be regarded as a wholly new event. They had a previous existence, not indeed as distinct items, but *implicite* in the burnt-offering. On the other hand, even the moral law in Mosaism acquired a new feature. Through its relation to the king Jehovah, and to the fundamental principle of the theocracy, "Be ye holy for I am holy," it also became a theocratic law. (3) "Never do we find, in point of fact, that murder, theft, and the like offences, were expiated by the sin-offering, since for these the law provided punishment alone. Even when such offences were undesignedly committed, they were never expiated by an offering; see especially Num. 35: 11, etc." Passing by the fact that, according to Lev. 6: 1—6, theft is actually expiated by the trespass-offering, which hereafter we shall notice more fully, we would give the following answer: That the crimes of theft, murder, and the like, when they were committed (בְּרִיךְ רָמָה) with a malicious and rebellious spirit, should not be expiated but punished, we have already shown to be necessary. Hence we are concerned only with the proposition, that such offences, even though committed undesignedly (בְּטִיְבוֹתָהֶם), were excluded from the sacrificial expiation.

Let us *instar omnium* consider the alleged example in Num. 35: 11. Here the subject treated of is the protection which the free cities should afford to "him that killeth unawares." From this Baehr concludes that for the inculcate there was no sin-offering, and that in this and similar cases generally, no offering was made. Even he, however, does not hold to the universal correctness of this inference, and hence the whole objection loses its point and power of demonstration. We, moreover, contend in the first place, that, in view of the whole connection of the passage, this was not the place to speak expressly of the ecclesiastical atonement; and hence to argue the non-existence of a thing from the silence maintained respecting it, is in this case a gross fallacy. In the second place, we affirm that there is a plain indication that such a case, in the *ecclesiastic* economy, does belong to the rubric of offences which may be expiated by the sin-offering. In regard to our first affirmation, it is to be observed, that the chapter in question does not treat *ex professo*, of the undesigned manslayer, for then certainly we should have expected some direction given in regard to the ecclesiastical atonement; but of the free cities and of the manslayer, only so far as he had a claim to the privilege of the free cities. Therefore the reference in this chapter to the undesigned manslayer, is limited simply to some special instructions in regard to the investigation to be instituted; whether the deed was

truly unintentional, and also in regard to the security of the inculpate from the avenger of blood.

The *indication*, spoken of above, is found in the repeated designation of murder by בְּשֵׁנֶי־נֶפֶשׁ , vs. 11, 15. This clearly refers to the canon of the sin-offering in Lev. iv.: "whoever shall transgress בְּשֵׁנֶי־נֶפֶשׁ any one of the commands of Jehovah, the same shall be expiated by the sin-offering." "Thou shalt not kill," is undeniably one of Jehovah's commands. The inculpate has violated this command, but (בְּשֵׁנֶי־נֶפֶשׁ) inadvertently, and hence he is not delivered up to the sword of justice, but must be atoned for by the sin-offering. Against the justness of this reasoning and inference, no one can have anything to object. Whether this sin-offering was to be brought immediately or only after the death of the high priest, when for the first time his appearance outside of the free city would be unattended with danger, we may not positively decide, though in our opinion the *latter* supposition is correct. Since he durst not leave the free city to come to the sanctuary, his theocratic rights and duties were suspended, and consequently his obligations in regard to the sacrificial atonement.¹

We have now shown, as we believe, that the limitation of the sin-offering to the positive-religious commands is wholly incorrect. We will however cheerfully concede, that as a matter of fact, the sin-offering was mostly concerned with such religious offences. The inadvertent violations of the moral law must in comparison with the like violations of the positive-religious laws be of extremely rare occur-

¹ The same which is here predicated of unintentional murder, holds true also of undesigned theft, as also of all unpremeditated transgressions. More difficult is it, to form a judgment in reference to theft designedly committed. That this was not punished with death, but only with a fine, seems directly to oppose Num. 15: 30. It is here well to remark that the rendering of בְּגֵרִי רָחוּץ by "designedly" is inaccurate and too weak. It means with "hand upraised" against Jehovah, and denotes malice, revolt, a wilful, determined rebellion against Jehovah. Simple theft however can hardly possess a character so aggravated, and is an offence moreover which admits of reparation. Theft belongs generally not to those offences which proceed from a determined rebellion against Jehovah, and hence is not punished with death; it belongs however generally not to those offences which are unintentional and which arose by mistake; it can therefore not be expiated simply by the sin-offering. So far as it is intentional, it is obnoxious to penal justice. So far as it arose from open rebellion, and admits in a measure of reparation, the exclusion from the theocratic communion was not absolute. Since now every exclusion from this communion can be abrogated only by an expiatory offering, it is more than probable, that so soon as civil justice was satisfied, he was received again into the communion of the church and theocracy by means of such an offering, and doubtless, as we shall see more plainly hereafter, by means of a trespass-offering.

rence, since these latter extended in an especial manner over the whole life, to all its various departments and relations.

The preceding investigation has detained us longer than we anticipated. This however we cannot regret, since the result obtained is far more important to us than we might at the first sight suppose. We wish not to conceal the fact, that on the theory of Baehr, were we obliged to acknowledge its correctness, an objection would lie against the juridical view of the offering which it were difficult, if not impossible, to remove. Baehr has merely hinted at it, Vol. II. p. 281. Steudel, on the contrary, has sought to give it force in the words already examined: "If offerings were appointed even for *external* offences, how important, in case substitution were to be thought of, must offerings have been for the far weightier, the strictly *moral* transgressions?" What our learned author has further said, p. 391-393, respecting the kind and method of the expiation, commands, for the most part, our assent, and as we cannot state our views more clearly or happily, we appropriate his own words:

"The expiation must be something different from that of the burnt-offerings and thank-offerings. These had to do only with sin in general, and hence the expiative act, the sprinkling of blood, had a more general and indeterminate character. The sin-offering has to do with sin exclusively and in its distinct manifestations. Its sole design is to atone. For these reasons the sprinkling of the blood must here be more definite, and generally more prominent. Hence the blood was sprinkled not as in the other kinds of offering, in general only upon the altar (round about), but on distinct and prominent parts of the same. It was also sprinkled on other and diverse vessels of the sanctuary, and on the more or less sacred and important ones, according to the degree of the crime to be expiated, or rather, according to the standing of the person to be atoned for; thus there appear to be different degrees of expiation.

The *first* degree of expiation above that of the other kinds of offerings, was the sprinkling of the horns of the altar in the fore-court. The horns are the insignia of the altar, and in them its meaning is concentrated. . . . Hence the sprinkling of these must in comparison with the sprinkling of the sides of the altar round about, appear the more important. . . . This degree of expiation was appointed for each private individual of the people and also for the ruler; yet with this difference, that in the first case the blood of a female, in the second, the blood of a male animal of the same species, was employed. The *second* degree of expiation was the (seven-fold) sprinkling of the

horns of the altar in the holy place and towards the curtain which hung before the ark of the covenant. This expiation is manifestly to be regarded as belonging to a still more elevated grade. . . . The sprinkling towards the curtain did not have this for its object, but the capporeth, which was here sprinkled, not directly, but only indirectly and symbolically. This second degree of expiation was appointed for the whole congregation or its representative and substitute, the high priest. Lev. 4: 3—7, 13—18. The *third* and highest degree of expiation was the sprinkling of the capporeth in the most holy place. . . . The sprinkling is here expressly designated as sevenfold, and this number, which is the number of the covenant and of expiation, directs us at once to the design and the importance of the sprinkling. . . . This third degree of expiation was in like manner appointed for the whole people and the high priest, yet it had reference, not to a particular offence, but to the aggregate offences of a whole year; and hence this highest expiatory act took place but once a year on the great festival of atonement. Lev. xvi." Thus far are we able to agree with our author. The points of difference have for the present been avoided, by omissions in the passage cited. These refer to the different views respecting the three divisions of the sanctuary. We will state our own view as briefly as possible. The tabernacle (the tent of the congregation, the dwelling) symbolizes the kingdom of God where Jehovah dwells among His people and meets with them. The fore-court is the vestibule to the sanctuary, as Judaism is to Christianity. The former represents the real, the latter, the ideal residence of the people. In that dwell the people, who still say (Ex. 20: 19) "Speak thou with us and let not God speak with us lest we die;" who indeed have a priestly calling, (Ex. 19: 6) for which, however, they are not yet perfectly prepared, but must first be educated to its practice; who still need a human mediator and may not yet approach (קָרַב) directly to Jehovah. Here, therefore, prevails the shadow-service. Here, therefore, bleeds the imperfect animal-offering, which must daily and yearly be repeated. Here, therefore, stood the altar of burnt-offering, the symbol of a people, sinful indeed, but waiting to receive expiation, the first representative form of the kingdom of God.

The *holy place* is the ideal residence of the people, who are a priestly kingdom, a holy nation, a people of possession. Here the sacrificial utensils are wanting; the sacrificial service has ceased, for the expiation is accomplished. The people are no longer laden with sins, which separate them from Jehovah. They are a people of light,

of prayer, and of good works. Therefore, here stand the candlestick, the altar of incense, and the table of show-bread, as symbols of this people. The people in their present stage of development and culture are still excluded from this place; yet in the hope that, when they shall become fitted for their priestly calling and shall have entered upon their priestly rights, then this place also shall become their actual abode. In the meanwhile, however, this place is not empty and desolate. Its vessels rest not idle. The candlestick sends forth its light, the altar its sweet odors, and the table proffers its gifts. For the people were now virtually a priestly kingdom and a holy people; the relative manifestation only was not yet conformed to the absolute idea. Suitably to the lower and still inadequate degree of their culture, admittance was to them denied. Their priestly calling and priestly rights are still ideal, but not, therefore, imaginary. These they already exercise, though only through their priests, whom Jehovah has chosen for this purpose, from the priestly nation. These, the flower of the people, their representatives, and, for a time, their mediators, are the familiars, the קָרִיבִים; these tread this holy place and perform the service.

In the most holy place dwells Jehovah, among the people, and yet separated from them. Here stands the ark of the covenant, which contains the law, the tables of testimony which testify against the people, but which are covered by the mercy-seat (the expiatory cover, the capporeth). On this most holy mystery, the cherubim, the symbols of the most perfect creature-life, the ideal creation, whose idea man is called to realize, look down with bowed face in adoration. And between the wings of the cherubim hovers the cloud, the shekinah, the symbol of the most immediate, yet reconciling, forgiving presence of Jehovah. A curtain separates the holy place from the holy of holies. So long as this partition-wall remains, only the high priest, in whom was centered all the priestly significance of the chosen, sacerdotal race, and even he, only once a year, may approach unto the mercy-throne. But when once that mystic temple (John 2: 19, etc.) shall be demolished and the veil (Heb. 10: 20) shall be rent in twain from the top to the bottom, then shall each one of the priestly nation have free access to the throne of grace (Heb. 4: 16).

The signification of the fore-court is concentrated in its principal vessel, the altar of burnt-offering. Its contents, as we have already seen, represent the church as *contentum*, or the people; the enclosing framework represents the church as *continens*, an institution origi-

nating from God and appointed by Him for salvation.¹ From the altar the horns jut out, in which again its meaning is comprised. "The horn is the image of power, strength and might, which in the animal are centered in the horn, Amos 6: 18. Ps. 148: 14. Hence it serves as a symbol of regal power, Dan. 7: 7, 8. 8: 3—9, etc. With this is connected the signification of honor and renown, as the horn is not only the weapon of the animal but also its ornament, Ps. 112: 9. 89: 17. Job 16: 15, etc. Quite peculiar is the use of the horn as a symbol of fulness, abundance, and so of prosperity and blessing, Ps. 92: 10. Hence the expression, Horn of salvation, Ps. 18: 2. 2 Sam. 22: 3. Luke 1: 69." The church as *continens* is the appointed institution for the bestowment of protection and ornament, blessing and salvation. This power of the church in its acme, is symbolized by the horns of the altar. As now the sprinkling of the blood of the sin-offering is distinguished from the like act in the other offerings, chiefly by the circumstance that the blood was sprinkled, not in an indefinite manner on the sides of the altar round about, but particularly on the *horns* of the altar; so by this is indicated an advance in the character and efficacy of the atonement. This higher expiation was required, since it had to do with a definite, open, and thus an *enhanced* offence, by which the theocratic communion with Jehovah was broken off. This mode of sprinkling was limited to the sin-offering of the private individual and of the ruler. In the sin-offering of the priest, the atonement must be of a still more advanced character, since, from his higher theocratic standing, his offence appeared the more aggravated. The priesthood, to whom was transferred the entire priestly dignity of the people, dwelt as such within the sanctuary. Here, therefore, the whole work of the sacrifice should have been performed, had not this entirely opposed and destroyed the *idea* of the holy place. The offering could only be brought into the fore-court by the altar. There the imposition of hands and the

¹ The altar of burnt-offering, as is stated in Ex. 20: 24, was made of earth. In the symbology of our author, earth is the representative and symbol of the people. The physical man was taken from the earth, and unto the earth will it return. The earth was cursed for man's sake. It thus stands in close relation to man, especially as fallen and sinful, and hence was the fittest material for the altar, the symbol of the people. The earth of the altar taken from this common earth especially represents the Israelites, a people, sinful indeed, yet chosen from among men in order to be made holy. The earth of the altar is embraced within a chest or box, and this represents the church as *continens*, as embracing within itself the elect and holy. Much of this to unimaginative minds may perhaps seem a little fanciful. — TR.

slaying took place; and there also the blood which remained was poured out at the bottom of the altar. But in order to represent the entire transaction as having special reference to the priest, and thus to satisfy the above claim, the *application*, at least, of the same, the sprinkling of the blood, was made within the sanctuary, the symbolical residence of the priesthood. Here the blood was sprinkled, not on the candlestick nor on the table of show-bread, although these were symbols of the priesthood, but on the altar of incense; both because this was ever the most important and essential vessel, since in it was centered in the highest degree the *idea* of the whole apartment, but especially because this vessel fell under the view of an altar, and therefore in its degree corresponded to the altar in the fore-court. Here also the horns were sprinkled or besmeared. But even this was not enough, and hence the blood was sprinkled seven times towards the curtain, before the capporeth. In the most holy place the expiatory blood could be brought only once a year, on the day of atonement, and not until that day could the priest even be allowed to enter. The priesthood in its essential character, however, was closely related to that which the most holy place contained and symbolized. In order, therefore, that the expiation of the priest should be valid, the *application* of it should have there been made; but to this end it was sufficient that the blood was sprinkled *towards* the curtain, where the capporeth was. The sin-offering of the whole congregation was of equal importance and worth to that of the priest. It had similar rites and a similar expiation, not only because the priest was a member of the congregation, but chiefly because the whole priestly dignity which was transferred to the priesthood, properly belonged to the congregation, though as yet it had not attained such a degree of maturity that each of its individual members could be regarded as a priest.

The third and highest degree of expiation was that where the blood was directly sprinkled on the capporeth. What the horns are to the altar, the capporeth is to the ark of the covenant, the concentration of expiatory power. Upon this, therefore, the blood was sprinkled. Hence, also, we perceive why and through what means the capporeth effects the most perfect expiation. In itself, it is indeed a cover, and is employed as such, but its peculiar, ethical power of expiation is obtained from the blood of the most holy offering with which it is sprinkled and covered; for, "without the shedding of blood is no remission."

Some further particulars respecting the sin-offering are furnished us in Lev. 6: 24, etc. And first of all is the command, v. 27, No one

may touch any of the flesh of the sin-offering excepting only the consecrated priest; and if the garment of any one is accidentally sprinkled with the blood, it shall be washed in a holy place. The strict meaning of this ordinance obviously is this: The flesh is so holy that only the holy person of the priest may touch it; the blood is so holy that not a drop of it must be borne without the sanctuary. "So the passage was explained from ancient times," remarks Bachr, and adduces especially Theodoret, Abenezra, Maimonides, Deyling, and Clericus. "De Wette (*de morte expiat. etc.*, p. 16) first made the observation, '*videtur opinio fuisse victimarum sanguinem, culpa peccatoris in eas translata, impurum esse factum,*' and this passage has since been largely employed in support of the theory of imputation and penal death. Scholl, p. 154, and Tholuck, p. 78, quote it in this sense. But even the connection is decisive against this view. If the flesh was so holy that no one except a holy person might touch it, so the blood, as the special means of atonement and sanctification, was still holier. Besides, nothing can be more contradictory to the whole nature of the Mosaic offering than to maintain that anything could be defiled by the blood of the offering, the very means of sanctification. Then the altars and the capporeth itself were defiled, while, on the contrary, they were purified yearly even with blood. Lev. 16: 19. Heb. 9: 21, 22. In fact, a weaker, more distorted argument in support of the theory of penal death in the offering, cannot be given." These remarks are so convincing that no objection can be urged against them. However, futile reasons for a thing prove nothing against the thing itself. But of this, by and by.

The same care lest any of this most holy offering should come without the sanctuary, and thereby be profaned, is manifested in the directions given in regard to the vessels, in which the flesh of the offering was boiled, vs. 21, 28. If they were earthen, they must be broken to pieces, since earthen, unglazed vessels gather moisture. If they were of metal, they must be carefully scoured before they could be applied to their customary use. Here, also, some defenders of the juridical view have fallen into a mistake. "Thus Scholl has strangely been pleased to find therein an argument for the impurity of the flesh of the victim, and thus indirectly for substitution; but he did not consider that in the preceding verse the flesh of the offering is designated as so holy that only the holy priests might touch it; and in the following verse it is commanded that only these priests should eat it, and that, too, in a holy place. The appeal to Lev. 11: 33 is untenable; for from the command to break in pieces those vessels into which a

carcass had fallen, it surely does not follow that the 'most holy' sin-offering which the holy servants of Jehovah ate within the sanctuary, belongs to the category of a carcass." Vol. II. p. 393.¹

Finally, in the chapter specified, vs. 26, 29, it is directed that the priest who performs the expiation shall eat in a holy place the flesh of the sin-offering which comes not upon the altar, (though from this the female members of his family were precluded,) yet those sin-offerings whose blood comes into the holy place, were prohibited from such a use, v. 30. Their flesh must not be eaten, but burnt in a clean place without the sanctuary. "Since the entire combustion of the animal on the altar constituted the distinguishing feature of the burnt-offering, so, in case this peculiarity were continued to the burnt-offering, the like transaction could not here take place. Hence, only the best of the offering as representing the whole, came upon the altar, as in the case of the thank-offering, while that which remained was eaten by the priest, or burnt." Vol. II. p. 394. What parts the priest was to eat, is not specified, since the reason which required such a specification in the thank-offering, viz., the distribution of the flesh of the offering between the priests and the offerers, was here wanting. Since now in case of the larger animals, as sheep, goats and rams, the priest could not eat the entire animal (excluding the fat portions) in *one* day, (for even the thank-offerings, though they were not most holy offerings, must be eaten on the first day, and certainly in case of the most holy sin-offering no longer period was allowed,) so here, the same course was taken, although it is not expressly stated, as was pursued with the remaining flesh of the thank-offering; it was burnt in a clean place without the sanctuary.

If we now consider the eating and compare it with the eating of the thank-offering, "it thus appears as an entirely different thing from this. The character of a repast is entirely wanting to it. Not the offerer even, and much less his family, could have a part therein. Nay, not even the relatives of the priest might partake of it, but simply the priests themselves. It was peculiarly a *priestly* meal, and the joyousness and festivity, which, according to the oriental idea, are inseparable from a repast, are wholly wanting. Here the priests

¹ J. D. Michaelis, with his usual stolid sagacity, explains the ordinance in the following manner: Moses would not recommend the use of earthen vessels since they were so fragile, but would inculcate upon his people in this delicate manner the truth, that the costlier brazen vessels were cheaper than the less expensive but fragile earthen ones. These, indeed, gather a light rust, but for this reason they were appointed to be cleansed. — Mosaic Laws, Vol. IV. p. 314.

appear as priests, in the exercise of their peculiar office and dignity." Vol. II. p. 394.

To the question by what association of ideas is the eating of the flesh of the sin-offering connected with the official character of the priest, it is somewhat difficult to reply. Lev. 10: 17 (a passage which Baehr has not considered) would seem to afford some information on this point. Moses here inquires of Aaron, Why have ye not eaten the sin-offering in a holy place? For it is a most holy thing, and it is given you (וְיִנְיֹן אֲתָם) to bear the iniquity of the congregation, to make atonement for them before Jehovah. Ingenious, at least, is the explanation of this passage in Deyling, Obs. ss. 1. 65. § 2: nam hoc pacto, cum ederent, incorporabant quasi peccatum, populique reatum in se recipiebant, ut indicaretur, aliquando sacerdotem et victimam unam fore personam, nempe Messiam, id quod in Jesu Nazareno exacte impletum fuit. Against this view we may not urge the objection, that the phrase וְיִנְיֹן אֲתָם is taken in the sense of *portare peccatum* (to bear sin), while, like the analogous αἰρεῖν ἀμαρτίαν of the New Testament (John 1: 29. 1 John 3: 5) it rather means *peccata auferre* (to remove sins), for Lev. 5: 1 is plainly used in the former sense, but that the eating did not take place until after the expiation was accomplished, when the sin was already covered, expiated and removed. Furthermore the phrase וְיִנְיֹן אֲתָם is here explained more definitely by the subjoined clause וְיִנְיֹן אֲתָם עֲלֵיהֶם. The predominant signification then of אֲתָם is that of *removal*, yet the other, of *bearing*, is by no means excluded thereby; rather was the bearing in this case, even a removal. The priest as mediator between the sinful people and the Holy God was a representative of both. The *portare* of iniquities appertains to him as representative of the former, the *auferre* of iniquities as representative of the latter. Certainly there could be no bearing and removing which were perfectly adequate, and correspondent to their idea, unless he as a proper mediator should take sin upon himself and by himself make expiation. But even in this is found that which rendered the typical sacrifice imperfect and unsatisfying, so that it could only be *σῴα* and not the *σῶμα*.

Though we cannot with Deyling regard the eating as a symbolical *incorporatio peccati*, yet we must consider it, an *incorporatio sacrificii*. The relation of the eating to the *priestly* efficacy of the atonement is from the above passage undeniable, and this can be explained only on the supposition that by this act was represented an intimate connection of the priest on the one hand with the offering,

and therefore with the offerer for whom it was presented as a substitute, and on the other hand with Jehovah, to whom the whole offering belonged, but who was satisfied with the fat portions as the most excellent, and gave the remainder to the priest, which should otherwise be given up to the fire. The relation of the sacrificial animal to the offerer was signified by the imposition of hands, as the same to Jehovah was signified by the burning of the best portions, and both these relations were united in the priest, when they were expressed by the eating of the remaining flesh. Baehr to a certain extent recognizes these relations, though in another form and on a different ground. "In the eating of the most holy offering in the holy place, the priests appear in the closest connection and communion both with this offering and also with Him from whom all holiness proceeds, and whose instruments they are, with Jehovah." Vol. II. p. 395. That this connection between the offering and the priest obtained only in the sin (and trespass) offerings, and not in the burnt and thank-offerings, has primarily an external ground. In the burnt offering, the entire combustion of the animal, and in the thank-offering, the so essential sacrificial meal, precluded all opportunity for the representation of this idea. There is also an internal reason why this relation must be found, if anywhere, in the sin-offering. As expiation is the central point of the offering, so is the sin-offering the most important one, the offering *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. It is this offering, therefore, which, as the concentration and highest (Old Testament) expression of the idea of sacrifice, was brought on the great day of atonement, and which of all the offerings most fully imaged forth the sacrificial death of Christ. Hence it was appointed that here should be manifested those necessary relations of the priest to the offerer and to Jehovah, which were realized through the *divine humanity* of Christ.

"Accordingly," to proceed with Baehr, "it lay without doubt in the peculiar character and design of this kind of offering, that neither the offerer nor any one except a priest, could have a part in the eating." And hereby also is explained the ordinance that, of those offerings whose blood came into the holy place, nothing should be eaten, but that the flesh should be burnt without the sanctuary. "It is," he remarks, "well to observe that *such* were the offerings which were brought for the expiation of the whole people, including the priests, or of the high priest as the head and representative of the people. Here, then, the priests, including likewise the high priest, were the persons who were to be expiated and sanctified, and not, as in the other sin-offerings, exclusively the sanctifiers or procurers of

sanctification. They here appear by no means simply in their priestly character, but as offerers and needing expiation. Therefore even they were not permitted to eat of this offering, and that which under other circumstances was eaten, must be disposed of in another manner. In this case, then, the transaction was not of a priestly character, and belonged not to a properly sacrificial act; it was rendered necessary by special circumstances and did not proceed directly from the fundamental idea of this offering. As the animal for a peculiar and extraordinary reason might not be eaten, the only course remaining was, in some suitable way, to remove and destroy it. For this purpose it was brought without the camp, though to "a clean place," and then it was not consigned to decay and corruption, which would seem like a despising and a profanation of the holy offering, but it was immediately consumed by fire and converted to ashes, in a manner entirely similar to the disposition made of the flesh of the *shelamim* (thank-offerings) which on the second or third day might no longer be eaten but must be burnt. That this act of burning possessed more of a religious than a properly priestly character, is shown by the twofold specification, according to which, this was to take place without the sanctuary, and the animal also (which elsewhere never happened, not even in the burnt-offering), was consigned to the fire with its skin and offal. Yet was this always designated as an offering, since this burning took place where the ashes of all the sacrificial animals were generally brought." Vol. II. p. 395, 396.

Even this removal and burning of the animal without the camp have been very incorrectly urged, by Scholl and De Wette, as an argument for the imputation of sin, and the consequent impurity of the sacrificial animal, on the ground that "nothing impure was suffered in the camp." In refutation of this, we very gladly employ Bachr's own words: "These sin-offerings in comparison with those of private individuals were certainly the more important, for their blood came even within the sanctuary. Hence they were the holier, and the expiatory or sanctifying power of their blood was greater. If now the lower class of the private sin-offerings was so little impure that they could be and must be eaten, even by the holy priests; so the burning of the higher class cannot possibly be accounted for by its greater impurity, but must have been occasioned by far different circumstances. Were the cause of the burning to be found in the impurity effected by the imputation of sin, then it surely must have taken place in *all* the sin-offerings, even in those of private persons, since the imputation and hence the impurity were entirely the same

in both classes. If everything impure must be removed out of the camp, it does not follow that everything which was carried from thence was impure. That which was unclean was wont to be brought to an *unclean* place, Lev. 14: 44, 45. In opposition to this, the law commands that the sin-offering shall be brought to a *clean* place, from which circumstance it follows quite as necessarily as naturally that the offering itself was pure. Nothing can be more opposite and contradictory to the whole doctrine of the Mosaic offerings than the affirmation that those offerings which served to atone especially and in a high degree, were in an especial degree impure." Vol. II. p. 397.

As in our explanation of the ritual of the sin-offerings, we have for the most part coincided with Baehr, it is now incumbent upon us to show that the views adopted or modified by ourselves are accordant with the juridical idea of the offering. And to this work are we the more strongly impelled since we are here met by our distinguished opponent with these words of victory and triumph: "While by our theory the management of the sin-offering appears to be based on the fundamental idea of the offering and is consistent throughout, the common juridical view is here especially reduced to straits." Vol. II. p. 396. And in a note, he places before us the hopeless prognostic, "never will the juridical view succeed in getting safely over this point."

Let us then hear what the obstacles are which so impassably block up the way. On page 396 he remarks: "If all guilt and sin were, as is maintained, imputed to the sacrificial animal, and if in consequence of this, it died a penal death and was impure, how, we ask, since even the contact with things unclean caused defilement, could the *eating* of the animal have been commanded, especially, how could this command have been given exclusively to the priests, who, otherwise more than any layman, were required to avoid, as possible, all defilement? Wherefore was the animal, having become unclean, to be eaten in 'the holy place,' while otherwise nothing impure, even in the slightest degree, was suffered to remain, and least of all, within the sanctuary? The law says: 'all the males among the priests shall eat thereof; it is most holy.' According to the juridical view, the opposite command should be given; no one, and least of all, a priest, shall eat thereof, for it is wholly unclean."

This whole argumentation furnishes new evidence, though similar to much which has already fallen under our notice, that the prejudices of our distinguished opponent against the juridical view held by the church, have so completely mastered him that they have darkened

his vision otherwise so clear and penetrating, and have not once allowed him to make himself acquainted with the opposite theory, so as to learn what in it is essential and necessary, and what is accidental and indifferent. He is so firmly fixed to his own point of observation, that he does not once leave it, even for a moment, in order that he may properly reconnoitre and appreciate the territory of an opponent.

To Scholl (from whose notice the contradiction in which he had involved himself did not escape, since he confesses, "this only is inexplicable to me at present, that it was permitted, nay, even commanded, to the priests to eat the flesh of the defiled victim,") to him the above argument is perfectly convincing and triumphant. It, however, affects only the *faulty* development and defence of the juridical theory, for which this theory itself is not and cannot be responsible, unless that view of the impurity of the offering were a necessary consequence from this, so that the former could not be given up without at the same time destroying the latter. But this is by no means the case, though Scholl seems to believe it to be such, and Baehr very willingly follows him in this belief. On the contrary, it is not difficult to show not only that this view in no way necessarily follows from "the penal death theory" but even that it stands in direct opposition to it, that it contradicts its essential nature, and originated only from a distorted view of the same. But thus the whole boasted argument falls to ruins, and the shout of victory is sounded forth much too early.

According to the so-called "penal death theory," sin is (symbolically) imputed to the animal appointed for sacrifice, by the imposition of hands.¹ This has to do with the principle of vitality, the blood. So far now as the blood is infected by the imputation of the sin to be expiated, the whole life of the animal is thereby infected (just as the whole life of the sinner is infected). For since the life or the soul is in the blood, and the blood which sustains the soul permeates the whole physical being of the animal in every direction, to the remotest limits, so the whole animal may be regarded as infected with sin, which is expressed in the strongest manner by this circumstance, that the animal itself is now called חַטָּאת (sin), and hence is regarded as sin, which is, as it were, individualized in the animal.²

¹ During this act the offerer, according to the Rabbinic tradition, made the following confession: Obsecro, domine, peccavi, deliqui, rebellavi, hoc et illud feci, nunc autem poenitentiam ago, sitque haec expiatio mea. Maimonides de rat. sacrif. 3. — Tr.

² Even the names חַטָּאת and עֹלֹת for the offerings in question, form an exam-

The blood as the seat of the soul and of feeling, as the sensitive principle, is also the seat of desire, and hence the birth-place and source of sin. As now the blood is concerned in the imputation, so also in the punishment. The blood as the seat of life is the source of sin; against the blood then as the seat of life is the punishment also directed, and this in consequence takes the form of death. The shedding of the blood is the death. So soon as this is shed, the punishment is suffered; so soon, however, as the punishment is suffered, the sin is annulled, abolished, the *status integer* restored. Until the blood be shed its desire is not annulled by aversion nor its life by death, and hence it was impure; but so soon as this takes place, this impurity is destroyed. The blood was now not only pure but purifying, and as such, as the means of expiation, was holy. If the garment of any one was sprinkled with it, the garment was not defiled thereby, but the blood rather was profaned, for the garment is a profane thing. Still less could the blood of the slain beast be regarded as unclean. It was not in itself properly impure, even before the death and expiation, but was only so in a measure by its connection with the blood. Had the blood been impure it could not have come upon the holy vessels. Had the flesh been unclean, then its better parts, the fat, could not have been given up to Jehovah through the fire, for Jehovah suffered nothing impure to approach Him.

In regard to the *material* of the sin-offering, the want of the meat-offering comes first into consideration. That this want was important and essential is shown by the ordinance (Lev. 5: 11) which appointed in case of extreme poverty a bloodless offering to be brought instead of a bloody one, and which, furthermore, prohibits any addition of oil or frankincense to this substituted, bloodless offering, and expressly adds as the reason for this prohibition, "for it is a sin-offering." Accordingly it was the oil and incense whose presence made the bloodless offering a meat-offering, and whose absence in the substitution of the bloodless for a bloody sin-offering, was essential and necessary. In this then lies the reason why in general no meat-offering was united with the sin-offering. Oil and incense symbolize the spirit of God and the prayer of man. The meat-offering in general is the symbol of good works. These, however, are good works and acceptable to God, only when they proceed from the depths of a godly and sanctified heart, when they are produced and matured by the Holy Spirit, and when, furthermore, they are presented to God as His own

ple in favor of imputation and substitution, which the opposite view will never be able to eliminate.

work in man, and the latter acknowledges with thanksgiving and praise, that the works are not the product of his own goodness, but of the grace of God. The sin-offering, however, was the expiatory sacrifice *κατ' ἔξοχῆν*. The idea of atonement was here so entirely predominant that no room for the other ideas remained. The giving up of all the members and capacities, subsequently to the expiation, to the sanctifying fire, already retires to the background; while the consecration of the good works is here wholly wanting, and can appear only in the succeeding stage of the sacrificial institute, the burnt-offering.

In regard to the material of the *bloody* sin-offering, we perceive that the value of the animal to be chosen stood in a proportionate relation to the higher or lower expiation, and hence also to the rank and position of the offerer within the theocracy: "Most commonly, and certainly in the more general and important cases, the he-goat (שְׂעִיר עֲזִיז) was appointed. That this selection was not made without design is too manifest to be overlooked, yet the reasons assigned for it are very diverse." We here confess our ignorance, and passing over the most wonderful and even absurd explanations of the same, we shall note only the opinion of Baehr, which, though it be purely conjectural, yet possesses the merit of being a very ingenious and certainly a not improbable conjecture: "The name of this kind of goat will guide us to a correct conclusion. They are called שְׂעִירֵי עֲזִיז on account of their long, shaggy hair. From this the garments of the mourners, and of the preachers of repentance were commonly manufactured (comp. Zech. 13: 4 with 2 Kings 1: 8). Among the mourners such a garment was called שֵׁט, *σάκκος*, (Isaiah 20: 2). That these garments possessed a significant character needs no proof. With the mourners, they were the direct signs of sorrow. With the prophets, they indicated that he who was thus clad proclaims sin and repentance,—a *sermo propheticus realis*. The שְׂעִיר עֲזִיז, as the sin-offering, had a similar reference to sin, and the mourning necessary for it (repentance). Very suitable then was the appointment of this animal for those offerings chiefly which had to do *only* with sin; and this was the more appropriate in case offerings, especially burnt-offerings, were brought at the same time. That this selection had not to do with male goats as such, is shown by the simple circumstance that not male goats in general, but only this species of the same, were selected for the sin-offerings, and never the other species, the עֲזִיזֵי זָכָר which were employed in the thank-offerings (Num. 7: 17).

Finally, Baehr passes to the case of indulgence, Lev. 5: 11, to
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which we have already alluded: "The oil is to the meal what the fat is to the animal. It is the sign of fulness and prosperity, and as such is the ornament and grace of the offering. The frankincense also, like all perfumes, is expensive, and is of the nature of ornament. The absence of both these has reference to the offerer as well as to this particular kind of offering. It was a poor offering, destitute of ornament and grace." (Vol. II. p. 400.)

This interpretation is clearly an unfortunate one, and must have had its origin in utter perplexity. If the oil bore the same relation to the meal as the fat to the animal, then it must have been as indispensable as this. As the fat of the sin-offering was offered to Jehovah, in the fire, so the oil must have been presented to Jehovah, on the altar. And if the oil, as the sign of fulness and prosperity, as the ornament and grace of the offering, was wanting, and if this destitution belonged to the idea of the sin-offering, then there should have been selected for the sin-offering as lean an animal as possible, or at least the fat portions of the same should have been set aside, and not have been laid on the altar. The reason, as we have already seen, is entirely the same as that by which the addition of the meat-offering to the sin-offering was prohibited. In the burning of the fat portions nothing peculiar presents itself. Only this appears remarkable, that the expression occurring so frequently in the burning of the flesh of the burnt-offering אֲנֵרָה רִיח־תִּיבְחֹנִן לַיהוָה (fire of a sweet savor unto Jehovah), is here never employed. Since the burning of the most excellent part of the flesh had manifestly the same significance as the burning of the whole flesh, so from the absence of the expression we cannot argue the non-existence of the fact. In the burnt-offering, the burning is the essential thing, the properly characteristic function which renders the offering a burnt-offering; and hence the phrase "of a sweet savor for Jehovah," which denotes the effect of the burning, is here chiefly and even exclusively employed. What the burning is in the burnt-offering, the sprinkling of blood is in the sin-offering, the *expiation*; and hence to this sprinkling, the אָבַרְכָּה (to make atonement) is chiefly and almost exclusively ascribed. As in the burnt-offering, the expression אָבַרְכָּה is extremely rare, occurring indeed only once, so that "of sweet savor," in the sin-offering, never occurs. But even if the אָבַרְכָּה had never been affirmed of the burnt-offering, yet, on account of the blood-sprinkling which here took place, expiation could not be denied to it; so also the "sweet savor for Jehovah" cannot be denied to the burning of the sin-offering, although it be not expressly ascribed to the same. The difficult pas-

sage, Lev. 5: 1—13, which we are convinced, appertains to the sin-offerings, yet as it has been placed by many, and especially by Baehr also, in the rubric of trespass-offerings, we can only consider hereafter.

ARTICLE III.

HEBREW CRITICISMS.

By M. Stuart, lately Prof. of Sacred Literature at Andover.

NO. I. A WORD MORE ON PSALM XXII. 17.

WHAT more can be said, or needs to be said? are questions which may very naturally be asked, by any one who knows that a little library of books has already been written, on the controverted clause of the text in question. And after all, the matter has not, as our cousin-Germans express it, *come into the clear*. Doubt and division of opinion remain; and not only as it regards the readers in general of the original Scriptures, but also among the most learned Hebrew scholars now living.

These grounds of doubt and difficulty cannot be felt, or duly appreciated, by the mere English reader. They rest almost wholly on the form of a single Hebrew word, viz. *כַּאֲרֵי*, as now presented in our commonly received Hebrew text. The English reader finds the verse in question apparently very plain. It runs thus: "For dogs have compassed me; the assembly of the wicked have enclosed me; they pierced my hands and my feet." The word *dogs* will, of course, be tropically understood by every intelligent reader; just as it is in the New Testament, when the Apostle says: "Beware of dogs" (Phil. 3: 2), and again, when the Apocalypticist says: "Without are dogs" (Rev. 22: 15). In all these three cases, degraded, vile, ravenous, and shameless men are tropically designated.

The second clause of Ps. 22: 17 (Eng. version, v. 16) employs a more literal diction, instead of this figurative one. Its words are: *The assembly of the wicked*; which is an equivalent of the preceding word *dogs*, such as is common in Hebrew parallelisms. All then appears to be plain. The meaning thus far seems to be simply,