place from the actual scenes of the gospel history, and written after
men had begun to withdraw into deserts and caves and convents, to
spend their lives in solitude and mortification, hoping thereby to gain
the favor of God; instead of going about doing good, as Christ did,
and as he taught all the early preachers of Christianity to do.

These apocryphal gospels will next engage our attention.

[To be concluded.]

ARTICLE IV.

TRANSLATIONS FROM ANSELM.

By J. S. Maginnis, D. D., Professor in the University of Rochester, N. Y.

PROLOGION OF ANSELM.

[The author of the following Article was one of the founders of
the scholastic Philosophy, and was regarded as the Metaphysician
par excellence of the eleventh century. Piety and good sense every-
where characterize his writings. Such were his reputation and in-
fluence that he was denominated the Second Augustine. His phi-
osophical labors constituted an epoch in the history of the human mind.
In theology, he did more than any other author from the days of the
apostles up to his own times, to vindicate the object of the death of
Christ as a vicarious sacrifice for sin. He was the first who effect-
vively broke the spell of that absurd theory which had prevailed for
so many centuries, both with the Greek and the Latin Fathers, and
had been advocated even by such men as Ambrose and Augustine,
and which represented the death of Christ as a ransom paid to Satan
to redeem men from his power. His views on this subject are ex-
pressed in his tract, Cur Deus Homo; i. e. as he himself explains
the title, Qua ratione vel necessitate Deus homo factus sit.

The Prologion, a translation of which is here presented to the
reader, is one of the most celebrated of his productions on account of
the ontological argument it contains in proof of the existence of a

1 Rixner Geschichte der Philosophie, Band II. S. 18.
God. It has obtained an honorable notice from every history of philosophy which has appeared since the age in which it was written. The argument it contains has been analyzed by Tennemann, Rixner, Reinhold and Ritter, and has commanded the respect of such thinkers as Descartes, Leibnitz, and Stillingfleet. In the progress of the discussion there may occur what may seem to us quaint expressions, absurd paradoxes, puerile illustrations; objections may be raised where none are needed, and difficulties started which may arise only from the form of expression in which they are stated. All this may be offensive to modern taste, and to a superficial judgment may create the necessity of some apology for introducing the Article into the pages of a literary or religious Review. No such apology, however, will be required by those who feel any interest in tracing the various steps by which the human mind has been advanced to its present strength and attainments. Such will recognize here and in the Monologion the movements of a great and vigorous intellect, the first awakenings of human thought after a slumber of ages—the first ripe fruit borne by the tree of knowledge after the desolating scourge of barbarism had swept away all that was fair and beautiful in the literature of the old world. The Proslogion is here inserted for the purpose of convenient reference for theological students and others, who may wish to investigate the history of the proofs of the existence of a God, and who have not the opportunity or leisure to consult the original.

The Translator is not aware that there exists any version of this singular document in the English language. The only translation he has seen is one into the French, undertaken by the advice of Cousin and published, in connection with the Monologion, under the title of Christian Rationalism.1 If Anselm deserves to be called a Rationalist, his was truly a Christian rationalism; and we could heartily wish that rationalism had remained just where he left it. He left it the humble pupil, but it has since become the critic and judge of divine revelation. In his view, we are not to make reason the sole judge of everything, and are not at liberty to reject a doctrine of revelation because we cannot comprehend it. He rose so far above the slavish dogmatism of his times as to admit that we ought, in all cases, so to exercise our intelligence as to seek for the rational grounds of our belief; and if we are so happy as to succeed, and

---

1 Le Rationalisme chrétien a la fin du XVe Siecle traduit et précédé d'une introduction, par H. Bonchitté, Professeur d'Histoire au Collège Royal de Versailles.
should thus advance from faith to knowledge or understanding (intellectum) we ought to render thanks to Him who has endowed us with faculties capable of such attainments; but the doctrines of faith which we cannot comprehend, we are still bound to venerate and admire. Even in his attempt to prove the existence of a God, Anselm piously disclaims seeking for any rational demonstration of this as a condition of adopting it as an article of his faith; but having once received it into his belief, this becomes a high and imperative reason why he should seek for its scientific proof. Indeed he intimates and very justly, that the mind which is not previously possessed with this belief; or a mind in a state of unbelief, is in the worst possible condition to perceive and appreciate the highest evidence that presents itself in favor of the divine existence. He says *Necesse enim quare intelligere ut credam: sed credo, ut intelligam. Nam hoc credo, quia nisi credidero, non intelligam.*

His argument is, strictly speaking, included within the second, third and fourth chapters. He seems to adopt as his text, "The fool (insipiens) hath said in his heart there is no God." The validity of this argument was called in question by Gaunilon, a monk of his own times, who puts into the mouth of the fool a reply which he may properly make to the reasoning here employed against him; his tract was, therefore, entitled *Liber pro Insipienti,* i.e. a book in behalf of the fool. Gaunilon's tract and Anselm's apology will both be presented to the reader.

It is not our design to pronounce upon the validity of this argument; in reference to this the reader must form his own judgment. But in explanation of the reasoning here employed, let it be observed that the author does not begin by attempting to prove the existence of God directly, but he attempts to prove the existence of some supreme thing, object or being conceived in the most absolute and unconditioned sense; after he supposes his object accomplished, he then identifies this supreme and highest conceivable being with our conception of God. Compare Chap. 8d of the Proslogion with Chap. 10 of Anselm's Apology. Postponing the question, therefore, whether this being is God or not, the first inquiry with Anselm is, does such a being exist? The whole force of his demonstration depends upon the peculiar nature of this being. Gaunilon has unques-

---

1 De Fide Trinitatis. *Nam christianus per fidem debet ad intellectum proficere, non per intellectum ad fidem accedere, aut si intelligere non valet, a fide recedere. Sed cum ad intellectum valet pertingere, delectatur, cum vero nequit, quod capere non potest, veneratur.*
tionably constructed a close, powerful and unanswerable argument against the reasoning of Anselm, if we concede that he has the right conception of the being whose existence is to be proved. But the circumstance which evidently vitiates his whole reasoning, and which renders his beautiful illustration drawn from the lost island inapplicable, is, that he starts out with an entirely different conception from that which Anselm has in his mind. Gannilin proceeds from the conception of a being greater than all things else that exist. This conception and form of expression do not necessarily forbid the supposition that a greater being than this may, at least be conceived. But Anselm starts with the conception of a being the greatest conceivable—that is, a being which must necessarily envelop and contain within itself every possible perfection, which, consequently, in its very conception implies not only possible and actual existence, but eternal and necessary existence. Apol. Chap. 5. Anselm freely admits that his reasoning can have no application to any different being from this. Apol. Chap. 8. His reasoning is designed to show that having once conceived of a being to whom necessary existence belongs, then to deny actual existence to such a being is a simple absurdity. It is easy to be seen that if we could be once assured of the actual existence of a necessary being, then, to ascribe to such a being the possibility of not existing, would be a contradiction in terms. But does the conception of this being prove his actual existence? Few, perhaps, are prepared to concede this. Whatever may be the reader’s views on this subject, the author’s reasons for the affirmative will be found expanded in his Apol., Chap. I. See also Cudworth, Vol. II. p. 141. Clark: Being and Attributes of God, Prop. III. Also, Preface to his Discourse on Natural Religion. Stillingfleet’s Origines Sacre, B. III. Chap. 1.

Leibnitz thinks that Descartes borrowed his argument from Anselm, of whose writings he could not have been ignorant—having studied the Scholastic Philosophy so long at the Collège des Jésuites de la Flèche. He says, the Scholastics all misunderstood Anselm’s argument, not even excepting their Doctor Angelic; he says, they represent it as a paralogism, but that it is not a paralogism, but only a defective demonstration; that all it wants for its completion is, first to show that the being in question is possible. He thinks it would follow that, if this being is possible, it exists—an argument, however, which will hold good only of the Deity.1 If this be all that is necessary to the completion of Anselm’s argument, we see not but

the defect is easily supplied. Everything is possible that is conceivable, and that implies no contradiction; but a perfect being is conceivable, and implies no contradiction; therefore, it is possible. Again, a perfect being is possible, otherwise it belongs to the very nature of being to be imperfect; in other words, the perfection of being would consist in its imperfection, which is absurd. The same reasoning is applicable to a self-existing being; this is possible, otherwise all being is dependent; on what, then, must it depend? On something that is not being? This would be absurd. If the impossibility of a perfect self-existing being is proved, atheism is of course established. If the possibility of such a being is proved, then its actual existence follows as a matter of necessity: for, if it does not now exist, its existence is plainly impossible—since any being that can hereafter be brought into existence, would not be perfect or self-existent. However untenable, therefore, the argument of Anselm may be, in the form in which he has left it, we conceive that an argument for the existence of a God may be constructed not merely from our conception of a perfect being, but from our conception of right and wrong, and from all our primary and necessary ideas. The untutored child may gaze long upon the starry heavens, and be delighted with the number and beauty of the objects it beholds, without ever making the reflection that the existence of these objects requires and presupposes the existence of space which surrounds and envelops them. So, those who are wiser than children, are too apt to speculate long and learnedly on our necessary mental conceptions, without reflecting that every one of these implies and proves the existence of God, just as certainly as the stars of heaven imply the existence of space. It is scarcely possible to start wrong, if we go in search of God. There is no point from which if we go out, we may not find Him. If it be true, as Inspiration teaches, that in Him we live and move and have our being, it is only necessary to have our eyes open in order to behold within us and around us the most direct and unequivocal proofs of the Divine existence, and we could no more doubt that there is a God, than the mariner could doubt the existence of the ocean, while his noble bark is gliding beautifully upon its bosom.—Tr.}
PROSLOGION, OR AN ALLOCATION CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Preface.

Having, at the urgent solicitation of some of my brethren published a short treatise as an example of meditation in relation to the grounds of our faith, representing the solitary reasonings of one who is in search of what he is yet ignorant of; and reflecting that this treatise consisted of a connected chain of numerous arguments, I began to inquire whether it might not be possible to find a single argument, which, being complete in itself, would need the aid of no other for its confirmation, and which would alone suffice to prove that there is indeed a God, that he is the supreme good, that he is in need of nothing, but that all things else are in need of him in order to their existence and well-being—an argument, in fine, sufficient to prove all that we are accustomed to believe concerning the Divine Nature.

To this subject I repeatedly and carefully turned my attention; sometimes the object of my search seemed to be within my reach; at other times it utterly escaped the grasp of my mind; at length I resolved, in despair, to abandon the inquiry, fearing that I might be in search of something which it would be impossible to find. But when I endeavored to banish this thought entirely, lest, by occupying my mind in a fruitless search, it might detain me from other studies in which I might make some useful progress, then it began to press itself upon me the more, with a kind of importunity; and the more I resolved to defend myself against it the more importunate it became. Therefore on a certain day, while fatigued with violently resisting its importunity, and in the very conflict of my thoughts, that presented itself to me which I had despaired of finding; and the eagerness with which I embraced the idea was equalled only by the solicitude with which I had repelled it. Believing that what had interested me so much in the discovery, would, if committed to writing afford equal pleasure to the reader, I have composed upon this and other matters, the following treatise; in which I represent one as speaking who is endeavoring to raise his mind to the contemplation of God, and who seeks to understand what he believes. Although I regarded neither this, nor the treatise above mentioned, as deserving to be called a book, or to have the name of the author prefixed to it; yet it seemed improper to send them forth without some title, which might, in a degree, invite to a careful perusal of them, those into whose hands
Exhortation to Contemplate God.

they might fall. I therefore entitled the former Exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei, "An example of meditation concerning the grounds of faith;" and the latter, Fides quaerens intellectum, "Faith seeking understanding." But as copies of each had already been multiplied, and that too with the above titles, many urged me to prefix to them my own name, and especially the Reverend Archbishop of Lyons, Hugo, the Apostolical Legate in Gaul, enjoined this upon me by his authoritative command. That this might be the more suitably done I have entitled the former Monologium, that is, a Soliloque, and the latter Proslogion, that is, An Allocation.

Proslogion.

Chapter I. Exhortation to the contemplation of God.

O, vain man! see now, for a little while from thine accustomed occupations; hide thyself for a brief moment from thy tumultuous thoughts; cast aside thy cares; postpone thy toilsome engagements; devote thyself awhile to God; repose for a moment in Him; enter into the sanctuary of thy soul, exclude the race all else but God, and whatever may aid thee in finding him; then, within the closed doors of thy retirement inquire after thy God. Say now, O my whole heart! say now to thy God: I seek thy face; thy face O Lord do I seek. Therefore now, O Lord, my God, teach thou my heart where and bow, it may seek for thee; where and bow it may find thee. If thou art not here, O Lord, where, while thou art absent, shall I find thee? But if thou art everywhere, why do I not see thee present? Truly thou dwellest in light inaccessible! But where is this inaccessible light, or how can I approach to light inaccessible? Who will lead me and conduct me into it, that I may behold thee there? And then by what signs, or under what form shall I seek thee? I have never seen thee, O Lord my God; I know not thy face. What shall this thine exile do,—O Lord, Thou most High, what shall he do, banished so far from thee? What shall thy servant do, cast far away from thy presence, and yet in anguish with love for thy perfections? He pants to see thee, but thy face is too far from him; he desires to approach unto thee, but thy habitation is inaccessible; he longs to find thee, but knows not thine abode. He attempts to seek thee, but knows not thy face. O Lord, thou art my Lord and my God, yet I have never seen thee. Thou hast created and redeemed me, and hast conferred upon me all my goods, but as yet I know thee not.
In fine, I was created that I might behold thee; but I have not yet attained to the end of my creation. O miserable lot of man, since he has lost that for which he was created! O hard and cruel misfortune! Alas! what has he lost and what has he found? What has departed and what remains? He has lost the blessedness for which he was created; he has found misery for which he was not created. That has departed, without which there is no happiness; that remains, which, in itself, is nought but misery. Then man was accustomed to eat the bread of angels, for which he now hungers; now he eats the bread of sorrows, of which he was then ignorant. Alas! the common affliction of man, the universal wailing of the sons of Adam! The father of our race was filled to satiety, we pine, from hunger; he abounded, we are in want; he possessed happiness, but miserably deserted it; we are destitute of happiness, and pitifully long for it; but alas! our desires are unsatisfied. Why, since he could easily have done it, did he not preserve for us that which we should so greatly need? Why did he thus exclude from us the light and surround us with darkness? Why has he deprived us of life and inflicted death? Miserable beings! Whence have we been expelled? Whither are we driven? From what heights have we been precipitated? Into what abyss are we plunged? From our native land into exile; from the presence of God into the darkness which now envelops us; from the sweets of immortality into the bitterness and horror of death. — Unhappy change! — from good so great to evil so enormous! O heavy loss! heavy grief! heavy all! But alas! wretch that I am, miserable son of Eve, estranged from God, at what did I aim? what have I accomplished? Whither did I direct my course? Where have I arrived? To what did I aspire? for what do I now sigh? I sought for good, but behold confusion and trouble! I attempted to go to God, but I only stumbled upon myself. In my retirement I sought for rest, but in the depths of my heart I found tribulation and anguish. I desired to laugh by reason of the joy of my mind, but I am compelled to roar by reason of the disquietude of my heart. I hoped for happiness, but behold! from this my sighs are multiplied. And thou, O Lord, how long? How long O Lord wilt thou forget us? How long wilt thou turn thy face from us? When wilt thou have respect unto us and hear us? When wilt thou enlighten our eyes and show us thy face? When wilt thou restore thyself unto us? Have respect unto us, O Lord hear us, enlighten us, show thyself to us. Restore thyself unto us, that it may be well with us; it is so ill with us without thee. Have pity upon our toils
and our efforts after thee; we can do nothing without thee. Invite us; aid us. I beseech thee, O Lord, let me not despair in my longing; but let me be refreshed by hope. My heart is embittered in its own desolation; assuage thou its sorrows by thy consolations. O Lord, oppressed with hunger I have commenced to seek thee; let me not cease till I am filled from thy bounty; famished, I have approached unto thee; let me not depart unsat; poor, I have come to thy riches; miserable, to thy compassion; let me not return empty and despised. And if, before I partake of this divine food, I long for it; grant, after my desires are excited that I may have sufficient to satisfy them. O Lord I am bowed down and can look only towards the earth; raise thou me, that I may look upwards. Mine iniquities have gone over my head; they cover me over, and as a heavy burden they bear me down. Set me free; deliver me from mine iniquities, lest their pit shall close upon me its mouth. Let me behold thy light, whether from the depth or from the distance. Teach me to seek thee; and while I seek show thyself to me; because, unless thou teach, I cannot seek thee; unless thou show thyself, I cannot find thee; let me seek thee by desiring thee; let me desire thee by seeking thee. Let me find thee by loving thee; let me love thee in finding thee. I confess, O Lord, and render thee thanks that thou hast created in me this thine image, that I may be mindful of thee, that I may contemplate and love thee; but it is so injured by contact with vice, so darkened by the vapor of sin, that it cannot attain to that for which it was created, unless thou wilt renew and reform it. I attempt not to penetrate to thy height, for with this my feeble intelligence can bear no comparison; but I desire, in some degree, to understand thy truth which my heart believes and loves. For I seek not to understand in order that I may believe; but I believe in order that I may understand, for I believe for this reason that unless I believe I cannot understand.

CHAPTER II. That God truly exists, although the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.

Therefore, O Lord, thou who dost impart understanding to faith, grant, so far as thou seest this knowledge would be expedient for me, that I may know that thou art as we believe, and that thou art this which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou art something, than which nothing greater can be conceived. Shall we, therefore, conclude that there is no such Being, merely because the fool

1 Ne desperem suspicando; sed resperem sperando.
hath said in his heart, there is no God? But surely even this same fool, when he hears me announce that there is something than which nothing greater can be conceived, understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his conception, even if he does not know that it exists. For, it is one thing for an object to be in the conception, and another to know that it exists. For, when the painter conceives, beforehand, the picture which he is about to sketch, he has it, indeed, in his conception; but he knows that it does not yet exist, for he has not as yet executed it. But, after he has painted, he not only has in his conception what he has just produced, but he knows that it exists. Even the fool, therefore, is convinced that there exists in his conception, something than which nothing greater can be conceived; because, when he hears this mentioned, he understands it, or forms an idea of it, and whatever is understood, is in the intelligence. And surely that, than which a greater cannot be conceived, cannot exist in the intelligence alone. For, let it be supposed that it exists only in the intelligence; then something greater can be conceived; for it can be conceived to exist in reality also, which is greater. If, therefore, that than which a greater cannot be conceived, exists in the conception or intelligence alone, then that very thing, than which a greater cannot be conceived, is something than which a greater can be conceived, which is impossible. There exists, therefore, beyond doubt, both in the intelligence and in reality, something than which a greater cannot be conceived.

CHAPTER III. That God cannot be conceived not to exist.

Indeed, so truly does this exist, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For it is possible to conceive of the existence of something which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than that which can be conceived not to exist. Wherefore, if that, than which a greater cannot be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, then this something, than which a greater cannot be conceived, is something than which a greater can be conceived; which is a contradiction. So truly, therefore, does something exist, than which a greater cannot be conceived, that it is impossible to conceive this not to exist. And this art thou, O Lord our God! So truly, therefore, dost thou exist, O Lord my God, that thou cannot not be conceived not to exist. For this there is the highest reason. For, if any mind could conceive of anything better than thou art, then the creature could ascend above the Creator, and become His judge; which is supremely absurd. Everything else, indeed, which exists besides thee, can be
conceived not to exist. Thou alone, therefore, of all things, hast
being in the truest sense, and consequently in the highest degree;
for everything else that is, exists not so truly, and has, consequently,
being only in an inferior degree. Why, therefore, has the fool said
in his heart, there is no God? since it is so manifest to an intelligent
mind, that of all things thine existence is the highest reality. Why,
unless because he is a fool, and destitute of reason?

CHAPTER IV. How it can be that the fool has said in his heart,
what cannot be conceived.

But how has the fool said in his heart, what he is not able to con-
ceive; or how is it that he is not able to conceive what he has said
in his heart — since, to say in the heart and to conceive, is the same
thing? If it be true that he has said it in his heart, because he has
conceived it, and at the same time, that he has not said it in his heart,
because he cannot conceive it, then there are more senses than one
in which a thing may be conceived, or may be said in the heart.
For, a thing is conceived in one sense, when the word which design-
ates it is conceived; in another, when the thing itself is in its own
nature understood and comprehended. In the former sense, there-
fore, God can be conceived not to exist; in the latter, this is impos-
sible. For no one who understands what fire is, and what water is,
can conceive that fire is water in reality — though he may conceive
this as to the mere sound of the words. So, therefore, no one who
understands and comprehends what God is, can conceive that God is
not — although he may say in his heart these words, either without
any meaning, or in a sense foreign to the subject. For God is that,
than which a greater cannot be conceived. He who properly under-
stands this, understands also that this something so exists, that it can-
not even in thought not exist. He, therefore, who understands that
God so exists, cannot conceive him not to exist. Thanks be unto
thee, O Lord, thanks be unto thee, that what I at first believed,
through thine own endowment, I now understand, through thine illu-
mination; so that, even were I unwilling to believe that thou art, I
cannot remain ignorant of thine existence!

CHAPTER V. That God is whatever it is better to be than not to
be; and being alone self-existent, has created all things else from no-	hing.

What art thou therefore, O Lord God than whom nothing greater
can be conceived? What art thou but that Being who is supreme
over all; who alone is self-existent, and has created all things else from nothing. For whatever is not this, is inferior to what can be conceived. But it is impossible to conceive of such inferiority in thee. What good, therefore, can be wanting to that Supreme Good from which all good flows? Thou art then just, true, happy; and whatsoever it is better to be than not to be; for it is better to be just than not just; happy than not happy.

CHAPTER VI. How God can be sensible (sensibilis) since he is not body.

But since it is better for thee to be sensible, omnipotent, compassionate, impassible than not to be; how art thou sensible if thou art not body; or omnipotent if thou canst not do all things or compassionate and at the same time impassible! For if corporeal beings only are sensible because their senses are around the body and in the body, how art thou sensible, since thou art not body but art the Supreme Mind, which is superior to body? But if to perceive sensibly (sentire) is nothing else than to know, and if the faculty of this perceiving is for no other purpose than the acquisition of knowledge—since he who sensibly perceives acquires knowledge just according to the nature of the sense he employs as a knowledge of colors by the sight, and of flavors by the taste—then any being may not improperly be said to perceive sensibly, which knows things in any manner whatever. Therefore, O Lord, though thou art not body, yet thou art truly in the highest degree sensible in this respect, that thou knowest all things perfectly; but not as an animal which acquires knowledge through the medium of the corporeal senses.

CHAPTER VII. How God can be omnipotent since there are many things he cannot do.

But how art thou also omnipotent if thou canst not do all things? Or, if thou canst not be corrupted, if thou canst not lie, if thou canst not make that which is true to be false, and that which is done to be not done, and many such things, how canst thou do all things? Is it that to be able to do those things is not power, but a weakness? For he that can do these things can do what is wrong and injurious to himself; and the greater his ability to do such things, the greater will be the power of adversity and evil over him, and the less will he be able to resist them. Whoever, therefore, has such ability, has it not from his power but from his weakness. For he is not said to be able to do such things, because he himself has power, but because his own
weakness gives something else a power over him; or we adopt a mode of expression according to which many things are improperly said, as when we employ is for is not; and do for a word which signifies not to do or to do nothing. For to one who denies that a certain thing is, we often say thus it is, as you say it is, when it would seem more strictly proper to say, thus it is not, as you say it is not. We also say, this one sits as that one does, or this one rests, as that one does; when to sit is not to do anything; and to rest is to do nothing. So, therefore, when any one is said to have the power of doing or of suffering what is wrong, or injurious to himself, weakness is to be understood by the term power; because the more of this power he has, the greater must be the power which evil and adversity will exercise over him, and the less will he be able to resist them. Therefore, O Lord God, thou art, on this account, the more truly omnipotent, because thou canst do nothing through weakness, and nothing can have power over thee.

CHAPTER VIII. How God is compassionate and yet impossible.

But how art thou also at the same time compassionate and impossible? For if thou art impossible thou dost not suffer with us; and if thou dost not suffer with us, thy heart is not pained with sympathy for our misery, for this is to be compassionate. But if thou art not compassionate, whence so great consolation to the miserable? How, therefore, O Lord, art thou compassionate and yet not compassionate, unless that thou art compassionate in relation to us, but not as implying any change in thee? Thou art, indeed, compassionate to relieve, but not to experience our miseries. For when thou hast respect unto our miseries, we feel the effect of thy compassion, but no change is felt by thee. Thou art therefore compassionate, because thou dost save the miserable, and dost spare thine offending subjects; and thou art not compassionate, in so far as no compassion for misery can produce any change in thee.

1 The term misericordia (compassion) has doubtless an objective as well as a subjective reference; yet it implies a state of mind in a subject rather than relief conferred upon an object; for compassion may be felt even where it is not manifested by bestowing relief upon the miserable. To deny, therefore, that there is anything subjective in God, to which the term compassionate is applicable, would be to deny one of the most essential attributes of the Divine nature. But no such denial is intimated by the author; his language only implies that compassion in God, is of such a nature that it in no way conflicts with his immutability; while at the same time it is all-sufficient for the wants of the wretched and miserable. In God there is compassion for the miserable, and mercy for the guilty.—Th.
CHAPTER IX. How a Being absolutely and supremely just, may spare the wicked, and that he may in accordance with his justice, exercise compassion towards them.

But, how dost thou spare the wicked, if thou art absolutely and supremely just? For how can a Being of absolute and supreme justice, do anything which is not just? Or, what justice is there in bestowing eternal life on one who deserves eternal death? Whence comes it, O thou good and compassionate God, good to the evil as well as to the good; whence comes it that thou dost save the wicked, if this is not just, and thou dost not do anything not just? Is it because thy goodness is incomprehensible, that this lies hid in that inaccessible light which thou dost inhabit? Truly, within the deepest and most secret recesses of thy goodness, is concealed that fountain from which flows the river of thy mercy. For, although thou art absolutely and supremely just, yet thou art also propitious towards the guilty, for the reason that thou art absolutely and supremely good. For thou wouldst be less good, wert thou propitious to no sinner. For he is more truly good, whose favor extends both to the good and to the evil, than he whose favor extends to the good alone; and he is more truly good who is good both in punishing and in sparing the wicked, than he who is good in punishing alone. Thou art compassionate, therefore, for the reason that thou art absolutely and supremely good. And although the reason may be apparent why thou dost recompense good to the good, and evil to the evil, yet surely we have reason to be profoundly amazed, that thou who art supremely just, and in need of nothing, shouldst recompense good to thy sinful and guilty subjects. O, the depth of thy goodness! O, my God! The source of thy compassion is seen, but not fully understood. We see from whence the river flows, but our vision cannot penetrate to the bottom of the fountain from which it springs. For it is from the plenitude of thy goodness, that flows thy clemency to sinners; but in the depth of thy goodness the reason of this lies concealed. For although it is from thy goodness that thou dost recompense good to the good, and evil to the evil, yet this would seem to be required by considerations of justice. But when thou dost recompense good to the evil, we know that thy supreme goodness has willed it, but we are amazed that thy supreme justice could permit it! O what compassion! How rich the sweetness and how sweet the riches from which it flows to us! O the immensity of the divine goodness! how deserving of the affection and love of sinners! Thou
God just in punishing and sparing the Wicked.

dost save the righteous, justice concurring; thou dost liberate the wicked, justice still, ruling; those, in accordance with their merits; these, notwithstanding their demerits; those, by recognizing in them the good which thou hast bestowed; these, by pardoning the evil which thou dost abhor. O, unbounded goodness, which so transcends all thought! Let this compassion which flows from thine inexhaustible fulness, come over my soul. Let those streams of mercy which spring from thy bosom, flow in upon my heart. Spare, through thy clemency; avenge not through thy justice. For, although it is difficult to conceive how thy mercy can be intimately united with thy justice, yet we are compelled to believe that it is by no means opposed to justice—because it flows from thy goodness, which is in perfect harmony with justice, and which otherwise could not be goodness. For, if thou art merciful only because thou art supremely good; and if thou art supremely good, only because thou art supremely just, therefore thou art truly merciful, for the reason that thou art supremely just. Aid thou me, O thou just and merciful God, whose light I seek; aid me that I may understand what I say. Truly thou art merciful, because thou art just. Does thy mercy, therefore, spring from thy justice? Is it, therefore, from justice that thou dost spare the wicked? If thus it is, O Lord, if thus it is, teach me how it is—Is it because it is just, that thou art so good and so powerful, that an increase of thy goodness and power cannot be conceived? For what is more just than this? Truly this could not be, if thou wert good only in punishing, and not in sparing; and if thou shouldst render good those who are only destitute of goodness, but not those who are positively wicked. Therefore, in so far as it accords with thy goodness, it is just that thou dost spare the wicked, and that thou dost render good those who are wicked. In fine, what is not done justly, ought not to be done; and what ought not to be done, is done unjustly. If, therefore, thou dost not justly compassionate the wicked, thou oughtest not to compassionate them. And if thou oughtest not to compassionately them, then thou dost compassionately them unjustly. But if it is impious to say this, then it is right to believe that thou dost justly compassionately the wicked.

Chapter X. How He justly punishes and justly spares the wicked.

But it is also just in thee to punish the wicked. For what is more just than for the righteous to receive good, and the wicked evil? How, therefore, is it just that thou shouldst punish, and just that thou shouldst spare the wicked. Dost thou in one sense justly punish the
wicked, and in another sense justly spare? For when thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, because this corresponds with their deserts; but when thou dost spare, it is just—not because it corresponds with their deserts, but because it is becoming thy goodness. In sparing the wicked, thou art just according to what is suitable to thee, but not according to what is deserved by us; in the same manner as thou art compassionate in the sense of relieving us, but not in the sense of changing thee. For as in saving us whom thou mightest justly destroy, thou art compassionate, not because thou art changed by compassion, but because we feel its effect; so also thou art just, not as rendering unto us that which is due, but as doing that which is becoming thy nature who art supremely good. Thus, therefore, without any contradiction, thou dost justly punish; and justly spare the wicked.

CHAPTER XI. How all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, and yet He is just in all His ways.

But is it not also just, O Lord, in a manner suitable to thee, that thou dost punish the wicked? For it is agreeable to our notions of thy justice that thou shouldst be so just that thou canst not be conceived more just; which thou couldst not by any means be, if thou shouldst render only good to the good and not evil to the evil. For he is more just who awards both to the good and to the evil their merits, than he who awards them to the good alone. It is just, therefore, according to thy nature, O thou just and benignant God, for thee to punish and to spare. Truly, therefore, all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, and yet the Lord is just in all his ways. And this surely without any contradiction to thy nature, for it is not just that they should be saved whom thou dost will to punish; nor is it just that they should be condemned whom thou dost will to spare. For that only is just which thou willest; and that not just which thou willest not. Thus, therefore, from thy justice springs thy compassion; because it is just that thou shouldst be good in such a sense as to spare; and it is perhaps for this reason that he who is supremely just can decree good to the evil. But even were it possible to understand why thou canst purpose to save the wicked, yet surely we can in no way comprehend why, of those who are equally wicked, thou dost, through thy supreme goodness, save some rather than others; and through thy supreme justice dost condemn these rather than those. Thus, therefore, thou art truly sensible, omnipotent, compassionate and impassible; even as thou art living, wise, good, happy, eternal, and whatsoever it is better to be than not to be.
CHAPTER XII. *That God is the life itself by which he lives; and so of all his attributes.*

But truly whatsoever thou art, thou art this, not through something else, but through thyself alone. Thou art, therefore, the life itself by which thou dost live; the wisdom by which thou art wise; the goodness itself by which thou art good both to the evil and to the good; and so of all thine attributes.

CHAPTER XIII. *How God alone is unlimited and eternal while other minds are unlimited and eternal.*

But everything which is in any degree enclosed by space or time, is less than that which no law of space or time controls. Since, therefore, nothing is greater than thou art, neither space nor time contains thee; but thou art everywhere and always; and because this can be said of thee alone, thou only art unlimited and eternal. How, therefore, are other minds said to be unlimited and eternal? Indeed thou art alone eternal; because as thou alone of all beings dost not cease, so thou dost not begin to be. But how art thou alone unlimited? Is it that a created mind, when compared with thee is limited, but when compared with body is unlimited? For that is certainly limited, which, when it is wholly in one particular place cannot be at the same time in any other place; which is true only of corporeal things; and that is unlimited which exists as a whole in every place at the same time; this can be predicated of thee alone; but that is limited and at the same time unlimited which, while it exists wholly in a certain place, exists at the same time wholly in some other place, and yet exists, not everywhere; which is true only of created minds. For if the whole mind were not in each member of its body, the whole mind could not feel in each member. Thou, therefore, O Lord, art alone unlimited, and eternal, and yet other minds are both unlimited and eternal.

CHAPTER XIV. *How and why God is seen and not seen by those who seek him.*

Hast thou found, O my soul, what thou wast seeking? Thou wast seeking God, thou hast found him to be something supreme over all, than which nothing more excellent can be conceived; that this is life itself, light, wisdom, goodness, eternal blessedness, and blessed eternity; and that this is everywhere and always. For if thou hast not found thy God, then he must be something different from that which
thou hast found, and cannot possess those perfections which the certain and necessary conceptions of thy reason have ascribed to him. But if thou hast found him why is it that thou dost not perceive what thou hast found? Why, O Lord God, does not my soul perceive thee, if it has found thee? Since it has found that which is light and truth has it not found thee? For how could it know this except by seeing the light and the truth? Or could it know anything whatever concerning thee except through thy light and thy truth? If, therefore, it has seen light and truth it has seen thee; if it has not seen thee it has seen neither light nor truth. Is that both light and truth which it has seen, and still has it not as yet seen thee, because it has seen thee only in part, but not as thou art? O Lord my God, my Creator and Regenerator, say to my longing soul, what else thou art than what it has seen, that it may clearly see what it desires. It strives to see more, but beyond what it has already seen, it sees nothing but darkness. Nay, rather, it sees not darkness, for there is no darkness in thee; but it sees itself unable to see more on account of its own darkness. Why this? O Lord, why this? Is its eye darkened by its own weakness, or dazzled by thy splendor? Surely it is both darkened in itself and dazzled by thee. It is also obscured by its own shortness of vision and oppressed by thine immensity. It is limited by its own narrow range, and is overpowered by thine amplitude. For how vast is that light from which every truth radiates that dawns upon the rational mind! How spacious is that truth which includes in itself everything that is true, and out of which there exists only nothingness and falsehood! How infinite the mind which sees at a single glance, all that has ever occurred; and which knows by whom and through whom and in what way all things have been created from nothing! What purity, what simplicity, what certitude, what glory is here! This surely transcends all that the created mind is able to comprehend.

Chapter XV. That the greatness of God transcends conceptions.

Therefore, O Lord, not only art thou that thou which nothing greater can be conceived, but thy greatness transcends all conception. For since it is possible to conceive that there is something whose greatness transcends all conception, if thou art not this very thing, then something greater than thou art, can be conceived, which is impossible.
CHAPTER XVI. That the light which God inhabits is inacces-
sible.

Truly, O Lord, this is light inaccessible in which thou dwellest; for truly no other being can penetrate this light, to contemplate thee there. Truly, therefore, I look not upon it, for it is too resplendent for me; and yet it is through this that I see whatsoever I do see; just as a weak eye sees what it does see, through the light of the sun; while it is unable to gaze upon that light in the sun itself. My intelligence cannot approach to thy light, nor comprehend it. So great is its effulgence, nor can the eye of my mind long endure to gaze thereon. It is dazzled by its brightness, overpowered by its amplitude, oppressed by its immensity, confounded by its profundity. O, supreme and inaccessible light! O, perfect and blessed truth! How far thou art from me, who am so near to thee! How remote from my sight, who am so constantly in thine! Thou art everywhere present and entire, yet I see thee not. In thee I move, and in thee I am, and yet I am unable to approach unto thee. Thou art within me, and around me, yet I perceive thee not.

CHAPTER XVII. That in God there is harmony, order, savor, polisli, and beauty, in a manner ineffable and peculiar to Himself.

As yet, O Lord, thou art concealed from my soul in thine own light and blessedness, and therefore it yet remains involved in its darkness and misery. For it looks around, but sees not thy beauty. It hearkens, but hears not thy harmony. It exercises the sense of smell, but perceives not thine odor; of taste, but it recognizes not thy savor; of touch, but it feels not thy polish. For thou hast in thyself, O Lord, in a manner ineffable and peculiar to thee, all those qualities which thou hast imparted, under the forms of sense, to the things which thou hast created; but the senses of my soul are numbued, stupidized, obstructed by the inveterate languor of sin.

CHAPTER XVIII. That God is life, wisdom, eternity, and every real good.

But, behold a new source of trouble! Behold, while seeking joy and gladness, I again encounter sorrow and grief. My soul was already expecting satiety, and behold! I am again oppressed with want. Already was I attempting to eat; but, behold! I hunger the more. I was endeavoring to rise to the light of God, but I have fallen back into my own darkness. Nay, not only have I fallen into it,
but I feel that I am quite enveloped by it. Before my mother conceived me, I fell. Surely in darkness was I conceived, and in darkness was I enveloped at my birth. Surely we have all fallen in him, in whom all have sinned. In him we have all been deprived of that good which he might have easily retained, but which he has so wickedly lost for himself and for us. When we wish to regain this, we know not the way; when we seek, we find it not; when we find, it is not what we seek. Help thou me for thy goodness sake, O Lord. I have sought thy face; thy face, O Lord, will I again seek. Turn not thou away from me. Raise me from myself to thee. Cleanse, heal, quicken, illuminate, the eye of my mind, that I may contemplate thee. Let my soul recover its energies, O Lord, that it may again, with all its powers, betake itself to thee. What art thou, O Lord, what art thou? Under what form shall my heart conceive of thee? Surely thou art life, thou art wisdom, thou art truth, thou art blessedness, thou art eternity, and thou art all that is truly good. But, these are multiform; my narrow intelligence cannot see them all at a single glance, so as to delight in them all at the same time. How, therefore, O Lord, art thou all these? Is it that all these are parts of thee, or is it rather that each one of these is all that thou art? For, whatever is composed of parts, is not a perfect unity, but is in some sense a plurality, diverse from itself, and susceptible of dissolution, either in fact or in conception — all of which is foreign to thee, thou than whom nothing more excellent can be conceived. Hence, in thee, O Lord, there are no parts, neither art thou multiform, but thou art in such a sense one and the same with thyself, that thou art in no respect dissimilar to thyself; nay, thou art unity itself, indivisible even in conception. Therefore, life, wisdom, and the other things enumerated, are not parts of thee, but all are one, and each is all that thou art, and all that the rest are. Therefore, as thou hast no parts, and as thine eternity which thou dost constitute, hast no parts, so a part of thee and of thine eternity is never and nowhere; but thou art everywhere entire, and thine eternity is always complete.

CHAPTER XIX. That God is neither in space nor in time, but that all things are in Him.

But if, through thine eternity, thou wast, and art, and wilt, and if to have been, is not to be about to be; and to be, is not to have been, nor to be about to be, how is thine eternity always complete? Is it that nothing of thine eternity passes away in such a sense as to
be no longer; and that nothing of it is yet to come as if it did not already exist? Therefore, thou wast not yesterday, nor wilt thou be to-morrow; but yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, thou art; nay, rather thou art neither yesterday, to-day, nor to-morrow, but simply thou art, irrespective of all time. For, yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, have an existence only in time; but, though nothing exists without thee, thou dost nevertheless exist neither in time nor in space, but time, and space, and all things, are in thee; for nothing contains thee, but thou containest all things.

CHAPTER XX. That God is before all things, and beyond (ultra) all things, even things which are eternal.

Therefore thou dost fill and embrace all things; thou art before and beyond all things. Before all things, because before they were brought forth, thou art. But, how art thou beyond all things? For, in what way art thou beyond things which have no end? Is it that these things can in no wise exist without thee, but that thou wouldst nevertheless exist even if these should return to nothing? For, in this way thou art in a certain sense beyond these things. Is it also that these things can be conceived to have an end, but that no end can be conceived of thee? For in this way they have an end in a certain sense, but in no sense can this be affirmed of thee. And surely that which, in no sense, has an end, is beyond that which has an end in some sense. Dost thou transcend all things, even eternal things, in this sense also, that thine entire eternity and theirs is present before thee; while of their eternity they see not as yet that which is to come, and behold no longer that which is past? For, in this way thou art always beyond these things; since thou art always present at that point, or rather that point is always present to thee, at which they have not yet arrived.

CHAPTER XXI. Whether this is that which is expressed by the terms Seculum seculi or Secula seculum.

Is this, therefore, what is meant by an age of age or ages of ages? For as an age of time contains all things pertaining to time, so thine eternity contains even ages of time themselves. Thine eternity is called an age, on account of its indivisible immensity. And although thou art so great, O Lord, that all things are full of thee, and in thee, yet thou art so entirely irrespective of all space that in thee there are neither parts nor proportions.
CHAPTER XXII. That God alone is what he is and who he is.

Thou alone, O Lord, art what thou art and who thou art. For that which is one thing in its whole and another in its parts, and in which there is anything mutable, is not what it is, in an absolute sense. And that which begins from non-existence and can be conceived of as not existing, and which unless it subsist through something else, must return to non-existence; also whatever has a past which is now no longer, and a future, which is yet to come, this does not exist in proper and absolute sense. But thou art what thou art; because whatsoever thou art at any time or in any manner, thou art this at all times and absolutely. And thou art who thou art properly and simply; because thou hast neither a past nor a future, but only a present, neither canst thou be conceived of as not existing at any moment. But thou art life and light and wisdom and blessedness and eternity, and many things good of this nature, and yet thou art none other than the one supreme Good, absolutely self-sufficient, needing nothing, but whom all things else need in order to their existence and well-being.

CHAPTER XXIII. That this supreme Good is equally the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; that He is the only necessary Being; that He is the whole, the absolute, the only Good.

Thou art this good, O God; the Father; and thy Word, that is thy Son, is this good. For in the Word, by which thou dost declare thyself, there can be nothing else than what thou art, nor anything either greater or less, since thy Word is as true as thou art veracious. And therefore thy Word is, as thou art, truth itself, and not another truth than thou art; and so simple art thou that nothing else than what thou art can spring from thee. This same good is Love identical with that which is common to thee and to thy Son, that is to say, it is the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son. For this same Love is not inferior to thee nor to thy Son; for, so far as thou lovest thyself and the Son, and so far as the Son loves thee and himself, so great art thou and he; this cannot be anything different from thyself and thy Son, which is not unequal to thyself and to him; nor can anything proceed from absolute simplicity, but that itself from which it proceeds. But that which each is, this the whole trinity is, at one and the same time, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, since each is no other than simple and absolute unity, and supreme, absolute simplicity, which can neither be multiplied nor be now one thing and
then another. Moreover, there is but one necessary Being; and He in whom is all good is this one necessary Being; may He be Himself the whole, the One supreme and the only Good.

CHAPTER XXIV. An attempt to conceive the nature and vastness of this good.

Now, O my soul, awake and arouse all thy powers; conceive, so far as thou canst, what and how great is thy good. For if all good things are pleasing, consider attentively how pleasing is that good which contains in itself the sweetness of all other things else that are good, and not such sweetness as we experienced in created things, but such as excels this as far as the Creator is superior to the creature. For if life created is good, how good is life creative? If salvation procured is pleasing, how pleasing is that healing power which has procured all salvation? If that wisdom is lovely which consists in a knowledge of things which are formed, how lovely is the wisdom which has formed all things from nothing? In fine, if things that are pleasing, afford great delight, what and how great the delight which He affords by whom these pleasing things themselves have been created?

CHAPTER XXV. What and how great are the blessings of those who enjoy this good.

O, who shall enjoy this good! What will be possess and what will he not possess? Surely he will have all that he desires, and nothing which he desires not. For here will be good for the body and for the mind, such as eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived. Why, therefore, O vain man, dost thou rove through a variety of things in search of pleasures for thy body, and for thy mind? Fix thy love upon this One Good which comprehends all other good, and it is sufficient. Direct thy desires to this single good which constitutes every species of good, and it is enough. For what dost thou love, O my body? What dost thou desire, O my soul? There, there alone is found whatsoever thou lovest and whatsoever thou desirest. If beauty delights; the righteous shall shine as the sun. If velocity, or strength, or corporeal freedom, which nothing can oppose; they shall be like the angels of God; for the body is even an animal body and it is raised a spiritual body, not indeed by nature, but by divine power. If a long and vigorous life; there is a healthful eternity, and eternal health; for the righteous shall live forever; and the salvation of the righteous is of the Lord. If complete mis-

Digitized by Google
faction; they shall be satisfied when the glory of God shall appear. If satisfaction more than complete; they shall be abundantly satisfied from the fatness of thy house. If melody delights thee; there choirs of angels chant without cessation, their harmonious praises to God. If pleasure unmixed and free from all impurity; thou shalt cause them to drink of the river of thy pleasure, O God. If wisdom; there wisdom itself, even the wisdom of God presents itself to the contemplation of the righteous. If friendship; they love God more than themselves, and each other as themselves; and God loves them more than they love themselves; because they love Him and themselves and each other through Him, and he loves himself and them through himself. If concord; they have all one will, for they have no other than the will of God. If power; the will of the righteous will be as omnipotent as that of God. For as God will be able to do whatever he shall will through himself, so they will be able to do whatsoever they shall will through him; because as their will can differ nothing from his, so his will differ nothing from theirs; and whatsoever he shall will must of necessity come to pass. If honor and riches; God will make his good and faithful servants rulers over many things; nay, he will constitute them his children and they shall be called gods; and where his Son shall be, there shall they be; heirs indeed, of God and joint heirs with Christ. If true security; surely as the righteous will be certain that these good things, or rather that this one good will never, by any means fail them, so they will be certain that they will never of their own accord cast it away, that God who loves them will never deprive them of it against their will, and that there is nothing more powerful than God which can separate them from him against his will and their own. But what and how great is this joy, where such and great good is found? O heart of man, poor and needy heart, inured to trouble and overwhelmed by misery! how wouldst thou rejoice if thou could abound with all this? Ask thy most inward depths if they could contain the joy which would flow from blessedness so great. But surely if any other, whom thou lovest altogether as thyself, should possess the same blessedness, thy joy would be double; for thou wouldst rejoice not less for him than for thyself. But if two, three, or a still greater number should partake of the same, thou wouldst rejoice as much for each one as for thyself, if thou shouldst love each as thyself. Therefore in this perfected love of innumerable happy angels and men, where no one will love each other less than himself, each one will in like manner rejoice for the other as for himself. If, therefore, the heart of man can
scarcely contain its own joy, arising from this great good, how will it find room for the aggregate of such joys? And, indeed, since the more any one loves another, the more he will rejoice in his good; and since in this state of perfect felicity each will love God incomparably more than himself, and all others with him, so he will rejoice more beyond conception, in the felicity of God than in that of himself and of all others with him. But if they shall love God with all the heart, with all the mind and all the soul, so that all the heart and all the mind and all the soul would, notwithstanding, be insufficient for the greatness of their love; surely they will so rejoice with all the heart, with all the mind and with all the soul that the whole heart and mind and soul would be insufficient for the fulness of their joy.

Chapter XXVI. Whether this is the fulness of joy which the Lord hath promised.

My God and my Lord, my Hope, and the Joy of my heart, say to my soul, if this is the joy concerning which thou hast spoken to us through thy Son, ask and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full. For I have found a fulness of joy, and more than a fulness; for after it has filled the entire man, heart, mind, and soul, a fulness of joy beyond all measure will still remain. It is not, therefore, that all this joy will enter into those who rejoice, but all who are to rejoice will enter into this joy. Say, O Lord, say to the inmost heart of thy servant, if this is the joy into which thy servants are to enter, who enter into the joy of their Lord. But surely this joy in which the chosen shall rejoice, neither eye hath seen, nor ear heard, nor hath the heart of man conceived. Therefore, O Lord, I have not as yet told, or even conceived, how great will be their joy who are blest of thee. Their joy will indeed be in proportion to their love, and their love will be in proportion to their knowledge. To what extent, then, O Lord, will they know thee, and how much will they love thee? Surely eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath the heart of man conceived in this life, the extent to which they will know and love thee in the life to come. O Lord, I beseech thee let me enter into the joy of the Lord who is God, three and one, blessed forever! Amen.