did of old, to turn their swords against each other, and thus destroys them by themselves. I would mention only the systems of Kant, Fichte and Schelling. How remarkable that just at a time when human reason is so highly extolled, and the divine word so greatly despised, these systems are in conflict with each, and some have already fallen! Did the preservation of God's truth in the world depend upon human faithfulness, we might well despair. But a divine power sustains it; it conquers by its own irresistible might. When most depressed, as all history shows, it has often risen and crushed its adversaries. We must be then indeed of little faith, if we despair of its final triumph. The grass of human doctrine withereth; the flower of human wisdom fadeth, but the word of the Lord endureth forever.  

---

ARTICLE VI.

REVIEW OF RECENT FRENCH WORKS IN METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE.


In 1836, the Academy of Moral and Political Science of the French Institute, at the suggestion of the Philosophical section, proposed a critical examination of German philosophy, as a subject of competition. The result is contained in the above works.

The competitors were to adhere to the following conditions: 1. By extended analysis to render an account of the principal German

---

1 Verbum Dei manet in aeternum. This was the motto of the Elector of Saxony, and his servants wore its initial letters embroidered in their garments. See a sermon of Sartorius, delivered at the Commemoration of the Third Centennial Anniversary of the Augsburg Confession, on The Glory of the Augsburg Confession.

_Vol. VIII. No. 29._
systems, from Kant to the present time. 2. To give special attention to the system of Kant, with which all the others are connected. 3. To give a critical estimate of the German philosophy; to discuss the principles on which it is founded, the methods it employs, the results it has attained; to seek out what of error and what of truth have met together in it, and to discriminate what, in the last result, may legitimately remain in one form or another of the philosophical movement in modern Germany.

In 1838, six memoirs were presented. They were adjudged insufficient, and the proposals were renewed, with a limit of two years. Seven competitors then offered their works; the section "j'ai eu ce concours fort et brillant;" but no one essay was thought sufficiently complete to fulfill the conditions of the programme. The final judgment was prorogued till 1844; and then three memoirs survived, which are the subject of the Report of De Rémusat.

This report is admirably drawn up; it is a kind of model of what such reports should be; and it is such a document as perhaps only a Frenchman could produce. It is eminently candid, and also strict; there is an air of courteous authority about it which is as it should be; it goes into the subject matter just about enough, and it gives a full account of the memoirs themselves, in all their parts. Honorable mention is made of M. Fortuné Guiran, the author of one of the essays; but the prize is decreed to M. Willm, as having given the most satisfactory exposition of the whole subject. His work is described as solid, faithful and conscientious; executed with care rather than with art; the style is simple, just, and for the most part clear; he shows, however, the traces of familiarity with German idioms, and sometimes has too many words, and too many strange words, though the latter fault is natural to one who is trying to transfer German philosophy into the French tongue. Parts of his work are specially signalized as of unusual ability and novelty—that, for example, upon the philosophy of Hegel. The report concludes, of course, with an assertion of the claims of the French philosophy as compared with the German. The results of the latter, it is said, inspire distrust; they are contrary to that truth which it is the object of philosophy to methodize, and not to annul. Neither in its method, nor in its results, neither as a matter of science nor as a matter of truth can the French philosophy fully accept the German philosophy. "Germany has been unfaithful to that wise and sure method inaugurated by Descartes," whom all philosophic Frenchmen delight to honor. To explain ourselves clearly, and in technical terms, in that
psychological method which does not indissolubly connect ontology with psychology; and in the antilogical doctrines which are not constantly based upon psychology, we cannot recognize the philosophical method of modern times; we do not recognize the fundamental condition of science. "The French philosophy may be enlightened by the lights of the German, and enriched by its ideas, but it ought to remain indissolubly faithful to the fundamental beliefs of human reason, and to the method of Descartes." Such is the constant refrain of the French, ever since Cousin took up the word. What they really mean by their "psychological method," as distinguished from the German method, it is not so easy to ascertain. As distinguished from the method of the materialistic philosophy, it has indeed a sense; but what its significance is as definitely exhibiting the scientific peculiarity and honor of their school, as contrasted with the Germans, we have endeavored in vain to discover in the repeated eulogies of it by Cousin and his zealous adherents. Nor does the exposition which M. De Rémusat gives of it in his preface, aid us much, especially when he assures us that Plato had this psychological point of view; and that the science of man (i.e. psychological science) is the science of reason.

The introduction to this report gives us a kind of sketch of the leading opinions of the chief German philosophers. It is written with clearness; but its criticisms are too general, and its appreciation of the real questions and problems of the German schools, is insufficient. And yet it is perhaps the best general and succinct exposition of these systems which is readily accessible.

The work of M. Willm, inspector of the Academy of Strasburg, and corresponding member of the Institute, is comprised in four large volumes; and it is undoubtedly the most complete, and faithful and candid exposition of German philosophy, to be found outside of that speculative country. The author is not himself a great philosopher, but he is able to understand and describe the systems of great philosophers. He is not remarkable for acuteness, and he is often too vague and general in his criticisms; but in respect to learning, to impartiality, and to general philosophical ability, he is well fitted for the great task which he has here undertaken. It has been the work of years of laborious research. It was begun before the prize of the Academy was instituted, and his last volume was published five years after the award had been decreed to himself.

This work is not only the most important and able in the French literature, upon the subject of German philosophy, but it is also the
only one which can pretend to any degree of thoroughness or completeness. In 1836, M. le baron Barchou de Penhoen published a history of German philosophy, in two volumes; but it is rather a narrative about the systems, than a philosophical exposition of them. The work of L. F. Schön (Transcendental Philosophy, Paris, 1831) is restricted to the system of Kant, and gives only a tolerable view of his Criticisms of the Pure Reason and of the Practical Reason. Cousin's Lectures on Kant (1844) present a rapid and brilliant sketch of the main principles of the Pure Reason, with a skilful attempt at the refutation of them in their bearings on the great interests of morality and religion. Besides this, in his lectures on the history of Moral Philosophy, we have an account of Kant's Ethical system; but he has nowhere attempted even a complete outline of the schemes of the later German philosophers. The work of M. Matter, on Schelling, (1845,) is more valuable as a contribution to the history of literature, than as a philosophical production. M. Ott, doctor of law, published in 1844, a work with the title, "Hegel and the German Philosophy; or, a Critical Exposition and Examination of the Principal Systems of German Philosophy since Kant, and especially of the system of Hegel." His notice of the earlier systems is superficial; it is a book upon and against Hegel, avowedly written in the interest of the Roman Catholic church against Protestantism. "Protestant philosophy," he assures us, "is done; Hegel has given it the last word." And the result of it is "universal confusion." That Hegel's system left M. Ott's mind in this state, is quite probable. Besides these, and some earlier productions, now past use, which give an account of the German systems, the French literature also contains translations of some of the more important works of the German philosophers, all the leading ones of Kant, Fichte's Destination of Man, Destination of the Learned, also his Theory of Science, Schelling's Bruno, System of Transcendental Idealism and Philosophical Fragments, (translated by Willm,) and Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics.

These were the forerunners of Mr. Willm's more arduous attempt, under the impulse of the Academy.

In a long introduction of some eighty pages the author expounds the points of view under which his criticism is conducted; gives a rapid sketch of German philosophy from the time of Leibnitz; and vindicates the general division of his work. He divides the modern German philosophy into three parts; the first, the period of Critical and Transcendental Idealism, comprises Kant, Fichte, and their
great opponent, Jacobi; the second, the period of Absolute and Objective Idealism, gives the systems of Schelling and Hegel, with the dissenting and opposing schemes, especially those of Herbart. Each of these two parts is in two volumes.

The first volume and one third of the second is devoted to Kant, and it is perhaps the most complete and satisfactory portion of the whole work. The extent of it was demanded by the programme, and is justified by the inherent importance and influence of Kant's position and system. The remainder of the second volume is devoted in about equal portions to Fichte and to Jacobi. Upon the dissent of the latter, and upon the merits of his dissent great stress is laid, not more perhaps than is justified by the importance of the principles which Jacobi advocates, but more than is due to the actual influence or the philosophical acuteness of his works. Nearly four hundred pages of the third volume are occupied with Schelling, and the remainder of this, with 350 pages of the fourth volume, gives a full and most valuable account of Hegel's various productions. Under the head of Dissenting and Independent Philosophy, we have the system of Schleiermacher, Bauer and Krause, and even those of Goethe, Jean-Paul and Alexander v. Humboldt. And last of all, Herbart is described as the great representative of the opposing philosophy, and of his various works a better account is given than can be found in any of the histories of modern philosophy. And yet our author's critical estimate of the value of Herbart's system hardly assigns him his due importance; for his philosophy may now be said to be the only system which is making progress in Germany. The works of Drobisch and Hartenstein are contributing to rescue it from the silence, and even contempt, with which its realistic positions have been treated by an overbearing idealism. Under these six names, then, Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, Schelling, Hegel and Herbart, M. Willm recounts the history of modern German speculation. Incidental notices of the writings of their followers, the lesser lights, are scattered through the volumes and the notes.

The whole work is one of an impartial historian of philosophy. The plan uniformly followed is to give a full analysis of every important work of each philosopher. This analysis is often minute, not to say tedious. The main points are fortified by translated citations. At the end of this analysis, M. Willm gives a general view and criticism of the whole system. At the end of the whole work there is the same for the whole. These citations are generally generous and manly in their tone, they have a certain air of independence, but they lack precision. It hardly seems to us that in this respect the work
answers the design of the Academy. The author is worthy of praise, however, in not lending his authority to that glorification of the French philosophical supremacy, with which most of the French accounts of German philosophy abound. His philosophical training has evidently been rather German than French. His position at Strasburg is favorable to an understanding of both the nations. And we think that no one can doubt that he has been more successful in transferring German philosophy into a foreign land than almost any of his predecessors. A comparison of his account of Hegel's work with that of Ott, and even of his exposition of Schelling's system, with that of M. Matter, shows his superiority. Cousin is here his only rival. The German categories do indeed often seem strange in their French garb, but that is unavoidable; and the author has not sacrificed faithfulness to elegance.

Our author is no blind panegyrist, and still less is he a blind reviler of these daring German schemes. He gives to Kant, the honor of freeing philosophy from the fatal grasp of sensualism, and of vindicating the authority of our moral nature, while he dissents from all the main conclusions of his criticism of the Pure Reason. He vindicates Fichte from the charge of an absolute denial of an external reality, and yet is not sparing in his condemnation of him for denying the Divine personality. While he maintains that the primitive form of Schelling's system, that of identity, rests on a gratuitous hypothesis, and contains decided pantheistic tendencies, he dare not deny its influence in elevating our ideas of nature, and in contributing to a more vivid impression of the immanence of God in his works. Of the later system of Schelling he does not give an account; and this would be a serious defect in his work, were it not to be supplied in a future volume, which is promised. His criticism upon Hegel's philosophy is better than that of any other excepting Kant, assisted as he is by the able logical works of Trendelenburg; its defects are carefully stated, its pantheistic tendencies and practical conclusions are opposed; while full credit is given to its immense systematic power, its grasp and comprehensiveness, and to the almost unrivalled philosophical genius and attainments of its originator.

It may be interesting to give a concise statement of the character and results of this great philosophical movement as they are presented by so able an historian. To do this we will abridge and translate some portions of M. Willm's concluding summary.

The insufficiency of sensation (or "sensible experience") to explain the facts of consciousness, and the impotence of materialism in ren-
daring an account of moral and intellectual phenomena are now generally conceded; sensualism, with all its theoretical and practical consequences, is forever banished from science, thanks to the united efforts of the French and the German philosophy. And this triumph of a spiritual philosophy in the nineteenth century is so much the more remarkable, since it is not a simple reaction, but has been obtained at an epoch when the physical sciences are making the most rapid progress, and when thought has been expressed with the greatest freedom.

While Kant recognizes internal and external experience as the only source of all real knowledge, he makes this experience itself to be a product of the activity of mind, and in the general laws and forms of sense and of understanding. Jacobi and Herbert are realists; they maintain the independent reality of external objects; but the former at the same time regards consciousness as the guaranty of this reality, and as the natural seal of moral and religious truths, of which reason is the organ; the latter recognizes the right of intellect to rectify, to modify, and to complete the data of experience according to the demands of logic, and seeks for truth far beyond the empire of the senses.

Fichte has made too much of the subjective element; but he has put beyond question the spontaneity and the power of the subject, of the ego. The results of his system confirm the position that the ego cannot by itself alone comprehend the world, that the real world will escape us if we renounce seeing with the eyes and feeling with the organs that are put at our service. Thus it is evident that besides the thinking subject it is necessary to admit the existence of an independent object; which is however in relation and harmony with the ego, acting upon it and ready in turn to be acted upon.

Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are idealists; yet in different degrees. Kant professes what he calls the critical or transcendental idealism, and he protests against the system of Berkeley. His philosophy is idealistic in respect to phenomena, and not in respect to things as they are in themselves. The idealism of Fichte is more radical, and this philosopher was able to keep himself from nihilism and from atheism only on the basis of that same faith in our moral reason, by which Kant re-established the truths which he regarded as theoretically problematical. The idealism of Schelling and of Hegel is absolute and objective, not like that of Berkeley, but in a wholly new sense; it might be more justly called rationalism or absolute intellectualism. They do not deny the real existence of the external
world, but they present it as the issue of mind or spirit, as made what it is by spiritual ideas, which alone are primitively and essentially true and real. They admit experience, but they say that this only gives us the surface of things, which are not at the bottom that which they appear as immediately known through the senses; their endeavor is, if we may so express it, to intellectualize experience by means of rational intuition and by the necessary evolutions of sovereign thought.

Kant assigns to reason, as the faculty of cognition, authority only in the way of criticism, and pretends to restrict it, so far as real knowledge is concerned, to the limits of the phenomenal world; yet he attributes to it a relative authority as a logical faculty, but an absolute value only in the form of practical reason. The rationalism of Fichte is more decided than that of Kant, but, not being able to explain the real world by the movements of thought alone, he denies it in theory and admits it on the faith of practical reason alone.

Jacobi, with all his distrust of discursive speculation, of the speculation of the understanding, which wrongly applies the maxims of experience to matters metaphysical, is yet a rationalist in according entire confidence to the fundamental convictions of man's rational nature, to consciousness fertilized and developed by observation and thought.

Herbert is a rationalist in conceding to the intellect, not the right indeed of abstracting from facts and of exercising itself in the void, but that of interpreting facts of making them complete by analogy and of transforming them by reflection.

Schelling and Hegel, in fine, make human reason equal to the divine intelligence, make it the depository of eternal ideas, and pretend, by the necessary evolution of thought, to comprehend and reconstruct the universe, the natural and the moral order of things.

Rationalism is then everywhere dominant in the German philosophy; it is the soul of it, both when it claims to explain the world a priori, and when it acknowledges the necessity of starting from the data of experience.

In respect to religious questions, Kant, Jacobi and Herbert are theists; but Kant recognizes only a moral theology, Jacobi only a theology of feeling, and Herbert only a physico-theology. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are pantheists, yet with differences. Fichte professes a sort of moral pantheism. The pantheism of Schelling is more material;\(^1\) that of Hegel is altogether idealistic or logical.

---

\(^1\) This can only apply to the first form of Schelling's system, and even in application to that it is hardly an intelligible statement.
That gross pantheism which makes matter divine, and which is the equivalent of atheism, is foreign to all these systems, and the immoral and irreligious consequences deducible from it were far from the thoughts of their authors.

As to the immortality of the soul, it appears incompatible with the pantheism of Schelling and of Hegel. Yet Schelling himself and a fraction of the school of Hegel have endeavored to reconcile personal immortality with pantheistic principles. Jacobi believed in it with all his soul; Kant made it a necessary condition of the moral law, certain as this law itself; and Herbart finds this dogma so simple and so evident, that it seems to him superfluous to prove it; it is the necessary result of his doctrine respecting the soul, which is, that it is in its essence simple, and hence eternal and imperishable.

In respect to ethics, Kant, Jacobi and Herbert may be placed on one side, over against Schelling and Hegel; Fichte occupies the centre between the two parties. The ethical principle of Kant is wholly rational; that of Jacobi wholly from feeling; and the morals of Herbert are derived from both reason and feeling. Fichte advocates a kind of mystic morals, yet strong and generous, full at once of personal dignity and of self-denial, of independence and of devotedness. In the idealism of Schelling and of Hegel the practical reason is absorbed by the theoretical, and morals properly speaking occupy a secondary place. The absolute precept of pantheistic idealism is this—know thyself; and the whole destination of man, in this system, seems to be to arrive at a knowledge of himself as absolute mind.

Moral freedom is not equally guaranteed by all these systems. According to Kant, liberty is the only immediate rational fact, the only law which we know of the “intelligible world.” According to Jacobi it is so certain, that it is his scale for measuring the truth of systems. He is ready to reject without further examination every scheme of fatalism. Fichte makes freedom to be the very essence of spirit, the principle of self. Though Herbert does not deny liberty, yet he does not consider it as a primitive fact, but he makes it the product of the development of the intellect, of the concurrence and mutual action of ideas. Schelling and Hegel profess an intellectual fatalism. Liberty presupposes an individuality, a real personality, such as pantheism does not admit.

As to the philosophy of nature, Kant, Schelling and Hegel explain every thing dynamically; opposite to them is Herbert, whose physics are entirely constructed on mechanical principles, although he grants that such principles are not sufficient to explain all the phenomena of the organic world.
All these philosophers have had, and still have, numerous adherents; it is then natural to suppose that there is in each system a fund of truth; for though error may seduce for a time, it cannot long carry the best minds in its train.

There was a time when almost the whole philosophy of Germany was of the school of Kant; some were drawn along by the force of the current, but others by their convictions, and among these were men of the highest distinction. That part of his system which deserved their assent, is that which will be abiding—and that is, the idea of a criticism of the human understanding, and the general spirit of his ethics. Such a criticism of the nature and limits of our knowledge founded on an examination of the primitive elements of reason, upon an analysis of consciousness, will ever be the obligatory beginning of philosophy. Such an examination will always lead to the result that the system of our knowledge reposes upon an intellectual basis; that the “forms” of our knowledge are furnished by the understanding. From this it is not necessary to conclude with Kant, that all our knowledge is subjective, but only that our knowledge of the world is from our point of view alone, limited and inadequate indeed, yet true in itself though incomplete. And as to Kant’s ethical system, the general formula may be modified, and its rigor at-tempered, but the sovereign principle presented by him in all its purity and majesty cannot longer be misconceived. Kant has conquered forever, at least in the view of science, the ethics of prudence and self-love. His indirect proof of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul, as necessary conditions of the moral law, will also remain, though in other forms; and his idea of an universal and just state, as the providential end of history, will also abide. His theory of the sublime and beautiful [to which he was instigated by Burke] has been the commencement of a new system of Aesthetics, not false but incomplete, for beauty and sublimity are in the objects as well as in ourselves.

In Fichte we have a singular union of an heroic idealism with an ethical system of pure self-denial; no one has more strongly insisted upon the sovereignty of self; no one has carried farther a regard to duty; and if, for a time, the moral order was his God, he at least showed that he was ready to sacrifice everything to the object of his worship. His idealism will remain as a testimony how far the human mind can go in the attempt to draw everything from its own substance—a proof both of its activity and of its inefficiency. To have the right to profess realism, we must have tried the way of idealism according to Fichte.
Besides the examination of the power of self, which was the aim of Fichte, and of the pure reason which was the object of Kant, we have in Jacobi an evidence of the necessity of an analysis of our actual consciousness, illustrated also, by the Scotch and French schools of philosophy. Though this will not give us a system of philosophy, yet it is the necessary basis of such a system. Here are revealed our fundamental religious, and moral and aesthetic feelings, the disinterested love of truth and science, all those elementary dispositions which go to make up the rational nature of man. Jacobi did not make a system; but his merit consists in having constantly opposed the voice of consciousness to the aberration of the philosophy of his times.

Schelling and Hegel have exaggerated a true principle, and that is the harmony between our spirits and the external world, between the subject and the object, the concord of legitimate thought and of objective realities. This principle is tacitly recognized by every positive philosophy. It is perverted in the doctrine of absolute ideality, and in the pretension that man can attain a divine and absolute science, and reconstruct the universe by a dialectic process. The idea of Schelling, in his philosophy of nature, of an immanent and dynamic principle, by which the universe is made an organic whole, is indeed only an ideal, and it may not ever be absolutely proved and traced out; but still it is by the light of such an ideal that we must study nature; for only thus can we have a science and a progressive science of nature, instead of a map of facts without inherent unity. And this may be done without ceasing to consider each thing as having its relative independence, without seeing in man nothing above a production of animal life, and while we still admit that God is the cause of all the order of the universe.

The idea of Hegel is still more vast; it is to the whole of philosophy that which Schelling's is to the philosophy of nature. Hegel has the merit of having laid hold of the problem of speculative science in all its grandeur, and having attempted to carry it through all the departments of human thought. Such an idea of unity and system as he propounds, has always been the soul of philosophy, though it can never be absolutely realized. There is, indeed, no true philosophy of history, without the supposition that the human race is advancing to realize some great end, that of universal freedom, of a perfect state. There is no true history of philosophy, if we see in its causes only a fortuitous succession of systems. We may not adopt the end or the scheme which Hegel propounds, either for phi-
lesophy or for history; but we say, that history can be rationally conceived of only as a progress towards some one end, and that the history of philosophy is instructive only as we view it as a constant means of arriving at real truth.

The philosophy of Herbert is contributing to the overthrow of the purely idealistic systems, and may be the transition to the re-establishment of a veritable realism.

Idealism, as an absolute and final system, must be abandoned; but only in its ruins, and in part from its ruins will a new system be reconstructed. This philosophy will not be the old dogmatism which Herbert has striven to re-establish; it will be a realism tempered by idealism, a rational realism, founded, not on the dogma of the real identity of subject and object, of thought and being, but upon the harmony which God himself has established between our reason and the external world, between intelligent nature and real nature, between the reason which is in us and that divine reason of which the universe is the expression.

Such is the substance of the conclusion, the final summary, of these elaborate volumes. Though many points here are stated too indefinitely, and though others are not at all peculiar to the German system, but a part of all philosophy, yet it seems to us that the summary is upon the whole cautious and candid. It may appear cold, in view of the theological and moral questions which are at stake; but the clear, intellectual dissent of a candid historian of philosophy, is a more influential authority against a false dogma than many an impulsive invective of those who know not the difficulty of the problems, especially when it is addressed to the members of the French Institute.

Of all the works that have appeared upon the German philosophy, this one is to be most commended. The account of these bold and difficult systems in the able and popular History of Modern Philosophy, by J. D. Morell, is the least satisfactory portion of that interesting work; it is less thorough, and the results of less independent investigation than are his sketches of either the French or the English schools.

M. Willm promises another volume to complete his work, which shall give an account of the later philosophy of Schelling; of the various parties in Hegel's school; the rage of Bauer and the desperation of Feuerbach; of the disciples of Herbart and Fries; of Reinhold in Jena; and Ulrici in Halle; of Weisse and the younger Fichte; of Beneke in Berlin, and others still. The whole is to be
completed by a bibliographical review of those works in German philosophy since the time of Kant, which still retain their value in the various departments of science. And he trusts that the final impression left upon the reader will be, the conviction, that "in the country of Kant, sound reason will eventually triumph over the vagaries of speculative imagination and the excesses of a haughty dialectic, which can only be done by constantly putting ourselves anew in the right position for hearing the voice of consciousness and knowing the eternal interests of humanity."

ARTICLE VI.

COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND AND THIRD CHAPTERS OF THE GOSPEL OF MATTHEW.

From the German of H. A. W. Meyer. By B. B. Edwards.

[Dr. Meyer is consistorial counsellor at Hanover, and pastor primarius of the city church. Nine Parts of his Commentary on the New Testament are published, embracing the four Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians and Philemon. Owing to the demand for new editions of the earlier parts, and the pressure of other engagements, Dr. M. has called to his aid Prof. Huther, of Schwerin, who has prepared a Commentary on the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, and Dr. Lüneemann, of Göttingen, who has published a Commentary on the Epistles to the Thessalonians. Second editions of Meyer's commentaries on the first three Gospels, and on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, have appeared. The later volumes, and especially the second editions, exhibit very marked improvement both in ability in expounding the text, and in orthodox views and feelings. In the Preface to the Commentary on the Colossians, 1848, the author writes: "It is the spirit of God which quickens the church; and it is the old, simple truth of the Gospel, which makes the church free, and one and invincible. On this rock, on which the church is placed, will the waves and foam of the spirits who affect another gospel than that of Nazareth, break and disappear." "The stock remains the

Vol. VIII. No. 29.