ARTICLE X.

RECENT ENGLISH WORKS ON LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

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These works are not all of equal value, but they are all interesting, as indications of the direction now taken by thinking men in England. They show that logic and metaphysics are far from dying out on English soil; that, on the other hand, they are pursued with greater thoroughness than for a long time previous, and are held in higher estimation, both in respect to their value in the training of the scholar, and in their relation to the fundamental principles of the sciences and theology. The advance in this respect since Whately published what may be called his vindication of Logic, is very perceptible and gratifying. Such works as Herschell on Natural Philosophy, Whewell on the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Mill's System of Logic, Hamilton's edition of Reid, Morell's History of Speculative Philosophy, etc., are all tokens of a more thorough and less timid philosophical spirit. In this country, the study of logic has for the last generation been almost unknown, and it is not surprising that it has been gravely proposed to dispense with it altogether and to substitute in its stead, as the regulator of the mind, intuition by the emotions! We may possibly be in the right in this judgment, but it may not be amiss for us, to be informed, of the differing judgments of our neighbors in England and on the Continent. In Germany, logic has for seventy-five years at least, held its deserved honor, and tasked the energies of all its severest thinkers. In England, it seems to be rising rather than falling in the public esteem. In both England and Germany, the relations of logic to science, or of thoughts to things, is occupying the attention of
many earnest men; as, with us, the kindred question of the relation of logic to theology. We propose to settle it by a contemptuous discharge of logic, as an inadequate and incompetent assistant, who will rather hinder than help us. Our older, perhaps not our wiser neighbors, seek by a more thorough study of logic itself, and by the light which logic affords, to trace distinctly the line between thoughts and things, between our conceptions and the realities which they represent; between things as expressed in language and things as they exist in nature.

The "Lectures on Logic" is a small volume, which is designed as a manual of formal logic, or logic as it is concerned with the forms of reasoning, as distinguished from "the method of their application to the various departments of knowledge." In style it is direct and condensed. It enters, without apology or introduction, upon the several topics of which it treats, defines and expounds each one in its turn, with perhaps a single illustration, and then leaves the subject for the next in order. As a manual for a beginner, it is of course too brief and synthetical; but as a text book for familiar oral instruction, or for a thorough review of the definitions of formal logic, it is unsurpassed and unequalled by any work that we know of in the language. What adds greatly to its value, is the fact, that the terminology of the Latin logicians is used and explained, and thus is secured to the student the double advantage of being trained to exact precision in nomenclature, and of becoming familiar with the origin of not a few terms which have passed into common usage. One or two other peculiarities we have noticed. The relation of Terms and Propositions to things, of the form to the matter, is constantly kept in mind, so that without discussion or illustration, simply by a sharp exactness of statement, the student is continually warned of the fact. The substance of more than one long and wordy chapter in Mill's system, is expressed within the compass of a single brief page, and almost compressed into the brief utterance of a definition. Under Reasoning, induction is treated of as well as deduction, and the various "methods," as they are called, as briefly defined and explained. The application of the figures of the syllogism is explained by an exhibition of the kind of reasoning to which each is appropriate; and even "analogy" is reduced to definition, and its canons as a positive and a negative argument are given, with the uses of each.

The "Essay on Logical Method" proposes to itself another problem, and that is, to discuss "Method or the use of Logic." The object is "to view Logic at once by the light of the past and the present; to inquire, in the first place, what ideas respecting its nature were formerly entertained, and what questions originated from their adoption; how one race of thinkers profited both by the knowledge and the mistakes of those pre-
ceeding them, and handed down the results of their labors to their successors, not without a still abiding mixture of error; and this done to show how as Logic has always of her own free will testified to the truth of Science, Science in her turn bears unintentional but not involuntary witness to the truth and utility of Logic." After thus defining his object, the author offers some just and forcible remarks on the uses of the study of method as well as upon its dangers. The mere collection of facts, which he cannot apply, may be of little use to himself or others; but he will also do little harm to either. It is not so with him who trusts to method, "unprovided with facts and without the intention of acquiring them." "On some of the first principles which recommend themselves to his own mind, or are taken on trust from those whom he admires, • • he fastens his belief."—"That which he thus invents he believes, but this belief rests not on objective truth, nor on the evidence of his fellow-creatures, nor on God, but on himself. Unbelief sits at the right hand of such a faith. A self-made Damocles, he sees the sword of skepticism suspended over him by a hair." If facts do not agree with his system, "he deserts his system; and what has he left?"

The first chapter is on the ancient view of the relation of Logic to Science. In a brief notice of the earlier schools of philosophy, the author shows the origin of the name, and the fact, that it was till the time of Aristotle applied both to the truths and facts on which the rules of reasoning were founded and to the rules of reasoning themselves. Between the two, Aristotle drew a dividing line, applying Analytic, to what we call formal Logic, and leaving Logic with its more general signification. Plato blended the two, and it was only the later Peripatetics who developed the true view of Logic, that it is only the instrument of thought. As the ancients failed to attain to a clear perception of the nature of Logic, it is not surprising that it yielded meagre results. Chapter II. is entitled, "The Mediaeval view of the relation of Logic to Science." In this, the author gives a brief, but an exceedingly clear and satisfactory exhibition of the Scholastic Philosophy, showing why its Logic, though so refined and acute, was yet altogether unproductive, and demonstrating that with their views of the principles furnished by Aristotle and the truths revealed in the Scriptures, they were necessarily shut up to these barren results. Chapter III. is entitled, "Nominalism and Realism," as a necessary part of the history of the gradual escape from these Logical forms into some insight of their relation to things as they are. Next we have in Chapter IV., "The Modern view of the relation of Logic to Science;" in which the principles of Bacon are discussed; and in Chapter V. a disquisition "On the different Modern Schools of Logic." In this, the opinions are first discussed of those who contend that Logic has to do with
language only as Hobbes, Horne Tooke and Condillac, then the position of Mr. J. Stuart Mill who considers it as more safe and practical, to regard it as having to do with things. With this Chapter, the author concludes the historical view. He then proceeds to the direct consideration of the nature and office of Logical Method. This he prosecutes in the nine Chapters following, which are entitled, "On Logical Method in general. On the Method of Science. On Scientific Ideas. On Classification and Definition. On the Gradations of Science. On Method in Art. On Method in Morality. On Analysis and Synthesis. On the connection of Method with formal Logic." In all these Chapters striking thoughts are expressed in a felicitous manner, but the expectations raised by the perusal of the historical criticisms of the views of others are not sustained when the writer proceeds to grapple with the subject itself. At all events, the difficulties are not all solved, nor is the subject exhausted. He concludes with the following inquiries, which will be recognised by some of our readers, as indicating a tendency similar to that avowed in this country. "And how far is this fair Mother of Sciences [Theology] like her children? Do the same formal conditions which bind them, bind her also? If they do not, has she another Method of her own; her own laws of investigation, and standards of truth and falsehood? If they do, how does the nature of the high and mysterious subjects with which she deals affect and modify their application? If again, she neither conforms to the ordinary rules of speculation, nor has extraordinary canons of her own, how can the body of truth which she presents, be fairly studied at all? How can the human mind, prone, not by its perverseness and obliquity but by a right instinct and a deep principle of nature, to seek for order and system, find its highest occupation in resting on details which may not be combined, statements which may not be compared, examples from which no principles may be extracted, facts which refuse to incorporate themselves with doctrines?

"He will do a good service to Truth and Christianity and the Church who shall face these questions fairly; and in grave earnest and after all due preparation venture in a strength not his own, to treat of a subject which I have not ventured to handle—the application of method to Theology." These inquiries have a significance at Oxford which they do not have elsewhere, but they also suggest a subject for discussion, for which the times and the minds of men are ripe with us.

The volume "On the Development of the Understanding," is altogether unpretending in its character, and may not be very rich in its actual contributions to the science of the human mind. It is however quite refreshing to meet with an English author, who dares to follow a method of his own, and to pursue a course of inquiry, with the air and the aim of a man, who thinks for himself. The work does not profess to be a complete and ex-
haunting "system," nor to be a "manual" for the instructor and the class room. It is only an Essay starting from a point well defined and proceeding through a distinct series of topics, with a single object. The first Section is entitled, "Scope of the Work." In this section Mr. W. first contrasts the superiority of Mental over Physical Science with the Ancients, and then asks, how it is to be accounted for, that this order of superiority has been precisely reversed with the moderns. The answer to this inquiry he finds in the fact that a precise and well grounded method of procedure has been applied to Physics, while no such method has been rigidly adhered to, and thoroughly applied, in the study of the mind.

Every object of thought may be considered in two lights; first in its relations to other objects, and secondly, with reference to its relations with the thinking being himself. In the second light we ask, "by the exercise of what faculties, by what train of mental action is it discerned amidst the multifarious scene, which is in a constant course of representation in the region of sense, or among the objects already developed in the Understanding." This last is the true method, which is coincident with the object proposed by Locke in his Essay. "Unfortunately Locke has not carried out his system with the rigor necessary to wring from it an authoritative decision in many of the great questions respecting the foundations of knowledge." The object of the author is, to apply the method of Locke to the solution of these unsettled questions. Lecture II. is on "Sensation and Thought." The difference between the two is thus indicated.

Thought is not exclusively appropriated to objects which are absent, but it accompanies sensation by being employed with it, on those which are present. In sensation, the attention is directed to the phenomenon before us. In thought we compare the present with the past. We regard both as a single thing. How do we pass in this way from sensation to thought? By the impression of resemblance. This perception of resemblance in the matured understanding is spontaneous; much more then should it be so, in the first beginning of its activity. From this distinction, the author proceeds to account for the fact of perception, or the distinguishing of the self and the not-self, and also to explain the origin of the distinction of substance and attributes. Section III. on "Number," carries forward the same course of thought. The perception of resemblance, involves that of difference, and in the perception of things as different originates the idea of Number. This is relative. The first object is apprehended without this feeling of resemblance to any other. The second is recognised as like the first, and is attended with a recollection of the first as being unattended with the discernment of such likeness. Hence the origin of first and second, and so on. The author then proceeds to discuss the following subjects. IV. Body and Space. V. Cause. VI. Free Will. VII. and VIII. Position. IX. Figure. X. Reasoning.
XI. Right and Wrong. To give an account of the opinions of the author on these points, and to show how he develops these notions, would require us to exceed the limits prescribed, and almost to copy the entire volume. It is enough to say that the method is novel and fresh, when the opinions are familiar and old, and that in more than one instance truths not familiar are explained and illustrated in a manner, that is striking and original. It is quite refreshing to the student of dry abstractions, often rendered doubly dry from being announced in the same stereotype phraseology, and enforced by the same out-worn illustrations, to meet with a book like this, which is at once thoughtful, condensed, and striking, without being also affected, obscure and ambitious.

"Ideas, etc." is a book quite as striking in its way, though the way does not seem to us quite so good. It is written in English by a Frenchman, and is designed to serve as a pendant to a previous work on the "Philosophy of Geology." We give its title at length. "Ideas. Essay the first; On Causation and fundamental Ideas; or Common sense versus the Kantian, Berkelyan, Scottish, and Whewellian Doctrines." It is divided into fifteen chapters. In the first, the author informs us that in his previous work he had advanced the opinion, that in the application of the idea of Causation, it must not be considered as involving a priori the constant uniformity of the antecedent fact. Otherwise as appears from the subsequent discussion, the evidence, furnished by Geological phenomena of the interruption of the constant uniformities of nature, by the interposition of a power purely creative, could not be received. He then considers the doctrine of Sir John Herschell, who derives the notion of power and of causation, from the consciousness of effort in the exertion or the resistance of force. This he rejects, as introducing into the science of nature, an element altogether extraneous and impertinent, but as it seems to us without exactly comprehending what Herschell intended by the doctrine, or the way in which he could apply it. He then attacks the a priori view of Whewell, and in order to explode his views of the origin of the idea of Cause, is led to discuss his account of Space, Time, Motion, Number and Substance. After a rambling discussion of these topics and of the fundamental view which they all involve, he proceeds to consider at some length the doctrines of Hume, Reid, and Dugald Stewart, and then those of Aristotle, Kant, Coleridge, Fichte and Berkely. He then brings before us his own view, to make way for which he had exploded all the theories of these celebrated philosophers. We derive the notion of Cause from our observation of the course of nature, or from actual experience. "Every fact is preceded by its appropriate antecedent fact, and vice versa." "Cause is the anterior fact; Effect is the fact which follows, and the idea of necessity has no other origin than the observation
of the constant repetition of the same relation between antecedent and consequent facts." But though Hume was in the main correct, in his view, he was wrong in requiring that the same fact should invariably precede its consequent, as is proved by the record of facts that are laid up in the rocky tablets which Geology uncovers and interprets, in which is plainly to be read, that facts have come into being, without being preceded by their common natural antecedents. Their antecedent and cause is therefore God. The whole discussion, beginning with its announcement, followed through its acute, ingenious, yet unjust attack upon his opponents, and terminating in a result so theistic, strikes one as decidedly singular. The book is worth reading however. In one other respect it is altogether by itself. Surely never was a discussion on "Causation and Fundamental ideas" served up in a volume so daintily executed as this. The paper is of the finest quality, the type is exquisitely cut, the binding is in the brightest red, and the edges of the leaves are gilded as if the book were prepared for the boudoir of a luxurious lady, rather than for the smoky recess of an angular metaphysician.

If "Ideas, etc." is a singular book, "Exact Philosophy" will be pronounced both singular and amusing. Who this H. F. Halle, P. LL. D. may be we do not know; but if he may be judged by the account which he gives of himself in a self-glorying Preface of some twenty-six pages, he is certainly a very wonderful man—a man far before his age, and whom his age treats with no greater regard than it treated Lord Bacon and sundry other philosophers in their life time. What his Exact Philosophy is, we cannot learn; for Books first and second contain little more than a general onslaught on the chemists, physiologists and philosophers of the day, who adopt the principles of the atheistic and material school. The most conspicuous objects of their attack are G. H. Lewes, Auguste Comte and J. Stuart Mill. This attack is not wanting in ability. In its argumentative portions it is able, and in the exposure which it makes of the verbal pretensions and the real hollowness of these influential writers, it is forcible and severe. The only thing to be regretted is that while the critic makes the subjects of his remark occasionally objects of contempt; he makes himself still more decidedly an object of laughter; and by his Quixotic and pedantic effusions, makes us wonder, under what "disastrous influence" of the stars his intellect was constructed and trained. One cannot however read his exposé of the current philosophizing of the day, without a feeling of horror at its mingled superficiality, pretension and blasphemy; nor can we contrast the occasional glimpses of a sounder and more religious science, which the author would defend, without wishing that his self-knowledge and intellectual dignity were equal to his acuteness and his zeal for the truth.