

scholars may confidently rely even in the minutest points,—next follows, with the “Probable Ancient Pronunciation.” In treating of the latter, he has been guided by ancient authorities, where they existed, and in cases wherein he has been obliged to offer his own conjectures, he has followed the dictates of a sound judgment, and we are the more inclined to receive his hypotheses as he seems neither to make them unnecessarily nor to substitute them for facts.

This work, though unpretending in its form, is very valuable and trustworthy,—valuable as ably discussing questions, which meet the student at the very beginning of his studies and constantly recur as he proceeds,—trustworthy as coming from one of the most accomplished and judicious Greek scholars now living.

We have here given a mere syllabus of its contents, but propose in some future number to examine the work in detail, and to consider the questions of which it treats.

ARTICLE XII.

REVIEW OF OWEN'S THUCYDIDES.

By James Hadley, Assistant Professor of Greek in Yale College.

The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides; according to the text of L. Dindorf; with Notes, for the use of Colleges, by John J. Owen, Principal of the Cornelius Institute. New York: Leavitt, Trow & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 688.

THUCYDIDES is not the earliest Grecian writer to whom we give the name *historian*; yet the earliest of historians could not have been more thoroughly original. Alike in the conception and the execution of his work he shows himself independent of his predecessors. He has his own notions as to the scope and aim of history. Others had been mythographers, annalists, story-tellers; it was his purpose to be something widely different. He could not content himself with reproducing the mere form and surface of the past, in a bare chronicle of outward actions and appearances; he sought to account for the past, to show how that which had been came to be. Nor in this attempt was he satisfied with attributing everything singular or mysterious to

an ever ready supernatural machinery. In the public life of States he saw the product of natural causes, the work of human agency, in which the common character of man is seen under the modifying influences of diverse political conditions. Man acting through the social and civil forms which man has organized to shape his action—this is the great idea of Thucydides. Hence his continual eagerness to get behind the outward act, to bring out the circumstances and the motives in which it had its origin, and thus to show that it was nothing capricious, arbitrary, unaccountable, but the very thing which was to be expected from such a character in such a situation. Hence too his confident belief that what has been will be; history, having its foundation in the nature of man, which is always essentially the same, must present essentially the same phenomena from age to age. With this view he does not hesitate about applying to the past the maxims of the present, as in his exhibition of heroic times; nor does he doubt that the present will reappear in the future, and so writes his book as a *κρήνη ἐς αἰεὶ*, that men may derive instruction from its precedents in every similar concurrence of events. Thus history—historic writing—is in his view the past giving lessons to the future; and its proper effect, to make that future not essentially different from the past, but only wiser and better.

Original in his conception of history, Thucydides is no less original in historical criticism. Unlike his predecessors, he does not receive with simple faith everything which he has heard. He balances evidence; he weighs authorities; he discusses probabilities; he is ever on his guard against deception. Everything claiming to be fact is subjected to a strict examination; and rigorously set aside unless it can make good its claim. In Thucydides, cautious, penetrating and exact, the modern historiographer finds his best authority, his main reliance for the earlier times of Greece. Other writers of antiquity may be fuller in their statements; in many instances they do no more than make the darkness visible; but when Thucydides, though with but half a sentence, touches on any subject, a ray of light has darted into the gloom. The historian, plodding wearily along, as through a quagmire, unable to discover solid footing—if he chance to find a passage of Thucydides lying in his course—feels that he has at length secured one firm spot, on which he can abide with confidence, and from which he can form some judgment as to what is safest in his future progress.

In the Peloponnesian war Thucydides found a subject every way worthy of his powers. It was a crisis in his country's history. The annals of the preceding half century are chiefly occupied with the

causes that led to it and the preparations that were made for it; those of the century following are little more than a development of its results. We see here Athens and Sparta, the leading States of Greece, well matched though most dissimilar, alike only in ambition, contending for the Hegemony; grouped around them are the minor States, bound to their principals by the most various ties of love, fear, hope, gratitude, necessity, and sustaining almost every relation of alliance or dependence. The contest is long continued; disputed on both sides with desperate valor and unfaltering determination. All the resources of all the belligerents are exhausted in the struggle. The war is full of enterprise, intrigue, vicissitudes of fortune, unexpected success, unexpected failure. Never, perhaps, has so much of political experience, been crowded within such narrow limits both of space and time. An action so various and complex, so critical, far reaching in its antecedents and its consequences, was fitted to give full employment for the highest order of historical abilities.

Thucydides lived, mature in years and judgment, through the whole period of the war; an actor in some of its scenes, an attentive observer of all. It has generally been assumed, that he waited for its termination, before commencing the composition of his work. On this point, however, Ullrichs, in his *Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thucydides*, has recently put forward a new theory. The Peloponnesian war consists of two parts, separated by the peace of Nicias, an armistice rather than a peace, which was concluded in the year 421, and subsisted, in name if not in fact, till the Sicilian expedition in 415. Observing now, that in the first books of his history, Thucydides makes no allusion to the Sicilian expedition or any of the events which followed it, while he repeatedly speaks of the war as continuous from first to last—Ullrichs supposes that he began to write after the peace of Nicias, regarding this as the conclusion of the contest, and not anticipating the speedy renewal of hostilities—that under this impression he wrote some three books and a half, when the war broke out afresh; that then recognizing in these two struggles only different acts of the same great drama, he waited for the catastrophe, after which he resumed the work and brought it to the point at which it now breaks off.

Dr. Owen's present volume includes nearly all that portion of the history, which is set off as of earlier composition, in the theory of Ullrichs. We have here the first three books with an extended commentary; the text occupies 178 pages, the notes, about 500 more.

Some may perhaps object to this amount of annotation as excessive. Yet all will probably admit that, if a copious commentary is allowable

in any school book, it is proper in a school edition of Thucydides. From earliest times he has been regarded as a difficult author. His weight of meaning, his sudden transitions, his extraordinary freedom of construction, his frequent *anacolutha*, his affectation of antiquity, must have made his books anything but light reading to the Athenians of his own day. And Cicero declares that he found the speeches of Thucydides almost unintelligible. A Greek writer, whom Cicero could hardly understand, will not be very easy to the American school-boy. He will be continually stumbling upon difficulties, which he cannot overcome, and therefore should not be required to overcome by his own unaided efforts. If he is not to grope blindly and wearily from page to page, lost in a labyrinth of uncertainties, disgusted with himself and his author, it is a point of indispensable necessity that he should be supplied with constant illustration both of words and things.

We would not indeed be understood as denying, that the work before us might have been compressed to some extent without lessening its value. There is a good deal of annotating in it, which we cannot but regard as otiose, though fully sensible how difficult it is to draw the line between things that may be of use to somebody and things that cannot be of use to anybody. Even where the matter is of unquestionable importance, the style of the editor often seems to lack condensation. Rigorous retrenchment would have made it more distinct, pointed and effective. The writer who is sparing of his words will be careful in selection; and a loss in quantity may be more than compensated by increased intensity. In this particular there are few commentators, who might not learn from Krüger, the latest editor of Thucydides, whose learned notes present rare models of perspicuous brevity.

Much has been accomplished within the last thirty years for the study of Thucydides. The labors of Bekker and Poppo have made the text one of the best which we possess among the remains of classical antiquity; so that, as Dr. Arnold thought, no great improvement is to be looked for from future criticism. At the same time a crowd of annotators, chief of whom are Poppo, Göller, Arnold, Krüger, have furnished satisfactory solutions for almost all the difficulties which beset the interpretation. A large mass of valuable materials was thus placed at the disposal of the American editor; and Dr. Owen has shown that he is acquainted with these materials and understands their value. He has used them abundantly, but not indiscriminately, exercising an independent judgment, and keeping constantly in view the circumstances and wants of the class for whom his work is intended.

Fronting the title-page is a very neat map of Greece, reduced from Kiepert's, representing the state of the country at the opening of the Peloponnesian war. In the notes, too, Dr. Owen has not overlooked the geography of his author. On this head he acknowledges his obligations to Col. Leake, whose merits in relation to the topography of Greece no one will deny; though when Dr. Owen following Bloomfield, calls him "the first geographer of our age," he makes an assertion, which, to say the least, is somewhat hazardous.

One of the most striking features of the present work is the attention everywhere paid to the train of thought, narrative and argument in the original. Each chapter is introduced in the commentary by a full analysis of its contents; and in many cases, a series of chapters, forming a separate whole, has a special introduction, defining its subject, and presenting a general conspectus of its structure. The style and mode of treatment of the editor in this department of his labors, are fairly enough represented, in faults as well as merits, by the following remarks, which usher in the Funeral Oration of Pericles.

"CHAPTERS XXXV—XLVI. These chapters contain the celebrated funeral oration of Pericles, which has ever been considered a masterpiece of eloquence, whether regard be had to the grandeur of the theme, the patriotic and liberal sentiments advanced, or the simplicity and dignity of its style. The exordium is contained in chap. 35; then having briefly announced the subject-matter of his discourse (chap. 36), he passes to a consideration of the internal policy, habits, customs, refinement, learning, liberality of the Athenians, for the existence and perpetuity of which the departed worthies had fought and died (chaps. 37—41). He then eulogizes more directly the persons whose funeral rites they are celebrating, and exhorts the Athenians to imitate their virtues, bravery and patriotism (chaps 42, 43); the parents and relatives of the deceased are then addressed in words of sympathy and encouragement, after which the orator closes with a brief peroration (chaps. 44—46).

"No adequate justice can be done in a brief abstract to this noble effort of one of the greatest minds which Greece or any other country ever produced, and it is commended, therefore, without further remark to the student as well worthy of his careful and frequent perusal. The more it is read and studied, the more prominent will be its grand and towering dimensions, the more impressive the noble sentiments with which it abounds. Let no one who would put himself under its full influence, cease his efforts to master it until he can read it fluently at a sitting, without the aid of grammars, lexicons or annotations. Then as he reads, he will find his sympathies with the theme and the

occasion awakened, his emotions enkindled, his soul inspired with high and generous sentiments, and he will rise from its perusal with a more ardent love of country, more liberal, enlightened and exalted views of what constitutes the true glory of a State, and better qualified to act the part of a good citizen in whatever sphere of action he may be called to move."

We have read over with much satisfaction the notes by which the editor has sought to make this speech of Pericles—a speech scarcely less celebrated for its difficulty than its excellence—intelligible to the student. We beg leave to introduce here a few remarks, which have occurred to us in the course of this examination; omitting the many points in which we should agree perfectly with Dr. Owen, and noticing for the most part those alone, on which we could wish for more or less of change.

L. II. c. 85. § 1. καὶ μὴ ἐν ἐνὶ ἀνδρὶ πολλῶν ἀρετὰς κινδυνεύεσθαι εὖ τε καὶ χεῖρον εἰπόντι πιστευθῆναι, and not that the virtues of many should be perilled upon one man, intrusted to him alike, whether he may speak well or ill (literally, to have been intrusted to him both if having spoken well and if worse). . . . πιστευθῆναι is expegetical of κινδυνεύεσθαι." On this passage we should prefer to follow the scholiast, and take πιστευθῆναι in the sense not of *entrusting*, but of *believing*; we would also treat it as the *object* of κινδυνεύεσθαι, which, meaning as it does to be endangered = made to incur danger, may be followed by the danger as its object. See Matthiæ Gr. § 534. b. The risk to which the virtues of many men are here supposed to be subjected, is that of being understood and hence believed according to the representation of the funeral orator, whether he has spoken well or ill; i. e. whether he has set them forth as they deserved, or (χεῖρον) done them less than justice. This interpretation seems to account more perfectly than any other for the *aorist* participle εἰπόντι.

C. 36. § 2. Pericles, speaking of the generation just departed, says, κτησάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξαντο ὅσῃν ἔχομεν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπόνως ἡμῖν τοῖς νῦν προσκατέλιπον; but immediately adds, τὰ δὲ πλείω αὐτῆς αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς οἶδε—ἐπηξήσαμεν. How reconcile these two statements, of which the first appears to say, that the Athenian empire had attained its present greatness in a former generation; and the second, that it had been rendered greater by the contemporaries of the speaker? Dr. Owen remarks: "There is no real contradiction . . . as the empire had not been essentially enlarged, but rather strengthened and reduced to a settled policy of government by Pericles and those of his own age." This is Poppo's view: ὅσῃν ἀρχὴν considered as referring to *extent of territory*, which excludes of course from the fol-

lowing τὰ πλείω αὐτῆς any material enlargement of domain. Krüger, on the other hand, has given a different explanation, which appears to harmonize better with historic facts. He understands ὄσσην ἀρχὴν of the *Hegemony*, regarded simply as supremacy among the Grecian States, without exact limitation either as to the authority conferred by that position, or as to the territorial limits within which it was acknowledged; so that in the ensuing sentence we are at liberty to understand extension in either one or both of these respects, in territory as well as in prerogative.

C. 36. § 4. ἀπὸ δὲ οἷας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ' αὐτὰ καὶ μεθ' οἷας πολιτείας καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἷων μεγάλη ἐγένετο. For the construction of οἷας—οἷων reference is made to Crosby Gr. § 589. 2. b., which is inapplicable here, as it relates to constructions like λεύσσετε—οἷα πρὸς οἷων ἀνδρῶν πάσχω, where two interrogative words are combined in a single interrogative clause. We may notice also another instance of irrelevant reference, III. 22. 7. καὶ οἱ τριακόσιοι αὐτῶν οἷς ἐτέτακτο, κ. τ. λ., "the article has reference to the relative οἷς which follows, and therefore retains its demonstrative force (S. § 166. 2. b.) *those three hundred who had been appointed.*" If the article be taken as a demonstrative in this place, we may with equal propriety consider it as such in a great majority of the cases where it stands; the use, which Mr. Sophocles calls demonstrative and describes in the remark referred to, is widely different, as appears from the phrases τὸν ὅς ἔφη, etc. cited as examples.

C. 36. § 4. νομίζων ἐπί τε τῷ παρόντι οὐκ ἂν ἀπρεπῆ λεχθῆναι αὐτά. λεχθῆναι has αὐτά for its subject, and is itself the subject of εἶναι understood, to which ἂν may be referred." This would require ἀπρεπὲς instead of ἀπρεπῆ; if εἶναι is supplied, αὐτά must be made its subject, and λεχθῆναι taken as a limiting infinitive, *that they would be not inappropriate to be spoken.* But it is not necessary to supply εἶναι; the construction may be represented tolerably well by rendering, *thinking that on the present occasion they would be spoken without inappropriateness.* We should likewise differ from Dr. Owen as to the construction in c. 38 § 2. καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν μηδὲν οἰκιστέρα τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γινόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, where he makes τὰ ἀγαθὰ the subject of ξυμβαίνει; better connect ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν καρποῦσθαι, κ. τ. λ. *it is our fortune to enjoy, etc.*

C. 37. § 1. καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' εἰς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται. For δια . . . οἰκεῖν the editor gives two interpretations. 1. *Because the government is not administered for the benefit of the few, but of the many.* (Arnold after Steph. and

Gail). 2. *Because the administration of government is not in the hands of the few, but of the many.* (Poppo and Goeller, 2nd ed.). Dr. Owen though he says the passage "does not seem admissible (susceptible?) of any interpretation wholly free from objections," yet pronounces at last in favor of the latter rendering; nor are we disposed to find fault with his decision. The context calls for such an explanation, and the construction, though certainly unusual, is after all less harsh and violent than Dr. Owen seems to think it. We may translate almost literally, *because the carrying on of government extends not to few but to many*, which naturally enough suggests the sense required.

C. 38. § 1. *ὦν καθ' ἡμέραν ἢ τέρψις τὸ λυπηρὸν ἐκπλήσσει.* "καθ' ἡμέραν ἢ τέρψις for ἢ καθ' ἡμέραν τέρψις." So also Krüger; but the difference of collocation appears to be more than a mere accident, and requires to be accounted for. We may say, perhaps, that καθ' ἡμέραν, standing as it does in the text, is not a mere adjunct of the noun, but qualifies the sentence, *whereof day by day the enjoyment drives away vexation.*

C. 39. § 2. *οὔτε γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καθ' ἐκάστους . . . στρατεύουσι.* This reading, which is the common one, makes it necessary to take *Λακεδαιμόνιοι* as a generic designation for the Lacedæmonians and their allies—for *neither do the Peloponnesian confederacy wage war by single States*—a rather harsh expedient. It would have been well, perhaps, to notice the easier reading καθ' ἑαυτοὺς which, though resting on little manuscript authority, is preferred by Poppo and Krüger.

C. 40. § 2. *οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ᾧ δεῖ ἔργον εἰθεῖν.* "This use of ἔργῳ in the sense of *in truth, in good deed*, is very common." Ἐργῳ here stands opposed to λόγῳ and signifies not *in truth*, but *in action*. Translate, "regarding not speech as any detriment to action, but rather not to be instructed by speech, before proceeding in action to those things which are necessary." In the next section Pericles continues: "For in this also we (Athenians) are peculiar, that we show the greatest courage, though at the same time we consider fully what we are to undertake: *ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει.*" Dr. Owen adopts the best account of this rather difficult clause, but has fallen, apparently through inadvertence, into some inconsistency of statement. He begins by saying, "the only difficulty in this passage results from the grammatical use of ὃ, which refers to *τολμᾶν* and *ἐκλογίζεσθαι*, i. e. the quality of daring combined with reflection." But further on he remarks: "Matthiæ and Poppo consider the relative as repeated and explained in *λογισμὸς* . . . the

sense being as though it had been written ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀμαθίας θράσος φροσύνης, ὄκνον φέρει. This appears to me the best explanation." Obviously, however, it would be absurd to say, *the quality of daring combined with reflection, brings cowardice, etc.*; and ὁ, if it is repeated and explained in λογισμός, can refer only to ἐκλογίζεσθαι.

C. 42. § 3. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς τάλλα χεῖροσι δίκαιον τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολέμους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνδραγαθίαν προτίθεσθαι. "τοῖς—χεῖροσι has the force of the adnominal genitive after ἀνδραγαθίαν. Krüger remarks (Gr. § 48. 12. R. 2) that the adnominal dative of possession for the genitive is a form of speech which does not frequently occur in Attic prose; and that where neither the position nor the sense requires us to connect the dative with the substantive, we should take it rather with the verb. In the present case, certainly, the latter is the superior construction. Translate, "Since indeed for those who in other points were worse, it is just that the manly courage, which led them to the wars in support of their country, should be put forward (as a shield or screen, to cover their failings)."

C. 44. § 1. "ὄσοι πάρεστε—ἐπίστανται. On the sudden transition from the *oratio recta* to the *oratio obliqua*, cf. Kühner, § 345. R. 6." There is a change here from the second person to the third; the orator goes on to speak *about* those whom he had just before been speaking *to*; but there is no quotation in the passage, and of course no passing from direct to indirect quotation—from the *oratio recta* to the *oratio obliqua*.

It will be seen, that of the points which we have noticed, some are the results of inadvertence,—slips, such as will now and then elude the keenest vigilance, and creep into the most elaborate productions. Others again are more or less matters of question; points on which different minds, with the same evidence before them, may come to different conclusions. They are very far from proving, as we are very far from believing, that the commentary has been hastily or carelessly prepared. On the contrary, our examination, limited and imperfect as it has necessarily been, has satisfied us that we have in this work the fruits of labor at once diligent and successful. So obvious, indeed, are the traces of industrious study, as to render quite unnecessary, expressions such as the following: "but I am disposed *after much reflection* to adopt as the sense of the passage" (note on II. 42. 4.); "*after much examination* I have adopted this as the best interpretation, though others may prefer to translate differently" (note on II. 40. 4.); which a pardonable self-distrust has led the editor to insert. Dr. Owen has shown in this book, that he is not one of those, who can rest content with past attainments, careless of further progress. No one

who compares his Thucydides with the highly popular and useful school books which he had previously edited, can fail to recognize its superiority. Its style is more correct, clear and business-like; it is nearly free from the faults of awkwardness and inaccuracy, by which those earlier works were occasionally disfigured. It shows much less of a certain disposition to *improve* upon the author, to dilate upon his beauties and endorse his moral teachings, to supply emotions that the student ought to feel, which in its predecessors bordered now and then upon the ludicrous. It exhibits a more mature scholarship, more thorough and exact research, and more of that practical skill in dealing with one's materials which practice only can bestow.

Scholars will await with interest the publication of the second volume, destined to contain, according to the announcement of the preface, "the remaining text of Thucydides, brief annotations, and copious verbal, historical and grammatical indices of the whole work."

ARTICLE XIII.

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL MISCELLANIES.

Age of Literary Men.

In a late Number of a German periodical, a list is given of the names and ages of some of the more prominent scholars and distinguished individuals in the various walks of life in Germany, together with some explanatory remarks. We subjoin the list as a matter of interesting record and of comparison, on a number of important points, with the theologians and literary characters of England and the United States. The first list includes those who lived to the age of 80—92 years.

Terstegen,	92 yrs.	Goethe,	83 yrs.
Spalding,	90	Planck (the elder),	82
Knebel,	90	Hans Sachs,	82
Tiedge,	88	Pestalozzi,	81
Gerstenberg,	86	Kästner,	81
Bodmer,	85	Duke Ulrich of Brunswick,	81
J. G. Müller,	84	Göckingk,	80
Gleim,	84	Kant,	80
Frederic Jacobs,	83	Jerusalem,	80
Hermes,	83	Wieland,	80

In this list are men who struggled with depressing poverty; others who could gratify every want; some who lived in quiet; others who performed the most active duties; some who were endowed with the highest poetic gifts; others who had no imaginative faculty. Creative