

of declamation, take no hold upon the reason—fasten no convictions in the understanding. Affecting only the imagination and desires, they leave the mind in a state similar to that described by Cicero in his *Tusculan Questions*, as produced by the reading of the *Phaedo* of Plato: “Nescio quo modo, dum lego, assentior; cum posui librum, et mecum ipse de immortalitate, animorum coepi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabatur.”

Whether the spiritual part of man be destined to survive death, and to live on forever, is not a question of philosophy, but simply one of fact, and one too of this peculiar character, that it is dependent solely upon the will of the Deity. It is obvious, therefore, that all our knowledge in respect to it must come from Him. He alone has formed us, and He alone can know his purposes concerning us. So far as it hath pleased Him to reveal them, whether through the teachings of inspiration or the intuitions of our own moral natures, and so far as we are able to gather them from what is discernible of the divine plan in the constitution and government of the world around us, so far we may advance in solving the question in which all have so deep an interest, and which in all ages has been the great problem of our race—but no further. We will not, however, extend these remarks upon a theme which has only an incidental connection with the subject of our essay. We may, possibly, resume it on some future occasion, and give to it a consideration more in proportion to its importance.

ARTICLE IV.

THE RELATION OF LANGUAGE TO THOUGHT.

By W. G. T. Shedd, Professor of English Literature, University of Vermont.

“It is a truth,” (says Hartung in beginning his subtle and profound work on the Greek Particles,) “as simple as it is fruitful, that language is no arbitrary, artificial, and gradual invention of the reflective understanding, but a necessary and organic product of human nature, appearing contemporaneously with the activity of thought. Speech is the correlate of thought; both require and condition each other like body and soul, and are developed at the same time and in the same degree, both in the case of the individual and the nation. Words are the coinage of conceptions, freeing themselves from the

dark chaos of intimations and feelings, and gaining shape and clearness. In so far as a man uses and is master of language, has he also attained clearness of thought: the developed and spoken language of a people is its expressed intelligence."¹

In this extract it is asserted that language is an *organic* product of which thought is the organizing and vitalizing principle. Writers upon language have generally acknowledged a connection of some sort between thought and language, but they have not been unanimous with respect to the nature of the connection. The common assertions that language is the "dress" of thought—is the "vehicle" of thought—point to an outward and mechanical connection between the two: while the fine remark of Wordsworth that "language is not so much the dress of thought as its incarnation," and the frequent comparison of the relation which they bear to each other, with that which exists between the body and the soul, indicate that a *vital* connection is believed to exist between language and thought.

The correctness of this latter doctrine becomes apparent when it is considered that everything growing out of human nature, in the process of its development and meeting its felt wants, is of necessity *living* in its essence, and cannot be regarded as a dead mechanical contrivance.

That language has such a natural and spontaneous origin is evident from the fact, that history gives no account of any language which was the direct invention of any one man or set of men to supply the wants of a nation utterly destitute of the ability to *express* its thought. Individuals have bestowed an alphabet, a written code of laws, useful mechanical inventions upon their countrymen, but no individual ever bestowed a language. This has its origin in human nature, or rather in that constitutional necessity, under which human nature in common with all creation is placed by Him who sees the end from the beginning, which compels the invisible to become visible; the formless to take form; the intelligible to corporealize itself. That thought is invisible and spiritual in essence, is granted by all systems of philosophy except the coarsest and most unphilosophic materialism. It is therefore subject to the universal law, and *must* become sensuous—must be *communicated*.

In the case of the primitive language, spoken by the first human pair, we must conceive of it as a *gift* from the Creator, perfectly correspondent, like all their other endowments, to the wants of a *living soul*. As in this first instance the bodily form reached its height of being and of beauty, not through the ordinary processes of generation,

¹ Partikeln Lehre, Bd. I. §§ 1, 2.

birth and growth, but as an instantaneous creation ; so too the form of thought, language, passed through no stages of development (as some teach) from the inarticulate cry of the brute, to the articulate and intelligent tones of cultivated man, but came into full and finished existence simultaneously with the fiat that called the full-formed soul and body into being. It would not have been a perfect creation, had the first man stood mute in mature manhood, and that too in his unfallen state and amidst the beauty and glory of Eden !

As the posterity of the first man come into existence by a process, and as both soul and body in their case undergo development before reaching the points of bloom and maturity, language also in their case is a slow and gradual formation. It begins with the dawn of reflective consciousness, and unfolds itself as this becomes deeper and clearer. In the infancy of a nation it is exquisitely fitted for the lyrical expression of those thoughts and feelings which rise simple and sincere in the national mind and heart, before philosophical reflection has rendered them complex, or advancing civilization has dried up their freshness. As the period of fancy and feeling passes by and that of reason and reflection comes in, language becomes more rigid and precise in its structure, conforms itself to the expression of profound thought, and history and philosophy take the place of the ballad and the chronicle.

Now the point to be observed here is, that this whole process is spontaneous and natural ; is a growth and not a manufacture. Thought embodies itself, even as the merely animal life becomes sensuous and sensible through its own tendency and activity. When investigating language, therefore, we are really within the sphere of life and living organization, and to attempt its comprehension by means of mechanical principles would be as absurd as to attempt to apprehend the phenomena of the animal kingdom by the principles that regulate the investigation of inorganic nature. It is only by the application of dynamical principles, of the doctrines of life, that we can get a true view of language or be enabled to use it with power.

It is assumed then that thought is the life of language ; and this too in no figurative sense of the word, but in its strict scientific signification as denoting the principle that organizes and vivifies the form in which it makes its appearance. It is assumed that thought is as really the living principle of language as the soul is the life of the body, and the assumption verifies itself by the clearness which it introduces into the investigation of the subject and by the light which it flares into its darker and more mysterious parts. That *fusion*, for instance, of the thoughts with the words which renders the discourse of the poet

glowing and tremulous with feeling and life, can be explained upon no other supposition than that the immaterial entity born of beauty in the poet's mind actually materializes itself, and thus enlivens the otherwise lifeless syllables. Nothing but a *vital* connection with the thoughts that breathe, can account for the words that burn.

We are not therefore to look upon language as having intrinsic existence, separate from the thought which it conveys, but as being external thought—expressed thought. Words were not first invented, and then assigned to conceptions as their arbitrary, and intrinsically, meaningless signs; mere indices, having no more inward connection with the things indicated, than the algebraic marks, $+$ and $-$, have with the notions of increase and diminution. In the order of nature, language follows, rather than precedes thought, and is subject to all its modifications from its first rise in the consciousness of the individual and the nation, up to that of the philosopher and the philosophic age in a nation's history. Language in essence is thought, is thought in an outward form, and consequently cannot exist, or be the object of reflection dissevered from the vital principle which substantiates it. The words of the most thoughtless man do nevertheless contain some meaning, and words have effect upon us only in proportion as they are filled with thought.

And this fulness must not be conceived of as flowing into empty moulds already prepared. It is a statement of one of the most profound investigators of physical life, that the living power merely added to the dead organ is not life;¹ i. e. that no intensity whatever of physical life streamed upon and through a dead hand lying upon a dissecting table can produce life in the form of the living member. The living member cannot come into existence except as growing out of a living body, and the living body cannot come into existence unless life, the immaterial and invisible, harden into the materiality and burst into the visibility of a minute seminal point which teems and swells with the whole future organism; a point or dot of life from which as a centre, the radiation, the organization, and the circulation may commence. In like manner it is impossible, if it were conceivable, to produce human language by the superinduction of thought upon, or by the assignation of meaning to, a mass of unmeaning sounds already in existence. When a conception comes into the consciousness of one mind and seeks expression that it may enter the consciousness of another mind, it must be conceived of as uttering itself in a word, which

¹ Carus' *Physiologie*, Bd. 1. Vorrede. He denies the correctness of the following formula upon which, he affirms, the mechanical school of physiologists proceeds: —todtes Organ + Kraft = Leben.

is not taken at hap-hazard and which might have been any other arbitrary sound, but which is *prompted* and *formed* by the creative thought struggling out of the world of mind, and making use of the vocal organs in order to enter the world of sense.

We cannot, it is true, verify all this by reference to all the words we are in the habit of using every day, because we are too far off from the period of their origin, and because they are oftentimes combinations of simple sounds that were originally formed by vocal organs differing from our own by marked peculiarities, yet the simplicity and naturalness of the Greek of Homer, or the English of Chaucer, which is no other than the affinity of the language with the thought, the sympathy of the sound with the sense, cause us to *feel* what in the present state of philology most certainly cannot be proved in the case of every single word, that primarily, in the root and heart, language is self-embodied thought.

Yet though it is impossible at present in the case of every single word to verify the assumption upon which we have gone, it is not difficult to do this in the case of that portion of the language in which there is emphasis and intensity of meaning. The verb, by which action and suffering (which in the animal world is but a calmer and more intense activity) are expressed, is a word often and evidently suited to the thought. Those nouns which are names not of things but of acts and energies, are likewise exceedingly significant of the things signified. The motions of the mouth, the position of the organs, and the tension of the muscles of speech in the utterance of such words as *shock*, *smite*, *writhe*, *slake*, *quench*, are produced by the force and energy and character of the conceptions which these words communicate, just as the prolonged relaxation of the organs and muscles in the pronunciation of *soothe*, *breathe*, *dream*, *calm*, and the like, results naturally from the nature of the thought of which they are the vocal embodiment.

And this leads us to notice that this view of the origin and nature of language acquires additional support from considering that the vocal sound is the product of physical organs which are started into action and directed in their motion by the soul itself.¹ Even the tones of the animal are suited to the inward feeling by the particular play of muscles and organs of utterance. The feeling of pleasure *could* not, so long as nature is herself, twist these muscles and organs into the emission of the sharp scream of physical agony, any more than it could light up the eye with the glare and flash of rage.

¹ See on this point Wallis's English Grammar, and Hearne's Langtofts Chronicle, Vol. I. Preface.

Now if this is true in the low sphere of animal existence, it is still more true in the sphere of intellectual and moral existence. If life is true to itself in the lower, it is true to itself in the higher realm of its manifestation. When full of earnest thought and feeling the mind *uses* the body at will, and the latter naturally and spontaneously subserves the former. As thought becomes more and more earnest, and feeling more and more glowing, the body bends and yields with increasing pliancy, down to its minutest fibres and most delicate tissues; to the working of the engaged mind, the organs of speech become one with the soul, and are swayed and wielded by it. The word is, as it were, *put into the mouth*, by the vehement and excited spirit.

When the mind is quickened, out of doubt,
The organs, though defunct and dead before,
Break up their drowsy grave and newly move
With casted slough and fresh legerity.¹

As well might it be said that there is no vital and natural connection between the feeling and the blush in which it mantles, or the tear in which it finds vent, as that the word—the “winged word”—has only an arbitrary and dead relation to the thought.

Again, it is generally conceded that there is an inherent fitness of gesture, attitude and look, to the thought or feeling conveyed by them; but do attitude, gesture, and look sustain a more intimate relation to thought and feeling than language does; language, at once the most universal as well as most particular in its application, the most exhaustive and perfect, of all the media of communication between mind and mind, between heart and heart? The truth is, that *all* the media through which thought becomes sensuous and communicable are in greater or less degree, yet in *some* degree, *homogeneous and con-natural with thought itself*. In other words they all, in a greater or less degree, possess manifest propriety.

It is to be borne in mind here, that the question is not whether thought could not have embodied itself in other forms than it has, whether other languages could not have arisen, but whether the existing forms possess adaptedness to the thought they convey. Life is not compelled to manifest itself in one only form, or in one particular set of forms, in any of the kingdoms, but it *is* compelled to make the form in which it does appear, vital like itself. The forms, for aught that we know, may be infinite in number, in which the invisible principle may become sensible, but the *corpse* is no one of them.

Thought as the substance of discourse is logical, necessary and immutable in its nature, while language as the form is variable. The

¹ Henry V. Act. IV. Sc. 1.

language of a people is continually undergoing a change, so that those who speak it in its later periods, (it very often happens,) would be unintelligible to those who spoke it in its earlier ages. Chaucer cannot be read by Englishmen of the present day without a glossary.¹ Again, the languages of different nations differ from each other. There is great variety in the changes of the verb to express the passive form. The subject is sometimes included in the verb, sometimes is prefixed, and sometimes is suffixed to it. The Malay language assumes the plural instead of the singular as the basis of number, all nouns primarily denoting the plural. Some use the dual and some do not; some give gender and number to adjectives, and others do not; some have the article and some have not. And yet all these different languages are equally embodiments of thought and of the same thought substantially. For the human mind is everywhere, and at all times, subject to the invariable laws of its own constitution, and that logical, immutable truth which stands over against it as its correlative object, is developed in much the same way among all nations in whom the intellect obtains a development. The vital principle—logical, immutable truth in the form of human thought—is here seen embodying itself in manifold forms with freedom and originality, and with an expressive suitableness in every instance.

That a foreign language does not seem expressive to the stranger is no argument against the fundamental hypothesis. It is expressive to the native-born, and becomes so to the stranger in proportion as he acquires (not a mere mechanical and book knowledge, but) a vital and vernacular knowledge of it. And this expressiveness is not the result of custom. Apart from the instinctive association of a certain word with a certain conception, there is an instinctive sense of its intrinsic fitness to communicate the thought intended—of its expressiveness. For why should some words be *more* expressive than others, if they all equally depend upon the law of association for their significance? And why is a certain portion of every language more positive, emphatic, and intense than the remaining portions? There is in every language a class of words which are its life and life-blood, a class to which the mind in its fervor and glow *instinctively* betakes itself in order to free itself of its thoughts in the most effective and satisfactory manner. But this is irreconcilable with the hypothesis that all words are but lifeless signs, acquiring their signification and *apparent* suit-

¹ Yet even in this case, as Wordsworth truly remarks, "the *affecting* parts are almost always expressed in language pure, and universally intelligible even to this day."—*Preface to Lyrical Ballads*. The more *intense* and *vital* the thought, the nearer the form approaches the essence, the more universal does it become.

ableness from use and custom, and all consequently being upon the same dead level with respect to expressiveness.

Still another proof that the connection between language and thought is organic, is found in the fact that the relation between the two is evidently that of action and reaction.

We have seen that language is the produce of thought; but this is not to be understood as though language were a mere *effect*, of which thought is the mere *cause*. The mere effect cannot *react* upon the pure cause. It is thrown off and away from its cause (as the cannon ball is from the cannon), so that there it stands insulated and independent with respect to its origin.

This is not the case with language. Originated by thought, and undergoing modifications as thought is developed, it, in turn, exerts a reflex influence upon its originating cause. In proportion as language is an exact and sincere expression, does thought itself become exact and sincere. The more appropriate and expressive the language, the more correct will be the thought and the more expressive and powerful will be the direction which thought takes.

But if language were a mechanical invention, no such reaction as this could take place upon the inventor. While connected with thought only by an arbitrary compact on the part of those who made use of it, it would be *separated* from thought by origin and by nature. Not being a living and organic product, it could sustain to thought only the external and lifeless relation of cause and effect, and consequently would remain one and the same amid all the life, motion, and modification which the immaterial principle might undergo.

Of course if such were the relation between the two, it would be impossible to account for all that unconscious but real *change* ever going on in a spoken language, which we call *growth* and *progress*. Language upon such an hypothesis would remain stationary in substance, and at best could be altered only by aggregation from without. New words might be invented and added to the number already in existence, but no change could occur in the spirit of the language, if it may be allowed to speak of spirit in such a connection.

Furthermore, if there is no vital relation between language and thought, it would be absurd to speak of the beneficial influence upon mental development (which is but the development of thought) of the study of philology. If in strict literality the relation of language to thought is that of the invention to the mind of the inventor, then the study of this outward, and in itself lifeless instrument, would be of no worth in developing an essence so intensely vital, so full of motion,

and with such an irrepressible tendency to development as the human mind.

It is however a truth and a fact that the study of a well organized language is one of the very best means of mental education. It brings the mind of the student into communication with the whole mind of a nation, and infuses into his culture the good and bad elements—the whole genius and spirit of the people of whose mind it is the evolution. In no way can the mind of the individual be made to feel the power and influence of the mind of the race, and thereby receive the greatest possible enlargement and liberalizing, so well as by the philosophic study of language. A rational method of education makes use of this study as an indispensable discipline, and selects for this purpose two languages distinguished for the intimate relation which they sustain to the particular forms of thought they respectively express. For the Greek language is so fused and one with Grecian thought, that it is living to this day, and has been the source of life to literature ever since its revival in the fifteenth century; and the rigid but majestic Latin is the exact embodiment of the organizing and imperial ideas of Rome.

These languages exhibit the changes of thought in the Greek and Roman mind. They take their form and derive their spirit from the peculiarities of these nations. Hence the strong and original influence which they exert upon the modern mind. If these languages really contained no tincture of the intellect that made them and made use of them, if they communicated none of the spirit of antiquity, they would indeed be "dead" languages for all purposes of mental enlivening and development.

But it is not so. The Greek and Roman mind with all that passed through it, whether it were thought or feeling, whether it were individual or national, instead of remaining in the sphere of consciousness merely, and thus being kept from the ken of all after ages, projected itself, as it were, into these fine languages, into these noble forms, and not only became a *κρήμα ἐς ἀσὶ* for mankind, but also a possession with whose characteristics the possessor is in sympathy, and from which he derives intellectual nourishment and strength.

A further proof that language has a living connection with thought, is found in the fact that feeling and passion suggest language.

Feeling and passion are the most vital of all the activities of the human soul, flowing as they do from the heart, and that which is prompted by them may safely be affirmed to have life. That words the most expressive and powerful fly from the lips of the impassioned thinker is notorious. The man who is naturally of few words, be-

comes both fluent and appropriate in the use of language when his mind glows with his subject and feeling is awakened.

But the use of language is the same in kind and character with its origin. The processes through which language passes from the beginning to the end of its existence are all of the same nature. As in the wide sphere of the universe, preservation is a constant creation, and the things that are, are sustained and perpetuated on principles in accordance with the character impressed upon them by the creative fiat, so in all the narrower spheres of the finite, the use and development are coincident and harmonious with the origin and nature. We may therefore argue back from the use and development to the origin and nature; and when we find that in all periods of its history human language is suggested, and that too in its most expressive form, by feeling and passion, we may infer that these had to do in its origin, and have left something of themselves in its nature. For how could there be a point and surface of communication between words and feeling, so that the latter should start out the former in all the freshness of a new creation, if there were no *interior* connection between them. For language as it falls from the lips of passion is tremulous with life—with the life of the soul, and imparts the life of the soul to all who hear it.

If, then, in the actual every-day use of language, we find it to be suggested by passion, and to be undergoing changes both in form and signification, without the intervention of a formal compact on the part of men, it is just to infer that no such compact called it into existence. If, upon watching the progress and growth of a language, we find it in continual flux and reflux, and detect everywhere in it, change and motion, without any consciously directed effort to this end on the part of those who speak it, it is safe to infer that the same unconscious spontaneousness characterized it in its beginning. Moreover, if in every-day life we unconsciously, yet really, use language not as a lifeless sign of our thought, but believe that in employing it we are really expressing our mind, and furthermore, if we never in any way agreed to use the tongue which we drank in with our mother's milk, but were born into it and grew up into its use, even as we were born into and grew up under the intellectual and moral constitution imposed upon human nature by its Creator, we may safely conclude that language, too, is a provision on the part of the author of our being, and consequently is organic and alive.

Indeed, necessity of speech, like necessity of religion and government and social existence, is laid upon man by his constitution, and as in these latter instances whatever secondary arrangements may be

made by circumstances, the primary basis and central form is fixed in human nature, so in the case of language, whatever may be the secondary modifications growing out of national differences and peculiarities of vocal organs, the deep ground and source of language is the human constitution itself.

Frederick Schlegel, after quoting Schiller's lines :

Thy knowledge, thou sharest with superior spirits;
Art, oh man ! thou hast alone,

calls language "the general, all-embracing art of man." This is truth. For language is embodiment—the embodiment not indeed of one particular idea in a material form, but of thought at large, in an immaterial yet sensible form. And the fact that the material used is sound—the most ethereal of media—imparts to this "all embracing art" a spirituality of character that raises it above many of the fine arts, strictly so called. It is an embodiment of the spiritual, yet not in the coarse elements of matter. When the spiritual passes from the intelligible to the sensible world by means of art, there is a coming down from the pure ether and element of *incorporeal* beauty into the lower sphere of the defined and sensuous. The pure abstract idea necessarily loses something of its purity and abstractedness by becoming embodied. By coming into appearance for the sense it ceases to be in its ineffable, original, highest state for the reason—for the pure intelligence. Art, therefore, is degradation—a stooping to the limitations and imperfections of the material world of sense, and the feeling awakened by the form, however full it may be of the idea, is not equal in purity, depth and elevation, to the direct beholding of the idea itself in spirit and in truth.¹

We may, therefore, add to the assertion of Schlegel, and say, that language is also the highest art of man. With the exceptions of poetry and oratory, all the fine arts are hampered in the full, free expression of the idea by the uncomplying material. Poetry and oratory, in common with language, by employing the most ethereal of media, approach as near as is possible for embodiments, to the nature of that which they embody, but the latter is infinitely superior to the two former, by virtue of its infinitely greater range and power of exhaustive expression. Poetry and eloquence are confined to the par-

¹ It is interesting in this connection to notice that the Puritan, though generally charged with a barbarian ignorance of the worth of art, nevertheless in practice took the only strictly philosophic view of it. That stripping, flaying hatred of form, per se, which he manifested, grew out of a (practically) intensely philosophic mind which clearly saw the true relation of the form to the idea—of the sensible to the spiritual.

ticular and individual, while language seeks to embody thought in all its relations and transitions, and feeling in all its manifoldness and depth. The sphere in which it moves and of which it seeks to give an outward manifestation is the whole human consciousness, from its rise in the individual, on through all its modifications in the race. It seeks to give expression to an inward experience, that is co-infinite with human life itself."

Viewed in this aspect, human language ceases to be the insignificant and uninteresting phenomenon it is so often represented to be, and appears in all its real meaning and mystery. It is an *organization*, as wonderful as any in the realm of creation, built up by a necessary tendency of human nature seeking to provide for its wants, and constructed too, upon the principles of that universal nature, which Sir Thomas Brown truly affirms to be "the art of God."¹

Contemplate, for a moment, the Greek language as the product of this tendency and necessity to express his thought imposed upon man by creation. This wonderful structure could not have been put together by the cunning contrivance, and adopted by the formal consent of the nation, and it certainly was not preserved and improved in this manner. Its pliancy and copiousness and precision and vitality and harmony, whereby it is capable of expressing all forms of thought, from the simplicity of Herodotus to the depth of Plato, are qualities which the unaided and mechanizing understanding of man could not have produced. They grew spontaneously and gradually, out of the fundamental characteristics of the Grecian mind, and are the natural and pure expression of Grecian thought.

Contemplate, again, our own mother tongue as the product of this same foundation for speech laid in human nature by its constitution. Its native strength and energy and vividness, and its acquired copiousness and harmony, as exhibited in the simple artlessness of Chaucer, and "the stately and regal argument" of Milton, are what might be expected to characterize the Latinized Saxon.

A creative power, deeper and more truly artistic than the inventive understanding, produced these languages. It was that plastic power, by which man creates form for the formless, and which, whether it show itself universally in the production of a living language, or particularly in the works of the poet or painter, is the crowning power of humanity. In view of the wonderful harmonies and symmetrical gra-

¹ Die philosophische Bildung der sprachen, die vorzüglich noch an den ursprünglichen sichtbar wird, ist ein wahrhaftes durch den mechanismus des menschlichen Geistes gewirktes Wunder.—Schelling's vom Ich. u. s. w. § 3.

dations of these languages, may we not apply the language of Wordsworth :

Point not these mysteries to an art
Lodged above the starry pole,
Pure *modulations* flowing from the heart
Of Divine love, where wisdom, beauty, truth,
With order dwell, in endless youth.¹

We should not, however, have a complete view of the relation of language to thought, if we failed to notice that in its best estate it is an imperfect expression. Philosophy ever labors under the difficulty of finding terms by which to communicate its subtle and profound discoveries, and there are feelings that are absolutely unutterable. Especially is this true of religious thought and feeling. There is a limit within this profound domain beyond which human speech cannot go, and the hushed and breathless spirit must remain absorbed in the awful intuition. Here, as throughout the whole world of life, the principle obtains but an imperfect embodiment. There is ever something more perfect and more glorious beyond what appears. The intelligible world cannot be entirely exhausted, and therefore it is the never-failing source of substantial principle and creative life.

In the case before us, truth is entirely exhausted by no language whatever. There are depths not yet penetrated by consciousness, and who will say that even the consciousness of such a thinker as Plato can have had a complete expression, even through such a wonderful medium as the Greek tongue? The human mind is connected with the Divine mind, and thereby with the whole abyss of truth; and hence the impossibility of completely sounding even the human mind, or of giving complete utterance to it; and hence the possibility and the basis of an unending development for the mind and an unending growth for language.

In conclusion, we are aware that the charge of obscurity may be brought against the theory here presented, by an advocate of the other theory of the origin and nature of language. We have no disposition to deny the truth of the charge, only adding that the obscurity, so far as it pertains to the theory (in distinction from the presentation of the theory, for which the individual is responsible), is such as grows out of the very nature and depth and absolute truth of the theory itself. We have gone upon the supposition that human language as a form, is neither hollow nor lifeless—that it has a living principle, and that this principle is thought. Now life is and must be mysterious; and at no point more so than when it begins to organize itself into a body.

¹ Power of Sound.

Furthermore, the spontaneous, and to a great extent, *unconscious* processes of life, are and must be mysterious. The method of genius—one of the highest forms of life—in the production of a Hamlet, or Paradise Lost, or the Transfiguration, has not yet been *explained*, and the method of human nature, by which it constructs for itself its wonderful medium of communication—by which it externalizes the whole inner world of thought and feeling—cannot be rendered plain like the working of a well poised and smoothly running machine throwing off its manufactures.

Simply asking then of him who would render all things clear by rendering all things shallow, *by whom, when, where and how* the Greek language, for example, was invented, and by what historical compact it came to be the language of the nation, we would turn away to that nobler, more exciting, and more rational theory, which regards language to be “a necessary and organic product of human nature, appearing contemporaneously and parallel with the activity of thought.” This theory of the origin of language throws light over all departments of the great subject of philology, finds its gradual and unceasing verification as philological science advances under a spur and impulse derived from this very theory, and ends in that philosophical insight into language, which, after all, is but the clear and full intuition of its mystery—of its life.

ARTICLE V.

JOURNEY FROM ALEPPO TO MOUNT LEBANON BY JEBLE EL-AALA, APAMIA, RIBLA, ETC.

By Rev. William M. Thomson, American Missionary in Syria.

Aug. 27th, 1846. Having accomplished the objects of my visit, and made all the necessary preparations for my journey back to Lebanon, I left Aleppo this morning at 10 o'clock. For the first few hours the road led over low, rocky hills, entirely deserted, naked and barren. We encountered a drove of more than 500 female camels, and my companions were not a little rejoiced when we were fairly rid of their wild and savage masters. In two and a half hours' rapid riding we came to a ruined khan, with the mellifluous name of 'Asil (boney). The only living things, in sight, were flocks of pigeons, which appear