ARTICLE III.

DE WETTE'S COMMENTARY ON ROMANS 5: 12—19.

Translated by M. Stuart, Professor at Andover.

Introductory Remarks.

[It may be proper to state some reasons, why a portion of Commentary by De Wette on Rom. 5: 12—19 has been translated, and is here inserted.

Every one conversant with theology or exegesis knows what importance has been attached to the passage of Scripture in question. It is appealed to beyond all others, as peculiarly exhibiting the condition of fallen man, and the connection of his depravity and guilt with the fall of the first human pair. The doctrine of original sin, or (as the Germans call it) inherited sin (Erbsünde), has been regarded, by a large portion of evangelical theologians, as having its most ample and solid basis in the passage before us. Of course, their opponents have made every possible effort to show, that the passage has been misunderstood and misinterpreted by them. The contest has been going on, in respect to this subject, ever since the days of Augustine and Pelagius, and even from a period still more remote. It would form a library of no small extent, were all that has been written on this subject embodied and published. Nor can we well wonder at this. The subject is one of the deepest interest. Men of sober thought and reflection will be prone to ask: What is our present native condition as moral and accountable beings? If corrupt and depraved, how has this been brought about, inasmuch as we naturally expect everything which comes from the hands of the Creator to be good? Can sin, or a sinful state or condition, be propagated? How far are we accountable for a state or condition, which we did not contribute in any way originally to form or introduce? How far are we, or can we reasonably be, accountable for the acts of others? These and many more of the like questions must give a high degree of interest to Rom. 5: 12—19; for it is here, either directly or consequentially, that material is found by the mass of theologians who are of the stricter cast, for the solution of such questions. Hence the animated attacks upon what is called the orthodox exposition of this passage, and the equally animated defences of that exposition.
Of late, some distinguished critics and theologians in Germany have renewed, in an animated way, the discussion of these matters. Pamphlets, monograms, small volumes, excursus appended to commentaries, etc., have been issued almost every year, until, as one would naturally suppose, the subject has been presented in nearly every possible light. In circumstances such as these, and after all the improvements made in sacred philology, it seems desirable that the theologian and the interpreter among us should have access to some abridged and summary view of what has been achieved by discussion; and such an one is presented in the pages of De Wette, a translation of which follows the present remarks.

What has just been stated is the leading reason for publishing the exegesis of De Wette. But there are other reasons, at which we will merely glance.

No living writer in the province of theology, sacred archaeology, and Hebrew and Greek philology and exegesis, can lay claim to more distinction in regard to extent and accuracy of knowledge acquired by study, than De Wette, though in particular departments men of greater ability may be found. It is a matter of the most unfeigned regret, on the part of all who are acquainted with his writings, and are at the same time the friends of evangelical sentiment, that his critical views are mostly of the neological cast, and his theological ones, in many respects, deeply tinged with the philosophy of the day. Still he is different, in not a few important particulars, from most of the distinguished writers of the neological school. He never rails. He employs no sarcasm or bitterness. He does not purposely misrepresent the views of those from whom he differs. He never exhibits levity, or indifference to religion. In feeling, he is understood and extensively believed to be nearer to the orthodox party than to the other. Those of evangelical sentiment, at least many of them who are acquainted with De Wette, even regard him as cherishing substantially the views and feelings of a Christian. His head, they say, has been turned by speculative philosophy, and is not in a right position, but his heart beats truly, at least it often does so, and responds to the hearts of others who love and believe the truth.

One thing, at least, can be truly said of De Wette as a commentator, especially as he appears in his latest works of interpretation. This is, that he rarely introduces anything but the simple principles of exegesis and philology, in order to establish his views of the meaning of Scripture. All creeds and confessions are left out of sight, and the text, and context, and tenor of discourse, and peculiarities of idiom, and matters of antiquity that have respect to various objects and opin-
ions and circumstances, are ever resorted to as the only reliable guides on which an interpreter can depend. Impartially, for the most part, has he dealt with all these exegetical subsidiaries. And that he brings to the decision of any exegetical question, a rare skill in detecting the nicer shades of language, a highly cultivated aesthetic feeling, and great discrimination in judging of the real and logical course of thought, no intelligent reader of him can deny or even doubt.

In one respect De Wette has some advantage over those who come to the investigation of Scripture with all their opinions formed and settled beforehand. The latter are often found in the attitude of pugnacious reasoners, now explaining away this, then introducing that, just as they wish to defend or to build up their own doctrinal structure. The paramount authority of the Scriptures they acknowledge, and hence the strenuous effort to make them speak what they themselves believe. De Wette is apparently free from any strong bias in this way. He is virtually a serious, sober Naturalist, (if I may so characterize him). He believes in the divine origin and authority of the Scriptures in the same sense in which he believes in the divine origin of all that is rational and moral in man, and of all that is good and beautiful in the world of nature around us. He regards the scriptural writers as well meaning, honest, sincere men, with the best intentions and most laudable purposes in view. But he also regards them as liable to mistakes, both as to matters of fact and of doctrine. He moreover believes them to have been too credulous, and thinks that they were somewhat tinctured with the superstitions of their age and country. Of course he attributes no binding authority to their decisions; and he is, in this way, placed as it were in a state of indifference, whether this or that statement or sentiment of the scriptural writers is correct or erroneous. So it comes about, almost as a matter of course, that he has no strong bias toward finding in the Scriptures this or that particular sentiment. We may easily conceive, that a scholar, in such a position, might investigate the Bible simply in a philological way, without any serious concern what the result of his investigation may turn out to be.

The translator of the following piece is very far from believing such a state of mind to be, on the whole, the most promising as to the real discovery of moral and religious truth. But he must think, that to such a man there is comparatively little embarrassment, in the way of striving to obtain the simple results of philology.

Of all the essays which the translator has read on Rom. 5: 12—19, he knows of none which have carried out simple hermeneutical principles in exegesis so entirely and exclusively as De Wette. This is
another reason for presenting the translation that follows. It cannot fail to be a matter of interest to all earnest inquirers, to know what are the fair results of such a process as De Wette has instituted. This process, from the hand of such a critic as he, deserves, and should elicit, the serious study of all who wish to arrive at the conclusions to which a purely philological discussion will lead them.

There is another consideration of some importance to many of the readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra. De Wette has nearly finished an Exegetical Manual, i.e. a brief synoptical interpretation, of the whole New Testament. His work, although not yet extensively known and used among us, will doubtless, ere long, be in the hands of many readers. Those who have had no opportunity to consult it, so as to know the manner and value of it, may learn, from the specimen now to be submitted to them, what they have to expect from the writer in question.

It is easy to see, that a commentary on the plan of De Wette must be exceedingly compressed and terse. Single words are made to speak whole sentences; single sentences, a whole paragraph. Hence the difficulty of reading and understanding De Wette's critical notes. Indeed, it must be rare, that the beginner in exegesis can be able to take in and fully understand the whole course of thought. De Wette supposes his readers to be already familiarly acquainted with all or most of the best critical works, including commentaries, literary introductions, and monogramms on particular passages. Hence he adverts to such works by a single word, or short sentence, leaving the reader to fill out what is lacking by his own knowledge. His abridgments of words, almost without number, are also very embarrassing to the unexperienced reader. So far as it regards proper names, this difficulty is mostly obviated in the following pages, by fully writing out the names which might occasion difficulty to many or most readers in our country. Beyond this the translator has not thought it best to go, because it is a part of his design to present De Wette as he is—terse, compressed, not to say abrupt, nearly beyond example.

The translator does not pledge himself as having in every case presented the exact shades of De Wette's meaning; for in fact he is almost untranslatable. Another language must fail to hit off some of the light and shade of his German sketches. But the aim has been, to be as nearly literal as the matter would bear, so far as our language would furnish the means. This is purposely done with the design of presenting De Wette as he is, or at least of coming as near to an exact likeness as may be.

The question is frequently asked: Why not present the whole of De Wette's Commentary in an English translation? An answer to
this may perhaps be found, in the specimen of it now to be subjoined. If not, then I would say, (1) Because our public are not prepared to receive and profit by it. His circle of references is mainly beyond our circle of reading and knowledge. His work makes demands on the reader, which most readers among us are not prepared to meet. Of course, much of his book would remain unintelligible, and therefore unprofitable. His trees are planted in a foreign soil and climate, and they will not bear transplanting without either stinting their growth, or rendering them fruitless. (2) Because the general tendency of his work leads on to mere Rationalism, and to a denial of the divine authority, consistency, and excellence of the Scriptures.

If the reader of the following exegesis expects to be interested in it, or to profit by it, he must do this by dint of real study, not of cursory perusal. A page or two will satisfy him of this. But if he will submit to patient labor and study, and has the power of appreciating what the author has done, he will find that there is scarcely a question of importance in respect to philology, that is not brought under examination. Various readings, points of grammar, matters of idiom, connection of thought, relation of parts to each other and to the whole, different opinions of respectable critics, different doctrinal views—in a word, everything which can fairly come within the compass of interpretation, is touched upon by De Wette, and his opinion, with the reasons for it, is summarily expressed. So much is crowded into a compass so small, that it can be duly understood and appreciated only by severe and intelligent effort.

Both parties in the contest among us about original sin, will be surprised, it is probable, at the results which De Wette presents. Those who contend for the views of the Westminster Catechism, would little expect from such latitudinarianism as that of De Wette, a result which differs only in some minor respects from their own. Those who are opposed to such views, will be disappointed at finding De Wette approach so near to the other party; inasmuch as they naturally, and perhaps confidently, expected very different conclusions from such a man. On v. 12 he says: "The apostle teaches the spread of sin, as well as death, among all men, in and through Adam. But the way and manner of this he does not particularly explain." In respect to the spread of sin, he also declares, that "in part it comes through the natural and organic propagation of a sinful inclination;" in part "through our social relations and connections;" and, "as the basis of both these, the apostle teaches the native likeness of all men, by virtue of which the sin of Adam becomes the sin of all. Still the sin that is propagated or inherited is finally the free act of all, for
which they are accountable. It is on this ground that he establishes the accountability of all, and the justice of punishment. How near this view comes to that of Pres. Edwards, every discerning reader will easily perceive.

It is no part of the translator's object to canvas, on the present occasion, the right or wrong of De Wette's views, but simply to present them to the reader. De Wette has left out of view the case of infants; and many a theological question that has been raised, he has not considered, because it did not come within his plan. How far philology supports his conclusions in general, the reader will judge for himself. But in whatever way he may decide this question, I think he will be constrained to say, that a more acute, subtle, thorough, philological analysis of the words and sentiments of Rom. 5: 12-19, cannot well be found, among all the essays that have been written upon it. Whether we agree or disagree in the results with the interpreter, we shall at least feel under obligation to him for having done so much to cast light on the simple meaning of the language which Paul has employed, in the development of his views respecting our connection with Adam and with Christ.—M. S.]

Summary of vs. 12—19. While the apostle is bringing into view justification by Christ and its effects which are fraught with blessings, he feels himself impelled to cast a comparative look on the times which had preceded. With Christ begins a new period of life and happiness for men, after death and misery had before his appearance been predominant. Both of these states are in one respect alike, viz. as to the fact that one individual, here Christ and there Adam, stands at the head. As by one (Adam) sin and death came upon all men, so by one (Christ) justification, life, and happiness, are imparted to all. The difference between them is, that in the one case sin, death, and corruption reigned, while in the other grace in a surpassing measure, life, and happiness, bear sway.


(V. 12.) Aită tò toû, therefore, accordingly, stands related to vs. 1—11, which describe the effects of justification by Christ. Rothe refers the relation to the idea comprised in these verses of the altered relation of men to God by reason of their sanctification, and supposes this to be the definite point of comparison with the clause ἐπὶ τὸ πάντες ἡμας. That thought, however, is merely accessory, and the lead-
ing idea of the passage is the οὐσία, and in this is comprised the contrast or opposite of sin and death in v. 12.

ὁσπερν, a particle which may mark either the first or the second member of a comparison. Most interpreters hold the clause before us to be the first member; but Cocceius, Elsener, Koppe, and a few others, regard it as the second, and they supply the preceding member out of the paragraph that goes before. But in this the points of comparison are not at least explicitly stated; and if we make out the first member by the words τὴν καταλαγήν ἐλάφομεν δι' αὐτοῦ, one does not well know what he is entering upon by the comparison. Those who take ὁσπερν δι' ἐνοίκ ν. l. to be the first member, fall into still greater difficulties; for in this case no second member of the comparison can be pointed out. It cannot be v. 18, making vs. 13—17 a parenthesis, (Grotius, Wetstein, Reiche, Flatt); for the ἀπε ὄνω of that verse manifestly points it out as a deduction from the context immediately preceding. Moreover, vs. 13—17 have not the nature of a parenthesis. Vs. 13, 14, do indeed make an interruption of the course of thought; but at the end of v. 14 is a proper period, and v. 15 begins a contrast. Nor can the second member of the comparison be found in the words καὶ ὄνω (i. e. ἔστω καὶ by inversion, Claricus, Wolfius); for in this way διὰ τοῦτο would be made superfluous, and the comparison with Christ would be superseded. Nor can it be in the words καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν ὁ θάνατος (Erasmus, Beza), whereby in like manner the comparison between Adam and Christ would be left out of view. Nor do the words ὅς ὅτι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος, in v. 14, constitute the second member (Calvin, Tholuck, Köllner, Meyer); for this clause, being coordinate and comprising a conclusion, by its form involves the idea of a comparison that has been already made. The supposition, that the after-clause was forgotten by the writer (Origen, Bengel, Rückert, Fritzsche, Win. § 64. II. a. 494, Rothe), is to be sure in some measure supported by the digressive nature of vs. 13, 14; but it is not probable that the apostle, v. 15, would bring into view the dissimilarity between Adam and Christ, rather than complete a comparison already begun.

It is an error to suppose that there must be two members of a comparison definitely in mind, if not plainly declared. The first is silently omitted; as if we should say: Therefore so as, and then leave it to the reader to make out the whole relation of the comparison from the one member of it which is expressed. Exactly in this way is the comparison managed after ὁσπερν in Matt. 25: 14, and after καθοις in Gal. 3: 6. In the passage before us, Paul thinks of no other point of comparison than this, viz. that through one man a change in the con-
dition of all mankind was introduced. In this respect is Adam a type of Christ. But at the same time, the full comparison rests upon several points of contrast also, which are brought to view in vs. 15—17; and by adding these he prepares the way for a full exhibition at last of similarity and contrast in vs. 18, 19. This arrangement of thought is disturbed by the usual mode of interpretation; for in this, one assumes that the whole second member of the comparison, comprising similarity and dissimilarity, is virtually expressed in v. 12. In this case, the contrast in vs. 15 seq. appears to destroy the comparison; and v. 18, which has the form of a deduction, assumes the nature of an annoying repetition. (Erroneously do Grotius and others hold ἡμεῖς to be a sign of resumption). The matter may perhaps be made clear, by the following exhibition of the course of thought: 'Therefore does Christ stand in a relation to mankind like to that which Adam bears, by whom sin and death came into the world,' (v. 12—to διηλθεῖν). The additional clause: ἐκ τοῦ πάντος ἥμαρτον leads to a digression in vindication of its correctness, which is contained in v. 18, ἐχθα γὰρ τόμον τοῦ ι. λ. on to v. 14, τῶν παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ. With the secondary and associated clause, ὡς ἵνα τύπος ν. τ. λ., the apostle reverts again to the comparison in v. 12.

Since however the entire comparison comprises contrasts [as well as similitudes], these are developed in vs. 15—17. They lie in the ideas designated by παράπτωμα and γάρμα, which is regarded as far superior in its effects (v. 15); in κατάκριμα and δικαίωμα; in ἐκ ἀμαρτήσεως and πολλὰ παραπτώματα (v. 16); and in θάνατος and ζωῆς with the much greater dominion of the latter (v. 17). With these points of contrast, however, points of similitude are at the same time developed; which are of ἐκ [Τάνατος] and ὡς ἐκ ἀνθρώπου [Χριστοῦ]; also οἱ πολλοὶ the posterity of Adam, and οἱ πολλοὶ those who belong to Christ (v. 15); and together with these, the βασιλείας of Θάνατος, and the βασιλείας ἐν ζωᾷ (v. 17). It is now, at the close of all this, that the apostle comprises both together, viz. contrasts and similitudes, and fully makes out his simple parallels in vs. 18, 19, as already in thought he had done in v. 12.

Ἀλ' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου εἰσῆλθε. The meaning of this clause is to be determined by correctly defining each particular idea. Light is cast upon it by Rom. 7: 7 seq., where a subjective view of the same thing is presented. The word ἁμαρτία is not the mere abstract of actual sin (Reich, Meyer), in such a way that Paul designates merely the very first period of its rise or origin; but, like v. 21 and 3: 9, it designates sin as a dominant power, partly as a principle, such as in accordance with 7: 8 slumbers in every man
and develops itself in its dominant sway over men in general, and partly as a sinful state or condition, such as Paul has described in 1: 17—3: 21. The word does not mean simply sinfulness, nor is the idea designated by it exactly inherited sin (Calv.), or the habit of sin (Olahansen), or sinful inclination (Rothe). To admit a personification (Reiche, Fritzsche, and others), such an one as finds place in 7: 8 seq., we have no sufficient ground in the plain expression εἰς τὸν κόσμον τινύλθα. This means not merely began to be, was first committed (Reiche, Fritzsche, Meyer), i. e. that which before was possible now began its actual existence, without comprising also the idea of extension. This is intimated by the δί εἶνος ανθρώπων which is placed in contrast with πάντας, and attaches itself to the idea of κόσμος, which is equivalent to mankind, not merely human nature (Reiche), or the moral community, because sin is something of a moral nature. In the same way is it spoken of in Wisd. 2: 24. 14: 14, and Gal. 3: 28 with simply ἐξεπαθεῖν. Still, the idea of extension is afterwards more fully brought to view.

δί εἶνος ανθρώπων — διὰ τῶν παρακτόματος (διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς) τῶν εἰνός ανθρώπων, vs. 18, 19. Αυτό is here connected with the original cause (v. 19), like the Dat. case in v. 17, only that the latter has respect to action, but the one before us to the agent, and so a distinction is marked between the immediate and mediate cause. (Comp. Matth. Gramm. Græc. § 896, Rothe, p. 112). The one man is Adam, not Eve (Pelagius), although Paul in 1 Tim. 2: 14 names the latter as being first led away (comp. 2 Cor. 11: 3), because, in reference to the world (the mass of men) the woman disappears behind the man, and not because the sin of Adam was peculiar and inexcusable, while that of Eve was excusable (Fritzsche).

καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἡ θάνατος, i. e. θάνατος εἰς τὸν κόσμον σιδήρλθε, namely in consequence of the divine sentence of condemnation, Gen. 2: 17. 3: 19. It is not therefore mere spiritual death, but corporal which is meant (Chrys., Aug., Calov., and others, Reiche, Meyer, Fritzsche). Since, however, this stands connected with all the misery of sin, sickness (1 Cor. 11: 30), fear (Heb. 2: 15), and, out of Christ, with eternal death; and since the apostle elsewhere employs the word in a more elevated sense (6: 16, 21. 7: 10 [comp. the contrasted εἰς ζωήν], 8: 6. 2 Cor. 7: 10), so here, at least in an obscure way, the ideas of evil and eternal death are to be connected with the word. (Comp. Krabbe, Lehre v. d. Sünde u. d. Tode, s. 196. Rothe, s. 177. Dähne, s. 57 seq.). The more comprehensive idea is without hesitation admitted here by Koppe, Tholuck, Köllner, Rücker (edit. 2, hesitatingly). The contrast διακατούσῃ ζωῆς v. 18, and ζωή αἰώνις...
v voc v. 21, decides not the meaning here with certainty, because in these phrases the idea of a resurrection, in contrast with the death of the body, is the principal and leading one.

Kai o'tac, and so, and consequently (11: 26), i. e. in consequence of the entrance of sin and death into the world; therefore, substantially, in consequence of the connection of sin and death (Olschhausen, Meyer); not—of sin by one man, v. 16 (Finkh); not—because Adam died on account of sin (Reiche, Fritzsche).—Eis pantes anaphronous diiilthy, diffused itself unto all men, i. e. came upon or invaded all men; not—was enforced throughout (Luther).


—Παντες anaphronous differs from kòsmos as the concrete parts of a thing are diverse from the abstract whole (Rothe); διεπρέπομα from στοιχεοθαι εἰς τ. νοον, as going from house to house differs from entering into a city.—The second ὢ θανατος is wanting in Ms. D. E. F. G. 62, al. Ital. Aug. al., and in Chrysostom and others it stands after διιλθον. Probably it is not genuine; and we can well dispense with it, (which Fritzsche denies). At all events, ὢ θανατος is the subject of the verb, [whether we regard it as expressed or implied], and not ῥ ἀμαρτία ν. ὢ θαν. (Aug.). It is erroneous, moreover, (Chry., Theod., Reiche, Fritzsche) to limit the extension, διιιθον, to death only; for (1) The diffusion of sin also is partly intimated and partly supposed, in the clauses ῥ ἀμαρτία... οἰκίθορη in καὶ ὦν... voc, and in the following ἔφρονες... ἡμαρτον; in part it is expressly said in v. 19. (2) One cannot otherwise well comprehend, how sin, which is general, came upon men; nor why merely death, which is the punishment of sin (6: 23), and not sin also, should have come upon Adam and his posterity. To be sure, the apostle regards the death of Adam as the result of a positive and primitive sentence of God (κοίμα v. 16); but the diffusion of the same among other men, he could hardly regard in the same light, since no declaration of the Old Testament to such a purpose is anywhere to be found. It is indeed true that in Sir. 25: 24. Wisd. 2: 24, and by many among the Jews (comp. Wetstein, Tholuck, Reiche, Fritzsche, in loc., and my Bib. Dogmatik, § 278, note e), only the death is spoken of which was brought upon men by Adam; and it is even said, that this death has come upon the righteous who have not sinned, (Rabbi Bechai in Lib. ῥαψιν 22, Bava Bathra f. 17, 1. Shabb. f. 55, 2). But it is still a fundamental position of the Old Testament, that all men from their birth are sinners; and this can hardly be explained in any other way than through the fall of Adam. Many of the Jews, moreover, do in
fact derive from this source the general sinfulness of men, e.g. B. Shem Tob in Sepher Haemunoth. The interpreter can have no doubt on this point, viz. that the apostle teaches the spread of sin as well as death among all men, in and through Adam. But in respect to the way and manner in which this takes place, he makes no particular explanations. Adam's first sin, and his death ordained by God as a punishment, were the original cause of a physico-moral corruption. (Paul appears, as also Augustine, to have regarded the first man, though made of dust [1 Cor. 15: 47], as capable before his fall of a natural immortality, Bib. Dogm. § 119]. Death comes undoubtedly in the way of natural propagation. So also in part does sin, which became an inclination that organically propagated itself; in part, however, it was continued and diffused by virtue of a community-state or condition, (Pelagius says, by imitation, which is vapid). Finally, one must admit, as the basis of both organic and social propagation, the original likeness of all men, by virtue of which the sin of Adam becomes common to all, and sin propagated or inherited is still the free act of every man. (See Lebrb. der Sittenlehre, § 84). The sequel will exhibit an accordance with these views.

'Eg' $\psi$ is rendered διότι by Thomas Mag. and Phavorinus; which is equivalent to ενί τοῦτῳ οἶν, (ενί on account of, because that, Acts 3: 16. Matt. 19: 9. Matth. § 586), and almost all interpreters follow in this track, even Fritzsche, Hermann ad Viger. But Origen, Augustine, Beza, Estius, explain it by in whom (Adam). Chrys., Theoph., Oecumenius, Elsner, on account of whom; Grotius, by whom (Adam); Finkh, quamquam. In point of fact, the meaning because that fits well this passage; and that in 2 Cor. 5: 4. But Rothe, regarding $\epsilon' \psi$ as equivalent to ενί τοῦτῳ οἶν εἰς, i.e. under the condition that, when joined with the Inf. or Indic. Fut. (Matth. § 479), understands it as meaning under the certainty that, so that, for that, inasmuch as; comp. Synesius Ep. 78, p. 221 C. edit. Petav: καὶ τὸν ἦλθ᾽ εἰς εἰς εἰς οἴνοις ἀνθρώπως εἰς Πετρόπολις ἐγειρόμεν, "and by agreement a man saw the light of the sun on condition that he impeached Gennadius," (Zeunius ad Viger. p. 30, "hac lege ut Gennadim in jus vocaret;" Hermann, p. 710, in opposition to this, "saeo odi causam quod Gennadim accusasset.") Theophilus Ant. ad Autol. Lib. IL p. 105, B. ed. Colon., εἰς οἴνοις θανάσως αὐτοῦ, under the certainty that, so that, he could not kill them. But here because is the only apposite meaning. By this method of explanation we attain to the idea, that the death of Adam's posterity together with their sinning was fixed, the one as the condition of the other; while the common view presents this matter as though each one's own proper sin was
the cause of his death. In the meantime, Paul does not mean, by his πάντες ήμαστος, either that all became sinful (Calv., Thol.), or that all suffered the penalty of sin (Grotius, Chrys. γεγοναυς θυρεοι), but he asserts merely the actual development of sin that pertained to all in the actual sin of all, and the justice of the punishment on the ground of individual accountability. This contradicts neither the deeper connection above alleged between the sin of Adam and of his posterity, nor the ideal or immediate imputation of the first; nor does it in any way exclude the individual or the mediate.

The preceding clause may seemingly contradict 4: 15, "Where there is no law, there is no transgression;" and hence the apostle proceeds here to vindicate it (γιγά). Ἀρχῇ νῦν, not to the end of (during) the law (Orig., Chrys., Theodoret); which indeed the usual loquendi would allow (Fritzsche against Rückert), but until the law, i. e. from Adam to Moses (v. 14), having respect to 4: 15.—Ἀμαρτία ής, sin was, i. e. there was sinning; in which Paul has reference to the testimony of Genesis respecting the corruption of men before the time of Moses.—Ἀμαρτία . . . νῦν, a concession or limitation (δέ), sin however was not reckoned, i. e. not brought into account (Phil. v. 18), viz. objectively, but not by the civil judge (Fritzsche), but by God (Estius, Bengel, Olshausen, Reiche, Köllner, Rothe); not by the sinner himself (Aug., Amb., Luther, Melanchth., Calvin, Beza, Baldwin, Usteri, Rückert), for the word ἐλλογίαι supposes a relation between two, of whom one reckons something to the other. Besides, the customary psychology of the apostle does not lead to this, (comp. ἐπίγνωσις τῆς ἀμαρτίας; 8: 20, and οἱ λογισμοὶ κατηγοροῦντες; 2: 15.—Where no law is, or where the law is not, which comes at last to the same thing; for this is always said respecting the time before the law of Moses, and is by no means a universal position. [But comp. 4: 15, where this is first said, and where the strain of the reasoning shows that the assertion is of a general nature. It must be as true at one time, as at another, from the very nature of the case. Is not the position of De Wette then, in this case, a very doubtful one?—Th.]. The Noachic precept in Gen. 9: 6 Paul does not appear to have looked upon in the light of a positive law, since he considers the time before Moses to have been without law. This clause of limitation, however, is itself again to be limited. Sin is either to be reckoned, or it is not sin. The apostle, therefore, in respect to sins before the time of Moses, does not simply and positively deny accountability, but only in a relative or comparative sense; just as he says of the heathen: As many as have sinned ἅπομοος, shall also perish ἅπομοος, 2: 12. Now punishment presupposes accountability, although it may be in a
lesser degree. Well known is the distinction between intentional and unintentional sins, (Luke 12: 47 seq. Sittenlehre, § 81). Both, however, are to be accounted for in the way of punishment. Intentional sin, committed against an express law, Paul names παράβασις, 4:15. The clause before us then must mean: 'Where there is no law, there sin is not reckoned as a παράβασις, i.e. as a transgression of a positive precept, (Est.), and so the sentiment is the same as that in 4: 15. (Dähne says: The verb ἀλλογίασει must be limited by mentally supplying σάμαρ or εἰς σάμαρ). Because now the very idea of sin presupposes a violation of some law, and the apostle ascribes sin to the times which preceded Moses, so Rosenmüller and Calovius are in the right, when they suppose that the law of nature must be here in view. They do not, however, do this in the way of an orderly connection of thought. Meyer, after Süsskind, doubting the affirmative declaration of what the passage before us contains, has taken the clause in an interrogative sense, the answer to which is to be in the negative:—a sheer mistake.

(V. 14.) But death reigned, etc.; but, in contrast with the foregoing limitation. Meaning: Death was a universal necessity to which all were subjected. If we dwell now on the relation of this clause to the preceding context, it is clear that the apostle means to confirm the assertion, that death has passed through upon all men, in contrast with the clause that sin is not imputed, etc. But is the causal clause, which follows, because all have sinned, rendered null? Just as little as the idea of sin is annulled by the oxide ἀλλογίασει, x. e. λ, which is to be relatively understood. Hence the sentiment of the Apostle is: All have, through their own sin, although not to be accounted for on the ground of a positive law, brought death upon themselves.

Even over those who did not sin, i.e. notwithstanding the diversity of sin, still death came upon all. 'Ενί does not denote extent (Meyer), but on or upon, Luke 19: 14. The genuineness of καί is not shaken by the few Mas. which omit it, (viz. 67** Clar.). Moreover the καί affords a ground or reason for the genuineness of the μὴ here, without which it would be destitute of meaning. Cod. 62. 63. 67, et al. apud Bufin., Ambrosiaster, Origen, Cyprian, al., omit the μὴ; but the testimony of almost all the Mas., and of many of the fathers, speaks in its favour with a force of evidence decidedly superior. In fact, the omission of the μὴ is plainly a mere expedient to get rid of an apparent contradiction (at least according to the Latin version) between this clause and the εἰς τὰς τάσις τῇματον.

After the similitude of Adam's transgression. 'Ενί, after the manner of, comp. 6: 5, and see εἰς in 2 Cor. 9: 6. Luke 1: 59, where εἰς
designates the idea of a normal conformity. The present clause stands connected with ἀμαρτήσαντες and not with ἔπαινων. Chrys., Theoph., Bengel, connect the reign of death over men before the law with the similitude of Adam's transgression; Elsner thus, "propter imaginem peccati Adami," i.e. on account of inherited sin; Homberg, Finkh. But in this way here would be a direct contradiction with the ἐπ' ἔστιν ὑμῶν, [which brings men's own sin into the account.—Tr.]. The emphasis lies upon παράβασις, the transgression of a definite command. Photius: "Adam transgressed and sinned against a law definite and sanctioned; but they sinned, contemning the self taught reason of nature." Erroneous is it to assume, with Beza, that the sinfulness of children is here meant; for the apostle has no special reference to their mortality, although it may be included in his general position. Equally so to assume, with Grotius and Wetstein, that such as have not sinned at all, but lived piously, are meant. Reiche, plainly without good reason, finds the difference not in the sinning but in the punishment, which in Adam's case was immediate, in that of his posterity mediate. Plainly the words καὶ ἐστὶν...Ἀδαμ form a limitation of the above declaration, because that all have sinned, like to that which is made by the foregoing ἀμαρτία δὲ υἱὸν ἐκοιμεῖτο κ.τ.λ., so that now the full idea of the apostle is this: All have by their own sin, although this is not reckoned after any positive law and is different from the transgression of Adam, occasioned death to themselves. It is erroneous, therefore, to attribute the mortality of men merely to Adam's death, and to derive it wholly from natural propagation, (Chrys., Theophyl., Theodoret, who however admits the sin of posterity). It is erroneous, also, while the sinning of posterity is admitted, to refer back the punishment of death, which they suffer on account of sinning, immediately to the sentence of God against Adam; for in such case, the circumstance that death accompanies sin is overlooked, for in conformity with this, death comes upon all because all have sinned. In itself not erroneous, but still not within the circle of the apostle's thought, is it to seek the moral ground of death in the immediate imputation of Adam's transgression (Köllner, with the older theologians); or in the guilt connected with inherited sin (Bengel, Elsner). According to Paul, the ground of death lies in the actual sin of men, which is by virtue of their original connection with Adam's sin, (not by an arbitrary decree of God, but by a natural moral arrangement), so that their sin, like his, is punished with death.

Who is the type of the future [Adam]. This refers back to v. 12, and what is there implied, is here expressly said, as to the similitude between Adam and Christ. ὦσ refers to Adam, and is not through
attraction to be referred to the foregoing words, so as to be equivalent to δ (Koppe).—Τόνος, type, resemblance, example (Phil. 3: 17); and here, as in 1 Cor. 10: 6, historical type, paralleled, and in this case a type by reason of similitude in the way of contrast. A historically objective connection between type and antitype, so that one is a necessary condition to the other, has Paul in this case fully assumed.—Τοῦ μιλλονού, not nenter — the future, viz. future salvation (Koppe), but more, meaning Adam, comp. 1 Cor. 15: 45. So Neve Shalom, II. 6. 8, speaks of the other Adam (Thol., Fritzache); moreover, not of him who formerly was to come (Benza, Reiche), but, in reference to the then present time, for which Christ as triumpbant was yet to be manifested (Frituche).

Vs. 15—17. These exhibit, in a striking manner, the points of contrast between the type and the antitype, or their contrasted relations to each other; and this leads to an investigation of the relation itself.

(V. 15.) Ἀλλ' εὖ όϊ ... γὰρ, i. e. not as the offense so is the free gift. In other words: Although Adam is a type of Christ, there are points of difference or contrast between the offence of the former and the free gift of the latter. Some (Homberg, Heumann, Rosenm.) make this verse with v. 16 an interrogaftion; erroneously, for thereby the contrast is destroyed.—Το παράπτωμα, offence, stumbling, designates the transgression of Adam — παράπτωμα in v. 14, which was the ground of the reign of sin after him. Παράπτωμα always designates an actual specific transgression, and differs from ἀμαρτία in this respect, viz. that the latter is generic, comp. v. 20.—Το γάρ τε, the gracious gift, i. e. justification, forms no direct contrast to the preceding word; and one might have expected to find ἐνοχή here, as in v. 19. Paul however has his eye here upon the consequences of Adam's transgression, and to these he opposes (as he well might) το γάρ τε.

The remainder of the verse, εἰ γάρ τε ... ἐπήρεασαν, represents the first point of contrast between παράπτωμα and γάρ τε; and this is presented in the way of a hypothetical conclusion, in which the reasoning is a minore ad majus, viz. If (so and so) ... then so such the more (thus and so). Does μαλλὰ μᾶλλον refer to a more of quantity, i. e. to a more intensive manifestation of force or energy? (Theophol., Calv., Beza, Thol., Rückert, Kölliner, Reiche, Rothe); or, as in 5: 9 seq., does it mark a logical more of possibility or certainty? (Chrys., Grotius, Fritzache). The point is still in dispute. In the meantime, the first method of interpretation places the difference between the operation of the offence and of the free gift in a more conspicuous point of light. (So Rothe, Rückert). The relation of the fore-clause to the corresponding after-clause, is that of a contrast in which one of Vol. V. No. 18.
its parallels has an increased intensity. Comparison manifests this; for (1) The όι πολλοι ἀπέθανον of the fore-clause, wherein lies the idea of extended influence, corresponds to the εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐνεργήσασθαι of the after-clause. The apostle here employs όι πολλοί, and not πάντες as in v. 12, because he could not say, on the one hand, that grace had extended to all. In like manner, in such cases, όι πολλοί in Matt. 20: 28. 26: 28. (2) To the παραπτώμαta in the fore-clause corresponds, in the latter clause, not γάρμαμα as before, but ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δοξα τῆς χάριτος, which does not mean merely the gracious gift (Thol.), or the like, but presents the idea of χάριμα both in the bestowment of it and in its source. Χάρις is not, as in v. 17, the operation of grace, but operative grace, for the other view would weaken the sentiment here.—Ἐν χάριμα ... Χριστοῦ belongs to or connects with ἐνεργίσασθαι, and marks the manner of the mediation; it should not be connected with ἡ χάρις ... δοξα (Köllner, Rothe). It is equivalent to ἐν Χριστῷ, only more emphatic, inasmuch as his grace (propitiatory love, 2 Cor. 8: 9) is named as the medium of divine grace. The article in τῷ τοῦ ἐνός κ. ο. l. is also emphatic: per benevolentiam quae unius est Christi, (Fritzsche, comp. Rothe). (3) To the τοῦ ἐνός in the fore-clause, corresponds τοῦ ἐνός ἐκδηλώσασθαι in the after-clause.—Ἐνεργίσασθαι, comp. 2: 7. The Apostle relates to the actual participation of the πολλοί, i. e. of Christians in time already past. 

(V. 16.) A second designation of dissimilitudes. Καὶ εἷς εἰς ... τῷ δώρῳ. The verb εἴση is of course implied. The various reading, ἀμαρτήσατος (D. E. F. G. Syr. Vulg. Theodoret, all) has Lachmann rightly excluded from the text. It is manifestly a mere correction of the common reading.—Αὐτὸς ἁμαρτήσατος, Rothe and Meyer interpret without any supplement; Rothe as follows: And the free gift is not in the same way as through one having sinned, i. e. the free gift is not limited after the manner of one who has sinned. But (1) This is too subtle. (2) There is nothing in the tenor of the following discourse respecting such a difference. (8) In this way, the contrast of ἐνός would be destroyed. Meyer gives the phrase the following turn: And not as through one who has sinned, is the free gift, i. e. this is not so as if it were occasioned by one who had sinned. In like manner Fritzsche: "τὸ δώρημα non sic habere [sae Paulus], quenammodum δι' ἐνός ἀμαρτήσατος [τὸ παραπτώμαta existiterit]," i. e. he makes out a supplement with παραπτώμαta ἐγένετο. This means, according to him, that the free gift differs from the offences in this respect, viz. that the former was not, like the latter, introduced by one who sinned. Against this view there are several objections.
(1) The first clause here must impliedly include within itself that which the subsequent development and confirmation comprised in τὸ μὲν γὰρ κ. τ. λ. contains. But according to this interpretation, both κατάκριμα and δικαίωμα are excluded, and all hangs merely upon ἵνα.

(2) This exegesis makes διὰ — ἐκ, or the reverse. But διὰ marks the original cause, (and as the cause of the διάγνωμα no one would think of Adam), and ἐκ the occasion. In the first clause, Theophylact and Reiche anticipatively supply τὸ κατάκριμα; Bengal, Tholuck, Köllner, prefer τὸ κρίμα. Paul could not well have intended for a supplement here the principal assertion in v. 12, ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐκ τὸν . . . ὁ θάνατος, because the idea of sin is already comprised in ἐς ἁμαρτήσας. Neither did he regard ὁ θάνατος εἰσήλθεν as a supplement (Grotius, Estius, Koppe), because he thought here in an indefinite way of the consequences of having sinned, and intended afterwards to give a more particular explanation. Paul gives here merely the original cause; for he virtually repeats here what is said in v. 12, δι'- ἵνα ἀνθρώπον κ. τ. λ. merely substituting ἁμαρτήσατος for ἀνθρώπου, because the idea of sin committed could not here be dispensed with. Beza deals arbitrarily here with the laws of grammar, since he converts into a substantive the whole clause, by prefixing τὸ. He however very nearly hits upon the true sense. This seems strictly to be as follows: And not like to that which took place through one that sinned, is the free gift. The word διάγνωμα is more indefinite than γάμωμα; and this corresponds well with the somewhat indefinite δι'- ἵνα ἁμαρτήσατος.

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίμα . . . κατάκριμα, scil. ἐγένετο, judgment was by reason of one unto condemnation. Rothe's construction: τὸ μὲν [scil. δι'- ἵνα ἁμαρτήσατος] γὰρ ἐστὶ κρίμα, does not at all fit the passage.

—Ἐξ ἵνας of course implies ἁμαρτήσατος (Meyer), or else ἀνθρώπου, comp. vs. 12, 15, 17. To make a complement here of ἁμαρτήσατος (Besa, Thol., Rothe) is forbidden by the laws of language, and by no means rendered necessary on account of the ἐς πολλοί παραπτωμάτων, since the like contrast is presented between one sinner and many sins, as between one sin and many sins.

Τὸ κρίμα . . . κατάκριμα Fritzsche explains thus: 'The forbidding of the fruit, and the sentence against Adam and all who sinned after him.' Reiche thus: 'The sentence against Adam, and that against his posterity.' Rückert (2) Thus: 'The one who had sinned was stricken by the divine sentence and the consequence thereof, viz. death; from him has gone forth sentence throughout all, and become a sentence of condemnation to all.' Theophylact: 'Sin, deservedly condemnable, flowing from one, Adam, became a matter of condem-
nation, i. e. of death, or of more sins, ever after to his posterity. That κατάξημα has reference to posterity, and that the sentiment is to be completed by an implied ἔγενετο and εἰς πάντας ἀμαρτίαν, (which Meyer names anticipative), is certain from v. 18. One must comprise under it what lies in vs. 12, 19; and consequently not merely ἡμῖνος (Reiche), but also ἀμαρτῶν κατακτάθρασιν. Τὸ κρίμα cannot mean merely the prohibition before the fall, because εἰς ἐνός does not mean through one (Fritzsche), but from or out of one; and κρίμα therefore is conceived of as something which had befallen Adam, and by reason of this had also befallen others. The sentiment of Reiche and Rückert, then, as given above, seems to be correct.

Τὸ δὲ χάρισμα . . . εἰς δικαίωμα, κειλ. ἔγενετο. Χάρισμα again introduces the more definite idea of the gracious gift on account of the δικαίωμα, which is not to be understood as in v. 18 (Rothe), but as the opposite of κατάξημα, with the meaning that attaches itself to the Pauline use of δικαίων, viz. sentence of absolution. It is parallel with the δικαίωσις of v. 18, i. e. acquittal (Fritzsche).—Ἐξ πολλῶν παρατατομάτων, springing from or occasioned by many offences, i. e. as the κατάξημα was incurred by men who sinned much, this gave occasion for the large manifestations of pardoning and justifying grace.—The second point of difference between Adam's influence and that of Christ consists in this, that in the first case sentence occasioned by one sinner became condemnation; in the second, the gracious gift in the way of justification was on the occasion of many sins.

(V. 17.) Here Paul confirms (γὰρ) the last thought of the preceding verse, εἰς δικαίωμα (Fritzsche), inasmuch as he, by a conclusion like that in v. 16, renders prominent the glorious consequences of justification. At the same time, however, he brings to view a third point of difference between the influence of Adam and of Christ, viz. that of much greater dominion. Rothe denies this connection, and attaches v. 17 to v. 15, making v. 16 a parenthesis. It is decisive against this, that the τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς δικαιοσύνης of v. 17 presupposes the εἰς δικαίωμα of v. 16, and connects itself with it. (Comp. Rückert.)

Τῷ τοῦ ἐνος παραστάσιμα. The various reading, εἰς (ἐν τῷ) ἐνοι παραστάσιμαι corresponds to the erroneous reading above, viz. ἀμαρτήματος for ἀμαρτήματος, v. 16, and belongs to the same Codices, only here some other witnesses are wanting. On the other hand, A. has εἰς εἰς, and Origen εἰς ἐνός. Lachmann reads arbitrarily, εἰς παραστάσιμαι, which Koellner and Rothe approve. Meyer holds εἰς εἰς as original, while Fritzsche supports the common Var. Lect. on account of consistency. Plainly τοῦ ἐνος is superfluous, on account of the fol-
The apostle, in the first place, employs τοῦ ἄνθρωπον μαρτυρισματος as corresponding to v. 15; then, as corresponding to δι' ἐνός ἀμαρτητον as ἐν ἑνὶ in v. 16, he employs δι' τοῦ ἐνός; the last particularly, because at the close of this investigation he wishes to make prominent the parallel between Adam and Christ. The contrasts, on the other hand, which he intends to bring particularly into view, are (1) By the offence of one (with the implied spread of its consequences)—and they who receive abundance of grace and the gift of justification. (2) Death reigned—they shall reign in life. Paul has put in contrast with τοῦ ἐνός παραπτωματι the opposite phrase τῇ περαισσίᾳ, κ. τ. λ.; and in opposition to ὁ θάνατος ἐκαίνιενας he has not opposed ἐν ἑνὶ ἐκαίνιεν, as we expect; but he has chosen another turn of expression which brings into view free moral personality, the predicates of which are life and dominion (βασιλεία), (comp. Rothe). The form of the conclusion is the same as in v. 15; and πολλῷ μᾶλλον is to be taken here as there.

Οἱ λαμβάνοντες (pres. Part.), one might expect λαμβάνειν (Aor.), so Frische, Meyer; but the Part. pres. here marks the continued appropriation of grace (Rothe).—Ἐν ἐνός, the opposite of θάνατος, and not merely the resurrection of the body is meant, but also a spiritual and moral resurrection; just as in the οἰκονομία which is by sin (v. 12), a spiritual and moral death is included.

Βασιλεία παραπτωματος is here employed, because in the contrasted clause we have ὁ θάνατος ἐκαίνιενας. However, the same expression is elsewhere (2 Tim. 2: 12) employed with the like meaning, i. o. to designate future happiness. The like in Rev. 20: 4. 22: 5, but there partly with reference to an objective Messianic kingdom, and partly in a subjective moral sense, because to reign implies the highest development of freedom and the highest gratification of every desire.
De Wette's Commentary on Rom. 5: 12—19. [Mat.

(V. 18.) *'Agw oéw, a well known inference particle of Paul, and contrary to Greek usage placed at the beginning, (7: 3, 25. 8: 12, et seq.) It serves here as an introduction to the summing up of what precedes (vs. 16, 17). That it does not fall back upon v. 12 (Rothe), one may see from the words παράπτωμα and κατάκριμα (which are in vs. 16, 17). It is only in v. 19, that άμαρτολοι καταστάθηκαν looks back to the έτι of πάντες μιμητοι of v. 12. After δι' ένδος παραπτώματος here, the supplement is commonly made of τό κρύμα ἐγένετο, (and so Rückert, Fritzsche); and after δι' ένδος δικαίωματος the supplement τό χάριμα ἐγένετο is regarded as implied. The better way is to supply the less definite ἐγένετο, αἰτήθη, happened to, came to or upon. In the second clause, if a verb were supplied, it must be in the Future (Fritzsche); designedly therefore did the apostle omit the verb, so as to leave out the limitation of time, because he here extends his view to all, εἰς πάντας.

Αἱ ἑνδος παραπτώματος. To construe this as being of the masculine gender, (so do Koppe, Tholuck, Fritzsche), is against the idiom, and even against its conformity to v. 17, which joins the article with παραπτώματι (Rothe), although the view of Koppe, etc., rests on a supposed conformity of the two passages. The same is true respecting δι' ένδος δικαίωματος. This word is here employed in a sense different from that which it has in v. 16, and designates the opposite of παράπτωμα, i. e. righteous doing (Rev. 19: 8. Bar. 2: 19, not means of justification, Beza, Bengel), and is equivalent to ἐπαλοκή in v. 19. (Meyer, sentence of acquittal; Rothe, fulfilment of justice, both erroneously). The word ἐπαλοκή refers to the death of Jesus, which was a proof of the most perfect obedience, and thereby was a moral action of the highest kind. Reiche and Fritzsche attach to the δικαίωματος here the idea of Jesus' incarnation, Phil. 2: 5 seq. The older theologians find their active obedience here, (Form. Concord. p. 684 seq.)

Εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς, to justification of life, i. e. to a justification which frees us from death, and makes us partakers of life.

(V. 19.) Γάρ, before an explanatory sentence, as elsewhere in like way. The εἰς κατάκριμα of v. 18 is here explained by άμαρτολοι καταστάθηκαν, and the εἰς δικαίωσιν by δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται. — άμαρτολοι καταστάθηκαν, were made sinners. άμαρτολοι must here have its full meaning, i. e. that of active and then of suffering sinners. Chrys., Theophl., ἐπενήθησον κολάσεως, erroneously. Καθωστάσεως means sisters, constitutue, to present, to set forth, and then to make into something, 2 Pet. 1: 8. In the passive, to be made this or that, to become, without any exact parallel in the New Testament; for James 4: 4,
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1848.

Itt\textit{\texttildelow} may be in the Middle Voice; pass. in Thucyd. II. 65 (Fritzsche). That it is altogether equivalent to \textit{\texttildelow} (Phavorinus), is incorrect. It always means to \textit{be made} something. On the other hand, one must not, with Grotius and Boehme, explain it as meaning \textit{they are treated as sinners}; nor with Koppe, Reiche, and Fritzsche, \textit{they appear as sinners}, viz. in consequence of the penalty of death coming upon them, (Fritz. "eorum mora eoe peccavisse ostendit.") The simple thought is, \textit{They are become actual sinners; not merely through imputation}, (Bensa, Bengel). Comp. notes on v. 12. So in the after-clause, \textit{vinum karaoradzovn}, not, \textit{they shall be righteous}; not, \textit{they shall be treated as righteous}, but \textit{be made righteous} — be justified; and this, not through the imputation of active obedience of another, but in accordance with the usual idea of justification, i. e. pardoning mercy. The Fut. tense is employed here, as in 3: 30, because justification in respect to the many is not yet completed. Reiche refers it to the future revelation of the glory of Christians after the resurrection (?).

ARTICLE IV.

THE PRODUCB OF THE VINEYARD IN THE EAST.

By Rev. Henry Homes, American Missionary at Constantinople.

In a country where wine, as in America, is known as a great promoter of the crime of drunkenness, and where the vintage is supposed to be gathered chiefly for the purpose of making wine, it is difficult for the mind to do justice to the common language of Scripture which extends the vine and its products as one of the staffs of life. The fruits of the vine, designated by ten different words in the Bible, that are translated wine in our version, are in more than thirty different passages, associated with the tithes and offerings, or with corn and oil, as emblems of temporal blessings. Along with the field of grain is mentioned the vineyard; along with the harvest is mentioned the vintage; along with corn and oil, wine is almost always combined as the third representative of the three chief blessings of the year. We will quote but two of the many passages of this kind. "And he will love thee and bless thee and multiply thee: he will also bless the fruit of thy womb, and the fruit of thy hand, thy corn, and thy wine (\textit{\texttildelow}) and