this is doubtless what has commended them to the minds of thoughtful theologians. And this, too, is an illustration of that fulness of grace and truth (John 1: 16, 17), which has come to us, not merely in Christianity as a whole, but also in its separate confessions and doctrines; that every one can look at them in the point of view which best corresponds with his wants and peculiarities; and that error usually first enters in, when one considers that aspect of the truth, in which it is first presented to his own mind, as the only one under which it can be viewed, and denies everything which does not come within his own sphere of vision.

ARTICLE III.

THE MOOD IN LANGUAGE.

By Henry N. Day, Professor of Sacred Rhetoric in Western Reserve College, Hudson, Ohio.

Language is the body of thought. It is something more than the mere dress of thought. It has an internal, vital connection with it. As the living spirit, in assuming to itself a body, penetrates what was before inert, dead matter with its own peculiar life, fashions, organizes and animates it according to its own proper nature, so thought enters sounds in speech with a vital, determining, organizing power. It exists before language in order of nature. It makes language what it is. In order to determine the properties and laws of language, the nature and uses of its various functions or members, we must accordingly, first go to the thought which is the organic principle of speech, and ascertain what are the actual or possible characters of thought which may be incorporated and expressed in speech. It is in this view of the relations of language to thought that the follow-

to all being; or Hase (Lehrbuch d. Dogmatik, S. 527), the doctrine of God the Father over all, with whom humanity was united in new love through the Son of Man, who became (rather, was) a Son of God, so that all men might become sons through the Holy Spirit that binds together the church; or Wegscheider (Institut. S. 93), that God as Father, through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, has revealed himself to man, so that he, being redeemed from the bondage of sin, might become holy and blessed.
Mood as the Expression of the Copula.

1.

The proper Function of the Mood.

Thought never properly appears in speech but as an expressed judgment; and logic teaches us that a judgment necessarily contains three members, the subject, the predicate and the copula. In every thought expressed in speech, there must necessarily be these three members. If each of these essential members have not an actual form appropriated to itself in every uttered sentence, it must be ever implied. It was to be expected that in expressing itself, thought would ever seek to secure for each of these independent and yet essential members its appropriate form; and that we should find in language the proper sign and expression of each. The mood is the proper expression of the copula. This is its distinctive office.

The copula has no other proper expression. If it may sometimes express its peculiar character through the use of other functions of speech, of adverbs, tenses, by periphrastic expressions, it does this only as other specific functions sometimes borrow help of their fellows to do their own work. There is no form of periphrastic expression appropriated to the expression of the copula. Adverbs and tenses have their own office-work.

The mood, further, actually expresses the copula. The indicative mood as truly expresses that form of the copula which appears in a real judgment, as truly expresses the reality of the judgment, and the potential mood the possible in the judgment, as the preterite tense expresses past time. All the uses of the mood to express anything else than the form of the copula, may be clearly explained as abnormal and derived uses. The copula, for the most part, for reasons which will hereafter appear, except when the speaker would throw an emphasis on the copula or assertion rather than on the subject or predicate, is found in combination with the predicate in the form of the verb. In almost all principal sentences, where a judgment is enounced, the verb
combines in itself the expression of the copula and also of an activity.

The various relations of the activity, are indicated by means of the other inflections of the verb. The voice indicates the direction of the activity as to or from the subject or the object; the tense the time of the activity; the personal inflections, the relations to the speaker, person addressed, or person or thing spoken of; the gender, these latter relations more specifically; and number, the repetition of the activity. The mood expresses no relation of the activity on the one hand; and the copula, on the other, has no other inflection through which its modifications can be expressed.

The proper and distinctive function of the mood, then, is to indicate the modifications of the copula.

If this be received as settled, then we should expect that the words actually occurring in speech would correspond to the diverse forms of the copula or modes of the judgment. Further, if this be true, then the normal use of the word is confined to such sentences as express a complete judgment, to what in other words, are called principal sentences. The occurrence of modal inflections of verbs in dependent clauses, must then be explained as derived from the proper functions of the mood; and such use of the mood must be regarded as an abnormal use.

2. The possible Kinds of Moods.

If the mood is the proper expression of the copula, then the possible modes of the judgment will determine the possible moods in language. The modes of the judgment are all reducible to three classes,

viz: those of existence and non-existence;
    of possibility and impossibility; and
    of necessity and contingency.

As the modes of necessity and contingency cannot always be distinguished from each other by a mere negative, there seems to be a ground furnished in the very nature of the case, for a distinction of moods in this last class, which does not exist in the two former. Hence there can be but four proper moods in language. If in any particular dialect more are in use, we should expect that two or more would be reducible to one class, or perhaps be specifically but not generically distinct.
Before considering the various kinds of modal expression in actual use in speech, a preparatory remark or two seems to be needful in explanation. In the first place, the modal relation is a purely intellectual relation. In this respect it differs from all the other inflections of the verb. All the others originally indicate relations in time or space, or in both. Assuming, what will probably be questioned by no one, that the verb originally expresses a sensible activity, that is, motion in space, it may be easily shown, that voice, tense, number and the other inflections of the verb all denote relations of the activity or motion which lie in time or space. As such they are more easily reducible to forms of language. But the modifications of the judgment or the copula, as real, possible, necessary or contingent, are in their own nature entirely independent of time and space. They have no direct relation to any thing outward. They are pure intellectual abstractions. Hence it is with some difficulty that they are introduced into language at all. In some early languages, we find but two moods, as in the Hebrew. Hence, too, the copula is easily omitted even in more fully developed languages; as “Happy the man,” instead of “Happy is the man.” “Nulla salus bello.” Hence, moreover, a wide diversity in the forms and varieties of modal expression introduced into particular languages. Even when introduced in full, the modal inflection is, sometimes as in the Greek, indicated only by a vowel, the most slippery and unstable of letters, which itself easily vanishes away when euphony will allow, as in the conjugation of Greek verbs in -μό.

In the next place, it should be remarked that the modifications of the copula are expressed in language in various ways, as by adverbs, by proper tense-forms, by periphrastic expressions, as by auxiliaries and inflections.

We find in the Greek language the most philosophically complete and accurate modal system. For the expression of the real and its opposite we have the indicative;—for that of the possible, the subjunctive, as εἰ ποιῶ; quid faciam? what can I do?—for that of the necessary, the imperative;—and for the contingent, the optative, as ἢδεως ἐν ἐπιθέμεν. The infinitive, as it expresses no copula, has no proper modal force. It is used in dependent clauses to express a mere conception of an activity.

The subjunctive is so named from its more common use, as it occurs most frequently in dependent clauses, although that use
is, strictly, abnormal. The proper denomination of this mood is, the potential. The potential judgment, however, as compared with the real or indicative, needs but rarely to be expressed in speech. The different shades of possibility which it is necessary to express, have readily led to a periphrastic manner of expressing this form of the judgment.

As the potential is closely allied with the future, a possible event being in its nature ever future, absolutely or relatively, we find that the form approaches to that of the future tense, as is still more strikingly the case in the Latin. We discover, moreover, in this view of the subjunctive, the explanation of the fact, that while the subjunctive is used in the first person in exhortation and incitement, in the second and third persons, the optative is preferred in such cases.

The optative is likewise so named from its more frequent use. Yet desire is but a species of the conditional. In the Sanscrit, a still more subordinate species of the conditional judgment, has a particular mood for its expression—the precative. The optative mood in Greek expresses various conditional judgments besides the strictly optative.

As the potential is naturally allied to the future, so the conditional bears a close affinity to the past in time. Thus the optative in Greek takes the inflections of the historical tenses; and in other languages which have no proper conditional, the tense-forms denoting past time are used; as in Latin, "at fuerat melius, si te puer iste tenebat;" in English, "it would have been better," etc.

The imperative, on the other hand, as expressing a necessary judgment, looks more to the future; and its inflections and uses indicate this. It affirms the connection between the subject and the activity of the verb as necessary. In the second person, such a judgment would generally convey a command. In the third person, it is used not only to communicate an order, but, also, to predict a future event with emphatic affirmation. It is likewise used in certain kinds of concession, as O Tov: ἦξεν, ὅς οὐ λέγει. This is much stronger than the indicative or the potential mood would express. It carries the will with the expression as the cause of the effect, which hence must necessarily follow.

The Latin language has no peculiar form for the conditional. The subjunctive is used for the most part to express this as well as the potential form of the judgment. "Quid faciat?" what can he do? "Facerem, si possemi," I would do it, if I could. The
former is a potential, the latter, a conditional judgment. In modern European languages, for the most part, these words are formed by auxiliaries.

4. The abnormal Use of Moods.

If the theory we have proposed be correct, then, as before intimated, the use of moods in dependent clauses or in such sentences as make no assertion, must be regarded as abnormal and irregular. A dependent clause expresses no judgment but merely a conception. As the proper function of the verb is to express an activity, while the noun is the proper form for the designation of a being or substance, and as we may have a conception of an activity without affirming anything respecting it, it would be easy and natural, to employ the verb in its own proper form, even where there was no judgment but merely a conception of an activity to be expressed. The infinitive is the proper form for this expression of the activity of the verb, viewed merely as such or as a conception. It is, accordingly, in strict propriety to be regarded as the substantive form of the verb, as the participle is the proper form for the attributive use of the verb.

But, it is obvious, that conceptions of activities may be characterized as to their mode as real, potential, necessary or contingent, as well as judgments. As neither the infinitive nor the participle of itself can express this modality of the conception, resort must be had in language either to periphrastic expressions, as to the use of particles or adverbial clauses, or to a borrowed use of forms originally appropriated to other purposes. Nothing could be more natural than to employ forms which properly denoted modes of judgment, in order to express analogous modes of conceptions. It is in this way, we conceive, that the verb with modal intlection appears in dependent clauses. It appears in them with these inflections only, as a substitute for the infinitive and participle, combined with such particles or adverbial clauses as might be necessary to express the modality of the conception. As being more brief and therefore possessing more energy, it would readily be used far more frequently than the infinitive or participle, in those languages in which the moods were expressed by mere inflections, or in which the participial forms were defective. Besides, as the representation of a concrete has ever more force in speech than that of a pure abstract, the proper modal forms which always imply a concrete are even preferred to the infinitive or par-
ticiple which represent mere abstractions. "The man who loves," every body feels to be more energetic than, "The man loving."

It should be remarked here, that sometimes two distinct assertions are contained in the same period. The illative, causal and some adversative conjunctions, thus, often connect phrases or clauses which are both assertive in their character, and of course admit the mood in its proper function. In all such cases, the mood has its proper significance, and is used in accordance with the laws that regulate the use of it in all principal sentences. As some of these conjunctions in the Latin language sometimes show a relation between a conception and an assertion or another conception, as well as between proper assertions, the form of the mood will often determine whether the clause is assertive or not.

In all strictly dependent clauses, then, that is, in such as contain no expressed judgment, the modal form of the verb indicates the modality of the conception as real, potential, necessary or contingent. We have thus the general principle for the use of the mood in such clauses. According as the conception of the activity expressed in the verb is regarded as real, potential, necessary or contingent, the verb in the given case takes the mood which would properly be employed to express a judgment of that particular character.

In illustrating the application of this principle, it will be convenient to distinguish the various purposes for which the verb may be employed in dependent clauses. There are four very distinct purposes for which the verb is so employed; and these several uses of the verb may be denominated, respectively, the attributive, the substantive, the adverbial and the objective use.

It is to be remarked, generally, that the Latin language, more than most others, inclines to regard mere conceptions as only possible and not as real. The use of the subjunctive in dependent clauses is thus to be regarded as the law in that language, and the use of the indicative, the exception. Hence in the oratio obliqua and all similar cases, subordinate clauses depending on other dependent clauses, incline to appear in the subjunctive mood. For all such conceptions are removed farther from the field of reality. When the conception, if entertained by the speaker, might take the indicative, it takes the subjunctive when entertained or supposed to be entertained by others. Here is the explanation of such cases as the following: "mater irata est mihi, quia non redierim domum."—Plautus.

As contrasted with the use of the Greek and English tongues,
this principle may be stated thus: The conception of an activity expressed by a verb, is regarded as a potential in Latin, and takes the subjunctive unless a reality is clearly to be implied; in Greek and in English it is regarded as a real and takes the indicative, unless a potential or conditional is to be implied. The German follows nearly the analogy of the Latin.

1. The **attributive use of the verb in dependent clauses.** In this use of the verb, the indicative generally prevails even in the Latin, for the conception is generally a real one: “Hannibal male fecit, qui Capuae hiemavit.” In the following sentence, however, the conception not necessarily being regarded as real, the subjunctive is preferred: “Sunt qui censeant una animum et corpus occidere.” In the English language, the indicative is used in such cases, unless necessity, potentiality, or contingency is clearly requisite; as “The Tarquin, who might have retained the consulship, but for the jealousy of a people just tasting their new liberty, was the last,” etc.

2. The **substantive use.** Instead of the noun we often find the conception of an activity expressed in the form of the verb and constituting the subject or predicate of a sentence. The infinitive is the more proper form for this use; but the modal inflections frequently occur, not only because modality can be expressed simply only by these, but also, because the inflected forms are more energetic. In this use, the subjunctive is preferred in the Latin, unless the reality of the conception is to be made prominent: “Non est verisimile, ut Chrysogonus horum litteras adaman.” Where, however, the verb occurs in a proper case of apposition, we should expect the indicative as in the attributive use of the verb: “Hoc me ipse consulabar, quod non dubitabam.”

3. The **adverbial use.** Here two specific uses of the verb are to be distinguished. The first is where the verb is employed to modify the copula of the principal verb. In this case, the Latin often takes the subjunctive where the Greek has the indicative, as *nisi nomic, edidoueras*; *si quid habuissemus, dedissemus.* Indeed, the Latin always take the subjunctive, unless there is a clear implication of the reality of the conception expressed in the dependent verb. If the indicative occurs, it throws at once an emphasis on the existence of the conception; as “*si est ut dicat velle se, redde.*” Accordingly, where the principal verb is in the future tense, if the condition on which the truth of its assertion depends, can be separated as a preceding event from the activity of the principal verb, the subjunctive is used; if however the con-
dition is involved in the main assertion so as to partake of its reality, the indicative is used. Thus, “expectationem facilliere vinceres, si hoc statueris;” but “nunquam labere, si te audies.”

The other adverbial use of the verb in a dependent clause is to modify the activity expressed in the verb. These modifications may be distinguished into those of time, place and manner. In all, however, the indicative or subjunctive is used according as the reality or only the possibility or contingency of the activity expressed by the dependent verb is fully to be implied or not. As, “Dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur.” “Donec, spectante Vitelio, interfactus est.” “Sed arma sumere non ante cuiquam moris quam civitas suffecturum probaverit.” In the sentence, “Male fecit Hannibal qui Capuae hiemari,” the subjunctive is used because the fact of Hannibal’s having wintered at Capua is intended to be entirely hidden behind the adverbial use of the verb. The expression is equivalent to this: in so far as he wintered at Capua. Where, thus, the mere adverbial use of the verb is intended, the subjunctive is always to be preferred.

4. The objective use of the verb. As the result of an activity is necessarily conceived of as future, the subjunctive mood as the proper expression of possibility and contingency, is employed in denoting the object of the verb. Here the Latin language always carefully distinguishes the objective from the attributive force of the verb. Where the indicative would be employed in the latter case, the subjunctive is found in the former; and the use of the one or the other determines the intention of the writer. As in the sentence, “praemisit in urbem edictum, quo vocabulum Augusti differeret, Caesaris non recipere,” etc., the use of the subjunctive shows that the edict not merely contained the intelligence of the fact that the title of Augustus was spread abroad, but that it was sent for that very purpose. The use of the indicative would intimate nothing as to the intent or object of the edict; but merely that the delay to take the title was incidentally communicated in it.

Sometimes the verb when it is used to modify a noun, or is attributive, yet takes the objective form, and is then put in the subjunctive; as “neque sum in hac opinione, ut credam.” The adverbial form, sometimes, cloaks an objective sense, and accordingly takes the subjunctive: “Nam se quoque moveri interim finget, ut pro Rabirio Postumo Cicero, dum aditum sibi ad aures faciat, et auctoritatem indurat vera sentientias,” etc.; where “dum faciat” is to be rendered “in order to make.”
The reason for the use of the subjunctive in the objective clause obviously does not exist after verbs of affirming and the like, as Dicam quod sentio. This may, indeed, be regarded as an attributive use of the verb.

The foregoing illustrations will suffice to explain the meaning and application of the principle we have proposed. This is our object in adding them, and not to extend the induction, so far as might be thought necessary in order to establish, beyond doubt, the correctness of the view we have taken.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CONSISTENCY OF THE ETERNAL PURPOSES OF GOD WITH THE FREE AGENCY OF MEN.


One of the most plausible objections ever urged against the doctrine of God's eternal purposes, is its alleged inconsistency with man's freedom of action. As this objection is, probably, more frequently advanced and more sensibly felt than any other, it may not be amiss to give it a careful examination. And it may be proper to remark at the outset, that the objection lies with as much force against the government and overruling agency of God, as against the doctrine of his eternal purposes. I would then ask those who object to the doctrine of the divine decrees on the supposed ground, that it is inconsistent with the free agency of man: do you believe that God reigns in the natural and moral world—that he does all his pleasure in the armies of heaven above and among the inhabitants of this lower world? If not, you have dethroned the monarch of the universe. You have taken from him his sceptre and driven him from his kingdom. You are, to all intents and purposes, an atheist. You do not believe in the existence of a perfect moral Governor of the world. And the first question to be discussed with you must be,—not, has God from eternity formed a perfect plan of government? has he foreordained whatsoever comes to pass?—but, is there a perfect God who reigns on the throne of the universe? But if, on the other hand, you admit this truth, if you admit that God does