After Freud, what? I fancy that this is the really significant question and the proper way in which to frame it; for such was the towering genius of this fantastic pioneer that since he worked and thought and wrote every serious theorist and practitioner in the psychoanalytic field has had inevitably to come to terms with him. Freud could be rebutted, his work could be affirmed, his thought might be reorientated or developed, but he could not be ignored. The monumental biography provided in the last decade by Ernest Jones not only demonstrated why this must be so, but also afforded the basic material for a critical and philosophical assessment. We begin to understand the man, a child of his age yet a giant of the future, flinging off insights which could not always be satisfactorily comprehended by his formulations, changing his mind, moving on from phase to phase, fruitful and fascinating in the very leaving of the loose ends that were to tantalise and divide colleagues and successors.

So, after Freud, what? It is possible to provide an answer in neat schematic, Hegelian terms. There is the thesis, supported by most of the published work of Freud and basically defended and delineated by his disciples, Jones, Abraham, Ferenczi. It preoccupied itself with the canonised categories of id, ego, and super ego, pivoted on the genital phase of childhood from the third year and the resolution of the Oedipus complex, worked in terms of instincts, of libido, of sexuality. It was essentially a psychobiology of the organism, reflecting the scientific philosophy of the late nineteenth century. But there is also and over against it the antithesis, having Adlerian roots but enunciated in America particularly by Karen Horney and Erich Fromm. This was marked by a shift of emphasis from the unconscious to the conscious and pre-conscious, from childhood to adult life, from inheritance to environment, from instinct-theory to neurotic character-trends, from id to ego, from depth psychology to a psychology of the development of the ego under cultural pressure, from depth-psychology to a psychology of the development of the ego under cultural pressure, from adjustment to self-realisation. It was basically a psychosociology in harmony with the cultural preoccupations and sociological optimism of the twentieth century American scene.

But thesis and antithesis find their resolution at last in the synthesis which has been steadily emerging within the borders of
Britain. Here the first key figure is Melanie Klein. With her there is the return to Freudian roots, though with far-reaching modifications. Psychobiology and psychosociology give place to true psychology, where the object of investigation is not the organism or the cultural community but the person. The psychoanalysis of children by reference to phantasy material and play technique resulted in the thrust back of the super ego and the Oedipus situation to the first year of life, to the oral phase, and in a shift of emphasis from sexuality to aggression. It meant that the primary importance of the mother-child relationship had finally received adequate recognition. Ferenczi had already moved in this direction away from the paternalistic theory of Freud. With the researches of Mrs. Klein this insight is established.

It is also to Melanie Klein that we owe the beginnings of theory of psychic structure that makes use of the concept of “internal objects.” There are unconscious psychic images developed by repression within the inner mental world—some bad, some good, but all emotionally loaded and all removed from relationship with outer reality. Thus is constituted from the earliest months of infancy a world of inner reality which increasingly influences reaction to the world of outer reality. Herein is found to lie both the content of the structure of psychic personality and also the essence of neurosis.

It is at this point that the work of W. R. D. Fairbairn becomes supremely relevant. With him there comes the explicit recognition that the Kleinian researches press toward and demand a completely revised theory of endopsychic structure. It is still upon Freud that we must build, but it must necessarily be both in the establishment of the most adequate Freudian insight and in the drastic reframing of the classic Freudian formulation. The result is the healing of the Freudian divorce between energy and structure, id and ego, and the decisive rejection of the atomistic tendencies which treated instincts, impulses, libido, as though they were some kind of mental entities. Libido is more basic than aggression (pace Klein). But it is not libido that seeks, but the libidinal ego; and what it seeks is not pleasure but the object and right relationship with it. So growth consists in the movement from infantile dependence, marked by a truly personal interdependence, a capacity for giving and receiving.

It is because of frustration in the establishment of early satisfactory object relationships that trouble arises. The “object” is internalised and split into a good object and a bad object in the inner phantasy world; and the process inevitably carries with it a corresponding internalisation and split of the ego. Thus is set up an inner arena of relationships perpetuating infantile dependence. Here, and not in the Oedipus situation, is to be found the ultimate
cause of psychosis. It is when the ego has to operate defensively in its struggles against the problems of this early period in which internal bad objects were created that the psychoneuroses appear.

It is to the charting of the territory I have here outlined that a recent volume in the International Psycho-Analytical Library\(^1\) is devoted. Apart from a tendency towards unnecessary repetitiveness in the earlier sections of the book, Mr. Guntrip has done a magnificent job. He is a disciple of Fairbairn, who in *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality* gave us a decade ago the fruits of his research. He follows his master closely, and there is consequently little in this book in the way of conclusions that is new. But he does provide an impressive contextual survey of the psychoanalytical field, and in the important and baffling matter of "regression" he does point us beyond Fairbairn's position. Material is amassed, related, and assessed with competence, and the whole is informed by a pleasing clarity of presentation.

This is an area of investigation that is relevant to the Minister and his task. It is to be hoped that we are outgrowing the facile identification of psychology and pastoral theology, of psychotherapy and pastoral ministration. Nevertheless, it would be an equally damaging error to imagine that we can afford to ignore all light thrown by the sciences upon human personality. We must know our God; we must also know our man. At this point the psychological contribution is only one among many. But it may prove to be crucial.

Still Mr. Guntrip should be treated with critical caution and not be accepted too readily. I confess that I always react to the psychodynamic theory of Fairbairn with deep-rooted suspicion. For the fact is that from a Christian point of view it is almost too good to be true. The primary unity of the ego, the priority of libido to aggression, of love to hate, the basic place of interpersonal relationships for all growth towards maturity, the living in the two worlds of inner phantasy and outer reality, the determining nature of infantile dependence—all this and so much more lends itself so readily to the drawing of straight lines from psychology to orthodox belief. It is all so convenient. And the Church is always prone to put its money on the most attractive secular horse, without too much regard for its pedigree, its stamina, or its respectibility. It should not be forgotten that, among his peers, Fairbairn remains very much out on a limb.

Yet, if caution be maintained, certain provisional suggestions may be advanced. This theory of personality structure is clinically based, logically coherent, and tied fast to commonsense. I think it may be forcefully argued that the true way forward does lie in

\(^{1}\) *Personality Structure and Human Interaction*, by H. Guntrip. The Hogarth Press Ltd. 45s. 1961.
the building upon Freudian foundations. And this needs saying if only because so much of modern Christian thinking has made use of and related itself to the theories of Jung rather than Freud. I think also that one of the main reasons for this is not far to seek. It is surely due to the assumption that the Jungian emphases are the most congenial to the Christian position. Superficially this might seem indisputable, but a more discerning investigation does not provide confirmation. In one of his later writings Erich Fromm probed this issue, and enabled us to see quite clearly that the Christian warfare is not with Sigmund Freud but with his erstwhile colleague. It is not the least of the indirect gifts of Mr. Guntrip’s study that it helps to buttress the conviction that in its relevant emphases Christian belief is on the side not only of the angels but also of reality.

Two further volumes in the Old Testament Library maintain the high standard already set. Needless to say the commentary on Exodus is the work of a first-class scholar who, despite his familiar concern with oral tradition and form criticism, holds to the fundamental importance of the analysis of sources and is careful both in text and exposition to distinguish, relate and contrast the familiar J, E, and P. The Yahwistic compilation is assigned, in accordance with contemporary trends, to the period of the united kingdom, and P is dated in the usual fashion; but Noth is suitably and wisely cautious in his attitude to the Eltonistic document. Against Rudolph and Volz he maintains belief in E as a separate source, but he is hesitant as to the possibilities whether of dating or of reconstruction.

If this work is compared with Von Rad’s Genesis, there becomes apparent a certain loss of profundity, or artistry, of theological penetration. Partly this is due to the difference in material to be treated. Genesis leads itself more readily to the broad canvas. Exodus has indeed the high points in Mosaic call, deliverance, and covenant-making, but P increasingly forces his preoccupations to the front and ties the commentator to the minutiae of exegesis. Yet perhaps this is not the whole story. The student who is unfamiliar with Noth’s post-war work on the Pentateuch should be alert to and constantly reminding himself of a problem of historical scepticism. For this continental scholar the history of Israel properly begins after the settlement in Palestine, the traditions of the earlier period are not in general of primary historical value, and Moses is not of pivotal significance in the Exodus story. Is it perhaps because of the inevitable suspension of judgment about the faith of Israel in its desert days that this commentary, outstanding

as it is, seems at times to be lacking both life and depth? Nevertheless, the governing word must be one of grateful recognition of a wealth of painstaking and accurate exegesis.

Whatever may be lacking in Noth's exposition is amply provided in the translation of Eichrodt's first volume. Of any work such as this we must ask two questions. How successful is it in grappling with the problems involved in the writing of an Old Testament Theology? How far within the approach chosen does it do justice to the material? On both counts the positive verdict must be awarded.

The author devotes a concluding appendix to the examination of the principles determining the recent Old Testament Theology of Gerhard von Rad. This latter presentation which conceives the expositor's task to be basically the echoing of the Old Testament's own historical and confessional recital, which bears marked resemblance to the standpoint of Ernest Wright, and which abhors all preoccupation with the theological world of Israel's faith, is in stark contrast to Eichrodt's own position. He defends that position still, with its search for Israel's unique realm of belief, its attempt to proceed in a systematic way that yet does justice to historical movement, its grasp of the covenant concept as epitomising God's action in history and thus as providing the key that will open up the Old Testament in its structural unity. So the present volume discusses the law and cultus of the covenant, delineates the nature of the covenant God, and discusses the covenant officials and leaders, whether prophets, priests, or kings.

It is hard to realise that this work was prepared as long ago as 1933. Granted that what we have is a revised edition, it yet remains a staggering achievement. It is so very markedly a book of the nineteen sixties, giving the impression that Old Testament scholarship has just about caught up with Eichrodt. The learning is massive, the style pleasing even in translation, the references to the relevant literature discerning and comprehensive. Throughout the author betrays an openness towards evidence that refuses to twist and distort for the sake of fitting a hallowed pattern or confirming a current theory. Consequently he is not among the extremists on any issue, and may be adjudged by some to be unduly conservative in his critical conclusions. But whatever be the verdict on this detail or that, the overwhelming impression left is of one who has really stepped inside the faith of ancient Israel. The best of the continental scholarship of the last forty years has been sifted, assessed, and pressed into fruitful order by a master hand. Amid so much of merit it is arbitrary to grade or select. But I cannot forbear to single out for special mention the treatment of early prophetism, for this is a field that seldom obtains in English works the illuminating exposition it requires. Perhaps we are at
last beginning to appreciate the crucial impact of the Solomonic monarchy upon the faith and cultus of amphictyonic Israel, and thence the lines that must be drawn from the political disturbances of the 8th and 9th centuries and the prophetic participation therein to the Elohist historical document and even to Deuteronomy itself. This is not Eichrodt’s direct concern. But he has an unerring sense for the big issues of faith and the two contingencies of the history that brings them to birth. The translator records his own conviction that “this is incomparably the greatest book in its field.” From a more limited knowledge I gladly underline and confirm that assessment.

The appearance of No. 33 in the Studies in Biblical Theology series remind us that much water has flowed under the bridge since the first of these monographs appeared; and increasingly there are to be heard suggestions that “biblical theology” has had its day. Professor Barr, in his recent work The Semantics of Biblical Language, launched an unhibited frontal attack upon some of the familiar techniques of its characteristic exponents and left a multitude of searching question marks across the field. In his present study he concentrates his troops on a narrower area and examines the work of Marsh, Cullmann, and J. A. T. Robinson on the so-called biblical concept of time, in so far as they apply certain lexical procedures in their understanding of such key words as kaires, chronos, aion. A mighty sledgehammer is wielded to crack a fragile nut.

The author deplores the shift of attention from accurate translations and textual commentaries to the word-studies and the theological dictionaries. He criticises the easy assumption that biblical terminology teaches us truth. He demands that we refuse to allow the interpretation of words in terms of some general context of biblical thinking to divert our attention away from a strict examination of actual syntactical contexts. He is extremely doubtful whether there can be said to be a biblical view of time in any meaningful sense whatever. And he concludes from these particular criticisms that current ways of viewing and stating both the unity and the distinctiveness of Scripture will need to be drastically modified.

Is he wholly right? Clearly he has uncovered some flimsy foundations. A theory and a technique have led some biblical expositors to propound conclusions that in certain respects fly in the face of plain incontrovertible scriptural usage. There has grown up a mystique about biblical words that badly needed challenging. But I fancy that the wise man will refuse to be stampeded or to draw too many far-reaching conclusions too quickly. “Words are symbols, and symbols, moreover, which

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3 *Biblical Words for Time*, by J. Barr. S.C.M. Press Ltd. 13s. 6d. 1962.
disclose something of the realities they express." So John Marsh has written. James Barr objects, and partly ridicules. But important as semantics may be, it is folly in this day and age to imagine that any of us lack or should lack philosophical presuppositions. Perhaps it is in this area that the battle must be continued.

Meanwhile, I can imagine Professor Barr at work with a blue pencil on Volume 5 of the series: Religious Perspectives. Its author is one of the commanding American Old Testament scholars of our time, whose reluctance to write has impoverished us all. But now at last we have from him a small but challenging study in Israel's ethic and ethics of which it might be commendation enough to say that it stands in the tradition of Paul Minear's Eyes of Faith. The way of the Word, the symbols of the way, the beginning of the way, the way of the leaders, the way of worship, the way of the future—these are chapter headings which prepare us for the approach that Professor Muilenburg would take. He cuts open the historical life of Israel, and with deft strokes provides us with the cross-section that invites us to look within. He is not blind to the shifts of historical progression, but his emphasis is on unity and distinctiveness. He shares, though at a deeper level, the insight of Matthew Arnold, who would declare that it is this people Israel which knows the way the world is going.

This is no pioneer work. It tells a familiar story. Yet its author has seen and expounded with unsurpassed clarity the eternal significance of the Old Testament, and he writes with a rare verve and power. Amid the mass of superficially similar presentations his prophetic call could so easily be passed over and disregarded. It should not be.

Perhaps it is salutary to step at last outside the charmed circle of faith and confront the apologetic task, to question our assumptions, to ask concerning the rationality of our belief. A slim volume, which is subtitled The Logic of Religious Belief promises to be a relevant guide, and those who sampled the author's previous work Language and Christian Belief will expect the working of a keen mind and know something of the way they will be asked to tread. Because we cannot oppose faith and reason we need philosophy. We must enquire about the logical status of our religious assertions. We must distinguish the various types of these assertions. We must face the problems of verification and falsification. Such a programme involves Mr. Wilson in some acute criticism of the attitudes of contemporary Christian thinkers, of Coulson, Mackintyre, and

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Farrer. It leads him more positively to conclude that the religious claims of primary significance are the assertions that appear to express "facts about the supernatural," that the attempt to provide a firm rational foundation for such assertions must proceed by way of religious experience, that religious experience can qualify as cognitive experience, that a way of testing informative religious assertions can be envisaged. All this is valuable, and much may be valid. But the justification of this study lies, it seems to me, not in its affirmatory conclusions, tentative as they are, but in the clarification of thought that it provides and in its stubborn refusal either to abate the claim for commitment or to countenance the irrationality of faith. We may not be entirely clear as to what it is that we should be saying to our generation. But at least we should be utterly clear that there are certain things we cannot and must not say. Religious assertions do not fill in the gaps left by science. They are not self-justified in the sense that no evidence should be expected for them outside themselves. They do not derive validity solely on the basis of authority. We must cease to argue in these kinds of ways. For in the end, to forsake rationality is to destroy faith.

N. Clark