

THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN TILLICH'S THEOLOGY

ARTHUR F. HOLMES, PH.D.

The relationship of philosophy to theology is a variable thing, depending in part on the views held from time to time of the nature of human reasoning and of proper philosophic method. Recent decades have seen a revolution in these views. Scientific empiricism and dogmatic rationalism have both had their day, and a wider and richer conception of philosophy and human reason is emerging in both analytic and phenomenological thought, one which goes beyond the forms of traditional thought, not denying their validity but questioning the range of their application and the claims they make to objectivity. It is the assumption of this paper that analytic and phenomenological investigations have progressed to the point that we can no longer rest content with older notions of philosophic reasoning, but must take cognizance of the enriched understanding of reason and experience, and of the resultant claim that truth cannot be reduced simply to empirical correspondence or rational coherence. Elsewhere I have attempted to outline an informal logic of religious belief in the light of these developments.¹ The purpose of the present paper is to examine Tillich's attempt to relate this conception of philosophy and human reason to theology, in the hope that we may learn from him both some mistakes to avoid and some emphases to cultivate.

Paul Tillich regarded himself as a theologian rather than a philosopher. Yet his commitment to "apologetic" rather than "kerygmatic" theology forces him into philosophy as well; an "apologetic theology," he tells us, is an "answering theology," answering the questions implied in the present human situation in the power of the eternal message. His method is one of correlation: addressing the answers implied in the Christian message to the questions pointed up by philosophy.² He attempts to make "the correlation of existence and the Christ" his central theme.³ In the method of correlation, philosophy's role is two-fold: (1) it clarifies the questions to which theology must speak, and (2) it provides theology with the conceptual means whereby it can speak the Christian message to men today. We shall look at each of these tasks in turn.

I. Philosophy and the Question

1. What is being-in-itself? What are the structures of being which make possible various forms of human experience? This is the philosophic question. Tillich interprets it, however, as calling for neither rationalistic

1. "Philosophy and Religious Belief." *Pacific Philosophy Forum*, V. (May 1967). 3-51.
2. S. T. I. 6. (Hereafter S.T. refers to Tillich's *Systematic Theology*.)
3. S.T. II. 19.

abstractions nor Kantian categories, but for a painstaking analysis of human existence. Underlying the traditional wording of the question is its existential source, for like the existentialists Tillich is convinced that philosophic reasoning arises out of human concern in historical situations. He starts, therefore, with the self-consciousness of existential man and with the threat of non-being under which a man lives.

The material of the existential question is taken from the whole of human experience and its manifold ways of expression. This refers to past and present, to popular language and great literature, to art and philosophy, to science and psychology. It refers to myth and liturgy, to religious traditions, and to present experiences. All this, as far as it reflects man's existential predicament, is the material without the help of which the existential question cannot be formulated.⁴

To describe the structure of being underlying conscious human activities is the special calling of the phenomenological method which Tillich adapts from Heidegger. The philosopher brackets the multifarious materials of experience in order to bring to light *a priori* categories and concepts. These can then be directly grasped—intuition is the phenomenological term—and described. As an *a priori* they are not universal and logically necessary in either the sense required by dogmatic metaphysics or that of Kant's first critique: phenomenology regards all such approaches as ill-founded. But nor are we left like the empirical sceptic, devoid of any *a priori* that can give meaning to experience. Phenomenology arose precisely as an attempt to avoid both logicism and scepticism. It employs a richer view of reason than does logicism and a wider empiricism than the positivist. It looks through a man's being-in-the-world to the structure of being-itself.

Whenever man has looked at his world, he has found himself in it as a part of it. But he also has realized that he is a stranger in the world of objects, unable to penetrate it beyond a certain level of scientific analysis. And then he has become aware of the fact that he himself is the door to the deeper levels of reality, that in his own existence he has the only possible approach to existence, itself. . . [It means] that the immediate experience of one's own existing reveals something of the nature of existence generally.⁵

The *a priori* Tillich is after is an existential one: It accounts for the condition of man-in-history, for his lived-world, for his historical experience and activities.⁶ Husserl's transcendental phenomenology has here given way to an existential phenomenology geared to human historicity.

4. S.T. III. 15. Cf. I. 63; II. 11.

5. S.T. I. 62. Cf. Alexander J. McKelway, *The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich* (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1964), p. 26f.

6. S.T. I. 18f, 166f; *Interpretation of History* (New York: Schribner, 1936), p. 37.

Tillich's *a priori* ontological structures, like Heidegger's *existentialia*, are temporal and arise in the processes of historical becoming. They are to be distinguished both from formal logical categories and from cosmological categories which, when extended to man, deprive him of his historicity and obscure the meaning of his being-in-the-world, and so of being-itself.

Tillich distinguishes "Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,"⁷ the ontological and cosmological. The former is the basic one, and operates on the principle that man is immediately aware with his whole being of something unconditional, being-itself. The latter assumes a more limited conception of human reason as purely objective, cognitive and dispassionate; taken alone, it dehumanizes man, falsifies being, and leads to a destructive cleavage between philosophy and religion. But used as an expression of ontological awareness, it can contribute to their reconciliation: dispassionate theoretical thought can subserve existential thinking of the ontological type, for there it is kept in a meaningful context. Man remains whole and is immersed by his historical existence in being-itself.

Despite the tendency to overrate man's being-in-the-world as the only way open to being-itself, and despite the much-publicized need to clarify the bearing of this approach on traditional metaphysics, I wish to suggest that existential phenomenology is extremely helpful in focusing dimensions of experience which narrower empiricisms have ignored, and in exposing underlying structures to which more rationalistic approaches have been blind. It is not irrationalistic, but a methodical examination of conscious human existence. It sees consciousness as neither a subjective *tabula rasa* nor an infallible custodian of universal and necessary truths, but as a structured historical existent in lived relationships with its world. The descriptions it offers of the structure of perception, freedom, temporality, social relations, language, truth, etc., cannot be ignored even if they need to be carefully evaluated. Analyses of the I-Thou relationship, to cite one example, have profoundly affected both theology and psychology, and have enriched our conceptual tools for articulating a view of religious knowledge. The work of men like Rudolph Otto, Max Scheler, Gerardus Van der Leeuw, Mircea Eliade and others on the phenomenology of religion is of lasting significance.⁸ One may disagree with the use these writers make of the phenomena, and in some regard with the selectivity and perspectives exhibited in their descriptions of religious consciousness, but they do afford access to data that cannot be ignored. Tillich also. He develops important aspects of the phenomenology of faith. He points out that ultimate concern aids the phenomenological task by itself bracketing all other concerns. He

7. *Theology of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 10-29. Cf. S.T. I. 72f.

8. For a brief summary of their work see John Macquarrie, *Twentieth Century Religious Philosophy* (Harper and Row, 1963).

sees the structure of the religious act as intentional, directed towards the Unconditional Ground of our Being, and describes its consequent self-authenticating operation.

2. Revealing and provocative as this sort of description may be, Tillich is not content therewith. The range of human experience is so vast and such actually contradictory examples may be adduced that a criterion of some sort must be employed. If phenomenology is to operate on its own principles, the criterion must be intrinsic to the phenomenological method itself. Decisions must be based on the choice of a particularly convincing example which illumines all else and so has universal meaning. Tillich calls this a "critical phenomenology:" every other example described is judged in terms of a meaning derived from the "classical example." The Christian finds Peter's reception of Jesus as the Christ, for instance, particularly illuminating in judging other examples of revelation that phenomenological description may adduce.⁹ Implicit here is Tillich's "dynamic" concept of truth in relation to *Kairos*. *Kairos*-truth confronts one with a decision at the right historical time, and in this regard is absolute. Peter's reception of Jesus is an example of revelation because it embodies his response to a historical confrontation. But it is not binding on everyone—as a "classical example" it is true only for those to whom this symbol of revelation has power because of some historic moment of disclosure of their own. Even Tillich's critical phenomenology, then, does not pretend to establish universally valid conclusions.¹⁰

Phenomenology has always had difficulty universalizing any one philosophical viewpoint. Husserl grappled continually with the difficulty in achieving a complete "reduction" and a corresponding pure "intuition." As a result his student Martin Heidegger attempted to combine with phenomenology Wilhelm Dilthey's emphasis on the historicity of philosophical thinking. Tillich agrees with Heidegger in this, but goes further. Heidegger felt a Diltheyan *Verstehen*-hermeneutic could enter into historical existence and describe emphatically the anxiety and fatefulness of its being-unto-death. But his descriptions, like those of Sartre, are too often relative to his own experience, too often incomplete, too often inclined to see man as alone rather than in community.¹¹ They are not as universally illuminating as he intended: they are somewhat autobiographical, revealing unconscious criteria of Heidegger's own tacit choosing. Tillich prefers his own deliberately chosen criteria, those of a Christian.

9. S.T. I. 107f. Cf. H. Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement* (Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), vol. II, p. 639f.

10. S.T. I. 59-66, 71-81, 100-105, 150-153.

11. Spiegelberg, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 88-91; Calvin Schrag, "Phenomenology, Ontology and History in the Philos. of Heidegger," *Révue Internationale de Philosophie*, XII (1958), 130. In an article entitled "Phenomenology and the Relativity of World Views," in *The Personalist*, July, 1967, I have argued more fully the insufficiency of a descriptive phenomenology for avoiding world-view decisions.

At this point his theological preconceptions affect his phenomenological description. The classical example he cites, of Peter receiving Jesus as the Christ, exposes the preconception that revelation is not "information about otherwise hidden truth" but the grasping, shaking power of the Ground of Being that upsets our established historical structures. It is neither propositional nor historical, but the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately. The Bible records the human witness of those who participated in revealing events, but it is not in itself revelatory. Nor are the other sources of theology he lists, namely church history and the history of religion and culture. A large proportion of the ideas derived from such assumed revelations are a matter not of revelation but of observation, intuition and reflective conclusion. They must all be subjected to scholarly testing, for it is not ideas about nature and history and people, about their future and their past, that are of ultimate concern to us. God alone, Being-itself, is the subject of revelation, and he is always revealed *for someone* and *in a concrete situation* of concern. Revelation is existential; the ideas we acquire are symbolic expressions of our awareness of existential estrangement and the way it can be treated.¹²

As an orthodox doctrine of revelation this is of course inadequate. Tillich fails to see in addition to direct revelation, the trans-historical revelatory significance of ideas and conclusions reached and expressed under the guidance of Divine inspiration. The revelatory character of the Christ-event is far from satisfied by Tillich's view of Jesus. It is doubtful whether any one classic example of the sort Tillich wants will suffice, for phenomenology confines itself to the "for-me" aspects of a structure of being, and gets to the "in-itself" only by extrapolation. The Biblical doctrine of revelation certainly includes the existential "for-me," but it is not confined to this. Historical event and propositional interpretation are as ingredient as the existential element. This complexity eludes Tillich, partly because of his "classic example" method, partly because of his preconceptions and partly because of the "for-me" limitations of phenomenology. But this does not mean we have nothing to learn for ourselves from his use of phenomenology: if we confess that our knowledge of God involves "all our being's ransomed powers," if we agree that human personality is richer by far than Descartes' *res cogitans* would lead us to think, and if we admit the inadequacy of a narrowly scientific view of man and reason, then we can see more readily how revelation includes something more than theoretical propositions, something which Enlightenment epistemologies precluded but which phenomenology helps bring to light. Propositions alone Tillich rejects, and he is right. But he substitutes existential awareness alone, and in this he is wrong. Revelation is existential, but it is also propositional. Both the existential and the propositional refer back to the historical event and its meaning, the former to its existential meaning-for-me—and the latter to its conceptual meaning-in-itself. The symbols employed express conceptual

12. S.T. I. 34ff, 110.

as well as existential meaning. We need accordingly to develop a religious epistemology which combines elements of historical, existential and conceptual knowledge in a fashion that is true to the modes of Divine self-revelation recorded in and exemplified by Scripture.

Tillich's theology is the result of theological preconceptions rather than of phenomenological description. He is explicit about this. Philosophy can only point up the question, not give the answer. To derive religious answers from philosophy, as natural theology attempted to do, is a "self-defying" kind of apologetic theology. Philosophy has no answers of its own, explicitly or implicitly. The answers philosophers pose they derive from religious or quasi-religious traditions, not from phenomenological descriptions. Augustine and Dostoevski, Marx and Sartre, Nietzsche and Heidegger—whether they be humanistic or theistic they speak to the human predicament from religious perspectives they have adopted.¹³ The task of philosophy, after all, is to clarify the questions to which theology must speak.

Yet even the way we ask a question may be loaded. If phenomenological description is conducted under the judgment of criteria that reflect our theological preconceptions, then these preconceptions help to determine the way the structure of being is exhibited, and consequently what questions are posed, and how. If we think Tillich does not speak to *our* questions, this is because they are *ours* and *not his*. Admittedly, some of our questions may be existentially trivial: theologians and philosophers gravitate too often to the trivial and irrelevant. It may also be true that Tillich is more aware of some real questions than we are. But is it the case that Tillich has exhausted the meaning of the existential questions to which Christian theology speaks—questions about faith and hope, finitude and guilt, death and despair? And is it the case that theology speaks to existential questions only and not to theoretical questions also? And if to theoretical questions also, then these cannot be described by a phenomenological approach. Some other philosophic method is needed, something more historical and dialectical. In other words, the evangelical is led by his own theological preconceptions to see more questions than does Tillich, and more in some of Tillich's questions than he does. But who then is to say which preconceptions are preferable? If truth means only *Kairos*-disclosure value and not some sort of cognitive adequacy, if revelation is only confrontation and not the communication of understanding, it is hardly possible to discuss the relative merits of one theological preconception as against another. The choice, like the choice of a "classic example," remains an exclusively private and existential affair.

With this outcome, I for one am not satisfied. Even granted that truth reveals itself to me through its disclosure-value—and in the case of the truth of the Christian revelation this is accomplished by the witness

13. S.T. I. 8; II. 13f, 25.

of the Holy Spirit—I am still not convinced that this is *all* there is to religious belief and world-viewish decisions. Phenomenologically, there seems to be a lot more; we need to show what more there is, what public considerations appear in the phenomenology of truth-judgment. I suggest that some careful phenomenological work at this point can exhibit both the inadequacies of Tillich's *Kairos* theory on his own terms, and a more fruitfully structured relationship between disclosure-value on the one hand and empirical and rational considerations on the other. But this too is a task from which Tillich is kept by his preconceptions. The correlation of theological answers to existential questions is all he can allow.

II. *Philosophy and the Answer*

1. While on the one hand theology cannot derive its answers from the questions involved in our existence, on the other hand it must not elaborate its own answers without relating them to the questions. The unrelated answers of a "self-defying kerygmatic theology" are not answers at all, for they are not addressed to concrete questions; they lack disclosure-value for man-in-the-world. Tillich has in mind the Barthian repudiation of philosophy on the grounds that the ontological question makes doubtful that which is most sacred and which is infinitely significant. This is as mistaken as the opposing rejection of Biblical religion on the supposition that it prohibits asking the ontological question at all.¹⁴ Both extremes presuppose a basic incompatibility between philosophic ontology and the Biblical world-view, such that either the one or the other must be rejected—the two cannot be held together.

This disjunction stems from the breakdown of the liberal synthesis of Christianity and the modern mind initiated by Schleiermacher and Hegel. People are too wearied and disappointed to try yet another synthesis after so many have failed. But Tillich sees no other choice.

We must try again! And we want to try by asking the question: Do the attitudes and concepts of Biblical religion have implications which not only allow but demand a synthesis with the search for ultimate reality? And conversely, does not ontological thought have implications which open it for the concern for Biblical religion?¹⁵

In making a fresh attempt, then, he must show that the symbols used in the Christian message are really the answers to the existential questions, that the concrete expression of ultimate concern to which the theologian is committed and his special revelatory experience do apply.

This is no easy task, for the Christian message is not "a sum of revealed truths which have fallen into the human situation like strange

14. S.T. I. 8; *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality* (University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 56f.

15. *Bibl. Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, p. 57.

bodies from a strange world."¹⁶ The existential form of the questions to be answered requires that the theologian participate in the situation of the question. Instead of arrogantly taking revelatory answers for granted, he struggles for the answer, struggles to translate the substance of the message into the form required of answers to existential questions. The distinction between substance and form is crucial. The substance of theological answers cannot be derived from the questions. Yet their form cannot remain independent of the form of the questions. And forms vary historically.

If theology gives the answer, "the Christ," to the question implied in human estrangement, it does so differently, depending on whether the reference is to the existential conflicts of Jewish legalism, to the existential despair of Greek scepticism, or to the threat of nihilism as expressed in twentieth-century literature, art and psychology. Nevertheless the question does not create the answer. The answer, "the Christ," cannot be created by man, but man can receive it and express it according to the way he has asked for it.¹⁷

This method structures Tillich's whole theology. In response to the question of man's finitude he develops the concept of God; in response to the question of self-estrangement he develops the meaning of the Christ; in response to the question implied in the ambiguities of life the answer is the Spirit; and in response to the ambiguities of history it is the Kingdom of God.

Tillich claims that Calvin expresses the essence of the method of correlation at the outset of his *Institutes*, when he correlates our knowledge of God with our knowledge of man. Man's misery provided the existential basis for his understanding of God's glory, and God's glory provided the essential basis for man's understanding of his misery.¹⁸ But Tillich's understanding of the substance of the Christian message differs noticeably from that of Calvin, and from orthodox theology generally. One wonders whether its symbols convey any enduring conceptual content or just a chameleon-type existential relevance. The fall of man is a symbol of the human situation universally, of man's self-estrangement, of the transition from essence to existence and the actualization of human freedom. It is the inevitable result of realizing our potentialities, of being authentic, free men.¹⁹ The wrath of God and condemnation are symbols of man's despair rather than objective conditions pertaining to a morally guilty and culpable race in a state of sin.²⁰ And the "assertion that Jesus as the Christ in the personal unity of a divine and human nature must be replaced by the assertion that in Jesus

16. S.T. I. 64.

17. S.T. II. 15ff.

18. S.T. I. 63.

19. S.T. II. 29ff. Cf. McKelway, *op. cit.*, p. 26f.

20. S.T. II. 76ff.

as the Christ the eternal unity of God and man has become historical reality."²¹ A Jesus Christ who is metaphysically unique by virtue of the hypostatic union—this is an outmoded theological symbol which no longer answers man's real questions. Rather he sees in the historical Jesus the Christ who brings a new eon, a new state of things, a new being. The logos of our being is the logos of God, and this is disclosed in the historical human person of Jesus.

I do not need to point out that Tillich has tampered not only with the form but also with the substance of both traditional theology and the Biblical message. He has allowed the question to limit the answer and permitted the theological preconceptions of liberalism to define both questions and answers. But this does not mean that he is mistaken in wanting Christian theology to speak to the questions of today. On the contrary, what he calls apologetic theology is of great importance and the thought-forms of patristic and enlightenment times do indeed differ from those of today: theology must constantly be recast and rethought if it is to speak to men in history. The problem is to understand their questions, to help them understand them better, and to structure our answers without compromising the message, while still exhibiting its relevance to the real questions. Tillich has tried and in my judgment failed. Yet methinks contemporary evangelical theology by and large is not trying sufficiently. We have too long addressed the questions of another generation than our own and have too long used the thought forms of the past (like Enlightenment epistemology or Hodge's Scottish realism or Strong's idealism) in speaking to the present. By doing so we run the risk of allowing the idea of God to die along with those philosophic forms for many of our contemporaries.

2. To illustrate what I mean and to bring this paper to conclusion, let me return to the enriched understanding of reason which has developed in contemporary thought, and which Tillich—properly, I think—tries to take into account in his theology.

Dissatisfaction with the reductionist tendencies of positivism and rationalism, with the dehumanizing force of scientism and with the Enlightenment tradition generally has engendered both analytic and phenomenological attempts to understand the wider and deeper dimensions of reason. Tillich shares this concern. He defines the rationality of theology as (1) semantic—it avoids conceptual ambiguity and distortion, (2) logical—it is dependent on formal logic though not bound by its limitations, and (3) methodological—it proceeds systematically in deriving and stating its propositions.²² But his qualifications are extremely important. (1) Semantic rationality must not be confused with the dead formality of mathematical signs, nor with the descriptivist

21. ST. II. 148. Edward Cherbonnier lists six incompatibilities between Tillich's approach and Christian theology. See "Biblical Metaphysics and Christian Philosophy," *Theology Today*, IX (1952). 360.

22. S.T. I. 53-59.

theory of meaning associated with positivism, for it is by the connotation of words, not by their bare denotations or arbitrarily assigned meanings, that spiritual realities are communicated. Analogy and symbol are proper vehicles of rational meaning. (2) Logical rationality does not exclude the "yes" and "no" operation of a dialectical movement of thought. A dialectical difficulty may mirror the human predicament in thinking about God; in this sense it may be "a criterion of truth but not the basis on which a whole structure of truth can be built."²³ A paradox, moreover, is neither a logical contradiction nor an absurd irrationality, but only that which contradicts *doxa*, ordinary human experience, the opinion of finite man. It points to what transcends the realm of finite thought, to that which breaks into our experience and shatters our reliance on rational expectations built up on the basis of our own limited experience.²⁴ (3) The systematic form of methodological rationality, finally, must not be confused with the closed, completed deductive system, but stands rather between the *summa*, that "deals explicitly with all actual and many potential problems," and the "essay" which deals explicitly with only one actual problem. It is both structured and inclusive, but not necessarily exhaustive, closed or apodictic.²⁵

Rationality, then, need not imply either positivism or rationalism. Its modes of expression and argument are at the same time both richer and more modest than they. The attempt to force theology into a closed deductive system may well pervert the truth. The attempt to finalize our answers to all the problems may well shut off new insights that come from an ongoing dialectic. The attempt to give all Biblical language an empirical reference may well obscure its richer intent. We cannot afford to ignore the conceptual values of paradox and symbol, any more than we can of the more traditional metaphor and analogy.

Reason cannot be confined to the objective. Positivism and rationalism alike were obsessed by a *passion for objectivity*—a self-contradictory state of affairs indeed. We have seen that Tillich rejects any independent operation of cosmological thought, because reality is not confined to objective being. But neither is reality subjective being. Tillich aims, with existentialism and phenomenology generally, to undercut the subject-object distinction and to reach phenomenologically the pre-objectifying structure of consciousness: a level of immediate experience where the contrast between subjective and objective does not arise. At this level reason is ontological not cosmological: a man knows himself as he lives in his world and he knows the world as it is for him. There is no subject without object and no object without subject. Without its world self-consciousness would be an empty form; and world-consciousness is possible only on the basis of a developed self-consciousness. A man is immediately confronted, not by purely objective facts nor by purely subjective states of mind, but by what appears in the subject-object con-

23. S.T. II. 12.

24. Cf. S.T. II. 90-92.

25. S.T. I. 59.

tinuum. His lived-world is more immediate, more meaningful and more revealing than the world of empirical science or abstract thought, and ontological reason points through its structures to being-itself. In the structure of cognition truth-itself appears; in the aesthetic, reason points to beauty-itself; in the legal realm, to justice-itself; in the communal realm to love-itself, and so on.²⁶

That our being-in-the-world does involve some such structure of consciousness that undercuts any subject-object dichotomy is, I think, phenomenologically evident. I am inclined to take seriously the richer conception of reason of which Tillich speaks, and to think of it as considerably closer to the truth of the matter than either classic empiricism or Cartesian rationalism—both of which, in any case, stem from the same historical roots. But from this it does not follow as Tillich supposes that we are committed to some Schleiermacher-Schelling-Hegel monism with pantheistic implications; nor does it follow that truth is the pure immediacy of some *Kairos*-disclosure, nor that revelation is purely existential. These represent Tillich's *interpretation* of the phenomenological evidence, an interpretation that reflects his liberal theological preconceptions. His interpretations are chosen, not proven, and so are ours.

All that does follow from the richer conception of reason is that the Cartesian heritage of a subject-object dualism—whether in empiricism or in rationalism—is phenomenologically unsound, that objectivism and subjectivism are alike mistaken and are not the only alternatives. Human knowledge arises in a subject-object continuum, and we have suggested that the phenomenology of truth-judgments seems to point to the operation of both existential and more traditional theoretic factors. Human language also. The phenomenology of language seems to show that it is able to conceptualize adequately for theoretical as well as existential purposes. "Apologetic theology" and the phenomenology of religion must present evidence that this is so in *religious language* as well; if it is, then human language can still provide an adequate vehicle for propositional revelation—not necessarily for a collection of pseudo-scientific propositions that can be worked out in an axiomatized formal system and leave no remainder of unused meaning, but for a revelation which informs us of the true meaning for all men of all times of the mighty acts of God in history and supremely in Christ. If language can carry interpretive concepts as well as triggering confrontation, then truth-judgments still involve cognitive adequacy as well as disclosure-value. But until we deal constructively with the problems of religious language, revelation, and the criteria of truth in terms of the richer conception of reason, we have not addressed ourselves to our day. Our words are likely to echo the limited forms of Enlightenment rationalism or nineteenth century scientism rather than communicating the eternal truth of God. We will give little evidence of having either understood or answered the questions of this hour.

Wheaton College
Wheaton, Illinois

26. S.T. I. 72f, 168-174; II. 79; "Existential Philosophy: Its Historical Meaning," in *Theology of Culture*, p. 92.