ASPECTS OF THE SOTERIOLOGY OF KARL BARTH
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The appearance of the last two part-volumes of Karl Barth's Kirchliche Dogmatik has sparked some interesting theological discussions on soteriology. One phase of this discussion concerns the question of a basic change in Barth's thought. Some think that Barth's present view of the justification and sanctification of man involves a significant change from his earlier emphasis upon the "infinite qualitative distinction between God and man." About a decade ago John A. Mackay expressed his conviction that Barth, out of fear of subjectivism and mysticism, was producing too much of a "theology of light" while ignoring a "theology of life" and Christian experience. And although Mackay is not yet entirely satisfied, he now writes in a lyrical vein of "Barth's loyalty to Christ's lordship and especially his growing appreciation of that lordship in its implications in the subjective realm of Christian experience."

Because of the section on sanctification in volume IV/2, Arthur Cochrane suggests that "this latest volume of Barth's Dogmatics should excite the keenest interest among his practical-minded, yes, activist readers in America."

In this connection it is interesting to note that Barth has anticipated a measure of satisfaction with his recent writings on the part of those whom he calls "Pietists and Evangelical groups." But he adds that they will obviously not be "entirely satisfied, for at the decisive points they cannot fail to hear something of the rolling thunder of the 1921 Romans even in the more accommodating tones in which I now express the things which particularly affect them." But what about those who think Barth has actually undergone a significant change in view of his recent writing on the justification and sanctification of man? To them the following words of Barth: "But I seem to hear from one and another of my former friends and fellow students who in this book have not gone as far in what I ascribe to me, rather like an old lion who has finally learned to eat straw. ... Perspicuous readers will surely notice that there is no break with the basic view which I have adopted since my parting from Liberalism, but only a more consistent turn in its development." When one carefully examines the nature of Barth's soteriology, I think he will agree with Barth's own conviction that there has been no significant change on this matter. We need not be detained by this question at the moment, although it is certainly one which will continue to receive a good deal of attention in the future.

I. The Place of "Soteriology" in Barth's Dogmatics

The question may be asked whether it is correct to speak of "the soteriology of Karl Barth." There is no section of Barth's Dogmatics which bears the heading "Soteriology." And in the few places where the word does occur, it usually involves a rejection of the traditional significance of the term. An ordo salutis in the sense of the older Protestant dogmatics which concerns for the most part a "temporal sequence, in which the Holy Spirit does His work here and now in men" is also rejected. When I speak of the soteriology of Karl Barth, therefore, I do so simply to use a common term to include those facets of Barth's doctrine of reconciliation known as justification, sanctification, calling, and faith, love, hope, to follow Barth's arrangement.

Soteriology is part of the comprehensive and complex doctrine of reconciliation handled in volume IV of the Church Dogmatics. The doctrine of reconciliation comprises what is usually discussed under rubrics of Christology, hamartiology, soteriology, sanctification, and ecclesiology. Soteriology, then, is divided into objective soteriology (justification, sanctification, calling) and subjective soteriology (faith, love, hope).

Barth's view of revelation, God, predestination, creation, man, sin, etc., in order to understand the doctrine of reconciliation. At the same time it is important to see the place and significance of the "soteriological" elements within the entire framework of the doctrine of reconciliation. To fail to do this will involve misinterpretation of Barth's unique position and confusion for the evangelical theologian.

That Barth's integration of soteriology and Christology with hamartiology and ecclesiology involves more than dogmatic procedure is evident if one compares the Church Dogmatics with the Systematic Theology of Charles Hodge. Hodge is a Reformed theologian who interestingly brings together in one major locus entitled "Soteriology" all of these significantly related matters: the plan of salvation (predestination), the covenant of grace, the person and work of Christ, the ordo salutis (vocation, regeneration, faith, justification, sanctification), a section on ethics (exposition of the Law), and concludes with the means of grace (the Word, sacraments, and prayer). The striking difference in real content should be obvious to anyone who studies Hodge and Barth carefully.

It seems to me that in the relation of soteriology and Christology, one has a remarkable clear indication of what the "Christocentric" approach of Karl Barth involves. In spite of the appeal of the term, Barth's "Christocentric" approach involves a unique position, remarkably different from historic Reformed theology. The Christology which takes up the first major section of each of the parts of volume four, is the crucial section each time. Barth says: "For it is there—and this is true of every aspect—that the decisions are made. There is no legitimate way to an understanding of the Christian life than that which we enter there. As I see it, it is by the extent to which I have correctly described this that the book is to be judged."

The main lines of Barth's Christology will indicate its relation to his soteriology. Barth speaks first of Jesus Christ as "very God." This means the "state" of humiliation, i.e., the humiliation of God, and the priestly office. To this Christological aspect is linked the justification of man. Next he speaks of Jesus Christ as "very man." This means the "state" of exaltation, i.e., the exaltation of man, and the kingly office. To this Christological aspect corresponds the sanctification of man. Finally Barth speaks of Jesus Christ as "God-man." There is no state corresponding to this aspect, while the priestly office is unaffected. And to this Christological aspect corresponds the final objective element in soteriology, calling. I cannot develop here the critique of this Christology, but I consider it basic to an evaluation of Barth's soteriology.

II. The Relation of Justification and Sanctification

We have noted above that Barth's comprehensive doctrine of reconciliation includes two sections which may be called objective soteriology and subjective soteriology. At this point we shall turn to the elements referred to as objective soteriology, i.e., justification, sanctification, and calling. To anyone acquainted with the usual Reformed ordo salutis the listing of calling at the end of this trilogy is at once arrest-
In view of the fact that calling will be given extensive treatment in the next part, we speak primarily of justification and sanctification.

One must remember that justification and sanctification are the corollaries of Christ's work involved in this divine action: the justification and sanctification of man, the exaltation of the world with Himself in Jesus Christ, is unitary. It consists of different events, for it is itself both the condescension of God and the exaltation of man in Jesus Christ. But it accomplishes the two together. The one is done to the humiliation of God and the exaltation of man. They belong inseparably to the in the event of salvation,

Justification and sanctification are simply two inseparably related "moments" of your God's rightness in relation to God. He makes himself imposable as the creature and covenant-partner of God. He does so in the good nature which is addressed to him. He compromises his existence for he has no right as sinner. He is only in the wrong.

The presupposition, the possibility and the truth of a positive relationship between God and man the peace of man with God consists (1) in being a right which now finds himself, (2) in this right not merely being transcendent but worked out in the man being set aside and a new human right being right of God, and its outworking, the setting aside of the wrong of man and the restoration of this right is the judgment of God. The justification of man takes place in the event just mentioned.

This right of God, of which Barth speaks, does have relationship to man. Justification involves a divine verdict, and it seems to be forensic in character. "This justifying sentence of God is His decision in which man's being as the subject of that act is ascribed to him instead a being as the subject of pure acts of thankfulness for this liberation."

But it is clear that the justification of which Barth speaks is something which coincides with the humiliation of God. It takes place once and for all. Its relation to man's being is spoken of later, but it is obvious that the relation of faith and justification as set forth in Scripture and as understood by Luther and Calvin cannot come to its right in Barth's presentation. According to Barth this justification concerns all "The work of atonement, the conversion of man to God, was done for all. . . . God's verdict and direction promise have been pronounced over all. To that extent, objectively, all are justified, sanctified and called. But . . . not . . . have perceive and accept and receive all that God is for all. . . . To those who have not been touched in this way by the hand of God, the axiom that Jesus Christ is the Victor is as such unknown. It is a Christian and not a general axiom; valid generally but not generally observed and acknowledged."

We turn now to the other "moment" in the one divine act, sanctification. "The divine act of atonement accomplished and revealed in Jesus Christ does not consist only in the humiliation of God but in and with this in the exaltation of man. Thus it does not consist only in the fact that God offers Himself up for men; that, He, the Judge, allows Himself to be judged in their place, in this way establishing and proclaims new situations, and in defiance of their sin, His divine right which is as such the basis of a new right of man before Him. It does not consist, therefore only in the justification of man," says Barth. "It consists also in the sanctification which is indissolubly bound up with his justification, i.e., in the fact that as He turns to man in defiance of his sin He also, in defiance of his sin, turns man to Himself. The reconciliation of man with God takes place also in the form that He introduces as a new man the one in relation to whom He has set Himself in the right and whom He has set in the right in relation to Himself. He has introduced him in the new form of existence of a faithful covenant-partner who is well-pleasing to Him and blessed by Him."

Sanctification thus concerns reconciliation from the standpoint of man's conversion to God objectively performed by God.

One is struck by Barth's failure to give specific treatment to other usual elements of the ordo salutis such as regeneration and penitence, e.g. But all these are to be comprehended within the single term "sanctification." "What is meant by sanctification?" asks Barth, "might just as well be described by the less common biblical term regeneration (regeneratio) or renewal (renovation) by that of conversion (conversio)," or by that of penitence (poenitentia), which plays so important a role in both the Old and New Testaments, or comprehensively by that of discipleship which is so outstanding especially in the synoptic Gospels. The content of all these terms will have to be brought out under the title of sanctification. But there is good reason to keep the term sanctification in the foreground. It . . . shows us a once where we are dealing with the being and action of God . . . that God is the active Subject not only in reconciliation generally but also in the conversion of man to Himself. Like His turning to man, and man's justification, this is His work, His facere But it is now seen and understood, not as his justificare, but as his sanctificare."

We have now seen that while justification involves this one thing "that God a the Judge establishes that He is in the right against this man, thus creating a new right for this man before Him," sanctification involves "quite another that by His mighty action He claims this man and makes him willing and ready for His service." This sanctification, which Barth considers to be objective and accomplishes in with the exaltation of the Judge, is also universal in its scope as already noted. Not only God's verdict, but also His direction or sanctification has been pronounced over all, and to that extent all are sanctified as well as justified.

III. The Relation of Faith & Love to Justification & Sanctification.

We have seen that Barth distinguishes objective soteriology from subjective soteriology. We recall also that these two are separated in each part-volume by a section dealing with the Church. Thus in Barth's treatment of reconciliation the subject faith, love, and hope is discussed last to be distinguished into the significantly constructed plan of the Church Dogmatics, it is here that one clearly notes Barth's anti-Schleiermacher polemic. Whereas the religious consciousness is first and most significant for Schleiermacher, its place is not only last bu
least significant for Barth. This important factor is at least in part overlooked by those who seem to think there has been a radical change in Barth's theology of late.

Attention is here given chiefly to faith and love because the yet-to-appear IV/3 will take up the discussion of hope in relation to calling. One is struck again at this point by the reversal of the usual order faith, hope, love.30 At this point we must recall that faith and love concern subjective soteriology, i.e., what Barth speaks of primarily as the knowledge of justification and sanctification. At times Barth refers to this as notic or epistemological in distinction from objective soteriology which is ontic.27 The universalism which is asserted without hesitation of the objective elements is nowhere asserted of the subjective, and at times explicitly denied. The question is as such an end), concerns the perplexing and much debated issue of the apokatastasis.

A statement which takes us from the objective to the subjective elements is the following: "In the whole event of atonement, justification, sanctification and calling function. . . . Where we say justification, sanctification and calling, on the one side, we are already expounding the relevance of what was done in Jesus Christ, but, on apprehension and acceptance in the world and by us men. We might say, we are dealing with the ascription but not the appropriation of the grace of Jesus Christ, or in particular. In the Christian there is an appropriation of the grace of Jesus Christ, or with what has taken place in Him for the world as such, but not for the Christian in particular. In the Christian there is an appropriation of the grace ascribed to all in Jesus Christ, a subjective apprehension of what has been done for the whole world in the happening of the atonement."28 But not all "hear, perceive and accept and receive all that God is for all."29 The Christian does. And that he does in faith relates to justification and in love to sanctification.

Consistent with his original position Barth does not regard faith as something which is once given to man by God and constantly possessed by man under the same statics which seeks by "possession" to control God. Although Barth speaks of faith as the gift of God and the work of the Holy Spirit, he regards faith as a continuously recurring event.

Faith is described by Barth as "an acknowledgment (Erkennen), a recognition (Kenntnis), and a confession (Beeken). As all these terms indicate, it is a very case it is an active knowledge."30 A fuller description is given in the introduction to the last section on "The Holy Spirit and Christian Faith:"

The Holy Spirit is the quickening power in which Jesus Christ places a sinful man in His community and thus gives him the freedom, in active self-giving to God and his fellow men, to respond to the love in which God has drawn him to Himself and raised him up, overcoming his sloth and misery.35

While faith involved reception, love involves self-giving. This love corresponds to the kingly office of Jesus Christ "in the exercise of which He the servant, as a man like ourselves and among us, is exalted to be the Lord, who as such draws to and After Himself and raises up in the power of God sinful man, the man who is slothful and miserable in His sin."36 It corresponds to "his sanctification, of his no less gracious claiming and endowment and institution for obedience, work and service." And so this love involves "no less wholly and purely . . . the decision for a definite direction in the life-movement of man, and therefore of his breaking out in this direction. In Jesus Christ a new man, the true man, has dynamically entered the human sphere, not merely demanding conversion and discipleship, but in the quickening power of His Holy Spirit calling and transposing into conversion and discipleship, Christians, then, are the men in whom Jesus Christ, and in Him their own completed sanctification, is revealed and present as their first-born Brother and subordinated to Him as their King instituted from all eternity. . . . It is the act of a pure and total giving, offering and surrender corresponding to this receiving . . . Christian love."37

IV. Evaluation

This survey of some aspects of Barth's soteriology has already implied something of the kind of comprehensive critique which the evangelical theologian is obligated to make. It is impossible to approach Barth's Dogmatics as one would approach Hodge or Bavinck or Berkhoef in order to make certain minor criticisms. It should be obvious that Barth's soteriology involves an amazingly compact and intricate structure which differs radically from historic Reformed theology. The evan-
ical theologian would be doing injustice to Barth as well as himself, if he were to present only minor strictures here and there. A critique of Barth's soteriology will have to take into account the total structure of Barth's theology. Such a critique must show how Barth's soteriology is related to his peculiar Christology as well as to his doctrines of revelation, God, predestination, creation, sin, and reconciliation. And it is also imperative that the evangelical theologian give careful attention to Barth's conception of the relation of God to the world and the significance of history. It is here that one will note the roots of Barth's rejection of the usual Reformed ordo salutis. But it is obviously impossible now to enter upon the kind of comprehensive critique which the subject demands.

Let me interject a comment here, lest the largely negative character of my critique be misconstrued. Even though I believe that an evaluation of Barth's soteriology in the light of Scripture and historic Reformed theology will end with a primarily negative judgment, I do not mean to say that Barth's theology can therefore be dismissed as a trivial and insignificant contribution to theology. This is due in part to Barth's importance on the contemporary scene. But it arises even more from the fact that Barth, wishing to break radically with the liberalism of Schleiermacher, claims to be reviving Luther, Calvin and Reformed theology in general. But even if one must disagree with Barth's claim, as I most seriously do, the study of Barth is extremely challenging and rewarding. In the words of a recent reviewer: "Whenever we open the book, we come across some aphorism, some epigram, some paradox which, if it refuses to make clear and plain the thought of its author, challenges us to re-examine the thought of our own mind."

Although I cannot now set forth the comprehensive critique which is really demanded, let me make a few observations. It is certainly true that soteriology and Christology are intimately related, as Barth repeatedly asserts. However, I am convinced that Barth's Christology does not provide a genuinely biblical basis for the interrelation which is required. This significant reservation, which I cannot now develop, must be borne in mind as the context for the following points of critique.

First, it should be noted that although soteriology and Christology are significantly related, there is also good warrant for distinguishing them. The atoning work of Jesus Christ is a complete, once-for-all satisfaction offered to God by Christ's substitutionary death on the cross of Calvary. Although this atoning work of Christ is complete, the application of it is not at once completed. That is, Christ's work provides the all-sufficient basis for the justification and sanctification of God's elect, but this application is not at once performed. Christ's work provides the solid basis for soteriology, but soteriology is not completed with the atonement. For Barth, the "moments" of soteriology are really one event and there is no real distinction between atonement and soteriology.

Secondly, the Scripture certainly indicates that the application of Christ's completed work does follow a certain order as indicated structurally in Romans 8:28-30 (calling, justification, glorification). It seems clear to me that the Reformers were entirely correct in interpreting the recurrent Scriptural references to justification by faith to mean that faith logically precedes justification in the ordo salutis. We are justified by faith or through faith. This demands, I believe, that faith either precedes or coincides with justification. And again it is a Scriptural demand to regard regeneration as preceding or coinciding with the first exercise of faith. (John 3:6 e.g.). Furthermore, the sinner who has been regenerated by the Spirit of God, justified by faith through faith, is also called upon to be increasingly sanctified. This ordo salutis is demanded by Scripture. While the objective basis for our justification and sanctification is Christ's atoning sacrifice and resurrection, yet man is not subjectively justified and sanctified by this action. (It must be remembered that for Barth the humiliation of God and the exaltation of man are the facets of Christology which have really replaced a substitutionary atoning death of Christ on the Cross.)

Thirdly, it has been noted that according to Barth justification is universal and objectively true of all men. Here a further critique of Barth's view of predestination ought to be set forth, for it is of course intimately related to the universal aspect of justification. By his own admission, Barth rejects Calvin's view of predestination. The intimate relation of justification and faith in Scripture cannot receive its rightful place in this view of Barth. Faith always follows justification according to Barth and in no sense is it the instrumental cause or agent. Here one sees how basically unchanged Barth's present position is from the views expressed earlier in the Romerbrief. Although Barth does speak of justification by faith, this only means a coming to know afterwards that one is and was already justified. And even when Barth speaks of forensic justification, again the term has been given a completely new meaning. Here one sees that Barth's conception of sin does not really reproduce the biblical seriousness of man's sin as guilt involving the transgression of God's law. And hence the justification of which Barth speaks really means only that God is right. God is right in the humiliation of God, and this right of God is called justification.

Fourthly, a similar critique of Barth's view of sanctification must be made. There is a measure of truth in asserting that sanctification includes regeneration and conversion. The regeneration wrought by the Spirit of God is indeed a major element in man's sanctification. The ordo salutis in its usual Reformed conception does not mean to say that regeneration is always chronologically posterior. But since regeneration is a single act of God upon the elect sinner, and is basic to man's conversion in faith and repentance, there is good reason for placing sanctification after justification. Justification as a forensic act of God is a single verdict. But sanctification must continue as the justified sinner seeks by using the means of grace to attain greater conformity to the will of God. The righteousness of Christ is imputed to him so that he is clothed with the righteousness of God. But the life-long process of sanctification is obviously incompatible with such a view.

In the fifth place, objection must be raised to the subjective elements of Barth's soteriology. Faith, love and hope were seen to be primarily nontical. This is true most specifically of faith, but even love and hope are spoken of as the acceptance of God's direction and of His calling. In the case of faith, as was indicated earlier in this paper, one simply comes to know and acknowledge what he already is — i.e., justified. It is here, perhaps most pointedly, that one sees how consequential the Christian life appears in Barth's theology. This, it seems to me, demands careful scrutiny on the part of those who think Barth's theology has significantly changed. Although Barth's theology has been characterized by the motif of the "triumph of grace", it is clearly grace other than that which Scripture presents as the grace of God in Christ Jesus. Man's is simply his failure to acknowledge what he really is. And this seems to be Barth's reason for speaking of it as the impossible possibility.

Finally, it is now evident why Barth's view of soteriology takes away the biblical urgency for preaching and evangelism, even though he has given proclamation a significance quite different from that of the liberalism of Schleiermacher and Ritschti. The urgency of calling men to repent and believe in the Lord Jesus Christ is absent, however. It has been rightly observed that neo-orthodoxy has not produced evangelists: Barth's theology has no motivation for evangelism. Although there is a difference between the Christian and the non-Christian, it lies chiefly in the fact that one knows he is justified and sanctified, while the other, equally justified and sanctified, does not know it. And it is probably correct to say that he simply does not
know it — yet. Even though Barth wishes to avoid the *apokatasis*, he seems incapable of doing so within the context of his own theology.

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4. Ibid., p. 376.

5. Ibid. Note also p. xi, "In the twenty years since I started this work I have found myself so held and directed that, so far as I can see, there have been no important breaks or contradictions in the presentation; no retractions have been necessary (except in detail); and above all . . . I have always found myself content with the broad lines of Christian tradition . . . a 'new Barth,' or, what is worse, a heresy . . . Naturally, I do not regard myself as infallible. But there is perhaps more inward and outward continuity in the matter than some hasty observers and rash interjectors can at first sight credit."


8. IV/1, pp. 103, 124, 144 e.g.

9. IV/2, p. 562. Cf. 507E.

10. IV/1, p. lx.

11. The interpretive problem is complicated, however, by Barth's avowed claim to be presenting the Biblical position as viewed by the Reformers and even "the broad lines of Christian tradition," cf. op. cit., p. 19. Cf. Berkouwer's recent volume *Faith and Sanctification*, Barth states, "I am particularly happy to record my general agreement."

12. IV/2, p. 391. What Wingren says of Luther is likewise true of the reformer Calvin: "The positions of Barth and Luther are incompatible and cannot at all be reconciled . . . All friends of historical truth would welcome a more general recognition of this fact both by Barth and by the Barthians." op. cit., p. 26 note 6.


15. IV/2, p. 201 f.


17. Ibid., 207.

18. Ibid., 499.

19. IV/1, 528-529.

20. Ibid., 145.

21. Ibid., 148.

22. IV/2, 499. Cf. IV/1, p. 146.

23. IV/2, 506.

24. Ibid., 503.


27. IV/1, 79-154 passim.

28. IV/1, 147.

29. Ibid., 148. Cf. IV/2, 727.

30. IV/1, 758. Cf. IV/2, 727.

31. IV/1, 745.

32. IV/2, 729-9.

33. Ibid., 727-8.

34. Ibid., 727.

35. Ibid., 729.

36. Ibid., 729-730.