

ethically depotentiate His Divine Person—that enabled Him to become an example and a redemption, not the one without the other, through His life and in His death.

Our argument ends where it began. If an ideal humanity existed necessarily and eternally in God, it became an actual humanity at the incarnation. The God-Man is not, as Hegel said, a monstrosity. A complex personality like Christ's is possible. If it be asked whether He is God or Man, the answer must be Both in One. He was in idea from eternity God-Man. He is and will be to eternity actual God-Man.

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ST. PAUL IN ATHENS.

II.

IT is the merit of Prof. E. Curtius first to have caught the right tone of this scene, and to have restored it to its true surroundings amid the active bustling life of the Athenian Agora, where alone it is in its element. While in part the view taken in this paper differs from Curtius's exposition, yet all I have to say starts from his exquisite essay, "Paulus in Athens." It was he who showed me the spirit and the suitability of a scene which I had previously misunderstood and mistrusted. I regret to find that I have made an error on this point on p. 218, trusting too much to memory and conversation with a friend; and I beg to remodel the sentence, ll. 8-12, thus: "He touched on the subject first in his *Stadtgeschichte von Athen*, and afterwards in the fascinating paper, 'Paulus in Athens,' defining the situation as being rather a preliminary examination," etc. My friend considers that in his essay Curtius draws back from the view that the scene was a *προδικασία*, and

makes it merely arise out of the curiosity of the philosophers; but I do not think that Curtius shows any intention to withdraw from his first view.¹

It has been necessary to spend a good deal of time on the word *Spermológos*, as the point of the passage lies in the peculiar innuendo which it carried in popular conversational language. The whole life of a nation is brought to a focus in its social slang. It is obvious that the force of a word springs from life and society, and not from the natural philological development; and it is characteristic of the difference between English and German commentators that many of the former have very good remarks on its connotation, while the latter usually acquiesce in the common rendering without a word, except that Dr. Blass makes the excellent observation already quoted. The word that most nearly corresponds to it in modern social slang (allowing for the difference between Athens and England) is "Bounder." I have more than once heard that word used in English university circles among younger men with exactly the innuendo which the Athenian lecturers on philosophy conveyed, viz. that Paul was a quite unqualified candidate for university recognition, and a mere outsider; he was not a true "sportsman," in whose mind and nature the knowledge and practice of the game were deep-seated and pervading,—making it a second nature for him to play the game fairly and rightly, to follow the rules, to think the thoughts,—but a looker-on, who was trying to play the game with the smattering of knowledge that he had picked up by eye and ear. Dean Farrar's rendering "this picker-up of learning's crumbs" is very neat; but it loses the flavour of slang that *Spermológos* carries with it; and to catch that flavour is

¹ I had not myself been struck with any difference between the two, but my friend was; and as in writing I was looking only at the essay, I assumed that the view taken in the book was stronger.

a first condition, if we would appreciate the true Athenian atmosphere in which the incident moves.

In the following attempt at a rendering, therefore, I have used the slang term; and the delightfully unconscious way in which the English school-boy often applies the term to better men, trained in the rough school of real life and not within the artificial ring, enhances the suitability of the translation. (xvii. 18) "And certain also of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers engaged in discussions with him; and some said, 'What would this "boulder" say?' and others, 'He seemeth to be an exponent of strange divinities.' (19) And they laid hold of him, and brought him before the Court of Areopagus, saying, 'May we learn what is this new teaching which is spoken by thee? (20) For thou bringest some things of foreign fashion to our hearing; we wish, therefore, to learn what is their nature.' (21) But (*while they who took an active part in the scene spoke thus, such*) Athenians and resident strangers (*as formed the mass of the crowd*) were interested only in saying or hearing something new and smart. (22) And Paul stood in the midst of the Court of Areopagus, and said, etc. . . . (33) Thereupon Paul went forth from the midst of them."

The key to the interpretation of the scene lies, of course, in the action of the philosophers, *vv.* 18 and 19. I speak on the understanding that they are the subject throughout the two verses. Such seems necessarily the construction of the sentences. Mr. Page makes an ingenious attempt to construe the passage otherwise, on the theory that "the clause, 'and certain also of the philosophers encountered him,' is almost parenthetical, and in no case are 'the philosophers' to be regarded as the people described, *v.* 19, as 'taking hold of Paul,' for Paul's speech was certainly not addressed to 'the philosophers,' who could not possibly be called 'rather superstitious' or have had the remarks in *vv.* 24, 29, addressed to them, but was made

to the 'men of Athens' generally." Mr. Page's understanding of the speech is, I think, quite correct; it was not addressed to "the philosophers," but to the "men of Athens." But his inference, that therefore it was not the philosophers who took Paul before the Areopagus, is unjustifiable; and there is not the slightest appearance that the first clause, about the philosophers encountering Paul, is parenthetical. Mr. Page has been misled by his principle of attempting always to find some correspondence between $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu$ and a following $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$; and this has made him, here and in some other cases, force the construction beyond what it will bear. He tries to connect $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu$ in *v.* 17 with $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ in *v.* 19, and in order to do so treats the intermediate clause as "almost parenthetical." But Dr. Blass remarks with regard to $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu$ here ¹ that it is used "*cum anacoluthia ut saepissime*"; and recent discussions in the EXPOSITOR have probably brought that fact prominently forward. We must follow the natural and the general construction, which interprets *vv.* 18 and 19 as referring to the action of the philosophers.

The word $\sigma\upsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\beta\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$ cannot mean simply "met him," as in *xx.* 14: it implies discussion ($\sigma\upsilon\mu\beta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\nu\varsigma$), whether friendly (as in *iv.* 15) or not; for discussion and exchange of opinion was required in order to enable the philosophers to form the opinions which they expressed about Paul's teaching. Probably the hostile innuendo lies in the word here; but that is not of much consequence; and I have therefore refrained from emphasizing it in the translation.

As the upshot of these meetings, some of the philosophers declared that this new-comer was a mere ignorant borrower of half-understood fragments from the lectures of real philosophers; while others said he was expounding foreign and unlawful divinities. These two conclusions,

¹ He refers to his notes on *i.* 6 and *i.* 18.

which are not perfectly consistent with each other, are purposely placed side by side to bring out—in Luke's quiet way of leaving facts to interpret themselves—the general perplexity and incapacity of understanding what Paul was driving at. It is commonly the case that popular feeling applies essentially inconsistent epithets to what it dislikes, unconscious of their real inconsistency. They sought philosophy (1 *Cor.* i. 22); and they got what some declared ignorant plagiarism, and others foreign impiety.

One thing, however, was certain. This foreign lecturer and disputant on questions of Moral Philosophy was attracting attention, and drawing an audience. He was coming into competition with the officially recognized lectures, the established lecturers and Professors in the University. That brings us into a question which is involved in the utmost obscurity. What were the legal rights of the recognised official teachers in the University, and how far and in what way could a new teacher find freedom to teach and to lecture in the University city? We cannot answer these questions with any approach to accuracy; but it is certain that something did exist in the way of regulations with regard to public teaching and lecturing; and that the Council of Areopagus took some official action with regard to the appointment of public lecturers in the University.

In the first place, with regard to the action of the Council, my friend and old pupil, Rev. A. F. Findlay, quotes the passage of Plutarch, *Vit. Cic.* 24, which mentions that between 48 and 44 B.C. Cicero induced the Council of Areopagus to pass a decree inviting Cratippus, the Peripatetic philosopher, to remain in Athens and to give public expositions to the young men; and we notice that the same verb is used about these expositions that Luke used about Paul's discussions in the Agora.¹

¹ διεπράξατο δὲ (ὁ Κικέρων) τὴν ἐξ' Ἀρείου Πάγου βουλὴν ψηφίσασθαι καὶ δεηθῆναι

In the next place, with regard to the position and the rights and advantages of the teachers in the Universities of Athens and the other great seats of learning, such as Tarsus, some kind of public recognition seems to have been required. This was certainly of a much freer and slighter character than the appointment to a chair in a University of our country; but still there was not absolutely free trade in lecturing. It was, of course, very common for teachers and lecturers in rhetoric or in philosophy to earn reputation by travelling to great cities that were strange to them, or to seek an opening in some great centre of learning. Those who came with an established fame were accepted on their reputation; those who came unknown were required to give some public display as a test and proof of their skill. A few sentences quoted from Mr. Capes's *University Life in Ancient Athens*, pp. 54 f., will illustrate this. "Besides these [the regular Professorships] there were many private teachers, who gathered an audience round them as they could, and at times even eclipsed the salaried Professors. At Athens, so few of the Academic world were native born that there seemed good reason for the fears of purists who complained that such a multitude of strangers had corrupted the purity of the Attic tongue. . . . With many it was far from being a question of a mere livelihood. . . . To some it seemed the highest object of ambition to rise to distinction as a Sophist. . . . They could not stay long in their native homes, if they felt that they were capable of greater things, but must go forth into the larger world to air their talents and measure themselves with rivals of renown. . . . Often they wandered off from land to land, to engage in literary tournaments with the champions whom they met, offering to lecture on some startling thesis, or to improvise on any that was given." As an example

μένειν αὐτὸν ἐν Ἀθήναις καὶ διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς νέοις ὡς κοσμοῦντα τὴν πόλιν. The Neoi were grown young men of 20 upwards.

he quotes the story from Philostratus, *Vitæ Sophistarum*, ii. 27, 7, how "Hippodromus, afterwards appointed to a Professorship at Athens, came for the first time to Smyrna, and, as soon as he had landed, walked straight to the agora to get a local guide. He saw a temple on his way, by which some private tutors sat, with servants carrying bundles of books under their arms, and guessed that there was somebody of note lecturing within. He walked inside and found Megistias, to whom he bowed without saying more." After some talk Hippodromus expressed his wish to give a specimen of his skill; and Megistias handed him his lecturing gown, and gave him a thesis as he asked. "Soon after he began his speech, the other hurried up, and begged to know who he could be . . ." and soon "all the educated men in Smyrna came hurrying to where Megistias was, for the rumour had already spread that Hippodromus had come to visit them. So he took up the same subject and handled it again in a new style."

The respect that was paid to the great teachers, and the applause with which their public lectures were received, are illustrated by Mr. Capes. "Of course their heads were often turned with such applause: of course they gave themselves high airs. . . . Adrian of Tyre began his inaugural address, on his appointment to a chair at Athens, with the prelude, 'Once more come letters from Phœnicia.' . . . The ceremony over, he was escorted home by students from all parts of Greece, who treated him with all the reverence due to a high-priest at the Mysteries."

Considerable emoluments attached to a Professorship, consisting partly of a regular salary, partly of fees from pupils (often very high, and apparently fixed at the discretion of the Professor), and partly of immunity from the burdensome and expensive duties of municipal offices. But it is uncertain whether the system (which was in full operation in the next century) of state appointments and state

salaries had as yet extended to Athens. Moreover, the regular lecturers, who were far more numerous than the formally appointed Professors, had not at any time the same advantages as they.

Such was the world in which Paul found himself in Athens. With his usual versatility, and his cosmopolitan experience and education,¹ he adapted himself to it as readily as he had done to every situation of his wandering life. At Tarsus he had been brought up in another of the great universities of the world; and the narrative shows clearly that he felt, as was natural, great interest in surveying the historical memorials of this centre of the world's education, *vv.* 16 and 23;² but this interest turned to indignation as he observed a more than usual profusion of idols in the very city where philosophers had been teaching for centuries that idols were nothing in themselves. But the very method in which he began to combat the idol-worship of Athens shows the influence that the genius of the place exerted on his spirit. He proceeded to discuss quite in the Socratic style with every one whom chance threw in his way in the market-place. Here, and here alone, is he said to have adopted the Socratic style of philosophic colloquy. In this and in every other scene of Paul's wanderings, we are struck with the way in which the narrative varies according to the surroundings and reflects their character. Let any one compare the scenes in Lystra (*xiv.* 11-18), in Paphos (*xiii.* 4-12), in Ephesus (*xix.* 23-41), and in Athens, as studies in social life, and he must be struck with the difference of character and type in each case; and a comparison of the scene with all that can be learned of the cities will show how correctly everything is

¹ At this point I must assume that Paul had such an education as to enable him to sympathize with Athenian life. If proof were wanting otherwise, it might be found in the story of his Athenian adventures alone.

² See Expository, May, 1895, p. 397.

delineated. An "instantaneous photograph" is the epithet that rises to one's lips in every case; and only the blindness of placid and contented ignorance about ancient cities and ancient life could ever have taken these scenes as compiled pictures instead of photographs from the life. For example, why does Paul discuss with chance comers in the agora in xvii. 17, while he taught in the school of Tyrannus xix. 9? Because in the former case he was in Athens, and in the latter case in Ephesus. Why does he use the simplest of illustrations and arguments from the harvests and other good gifts of God in xiv. 15, 17, while in xvii. 23-30 he quotes from Aratus or Cleanthes, and talks in the style of semi-Pantheistic popular philosophy about "the Divine nature" (vv. 23, 39)? Because in the former case he was addressing the simple rustic Lycaonian *incolæ* of Lystra (not, be it observed, the Roman *coloni*, who would not speak "in the speech of Lycaonia," and were not of the character implied); while in the latter case he was addressing an audience of Athenians, familiar with the superficial aspect of philosophical conceptions.

Athens in Paul's time was no longer the Athens of Socrates; but the Socratic method had sprung from the soil and the nature of the people, and in Athens Socrates can never quite die, even though the spirit of Herodes Atticus was already more congenial to the learned Professors of the University than that of Socrates. Among the people Paul reasoned in the Socratic style; but when the Professors came upon the scene, they demanded of him a display in the style of the rhetorician. No one who thinks of the above-quoted story from Philostratus (with many others like it) and of the general character of philosophical lecturers at the time can fail to be struck with the resemblance between the scene in the Hall of the Areopagus and that in the temple at Smyrna. There is the difference that Hippodromus invited himself, whereas Paul was practically

forced to his rhetorical display; but that lies in the difference of character and aim of the two men.

Asterius, bishop of Amaseia, about A.D. 400, who was not too far removed from the ancient University life, has caught, though with some errors, the general character of the scene. He makes Paul volunteer his rhetorical display, and he places it on the Hill of Mars; but otherwise his account is interesting and not uninteresting. He says that Paul "hurried up to Mars Hill, and finding a multitude collected there, he stood and delivered a harangue beyond the usual rhetoricians, who vied with one another among the Athenians every day; and he came down from thence a victor."¹

Paul's address was delivered before the Council of Areopagus, and not simply as a display before a general audience. What then was the object of the other lecturers in making his oration something in the nature of an examination before a court? As we are so much in the dark about the whole question of the relations between the lecturers and the government, it is not possible to answer the question confidently. But, in the first place, it is well known that the government of the Greek cities exercised a good deal of control by special officers over the whole system of educating the rising generation as boys and as young men: the young were trained in graduated classes, and passed on from class to class in regular course. Further, we have seen that the Council of Areopagus was concerned with the duty of appointing and inviting lecturers in Athens; and Quintilian mentions that they

¹ πρὸς τὸν Ἀρειὸν πάγον ἀναδραμῶν, ἔνθα ἦν βουλή σκληρὰ καὶ ἐπίφοβος, ταῖς φονικαῖς δίκαις δικάζουσα, εὐρῶν δὲ πλῆθος ἐκεῖ συνειλεγμένοι πολὺ, στὰς ἐδημηγόρει ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐθάδας ῥήτορας, τοὺς καθ' ἡμέραν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀγωνιζομένους, . . . ὥστε τὸν κορυφαῖον τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν τὸν Διονύσιον . . . πείσας μετέστησε, . . . κατελθὼν δὲ μικτῆς ἐκείθεν: Asterius, *Homilia viii.*, in *SS. Petrum et Paulum* (Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, xl., p. 294). He calls Paul's address a harangue (*δημηγορία*), and Philostratus calls Megistias's lecturing gown a *δημηγορικόν*. *μάτιον*.

punished a boy who used to pluck out the eyes of quails. It is therefore evident that they exercised some general control over the educational system of the city, at least in the Roman period, perhaps earlier. That control is closely related to their older control over the manners and morals of the citizens, over the slighter religious faults (though accusations of impiety and of the introduction of foreign and unlawful religion were tried before the popular courts, and never before the Areopagus), and over the public hygiene and the state physicians; it is also related (as ancient thought went) to the police jurisdiction which they exercised in the Roman period.

In accordance with these powers must we not regard the scene in the Hall of the Areopagus as a sort of test applied to a new teacher of philosophy at the instance of the established, in fact as a piece of professorial jealousy? Those who thought that Paul was an ignorant setter forth of borrowed knowledge, and those who thought that he was a preacher of foreign and illegal religious ideas, would hope, for different reasons, that this interloper would be stopped by the court which took cognizance of morality and order in educational matters. There was no formal accusation, and therefore no defence; and yet Paul was placed in a difficult and invidious position, for at the conclusion he is said to have "gone forth from the midst of them," with an expression that suggests trouble, and even danger, in the situation (cp. xxiii. 10). The danger did not extend so far as his life, for the Areopagus had no such powers; but he might have been silenced as an unsettling teacher. Moreover, his opponents might hope that, if he were suddenly taken to stand the test of a public address in such impressive and august surroundings, he might be nonplussed and confused. In the result the decision was not pronounced, but postponed.

Paul's speech, then, was delivered where the Council of

Areopagus was in the habit of meeting. But, though it derived its name from the Hill, it did not always meet on the Hill. Demosthenes is our authority that, in certain departments of its duty, it met in the King's Stoa (*στοὰ βασιλείος*), a large hall on the Agora; and we may safely say, in the words of M. Caillemet¹ (endorsed by Prof. E. Curtius), that in this case the Council *siégeait non plus sur la colline de Mars réservée aux φονικὰ δίκαι, mais dans le Stoa Basileios*. No one that has any conception of what practical work means could believe that the general business of the Council was ever conducted on the exposed and confined top of the Hill. Even in cases of murder, it was doubtless only the concluding stages of the trial that took place on the sacred Hill-top.

In *v. 21* the force of the imperfect must be noticed. It cannot be taken as the statement of a permanent characteristic of the Athenians, for that, as being true at all times, would be made in the present tense. In the business-like style of Luke, this sentence must be interpreted as part of the scene; and I see no other force in the imperfect, as compared with the aorists in *vv. 19, 22*, except that it expresses what was the general feeling among a crowd of bystanders, while the proceedings were going on.

We find then, in this case, as in every other scene in *Acts*, all the essential constituents of the situation lightly but sufficiently described. First are mentioned the Council of Areopagus, perhaps the most famous assembly of ancient history, the subject of the inquiry, who stands forth in the midst of the Court, *viz.*, a newly arrived teacher and lecturer from foreign parts, and the official teachers, who already occupied Chairs in the University. But in all the public scenes of the early Empire, even in the trials before courts of law, there was a fourth element, which played a very important part, *viz.*, the general audience, the *corona*.

¹ In Daremberg and Saglio, *Dictionnaire des Antiquités Gr. et Rom.*

Pliny remarks on the degradation of legal oratory in his time, owing to the fact that lawyers looked more to the approval and applause of the audience than to the opinion and judgment of the court. Every one who has any acquaintance with the literature of the early Empire knows how important the audience was in all intellectual displays. Owing to the absence of printing and the difficulty of multiplication of literary productions, public opinion could not make itself felt so strongly in any other way; and hence the applause or disapproval of the *corona* came to represent the public verdict on all intellectual questions and achievements.

Accordingly, in the scene which took place in the Hall on the Agora where the Areopagus sat, it was impossible to leave out the general audience in a good description of the scene; and Luke touches it off in *v.* 21. The unmistakable tone of contempt in the brief words was not undeserved, and is certainly natural in a Macedonian (as I believe Luke was) writing about an Athenian audience, for the attitude of the two peoples was one of mutual dislike and scorn. The philosophers were malevolent, and insisted on an examination and testing of the new teacher; but the crowd of Athenians and strangers were merely amused and curious to hear the expected display. That is exactly the character of the crowds who flocked to hear one of the great rhetorical exhibitions. Let us hear what Mr. Capes says in his *University Life in Ancient Athens*: "The people commonly was nothing loath to hear; they streamed as to a popular preacher in our own day, or an actor starring in provincial towns; the epicures accepted the invitation to the feast of words, and hurried to the theatre to judge as critics the choice of images, and refinement of the style, and all the harmony of balanced periods." Luke therefore has a distinct innuendo in his statement that they were interested in speaking (*i.e.*, criticising) even more than in hearing.

The absence of the article before the noun *'Αθηναῖοι* is perhaps an element in the meaning of this sentence, for it cannot be sufficiently explained by the tendency in later Greek to drop the article.

Now, as Jelf points out (*Greek Grammar*, § 446 β), "the article gives an individual collective character to the plural noun: *οἱ ἄνθρωποι* (men considered collectively); Plato, *Legg.*, 680, c, *οὐ σφόδρα χρώμεθα οἱ Κρήτες τοῖς ξενικοῖς ποιήμασιν.*" Similarly, if Luke had used *οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι πάντες* in this case, he would have been laying down a general rule about "all Athenians taken collectively as a nation." It seems therefore that, in distinction from *οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι*, the simple *'Αθηναῖοι* must be taken as denoting "Athenians, such, namely, as were present at the scene."¹

This seems to be the force intended; but some perhaps may think that a different explanation is better. As Jelf says (*Greek Grammar*, ii. 447, b), "when two or more nouns are so joined together that they together form a compound notion, and lose their separate individuality," the article need not be used, e.g., *Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι*. In this case *ξένοι* and *'Αθηναῖοι* are so joined, but the expression is complicated through the necessity of defining *ξένοι* by the additional *οἱ ἐπιδημοῦντες*; the case really is *'Αθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ ξένοι* (namely, *οἱ ἐπιδημοῦντες*). I cannot think so.

What was the result of the test applied to Paul? It seems to have been so far satisfactory, that he "went forth from the midst of them" (v. 33); but it was not conclusive, for some mocked, while others desired more information and further examination before coming to any decision.

¹ A similar case occurs in Thucyd., 8, 69 (the parallel is quoted for a different purpose by Mr. Hamblin Smith in collecting coincidences of expression in Thucyd. and *Acts*): *ἦσαν δ' Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες δει κτλ.*, "All the Athenians (*who might have been expected to be ready to prevent the conspiracy*) were on outpost or other warlike duty." In that case also the assertion does not, and could not, apply to "all Athenians," but only to those who might have been on hand at the incident which was proceeding.

But Asterius certainly takes too rosy a view of the facts when he says that Paul "came down a conqueror." There is a marked absence of the popular ovation that greeted a great victory in such contests; "but certain men clave unto him, and believed." What a contrast is this to the effect in Galatia, in Thessalonica, and other places!

Clearly Paul recognised that in Athens no "door was opened to him" (2 *Cor.* ii. 12). The philosophers, with all the University influence to support them, were against him; here, as at Corinth, "not many wise after the flesh," not many of the recognised instructors in philosophy and morality, were on his side (1 *Cor.* i. 26). There can be no question that the account which he gives in the opening chapters of 1 *Corinthians* shows a recoil from his plunge into philosophic method at Athens: "and I, brethren, when I came among you, came not announcing in superior language (as a rhetorician) or in superior wisdom (as a philosopher) the mysterious nature of God (as a knowledge reserved for the initiated few);¹ for I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ and Him crucified." What a contrast is that to the speech before the Areopagus, with its talk about the "Divine nature," and its silence about Jesus and the crucifixion (except in the obscure and nameless hint in xvii. 31)! It was not among the "wise after the flesh," the professors and lecturers of the University, that the new teaching could find a ready audience; and the history of the world ever since has proved, time after time, century after century, that the established teachers at the Universities are, with rare exceptions, the slowest to move and the last to accept any new ideas, while their young pupils as a rule are the quickest to respond to every new movement in thought. Paul found his ready converts

¹ This is one of the places which might be taken as a test of manuscript excellence: the reading *μαρτύριον* is hopelessly feeble, and yet a very natural correction on the part of a *diorthotes*.

among the eager, the earnest, and the enthusiastic: these were the persons that had the power of believing which tends to salvation (xiv. 9). But the Athenian University was the home of dilettantism and of the cool, cultivated, critical intellect, which had tried all things and found all wanting; and in it there were few hearers and no open door for the new teaching.

The influence of Paul's Athenian surroundings may be traced in the "philosophy of history" which he sketches briefly in his address. In the Socratic position the virtue of "knowing" was too exclusively dwelt on, and in some of the earlier Platonic dialogues the view is maintained that virtue is knowledge and vice ignorance; and Greek philosophy was never clear about the relation of will and permanent character to "knowing." The Greek philosophers could hardly admit, and could never properly understand, that a man may know without carrying his knowledge into action, that he may refuse to know when knowledge is within his grasp, and that the refusal exercises a permanent deteriorating influence on his character. Now Paul, in his estimate of the relation of the pre-Christian world to God, adopts a different position in the Athenian speech from that on which he afterwards took his stand in his letter to the Romans (i. 19-32). In the latter place he recognises (to quote Lightfoot's brief analysis) that the pagan world "might have seen God through his works. They refused to see Him. They disputed, and they blinded their hearts. . . . Therefore they were delivered over to impurity. . . . They not only did those things, but they took delight in those who did them." Here we have a full recognition of that fundamental fact in human nature and life, which Æschylus expressed in his greatest drama as a conception of his own differing from the common Greek view: "The impious act breeds more, like to its own kind: it is the nature of crime

to beget new crime and along with it the depraved audacious will that settles, like an irresistible spirit of ill, on the house."¹ But to the Athenians Paul says, "The times of ignorance, therefore, God overlooked"; and those times are alluded to as a period when men were doing their best to find and to worship "God Unknown." We must not, of course, demand that the entire theology of Paul should be compressed into this single address; but yet there is a notable omission of an element that was unfamiliar and probably repugnant to his audience, and an equally notable insistence on an element that was familiar to them.

NOTE.—In *v.* 18 an explanatory clause is added in almost all MSS. at the conclusion: "because he was giving the good news of 'Jesus' and the 'Resurrection.'" A similar explanatory clause is found in xviii. 3. Both are omitted in the Bezan Text and in one old Latin Version (*Gig.*). In xiv. 12 a similar explanatory clause (introduced however by *ἐπειδὴ*, not by *γάρ*) is omitted in an old Latin version (*F1.*), but given in the Bezan Text. Probably all three are very early explanatory glosses, which crept into the text in a similar fashion to many Bezan additions. The only one which adds anything to the meaning is the second, xviii. 3; but it seems not to have formed part of the original text, for the words *διὰ τὸ ὁμότεχνον εἶναι* in the early part of the verse would hardly have been used by a writer who was going to say at the end of the sentence *ἦσαν γὰρ σκηνοποιοὶ τῇ τέχνῃ*, and the double statement, with the second partly agreeing with and partly adding to the first, is not in the brief, concise style of Luke.

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¹ *Agamemnon*, 730 f., a passage where the text is very uncertain and is terribly maltreated by many editors. Paley turns it into an elaborate genealogical tree, while Wecklein conjectures away the depravation of the will, which is the key to the philosophic position of *Æschylus*.