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presence in this Sacrament began to find expression amongst certain Continental teachers; but the opinion received general condemnation. Rabanus Maurus, who was regarded as the greatest divine of his age,[1] wrote in opposition to such teachers. He speaks of such persons as holding erroneous doctrine, and states that such an opinion was of recent origin. This latter assertion is of importance. He says that he had exerted himself to the utmost in a particular writing to expose the error of such a doctrine. His work, addressed to Heribold, principal chaplain to Charles the Bald, has, however, like the writings of many others who tried to oppose the introduction of novelties into the creed of the Church Catholic, been lost. The record of the work and its purpose has fortunately come down to us, thus: "For certain persons lately, not thinking rightly of the very Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, have said, This is the very body and blood of the Lord, which was born of the Virgin Mary, and in which the Lord suffered upon the cross, and rose again from the grave. . . . To this error we, writing to the Abbot Egilone, have shown, as well as we could, what must be truly believed concerning the body itself."[2]

D. MORRIS.

(*To be continued.*)

ART. II.—THE AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF GRACE AND THE WILL.

THE sack of Rome by Alaric and his Goths[3] closes a chapter in the world's history. For the time being men were too much stunned to realize what it meant. But there was an exception. At the opening of his "City of God"—that majestic treatise which is not merely the "epitaph of the ancient civilization,"[4] but the epic of the Church militant and triumphant—St. Augustine glories in the unprecedented fact that,

[1] *Vide* Moreri, "Le Grand Dictionnaire Historique".

[2] "Nam quidam nuper, de ipso sacramento corporis et sanguinis Domini non rite sentientes, dixerunt: Hoc ipsum corpus et sanguinem Domini, quod de Maria Virgine natum est, et in quo Dominus passus est in cruce, et resurrexit de sepulchro: . . . . cui errori, quantum potiumus, ad Egilonem abbatem scribentes, de corpore ipso quod vere credendum sit aperuimus." Soames, Bamp. Lect., p. 417. *Vide* "The Romish Mass and the English Church," p. 66, published by Mackintosh, London.

[3] August, 410.

[4] J. W. Mackail, "Hist. of Lat. Lit.," p. 276.

amidst all the horrors of the sack, the name of Christ was sufficient to protect fugitives from rapine and murder; that the basilicas of Apostles were reverenced as pagan temples never had been. The earthly empire was about to fade away before the "most glorious City of God."

But the immediate effects of this catastrophe upon the Christian Church speedily appeared. Not only was the old Roman aristocracy, the mainstay of the national paganism, broken up and scattered over seas: many Christians had to emigrate; among them two friends, Pelagius and Celestius—names destined to a sinister fame in Church history—both hailing originally from our own shores, it is supposed. Pelagius is the Græcized form of the British "Morgan," the "sea-born"; Celestius was a "Scot," *i.e.*, a native of Ireland.[1]

The two were already known as champions of the doctrine of free-will, which attributed to man, unassisted by Divine grace, the power to choose and to do the right, while it did not deny the fact of Divine grace, which, however, is practically identified with natural powers and the order of Nature as Divinely created.[2] From Rome they first crossed into Africa, where Celestius, seeking ordination at Carthage, was charged with heresy, and condemned by a synod, from which he appealed in vain to the Bishop of Rome. The fact is interesting, occurring when it does. Ere long the "chair of Peter" was to be invested, through successive usurpations, with the world-wide jurisdiction of the Cæsars, and Rome, no longer the capital of the nations, was to become the spiritual metropolis of Christendom. But hitherto the only sanction which these pretensions had received was given by the Council of Sardica (A.D. 343), which conferred on Julius, Bishop of Rome, a limited appellate jurisdiction in the case of Bishops; and this was a Western Council in all but the name, all the Eastern Bishops having retired from it.

Pelagius passed also from Africa to the East. In 415 he was indicted for heresy before John, Bishop of Jerusalem, by Orosius, a Spanish priest, who had brought letters commendatory from Augustine to Jerome. The story of his fortunes as a heresiarch need not be narrated in full; but another incident bearing on Papal claims may be mentioned. Pope Zosimus reproved the African Bishops for condemning

[1] According to Jerome, "Scotorum pultibus prægravatus," battened on Irish "stirabout."

[2] So Pelagius apud Aug. de Grat. Christi, n. 5: "Posse in natura, velle in arbitrio, esse in effectu locamus. Primum illud, id est, posse, ad Deum proprie pertinet, qui illud creaturæ suæ contulit: duo vero reliqua, hoc est, velle et esse, ad hominem referenda sunt, quia de arbitrii fonte descendunt."

Pelagius and Celestius. They retorted at a plenary synod held at Carthage on May 1, 418, by asserting their independence of the Roman See, and Zosimus himself had subsequently to retract his favourable judgment on the heretics. After this Pelagius disappears from history. In justice to him, it should be stated that he never attempted to form his followers into a schism.

The law of action and reaction plays a large part in the dynamics of human thought, and notably in the controversy between fatalism and free-will. The early heresies (the Gnostic and others) embodied the pantheistic fatalism of Eastern philosophy. Hence we find the earlier Fathers, such as Origen, emphatic in their assertion of human freedom. St. Augustine himself might well have been carried, in a rebound from Manichæan views, to an opposite extreme not very different from Pelagianism. Why was this not so? His spiritual history is the answer. Read what he says of Divine Providence: "Which hath never entirely deserted man, fallen from her laws; that righteous power is severe to punish and merciful to deliver is a way strange and incomprehensible, through the mysterious sequence of events of God's making, serving His purpose."[1] Or mark how consistently he exhibits pride (the fault of Pelagius) as the πρώταρχος ἄτη of man: "This it is by which he declines to obey the laws of God, while desiring to be independent (*suæ potestatis*), as God is."[2]

But Pelagianism was a reaction from the teaching of St. Augustine, and it was by him that it was finally demolished. By his treatises on this subject he wielded an influence in his own day felt throughout the Church, and on this account, if on no other, holds a position in the history of theology attained only by its few master-minds.

Let us examine briefly the Augustinian doctrine of predestination and grace, and proceed next to view it in the light of certain inferences, contrasted truths, historical developments, which may suggest some modification of the extreme position.

The Manichæan system, asserting a duality of First Causes —in other words, that there is a God of good and a God of evil in the universe—asserted by implication that sin is not *against Nature;* for the power of darkness made matter, and evil is its necessary outcome. Then Pelagius appears. Let us mark carefully what he has to say as to the nature of sin. He is possessed with a laudable indignation against those who disparage the dignity of human nature, and flies to the other extreme. He maintains that man's natural will can of itself,

[1] "De Moribus Eccl." (against the Manichæans), c. xii.
[2] *Ibid.*, c. xx.

without any assisting grace, choose the good; that man is endowed by the Creator with a permanent capacity to choose between good and evil. This is free-will, or what he terms an equilibrium of the will. Thus, there is no bias towards evil, such as the doctrine of the Fall implies. We can now see how Pelagius accounts for sin. Man, standing in this equipoise between good and evil, ever and anon chooses evil. Thus sin enters the world, as man's creation. Man is, in fact, an *original cause* of something in the world. It is just at this point that the impiety of Pelagius comes in. Man is set up, independent of God, as a First Cause in regard to certain acts. After this we are prepared to find that Pelagius maintained not merely that man could live without sin, but that men have lived without sin, instancing Abel, Enoch, Melchisedec.

St. Augustine takes the middle course between Manichæism and Pelagianism. Deeply impressed as he is with the truth of the principle, "Nihil bonum sine gratia," and with the necessity of giving God all the glory throughout the history of the redeemed soul, he has to account for the presence in the world of evil, which is against the will of the Author of all good. This he does by ascribing to man's will a limited freedom. The will in its normal state (as it was before the Fall) is in communion with God, and has a Godward direction, a natural attitude of obedience to the Divine will. Its freedom consisted in this—that it was free to accept or reject the assistance (*adiutorium*) which Divine grace offered. "As death is in a man's power when he wishes it (for anyone can starve himself to death), but for maintaining life the *will* is not enough if the assistance of aliment is wanting, so man in Paradise was competent by his will to kill himself by forsaking righteousness; but his willing it was not enough to enable him to keep the life of righteousness, unless He who had made him should assist him."[1] (This passage also illustrates Augustine's view of evil as a *negation* in its essence—*privatio boni*).[2]

Thus, as regards the origin of evil, he retains, we may say, a sufficient amount of free-will to make man, and not God, responsible for its appearance. We can now understand where the fall of man comes into the Augustinian scheme. The first man having as yet no inclination to evil (or what is technically called *concupiscence*, the result of a will enfeebled by sin), having a *good will* implanted in him by God,[3] yielded to a principle of desire within him, succumbed to the temptation to forsake his obedience and to make trial of the

[1] "Enchir.," § 106. [2] *Ibid.*, § 11. [3] "Op. Imp.," v. 61.

unknown. The sin of Adam was quite unique among sins, being committed in despite of a good will, and not, like all subsequent sins, in accordance with an evil bias. Thus, St. Augustine magnifies the sin of Adam by enlarging on the Divine activity exerted in his behalf.

From the fall of man we pass to the doctrine of original sin. Pelagius had resolved this into "the following of Adam,"[1] *i.e.*, the influence of his example, and of a formed habit of sin, upon later men. Our Article states the Catholic view with admirable precision: "Original sin is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam." St. Augustine finds this corruption of nature in the *loss of free-will:* "Sin is the punishment of sin"[2]; and thus "original sin" is a state of necessity on the side of evil—a state of positive evil. Unlike Clement of Alexandria, who allows the heathen character, though faulty, a foundation of natural virtue, Augustine would have assented to the verdict that "the virtues of the heathen are but shining vices." And thus, in his own words, "The whole mass of mankind, under condemnation, lay, or rather wallowed, in misery, and was plunged from misery to worse misery."[3] God provides a remedy. Man having fallen in the exercise of his free-will, God does not repeat His previous dispensation, does not renew the gift of free will. The second dispensation must be no *conditional*, but an *absolute* saving act; and this involves predestination. For granted that whatever God does He decrees to do from all eternity, and granted that only a portion of mankind is saved, there must be of necessity (so St. Augustine argues) an eternal Divine decree, antecedent to, and irrespective of, any difference of merits, ordaining one part of the human race to everlasting life and the other to everlasting misery. "He predestinated us not because we were going to be, but that we might be righteous."[4] "I cannot tell you, if you ask me, the reason why, because I confess to you I cannot find what to tell you. But if you still ask me why, it is because in this matter, as His anger is just, and His mercy great, so are His judgments inscrutable."[5] "The rest of mankind who are not

[1] Article IX.

[2] "Op. Imp.," vi. 17; "Contr. Julian.," v. 14. Compare a striking passage in "Civ. Dei" (xiv. 15): "In the punishment of that sin, what retribution was made to disobedience but disobedience? For in what does man's misery consist, but in his own disobedience to himself, so that since he willed not what he could, now he wills what he cannot?" *Cf.* Rom. vii.

[3] "Enchir.," c. xxvii.

[4] "Prædest. sanct.," xviii. 36; quoting Eph. i. 4.

[5] "De Don. Persev.," viii. 18.

of this number,[1] but who, out of the same lump of which these are, are made vessels of wrath, are brought into the world for the advantage of the elect";[2] "are created by a foreknowing God on this account, that by them He may show how little the free-will of man can do without His grace."[3]

But we need not accumulate further illustrations of this uncompromising tenet of the Augustinian system; it is already evident that in this predestination reprobation is involved: the fate of the lost is as clearly foreordained as the bliss of the saved. But an attempt is made to reconcile the doctrine with our moral ideas, while it is represented (not quite consistently) as an inscrutable mystery.[4] He endeavours so to phrase it as to exclude the danger of men's being "thrust by the devil either into desperation or into wretchlessness of most unclean living."[5] Secondly, the doctrine is involved in his scheme of Divine Providence; he defines predestination as God's "disposing in His foreknowledge works that shall be"[6]; he sees in the fate of the damned only a further *manifestation* of the wise purposes of God. And, finally, he held that, mankind "as a lump" having merited eternal punishment, it was no injustice if a part of them is predestined thereto; the rest might well thank God's gratuitous mercy.

We can only touch upon another Augustinian doctrine, necessarily implied in what precedes, viz., that of efficacious or irresistible grace, by which the Divine decree is carried out. This is to be distinguished in our minds from the doctrine of an *assisting* (rather than a controlling) grace, previously taught in the Church.[7] A corollary is the doctrine of final perseverance. This St. Augustine regards as an absolute gift of God to the elect and predestined, which ensures that they all, though their place and reward in heaven shall vary, may exhibit at least enough goodness to ensure their entrance into bliss.[8]

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[1] "Dei præscientia definitus numerus" (Ep. 186, § 25).

[2] "Contr. Julian.," v. 14; *cf.* Rom. ix. 20-24.

[3] Ep. 186, § 26; quoting Rom. ix. 23.

[4] Its justice is real, but "hidden" (*vide* Mozley, "Predestination," chap. v., p. 134).

[5] Article XVII.

[6] "De Don. Persev.," 41.

[7] "De Don. Persev.," c. xiv. The men of Tyre and Sidon would have believed if they had seen Christ's miracles: the Jews, who saw, could not believe; but this was immaterial, as neither people was predestinated.

[8] "We pray, Hallowed be Thy Name—that is to say, we pray that, having been sanctified in baptism, we may persevere in that beginning. We pray, therefore, for perseverance in *sanctification*."—"De Don. Persev.," c. ii.

It remains that we should offer some criticism upon this powerful, if narrow, theory of the Divine dealings with man. Though it may not survive in its entirety, in any theological school of the present day, it will retain its historical interest to the end of time.

Our innate sense of justice revolts against the thought that an arbitrary decree has from all eternity ordained some men to eternal life, some to eternal death, antecedently to any difference of deserts. We cannot conceive of human personality as merely "a means," and not "an end in itself;"[1] as a wheel in a machine or a pawn in a game; it must have a self-determined will, that we may predicate of it moral responsibility. In a word, St. Augustine's theory is subject to the difficulty which any necessitarian view, whatever its basis, has to confront. His solution can only be held to be partly satisfactory: that good actions spring from grace, evil actions from the root of an evil will, from original sin, and that is the infection of the first sin done by Adam when in full possession of free-will. Thus, a sort of constructive responsibility is set up. It is true that at times he allows that we have free-will in the sense that we are *agents* in our deeds, as well as *acted upon*:[2] and so goes a far way towards surrendering the key of his position. He feels the necessity of a reasonable basis for good works; but how is it to be found, if man's moral personality stands obliterated in the presence of the Almighty Arbiter? If God is everything and man is nothing, grace does all; if, on the other hand, grace is to be sought and found, conscience and will must have some scope. Augustine never quite reconciles the idea of an absolute decree determining *all*, with the belief in the independent spiritual value of a life and growth in holiness and the effort towards it.

Then there is the question of the exact relation of the body of the predestined to the Church. No one can read the anti-Donatist Treatises without recognising that Augustine, while insisting on the presence of tares with wheat, holds firmly the doctrine *extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*. There must be visible union with the Church through the Sacraments. In his anti-Pelagian writings, this truth, while allowed,[3] does

[1] *Cf.* "Enchir.," c. xcv. The evil appear to serve just as well as the good to manifest the Divine character—the one in its justice, the other in its benignity (*ibid.*, c. 100).

[2] "Op. Imp.," i., c. 134: "Both are true, that God prepares the vessels for glory, and that they prepare themselves" (*vide* Mozley, "Predestination," p. 227).

[3] "Contr. Julian.," i., § 14: "O son, born to your woe of Adam, but born again to your weal in Christ, you are trying to take from your mother (the Church) the Sacraments by which she bore you." Read also § 13.

not seem to be brought into line with the rest. Nor even does the mediatorial work of Christ receive its proper prominence: it is subsumed under the architectonic idea of the Divine Decree: Christ Himself is "the most eminent instance of predestination and grace."[1] In fact, the corporate aspect of salvation is left in the background.

In the matter of the "reprobate," St. Augustine went beyond what Holy Scripture has definitely asserted; he completed what was, with a wise purpose, left incomplete. He takes all the passages which make for predestinarian doctrine, and explains away those of a contrary tendency, such as 1 Tim. ii. 4, Acts iii. 21. He subjects this "mystery" to the processes of human reasoning. So, too, with his doctrine of Grace. It is not for man to define the limits within which Divine Power is pleased to work. But St. Augustine argues from the premiss that it must be an absolutely unlimited thing. A deeper philosophy has led us to the thought of God's self-limitation, and this in various ways; not only those which will occur at once to everyone—*e.g.*, Plato's "forms of theology"[2]—but in those which leave room for a "reign of law" in the universe, and of a free will in the individual.[3]

It is superfluous to enlarge upon an extreme instance of the tendency to supplement Holy Scripture with unscriptural deductions: the relegation of infants dying unbaptized, and of heathen who have never heard the Gospel, to eternal suffering. It is a grave danger to the cause of religion when theologians adopt any position (however logical it may appear) which outrages our common human feeling.

Here we may recall a distinction which has been well drawn by Dr. Mozley between the truths with which human thought deals: the one kind giving a "distinct and absolute" conception; the other kind, of which it is "indistinct and only incipient or in tendency." Of the former, the facts of mathematics or the immediate sensations—*e.g.*, colour—are examples: of the latter, the ideas of substance, of infinity, of power. The perceptions—or, rather, half-perceptions—connected with the latter class are sometimes found in apparent contradiction. Applying this thought to our subject, we find on the one side a perception of Divine Power—absolute, infinite, omniscient; on the other side an instinctive sense of our own free-will, of the *originality* of our actions. Both are severally recognised in Holy Scripture and in our own con-

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[1] "Prædest. Sct.," c. xv.

[2] "Plat. Rep.," 379, *sqq.*: (*a*) "God is God, and the Author of no evil; (*b*) God is true, and changes not."

[3] Bishop Moorhouse, "Teaching of Christ," pp. 33, 34.

sciousness. On the abstract idea of Divine Power grew up the Augustinian doctrine of Predestination; on the abstract idea of free-will, the Pelagian theory.

We should, then, recognise that our human faculties are imperfect—their purview is limited. These apparently contradictory truths can be reconciled, though not by us and in this life; we know that, like the two parts of the hyperbola, they meet—we know not how and where. In many questions, faith must content herself with an antinomy.[1]

And yet we must not part from the Augustinian system with a protest only; let us estimate the debt which the Church owes to the greatest of the Latin Fathers.

I. It is a very Proteus in its many disguises, that error which leads man to rest in his own unaided goodness. We hear much to-day of the "perfectibility of the species"; we hear angry murmurs against the doctrine of a Divine Providence and a beneficent purpose in creation, which remind us of the temper of Pelagius. (A well-meant if at times scarcely reverent presentment of these views may be found in Mr. Coulson Kernahan's recent *brochure*, "God and the Ant.") And we are thrown back on the grand principle of Augustinian faith—that man is absolutely dependent upon God: and more,

> Oh, yet we trust that somehow good
> Will be the final goal of ill,
> To pangs of nature, sins of will,
> Defects of doubt, and taints of blood.[2]

Or, in the great Father's own words, "God as He is the good Creator of good natures, so He is the just Orderer of evil wills: so that while they use their good natures ill, He uses even evil wills for good."[3]

II. We owe a still greater debt to St. Augustine for his enforcement of the Pauline doctrine of Free Grace, on which alone the individual soul can rely in its access to God.

In the Middle Ages the battle of Necessity and Freedom had been waged by the Schoolmen, Thomas Aquinas and the Dominicans maintaining the former, Duns Scotus and the Franciscans the latter; the Thomists, on the whole, were in the ascendant, and their leader (under the influence of Aristotle's doctrine of a φυσικὴ ἀρετη, as well as that of the Clementine School) modified the rigour of the sentence of reprobation. With the Schoolmen, however, the doctrine was rather a matter of philosophy than of spiritual experience.

[1] This question of free-will does, in fact, answer to Kant's third antinomy (in the "Critique of Pure Reason").

[2] Tennyson, "In Memoriam," liv.

[3] "Civ. Dei," xi., c. xvii.

It was Luther, in his agony of soul, who learnt in the study of St. Paul, as interpreted by Augustine (especially in the *De Spiritu et Litera*), to magnify the justice of God "as that with which God endows us when He justifies us." Thus the individual is brought into a personal and immediate relation with God—the great truth rediscovered by the Protestant Reformers. After this, the Church of Rome naturally veered from the Thomist doctrine to that of Free Will, as expounded by the Jesuits.

The Continental Reformers, while they broke with the ecclesiastical tyranny of the Middle Ages, did not by any means divest themselves altogether of the mediæval habit of mind. Calvin, with his keen logical French intellect, based his theology on the strictest of predestinarian doctrine. "His dogmas were not primarily suggested by Scripture. . . . An attentive study of the 'Institutes' reveals the presence of Augustine everywhere."[1] The Church of England was preserved from Calvinism by her appeal to Scripture and to primitive interpretation, and by her continued consciousness of a corporate salvation. Outside her communion the old dispute still goes on, with a change of names, between Calvinists and Arminians. But the doctrine of predestination has its value in the Christian life as an incentive to perseverance, a tonic to the health of the spirit, an assurance of its lofty destiny. Holy Scripture constantly recognises this by its appeal to the "godly consideration of Predestination."

A word must be added about an interesting movement of thought within the Church of Rome itself in the seventeenth century. It began with the great work of Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, an opponent of the growing power of the Jesuits, the "Augustinus seu doctrina S. Augustini de humanæ naturæ sanitate ægritudine et medecina adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses," published in 1640, two years after his death. It was condemned, owing to Jesuit influence, by successive Popes,[2] although it had strenuous supporters in France and the Netherlands, notably Arnauld and the Port Royalists. The first two of Pascal's "Provincial Letters" appeared in their defence; but Arnauld was expelled from the Sorbonne, and the nuns were imprisoned. Still, the Jansenist faction lingered on in France until 1727. In Holland it included the Archbishop of Utrecht and some bishops, who were thus able to continue the Episcopal succession, and in 1869 the Jansenist

[1] Tulloch, "Leaders of the Reformation," p. 223.

[2] Especially the Bull, "In Eminenti," of Urban VIII.; and the condemnation of five propositions taken by the Jesuits out of the "Augustinus" by Innocent X. (1653).

Church still numbered 6,000, professing all the main articles of the Roman faith except Papal infallibility. The Jesuit policy has thus proved only too successful, and a movement which might have matured into a thorough reform from within has languished away into a sterile schism.

Within the last half-century the philosophy of evolution has influenced even theology so profoundly that such problems as those handled by St. Augustine and his successors require restatement before they can be finally discussed. This we cannot attempt at the close of an article—but we may be allowed to enter a caution. There are some well-intentioned apologists who, to lighten the ship, would throw over the Christian doctrine of sin. The type is perfected through struggle; and, viewing the process from its consummation, the physicist will tell you that sin is only "a necessary condition of all progress, and pre-eminently so of moral progress";[1] it is conduct tending to the extinction of the sinner, who is simply the weaker that goes to the wall. Original sin is the outcrop of inherited tendencies which in the primitive savage state were useful and life-sustaining. This is surely Pelagian teaching; its only message to the wounded, sin-laden conscience, seeking peace with God, is the sentence of Nature, "red in tooth and claw," upon her weaker organisms—*Væ victis!*

W. Yorke Fausset.

Art. III.—THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH OF IRELAND.

At the present moment, when Church Reform in connection with the Church of England is attracting so much attention, a short sketch of the constitution of the sister Church of Ireland, which she adopted after disendowment and separation from the State, may not be destitute of interest. That constitution is no mere academic one; it is a very real thing, an active, vital organization, bearing from day to day the strain of actual working. It is a constitution which has now been in existence for more than five-and-twenty years, has been found efficient for the purposes for which it was designed, and has enlisted in its favour the adhesion of the vast majority of the members of that Church. It consequently may be considered as an object-lesson of a plan of representative

[1] Le Conte, "Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought," pp. 336, 337. *Cf.* Correspondence (L. Huxley and others) in *Journal of Education*, January, 1897.