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Reformed Versus Anabaptist Social Strategies: An Inadequate Typology

by John H. Yoder

Some of the striking contours of our time—the arms race, the appearance of Liberation Theology, the increasing marginalization of the church in the North Atlantic nations—have made the Anabaptist tradition look more interesting to many. The difficulty for those in other traditions who wish to learn of this tradition has been finding appropriate situations for dialogue. We are delighted to present one such dialogue here. John Howard Yoder, professor of theology at the University of Notre Dame, has been a leading interpreter of Anabaptist traditions for this generation; Richard Mouw, professor of philosophy at Calvin College, has been one of the few Reformed thinkers who have sought to nurture this particular dialogue. To both of these go our thanks.

I have been invited by the editors of the *TSF Bulletin* to undertake two different and, in fact in a way, contradictory arguments. First, I shall show why the widely used Reformed/Anabaptist typology, despite or maybe because of its wide circulation, is untrue to the facts of the argument. The Reformed/Anabaptist debate does not represent a classical dilemma.

By the term "classical dilemma," I mean that the kind of necessary decision which one can argue is genuinely built into the shape of a problem, so that the logically available options are few; they constantly recur as, through history, Christian thought encounters afresh the same basic questions; and one can show in the logic or the socio-logic of the problem that whenever it arises there is the same necessary choice.

By the nature of the case my objections will be of different kinds. Some are specifically historical, derived from the sixteenth century experience, which the approach I am objecting to takes as a model. (Since sixteenth-century history is my own dissertation field, my skepticism on this subject expresses an affirmation of, not doubt about, the uses of history.) Others relate more to contemporary church politics and caucus policies. Still others are more abstractly logical. Each kind of argument would need to be introduced by documentation, which, in this context, would be too much.

My second task will be to argue as if the typology were fair to the facts, and as if the use made of it by persons affirming a "Reformed" loyalty were to be cogent in rejecting what they call "Anabaptist." I shall seek to disengage from the "typed" debate what the "Reformed" would then need to prove.

The Reformed/Anabaptist Typology: An Historical Challenge

In the present context we may stipulate what elsewhere might need to be documented or exemplified further: the self-understanding of churches in the Reformed tradition begins by naming and rejecting "the Anabaptists." The Belgic Confession is prototypical: "We detest the error of the Anabaptists and other seditious people."[1]

Richard Mouw, in his *Politics and the Biblical Drama*, pp. 93ff., discusses the "principalities and powers" language of the Pauline literature, as the pertinence of those passages and their world view has been brought to the fore by Reformed theologians such as Berkhof, Caird, Barth, van den Heuvel, Visser 't Hooft, and Ellul. In the midst of this intra-Reformed debate, Mouw (*Politics*, pp. 98ff.) moves to my use (*The Politics of Jesus*, pp. 135ff.) of the same Pauline materials. Both Mouw's work and mine claim to be Bible studies. Yet the argument shifts without explanation to the sixteenth century typology.

His description is substantially the same as mine in chapter eight of my *Politics of Jesus*, which is no surprise, since he leans on the same group of Reformed exegetes and theologians I had been citing. But then, just before it gets serious, Mouw warns the reader that there is this Reformed/Anabaptist dialogue, beginning with a division between Hendrik Berkhof (whose work on the subject I first introduced to English readers) and myself. Before the readers can proceed any further the typological barrier must be built: "before looking at some of the details of Yoder's discussion, some note must be taken of the historical setting . . ." I do not grant that anything dealt with in the following pages of my interpretation of Paul and the powers, or Paul and *Haustafeln*, or John of Patmos and historical hope, is specifically "Anabaptist." They are not texts which sixteenth-century Anabaptists used a lot, in this interpretation, and Calvin or Knox did not. Especially the *Haustafeln* have been used with far greater simplicity, clarity, and historical impact in Reformed social thought than ever by Mennonites. I can't really complain if the historical typology keeps Mouw from fairly understanding me on the first go-round; but that he lets a sixteenth-century typology keep him from dealing directly with Paul and John as interpreters of the "Biblical Drama" is too bad. That one unfinished friendly debate shall have to serve as documentation of the relevance of the theme.

If any debate is important, it is a mark of that importance that the two parties differ, at least at the outset, not only in their conclusions but in their understanding of what the debate is about. That is certainly the case here. The difference of views begins with the history. In all their major manifestations, these two theological tendencies arose interlocked with one another. There were many kinds of Anabaptists in the sixteenth century, but the most viable group, the first to initiate adult baptism, and the first to state the view of the state which is later taken as typical, arose in Zwingli's own circle. It first spread rapidly and then survived in the Zurich/Bern/Strasbourg triangle (later expanded to Geneva) which was at the same time the birthplace of Reformed theology. In the Netherlands, the Anabaptists were there first. They were tolerated when William of Orange consolidated a pro-Reformed state structure in the northern Netherlands and abandoned the southern Netherlands to the Spaniards. In the 1640s the consolidation of English Calvinism at Westminster coincided in time with the definition of the Baptist and Quaker alternatives. Thus these two streams or strands are regularly interlocked as neither of them is with other forms of protestantism, Lutheran, Anglican, or later pietists, etc.

In their interlocking naturally, the two streams dealt with their relationship in contradictory ways. The protestant creeds in general do not refer to the other confessions. The Augsburg confession refers to the Roman church only at points of claimed agreement, though it condemns "the Anabaptists" five times. Lutheran confessions do not name Anglicans or Zwinglians. Reformed confessions do not name Anglicans or Lutherans. But they all do name and condemn "the Anabaptists."

Thus, in its creeds, the "Reformed tradition" has a definition of the relationship between the Reformed and Anabaptist types of social ethic. This includes by implication a definition of historical origins, namely, that Anabaptist is something fundamentally different from "The Reformation." It therefore can best be understood by dramatizing and making central the points at which they differ, those points (rejection of the cultural mandate and rejection of the state) being the fulcrum or hub which moves all the rest.

The various sixteenth-century movements which were called "Anabaptist" differed so much among themselves that it is not really proper to speak of them as one movement. They did not respond to the guidance of a single leader or talk a single kind of language. But it was probably true of all of them that they began by considering themselves a part of the wider reformation movement of which Erasmus, Luther, and Zwingli were the major voices. Once those three major figures fell apart, the radicals considered

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themselves as being more with Luther and Zwingli than with Erasmus, since they too had already implicitly if not explicitly broken their ties with medieval Catholic unity, although some of them retained a pre-protestant mystical piety. It was true of almost all of them, although in quite different ways—some apocalyptic, some mystical, some intellectual, some biblicistic—that they claimed to be doing what the official reformers were doing, but more thoroughly and radically, refusing to let themselves be held back by the reticence of the civil authorities, and refusing to leave any agenda untouched in the reformation program.

It clearly spreads the debate too widely to speak of all the various kinds of Anabaptists together, because they radicalized the reformation intention in different directions. Putting them all in one bag was part of the strategy of the official Reformation, in order to be able to condemn them more easily by ascribing to each the vices of all. Yet the fact remains that they all did claim to be carrying the Reformation, properly so-called, to its logical conclusion, not doing something else, and not coming from somewhere else.

To come to the narrower focus of those whom Bullinger called the "general Anabaptists," or whom George Williams calls the "evangelical Anabaptists," the shape of the radicalization can be even more simply shown. The leaders of this movement were literally the pupils of Huldrych Zwingli. They became disappointed with his leadership because he did not live up to his promises and threats. When they went beyond him they used no language against him but what they had learned from him. The most sweeping affirmation that this particular kind of Anabaptism represents a radicalizing of the original language of the Zwinglian Reformation is today made by the late Richard Stauffer, the most respected Calvin scholar of his generation in French speaking Europe.

First, in terms of genetic relationships, Anabaptism in the Upper Rhine Valley is "radicalized Reformation." The Anabaptists were the children of Zwingli. When he disavowed them, they remained in conversation with the reformers of Basel, Schaffhausen, St. Gall, and especially Strasbourg. They were clearly the left wing of the very same movement using the same Bible and the same language, and moving in the same circles.

It is not our present concern, but it confirms the typology, to observe that the same thing happens again and again. In Britain the seventeenth-century radical reformers were not a transplantation of the sixteenth-century Anabaptist movement, but rather both the Baptists and the Quakers arose out of the radicalizing of the Calvinist Puritan movement. Both the concern for proper church order which resulted in origins of the "Particular Baptists" and the concern for a valid inner experience which culminated in Quakerism were the products of radicalized Puritanism much more than of borrowing from he Lollards or the Dutch Mennonites.

The same is the case once more with "Anabaptism" on the American frontier. Although other streams of population flowed into the movement, the source of the Restoration movement was radicalized presbyterianism, in its concern for the proper pattern of church order according to the Bible. As Richard Hughes and I have indicated elsewhere,[2] Anabaptist and Calvinistic understandings of restitution vary precisely at this point. The Calvinists' vision of restitution is more concerned for restoring the details of church order. Campbell was at this point a radicalized Calvinist.

What has been said above in terms of personal and group genetic relationship must also be said on the level of theological drive. In their debates with the official Reformation, the Anabaptists applied the principle of *sola scriptura* not only to the question of soteriology but also to the questions of ecclesiology and social ethics. In those debates, the Reformed reformers said scripture is not to be applied in those areas, because with Constantine and Justinia we have moved beyond the phase of holy history which the New Testament describes.

The Anabaptists applied the principle of *sola fide* not only to justification but also to epistemology; i.e., they called into question their reliance on the notions of the revelation of social ethics through reason and nature, which become all important when one claims that the orders of creation give us more valid guidance in ethics than do the words and the work of Jesus.

Since the reformers were debating among themselves and with Catholicism, they never had to face this problem in their classical self-image; but if one asks what the concept of revelation is that underlies reformed social ethics at the points where it differs from the Anabaptists, one thing becomes clear: a level of trust in reason and in nature is being affirmed which fits poorly with what is said about human reason at other points in the Reformed system.

The Reformed image of the Anabaptist is that of a fanatic wanting to derive all of theology from his denial of the sword. The Anabaptist picture of Reformed theology is of Zwingli's and Bucer's having started out a process of testing everything by Scripture, and then having pulled back from the radical implications of that testing when it was discovered that the post-Constantinian adjustment of the Church to her close symbiosis with the rulers would have to be tested.

Two Perspectives Then and Now

What has been said here in sixteenth-century terms can also be played back, in another key, regarding the present. The Reformed vocabulary and the Reformed thought patterns have largely set the tone for WASP theological culture in our time. This means that any American Mennonite who learns to read has some awareness of the Reformed thought structure. If he thinks theologically he becomes aware of his own position in the encounter with Reformed mainstream thought. This is further fostered by the fact (which I cannot fully explain) that between 1910 and 1970, when North American Mennonite students went off to doctoral study, they tended more often to go to Reformed institutions than to Anglican, Lutheran, secular, Catholic, or Methodist universities. Thus, whether consciously or not, and whether with intellectual independence or alienating subservience, most North American Mennonites understand Reformed thought patterns. In fact, many of them understand an intrinsically Anabaptist or New Testament logic less clearly than they do the Reformed thought patterns of their graduate educational context.[3]

On the other hand, there are no Anabaptist graduate schools to which a Reformed scholar could go; and, if they existed, a Reformed scholar would not go there. The few Reformed thinkers who have some notion of what a conversation with Anabaptist thought would be about are those (like Mouw) who have taken it up with a special sense of the reasons for doing so.

So far I have been making formal observations in order to locate our agenda. Before I proceed to the agenda, I will briefly give other reasons for challenging the usefulness of giving priority to this dichotomy:

A. It leaves out many components of the evangelical coalition: Lutherans, whose concern for the law/gospel dialectic puts this entire debate in another light; pietists, who affirm a spirit/world dualism different both from the Anabaptist faith/unfaith dualism and from the Reformed visions of church/world unity; evangelicals within other denominations, who intentionally have no ecclesiastical shape for a distinctive ethos; Anglicans, Brethren and Bible Church types for whom this entire debate is off the subject. Wes-

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leyans and Adventists have still other handles on the social agenda.

B. Although coalition building is important for "evangelicals," as far as social involvement is concerned, neither the Reformed nor the Anabaptist stance is tied one-to-one to "evangelical" assumptions about biblical authority or regeneration. One can very well be either Reformed or Anabaptist about social involvement and not concerned to prove oneself evangelical.

C. The need to be on record as rejecting "anabaptist separatism" has led some to be less critical of the powers that be than their theology would call for. The non-anabaptist "just war" tradition intends to provide relevant restraint on nationalistic violence; but for how many evangelicals has it done that? Many are more attached to disavowing pacifism than to disciplining nationalism. Therefore, the recent espousal of a "just war pacifism" with regard to nuclear arms by many non-pacifist believers is a striking development.

D. To speak in formal terms, there is a conflict between the systematician's task and the historian's. To use types derived from history without being subject to proving at what points their historical rootedness is verified, mixes two disciplines. The person using types systematically feels responsible to be selectively anachronistic, assuming from that confessed past only those elements still considered relevant. It is hard for any twentieth-century Christian to advocate the control of the church by civil government, the civil repression of religious dissent, or the imposition upon dissenters of the social views of the particular reformer who has the ear of the civil ruler. (These items are in fact what was at stake when in the 1520s the Reformed movement in Zurich divided.) These items are not what the modern Reformed thinker who rejects Anabaptism wants to favor. But the socio-theological type has been divorced from history. The Mennonite, Quaker or Sojourner is not granted the same liberty to disentangle his socio-theological axioms from the empirical options available to his ancestors—or even from the options of other "radicals" who were not his ancestors at all, but to whom the authors of the protestant creeds chose also to attach the label "Anabaptist."

If I reject as improper a picture of polarity between the Reformed and the Anabaptist thought patterns, am I then under the obligation to propose another image? I am not sure that I should; but if I had to, it would begin with an alternative historical scenario, imagining some adaptation of the original Anabaptist picture of a pilgrimage toward reformation which we began together. But then those who made their peace with the state structures solidified in the 1520s, and the doctrinal structures that solidified between 1532 and 1550 simply did not go "all the way" with the Reformation. What this "all the way" would have been, if the less radical "state church" brethren had been willing to go farther, is not identical with what the Anabaptists wound up doing, since the element of separation which was involved in their "going farther" was not of their own will. Not being able to describe the difference between stopping part way and going all the way in terms of the sixteenth-century model of separation as it was forced upon men like Sattler, I suppose the more adequate model would be seen in the British experience.

Some Calvinist thinking permeated the original established Anglican movement, especially in the age of Edward, with the presence of Calvin's own theological father Martin Bucer; but it could not be contained there. It moved into an early Presbyterianism, intrinsically willing to break with the official Episcopal structure, although that break took a long time to be consummated. It went beyond that into Congregationalism, still nourished by the theology and the biblicism of Calvin. Although they "went farther" formally, even then the congregationalists were still Calvinists in their hermeneutic approach, believing that they found in the New Testament a congregational pattern to be applied. Since it had to be applied, and could be applied by the sovereign, it should apply to all Christians in England. Therefore there was nothing separatist about that kind of Independents. All the way to the most independent party in the Westminster parliament, this assumption remains. As Baptists and Quakers pushed biblical radicality to the point of cutting their ties with the civil government, they still took this further step without breaking the momentum or the continuity of their Calvinist identity. They continued to assume and to affirm that there is one proper form which God wants his people to have, and that this form can be known and realized. Since every Christian should adopt this form, to advocate it is not sectarian or schismatic. Thus they continued to agree with Calvin against Luther, for whom all such matters of form are flexible or adiaphora, and against the Catholic views for which the desirable structure is the one which has continued to evolve over the centuries, with the assistance of the powers of this world.

Perhaps a Calvinist or a Lutheran needs, for reasons which can be defined theologically, to be faithful to his founder. The descendants of churches once led by Menno do not.

E. Favoring models from the heroic generation of founder-fathers may seriously skew considerations having to do with continuity, evolution, and necessary mid-course corrections. Both Reformed and Anabaptist tend to decry the development of body/spirit dualisms, sometimes called (with questionable accuracy) "pietism." But maybe some such adjustments are necessary parts of any movement that lives more than fifty years. Might it be intrinsically improper to use *any* first generation model as a base-line for categorizing or for guiding ongoing communities?

F. The issue of scriptural authority is not dealt with in the same way for all who would call themselves Reformed or Anabaptist. Yet many in both camps, and all of them in the sixteenth century, claimed to expositing the test of Scripture. For both, there were issues of hermeneutic method which took priority over and underlay the differences in ethics. We do an injustice to both parties in the dialog when we *then* deal with them first as different social approaches. For the Reformed, all the Bible stood on the same level of authority and usefulness, so Joshua and Josiah were valid models of Christian social responsibility. For the Anabaptists, the movement from the Old Testament to the New was a necessary implication of their Christology and applied to the civil realm as well as to the ritual. For the Reformers, the theologian's task was dependent on the authority and the university-taught rhetorical and linguistic expertise of the rulers. The Anabaptists were ready to entrust the hermeneutic operation to the Holy Spirit operating in the gathered community, with the linguist only one among the gifted members. There were also differences about the hermeneutic authority of the ecumenical councils and the fathers, as to whether the work of Jesus was relevant to the social realm, and as to the knowability of the will of God through "nature" and "reason," etc.

Our model from the British experience gives us a picture of a continuum of reforming initiatives, each standing on the shoulders of the one which went before it. No one of them is intrinsically sectarian, for each step along the way can be taken with the conviction that all true Christians can join in taking it. The congregationalists who argued on the basis of particular biblical texts and models that each local congregation should be formally responsible for its own order were simply carrying to its logical conclusion a doctrine already stated by Luther and Zwingli in 1523. This did not need to mean a break with all other Christians nor even with government, since government (Cromwell) could properly understand its task as being to support that kind of church. In the age of Cromwell and in New England it was obvious that congregationalism did not mean any break with the Christian civil authority.

Thus, no single step of fuller radicality in reformation is intrinsically sectarian. The least we can say about the divisions of 1525 is that Zwingli, who broke off the small-scale conversations and appealed to the civil power, was as responsible for the separation as were those who refused to let the conversation be decided on that level. If that appeal is not to be permitted to stop the conversation, or if the peculiar social situation (as in England) does not permit the civil power to stop the conversation, then the form the

reformation may take (while continuing to become more thorough) must be projected apart from its needing to produce separation within the churches. That is the matter I would like to see apply still today, if Reformed brethren would agree that we are carrying on a conversation within the same league, rather than beginning a priori by their boxing me into a position already rejected by their creeds.

One last cavil before moving to the polarity proper. The very value of holding to a *type* of theology, and of stating it in a confessional document, is perceived differently in the two families. The political function of a confession in the sixteenth century was not separable from its truth claim. That made it unavoidably a virtue that evolution from there on should be conservative. Everyone said "*ecclesia reformata semper reformanda*," but the parameters of the ongoing reformation could not reach past what was already defined. From the other perspective, it is not clear, or at least it would need to be explained for each time and each issue, why trueness to type should be a virtue. Perhaps a Calvinist or a Lutheran needs, for reasons which he can define theologically, to be faithful to his founder. The descendants of churches once led by Menno do not. By the nature of the case the tradition of the sixteenth century is not normative in the free church style. The free church tradition is also a *tradition*, so that guidance is also received from the past. But the *way* that guidance is received is much less firmly structured, and much less concerned for fidelity to any particular father.

Insofar as one particular "father" is recognized in the free church family as exemplary or as more interesting than other predecessors, a recognition which I affirm for Cheltchitski and Fox and Mack no less than for Sattler and more than for Menno, it is I who affirm that congeniality; and I, within my contemporary accountability to contemporary churches, therefore remain free to define the *tertium quid* which makes his witness congenial and interesting to my time and place. I have no commitment to detailed fidelity at those particular points of the view of one of those "fathers" of which Guy de Bres happened particularly to disapprove or to choose to take as typical.

The Typology Challenged

I have stated "from the outside" my doubts about the Reformed/Anabaptist polarity as inherited. Now I move on to test it "from the inside." I now set forth the discrepancy of structure between the two approaches as the typology seems to demand. To do so I shall characterize the Reformed position in the form of those theses which seem to be indispensable for its own coherence (and not to be acceptable from my perspective). It will not work to do it the other way around, by starting with Anabaptist theses, because the Reformed definition of the Anabaptist theses will appear to the

If I understand the Reformed argument on these matters, it is, first, that *the cultural mandate is univocal.*

When I say the cultural mandate is *univocal*, this means there is no serious debate as to the substance of moral obligation. It is only when we can assume everyone knows what is called for that it becomes possible to say that the only debate is whether to do it. Just as long as there are alternate readings of what is called for, then the interlocutor who refuses to do what I interpret to be culturally mandated is not rejecting the mandate as such by my interpretation of its content. The Reformed do not say that the Anabaptists misinterpret the cultural mandate but that they deny it. This only makes sense if that mandate's content is univocally that which the Anabaptist refuses to do. This is very obvious in the classical discussion of this theme by H. Richard Niebuhr. The single sentence in *Christ and Culture* which refers to the Mennonites says that they are opposed to culture *because they operate their own schools.* It would not occur to you to say that Calvinists are opposed to culture because they operate their own schools.[4] To be doing something different about education is still to be doing something about education and not negating it. Even the Old Order Amish, who wish for their children the freedom from the civil obligation to attend *high* schools in the *city*, do this not because they are opposed to education but because they are committed to a different context and content of education, whose total cultural meaning is more coherent with their faith.[5]

Second, one must say that the cultural mandate is *monolithic.* This is my label for the logical procedure which says that to be consistent, one must take the same attitude with regard to every segment of culture. In this way of reasoning, Richard Niebuhr says that Tertullian was inconsistent because on the one hand he rejected Roman imperial violence (thereby against culture), and yet he made very good use of the Latin language (in favor of culture). The common person looking at this argument would say that Tertullian should have the freedom to discriminate within culture, accepting some elements and rejecting others; but it is obvious that Richard Niebuhr considers this to be cheating, since to be consistent one ought to do the whole thing with culture as a whole. According to this understanding of the cultural mandate, it is an offense in logic and perhaps even in morality when the Anabaptist is willing to take more responsibility for some elements of culture than for others. Where I would see ethical selectivity as the essence of responsibility for limited resources in a diaspora situation, my Calvinist brother sees it as a culpable inconsistency.

The third general thesis of the Reformed stance, as I seek to understand it (despite my not being convinced by it), is that *the civil order is the quintessence of the cultural mandate.* The cultural mandate has many dimensions (family, the economy, education, the arts, communication) but they are not all of equal clarity and centrality. The civil order is the one on which the others all depend; the sovereignty of the other spheres is more relative. Both historically and philosophically, both in modern terms and in the sixteenth century, the bearers of the civil responsibility lead the community in all the other realms as well. The other realms have a degree of autonomy which the rulers delegate to them; it is not intrinsic. This is not only the case because rulers in fact do rule. It is by nature or by divine right that the sanctions of which the civil sovereign disposes are properly to be used to reinforce the virtues of the other realms.

This thesis is indispensable to the Reformed position, since it is only at the point of the sword of the civil ruler that there is any difference with the Anabaptist in acceptance of the cultural mandate. Yet the Reformed accuses the Anabaptist of refusing that mandate in toto.

The fourth thesis identifies a still further narrowing: *the sword is the quintessence of the civil order.* Again the argument may be based either on historical realism or on an understanding of the divine mandate. A civil order without the sword is not a better civil order but a defective one. This is to deny in principle the possibility of a progressive minimizing of the violence of the sanctions of the state and a progressive dismantling of the lethal sanctions of the state through considerations of social contract and checks and balances. It denies the vision of peace as the *prima ratio* of government, as held to by Catholicism, by liberalism, or by Karl Barth.

This narrowing is again essential for the logic of the polar debate to stand. If and when the civil order is understood as the implementation of the social contract, as the administration of public welfare, as the dialogical formulation of public policies, or as the execution of policies serving the common weal, there is no controversy. It is only at the point of the sword that classically there is a debate. The discussion is not about democratization, or about socialism as an option in the political economy. Nor is the debate about fraud, cheating, cronyism and classism, lying and defamation, and all other standard human vices which the civil realm shares with the realms of business and the university, but which are not its definition.

Fifth, in making this identification between the sword and the civil order, the Reformed tradition, if I understand it, also *fuses creation and the fall.* This observation is so important that I must return to it later. An unfallen earthly society would certainly need a civil order to make decisions and to apportion tasks and resources. But it would not need a sword. The sword is at the very best the reaction of the fallen order under Providence to the fallenness of its citizens. There is no ground in the biblical doctrine of the fall to argue that the hand that bears the sword or the order that defends itself by the sword is any less fallen than the offender against whom the sword is used. Once again, this thesis is indispensable for the Reformed position. It is only at the point of the sword that the Anabaptists denied the call to share in the administration of the created order. From the beginning they accepted non-combatant

civil duties. Pilgrim Marbeck, the leading thinker of the movement from 1530, earned his living as a civil engineer.

Sixth, it must be assumed that *the sword is available to the believers*. It is meaningless to discuss whether the Christian may properly be a ruler, if that option is practically excluded. Whereas the other axioms thus far identified are logical, this one is empirical, historical, and cultural. It must be possible, in some way deemed legitimate, for the Christian to accede to the possession of the sword, by hereditary royalty or nobility, by majority vote in a democracy, or by a justified revolution. Only when one or more of those is possible is the sword question other than of an hypothetical empty set.

In the early church, as in most of the world through most of history and today, that set is still empty. The Reformed statement of the issue makes "Christendom" assumptions which, if empirically valid sometimes, are on the same grounds inappropriate elsewhere.

This is an issue that needs more attention than it is getting today in the West. Nothing in the written laws keeps a Christian from running for candidacy in a democracy, but in reality there is much to keep a Christian with the substantial moral commitments that any Evangelical makes, from being very likely to be elected very often. The Reformed candidate who takes a position on *any* question (truth-telling, slavery, abortion...) such that he will not get elected, and the Anabaptist who will not get elected because his views concerning government's violence are rejected by the majority, differ only in detail, not in structure. Both are willing to let others run the government (except for those older pre-Cromwell Calvinists who affirmed aristocracy rather than democracy and were themselves aristocrats). The idea that "Anabaptist withdrawal" will abandon government to the bad guys, i.e., to non-believers, is silly. Democracy does this.[6]

The above six points are true by virtue of *a divine act of institution*. A specific divine decree created the institution of government. This is most meaningfully spoken of when the word "institution" is taken literally, in such a way that it would be possible to hypothesize a time (or an eternity) before the event of that institution, just as we can say that the *institution* of the Lord's supper took place at a given time in Jerusalem.

If we exercise our historical imagination, it is quite possible to understand what Christians in the middle ages of the sixteenth century were thinking about when they used such language as this. Even then, we need to ask whether this "institution" should be ascribed to the order of preservation or to some other covenant. What is usually referred to as the institution of civil government is reported in Genesis 9 after the flood rather than after the Fall in chapter 4. Thus, if we were to attempt to take seriously the orthodox Calvinist scheme of a series of covenants, the definition of government for all humankind comes not even right after the Fall but only with Noah. "Creation" then is hardly the word for it.[7]

But not all of us have the historical imagination or the playfulness to attempt to discuss a matter like this in terms borrowed from the seventeenth century. It is anachronistic to replace "institution" with the idea that a need for or inclination toward certain orders is part of human nature, without seriously questioning how much of this can be retrieved and carried over into a more contemporary post-enlightenment historical awareness.

Eighth, all of this information is *known to us by revelation*. But again, the argument is not always clear. Sometimes the revelation in question is the natural revelation accessible to reason. Other times the revelation in question is the special revelation of a few biblical texts on the subject. These two kinds of revelation may be held to coincide completely, or one may be ascribed greater precision or greater generality than the other.

To try to take seriously theses seven and eight in the modern world, we must remember that what is being debated is not whether there is or whether there needs to be social organization, but whether it is the will of God that one nation should fight another or that one man should oppress or destroy another in the name of divine right.

When we look specifically at this question, at least the following limitations to the applicability of these theses must be recorded:

a) Romans 13 affirms the acceptance by the apostolic church of the existence of a *pagan* government in which Christians had no responsible decision-making possibilities or duties. When they logically derived from this observation a duty to be *subject* to government, one may not with legitimate logic draw from their statements a duty to administer government. It could not have been a duty when it was not even a possibility.

b) There is a considerable difference in local situations so that involvement-in-tension in one place, moderate involvement in another, and uninvolved witness in another might all be expressive of the same basic ethical view. When Menno Simons said a Christian can be in government if he does not apply the death penalty, and Michael Sattler said a Christian cannot be in government because it does apply the death penalty, they did not necessarily have different views of Christian ethics. They may have been responding to different experiences of government.

That the Anabaptist reject all concern for the civil order is not a fact of history but rather a defamatory statement in the Reformed confessions. In what other area is the historian still ready to take at face value the description of dissenters as stated by their persecutors? It is true that in circumstances where they had no significant access to such decision making as could change the nature of the civil order, certain Anabaptists did affirm in light of Romans 13 that the civil order, even when it persecuted them, was still within the divine plan and that their participation in it was none the less not desirable. But as I have attempted to demonstrate, that position is not a sweeping generalization but rather the application for a given situation of a broader attitude toward society which is not fundamentally dualistic.

c) The most that the Genesis texts can authorize is punishment of death by death. There is no logical extension of this (in the texts) to cover the use of civil sanctions for any other crime but bloodshed. Nor does it determine who is the legitimate claimant to that punitive function: it assumes legitimacy but does not adjudicate it. Even less could it authorize war beyond the limits of a given sovereign's territory.

Creation, Fall and Preservation

Above, I observed the mixture of appeals in Reformed views of the state. That there must be order is a created mandate; but that it must wield the sword is not. The fusion of creation and Fall is not merely an imprecision. It is a logically illegitimate move whereby a number of substantial assumptions are smuggled in without examination.

First, the Fall makes a difference in the empirical order of society which is no longer wholesome and mutually supporting. To the extent to which "the order of nature" is an order which can be perceived within the structures of nature, this "knowability" is compromised if not lost.

Second, the human mind in its capacity to know the truth, however that truth be understood (special revelation, empirical nature, speculative nature), is distorted by the Fall. My capacity and desire to know the truth are distorted by my desire to use the truth for my own purposes and my desire to avoid those parts of the truth with which I disagree.

Even if in some sense it could be held that the truth remains essentially unconfused despite the Fall, and my ability to perceive it were not radically destroyed, there still remains the flaw in my will which no longer desires to obey but prefers to use the arena of history to act out my rebelliousness, my will to power, and my hostility to my brother.

Even if my will were unfallen and my knowledge were unfallen, my ability to control the course of events would no longer be whole. The chain of causation, the structures of the social order, communication and decision making are fallen as well.

A further change is on the epistemological level. When we speak seriously of the moral obligation derived from creation we can assume the univocality of the divine will. God's purpose is the same for all because all are in the same situation with the same potential

and the same function. After the Fall and especially after the conditional divine interventions classically referred to as the covenant with Adam and the covenant with Noah (a situation still further complicated by further covenants between then and now), that univocality is gone by definition. There is no self-evident reason to assume that the will of God has the same meaning for a Jew as for a Gentile in the age of Moses, when tabernacle worship and circumcision are not expected of the nations.[8] There is no self-evident reason to assume that the obligations of Christians and pagans are the same in the New Testament when one decides and acts within the reestablished covenant of grace and the other does not. There is no reason to have to assume that the moral performance which God expects of the regenerate he equally expects of the unregenerate. Of course, on some much more elevated level of abstraction, our minds demand that we project an unique and univocal ultimate or ideal will of God. But it is precisely in the nature of his patience with fallen humanity that God condescends to deal with us on other levels. The well-intentioned but uninformed heathen, the informed but rebellious child of the believer, the regenerate but ignorant, the educated victim of heretical teaching, the teacher, and the bearer of a distinct charisma all stand in different moral positions.

On the level of normative social ethical discourse, this awareness means that the substance of the Christian testimony to a pluralistic social order will not be identical with the claims of discipleship for the disciples of Jesus Christ; a relevant moral witness to the authorities in a Western democracy will be different from that to a pagan monarch. There is not one timeless pattern of pertinent social norms. The hermeneutic we need must be dialogical and congregational, renouncing claims to leverage from outside the historical flux.

A Personal Epilogue

There is one more level upon which one can attempt to gain hold on the substance of a debate. One can ask very subjectively, "Do they understand me? Do they speak to me?"

When I ask whether I am understood, my answer is, "not really." I perceive that I am being read and heard through a filter, whether I meet that in historical terms as the definition of Anabaptism which is in the Reformed confessions, or whether I identify it in logical content as the axioms stated above.

The other question is whether the alternative view which is being commended to me has something from which I can learn, because it appeals to the New Testament or to some other independent reference in a way that reaches past established confessional differences to or from the New Testament. Thus far this is not the case. What I hear my Reformed interlocutor asking me to accept is not some particular biblical text or even some particular biblical theme[9] but rather a system of definitions adding up more or less to the same thing as the axioms stated above.

There is a strange ambivalence in that criticism. On the one hand, I am told that I am wrong because my position implies a systematic dualism and total withdrawal from the social struiggle, and it is wrong to withdraw from the social struggle.

But then when I say I also consider it wrong to withdraw from social struggle because Jesus was "politically" involved, as were William Penn and Martin Luther King, Jr., I get two contradictory answers. One is that I am logically cheating because I ought to want to withdraw according to the Reformed image of what my position implies. I do not defend their image of what I ought to believe. Instead of seeing that as a challenge to the accuracy of their image, they challenge my representativity. The other is that they wish I would withdraw, because they do not want my Jesus and me in the real arena with real alternatives. They want me to affirm the irrelevance which is their a priori pigeonhole for me (and, more importantly, for the Jesus of the Gospels). My acceptance of withdrawal as the price of my faithfulness is needed for them to explain lesser-evil calculations as the price of the "responsible involve-

[1] Article XXXVI; article XXXII uses the same phrase with regard to baptism. We set that aside for present purposes: millions of Baptists are Reformed in their social ethics, showing that the link between ecclesiology and social strategy is not always close.

[2] Cf. my *The Priestly Kingdom* (Notre Dame University Press, 1984) p. 131f.

[3] Add to this anomaly the awareness that the sociology of the ethnic enclave, typical of most Mennonite experience from 1650 to 1950, is a form of establishment, rather than an implementation of the radical missionary vision.

[4] Nicholas Wolterstorff characterizes Mennonites as seeking to create "a holy commonwealth in a separated area" (*Until Justice and Peace Embrace*, Grand Rapids, 1983, p. 19); an inappropriate reference especially in lectures presented in Amsterdam, where Mennonites since 1600 have typically been about as separated as Quakers in Philadelphia. Another specimen—to demonstrate how widely abused is the typology—is an interview in the *NRC-Handelsblad*, the Dutch equivalent of the *Wall Street Journal*, 29 November 1984, in which A. M. Oostlander, research director of the Christian party (CDA), claims that the InterChurch Peace Council (IKV) represents "an ancient dutch phenomenon with deep roots in national history," namely the Anabaptist movement, which "turned its back on government." Oostlander is wrong on every count. a) The IKV is made up mostly of non-pacifists, mostly Reformed and Roman Catholic, who under the pressure of actions taken by the Reformed Church of the Netherlands since 1952 is critical of the nuclear arms race policies of NATO; b) The Anabaptists of the sixteenth century did not turn their back on government; government outlawed them and burned them at the stake; c) What Oostlander dislikes about the IKV is not that it turns its back on government but that it is becoming politically powerful. This is thus an excellent specimen of the way in which, far from using historical types as an instrument of authentic ecumenical communication, the reproach of Anabaptism is a tool of intra-Reformed polemics.

[5] Franklin H. Littell: "The Radical Reformation and the American Experience" in Thomas M. McFadden, ed., *America in Theological Perspective* (New York, Seabury, 1976), pp. 71-86; and "Christian Faith and Counter-Culture," *The Iliff Review*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, Winter 1973, pp. 3–13.

[6] I have been watching with interest the Reformed social think tanks at Grand Rapids, Pella, Toronto and elsewhere for some years now. What is most striking to me is the absence of any head-on recognition that if one recognizes or even advocates democracy, as it exists in pluralistic North Atlantic society, the classical theocratic language of the Reformed vision is more anachronistic than is the "sectarian" language of the Anabaptist model. As Nicholas Wolterstorff wrote, "In one way we have all become Anabaptist . . ., the sixteenth-century Anabaptists urged the abolition of a sacral society... That heritage of Anabaptism is the policy we all embrace . . ." (*Reformed Journal*, October 1977, p. 11). To negate "sacral society" is vaguer and easier than to affirm democracy, which Wolterstorff would also do, but either way is to say it lets other people run the place.

[7] Meredith Kline sees JHWH's threat to avenge any attack on Cain (Gen. 4:15) as an earlier version of the same revelation. That would bring us one covenant earlier, but still would be a salvation-historical intervention (Kline calls it "oracle") rather than an order of creation knowable to reason. It does not (like the Noachic covenant) name man as the executor of JHWH's vengeance. It would authorize only punitive vengeance, none of the other functions of the civil order. It would call literally for the vengeance taken to be collective, i.e., sevenfold. It would make the escalation of human autonomy through city-building and technology to the war cry of Lamech look like a fulfillment of JHWH's intent. It would make no difference to the question of what the New Covenant in Jesus' blood does with Genesis and Moses. Nonetheless, Kline's effort to found the notion of a divorce mandate for the civil order is more serious than most.

[8] Since the adjustment to the Jewish-Christian schism, whereby rabbinic thought largely abandoned "mission" to the "Christians," it is generally affirmed that gentiles can have access to "the world to come" if they live according to the Noachic covenant. Cf. David Novak, *The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism*, Toronto, Lewiston, Edwin Mellen Press, 1983.

[9] With the exception of Meredith Kline, note 8 above.

Abandoning the Typology: A Reformed Assist

by Richard J. Mouw

Professor Yoder thinks that the differences between Anabaptist and Reformed Christians have been rather consistently misrepresented, especially on the part of Reformed thinkers. He demonstrates his convictions regarding these matters by means of two strategies. First, he argues that the common notion that the Reformed-Anabaptist cultural-theological debate constitutes a "classical dilemma" does not provide us with the best account of the historical developments bearing on these disputes. Then, having offered this argument "from the outside," he moves "inside" the discussion. Here he argues that if the issues at stake are properly construed, then Reformed criticisms of the Anabaptists often miss the mark; Reformed people, in attempting to make an effective case against the Anabaptist cultural perspective, would have to provide different sorts of arguments than they seem to think are necessary.

I am in basic agreement with Professor Yoder on these matters. This is not to say that I have become an Anabaptist. But I do endorse, in general terms, his account of the actual shape of the debate between the two camps. The continuing differences between the two groups ought to be understood, I am convinced, along the lines he suggests.

On a number of occasions I have protested against what I have labelled, for lack of a better terms, the "Mennophobia" of many of

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my fellow Reformed Christians. The deep hostility toward Anabaptists is expressed openly, as Professor Yoder notes, in Reformed confessional documents and in other writings from the past. My own denomination has officially declared that those of us who are required to subscribe to the Reformed confessions of the sixteenth century are not bound by the "incidental historical references" of those documents—and the "detesting" of the Anabaptists has been explicitly singled out as an example of those non-binding "incidentals." Making hatred non-binding, however, is not the same as condemning it as improper. Thus a detesting of the Anabaptists—no longer ecclesiastically compelled, but now merely optional—continues to occur in the Reformed community.

Of course, the detesting flows in both directions. When Calvin and other sixteenth century Reformers accused the Anabaptists of an unhealthy perfectionism, they were not completely off-base in their charge. The horrible programs of persecution which Reformed people launched against the Anabaptists—and what they did was surely horrible—were often stimulated by Anabaptist claims that the Calvinists and Lutherans were nothing but thinly disguised papists—or in other words, given the parlance of the day, tools of Satan himself. A properly revised narrative of our ecclesiastical pasts will require all of us to reformulate our confessional stories.

But this is not the place, nor am I the person, to deal with those pastoral matters. Nor is this the appropriate occasion to carry on what Yoder rightly calls the "one unfinished friendly debate" between him and me. Suffice it to say that in my *Politics and the Biblical Drama* I was motivated by some of the same concerns that move Yoder in this present discussion. I wanted, among other things, to demonstrate to those Reformed people who were wont to dismiss Yoder's case in *The Politics of Jesus* as advocating "Anabaptist withdrawal," that Reformed Christians must deal with the questions of Christian political action precisely where Yoder issues the challenge: by beginning with a non-negotiable commitment to the way of discipleship—to the waging of "the Lamb's War." If in the process of arguing that case I employed and perpetuated old stereotypes, I am sorry. This present discussion can at least serve as an occasion for me to make it clear that I want to join John Yoder in attempting to bring the Reformed-Anabaptist debate to a new and more honest level of mutual exploration.

The Historical Challenge

Professor Yoder convincingly presents historical evidence for calling the long-standing "Reformed-versus-Anabaptist" typology into question. I am not an historian, so I can do little to add to this case. But it is interesting to note that some verification for his contentions can be found by looking at intra-Reformed debates.

Discussions about "Reformed-Anabaptist tensions" often fail to account for the fact that each of the communities being discussed is itself quite pluralistic—so much so that the tensions between the two traditions are not experienced in the same light or with the same intensity at every point on the spectrum within each community.

My own denomination, the Christian Reformed Church, has been fed and shaped by two dissenting factions within the Reformed community in the Netherlands. The first faction has its roots in the Secessionist movement, which in 1834 broke from the established Reformed church in Holland. The Secessionists were deeply pious folk who placed a strong emphasis on preserving the Calvinist soteriological teachings of the past. They viewed themselves (and rightly so) as victims of a strong alliance between church and state in the Netherlands, and they exported this distrust of the cultural status quo to North America, by means of the emigrations of the 19th century.

These Secessionist Calvinists expressed their strong sense of separation from the world in two ways. First, they nurtured a piety in which there was a central emphasis on avoiding attachments to the values of "the present age." Second, in their theological reflection they gave an important place to the idea of "the antithesis"—i.e., a radical opposition between elect and reprobate. In its most expreme form, "antithetical Calvinism" fostered the notion that elect and reprobate, since they operate with radically different presuppositions, share little or no intellectual common ground.

The second dissenting faction stemmed from the movement headed by the Dutch statesman Abraham Kuyper who, during the 1880s, led another major movement out of the established Reformed Church in Holland. This group soon merged with the church body that had been formed by the earlier Secessionists. But the Kuyperians were of a somewhat different character. Their leadership was urbane and well-educated, not inclined to relinquish the reins of cultural leadership to the children of darkness. Kuyper initiated a major effort at ecclesiastical reform. He also founded the Free University and established a Christian political party which he represented in the Dutch parliament; for a few years around the turn of the century, he was Prime Minister of the Netherlands.

Kuyper himself made much of the antithesis between belief and unbelief. But this emphasis never functioned in this thinking as a basis for justifying cultural withdrawal. To many of those who sympathized with the earlier Secession, Kuyper's programs exhibited an unhealthy triumphalism; the Kuyperians, they thought, placed too high a premium on "horizontalist" forays into worldly territories. Some of the Secessionists made their case in pietistic terms, while others argued against Kuyper by a direct doctrinal appeal to the antithesis. But in any case there has been, as a consistent presence in this community, a nervousness expressed about a Calvinism that places too much stock in cultural activism.

The point I want to illustrate by this brief (and much too unnuanced) piece of ecclesiastical history is that something *like* the so-called "Reformed/Anabaptist tensions" actually occur *within* the Reformed community. And the fact is that when the going gets tough in one of the open debates that regularly surface in my confessional community, there will very often come a moment, as the Calvinist antagonists really begin to slug it out with each other, when the more culturally activistic Cavlinists will reach into the rhetorical arsenal and hurl out the ultimate insult: they will accuse their more pietist or doctrinalist Reformed opponents of being "Anabaptists."[1]

There are, of course, different ways of explaining this phenomenon. One is to suggest that since—on the standard typology, which Yoder and I are both rejecting—the Anabaptist position is the most detestable of alternatives to the Reformed position, it is quite likely that Calvinists would use the most insulting label that comes to mind when they really get angry with each other. But the fact is that this label is used by Reformed people to refer to actual tendencies which they observe within their own community. This suggests that the Anabaptist position is not one that Calvinists denounce because it is so alien to their own views, but rather because it represents very real tendencies that they fear within themselves.

It only remains to be argued that these tendencies are very natural ones, given the essential characteristics of the Reformed orientation. And I think that this is indeed the case.

Calvinism is well known for its stark portrayal of the human sinful condition. It is perhaps no accident that the first letter in TULIP stands for "Total Depravity," since it is this negative assessment of human abilities that gives everything else that is distinctive about Reformed doctrine its poignancy. The Calvinist emphasis on God's absolute sovereign control over the process of salvation has to be seen against the backdrop of its insistence that human beings are completely incapable of initiating, or making any interesting contribution to, that process.

Once Calvinism has begun with this negative assessment of the present human condition, any teaching that seems to modify this assessment, by attributing, say, some sort of positive noetic or ethical or volitional ability to human beings, will need special explaining. And the fact is that Calvinists have regularly gone out of their way to provide such explanations.

Recently I joined two of my Philosphy colleagues in teaching a course on "Philosophy in the Dutch Reformed Tradition." Dutch Calvinists have sustained a strong interest in systematic philosophical thought. We discovered that in these philosophical explorations, Dutch Calvinists regularly credited (following the example of Calvin himself) non-Christian thinkers with having made positive contributions to a proper understanding of reality. But inevitably this kind of admission required extensive explanation on their part, since they had begun with strong endorsements of the ideas of depravity and antithesis.

My own impression is that these efforts at explanation are quite

legitimate. I find the qualified Calvinist endorsement of specific non-Christian philosophical contributions to be necesary and satisfactory. But my point is that Reformed people do have to *work* a bit at providing such explanations. They do not come easily—certainly not automatically. Having arrived at such explanations, after the appropriate Calvinist hard work, it is not pleasant to be required by the antithetical Calvinists on one's rear flank to provide an obvious and convincing Reformed rationale for the philosophical moves that one has made. Again, one may be confident that one has indeed *made* appropriate moves; but it is awkward nonetheless to be asked to trace one's steps from the "T" in TULIP to one's nuanced epistemological proposals. And once one has had to defend these nuances against antithetical *Reformed* opponents, the confrontation with the radical epistemology of many Anabaptists is simply more of the same.

In short, Yoder's historical analysis is given further credence by evidence that Reformed-Anabaptist debates are mere variations on the kinds of disputes that occur *within* the Reformed community. And these intra-Reformed discussions do not result from the importing on the part of some Calvinists of "alien" Anabaptist themes. The themes are generated by the very logic of the Reformed position itself.

Inside the Typology

As Professor Yoder turns to an "internal" discussion of the received typology, his strategy seems to be along these lines: he states what he takes to be crucial Reformed theses—i.e., theses which are necessary for the coherence of Reformed social thought, but which Yoder as an Anabaptist rejects. Yoder shows, however, that his reasons for rejecting key elements of Reformed thought, as contained in these particular theses, suggest a somewhat different set of Reformed-Anabaptist disagreements than the state of affairs dictated by the traditional typology.

For example, on the received reading of the differences between Calvinists and Anabaptists, Calvinists believe that we ought to be transforming culture while Anabaptists adopt an anti-cultural stance; and more specifically, Calvinists urge Christians to participate in civil government while Anabaptists oppose such participation.

But these portrayals of the differences do not capture the way in which Yoder experiences the tensions between Reformed and Anabaptist Christians. He sees Anabaptists as opposing the Calvinist *mode* of cultural transformation. Reformed people act as if the biblical mandate to shape cultural activity in obedience to God's will were a crystal-clear matter, and that it, furthermore, applies with equal weight and clarity to all areas of cultural activity. Anabaptists do not dissent from the notion of a biblical cultural mandate as such, but they do resent having Calvinists tell them exactly what it means to obey that mandate.

The question of involvement in civil government turns out to be a case in point here. If "political involvement" means a willingness to participate in the processes of public administration, or a holy desire to influence public policy in the light of biblical standards of righteousness, then there is no principled disagreement between Reformed and Anabaptist. The real argument gets going only at that point where the Calvinist insists that people who refuse to wield the sword are, by virtue of that refusal, denying the legitimacy of all "political involvement."

Here again, Yoder is correct in his account. At least he is correct in general terms; I am not sure that Reformed Christians have to endorse everything that Yoder claims is required for the "coherence" of the Reformed position. But in general terms he has it right. Indeed, his formulations, if taken seriously, can serve to advance the discussion of substantive issues.

Many of the points which Yoder attributes to the Reformed perspective are endorsed by Abraham Kuyper, when he explains why he refuses to distinguish between "general moral ordinances, and more special *Christian* commandments":

> Can we imagine that at one time God willed to rule things in a certain moral order, but that now, in Christ, He wills to rule it otherwise? As though He were not the Eternal, the Unchangeable, Who, from the very hour of creation, even unto all eternity, had willed, wills, and shall will and maintain, one and the same firm moral world-order! Verily Christ has swept away the dust with which man's sinful limitations had covered up this world-order, and has made it glitter again in its original brilliancy. Verily Christ, and He alone, has disclosed to us the eternal love of Christ which was, from the beginning, the moving principle of this world-order. Above all, Christ has strengthened in us the ability to walk in this world-order with a firm, unfaltering step. But the world-order itself remains just what it was from the beginning. It lays full claim, not only to the believer (as though less were required from the unbeliever), but to every human being and to all human relationships.[2]

If accepting the kinds of emphases embodied in these remarks is required for maintaining a coherent Reformed position, then I am not a very coherent Calvinist. My discomfort has to do with some of the same issues raised by Yoder in explaining why he rejects the Reformed cultural perspective as such. I find Kuyper—in this passage at least—much too confident in his celebration of a "world order" which remains intact since the original creation.

More specifically, I have, first of all, metaphysical qualms about this celebrative mood. The Bible gives us reason to think that sin actually perverted the creation in significant ways. The theology of the "principalities and powers," which Professor Yoder has done much to sensitize North American Christians to, is one important vehicle for understanding this distortedness. More generally, biblical Christianity must promote an awareness of the "cursedness" of the falled creation. To be sure, Jesus came to the creation to lift the curse of sin, a transaction that has been completed in principle by means of the work of the Cross. But as the writer to the Hebrews observes, while God placed all things originally under the dominion of humankind, "as it is we do not yet see everything in subjection" to human beings—"but we see Jesus, . . . crowned with glory and honor because of the suffering of death" (Hebrews 2:8-9).

Second, Kuyper seems much too confident in this passage regarding our noetic abilities. Suppose, for example, that my first concern was in fact misguided; suppose that the original "world-order" does remain intact, shining as from the beginning in all brilliancy as a testimony to the creator's good purposes. We would still have to reckon with the noetic effects of sin: have not our human minds become so darkened by sin that we are seriously deficient—even blinded—in our ability to grasp this world-order?

And third, Kuyper seems much too sanguine about our volitional capacities; he describes the work of Christ as a "strengthening" of our "ability to walk in this world-order with a firm, unfaltering step." Is *this* the problem that Jesus died to overcome—a mere weakness, a human faltering?

Fourth, all this points to a general Christological weakness in these remarks by Kuyper. As one who considers Kuyper to be a hero, I am loathe to admit that in this particular passage he seems to be breathing the spirit of the very modernism which he so valiantly fought against on other occasions. Modernistic-liberal theology is inevitably led to a weak Christology because of its weak analysis of sin. We cannot properly understand the nature of the proclamation that "Jesus Saves" unless we know what it is that he saves us from. Kuyper, in describing here the work of Christ in terms of a mere "dusting-off" of the original world-order, is treading on dangerous theological ground.

I think that I am pointing here to a very basic and important theological question: Who is Jesus Christ, and how are we to understand his redemptive mission? This Christological question has to be asked against the backdrop of an analysis of the human condition. Out of his experience of the actual tensions between Reformed and Anabaptist thought, Professor Yoder reports items of theological concern which bear on a proper understanding of the human sin which Christ came to confront. And these items, as he spells them out in his response to the Reformed theses, have to do precisely with questions about the metaphysical, noetic and volitional effects of sin, and about our understanding of God's antidote to sin.

In effect, then, the Anabaptists as represented by Professor Yoder are posing questions to Reformed Christians about the radicality of human sin, and about the radicality of the work of the Savior who

came to rescue the creation from the curse of that sin. What did the fall do to the creation? What did it do to human noetic and volitional capacities? What did Jesus accomplish in his redemptive ministry? What does he call human beings to be and do? Suppose, for example, that because of the ravages of sin, God *has* in some sense "instituted" the exercise of the sword in sinful societies. How has the work of the Lamb altered the ways in which disciples of Jesus relate to this work of the sword? How will the "antithesis" manifest itself in Christian political behavior?

It seems obvious—to Professor Yoder and to me—that these are very Reformed questions. But they are also very Anabaptist questions. If so, then the main dispute between the two positions is not a conflict between radically different types. It is a family argument between Christians who claim to take human depravity and the riches of the Gospel seriously—not only in relation to very personal belief and behavior, but to the full range of human social, political and economic activities.

Toward Family Healing

Needless to say, family arguments can get very tense. Even if the traditional typology, then, is abandoned, there is still much for Reformed and Anabaptist Christians to argue about. It may be that Calvinists have been too quick to view the civil order as the quintessence of culure, and the exercise of the sword as the quintessence of the civil order. But even if these mistaken emphases are remedied, one could still hold—as I am very much inclined to do—that it is legitimate for disciples of Jesus to participate under certain conditions in governmentally-sanctioned acts which utilize the means of lethal violence. I am much more inclined to focus on the "politics of Jesus" than many of my fellow Calvinists in attempting to formulate the nature of Christian political obligation. But I am not convinced that a commitment to the Lamb's War proscribes all Christian use of violent means of problem-solving.

Having said that, though, I must also say that I believe that intense dialogue between Reformed and Anabaptist Christians is a matter of highest priority. This belief is nurtured by three concerns.

First, however legitimate and/or understandable the intra-Protestant struggles were in their original sixteenth century context, they are not as pressing today. Even if the received typology were true, it would be strange for Reformed and Anabaptist people, or for Lutherans and Roman Catholics, for that matter, to view each other as the "real" enemy, whom to struggle against is to exhibit faithfulness to the Gospel. The devils who fill the present world are no longer inclined—if they ever were—to disguise themselves as people who confess the Name of Jesus.

Second, whatever the merits of the debates that occurred in the sixteenth century, we have no right to look at those debates today except through the history that has flowed out of those intense disputes. For me this means that I cannot listen in on the discussions between Anabaptists and Calvinists that occurred in sixteenth century Basel and Geneva and Amsterdam without also listening to the cries of Christians whom my Calvinist forebears have brutalized and persecuted in word and in deed. The history of the Reformed-Anabaptist relationship is not merely one of words and ideas; it is made up of the flesh and blood of human suffering.

Third, even if we could ignore the past, we cannot ignore the pressing challenges of the present. It is one thing for a Calvinist to insist that there are and have been situations in which the Christian endorsement of military violence is justified. It is another thing to take an honest look at the ongoing production of weapons of unthinkable destruction. To view the present arms race with an awareness of the complicated self-deceptions of which human beings, even Christian human beings, are capable—deceptions which involve whole nations in idolatrous militaristic and nationalistic schemes—is to realize how desperately we all need the chiding and challenging and mutual correction that can be gained from intense Christian dialogue. May we abandon outworn typologies and get on with that kind of dialogue!

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[1] See James D. Bratt, *Dutch Calvinism in Modern America: A History of a Conservative Subculture* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984), Chs. 7 and 8.

[2] Abraham Kuyper, *Lectures in Calvinism* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1931), pp. 71–72.

BIBLICAL STUDIES

Qumran and the Hebrew Psalter

by Gerald H. Wilson

Among the thousands of fragments of ancient religious documents discovered nearly forty years ago in caves near the ruins of ancient Qumran and known popularly as the "Dead Sea Scrolls" were numerous fragments of manuscripts containing portions of psalms known previously from the canonical Hebrew Psalter. Of the eleven caves in which manuscripts were found, seven have yielded a combined total of more than 309 different psalm manuscripts. By far the most extensive collections are those of Cave 4 (with 18 distinct manuscripts) and Cave 11 (5 distinct manuscripts). The earliest of these texts were copied in the second century B.C. while the latest are dated by paleographers to approximately A.D. 68.[1]

It is hardly possible to overestimate the importance of these texts for our understanding of the canonical Psalter. In the first place, they represent the earliest known examples of the text of the individual psalms. Before the scrolls were uncovered, our earliest Hebrew Psalter texts were dated to the 9th and 10th centuries A.D. This single find pushed our knowledge of the text of the individual psalms back almost 1000 years! In a number of these Qumran manuscripts, psalms are arranged quite differently than in the canonical Psalter. Some of the canonical psalms are ordered differently in relation to each other, others are entirely absent and, in some manuscripts, "apocryphal" compositions are introduced which are not known in the canonical text.

This variation in the Qumran psalm manuscripts has sparked continuing controversy about the nature of these texts, their authority, and where they fit in a history of the canonical Psalter. For some, the variety of the Qumran texts suggests that the arrangement and contents of the Psalter were still in a state of flux as late as the middle of the first century A.D. Others resist this conclusion and explain the variant manuscripts as liturgical adaptations of the canonical arrangement which was fixed by the 4th century B.C.[2]

Proponents of the late fluidity of the Psalter (especially James A. Sanders who edited the primary edition of the Qumran Psalms Scroll from Cave 11) emphasize the amount of variation encountered in the Qumran manuscripts as support for their views. On the other hand, those who accept the early fixation of the Psalter (most notably the late Patrick W. Skehan who edited the psalm manuscripts from Cave 4) play down the significance of variant data while stressing that the majority of evidence supports the canonical arrangement. A close look at the Qumran scrolls themselves reveals an unexpected circumstance which points up the complexity of the issue and may help us evaluate these conflicting claims.[3]

Evidence for the Arrangement of Psalms at Qumran

First, the amount of evidence which supports or contests the canonical arrangement is not always easy to determine. Most of the manuscripts are extremely fragmentary. To determine the arrangement of a manuscript, one must look for "joins" between psalms, where one psalm ends and the next begins. For example, considering the 150 canonical psalms, there are 149 "joins" between them (ps 1 with 2; 2 with 3; and so on). All the Qumran psalm manuscripts together confirm only 54 of these canonical joins (slightly more than 36% of the total). The other 95 joins (about 64%) are not confirmed. On the other hand, 26 of the 149 canonical joins (just over 17%) are contested by the Qumran manuscripts when psalms are placed in different arrangements or apocryphal compositions

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are introduced. There is no data available for a large number of joins (71 or about 48%).

When all evidence confirming the canonical arrangement is correlated with all data contesting it, there are only *two* instances of conflicting overlap. In other words, of the 26 canonical joins contested by the variant data, only two are among the 54 confirmed by the supportive data. The other 24 contested joins fall among that 64% for which there is no supportive data at all! Because of this lack of overlap, it is difficult to evaluate the significance of supportive data, since, while evidence of variation is unambiguous, it is always conceivable that supportive manuscripts contained variant material in the gaps between their fragments.

Finally, even these two examples of actual overlap have their problems. Both occur in one manuscript from Cave 4 which itself exhibits a major contradiction of the canonical arrangement of the Psalter. It "omits" the whole group of psalms 104-111 and follows psalm 103 immediately by psalm 112. As a result, the confirmation value of this manuscript is weakened and we are left without a single, fully supportive manuscript in direct conflict with evidence of variation.

To summarize up to this point: the amount of evidence for or against the canonical arrangement of the psalms is small and there is even less evidence of conflict between these two bodies of evidence. The value of supportive evidence is somewhat ambiguous since it is taken from fragmentary manuscripts which may have contained variant data in their gaps. Since we cannot fully recover the intent of the editor(s), we cannot know with certainty what relative authority was placed on these conflicting and supporting arrangements. It is dangerous to allow our own knowledge of the present shape of the canonical Psalter to persuade us that the presence of supportive readings necessarily signifies the existence of the fixed, authoritative canonical Psalter. It is quite feasible that supportive readings represent only one *possible* arrangement of the psalms at a time prior to final fixation of the text or (as we will see below) indicate only that certain parts of the Psalter arrangement had been fixed.

The Five-Book Division and the Age of the Manuscripts

Since the limited amount of evidence for support or variation permits no firm conclusions about the history of the canonical text, is there any other way to view the data which illuminates the issue? It has long been accepted that the canonical Psalter is divided into five segments or "books" of unequal size (psalms 1-42; 43-72; 73-89; 90-106; 107-150). Each of these segments concludes with a similar benediction, except for the last in which the concluding collection of five hallelujah psalms (146-150) may serve the same purpose. Recent study of these book sections has demonstrated the existence of different techniques of organization and psalm arrangement in Books Four and Five, as opposed to the earlier three sections. This implies the first three books developed independently of the last two and the final canonical form represents a later marriage of originally separate materials.[4]

In light of this situation, the distribution of evidence of variation from the canonical arrangement over these five books is most interesting. Contested joins, practically non-existent in the first three books (only four of 88 possible joins are contested), increase dramatically in Books Four and Five (22 of a possible 60 joins). This circumstance, while hardly conclusive, is quite consistent with the theory proposed by James A. Sanders that the Psalter only gradually stabilized from beginning to end with the first two-thirds being fixed when the last third was still in a state of flux.[5]

Sanders' theory is further supported by the age of the manuscripts containing variant arrangements. When one arranges all the significant Qumran psalms manuscripts according to the date of origin, a definite correlation emerges between the age of the manuscripts and evidence of support or variation. Variant manuscripts consistently occupy the earliest positions, while fully supportive manuscripts only begin to appear about the middle of the first century A.D., at which time variant arrangements disappear altogether. The general impression is of an early fluidity of psalm arrangement which continued until ca. A.D. 50 and apparently died out soon after.

So, while the Qumran evidence for the arrangement of the psalms is not exhaustive and cannot, therefore, supply a final commentary on the date of the fixation of the canonical text, it clearly suggests a fluidity in the arrangement and content of the latter third of the Psalter continuing long after the traditionally accepted date for its closure. As a result, if we hope to discover the sociological background of the final form of the Psalter and understand its significance, we must look to a period much later than is usually supposed.

What can we say provisionally about the significance of the final shape of the Psalter? One of the first keys is the recognition of two distinct segments within the Psalter (Books One through Three and Books Four and Five) representing two periods in its development. The earlier stage clearly reflects the concern of the exilic period to understand the apparent failure of the Davidic Covenant. The placement of Royal psalms at the "seams" of this early collection (psalms 2, 41, 72, 89) organizes these books around this theme.[6] Such a collection might date to the fourth or fifth century B.C. (the traditional date for the closure of the Psalter) and concludes with a plea to YHWH to fulfill his covenant obligations and restore the Davidic kingdom (psalm 89:46-51).

The subsequent addition of the fourth book (psalm 90-106), with its central celebration of the kingship of YHWH, shifts the emphasis of the whole away from the reestablishment of the human kingdom of David toward the more universal and spiritual kingdom of YHWH. One is no longer to place his trust in human princes who will ultimately fail, but in YHWH who rules on high forever (cf. psalms 91, 92, 103).[7]

The similarity of this viewpoint to the "kingdom of the spirit" which Jesus preached and which occupied the vision of the early Church is intriguing. That they both clearly speak to the same human situation lends credence to a late date for the final fixation of the Psalter. Those whose hopes for political independence from Rome are squashed by the realities of their circumstances are called to the inner kingdom of the spirit where YHWH rules directly over the affairs of humankind.

That this viewpoint came to dominate the central religious cult in Jerusalem, where no doubt the Psalter reached its final form, is not unexpected. In light of the highly charged apocalyptic visions of the Qumran sectarians who actively opposed the central cult in this period—visions which culminated in the development of the even more emphatically Davidic Qumran Psalm Scroll[8] and the

MANUSCRIPT	DATE	RELATIONSHIP TO MT
4QPs^{a}	Mid 2nd C BC	Contradictory
4QPs^{f}	ca. 50 BC	Contradictory
4QPs^{d}	Mid 1st C BC	Contradictory
4QPs^{b}	2nd half 1st C BC	Contradictory
4QPs^{e}	1st half 1st C AD	Contradictory
11QPs^{a}	30-50 AD	Contradictory
11QPs^{b}	1st half 1st C AD	Contradictory
MasPs 1039-160	1st half 1st C AD	Supportive
4QPs^{q}	Mid 1st C AD	Contradictory
4QPs^{s}	50 AD	Supportive
4QPs^{c}	50-68 AD	Supportive
5/6 HevPs	2nd half 1st C AD	Supportive

INCONCLUSIVE MSS

DATE NOT ESTABLISHED	INSUFFICIENT CONTENTS	
11QPs^{c}—Supportive	4Qps^{g}	4QPs^{l}
11QPs^{d}—Supportive	4QPs^{h}	4QPs^{m}
11QPs^{e}—Supportive	4QPs^{j}	4QPs^{n}
4QPs^{r}—Supportive	4QPs^{k}	4QPs^{p}

Qumran Mss Arranged by Date

sectarian War Scroll which detailed the final battle to destroy Roman power and reestablish the Davidic kingdom; in light of the growing Zealot movement which led to open (though futile) conflict with Rome in the years before A.D. 70, the call to reliance on YHWH's inner kingdom must have represented a pragmatic way to encourage religious cohesion and hope without threatening the existing Roman power structures.

While this viewpoint (and the final shape of the Psalter) may have grown out of pragmatic realism in the face of Roman domination and military superiority and the futility of Zealot resistance, the result is a Psalter cut off from specific nationalistic hopes and set free to speak to the spirit of all people everywhere. It is little wonder that the Psalter enjoyed such popularity in Christian circles, being frequently bound as part of early New Testament manuscripts.[9] Also, while it is true that messianic hopes continued both in Judaism and Christianity, the final form of the Psalter certainly played an important role in restructuring thought about the present experience of humanity which is no longer understood as a time in which the kingdom is lost, but a time in which YHWH rules directly over the spirit of humankind. In this light, the psalms become sources of individual meditation on the kingship of YHWH in the inner life of the reader (the insight provided by the introductory psalm 1) rather than communal, cultic celebrations of the nationalistic hopes of Israel.

[1] For a more complete discussion of the evidence, see Gerald H. Wilson, "The Qumran Psalms Manuscripts and the Consecutive Arrangement of Psalms in the Hebrew Psalter," *CBQ* 45 (1983) 377–88; *The Editing of the Hebrew Psalter* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985).

[2] Gerald H. Wilson, "The Qumran Psalms Sroll Reconsidered: Analysis of the Debate *CBQ* 47 (1985) [in press].

[3] Sanders has expressed his views in numerous articles, particularly "The Qumran Psalms Scroll (11QPs•) Reviewed," *On Language, Culture, and Religion: In Honor of Eugene A. Nida* (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), pp. 95–6; "Variorum in the Psalms Scroll (11QPs•)," *HTR* 59 (1966) 86–7. Skehan's most recent and persuasive treatment is found in "Qumran and Old Testament Criticism," *Qumrân: sa piête, sa theéologie et son milieu* M. Delcor, ed., (Louvain: Duculot, 1978), pp. 163–82.

[4] Gerald H. Wilson, "Evidence of Editorial Divisions in the Hebrew Psalter," *VT* 34 (1984) 337–52; "The Use of 'Untitled' Psalms in the Hebrew Psalter," *ZAW* xx (1985) [in press].

[5] James A. Sanders, "Cave 11 Surprises and the Question of Canon," *McCormick Quarterly Review* 21 (1968) 288. This article is also available in *New Directions in Biblical Archaeology* D. N. Freedman and J. C. Greenfield, eds. (New York: Doubleday, 1969/71), pp. 101–16; and in *The Canon and Masorah of the Hebrew Bible*, Sid Z. Leiman, ed. (New York: KTAV, 1974), pp. 37–51.

[6] See Wilson, *The Editing of the Hebrew Psalter*, pp. 209–14.

[7] Wilson, *The Editing of the Hebrew Psalter*, pp. 214–20.

[8] James A. Sanders, "Ps 151 in 11QPss," *ZAW* 75 (1963) 73-86; Wilson, *The Editing of the Hebrew Psalter*, pp. 70–73, 129–31, 136–37.

[9] Robert Holmes and J. Parsons, *Vetus Testamentum Graecum cum variis lectionibus*, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1798-1827) cite a number of instances of Psalters bound together with manuscripts of the New Testament.

MISSION

The Missiological Implications of an Epistemological Shift

by Paul G. Hiebert

The current epistemological crisis in science and philosophy has significant implications for western theology (Hiebert 1985). It also affects the integration of theology and science, and our understanding of the missionary task. How we contextualize theology, how we respond to the theological pluralism now emerging in non-western churches, and how we relate to non-Christian religions as systems of thought and to non-Christians as persons are all determined to a great extent by our epistemological premises. At the core, all of these raise the question of how we relate two or more different systems of knowledge.

Systems of Knowledge

When we talk of relationships between systems of knowledge, we must specify their level of abstraction (Figure 1. cf. Kuhn 1970, Schilling 1973, Laudin 1977, and Hofstadter 1980). For our purposes, we will differentiate three levels.

At the bottom are theories. These are limited, low level systems of explanation that seek to answer specific questions about a narrow range of reality, and do so by using preceptions, concepts, notions of causation and the like. Alternative theories may arise which give different answers to the same set of questions. Theories themselves may be on different levels of generality, and broader theories may subsume more limited ones.

Theories are imbedded in higher level systems of knowledge which Kuhn (1970) calls "paradigms," Laudin (1977) calls "research traditions," and I will refer to as "belief systems." In the sciences these would include physics, chemistry, biology and so on. In theology these would include systematic and biblical theology. Belief systems select a domain of reality to examine, determine the critical questions for investigation, provide methods for investigation and integrate one or more theories into a comprehensive system of beliefs. They also mediate between theories and the world view of the culture within which they emerge. In relationship to theories, they set the boundaries of inquiry and determine the legitimacy of problems to be examined. They also generate conceptual problems for theoretical investigation, and serve heuristic and justificatory roles (cf. Laudin 1977:78–120). In relationship to the world view in which they are located, they make explicit its largely implicit assumptions and work out the implications of these assumptions for beliefs and behavior. They also affect changes in the world view by introducing new theoretical constructs, and by mediating changes forced by experiential input.

The specialists who work in a belief system form a community that sets the standards, defines "proofs," and checks their research and teaching. It also controls the training and entry of new candidates into the discipline (Barnes 1982:10).

Others apply the theories of a belief system to life. Thus we have applied physics, engineers and technologists who draw on theoretical physics. Furthermore, sections of the general public may accept the word of specialists as authority. Most Americans, for instance, are confident that physicists have a great deal of true knowledge about the real world because they see and use the technological fruits of their theories. The public is generally unaware of the theoretical debates taking place between specialists within a research tradition.

Finally, a number of research traditions and a great deal of common sense knowledge are loosely integrated in large "world views." These are the most fundamental and encompassing views of reality shared by a people in a culture, the largely implicit assumptions they have about the nature of things—about the "givens" of reality. To question these assumptions is to challenge the very foundations of their world. People resist such challenges with deep emotional reactions, for they threaten to destroy their understandings of reality. As Geertz points out (1979), there is no greater human fear than a loss of a sense of order and meaning. People are even willing to die for their beliefs if these make their deaths meaningful.

Relationships Between Systems of Knowledge

In considering relationships between different systems of knowledge, we must keep these levels in mind. Although it is important to examine in detail how systems on one level relate to those on another (e.g., how theories relate to paradigms, and paradigms to world views), we will not do so here. Rather, we will briefly examine how theories in a paradigm relate to each other, how paradigms within a world view relate to each other, and how world views relate to each other.

How we view the relationship between systems of knowledge on the same level is largely determined by our epistemological foundations (see Hiebert 1985: figure 1). Naive realists and idealists hold that true knowledge must be precise, objective and certain. Both basically hold to a one-to-one correspondence between human knowledge and reality, but for different reasons. The former see knowledge as a photograph or a mirror of reality (Gill 1981:34-36); the latter see it as creating reality. Consequently, both look for a single comprehensive system of knowledge that will encompass all

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reality within it—a sort of Grand Unified Theory. They cannot accept as valid two different views of the same reality. All photographs taken of a hill or tree from the same spot will be the same.

Because of this, naive realist scientists are not willing to accept the validity of theology until it fits into the assumptions of science—hence the need to "demythologize" religion. Naive realist or idealist theologians, on the other hand, refuse to accept the findings of science if these challenge their theologically based views of nature.

A unified theory can be achieved in several ways. Competing theories can be modified to make them compatible, a new theory or belief system can be formulated to replace the old ones, or areas of conflict may be declared unimportant or handed over to another belief system. (Laudin 1977:45-69).

Naive realists and idealists have taken two approaches to the integration of belief systems. One is to separate them into non-overlapping domains. This has been most common in rationalism. For example, many Christians sought to integrate science and theology by assigning them to two realms. This was a legacy of the classical perspective, following Plato, in which reality was divided into two main worlds: the one natural, tangible, and transitory; the other transcendent, spiritual and eternal. Augustine and Aquinas introduced this approach into theology.

The other approach, found particularly in empiricism, is reductionism. Gill notes:

> Materialists claim that all intangibles are nothing but epiphenomena, positivists argue that all value judgments are nothing but expressions of emotion, behaviorists maintain that mind and spirit are nothing but conditioned behavior, and Marxists affirm that culture and society are nothing but reflections of material conditions (1981:29).

Reductionism has been used to integrate the sciences. For example, physical reductionism reduces all phenomena ultimately to fundamental particles such as atoms, mesons and quarks, and to forces. Galileo concluded that the physical world was a perfect machine whose future happenings can be fully predicted and controlled by one who has full knowledge and control of the present motions. This led nearly two centuries later to the famous remark of Laplace, that a superhuman intelligence acquainted with the position and motion of the atoms at any moment could predict the whole course of human events (Burtt 1954:96). The result, observes Harold Schilling (1973:44), was a world that was "closed, essentially completed and unchanging, basically substantive, simple and shallow, and fundamentally unmysterious—a rigidly programed machine."

Similarly, psychological reductionism roots all human realities, including human societies and culture, in psychological theory. Sociological reductionism sees group dynamics as the foundation of all human beliefs and behavior, and leads to a formula approach to changing humans.

Given their commitment to what J. B. Conant (1952) has called "grand conceptual schemes" within which there are fit together smaller theories, naive realists and idealists cannot accept different, complementary views of the same reality. Therefore, they do not speak of different "theologies." To them this is a contradiction in terms. And since they are certain about the truth and objectivity of their own views, they are often closed to changing them, and must

FIGURE 1
LEVELS OF MENTAL CONSTRUCTION



attack other views as false. (A summary of the characeristics of naive realism and idealism, and the ways in which they resemble and differe from other epistemological positions, is given in Figure Two.)

Critical realists and instrumentalists, on the other hand, recognize the finiteness of human knowledge and therefore are open to change, and to the reexamination of their existing beliefs. Conflicting theories force them to test their theories further against empirical and rational criteria. Moreover, critical realists and instrumentalists allow for diverse views of reality, but on different premises. Critical realists claim truth for their systems of knowledge, while instrumentalists do not. This leads them to relate different systems of knowledge in different ways.

Critical realists see theories and belief systems as maps or blueprints of reality. Each may give us some truth about reality. None of them shows us the whole. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of reality, we need many blueprints which complement one another. For example, to understand a house, a simple photograph will not do. We need the blueprints of its wiring, plumbing, structural beams and foundations, most of which remain unseen. Reality is far too complex for our minds to grasp in total. We need simplified maps by which we can comprehend it.

At the heart of the integration of theories and belief systems for realists is the theory of complementarity (Grunbaum 1957, MacKay 1958, 1974, Austin 1967, Holton 1970, and Kaiser 1973). Different views of reality can be accepted as complementary so long as they do not contradict one another in the areas of their overlap. If there is disagreement, the discrepancy must be resolved or one or the other must be rejected. We may see things in different ways, but ultimately there can only be one truth within which there is no inconsistency. For instance, if the blueprints show wiring in a wall that does not exist in the structural blueprints, one of them must be wrong.

A critical realist sees the various sciences as potentially complementary. Physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology and anthropology can all contribute insights into the nature of reality which the others do not provide. Each, in a sense, provides a level of analysis not found in the others. Schilling points out that physicists have found

> that the newly discovered strange phenomena and entities (those of the micro-world) differ so fundamentally and categorically from the more familiar ones (of the macro-world),

FIGURE 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITIONS

IDEALISM	**MENTALISM** (reality is in the mind) —knowledge is itself the object of analysis —we know it with certainty.	**DOGMATIC** (closed to change) —knowledge is exact and cumulative. —declarative in stance. —ahistorical and adultural in nature. —authoritarian. —parent/child approach to others. —learning = memorizing. —teacher and message oriented. —at times arrogant and combatitive. —conversion is radical displacement.	**ABSOLUTES** (affirms that truth can be known) —can know in full.	**CHOICE** (humans reason and choose)
NAIVE REALISM	**REALISM** (reality is the world including the mind. Tests knowledge against experience and history) —knowledge is totally objective. —photograph view of knowledge.		—can know in full. —knowledge is totally objective.	
CRITICAL REALISM	—knowledge is both subjective and objective. —map or model view of knowledge.	**AFFIRMATIONAL** (open to change) —testimonial and irenic in nature. —sees knowledge in cultural and historical contexts. —adult/adult approach. —concern for person and message. —learner oriented. —teach students to think. —more humble attitude. —conversion = a new gestalt.	—know only in part. —knowledge is both objective and subjective.	
INSTRUMENTALISM	—knowledge is totally subjective		**RELATIVISM** (denies that truth can be known) —pragmatism. —test is usefulness and does it work. —anti-conversion.	
DETERMINISM				**DETERMINISTIC** (no human reason or choice)

known earlier, that no theory can possibly describe the newcomers adequately if its concepts and imagery are taken exclusively from the realm of the old. More than that, it became evident that theory in general could no longer be expected to describe reality pictorially, or in one-to-one correspondence to it (1973:78).

He goes on to develop the theory of complementarity between levels of scientific analysis, and suggests that to these can be added theological levels of analysis.

Because critical realists recognize the subjective dimensions of human knowledge, they are also aware that historical and sociocultural contexts influence systems of knowledge. (Because at the deepest levels these context factors have to do with world views, we will examine them later.)

Instrumentalists, on the other hand, see systems of knowledge as problem solving devices. Because neither theories nor belief systems make truth claims, there is no need to integrate them into a single grand conceptual scheme. Nor is there need for complementarity. Mutually contradictory theories and belief systems can be used so long as they best "do the job." Thorough going determinists, on the other hand, see all knowledge as epiphenomenal, as by-products of external forces. It is foolish, therefore, to speak of the integration of knowledge into single or complementary systems. Both of these views, obviously, are unacceptable to committed Christians because they deny any possibility of knowing the truth.

Integration of Theology and Science

Science and theology have emerged as different belief systems in a western world view. How do they relate to each other? Here again the epistemological question plays a key role in determining the nature of the relationship.

It is clear that no real integration can be achieved between an idealist theology and a realist science. The two are built on different foundations, and attempts to build a common structure upon them will inevitably lead to cracks. The two talk past each other, and in the end we will be forced to choose one or the other as our fundamental frame of reference.

It is possible to seek an integration based on different types of realism. Many social scientists take a naive or critical realist approach to their science and an instrumentalist approach to religion. They affirm the truth of their theories and belief systems, but see religion as a useful fiction created by human groups to hold themselves together. For Durkheim, Marx and others, religion is the symbol of a group's authority over the individual. God is merely a projection of the group's power and values on the cosmic screen. Some theologians turn the tables and claim truth for theology, but only practical utility for the sciences. In both cases, one party demeans the other by not taking it seriously.

As the record of the past hundred years shows, integration between a naive realist theology and science was difficult to achieve. Few problems arose in the areas of nuclear physics and chemistry in which theology made no claims. The greatest conflicts arose in areas where the two overlapped, such as in theories about the origin of the universe, about humans, about miracles (Brown 1984), and about the meaning and forces behind history. Each claimed to offer a grand unified theory and attacked the other on points of disagreement. It is not surprising, therefore, that in a naive realist framework, no integration was achieved.

With the collapse of naive realism, the picture has changed. There is a growing acceptance by critical realist and instrumentalist scientists and theologians of each other's disciplines. But the nature of integration differs greatly depending upon the epistemological foundation used.

Integration is unnecessary in an instrumentalist mode. Both science and theology are seen as pragmatic solutions to immediate problems; the only test is results. But instrumentalism undervalues both of them. Few scientists would agree that although astronomy may do a better job than astrology in solving problems, it is no closer to the truth than the latter. Most scientists are convinced that they are discovering truth about nature. Similarly, no evangelical would hold a relativistic view of theology which affirms that Christ is not *the* truth, not even *a* truth, but only a useful way of looking at history.

What would integration look like in a critical realist mode? We must keep in mind that critical realism makes truth claims for its theories and belief systems. Therefore, it calls for a test to evaluate two or more theories formulated to answer a set of questions. For example, we can determine which of two road maps is more accurate and complete. But, as we have seen, critical realism allows for complementary theories that examine the same reality in *different ways*—there may be several types of maps of the same city.

It is possible, therefore, to look for complementarity between theology and science, as long as they share the same world view. This requires a theistic science that accepts the existence of God and seeks to examine the order in the universe he has created. We also need a realist theology that examines God's self-revelation in the history of that world. Both science and theology, then, are based on an examination of real events in history, but focus on different dimensions or levels of reality.

There is a second type of complementarity that we need to explore: that between synchronic and diachronic systems of knowledge. The former seek to understand the structures of reality, how these operate and the functions they serve. For example, a synchronic analysis of a human would include an analysis of the body, its various structures such as the circulatory, assimilative, digestive and reproductive systems, and the way it thinks and moves. It would also analyze the effects of various diseases upon the body.

Diachronic systems of knowledge, on the other hand, look at the history of specific realities. A diachronic analysis of a person would examine her or his life story. It would look at various events in the lives of one or more individuals, and the forces at play and their responses.

This distinction helps us understand the sciences. Most, such as physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology and anthropology, are synchronic in character. They examine the structure of matter, life, persons, groups and cultures. History, and to some extent astronomy, are diachronic.

The distinction also helps us to understand theology. Systematic theology is synchronic. It examines the unchanging nature of God and the fundamental structures of creation. Biblical theology is diachronic. It looks at God's acts and revelation in specific cultural and historical settings. We need both synchronic and diachronic models. They complement each other. We begin with specific experiences in history, and from these we infer the basic structures of reality. And these structural models help us to understand and predict what is going on around us. Normally one is in focus, the other is subsidiary. Synchronic models show us the universal order of things. They do not look at specific events. Consequently, exceptional cases and miracles are out of focus. Diachronic models, on the other hand, look at unique events. Synchronic models help us to *understand* how things operate, but *meaning* ultimately seems to rest in diachronic models—in the story of the universe, of a specific people such as Israel, and of individuals.

Taken together, science and theology, diachronic and synchronic paradigms, provide us with a better understanding of reality (Figure 3). But complementarity does not assure us of integration. We can deal with different belief systems piece-meal, and end with what Clifford Geertz (Hammel and Simmons 1970:50) calls a "stratigraphic approach" to reality. For integration to take place, we need to examine the ways in which complementary belief systems relate to each other. When problems and contradictions arise, we need to examine again our theologies against the biblical data, and our sciences against observational data. The task of integrating the sciences and theology is not simple. But it is easier when we deal with complementarity than with grand conceptual schemes.

FIGURE 3
COMPLEMENTARY BELIEF SYSTEMS

	Diachronic Models	Synchronic Models
Theology	Biblical Theology:	Systematic Theology:
Science	Historical Sciences:	Natural and Social

Epistemology and Christian Missions

What implications do epistemological stances have for Christian missions? Six areas in which epistemology plays a particularly important part in missions thinking are: 1) the way in which the essence of the Gospel is defined, 2) the way in which the relationship of Gospel and culture are viewed, 3) the way in which Christians deal with the contextualization of theology and the resulting theological pluralism, 4) the way in which Christians view non-Christian religions, 5) the way in which Christians relate to non-Christian peoples, and 6) the way in which leadership is developed in younger churches. For lack of space, we can touch only on a few of these.

Cultural Differences and Contextualized Theologies One of the central problems facing all missionaries is how to deal with cultural pluralism. The fact is that people in other cultures put their world together in different ways.

We must recognize the greatness of the early missionaries, their commitment to the Gospel, and the great sacrifices they made. However, for the most part, they were naive realists and idealists. They were convinced that their belief systems were true, and they failed to differentiate the Gospel from their cultural ways. Writing about them, Juhnke (1979:10–11) says:

> They were too confident of the wholesomeness and goodness of their own culture to see the pagan flaws in their own social and political structures. The mission was strongly influenced by nineteenth-century ideas of progress .... Missionaries believed themselves to be participating in a worldwide crusade of human advancement.

For them, too, there could be only one theology. They assumed that their own theology was wholly biblical, and that it was not biased by their cultural and historical contexts.

The consequences of these assumptions were damaging. First, they considered most local customs to be evil and sought to root them out. Little attention was given to the local culture and to the felt needs of the people. Consequently, the Gospel was unnecessarily foreign. In a sense the Gospel is foreign to every culture, for it is God's prophetic voice to sinners and the cultures they create. But to this was added the foreignness of western culture such as dress, buildings, pews, translated hymns, western leadership styles and imported technology. Those who became Christians were often seen as agents of the west.

Second, the missionaries sought to transmit their theologies unchanged to the national church leaders. The relationship was that of parent and child, in which the national leaders were expected to learn the missionary's theology by rote. Much was written about the three selves: self propagating, self supporting and self governing. But little was said about the fourth self: self theologizing. For the most part, national leaders were not encouraged to study the Scriptures for themselves and to develop their own theologies. Deviation from the missionary's theology was often branded as heresy. To young nationalistically minded leaders, this was theological colonialism.

Several forces have changed this picture. The first was the maturation of young churches. First generation national leaders were often simple tribal and village pastors. But the second and third generation ... grew up in Christian settings and were seminary-trained theologians.

The second was the emergence of nationalism around the world. Young national leaders threw off the colonial rule and trappings of the west. Young churches demanded self-rule and the right to study the Scriptures for themselves. This was particularly evident in the independent churches that emerged in many societies.

The third was the rise of anthropological thought and the growing awareness among missionaries of the impact of cultural contexts on Bible translations and theology.

Naive realist approaches are becoming untenable in missions, not only because they are no longer intellectually credible, but also because they fail to resolve the problem of theological pluralism that has resulted from missions. Whether we like it or not, young theologians around the world are reading Scripture and interpreting it for their own cultures. To claim that the missionaries' theology is the only correct one can only lead to breaks in the relationships between western missions and the churches they have planted around the world. It also denies the priesthood of all believers, and the work of the Holy Spirit in nonwestern Christians.

Idealist theologies face the same problems, for they, too, are essentially ahistorical and acultural in nature. Moreover, they face the fact that different cultures use different systems of rationality in justifying their beliefs (Luria 1976), so an appeal to universal human reason based on propositional logic is difficult, if not impossible to make.

How would critical realists deal with theological pluralism? First, as realists, they would take the historical and cultural contexts of theology seriously. They see all theology as human interpretations of the biblical revelation within specific contexts (Figure 4). Consequently, different theologies are bound to emerge because different cultures ask different questions, and because they view reality in different ways. For example, Indian Christians must ask what a Christian response to the caste system is, and whether they can use Indian terms such as *deva, Brahman, avatar* and *moksha* for God, incarnation and salvation. These terms are used in Hinduism and normally have Hindu world view connotations. On the other hand, to introduce western or Greek and Hebrew terms makes the Gospel unintelligible to the average Indian. Similarly, Latin American theologians must struggle with the biblical response to the oppression of peasants and the poor.

FIGURE 4
THEOLOGY IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF SCRIPTURES IN A CULTURAL CONTEXT



Second, because critical realists affirm truth in theology, they must deal with these differences. They cannot accept mutually contradictory theological positions. Often different theologies are complementary, for they address diferent needs and situations. But where contradictions emerge, they would be resolved by examining the Scriptures.

But critical realists would also check for cultural biases. Just as we can more clearly see sin in the lives of others, so we can see how the cultural and historical settings of Christians in other lands affects their theology. Conversely, they see the cultural biases of our theology much more clearly than we. Therefore, we need to see the church as an international hermeneutical community, in which Christians and theologians from different lands check one another's cultural biases. In the process, there can emerge out of the current diversity a metacultural and metahistorical theology that is largely freed from the influences of specific human contexts. One benefit of this for western theology would be to free it from its cultural biases, and restore its prophetic voice in the face of modernity. As Linder and Pierard point out (1978), western Christianity is in danger of becoming a civil religion justifying western cultural systems.

All this affects the way critical realists view the training of national leaders. The first missionary task is to translate the Bible; the second is to train national leaders to read and interpret the Scriptures in their own cultural context. While the missionaries are deeply persuaded about their own theological understandings, they must accept the fact that the Holy Spirit also leads national leaders and that the message of the Gospel must be discerned within the community of believers and their leaders, and not by outside leaders alone.

Christianity and Non-Christian Religions How do epistemological positions affect our attitudes toward non-Christian religions? Idealists and naive realists are compelled by their epistemologies to reject other religions as totally wrong, but for different reasons. Both seek to construct grand conceptual schemes, brick by brick, by analyzing discernible *parts* (Gill 1981:20-25, Berger et. al. 1973). For naive realists these are empirical facts; for idealists they are rational propositions. Consequently, other religions and cultures must be radically displaced, not only in their configurational whole, but also in their parts. Old customs, beliefs, and rituals must be destroyed and replaced by new Christian ones. There is little room for reinterpreting them to fit Christianity. Christianity must, therefore, take a combative approach to other religions, and seek to discredit them. The battle must be won on the basis of facts and reason. Conversion, in this epistemological mode, requires a radical change in beliefs and behavior in all their details.

Instrumentalists, on the other hand, see all religions as culture bound, and as serving useful functions in their respective societies. Christianity may be shown to be the best of religions, but it is not unique. Consequently, Christian missionaries should not call for a radical displacement of the old. They should seek to help others better their old religions, and look for an evolutionary movement toward Christianity. Conversion is not central. Helping people to solve their life problems is.

Critical realists fall between these extremes of recognizing only absolutes or relativism. On the one hand they affirm the uniqueness of a Christianity that is faithful to biblical revelation. Consequently, they hold to truth and absolutes, and reject religious relativism. They call for radical conversion to Christ (cf. Kraemer 1938). On the other hand, they recognize that such conversions take place within cultural and historical settings. Young converts cannot totally change the way they see the world. They come with their old categories of thought, and old world view assumptions. These must be changed through careful instruction after conversion. Conversion itself is then not a change in propositional or factual knowledge, it is a change in the overall configuration or *gestalt* in which these are seen; it is a change in allegiance in which Christ is accepted as Lord and the center of their lives. On the synchronic level this means accepting Christ as Lord of all things, on the diachronic level as Lord of history and of the convert's everyday life. The implications of this for the new believer in terms of his or her beliefs, customs and behavior must be worked out daily as the new convert lives under the authority of the Scriptures. The process of sanctification cannot be divorced from that of justification.

Because people live in cultural contexts, the Gospel must be translated into forms and meanings the people understand. But this requries a deep knowledge of other cultures. Missionaries, therefore, must study other religions and dialogue with their leaders, not in order to create a new synthesis between Christianity and other religions, but in order to build bridges of understanding so that the people may hear the call of the Gospel in ways they comprehend without compromising the truth of the Gospel. Because critical realists are concerned deeply about truth, they are aware of the dangers of syncretism and a false Gospel.

Christians and Non-Christians How do epistemological positions influence our attitudes towards non-Christians as persons? Because idealists and naive realists claim certain truth, they often see evangelism as the proclamation of the truth and as an attack on the evils of other religions. This polemical stance often seems arrogant to non-Christians who resent the parent-child relationship implicit within it. Moreover, the emphasis idealists and naive realists place on objectivity and right systems of belief, and their combative approach to other belief systems, often leads to accusations that they are more interested in proving correct doctrine than on winning persons. In both of these positions, emotions, social interaction and other human factors are thought to contaminate reason and truth (Gill 1981:50-52).

Instrumentalists recognize the subjective dimension of human knowledge, and make no claims to truth. Consequently, they accept religious differences uncritically. Often for them, interpersonal relationships and open dialogue are more important than personal convictions.

Critical realists hold to objective truth, but recognize that it is understood by humans in their contexts. There is, therefore, an element of faith, a personal commitment in the knowledge of truth (cf. Peirce 1955). There are several consequences in this. On the one hand, critical realists respect people of other beliefs as thinking adults, and show respect for their convictions. On the other, critical realists have deep convictions about the truth of their belief systems, and bear testimony to these. Missions to non-Christians then begins in witness—in declaring what God has done in their lives through Jesus Christ. They begin with "I believe . . ." and share with others the Good News they have personally experienced (cf. Acts 26:16, 2 Tim. 1:12). Once people have accepted the Gospel, the missionaries can proclaim its authority in their lives. E. Stanley Jones, one of the great missionary evangelists of our time, wrote (1925:141): "When I was called to the ministry, I had a vague notion that I was to be God's lawyer—I was to argue his case for him and put it up brilliantly." After describing his failure in this approach, he continues (1925:141-142):

> This was the beginning of my ministry, I thought—a tragic failure. As I was about to leave the pulpit a Voice seemed to say to me, "Haven't I done anything for you?" "Yes," I replied, "You have done everything for me." "Well," answered the Voice, "couldn't you tell that?" "Yes, I suppose I could," I eagerly replied. So . . . [I] said, "Friends, I see I cannot preach, but I love Jesus Christ. You know what my life was in this community—that of a wild reckless young man—and you know what it now is. You know he has made life new for me, and though I cannot preach, I am determined to love and serve him." . . . The Lord let me down with a terrible thump, but I got the lesson never to be forgotten: in my ministry I was to be, not God's lawyer, but his witness. That would mean that there would have to be living communion with Christ so that there would always be something to pass on. Since that day I have tried to witness before high and low what Christ has been to an unworthy life.

It was on this basis that he later established his effective Round Table method for witnessing to Hindus and Muslims.

Conclusions

I realize that in some ways I have painted a caricature of various epistemological responses to the key missionary questions of our day. But even a caricature can help us to cut through surface impressions to see what lies beneath. Clearly, in a post-modern world we need to reexamine again our epistemological foundations, and to see how they affect our relationships to other people, culture, theologies and religions in a pluralistic world. I am convinced that critical realism is a biblical approach to knowledge (I Cor. 13:12). I am also convinced it is the approach we must take in a post-colonial era in missions in which we must deal with cultural, religious and theological pluralism with deep convictions about the truth, but without arrogance and paternalism.

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THEOLOGY

Karl Barth and Evangelicalism: The Varieties of a Sibling Rivalry

by Donald W. Dayton

In recent years, we have seen a flexing of the muscles of what both insiders and outsiders have come to call "evangelicalism." This current of American religious life is no new phenomenon; what is new is that a culture that apparently thought it had moved beyond taking "evangelicalism" seriously is being forced to reevaluate that easy dismissal. What is true on the cultural level is also reflected in intellectual circles—and in the discipline of theology.

This is perhaps especially true among students of the theology of Karl Barth, where a special affinity between "evangelicals" and Barth has, for example, recently swelled the ranks of the Karl Barth Society with newcomers from a variety of "evangelical" traditions. And the literature on this relationship has so grown that we now have a survey of the discussion, whose title I have appropriated for this article: *Karl Barth and Evangelicalism,* by Gregory C. Bolich (InterVarsity Press, 1980).

But you will notice that I have quickly added to this title my own subtitle, "the varieties of sibling rivalry," to suggest that we are dealing with a matter of greater complexity than we (or Bolich) may at first imagine. Something of the difficulty of the path ahead of us in this article may be suggested by the diversity of "evangelical" opinion about Barth. Reformed theologian Cornelius van Til, on the one hand, has consistently polemicized against Barth in such works as *Christianity and Barthianism* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1962), with an emphasis on the implied dichotomy. In an essay titled, "Has Karl Barth Become Orthodox?" he judged that of all the heresies that have evoked the great creeds as refutation, "no heresy that appeared at any of these was so deeply and ultimately destructive of the gospel as is the theology of Barth."[1] We could survey other such statements—like that of dispensationalist Charles Ryrie who finds "Barthianism" to be a "theological hoax"[2] because it attempts to be both critical and orthodox. But on the other end of the spectrum we find other evaluations that coud hardly be in starker contrast to the judgment of van Til. Donald Bloesch, for example, has insisted that "Karl Barth is himself an evangelical theologian"[3]—though with some qualifications. Between these two extremes may be ranged the variety of "evangelical" judgments on Barth.

But how do we get such diverse readings of Barth from "evangelicals"? From one angle this diversity should be no surprise. Barth has suffered much from his interpreters in all camps. He has often been interpreted from caricature or on the basis of fragmentary readings. Barth is, of course, not without fault in this process. The range of his writings makes the task of adequate interpretation a lifetime task. The dialectical and multifaceted character of his thought means that one is always in danger of reading and extrapolating from one of several facets. And the changes in Barth's thought—especially from the earlier dialectical period to the later Christocentric orientation in which his Christology and the doctrine of incarnation overcome earlier themes—have always provided problems for interpreters. "Evangelical" interpreters have, not surprisingly, shared all these problems.

But there are within the nature of what we call "evangelicalism" itself issues and problems that complicate our discussion. The most profound of these is the "slipperiness" of the term *evangelical.* In the language of W. B. Gallie, it is an "essentially contested concept"[4]—one whose fundamental meaning is at debate. My own efforts to bring clarity to this issue have centered in the development of a typology of the meanings that the term "evangelical" may convey.[5] I would argue that there have been three primary periods in the history of protestantism that have provided content to the word "evangelical." Uses of the word may generally be shown to gravitate toward one or another of these periods or modes of using the word. Let me indicate these meanings:

(1) Many users of the word *evangelical* have in mind primarily the Reformation and its themes, particularly the great *sola*'s (*sola fide, sola gratia, sola Christe, sola Scriptura*) that convey the Reformation call to grace and the centrality of "justification by faith." Usually correlated with these themes are an Augustinian/Reformed anthropology, a doctrine of election, and a predominantly forensic

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view of atonement and salvation. These themes are generally common to the figures of the magisterial Reformation, though we have articulated them in a pattern that may be tipped more toward Lutheranism than Calvinism. But this is in part to reflect the German usage where the word *evangelisch* roughly means "protestant" but particularly Lutheran.

(2) In the Anglo-Saxon world, the word *evangelical* is more likely to gather its connotations from the "evangelical revival" and the "great awakenings." In this period, protestant themes were pushed in new directions and into new configurations. There is an intensification of the soteriological orientation of the Reformation in the turn to a piety of "conversion" that involves a shift of emphasis from "justification" to "regeneration" and often indirectly to sanctification. This orientation flowered in missions, evangelism and the rise of benevolent societies to address every kind of human ill. Nineteenth century revivalism emerged from these currents and accentuated the low church, moralistic and ethical tendencies to be found in this form of evangelicalism. It is important to notice that the preservation of "orthodoxy" is not the major motif of this form of evangelicalism. From the rise of pietism on, it includes an element of protest against orthodoxy in favor of spiritual vitality. The emphasis has been on conversion. The enemy is "nominal Christianity" on the right as much as rationalism and deism on the left. This form of evangelicalism became the dominant form of religion in America for much of the nineteenth century. In Europe it was much more marginal and would have been known in German as *Pietismus* or in its more recent forms as *Neupietismus*, or as the *Erweckungsbewegung*.

(3) Especially since the Civil War and particularly in the USA, there has been a growing split in American Protestantism that culminated in the twentieth century fundamentalist/modernist controversy. Since World War II, a more intellectually articulate and socially and culturally engaged wing of the fundamentalist party has also appropriated the label "evangelical." It is this use of the word "evangelical" that has become the dominant one in our own time. The word in this context refers to a mixed coalition of a variety of theological and ecclesiastical traditions that have found common cause against the rise of "modernity" and the erosion of older forms of orthodoxy under the impact of biblical criticism, the rise of Darwinianism, and, perhaps even more fundamentally, the relativism occasioned by the impact of the social sciences and historical consciousness. In this use of the word, the primary thrust is "conservative" and is concerned with the preservation of "orthodoxy"; the consistent "enemy" is "liberalism" in a variety of forms. The German language was not well prepared to describe this current, but in the last decade or two it has taken over from the English a neologism *evangelikal* with a "k," to represent the post World War II post-fundamentalist evangelicalism that in the wake of the Lausanne Congress of the early 1970s has also become a force in Europe.

This, then, is my typology of uses of the word *evangelical*. Like all typologies it has its problems. Many currents fall between my periods and types. Calvin's emphasis on regeneration, for example, puts him somewhat between types one and two. Some wings of type two were close to the classical Reformation. And type three includes groups also shaped by the earlier currents. Even though one may discern certain continuities by emphasizing one strand or another, I find it both helpful and necessary to distinguish between these various connotations of the word *evangelical*—and to argue that they are finally irreducible. Strict advocates of type one will lump large segments of types two and three with liberalism and Roman Catholicism as fundamentally in error in tending toward "Pelagianism." Similarly, strict adherents to type two will deny the label "evangelical" to many classical expressions of type one and some of the more confessional expressions of type three. Some of the ironies in the modern post-fundamentalist use of the word may be seen in the emerging neo-Catholic movement among evangelicals, whereby holding a commitment to "orthodoxy" and "traditionalism" constant, an evolution into a new sacramentalism is possible. There is a tendency to use the label "evangelical" to describe all sorts of cultural and theological reasons, no matter what the fundamental issue at stake.

The value of this typology will be demonstrated as we turn more fully to examine Barth's relationship to evangelicalism. We must distinguish these usages of the word, because in each case the shape of the discussion with Barth is quite different. But in each case, we will find the relationship ambiguous—sharing Barth's commitments to various degrees but also differing in the appropriation of themes. It is for this reason that we have subtitled this article "the varieties of a sibling rivalry"—to emphasize both the close relationships and the tensions present. With this background let us briefly examine Barth's relationship to each of these currents.

Evangelicalism as Fidelity to Reformation Themes

It is the first version of evangelicalism that is most congruent with Barth's fundamental commitments. The movement of which he was a determinant force has been called "New Reformation Theology." An early British *Festschrift* for Barth was entitled *Reformation Old and New*. In his contribution to that volume, John McConnachie suggested that "no one has done more to reinterpret, transform, and illumine the issues of the Reformation for our day as Karl Barth."[6] It was in many ways the rediscovery of the Reformation that launched Barth on his new theological direction. Eberhard Busch traces this development at Göttingen largely in the words of Barth himself.

> In Göttingen things changed almost at a stroke. Barth now felt that his previous theological view was really a pre-Reformation position .... "Only now were my eyes properly open to the reformers and their message of the justification and the sanctification of the sinner, of faith, of repentance and works, of the nature and the limits of the church and so on. I had a great many new things to learn from them." At that time "I 'swung into line with the Reformation,' as they used to say," not uncritically, but certainly with special attention.[7]

These hints from early in the theological career of Barth were echoed at his retirement when in his final lectures, repeated on his American tour, he did not hesitate to use the word *evangelical* to describe his theology.

> The theology to be introduced here is *evangelical* theology. The qualifying attribute "evangelical" recalls both the New Testament and at the same time the reformation of the sixteenth century. Therefore it may be taken as a dual affirmation: the theology to be considered here is the one which, nourished by the hidden sources of the documents of Israel's history, first achieved unambiguous expression in the writings of the New Testament evangelists, apostles, and prophets; it is also, moreover, the theology newly discovered and accepted by the Reformation of the sixteenth century.[8]

This, at least, was the basic theological intention of Barth: to recover and restate the Reformation recovery of the New Testament gospel. In this Barth would be in accord with our first type of evangelical. But, of course, this congruence of intention does not answer all questions. There is much room for debate about precisely how to retrieve and articulate the Reformation message for our own times. Barth himself was clear about the need to revise Reformation theology at several points:

> Having in the 1920s swung in clearly behind the 'Reformation line,' "I soon saw that it was also necessary to continue it, to arrange the relationship between the law and gospel, nature and grace, election and christology and even between philosophy and theology more exactly and thus differently from the patterns which I found in the sixteenth century. Since I could not become an orthodox "Calvinist," I had even less desire to support a Lutheran confessionalism."[9]

Barth also understood that in each case the basic reason for his reformulation was the same: the pressures of what he called his "Christological concentration." We cannot take time to work out the implications of this move for each of these themes. Let me merely indicate how this concern leads Barth to revise what is generally seen to be the center for Reformation faith (especially for Luther), justification by faith.

> The *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae* is not the doctrine of justification as such, but its basis and culmination: the confession of Jesus Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col 2:3); the knowledge of His being and activity for us and to us and with us. It could probably be shown that this also was the opinion of Luther. If here, as everywhere, we allow Christ to be the center, the starting point, we have no reason to fear that there will be any lack of unity and cohesion, and therefore of systematics in the best sense of the word.[10]

I find this move of Barth's not only appropriate, but a necessary revision of the patterns of thought in Reformation theology. I suppose other implications of Barth's Christological concentration might appear more problematic for some—especially in the doctrine of election, where the revisions seem much more radical. (I shall leave that debate to experts in the Reformed tradition.) I shall only note as an outsider that one sees, for example in the book by James Daane, *The Freedom of God* (Eerdmans, 1973), the pressure, in what might be called evangelical circles, to move in a similar direction as Barth (though interestingly enough in this case without real acknowledgment of the apparent impact of Barth himself). From my vantage point, these questions of Barth seem entirely appropriate and well within the range of the necessary for any "orthodox" retrieval of the Reformation tradition for our own time. And I would concur, for example, with Colin Brown that

> The basic difference between Karl Barth and traditional protestant theology lies, therefore, not only in his doctrine of the word of God. Barth has, in fact, more in common with traditional Protestantism on this score than is sometimes imagined. Whilst there are vital differences, there are things that evangelical theology could learn from Barth without any surrender of vital principle. The basic difference lies in Barth's understanding of the significance of Christ. It is summed up in the contrast between the older idea of the two covenants—the covenant of works and the covenant of grace—and Barth's idea of the single, all-embracing covenant of grace in Christ.[11]

It is in these areas that the discussion ought to be pursued.

If we were to look for a representative of evangelicalism that has most pursued the dialogue with Karl Barth from a commitment to my first paradigm, it would have to be Donald Bloesch, who has found himself increasingly drawn toward Barth as a result of his commitment to the faith of the Reformation.[12] Perhaps we are now in a position to understand better his judgment that Barth is indeed an "evangelical theologian."

Evangelicalism as Expressed in the Pietist Traditions

Our second paradigm of evangelicalism was that expressed most fully in the pietist and awakening traditions. When we turn to this paradigm we are immediately faced with an historical anomaly. Even though it could be argued that this paradigm has been the most influential in the Anglo-Saxon world, there has been almost no English literature of discussion with Barth from this perspective. (The major exception would be the work of Donald Bloesch, who, because he tends to see the rise of "evangelical pietism" as the fulfillment of the Reformation, has engaged Barth from issues that arise from the pietist vision. This can be seen particularly in his book *Jesus is Victor: Karl Barth's Doctrine of Salvation* with its concentration on Barth's soteriology.)

Ironically, we must turn to Germany for the major discussions with Barth from this second paradigm. This is in part because the German counterpart of what we would call evangelicalism in this country is less shaped by fundamentalist concerns and more by themes of nineteenth century revivalism and what is called *Neupietismus*. In part this is because of the dominance of what is called the *Gemeinschaftsbewegung*, a "fellowship" and "higher life" movement that has many affinities with what we call in the Anglo-Saxon world the "Keswick movement." As a result (as I discovered on a recent sabbatical term in Germany), evangelicalism in that context has a distinctly different character than in America—though the scene is becoming increasingly muddied by recent American imports. Thus the German counterpart to the American InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, the *Studenten Mission Deutschland*, is less troubled by apologetics, the concern to preserve orthodoxy, and the American "battle for the Bible," and more fully defined by its concern for the cultivation of the devotional life and its commitment to evangelism and mission. There is a growing interest in Barth in these circles, often mediated by Otto Weber, whose dogmatic work has served as a bridge from the concerns of pietism into contemporary theology.

Slightly before the publication of Bolich's volume in America, there was a counterpart in the German discussion, *Karl Barth und die Pietisten* (Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1978), by Eberhard Busch, the biographer of Barth and one of his last *Assistenten*. Busch has deep family roots in the leadership of the *Gemeinschaftsbewegung*. His book is concerned primarily with the early Barth, the critique of pietism in the early editions of Barth's commentary on Romans, and the responses to it by writers in the various journals of the *Gemeinschaftsbewegung*. (This discussion has been extended in a series of articles by Busch on "Karl Barth und der Pietismus" and a response by editor Ulrich Parzany entitled "Die Pietisten und Karl Barth" that appeared in *Schritte* (July-Sept 1980), a magazine representing roughly a cross between *His* and *Eternity* in this country.)

This dialogue immediately takes a different character because of a special burden not present in other forms of evangelical dialogue with Barth—Barth's own intense polemic against pietism as merely another form of the anthropocentric orientation that manifested itself in liberal neo-Protestantism. In entering this discussion we are immediately drawn into the question of Barth's ambivalent relationships with Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard, both of whom, it has been argued, may have some claim to being a theological articulation of pietist themes. What is primarily at stake in these discussions is Barth's so-called "objectivism," with its concern to ground salvation in a cosmic, external event that is prior to and the ground of any experiential appropriation of it. As he put it in the first edition of the commentary on Romans:

> The Holy Spirit in us is no subjective experience concealed in mystic darkness but is the objective truth that has disclosed itself to us .... It is our life-basis, not our experience.[13]

Two themes regularly occur in Barth's critique of pietism. One of these is related to one of the structural features of the fourth volume of the *Church Dogmatics* where ecclesiology takes precedence over the treatment of the response of the individual Christian. Barth attacks what he sees as the individualistic tendency of pietism in which the experience of God's grace *pro me* obscures the priority of the *pro nobis*. Thus in IV/1, after almost 600 pages of theological foundations—primarily Christological—Barth devotes only 40 pages to the act of faith. In doing this Barth is self-consciously setting himself against both the *Glaubenslehre* tradition and pietism.

> In the last centuries (on the broad way which leads from the older Pietism to the present-day theological existentialism inspired by Kierkegaard) the Christian has begun to take himself seriously in a way which is not at all commensurate with the seriousness of Christianity. . . . From the bottom up we can neither approve nor make common course with this procedures. We shall give to the individual Christian and his faith the attention which he demands, but it must be at this point—not at the beginning of our way, but very briefly at the end.[14]

The other side of Barth's critique of pietism we have already indicated is grounded in his so-called "objectivism." Barth is concerned to maintain the priority of the salvation wrought for us *extra nos* in the work of Christ. He fears that the *pro me* and *in me* of pietism may obscure the *extra nos* as well as the *pro nobis* and *in nobis*. As Barth put it in dialogue with Methodist pastors: "I do not deny the experience of salvation. . . . But the experience of salvation is what happened on Golgotha. In contrast to that, my experience is only a vessel."[15] We know this to be a fundamental theme in Barth, one that stretches minds shaped by more traditional theologies most with the difficult claim that all are not only *de jure* justified but also sanctified in Christ prior to any *de facto* appropriation or acknowledgement of that fact.

Here we are very close to the disputed question of how best to understand the universalistic themes in Barth. This issue arises in

any "evangelical" discussion with Barth, though with different concerns in each of the three paradigms. From the pietist or second paradigm, the focus is less on election or eternal destiny and more on the efficacy of grace and Barth's relativizing of the boundary between believers and unbelievers. Busch reports that this has been the major unresolved issue in Barth's dialogue with representatives of pietism.[16] Far be it from me to attempt to resolve these issues here. I am convinced, however, that Barth is often caricatured on this issue and that his denials that he is a universalist need to be taken more seriously than they often are. And several readings of IV/2 have convinced me that Barth posits more difference between believers and unbelievers than the awareness of the former of the salvation wrought for all. But the very difficulty of establishing that and the "slipperiness" of Barth's language in dealing with these themes indicate that there is a real issue here between Barth and the pietists.

On the other issues—the priority of the *extra nos* and the *pro nobis* over the *pro me*—I have more difficulty seeing that the issue is one of genuine substance. It seems to me that Barth reads pietism through its most decadent forms. I do not think that classical pietists, at least, really understood themselves to actualize salvation so much as to fully appropriate it. And even if we grant a tendency toward individualism in this evangelical vision, we should also note that this vision has been exceedingly creative of communal forms of Christian life and piety—from the *collegia pietatis* of pietism to the bands and societies of Methodism. At this point, there is clearly a difference of emphasis between Barth and representatives of this evangelical vision.

Barth's relationship to pietism is not fully grasped by noting only his correctives to it. Busch points out the pietist influences in Barth's own background. One cannot help but notice Barth's appropriation of and praise for pietist exegesis (cf., for example, his use of Bengel on I Corinthians 13 at the end of IV/2). Nor are we prepared by Barth's polemic for his growing appreciation for Zinzendorf and his piety. Barth discovered several of his basic themes in Zinzendorf, and came to see him as "perhaps the only genuine Christocentric of the modern age (fools would say Christomonist)."[17] In dialogue with modern Moravians, Barth shared increasing fascination with Zinzendorf's linking of Christ as Savior and Creator, his tending to speak of our sanctification as fulfilled in Christ, and his tendency to polemicize against less Christocentrically oriented representatives of pietism.

Nor may we forget the impact of the Blumhardts on Barth and the significance of the slogan *Jesus Sieger* that emerged in the much discussed "exorcism" in Möttlingen. Barth is inclined to appreciate themes from this event as mediated by the younger Blumhardt and Leonard Ragaz in the religious socialist movement, with the implication that this movement toward a world-transforming understanding of grace is a decidedly "unpietistic" emergence from pietistic roots. I am coming to the position that it is of the essence of pietism's shattering of the Lutheran *simul justus et peccator* with a strong doctrine of regeneration that soon overflows into culture and society. A similar movement has taken place in Methodism and elsewhere. And even though Barth's appropriation of "Jesus as Conqueror" and "Overcomer" may be given a new content by his "objectivism," it may well be that in this—one of his most central themes—Barth is more dependent on pietist currents than he realizes. If so, Barth's relationship to this form of evangelicalism is more dialectical than his polemics would at first suggest.

Evangelicalism as the Defense of Orthodoxy

Finally, we turn to the last paradigm, the one that is probably the most common use of the word *evangelical* in our own time. As we have already suggested, here we have less a movement that can be defined in terms of its positive commitments and more of a complex coalition in opposition to a common enemy—liberalism or perhaps modernity in general. It is a much disputed question whether fundamentalism, or evangelicalism in this sense, can be more precisely defined theologically. Ernest Sandeen, for example, has argued in his *Roots of Fundamentalism*, that the movement must be seen theologically as the rise of premillenialism in the nineteenth century and its coalescence with the so-called "Princeton theology" of the same period—the bridge being the view of Scripture, specifically the doctrine of inerrancy. Thus we see the effort of the Evangelical Theological Society, for example, to build its coalition since World War II on a single platform—the doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture.

Any means of describing the character of fundamentalism will inherently be reductionist and one-sided. To focus our discussion, however, we need to pick out one discernible tradition for analysis. Probably the most useful for our puposes is the "Princeton theology," already mentioned. This theological tradition, especially its doctrine of Scripture, has become influential beyond its normal confessional boundaries. The struggles at Princeton that led to the founding of Westminster Seminary in Philadelphia are in many ways the classic illustration of the fundamentalist/modernist controversy. The shape of this theology could be described in several ways, but for our purposes we may note that it attempted to preserve the theological formulations of Protestant scholastic orthodoxy—particularly at the point of the doctrine of Scripture. The importance of orthodoxy in this sense for modern evangelicalism is confirmed by Bernard Ramm in *The Evangelical Heritage* (Word, 1973), where he defines "evangelical" in terms of this movement and recognizes the influence of Princeton even upon his own Baptist tradition. I find this way of describing evangelicalism highly inadequate, but do agree that this is the dominant theological construct in the post-fundamentalist evangelical experience that is epitomized in Westminster and Fuller seminaries, for example, or in the pages of *Christianity Today*. And most of the modern "evangelical" dialogue with Barth in this country has been out of this theological tradition.

We can also see in this paradigm the basis for both attention and revulsion between Barth and this variation of evangelicalism. Barth emerged in the twentieth century as the most powerful critic of "liberalism," the *bête noir* of modern evangelicalism. Yet his standpoint was one of a "neo-orthodoxy" that broke the categories of the older orthodoxy. Barth attempted to articulate a biblical starting point, but his appropriation of Scripture was "post-critical" while most modern evangelicals were still committed to a largely "pre-critical" position that could only see such an agenda as a "theological hoax" (again to use the words of Charles Ryrie).

Barth even reappropriated the traditions of protestant orthodoxy, while at the same time recasting them in new forms and conceptualities. This last point is worth further elaboration. Protestant orthodoxy has by and large had bad press in modern theology. Yet it was the rediscovery of this orthodoxy that played a crucial role in the emergence of Barth's own *Church Dogmatics*. Barth describes this and his relation to orthodoxy in a preface to Heppe's *Reformed Dogmatics*.

> I shall never forget the spring vacation of 1924. I sat in my study at Göttingen, faced with the task of giving lectures on dogmatics for the first time. No one can ever have been more plagued than I then was with the problem, could I do it? and how? . . .
>
> Then it was that, along with the parallel Lutheran work of H. Schmid, Heppe's volume just recently published fell into my hands; out of date, dusty, unattractive, almost like a table of logarithms, dreary to read, stiff and eccentric on almost every page I opened . . .
>
> I read, I studied, I reflected; and found that I was rewarded with the discovery, that here at last I was in the atmosphere in which the road by way of the Reformers to Holy Scripture was a more sensible and natural one to tread, than the atmosphere, now only too familiar to me, of the theological literature determined by Schleiermacher and Ritschl.
>
> At the same time I was also aware that a return to this orthodoxy . . . could not be contemplated.[18]

We may see in this quotation epitomized the frustration that Barth evokes among evangelicals. He seems to veer toward them and to share fundamental commitments, but at the last moment he moves off in a new direction that is beyond their comprehension. We could pursue this discussion from many angles. (Fortunately much of the evangelical dialogue with Barth is summarized in Bol-

ich.) Let me allude to only two of the most basic issues—Barth's doctrine of Scripture and whether his view of history allows the resurrection to occur in time and space.

The evangelical debate about Barth's view of Scripture has produced numerous articles and at least one full monograph on *Karl Barth's Doctrine of Holy Scripture* (Eerdmans, 1962) by Klaas Runia. On the most fundamental level, as we have already indicated, the clash is between pre-critical and post-critical use of Scripture. As Barth comments in the first preface to his commentary on Romans, if forced to choose between the older doctrine of verbal inspiration with accompanying modes of interpretation and the products of modern critical interpretation, he would go with the former. But Barth, of course, refuses to be captured by that way of putting the question and frustrates observers on both sides by using Scripture in a manner continuous with the classical theological traditions of the church while reflecting a critical consciousness. We cannot hope to resolve an issue that the church has struggled with for at least a couple of centuries. I will only comment from my own perspective that the pre-critical option still maintained by many, if not most, modern evangelicals is, at least for me, impossible. The significance of Barth for this issue is primarily that he transcends the evangelical way of putting the question.

Another point at issue in the evangelical dialogue with Barth is expressed in the accusation that for Barth, the Bible is not the word of God written and therefore objectively authoritative but only *becomes* the word of God in the moment of reading under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit or according to the subjective whims and predilections of the reader. My own reading of Barth finds this to be a caricatured and one-sided understanding of Barth, though it may point to a tendency of Barth's "actualism" and his unwillingness to permit a totally objective, absolute authority in the Bible as such. Perhaps I am too shaped by pietist and Wesleyan exegesis—which, for example, in the interpretation of I Timothy 2:16, has also, over against the orthodox concern for the once-for-all process of inscripturation in the past, emphasized the present "inspiring" work of the Holy Spirit. But I must confess that I find it almost ludicrous to accuse Barth of rampant "subjectivism"—especially in view of our earlier discussion of the pietist concern with Barth's rigorous "objectivism."

More to the point are the implications of Barth's christological concentration. For Barth, Christ is the epistemological hinge; for the evangelicals, it is the Bible. Most evangelical formulations answer the question of our knowledge about God by some version of "God wrote a book" that makes Christ epistemologically irrelevant. For Barth this generates the "irremediable danger of consulting Holy Scripture apart from the centre, and in such a way that the question of Jesus Christ ceases to be the controlling and comprehensive question."[19] From the evangelical side, Barth's position reduces the Scripture to the role of a mere witness to the revelation of God and not the revelation itself. The level of absoluteness that the evangelicals invest in the text itself is obviously another reason for their reluctance to have that text open to critical analysis. Barth's shift of the fundamental hinge is one reason he can be more open to criticism. Those questions cannot be resolved here, and I would only reveal my own prejudices in indicating any further that I find Barth's formulations to be vastly superior. Suffice it to say that the evangelical grasp of Barth's doctrine of Scripture is becoming more subtle and appropriate,[20] and that Bolich argues that it is at the point of Scripture that Barth has the most to contribute to modern evangelicalism.

A second major point of evangelical discussion with Barth has revolved around his views of history. Several evangelicals, including Cornelius Van Til, John Warwick Montgomery, and Fred Klooster, have acused Barth of splitting history into two realms, *Historie* (the realm of actual, factual history) and *Geschichte* (the realm of meaningful history and God's transcendent action) so that, for example, the crucifixion happens in *Historie*, but the resurrection only in *Geschichte*.[21]

The range of questions involved here is very complex and the issues much debated, within and without evangelical circles. Evangelicals have not been the only ones to accuse Barth of splitting history in this way. Whether or not one accepts this particular criticism of Barth, it is clear that this aspect of Barth's thought—his views of history, historical method, their relation to revelation, etc.—is at least problematic and perhaps the Achilles heel of his theological program. It is clear that the theological problems of both Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jürgen Moltmann, as different as they may now be seen to be, both were launched to some extent against Barth at some of these points.

It has become increasingly clear that the earlier evangelical critique of Barth (that his view does not allow the resurrection to be an "historical" event in the normal sense) cannot be sustained. In volume IV of the *Church Dogmatics* Barth became increasingly clear about his affirmation that "the event of God's loving" described in John 3:16

> did not take place in heaven, but on earth. It did not take place in secret, but it can be known (i.e. not as a purely spiritual process, but as something which according to I John 13:1, can be heard and seen with our eyes and touched, yes, handled with our hands).[22]

And of the resurrection, Barth has insisted that "it happened in the same sense as his crucifixion and his death, in the human sphere and the human time."[23]

What is really at stake in the discussion with Barth at this point is an issue of historiography and historical method—whether there can be an "historical" or "apologetic" *proof* of the historicity of the resurrection. Barth is quite clear in his denial of this:

> There is no proof, and there obviously cannot and ought not to be any proof, for the fact that this history did take place (proof, that is, according to the terminology of modern historical scholarship).[24]

There is a genuine issue here—one described well by evangelical New Testament scholar George Eldon Ladd:

> The basic problem for the modern theologian is this: Shall we insist upon a definition of history broad enough to include such supra-historical events as the resurrection; or shall we accept the modern view of history as a working method but insist that there is a dimension within history which transcends historical control? The latter is the method of Karl Barth, and even though it calls down the wrath of Rudolf Bultmann . . . it appears to be the only adequate explanation.[25]

Since Ladd wrote these lines, the debate has proceeded along different lines and the first option has been powerfully defended by Pannenberg. The point to be made here is that the genuine debate that Barth raises here is not one between orthodoxy and heterodoxy or between evangelicalism in this sense and a position that is not "evangelical"—but an issue that faces all modern theology and one that has thus necessarily become also an "intra-evangelical" debate.

The evaluation of the evangelical debates about Barth's views of history and the resurrection perhaps illustrates how Barth has become the bridge for many evangelicals into contemporary theological discussion. The fact that Barth is in many ways no longer at the center of contemporary theological struggles which have often moved on in different directions may limit the significance of this "bridge." But in the present historical situation, with its inherited chasms between the grandchildren of both fundamentalists and modernists, we may need to value any bridges that are available. It may well be that the ecumenical significance of Barth's thought has as yet unexplored aspects. Barth's dialectical and ambivalent relationship to the varieties of currents that claim the label "evangelical" may be a means of drawing them all into closer theological dialogue not only among themselves but also into the broader theological world, hopefully for the mutual edification of all concerned. There is certainly extensive evidence that this has already taken place and that it is, among "evangelicals," gaining force. I would not wish to attempt to predict the future, but we should not ignore the significance of the continuing discussion between "Karl Barth and Evangelicalsim" even amidst the confusing but sometimes illuminating complexities occasioned by the "varieties of a sibling rivalry."

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[1] Cornelius Van Til, "Has Karl Barth Become Orthodox?" *Westminster Theological Journal* XVI

(May, 1954), 181.
[2] Charles C. Ryrie, *Neo-orthodoxy* (Chicago: Moody Press, 1956), p. 62.
[3] Donald Bloesch, "A Reassessment of Karl Barth," chapter IV of *The Evangelical Renaissance* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973), p. 81.
[4] Cf. Colin Brown, "The Concept of 'Evangelical,'" *Churchman* 95 (1981), 104-9, and William J. Abraham, *The Coming Great Revival* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984).
[5] This typology was first developed in "The Social and Political Conservatism of Modern American Evangelicalism," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 32 (Winter, 1977), 72-74, but also in "Whither Evangelicalism" in Theodore Runyan (editor), *Sanctification and Liberation* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1981).
[6] John McConnachie, "Reformation Issues Today," in F.W. Camfield (editor), *Reformation Old and New: A Tribute to Karl Barth* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947), p. 103.
[7] Eberhard Busch, *Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 143.
[8] Karl Barth, *Evangelical Theology: An Introduction* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 5
[9] Eberhard Busch, *Karl Barth*, pp. 210-11.
[10] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV/1, pp. 527-8.
[11] Colin Brown, *Karl Barth and the Christian Message* (London: Tyndale Press, 1967), p. 139.
[12] This attitude is most fully evidenced in Donald Bloesch, *Jesus is Victor: Karl Barth's Doctrine of Salvation* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1976).
[13] P. 114 as translated by James D. Smart, *The Divided Mind of Modern Theology: Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, 1908-1933* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), p. 85.
[14] *Church Dogmatics*, IV/1, p. 741.
[15] Reported by Eberhard Busch, *Karl Barth*, p. 447.
[16] Eberhard Busch, *Karl Barth*, pp. 445-6.
[17] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV/1, p. 683.
[18] From Barth's foreword to Heinrich Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950), pp. v-vi.
[19] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV/1, p. 368.
[20] Cf. for example the work of Howard Loewen, of which there is an early report in Karl Barth's "Doctrine of Scripture," *Studia Biblica et Theologica* I (March, 1971), 33-49.
[21] Cf. Fred H. Klooster, "Karl Barth's Doctrine of Jesus Christ," *Westminster Theological Journal* XXIV (May, 1962), 137–172; John Warwick Montgomery, "Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology of History," *Bulletin of the Evangelical Theology* VIII (Winter, 1965), 39–49; and the various writings of Cornelius van Til, especially those mentioned above.
[22] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV/1, p. 70.
[23] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV/i, p. 333.
[24] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV/1, p. 335.
[25] George Eldon Ladd, "The Resurrection and History," *Dialog* I (Autumn, 1962), 56.

CHURCH HISTORY

The Decade (1973-1982) in Pentecostal-Charismatic Literature: A Bibliographic Essay

by Cecil M. Robeck, Jr.

The past decade has seen a substantial increase in the number of books which have addressed issues related to the history, theology, and practices of charismatic renewal. This article, while by no means intending to provide a list of all such publications, is a short bibliographic essay outlining some of the more important books along these lines. They include studies undertaken by authors who represent a variety of theological positions. Some studies are clearly directed toward the subject of charismatic renewal while others are more obliquely related. It is hoped this essay will serve as a reference work for future use.

The present charismatic renewal's relationship to historic or classical Pentecostalism goes almost without saying. Much of its theology and practice has been greatly influenced by that of classical Pentecostalism. Several books have been published within the past decade which trace the origins of classical Pentecostalism, enabling us more fully to understand the relationship between it and the contemporary charismatic renewal.

Virtually all classical Pentecostal denominations around the world trace their origins to the Azusa Street Mission revival in Los Angeles, California, between 1906 and 1909. Two accounts written by first hand observers recently appeared. The first, Frank Bartleman's *Azusa Street* (Plainfield: Logos, 1980) is a reprint of his *How "Pentecost" Came to Los Angeles*, originally published in 1925. Long out of print and indeed quite rare, this diary of events appears in unabridged form edited by Pentecostal historian Vinson Synan who has provided an extended introduction which placed the book in its broader context. A.C. Valdez's *Fire on Azusa Street* (Costa Mesa: Gift Publications, 1980) provides a second eyewitness account of what went on at the mission during those important years.

The photographic reproduction of the first thirteen issues of "The Apostolic Faith" in Fred T. Corum's *Like As of Fire* (1981) provides a valuable resource on Azusa Street history. Published between September 1906 and May 1908 from the Azusa Street Mission, these papers, now available from the Gospel Publishing House in Springfield, Missouri, outline the influence of that mission, including sermons and articles by those in leadership at the mission, reports of worldwide revival and letters written from those who had passed through the mission during its formative years.

Joining Vinson Synan's authoritative study of American Pentecostalism, *The Holiness-Pentecostal Movement in the United States* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), is social historian Robert Mapes Anderson's *Vision of the Disinherited: The Making of American Pentecostalism* (New York: Oxford Press, 1979). This is a skillful analysis of the tradition, tracing its history from reformed holiness roots, outlining key doctrines and providing a rare perspective on early leaders through the 1920s. David Edwin Harrell Jr. has chosen to trace the history of healing and charismatic revivals in modern America in *All Things Are Possible* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1975). He provides much data and traces connections between various healing revivalists who sometimes turned their disadvantages into opportunities for personal advantage while also ministering to multitudes.

Walter J. Hollenweger's worldwide survey *The Pentecostals: The Charismatic Movement in the Churches* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1972) has been particularized by a number of regional and Third World studies. Friendship Press of the World Council of Churches has reprinted Christian Lalive d'Epinay's *Haven of the Masses: A Study of the Pentecostal Movement in Chile* (1969). Cornelia Butler Flora has contributed *Pentecostalism in Colombia* (East Brunswick: Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1976), and G. C. Oosthuizen has given us *Pentecostal Penetration into the Indian Community in South Africa* (Durban, 1975). These volumes provide historical, theological, and sociological assessments. Anthropologist Stephen D. Glazier has edited a collection of anthropological case studies on Caribbean and Latin American Pentecostalism in *Perspectives on Pentecostalism* (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), while James E. Worsfold has given us an extensive *History of the Charismatic Movements in New Zealand* (Bradford, U.K.: Puritan Press, 1974).

Ethnic issues have not been ignored in this decade. The prolific Walter J. Hollenweger has offered his short *Pentecost between Black and White* (Belfast: Christian Journals Ltd., 1974) which deals, among other things, with Black and Hispanic manifestations of Pentecostalism. The late Victor de Leon has provided *The Silent Pentecostals* (privately published, 1979), a survey of American Hispanic Pentecostalism. He aimed to provide a biographical history of the Pentecostal movement among Hispanics, but dealt with the subject largely within the context of the Assemblies of God.

Three sociological studies, two of them dealing with ethnic issues, bear mention as well. The University of Pittsburgh Press has given us Melvin D. Williams's *Community in a Black Pentecostal Church* (1974), while the University of Massachusetts Press has recently published Arthur E. Paris's *Black Pentecostalism: Southern Religion in an Urban Setting* (1982). The third sociological study deals with neo-pentecostalism and the socioeconomic deprivation theory. It is Cecil David Bradfield's *Neo-Pentecostalism: A Sociological Assessment* (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1979). Two volumes appearing within the past decade are composed largely of papers originally given at meetings of the Society for Pentecostal Studies. Vinson Synan edited the historical *Aspects of Pentecostal-Charismatic Origins* (Plainfield: Logos, 1975) including articles by Martin Marty, Donald Dayton, Larry Christenson, Edward O'Connor and an array of Pentecostals. Russell P. Spittler edited *Perspectives on the New Pentecostalism* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976), including studies by Walter Hollenweger, Clark Pinnock, Kilian McDonnell, J. Rodman Williams, William Smarin, Donald Gelpi, Morton Kelsey and others. It provides historical, theological

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and reflective articles relevant to the charismatic renewal.

Two other edited volumes are the result of denominational studies on the subject. The papers presented at the Fifth Oxford Institute on Methodist Theological Studies held in 1973 appear in Dow Kirkpatrick, ed., *The Holy Spirit* (Nashville: Tidings, 1974). Similarly, the papers presented in a series of Lutheran discussions held between 1974 and 1976 in a study project of the Division of Theological Studies of the Lutheran Council in the U.S.A. are available in Paul D. Opsahl, ed., *The Holy Spirit in the Life of the Church* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1978). A third edited volume of importance is Edward D. O'Connor, C.S.C., ed., *Perspectives on Charismatic Renewal* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame, 1975) which among other things provides a 40-page bibliography on "The Literature of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, 1967-1975." Michael P. Hamilton has edited a similarly helpful volume called *The Charismatic Movement* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), complete with a record of speaking in tongues, while J. Elmo Agrimson, president of the American Lutheran Church's Southeastern Minnesota District, edited *Gifts of the Spirit and the Body of Christ: Perspectives on the Charismatic Movement* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1974).

It is clear that classical Pentecostalism and the charismatic movement have spoken often of the importance of the Holy Spirit's presence and ministry in the church. A number of works written on the Spirit within the past decade warrant mention. George T. Montague, S.M., former editor of the "Catholic Biblical Quarterly," has offered a technically competent and instructive work called *The Holy Spirit: Growth of a Biblical Tradition* (New York: Paulist Press, 1976) in which he analyzes the principal canonical texts on the subject and shows how the people of God grew in their understanding of the Spirit. Building upon his important work on *Baptistm in the Holy Spirit* (Naperville: Allenson and Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970), James D. G. Dunn has given us his sometimes controversial but equally stimulating *Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976). Michael Green, editor of the "I Believe" series, has written the popular, balanced and practical *I Believe in the Holy Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975). Classical Pentecostal Stanley M. Horton has given us his thoughts in *What the Bible Says about the Holy Spirit* (Springfield: Gospel Publishing House, 1979). Presbyterian charismatic J. Rodman Williams, professor of theology at the School of Biblical Studies, CBN University, has contributed yet another book on the subject titled, *The Gift of the Holy Spirit Today* (Plainfield: Logos, 1980).

Eduard Schweizer has produced a small but important work, *The Holy Spirit* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), in which he analyzes the biblical evidence theologically and proceeds to address its implication in the life of the church. Edward Malatesta, S.J., edited *The Spirit of God in Christian Life* (New York: Paulist Press, 1977) dealing with issues of sanctification. Methodist Kenneth G. Greet's "Cato" lectures delivered at the last General Conference of Australasian Methodism prior to the formation of the Uniting Church of Australia, addressed the subjects of Pentecostalism and charismatic renewal in *When the Spirit Moves* (London: Epworth, 1975). Finally, the results of a symposium sponsored by the Institute for Theological Research, held at the University of South Africa in 1980 have appeared in W. S. Vorster, ed., *The Spirit in Biblical Perspective* (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1980).

The subject of baptism in the Holy Spirit has remained more or less dormant since the works of Dale Bruner and James Dunn appeared in 1970—with two notable exceptions. Anthony A. Hoekema's two volumes on tongues (1966) and Spirit baptism (1972) have been re-issued in a single volume titled *Tongues and Spirit Baptism: A Biblical and Theological Evaluation* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981). Charismatic Thomas A. Smail, editor of Britain's "Theological Renewal," has addressed the subject with some freshness in *Reflected Glory: The Spirit in Christ and Christians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975).

Gifts of the Spirit have received a great deal of attention, unfortunately not all of it helpful. Robert L. Thomas of Talbot Theological Seminary has provided a well written study of 1 Corinthians 12 through 14 from a modified dispensational perspective called *Understanding Spiritual Gifts* (Chicago: Moody, 1978). Kenneth Kinghorn of Asbury Theological Seminary and John Koenig of Union Theological Seminary have provided helpful works on gifts, the former giving us a popularized *Gifts of the Spirit* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1976), the latter providing a more substantial biblical theology, *Charismata: God's Gifts for God's People* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978). Roman Catholic Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., has written a short yet impressive work, *Charisms and Charismatic Renewal: A Biblical and Theological Study* (Ann Arbor: Servant, 1982), while Fuller professor C. Peter Wagner has attempted to link the subjects of spiritual gifts and church growth in *Your Spiritual Gifts Can Help Your Church Grow* (Glendale: Regal Books/Gospel Light, 1979). Finally, William J. Sneck has provided a scholarly phenomenological analysis of several gifts in his *Charismatic Spiritual Gifts* (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1981).

Specific gifts receiving treatment during the past decade are several. Healing and prophecy have received the most attention, but other studies need to be mentioned as well. On healing are Father Francis MacNutt's classics *Healing* (Notre Dame: Ave Maria, 1974) and *The Power to Heal* (Notre Dame: Ave Maria, 1977), the latter being available since 1979 as a Bantam paperback. These two works have received wide circulation within the Catholic charismatic renewal movement. Anglican Bishop Morris Maddocks has writtten *The Christian Healing Ministry* (London: SPCK, 1981), while classical Pentecostal Hugh Jeters links healing to the atonement in *By His Stripes: A Biblical Study on Divine Healing* (Springfield: Gospel Publishing House, 1977). InterVarsity has published the pastorally-oriented work of Roy Lawrence, *Christian Healing Rediscovered* (Downers Grove, 1980).

Morton T. Kelsey has produced an important work on the subject called *Healing and Christianity* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973) in which he surveys the history, theology and praxis of healing in the church. More recently, Klaus Seybold and Ulrich B. Mueller have provided a thoughtful biblical theology on the subject of *Sickness and Healing* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1981). Of particular interest to those involved in the integration of science and theology is physician John Wilkinson's *Health and Healing: Studies in New Testament Principles and Practice* (Edinburgh: Handsel, 1980). Finally, two books on inner healing which have found widespread use in charismatic renewal circles have been Ruth Carter Stapleton's *The Gift of Inner Healing* (Waco: Word, 1976) and John A. Sanford's *Healing and Wholeness* (New York: Paulist Press, 1972).

During the past decade, the gift of prophecy has received the most intense study of any of the gifts. No fewer than eight major monographs or books have been written in a variety of languages on this subject. The best available in English are: David Hill, *New Testament Prophecy* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1979), and the massive work of David Aune, *Prophecy and Early Christianity* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), which deals with every major prophetic oracle through the mid-Second Century. Those wishing to do more in-depth study of this gift will benefit from three other works in English: E. Earle Ellis, *Prophecy and Hermeneutic in Early Christianity* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978) which also has much to say on words of wisdom and of knowledge; J. Panagopoulos, ed., *Prophetic Vocation in the New Testament and Today* (Leiden: Brill, 1977), and Trinity's Wayne A. Grudem's revised Cambridge Ph.d. dissertation *The Gift of Prophecy in 1 Corinthians* (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1982). M. Eugene Boring has recently added a monograph to the field called *Sayings of the Risen Jesus: Christian Prophecy in the Synoptic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) in which he gives a major treatment to the question of "how the post-Easter Jesus continued to speak to his church through Christian prophets." Bruce Yocum, active in the Catholic charismatic renewal, has given us a very helpful book on how the gift is generally defined, used and tested in Pentecostal and charismatic contexts in *Prophecy: Exercising the Prophetic Gifts of the Spirit in the Church Today* (Ann Arbor: Word of Life, 1976).

The gift of tongues, long overdue for major biblical and theological study, has received some treatment in recent publications. William J. Samarin has undertaken a fine linguistic study of speaking in tongues in his *Tongues of Men and Angels* (New York: Macmillan, 1972). Felicitas D. Goodman, *Speaking in Tongues: A Cross-Cultural Study of Glossolalia* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1972), on the other hand, has looked at the subject as an anthropologist

interested in linguistics and psychology. David Christie Murray's *Voice from the Gods: Speaking in Tongues* (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1978) addresses the subject phenomenologically, for the most part, and spends too much space on the phenomenon in Spiritualism. Another phenomenological study, much more helpful in its treatment of this gift in the Christian context, is Cyril G. Williams's *Tongues of the Spirit: A Study of Pentecostal Glossolalia and Related Phenomena* (Cardiff: University of Wales, 1981). Its chief drawback is its price of $50.

Two other books deserving mention include the collection of essays from a variety of perspectives (psychological, historical, pastoral, etc.) edited by Watson E. Mills, *Speaking in Tongues, Let's Talk About It* (Waco: Word, 1973). Robert Gromacki's 1966 work, *The Modern Tongues Movement*, has been revised and is distributed by Baker. Its perspective is decidedly dispensational.

Fuller Graduate School of Psychology professor H. Newton Malony and psychology alumnus A. Adams Lovekin have co-authored a book on speaking in tongues from the perspective of the behavioral sciences which will be issued later this year as *Glossolalia: Social and Psychological Perspectives* (New York: Oxford Press, anticipated May 1985).

Other books devoted to the study of specific gifts which merit attention include Thomas C. Campbell and Gary B. Reierson, *The Gift of Administration: Theological Bases for Ministry* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981). Leopold Sabourin, while not dealing with the gift of miracles as such, has written an outstanding work called *The Divine Miracles Discussed and Defended* (Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1977). Martyrdom is addressed in William Horbury and Brian McNeil, eds., *Suffering and Martyrdom in the New Testament* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1981), the article by G.W.H. Lampe, "Martyrdom and Inspiration," being exceptionally appropriate in light of the early Christian understanding of martyrdom as a gift of the Spirit.

Gifts of leadership are addressed by Martin Hengel in *The Charismatic Leader and His Followers* (New York: Crossroad, 1981) particularly as related to Jesus. Historians will find Paul Jonathan Fedwick's *The Church and the Charisma of Leadership in Basil of Caesarea* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1979) provides an equally intriguing case study. Catholic theologian Edward Schillebeeckx has written *Ministry: Leadership in the Community of Jesus Christ* (New York: Crossroad, 1981) where, among other things, he discusses celibacy as a charisma. Christian leadership in the persons of evangelists and teachers are expounded in David Watson's *I Believe in Evangelism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976) and Joseph A. Grassi's *The Teacher in the Primitive Church and the Teacher Today* (Santa Clara: University of Santa Clara, 1973).

The all-important question of discernment of spirits has been the objective of study in Casiano Floristan and Christian Duquoc's interesting and provocative book *Discernment of the Spirit and of Spirits* (New York: Crossroad, 1979). Morton Kelsey has also addressed himself to this subject in *Discernment: A Study in Ecstasy and Evil* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978).

Several works have appeared since 1973 which address the subject of the charismatic renewal within various traditions. All of the major formal statements on the subject which have been issued by church bodies around the world since 1960 have been collected by Kilian McDonnell in his three-volume work *Presence, Power, Praise* (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1981).

Calvin H. Chambers has addressed himself to the subject of charismatic worship in the Reformed tradition in his book *In Spirit and in Truth* (Ardmore: Dorrance and Co., 1980). Erling Jorstad wrote *Bold in the Spirit: Lutheran Charismatic Renewal in America Today* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1974), which has since been joined by Larry Christenson's *The Charismatic Renewal Among Lutherans* (Minneapolis: Lutheran Charismatic Renewal Services, 1976). Eusebius A. Stephanou has written on *Charismatic Renewal in the Orthodox Church* (Fort Wayne: Logos Ministry for Orthodox Renewal, 1976).

Charismatic renewal in the Roman Catholic tradition has been the subject of several authors. Following the publication of Kevin and Dorothy Ranaghan's pioneering works *Catholic Pentecostals and As the Spirit Leads Us*, published by Paulist in 1969 and 1971 respectively, were two other important works. Edward D. O Connor, C.S.C., produced an historical and theological work called *The Pentecostal Movement in the Catholic Church* (Notre Dame: Ave Maria, 1971), and Donald L. Gelpi gave an outstanding theological critique and statement in *Pentecostalism: A Theological Viewpoint* (New York: Paulist Press, 1971). Since that time, three books of importance have been published. Kilian McDonnell has edited a work which looks at a variety of important theological questions in the movement under the title *The Holy Spirit and Power: The Catholic Charismatic Renewal* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1975). Catholic charismatic lay leader Ralph Martin has compiled *The Church and the Spirit* (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), said to provide a personal and documentary record of the renewal in the Catholic Church. French theologian Rene Laurentin has produced the third volume of importance which weaves together both history and theology, *Catholic Pentecostalism* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1977).

It must be recognized that there are differences of opinion of the value of charismatic renewal today. John F. MacArthur Jr. published a series of sermons in which he attempted to deal with what he saw as problems confronting the church as a result of charismatic renewal. It was called *The Charismatics: A Doctrinal Perspective* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1978). A much more objective analysis has been provided by Robert H. Culpepper, *Evaluating the Charismatic Movement: A Theological and Biblical Appraisal* (Valley Forge: Judson, 1977).

Four markedly irenic books on the subject have appeared which should, perhaps above all others, be congratulated for the spirit which they exude: Peter E. Gillquist, *Let's Quit Fighting about the Holy Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1974); Michael Harper, *Three Sisters: A Provocative Look at Evangelicals, Charismatics and Catholic Charismatics and Their Relationship to One Another* (Wheaton: Tyndale, 1979); Eric Houfe, *Vision for Unity* (Eastbourne: Kinsway Publications, 1980); and Charles E. Hummel, *Fire in the Fireplace: Contemporary Charismatic Renewal* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1978). Each of these authors calls for a renewed level of Christian charity and understanding as it relates to charismatic renewal.

Several other books have appeared in recent years which look at Pentecostalism and the charismatic renewal from an ecumenical perspective. Simon Tugwell, Peter Hocken, George Every, John Orme Mills and Walter Hollenweger have collaborated on *New Heaven? New Earth? An Encounter with Pentecostalism* (Springfield, IL: Templegate, 1976). Kilian McDonnell has given us two important works. The first, *Charismatic Renewal and the Churches* (New York: Crossroad, 1976), looks both at history and psychology, using the data available in these disciplines as objects for theological reflection. His second work, *The Charismatic Renewal and Ecumenism* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), is an attempt to futher the ecumenical task providing a number of pastoral suggestions for Roman Catholics in particular.

The World Council of Churches has published two works on charismatic renewal in the past five years. Rex Davis, *Locusts and Wild Honey* (Geneva: WCC, 1978), provides an interesting survey on the subject. The second book is the outcome of a major consultation in Bossey, Switzerland, in 1980. Edited by Arnold Bittlinger, *The Church is Charismatic: The World Council of Churches and the Charismatic Renewal* (Geneva: WCC, 1981) provides a variety of papers presented at the consultation and its two preparatory sessions and makes recommendations on how WCC churches should relate to charismatic renewal.

Three theological works, all by Roman Catholics, are intended to provide some direction in the task as well. Herbert Muhlen has written *A Charismatic Theology: Initiation in the Spirit* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), an exciting work which he describes as "the fruit of Catholic/Protestant solidarity." Charismatic Jesuit theologian Donald L. Gelpi has set forth his rigorous and rewarding *Charism and Sacrament: A Theology of Christian Conversion* (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), in which he studies conversion and gifts of the Spirit against a sacramental backdrop. His more recent work *Experiencing God: A Theology of Human Emergence* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978) provides a somewhat elaborate "foundational theology" that can be used to interpret and explain the experience of Christian worship. Gelpi's attempt is a heady one designed to encourage "critical self-understanding and theological sophistication" among those involved in charismatic renewal.

While many pastoral issues have in one way or another been addressed in a number of works already, three volumes deserve mention in their own right. Sheila Macmanus Fahey has provided a very encouraging word on social action in her *Charismatic Social Action: Reflection/Resource Manual* (New York: Paulist Press, 1977). It is a "must" for those who wish to see charismatic renewal reach out into other areas of Christian service. Charles Farah Jr., professor of theology and history at Oral Roberts University, has turned his attention to a very practical problem of "faith-formula" teaching in the book *From the Pinnacle of the Temple* (Plainfield: Logos, no date). Finally, Thomas A. Smail in *The Forgotten Father* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980) has focused on what he perceives to be a trinitarian problem. The charismatic renewal has concentrated on the Holy Spirit and the Son whom the Spirit glorifies, but has at times overlooked the role of the Father. His book is a genuine challenge to rethink this frequent oversight.

Finally, it would be appropriate to mention a few of the many journals which regularly address issues which have been mentioned in this article. "Pneuma: The Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies" is the newest and perhaps the most academic of such journals. Issued semi-annually, it addresses biblical, theological, historical and practical issues related to charismatic renewal. It is edited by William W. Menzies of the faculty of the Assemblies of God Graduate School in Springfield, Missouri. "Pneuma" may be ordered by corresponding with Russell P. Spittler, a member of Fuller's faculty and secretary of the Society for Pentecostal Studies. "Paraclete," a quarterly publication dedicated to exploring the person and work of the Holy Spirit, may be ordered from Hardy W. Steinberg, editor, 1445 Boonville Ave., Springfield, Missouri 65802. From Britain comes "Theological Renewal" edited by Thomas Smail. This journal comes in a joint subscription with the more popular magazine "Renewal" and is available by writing to Grove Books, Bramcote, Nottingham, NG9 3DS, United Kingdom. A Roman Catholic periodical worthy of consideration for its practical treatment of pastoral issues is "Pastoral Renewal," P.O. Box 8617, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48107.

NEWS

Diversity Marks Wheaton Conference

by Douglas Jacobsen

For three days in March (20–22), The Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals (located at Wheaton College) hosted a rambling, yet surprisingly coherent, conference on "Christian Theology in a Post-Christian World." Thirteen presentations, each followed by a formal response and general discussion, were grouped under three major themes.

The first, entitled "Image-Maker and Images," addressed issues of connections and distinctions between the human and the divine, or, expressed more concretely, between God and human beings (presenters: J. I. Packer, Cornelius Plantinga, Stephen Evans). The second, "Revelation and Its Reception," explored different aspects of the nature and scope of human knowledge available to Christians in light of the reality of God and the limitations of human existence (Gabriel Fackre, Thomas Morris, Anthony Thiselton, Clark Pinnock). A third session—the longest of the three—dealt with more pragmatic and particular concerns (e.g., culture, work, secularization, science, the poor, and the future) and was entitled "Creation and Restoration" (Donald Bloesch, Paul Marshall Klaus Bockmuehl, David Livingstone, Richard Mouw, David Wells). John Stott presented a biblical meditation at the beginning of each of these major sessions, and it was the expressed desire of the organizers of the conference that these homiletical talks should set the tone for and context of the discussions that followed—i.e., that of the worship of the God of the universe.

The genius of the conference was its format. It was designed as a well organized bull session. Papers were distributed in advance and were not reread at the conference. Time in meetings was spent talking, and the conversational aspect gave life to the proceedings. Another boon was that professional theologians did not dominate the landscape. Instead, evangelical thinkers from a range of academic disciplines were represented, and that too added to the creative flavor of the conversation.

The result was a pleasing overview of the state of the art of evangelical religious thinking. No broad evangelical consensus was reached by the conference. In fact, diversity was at least as prominent as agreement. But uniformity was not the aim of the gathering. Rather, the desire was to provide an initial platform from which further creative collaboration on important issues could continue. Mark Noll, one of the organizers of the conference, expressed his reaction in terms of guarded optimism: "The conference may or may not have contributed a great deal to Christian thinking on any particular subject. . . . Yet, the opportunity to observe both theologians and non-theologians talking together . . . may be a harbinger of a more refined evangelical thought for the days ahead."

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BOOK REVIEWS

Individualism and Social Ethics: An Evangelical Syncretism
by Dennis P. Hollinger (University Press of America, 1984, 284pp., $12.50). Reviewed by Richard V. Pierard, Fulbright Professor, Universität Frankfurt.

American Evangelicalism is now receiving the scholarly attention that it has long merited. One need only mention the books by Robert Booth Fowler, James D. Hunter, and George Marsden,, the Hatch-Woodbridge-Noll collective work, *The Gospel in America*, and the formation of the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals, all of which came about in the last five years, to provide evidence of this. Dennis Hollinger's study of Evangelical social ethics is a welcome and significant addition to the literature.

A professor at Alliance Theological Seminary, Hollinger possesses an understanding of the inner dynamics of Evangelicalism that makes his critique all the more trenchant. He goes beyond what some of us have done in explicating the alliance with conservative politics and the lack of social concern to get at the root of these external manifestations of the flawed evangelical philosophy. His thesis is that individualism is the most basic motif of Evangelical social thinking.

He begins by defining individualism and Evangelicalism, both historically and theoretically. He then makes a content analysis of *Christianity Today*, the chief theological voice of the Evangelical movement, during the period 1956-76 in order to determine how much of an individualistic social philosophy is to be found there. The topics he explores are personal versus social ethics, social change, economic thought, and political views. He concludes with a sociological and theological analysis of the findings.

Hollinger defines individualism as: 1) a metaphysic with an atomistic world view; 2) a value system that heralds freedom, privacy, autonomy, and self-sufficiency, and most importantly 3) a social philosophy which stresses personal morality over social ethics, individual transformation as the key to social change, the laissez-faire approach to economic matters, and a political theory extolling the freedom of the individual and a limited state. He sees modern Evangelicalism as a movement preaching historic Christian orthodoxy but without the rancor and excesses of Fundamentalism. It seeks to recapture the spirit of cooperation and openness that characterized nineteenth-century Evangelicalism, places more value upon intellectual pursuits, and emphasizes social involvement.

The book is rich in insights, of which the most helpful may be his explanation of how Evangelicalism's ineffectiveness in the social realm results from its belief that the individual, not the church, is to act; social problems are magnified personal problems; the regeneration of individuals (not reformation of institutions or revolution) is the proper strategy to achieve change; and God's standards apply to the spiritual kingdom while the realm of the world is under natural law and we can do little about things here. The unfortunate stance on economic and political questions taken by many writers in *Christianity Today*, which Hollinger copiously documents, flows naturally from this underlying

individualism. Using sociological analysis he shows convincingly that their individualism is rooted not in Scripture and Christian theology but inherited ideological presuppositions and American middle class culture.

The author does see a ray of hope in the so-called "new breed" of Evangelicals beginning to make their presence felt who work from a conception of community that goes beyond the old antithesis of individualism/collectivism. Whether they will gain the upper hand in the near future is an open question, but they do offer an alternative to the individualistic ethic that holds back American Evangelicalism from being the force in the world that it could and should be.

Building God's People in a Materialistic World
by John H. Westerhoff III (Seabury Press, 1983, $8.95). Reviewed by Craig M. Watts, minister, First Christian Church, Carbondale, IL.

It has virtually become a cliche to say that stewardship is not just a matter of finances, but is an approach to life which involves all that we own. John Westerhoff has taken us a step further by explaining that stewardship pertains first of all not to what we have but to who we are. It shapes our identity before it touches our activity. Stewardship begins with the recognition that we are God's people, and not our own. In view of this, Westerhoff writes, "Stewardship is nothing less than a complete lifestyle, a total accountability and responsibility before God ... Thus our stewardship is multidimensional ..." (p. 15). His study is dedicated to expanding upon this insight.

The author, professor of religion and education at Duke University, does not limit himself to applying the concept of stewardship to our talents, our use of time, or even our politics. He also deals with other crucial facets of Christian existence which are too rarely viewed from the perspective of stewardship. Westerhoff focuses his attention on Christian education as it pertains to worship, morality, spirituality, and pastoral care, examining all of this through the lens of stewardship. He contends that the church needs to learn how to integrate the various aspects of its work and thought into a more unified whole lest the church's life and ministry be damaged through fragmentation and specialization.

Unexpected insights permeate this volume as Dr. Westerhoff speaks of baptism, the Lord's Supper, community and even abortion in terms of stewardship. For instance, in connection with the Lord's Supper he observes that in partaking of the Eucharist we are to become what we eat. We are to ask ourselves what form our lives are to take in relation to others, in view of the fact that we receive spiritual nourishment from the body and blood of Christ. "Thus the Eucharist offers a judgment on our consumer society and its values, a society in which we deny the physically hungry the food they need because we ourselves are not spiritually fed" (pp. 71-72). Both the Lord's Supper and the offering are symbolic acts pointing to how we intend to live the rest of our lives.

Two observations which fundamentally challenge our typically Western view of life echo throughout the book. The first of these is that we do not absolutely own anything in creation. We are caretakers of God's wealth. Thus sharing wealth with others who are in need is not just a matter of mercy or charity but a matter of justice and responsible stewardship. The second observation is that human life is communal rather than individualistic. This goes gainst the grain of a people who have over-stressed independence and self-reliance. Westerhoff maintains that we reflect the nature of the caring, Triune God as we live together within community.

In order to foster a vision of life from the perspective of stewardship, says Westerhoff, the life of the church must be structured so as to provide experiences and opportunities for reflection on what it means to know God and to live with God for the sake of the world. But the reflection which is most needed is not abstract. Rather it must be concrete: providing people with insight and occasions to become faithful stewards of God.

Building God's People in a Materialistic Society is not a "how to" book, and it will disappoint anyone who picks it up in hope of finding a clear-cut technique for meeting the church budget. Nor is this a paper theology which lays dead on the page. John Westerhoff supports and illustrates his positions by pointing to situations where they are incarnate in the life and practice of various churches. In a diversity of ways he reminds us that the church is to be a community of faith, hope and love which opens the way for people to experience compassion, wholeness, freedom and reconciliation.

In the postscript John Westerhoff explains that he set out to write a book on stewardship from an Anglican perspective. But what he has written is a study which has much to offer all of us. Unfortunately, he does from time to time use a theological vocabulary and refer to traditions which may not be familiar to non-Anglicans. Nevertheless, the wealth of his insights and the vividness of his stories and examples more than make up for this slight obstacle.

Jesus, Son of Man
by B. Lindars (Eerdmans, 1984, 244 pp., $9.95). Reviewed by Dr. P. Maurice Casey, Dept. of Theology, University of Nottingham, England.

This book further increases our knowledge of Jesus' use of the term "son of man." Building on earlier work by G. Vermes and the reviewer, Lindars argues that Jesus made idiomatic use of the Aramaic term bar *(e)nash(a)*, "son of man," or "man." By means of this idiom, the Aramaic speaker "refers to a class of persons, with whom he identifies himself" (p. 24). This idiom properly required the definite state *bar (e)nasha*: the definite state was more or less the Aramaic equivalent of the English definite article "the," but Lindars argues that in this idiom it was used generically, and Jesus' use of the definite state led the Gospel translators to the Greek translation *ho huios tou anthropou* with both definite articles.

Lindars finds nine examples of this idiom in the teaching of Jesus, and his most important contribution lies in his discussion of the interpretation of these sayings. That of the unforgiveable sin is especially useful. Lindars brings out the original setting in controversy with the Pharisees, and against this background shows how "we can see that the saying is both a general statement and a particular defence of Jesus himself .... Jesus refuses to allow any suggestion that his commission does not come from God himself. To slander him as a man would be pardonable, but to slander the Spirit who inspires him and works through him is far more serious" (p. 37). Thus the saying emerges in its original cultural context as a vigorous defence of Jesus' ministry, without the use of any Christological title. Anyone not fully familiar with the proposed operation of this idiom in the teaching of Jesus will also find the discussions of Matt 8:20//Luke 9:58, Matt 11:16–19//Luke 7:31–35, Mark 2:10, Matt 10:32f//Luke 12:8f (cf Mark 8:38), Mark 19:21 and Mark 10:45 interesting and helpful.

Lindars' second significant contribution is his redaction-critical analysis of the use of "son of man" by each of the four evangelists (chs 6–9; ch 5 deals with Q). This is the first substantial piece of its kind, and it has many correct insights. Further discussion may, however, show that the conventional assumptions of redaction criticism have led Lindars to attribute more thought, care and editorial activity to the individual writers than they in fact exercised. The final chapter draws all the material together into a developmental pattern, with Jesus' ironical references to himself as authentic and the definite titular usage produced by the early church on the basis of Daniel 7.

The major weakness of this book lies in the handling of the Aramaic evidence. It is clear that a fresh examination of the Aramaic sources as a whole has not been carried out, and no complete new reconstructions of authentic sayings of Jesus are offered. At the center of the description of this idiom, there is no adequate discussion of what is meant by "generic," either in terms of the use of generic sentences in other languages or in the Aramaic sources. This leads to the assertion that this idiom properly requires the definite state, an assertion contrary to our Aramaic sources, which show no such discrimination. This means that the proposed explanation of the presence of the articles in *ho huios tou anthropou* is inadequate. Further, when he deals with sayings of Jesus, Lindars has no clear concept of how small a group of people may be in view for the idiom to continue to function. This is especially unsatisfactory in dealing with the passion predictions. Lindars suggests an original beginning *ithmesar bar enasha*, "A man may be delivered up ..." This, however, does not appear to be true in any generic or general sense ("may" is produced in the translation and is not clear in the Aramaic), so that the indirect Aramaic expresion in it should be *hahu gabra*.

There are also a number of details where Lindars' view may be considered doubtful or unconvincing. For example, his dating of the Similitudes of Enoch after A.D.70 is extremely precarious, and his reasons for rejecting Mark 2:28 as an example of this idiom could be overthrown by detailed study of Mark 2:23–28 against the background of first century Jewish culture.

Much therefore remains to be done. In the meantime, this book is the best available discussion of several examples of this Aramaic idiom in the teaching of Jesus, of the understanding of "son of man" by the four evangelists, and of the Christological implications of results of this kind. It should be read by anyone seriously interested in the Jesus of history and/or in New Testament Christology.

Easter Enigma: Are the Resurrection Accounts in Conflict?
by John Wenham (Zondervan, 1984, 162 pp., $6.95). Reviewed by Tom Schreiner, Assistant Professor of New Testament, Azusa Pacific University.

It is well-known that there are seemingly insoluble contradictions in the differing resurrection accounts. John Wenham, in this fascinating book, attempts to weave the resurrection accounts into a coherent and consistent narrative. The book is basically divided into two parts. In the first part Wenham attempts to identify the major characters who played a significant role in the resurrection narratives, while in the second part of the work he attempts to harmonize the resurrection accounts. The two different parts of the book are not necessarily connected. In other words, the credibility of the harmonization of the resurrection narratives is not indissolubly linked with Wenham's attempt to identify the central characters.

Some of Wenham's conclusions regarding the identity of major characters in the resurrection narratives are quite interesting. It is argued in some detail, for example, that Mary Magdalene is the same person as Mary of Bethany, the sister of Lazarus. Salome is identified as the mother of the sons of Zebedee and the sister of Mary, the mother of Jesus. The "other" Mary is the wife of Clopas and

the mother of James the younger and Joses. The identification of Clopas is rather complex. Clopas has already been identified as the husband of the "other" Mary, and Mary's son is James the younger, i.e., according to Wenham, the younger James in the apostolic circle. But in the gospels and Acts, James the younger is consistently said to be the son of Alphaeus; Wenham says that Alphaeus is probably a different Aramaic version of the name Clopas, and therefore the two are the same person. Indeed, Clopas can be identified with Cleopas to whom Jesus appeared on the road to Emmaus (Luke 24). Furthermore, Eusebius says that Clopas was the brother of Joseph, and as a result this person (Clopas/Alphaeus/Cleopas: different names for the same person according to Wenham) is the uncle of Jesus!

The second part of the book sets forth the story from Good Friday to the ascension of Jesus. This portion reads like a fascinating detective story as Wenham tries to show that the different accounts are complementary and not contradictory. Indeed, because Wenham has identified all of the characters with such precision, he can postulate with some plausibility (given his assumptions) the specific location and role each character played in the drama.

Methodologically, Wenham's main point seems to be that none of the gospel accounts is exhaustive, i.e., technical precision was not the intention of the gospel writers. Nevertheless, the lack of precision in the gospels does not imply historical inaccuracy. What the gospel writers include is true and reliable, but it is not complete. For example, how many angels were there at the tomb: one (Matthew, Mark) or two (Luke, John)? Wenham sees no contradiction here because if there were two angels, then it is certainly not inaccurate to say there was one angel. It would only be inaccurate if a gospel writer denied that there were two angels present, not if he simply chooses to focus upon only one angel. In John's gospel Mary Magdalene seems to come to the tomb alone, whereas the synoptics indicate that she was with other women as well. John's focus on Mary Magdalene does not imply that he was unaware of the presence of the other women. Indeed, there are hints of their presence ("*we* do not know where they have laid him" 20:2) in John's account. John is not giving an exhaustive description of what happened but is recounting the event in a selective way. How does Wenham account for the fact that in John (20:1-2) Mary Magdalene flees and tells Peter and John about the empty tomb, while in Luke all the women inform the disciples (24:9-11)? He argues that Luke is telescoping the story and not giving the reader all the details. What probably happened is that Mary Magdalene fled immediately from the empty tomb to tell the apostles about what had happened. The other women stayed behind and encountered the angels and then returned to tell the apostles.

I think Wenham's attempt to harmonize the resurrection accounts is basically successful. Even if one does not concur with all the particulars of his reconstruction, many of his proposals are credible and do not force the text into a preconceived mold. For instance, Wenham's notion that Luke is telescoping his story of the resurrection is quite probable, for Luke never intended to give an exhaustive description of the resurrection, although the account he gives is not thereby falsified. Again, the failure to mention both angels in some of the resurrection accounts is not problematic unless one requires that the gospel writers tell us all they know, and this is clearly asking too much. Some of the problems, of course, are more difficult. Wenham's attempt to reconcile the Markan and Lucan accounts of disbelief/belief at the return of the two from Emmaus is not completely satisfactory, although it may be an accurate representation of what happened. Even here Wenham does not force the narratives into a procrustean bed but respects the intention of each account. His reconstruction of the movements of Mary Magdalene is fascinating, but due to the limited nature of the evidence it is hard to judge the validity of this proposal.

Other elements of this book are less convincing. I think it is quite improbable that Mary Magdalene and Mary of Bethany, the sister of Lazarus, are the same person. Of course, such a view is possible but rather unlikely since the identification is never made in any gospel, and Wenham's attempt to account for this silence in Luke is not very credible; for even if Mary is not the focus of the stories, it is probable that Luke would have indicated identity if such were the case. The linkage of Alphaeus/Clopas/Cleopas is even more improbable. Here Wenham builds hypothesis upon hypothesis until he finally concludes that this person was Joseph's brother! Some of these character identifications have a romantic attraction, but they are so speculative that they are scarcely convincing. Nevertheless, these identifications do not damage Wenham's central thesis, although they do cast doubt on some of the dramatic touches present in the book. To sum up, Wenham builds a good case here for harmonizing the resurrection narratives, and despite a few improbabilities he shows that harmonizing can be done in a sensible and convincing way.

The Cosmic Adventure: Science, Religion and the Quest for Purpose
by John F. Haught (Paulist Press, 1984, 184 pp., $6.95). Reviewed by Richard H. Bube, Professor in the Department of Materials Science & Engineering, Stanford University.

The author, an Associate Professor of Theology at Georgetown University, addresses himself to the fundamental question of whether the universe has any purpose. From the perspective that "the central core of religious consciousness is a fundamental trust, primordially expressed in symbols and stories, that reality is ultimately caring," he asks the question, "Is this intuition of cosmic care consistent with the findings of modern science? And if so, how?"

In his consideration of these questions, the author seeks to refute scientific materialism, and by building on the thought of Michael Polanyi and Alfred North Whitehead to provide a framework

within which to consider these issues, he attempts to show that "being a Christian is an acceptable way of endorsing and fostering the scientific discoveries of modernity."

There are many insights provided by this book that are helpful to the Christian. The relationship of what are called "chance" events to the emergence of novelty in the world; the explication of a hierarchical view of the universe in which lower levels are essential for the existence of higher levels, but in which the properties of the higher levels emerge from the specific interactions of lower levels in such a way that higher levels cannot be comprehended in terms of lower levels only; the concept of the "beauty" of creation as a critical balance between chaos on one side and triviality and monotony on the other, providing aesthetic criteria for evaluating the concept of purpose in the universe—these and other insights may profitably be integrated into the worldview and philosphical perspective of the evangelical Christian.

Unfortunately, the author does not provide us these helpful insights within the framework of biblical evangelical Christianity. In almost half of the book he is reluctant to use the term *God*, preferring instead such circumlocutions as a *morphogenetic field*, and he does not specifically refer to Christian thought until his final chapter. Although the subject index has an entry for Buddhism, it has no entry for Christianity. By the time the final chapter is reached, it is clear that the author, following also Teilhard de Chardin, has no place for biblical concepts of sin and evil. Indeed, he is anxious to replace an "ethical" view of the universe by an "aesthetic" view on the grounds that the presence of purpose can be defended on the latter basis whereas it cannot on the former. Jesus of Nazareth becomes "the primary symbol through which the ultimate meaning of the universe becomes transparent to the believer." Jesus is such a symbol, not because of His ethical teachings, but because of "his relativizing of the ethical by his proclamation of a higher goodness that embraces both good and evil, the moral and the immoral."

When the model of a hierarchical structure is carried to an extreme so as to include the attributes of God as the emergent properties of the highest level of such a structure, we have the limited God of process theology. Still, even here, the reader can be touched and even learn from Haught's vision of the "crucified God" as an essential point in the biblical message that is often passed over by the Christian in the effort to defend an omnipotent, transcendent God.

It is frustrating to have so many good ideas so mingled with concepts that violate the biblical perspective and are not really essential for the argument being advanced. Certainly we can agree with the author when he summarizes by saying, "Science is a mode of knowing adequate to grasp what lies below consciousness in the hierarchy . . . . Religion, on the other hand, complements science by relating us to fields, dimensions or levels that lie above, or deeper than, consciousness in the cosmic hierarchy."

This is a good book for discriminating and mature theological students to read and discuss together. It represents a mode of thought and an approach that is certainly a common one for people who take modern science seriously as an insight into truth and at the same time wish to maintain the relevance and authenticity of a religious perspective.

The Reformation and the English People
by J. J. Scarisbrick (England: Basil Blackwell, 1984). Reviewed by Donald Smeeton, Associate Dean of the International Correspondence Institute, Belgium.

This book is much like a prescription medicine. It is useful to treat a particular abnormality but can be dangerous if used indiscriminately. Having proved his skill in his study of Henry VIII (1968), J. J. Scarisbrick again undertakes to study the English Reformation and to prescribe a remedy for an unhealthy understanding of these events.

His principle thesis is that the English Reformation was primarily a governmental affair which imposed a religious change upon a people who, for the most part, were reluctant to be reformed. In other words, many who had tasted both old wine and new preferred the former. Although Scarisbrick ranges the length of the sixteenth century to gather data and illustrations, his argument is most strongly supported by evidence drawn from wills, account books, and lay fraternities. He concludes that there was little discontent with the religion of Rome on the eve of the Reformation and, for that matter, throughout the period. Evils were seen, of course, but accepted—rather than provoking the anticlericalism and iconoclasm of the continental reform. The book challenges the assumption that the religious tumult was a triumph for the laity over the clergy. Certainly any assumption that the great multitudes of lay people fled the old order to commit themselves to the new needs a remedial balance.

Scarisbrick's strong treatment was prepared for the Ford Lectures (1982). Therefore, the chapters "sound" well and are for the most part unencumbered by notes and references; but this form of presentation robs the material of the nuances of a study that might have equaled the detailed care of research.

Scarisbrick's thesis is weakened by generalizing from a few examples, by arguing from silence, and by stressing the consistent good in Catholicism. Few would want to claim, for example, that the Protestantism of the Tudor Kings and Queens was untainted by political and economic motives, not to mention plain greed. But, on the other hand, neither was Mary's Catholicism. The changes which occurred during the period cannot be understood apart from the total social mobility, the economic changes, the value shifts and the political realities. Secularism and indifference took root before the Reformation, and continue to the present.

Scarisbrick does not attempt to refute the contrary evidence such as the desire for and rapid dis-

semination of Tyndale's translation of Scripture. Nor does he consider the perseverence of early Protestantism in face of political pressure. By contrasting lay fraternities with some of the more oppressive elements of puritanism, Scarisbrick concludes that "the Reformation caused the pendulum of influence to swing against the laymen" (p. 168). This position ignores the concerns expressed in the pre-Reformation literature that decadent priests escaped justice by claiming clerical privilege and that laymen were tried in church courts beyond the supervision of any laymen, even of the crown. The abundance of unanswered evidence lingers on and challenges Scarisbrick's interpretation. His medicine should be mixed carefully with wisdom, or the cure could be worse than the disease.

Primary Speech: A Psychology of Prayer
by Ann and Barry Ulanov (John Knox Press, 1982, 178 pp., $9.95). Reviewed by Gary R. Sattler, Assistant Professor of Christian Formation and Discipleship, Director of the Office of Christian Community, Fuller Theological Seminary.

The title of this book is a bit misleading, in that the book hardly qualifies as "a psychology of prayer." Rather, one discovers how prayer and emotional/psychological issues are intimately, and therapeutically, related, yet without at all getting the sense that prayer is just one more potentially helpful tool in the arsenal of mental health. Apart from this unfortunate decision concerning the title, however, there is little about *Primary Speech* which is problematic. The Ulanovs seem to have a good feel for the difficulties and joys of prayer experienced by those who see it as more than a "demand and delivery" process by which the just receive what they want and those of little faith get what they deserve, or get nothing at all. They also go beyond their promised topic and delve into the (mainly interior) Christian life with prayer as the unifying theme. Hence chapters on "Fantasy and Prayer," "Prayer and Aggression," and (of course) "Sexuality and Prayer."

Once one gets past the infelicitous first sentences ("Everybody prays. People pray whether or not they call it prayer"), one discovers a fine book which is less likely to seize one with the force of its intellectual argument than captivate with insights which may evoke responses such as, "I surely know those feelings," or, "So that's how I can handle this!"

The reader may have theological or philosophical reservations about the Jungian bias of the book or the attempt to integrate depth (rather than pop) psychology with Christian spirituality. I encourage such a reader to demythologize the Ulanovs' message, as it were, and glean from *Primary Speech* the valuable lessons it contains concerning the absolutely crucial role of honesty and courage in prayer. One would do well, too, to pay heed to the critical but non-judgmental attitude the authors exhibit toward pray-ers' often difficult, or even infantile-appearing, first efforts at praying. In this book one finds a refreshing lack of dogmatism about forms of, preparation for, and anxieties about "proper" prayer.

The critical reader may also have some difficulty with the Ulanovs' rather uncritical use of historical figures. Too frequently names such as Eckhart, Simone Weil, Suso, and Ruysbroeck appear within one breath, the implication easily being drawn that they all are saying basically the same thing and/or are starting from the same point. While this may on occasion be the case, the authors do not need a hodge-podge of names from the mystical past and present to justify their opinions. This sort of willy-nilly name-dropping is all too common in recent books on spiritual things. One finds as well the obligatory nod to the "triple way" of purgation, illumination and union which, however "inexorably drawn" to it one might be (p. 110), belongs to St. Bonaventure only because he stands in its tradition, not because (as the reader may infer) he started it.

All this carping notwithstanding, *Primary Speech* is a book which should be read by anyone who takes his or her Christian life seriously; that is, by anyone who is willing to risk the transformation that comes with acknowledging (as is acknowledged throughout the book) that everything starts with God. From this point the reader is challenged to pray with brutal honesty, to own his or her gifts and weaknesses, and to sacrifice them all to God. This element of giving oneself over to God in prayer is too often lacking in books combining Christianity and "psychology," in which one finds self-acceptance and justification to be virtually the same thing. The freedom, indeed necessity, to be oneself in prayer, combined with the rigor of submitting self-discovery *coram deo* to be a tool of transformation, provides a healthy and perhaps even life-changing

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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This is a nice little book which should be read through more than once and would be an excellent book through which to work in a small group of close friends.

Women and Priesthood
edited by Thomas Hopko (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1983, 190 pp., $7.95). Reviewed by James Stamoolis, IFES Theological Students' Secretary.

This collection of essays examines the Eastern Orthodox Church's position on the ordination of women. While described in the introduction as a "beginning of an answer, however tentative and fragmentary," the reader will be impressed with two things. The first is the theological perspective displayed as the essays go deeply into the theological tradition of the Orthodox Church. For someone who has little knowledge of the mechanism of the Eastern Orthodox theological framework, this work will serve as a partial introduction. The strong emphasis on worship and the Church as primarily a worshiping community permeates the entire volume. Indeed, the arguments for the necessity of a male priesthood are based in large part on the theology behind the liturgical forms.

This leads to the second thing that will impress the reader, which is the intransigence manifested on the question of women's ordination. All the contributors categorically disagree with any concept of women priests. To be fair to the involved theological argumentation, the serious student must read the book. However, in the end all the arguments can be reduced to two: 1) the tradition of the Church has never known women priests, and 2) the priest is an icon of Christ and as such must be a male.

The honesty and determination of the writers are to be admired, even if the reader cannot accept the conclusions which are drawn. One case in point is the essay of Thomas Hopko, which originally appeared as an article in the *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* (1975). The essay is printed with criticisms made by Hopko's students and others. He seeks to respond in a thoughtful manner to his critics. This reviewer appreciated the humility of Hopko's approach in this section. In another essay, Hopko interacts with Paul Jewett, *The Ordination of Women*, and Carrol Stuhlmueller, ed., *Women and Priesthood*. This essay clearly shows the Orthodox perspective on the subject.

The discussion of the ministry of women (apart from the ordained priesthood) is quite good and certainly an advance on certain Christian bodies which see little role for women's ministry. Especially good is the discussion on women deacons in the early Christian centuries, an order that in part disappeared because of the increase in infant baptisms which made the deaconess' role in adult female baptism unnecessary (p. 88).

The denunciation of women's ordination by the Orthodox is accompanied by an extremely high view of the role of women in society and the church. Several women in Orthodox church history have been honored with the title "equal to the Apostles" and are so commemorated in the liturgical services of the church. A recurrent theme in the essays is the identification of the Holy Spirit with the feminine gender. This corresponds to the identification of Christ with the masculine gender and in Orthodox thinking represents a complete humanity. Whether or not the reader accepts as valid the conclusions offered, the volume is an interesting and important study of the current debate from a different perspective.

The Life and Thought of Michael Sattler
by C. Arnold Snyder (Herald Press, 1984, 260 pp., $19.95). Reviewed by James C. Juhnke, professor of history, Bethel College (Kansas).

Michael Sattler, author of the 1527 Schleitheim Articles, was among the most significant of the early Anabaptist leaders. His martyr death by fire shortly after the Schleitheim meeting, and the relative paucity of information about his earlier life, have made him an attractive figure for both scholars and popular writers. Arnold Snyder's book, first written as a doctoral dissertation at McMaster University, is a carefully crafted revisionist study which goes well beyond earlier work in filling in the gaps for a coherent picture of Sattler and his contribution. Snyder freshly assesses both the biographical details of Sattler's life and the appropriate contexts for understanding the sources of his thought.

The initial context is Benedictine monasticism. Sattler served as prior of the St. Peter monastery in the Black Forest before becoming an Anabaptist. Here he participated in a "Bursfeld" reform, which endeavored to recapture the more rigorous disciplines of early monasticism as well as to adopt a simplified and meditative form of liturgical observance. Benedictine themes which appear in Sattler's writings as an Anabaptist include fellowship in community, imitation of New Testament life, and costly discipleship.

Snyder illuminates the interrelationships of economic upheaval and religious reform. Reformed monasteries, such as St. Peter's, were more strict in their collection of feudal taxes on their extensive landholdings. In March of 1522 the margrave invaded the monastery, allegedly to protect his peasant subjects against unfair monastic taxation. In 1525 both margrave and abbott were beseiged in the Peasants' War, a revolt which gained exceptional cohesion from a divine law ideology rooted in Reformation doctrine. Sattler learned the new ideas, according to Snyder, from contacts with invading peasants in 1522 and 1525. His decision to leave the monastery in 1525 resulted from a Peasants' War which was "part and parcel of the Reformation" (p. 65).

The fledgling Anabaptist movement in the Zurich area did not intend to separate church and state, in Snyder's view, but rather hoped to have civic religious leaders cooperate in reform as locally autonomous communities (not centrally directed from Zurich as Zwingli proposed). Sattler became an Anabaptist by mid-1526, *after* the territorial option had failed and after the Peasants' movement had collapsed. Sattler's influence upon the movement was in favor of an inflexible separatism, a position crystallized in the Schleitheim Articles of essential Anabaptist practice in February, 1527. The separatism of Schleitheim, a document of surpassing significance for subsequent Anabaptist and Mennonite development, came less from the initial vision of Zwingli's radical followers in Zurich (Greb, Manz, and Blaurock) than from Sattler's unique and creative synthesis which dialectically resolved the contradictions between his monastic background and the peasant revolt against monastic privilege.

Snyder reviews Sattler's teachings under four rubrics: Scripture, Christology, Salvation, and the Church. In each category he endeavors to sort out the elements Sattler learned from his various sources—Benedictine, the peasants, the Protestant Reformers, the Anabaptists. The conclusions are fascinating: Though he left the monastery, Sattler interpreted Scripture in a monastic manner (p. 149). Anabaptist teachings modified, but did not erase, Sattler's monastic ascetic themes of renunciation, obedience, and suffering (p. 169). His soteriology was a synthesis of Catholic and Protestant elements, although he was on the Catholic side of the question of justification by grace through faith alone (pp. 181–82). His view of the church paralleled the Benedictine view "at all important points" (p. 185). Most significant of all for Sattler, according to Snyder, was his "fundamental and pervasive Christocentrism," also derived from the Benedictine tradition (p. 196).

Members of the Anabaptist-Mennonite tradition in North America in recent years have been attracted by the formulation, "Anabaptism: Neither Catholic nor Protestant," popularized by Dr. Walter Klaassen, one of Snyder's mentors. Snyder echoes this theme by characterizing Sattler's thought as "neither Protestant, nor Catholic, nor monastic: it is Anabaptist." The statement may also be put positively. Anabaptism was both Protestant and Catholic—and more. This meticulously researched and closely reasoned study puts new emphasis upon the Catholic sources, while insisting upon the importance of peasant socioeconomic concerns in emergence of this strand of Anabaptism.

Scholars who find their work revised on these pages may find the book overly self-conscious in its revisionism. Some may be unconvinced by Snyder's conjectures at critical points where historical data is slender. But few will deny that this is a brilliant work of scholarship and exposition.

The Coming Great Revival
by William J. Abraham (Harper & Row, 1984, 114 pp., $12.95). Reviewed by William D. Ellington, Ph.D., United Methodist Minister, Director of Field Education, Coordinator of Methodist Ministries, Fuller School of Theology.

This fine book is an analysis of contemporary evangelical orthodoxy, exposing its theological impasses and offering corrective recommendations. The weaknesses of contemporary evangelicalism are caused in part by its inseparable relationship to 20th century fundamentalism which identifies tradition with divine truth, failing to see the rightful human factor in all theology. By centering dogmatically on a few sacrosanct doctrines (e.g., inerrancy), contemporary evangelicalism has lost its freedom to be confronted by Scripture, tradition, and the ongoing realities of life again and again so that it might *receive* an adequate vision of God and Christian discipleship.

Abraham invites contemporary evangelicals to shake the narrowness of fundamentalism by constructing its theology within the context of the greater evangelical history and exemplars, e.g., Au-

gustine, Luther, Calvin, and Wesley. In Wesley, especially, Abraham finds an evangelical tradition and theology which can enrich modern evangelicalism by correcting some of its inherent negative dynamics. Wesley: 1) places the *content* of Scripture above all limiting rationalistic paradigms, e.g., the doctrine of inerrancy; 2) places God's love and grace on the side of people and history, thereby refuting an excessive negativism about humanity and history; and 3) embraces a loving, catholic spirit toward all Christians, thereby denying a pugnacious attitude toward those with whom one differs. Abraham believes the Wesleyan theological method would lead contemporary evangelicalism beyond the turgid scholasticism within which it is languishing.

Abraham's historical analysis and call to theological correction are informing and stimulating. From my own experience, however, he overstresses the return of contemporary evangelicalism to fundamentalism, failing to see the broadening of theological method taking place in many Christians, evangelicals, catholics, liberals, and pentecostals, who are eager to reject self-justifying academic and institutional traditions in order that the church might hear the word of God through the Holy Spirit and be made alive.

I am also concerned by Abraham's belief that the Wesleyan theological method is broad enough to include the contemporary witness of the church to the work of God. Calling us back to tradition is a risky way to gain such an inclusion. It can create a Wesleyan scholasticism. His proposal needs to include a specific plan for hearing the witness of the church concerning the NOW saving work of God. Without it theology will always be boring.

There is not much said about "the coming great revival" in this book. Its title may be prophetic, however. Abraham hopes (and so do I) that Wesleyan theology can help shape a revival. But, as Abraham states, revival will be the work of the Holy Spirit and those who move with the Spirit. I believe this book to be the product of the Spirit's nudge. It will help. May we be moved!

BOOK COMMENTS

Josephus: The Historian and His Society
by Tessa Rajak (Fortress, 1984, 245 pp., $24.95).

Tessa Rajak has written an illuminating study of Josephus that succeeds admirably in accomplishing her purpose of setting the most famous of all Jewish historians in the context of the political, cultural and social history of first century Palestine. Too many studies of Josephus, she claims with some justification, approach Josephus with the purpose of deriving from his writings evidence tangential to his own central purposes. This Rajak seeks to correct by focusing on Josephus as a participant in the violent and confusing political and social upheaval that overtook Palestine in A.D. 66-70.

In the course of her monograph, three main themes emerge. First, as has been suggested, Rajak is particularly interested in analyzing the socio-economic aspects of the great revolt. She portrays Josephus as an upper-class "conformist," unhappy with the radicals who force the issue, an unwilling collaborator wiwth the revolt movement when resistance becomes useless. In this, Josephus mirrors many of the class conflicts within Palestine that played so crucial a role both before and during the War with Rome. Josephus' own description of the social tensions within the revolutionary camp fits nicely into contemporary social paradigms of such movements—providing some vindication for Josephus' accuracy as an historian.

This last point becomes the second major theme of the book. Rajak consistently defends Josephus' historical reliability. Of course, Josephus makes mistakes, and his *Jewish War* (with which Rajak is mainly concerned) is not without bias. In general, however, Rajak argues that Josephus is not nearly as partisan as many of his detractors have claimed. Even the Flavian patronage that Josephus enjoyed should not be seen as a dominant motive in Josephus' work.

And this, in turn, brings us to the third motif. Josephus, like many Jews of his era, was torn between loyalty to his ancient tradition and loyalty to the political reality of his day, Rome. While many portraits of Josephus have him virtually abandoning his "Jewishness" in order to make his way in Rome, Rajak succeeds in showing that, in the end, it was the Palestinian, Jewish influences that outweighed the Greco-Roman ones.

Not being a Josephus scholar, I can offer few substantive criticisms. On the whole, Rajak argues her thesis clearly and convincingly; and, if nothing else, the book is a gold-mine of information about first century Palestinian society and culture. I suspect that her defense of Josephus' reliability may err a bit in being too strong; but, even so, she provides a healthy balance to the other extreme.

—Douglas Moo

I've Seen the Day
by George M. Docherty (Eerdmans, 1984, 308 pp., $19.95).

Here are the memoirs of a transplanted Scots preacher, the major part of whose 40-year ministry coincided with one of the most troubled eras in American sociopolitical history. The early chapters tell of his humble Scottish origins, his education and ordination in the Church of Scotland (1938), and of a nascent career, promising enough but complicated by his wartime pacifism.

The second half of the book, set in the United States, covers the rest of Docherty's lifework in the quarter-century after 1950. That year, at age 39, he succeeded fellow-Scot Peter Marshall at the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church in Washington, D.C. Historically, the congregation, three blocks from the White House, had included presidents, cabinet officers, congressmen, high military officers, and other top government officials. But by the late fifties, the author found himself pastor of a deteriorating inner-city parish, its membership in

decline. He recounts how many of his affluent parishioners, rather than flee to the suburbs, chose to stay and help turn traditional ways of witnessing into programs of social action.

The main focus of this half of the autobiography, however—which features a laudatory, insightful chapter on Billy Graham—is the author's militant activism beginning with the 1960s. He made his highly visible pulpit—and church—a center of agitation on Civil Rights, Vietnam, and Watergate. His narrative of those times, placed in a national scene, is interspersed with perceptive, sometimes provocative, cameos of their dramatis personae. Docherty retired from the "Church of Presidents" in 1976, a remarried widower, to live in St. Andrews, Scotland.

This moving record of one man's long and eventful ministry will prove a source of inspiration to clergy and laity alike. Richly anecdotal, its pages reveal the agonies and bliss of the pastoral calling, and, in this case, the personal struggles and successes of one who gloried in preaching. No less a part of the story is that host of men and women in the pew who, in their individual ways, stood by his work over the years, sharing his prophetic vision of compassion and justice.

—Earl C. Kaylor, Jr.

The Atonement
by Leon Morris (Leicester, England: IVP, 1983, 206 pp., $6.95).

Dr. Morris' book is a study on the Old Testament background concerning the atonement and the key words in the New Testament which bring out the meaning of the atonement. These key words are *redemption, reconciliation, justification,* and *propitiation.* The book is an expansion of the Apostle Paul's stated desire "to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and Him crucified" (I Corinthians 2:2). This writer found it readable for a serious lay person and still challenging for the minister. The book fills a great vacuum in Christian literature today, so much of which bypasses the centrality of the cross to the Christian faith. The author is an evangelical in the classical strain, but this does not mean he succumbs to the temptation to rely on the time-worn cliches of the standard interpretations of the cross.

Dr. Morris brings out many new insights. For example, the term *blood* in the Old and New Testaments is used mainly as *violent death* and not just *life.* He aptly reminds us that Holy Communion is that service which places us in a position constantly to remind ourselves of the Lord's death and His return. Each of the eight chapters end with a set of study questions that help the reader review the main points of the chapter.

My two disappointments are that the book did not include a chapter on the Person of Christ, and secondly that the author spent too much time in chapter seven attempting to expose the problems with Dodd's argument which neglects the biblical implications of propitiation.

The book has a marvelous epilogue which shows that truly the atonement is central to a biblical theology and is a gracious act of God that brought guilty sinners into a place of freedom and right-standing with Him. The last four pages are a great challenge to the world as well as the church. The cross speaks to a self-centered world today! This book shows the relevance of the cross to our lives and challenges us to become what God intends us to be.

—Stewart Drake

Christianity and World Religions: The Challenge of Pluralism
by Sir Norman Anderson (InterVarsity Press, 1984, 216 pp., $6.95).

This book is a substantially revised and expanded edition of Anderson's *Christianity and Comparative Religion* which is now out of print. It is significantly different and better. If you have his earlier work, don't put off getting this book. He points out that there have been a large number of excellent publications recently dealing with the ongoing debate about the world's great religions and their relation to the Christian and to Christianity. We are not discussing a philosophical position but a foundation for or against evangelism. We are dealing not only with people's minds and hearts but also their souls and eternal destiny. If I believe that all religions are basically valid even though Christianity has "an edge," what will be my response to mission? Mission is both over there (wherever that is) and over here. My mission field is comprised of those I live with and come into contact with—my co-workers, neighbors, and students. These include Moslems, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and many others. In my county there is an Islamic Center, a Buddhist Temple, a Hindu Temple, a Zoroastrian Temple, "gurus" of various types, and, of course, the various Christian heresies such as Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Jehovah's Witnesses. If I believe that those religions may contain some God-given truth but also much that stands condemned by the gospel, I must be a missionary.

But why should I be different from others who turn down a mission? Should I risk my neck and reputation, in order to witness? Yes. This book will help you be a credible witness in that you will now have greater knowledge about the other religions. Unlike other books of this type, Sir Anderson does not deal with particular religions but instead deals with themes. I think that this is a wise choice. The chapters are: "Introduction," "A Unique Proclamation?" "A Unique Salvation?" "A Unique Disclosure?" "No Other Name?" "Proclamation, Dialogue, or Both?"

This book is well worth the time and effort it takes to read it.

—Charles O. Ellenbaum

Philippians
by Gerald F. Hawthorne (Word Biblical Commentary; Word Books, 1983, 232 pp., $18.95).

Philippians requires of the commentator a warm heart as well as a keen mind. In this recent addition to the Word series, Hawthorne, a professor of Greek at Wheaton College, proves himself to be equal to the challenge as he energetically attacks exegetical difficulties and sensitively portrays the personal side of Paul as revealed in this document. He has produced a genuinely helpful volume which makes a real contribution toward a better understanding of one of the most appealing of Paul's letters.

The introduction is the weakest part of the book, in that it is somewhat uneven. The excellent discussion of provenance (Hawthorne opts for Caesarea, ca. A.D. 59-61), e.g., contrasts sharply with the weak treatment of the integrity of the letter (on which cf. H. Gamble, *The Textual History of the Letter to the Romans* [Eerdmans, 1977], 137-146).

The comments, however, which follow useful remarks regarding form/structure/setting, *detailed* bibliographies (four full pages on 2:5-11 alone!), and the author's own vigorous translation are consistently good and occasionally brilliant. The treatment of 1:28 is especially impressive. The contrast, Hawthorne argues, is not between "*their* destruction" and "*your* salvation" (cf. NIV), but between two perceptions of the Philippians' faithfulness: the opponents view the stubborn loyalty of the Philippians as a sign of the Philippians' destruction, but to the Philippians themselves, it is a sign of their own eventual salvation. With regard to the vexing issue of the "background" of the hymn in 2:6–11, he suggests that the question is impossible to answer. The language utilized is so allusive that reflections of "any or all" of the numerous proposals may be found in the hymn. Hawthorne roots the hymn in one incident in the *Gospel* tradition: the footwashing episode in John 13. Similarly provocative (but less convincing) is his proposal that the opponents denounced in 3:2ff are Jews, not "Judaizers." While "Judaizers" would have a *different* Christology than Paul, Jews would have *no* Christology at all, and it is not clear how such a message would have any appeal to the Philippians.

Overall, in light of the high standards established by the three earlier New Testament volumes in the Word series (by F.F. Bruce, R.J. Bauckham, and P.T. O'Brien), it is no small thing to say that the present volume maintains the level of quality we are coming to expect from this series. Hawthorne has written one of the best commentaries on Philippians today.

—Michael Holmes

Faith and Reason
by Richard Swinburne (Oxford, 1981, paperback ed. 1984, 206 pp., $9.95).

This important work is the last volume in a trilogy in philosophy of religion by the professor of Philosophy at the University of Keele. The first two controversial books were *The Coherence of Theism* (1977) and *The Existence of God* (1979).

Swinburne begins by arguing that belief means believing something to be more probable than its alternatives (e.g., p is more probable than q, r, or -p). Belief, he tells us, is involuntary. I cannot will to believe that the earth is flat, or that this year is AD 1504. He then examines the criteria for rational belief, and concludes that there are different types of rationality (five to be precise!). While one cannot morally insist that someone subject her or his beliefs to the highest criteria of rationality, religious beliefs ought to be so subjected since truth in this area is of vital importance. A central chapter argues that while faith is more than belief in propositions, faith also includes belief in some propositions; or, as he puts it, faith involves a creed and a way. The "way"—that is, the religious and moral life—is central. The "creed" is important only as a general guide to proper living and acting. In a final chapter Swinburne argues that "creeds," or religions, can be compared and decided upon on the basis of their overall probability or rationality.

This is obviously an important book if only because it argues against the general tenor of much of contemporary philosophy of religion and comparative religions. I wish he had considered the symbolic-expressive concept of faith (as in Tillich). And his chapter on comparing the creeds is really too brief. But in general I recommend this book as a better, more sophisticated, and closer to correct view of reason in religion than what is usually found in evangelical circles on the one hand, or liberal Protestantism on the other.

—Alan Padgett

Excavation in Palestine
by Roger Moorey (Eerdmans, 1983, 128 pp., $6.95).

Excavation in Palestine is an attractively designed small paperback which is part of a series entitled "Cities of the Biblical World." The author is Senior Assistant Keeper of the Department of

Antiquities of the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford.

The book is written for the person who has "little or no archaeological knowledge." After an introductory chapter which may be difficult for the person with "little or no archaeological knowledge" to comprehend, Moorey moves through a series of topics which are basic and essential for gaining an understanding of archaeology. In chapter two Moorey provides an overview of the development of the discipline. Chapter three introduces the student to the many factors to be considered in the selection of the site. The multifaceted procedures involved in the excavation itself are discussed in chapter four. Chapters five and six explain the tasks the director faces after the excavation, namely, the establishment of a chronology for the site and the study and interpretation of the structures and the small artifacts unearthed during the excavation. Equally important is chapter seven, "After Excavation: the use and abuse of archaeology in biblical studies," in which Moorey discusses the constant temptation to draw conclusions on the basis of anticipated answers rather than rigorous cross-examination of the materials at hand.

Moorey's *Excavation in Palestine* is informative and valuable. The book has much to offer the person who takes biblical history and the discipline of archaeology seriously. The work is marked by honesty and integrity. A wealth of resources is found at the end of each chapter in the notes and bibliographical entries. Perhaps the major weakness of the book is that in places the reading may be difficult. A prior knowledge of the discipline would be helpful.

–LaMoine DeVries

The Meaning of Icons
by Leonid Ouspensky and Vladimir Lossky (St. Vladimir's Press, revised 1982, 221 pp., $25.00).

The book is an attempt to communicate the language and meaning of Byzantine icons to western readers. It is a revision of the 1952 edition, conducted by St. Vladimir's Press and Ouspensky. It includes sixteen new color plates along with new illustrative material, textual modifications, indices and a selected bibliography. Each photograph of one of the most popular icons used today is accompanied by a theological, liturgical, biblical and spiritual explanation of its meaning. This constitutes the major layout of the text, which makes the book more of a reference tool than a thematic study of iconic theology.

The book would have been more valuable to westerners, however, if St. Vladimir's Press would have included an article to offer a biblical view in support of the legitimacy of icons. Although biblical passages are cited throughout the text, there is no attempt to provide a biblical foundation for the modern-day acceptance of icons in worship. It is difficult to overlook this deficiency, since credible dialogue with the biblical text has been barren in virtually all modern Orthodox literature.

–Bradley L. Nassif

BOOK COMMENT CONTRIBUTORS

The following have contributed book comments in this issue: LaMoine DeVries, Dept. of Religious Studies, Southwest Missouri State University; Stewart Drake, Pastor of Community Presbyterian Church, Strasburg, Colorado; Charles Ellenbaum, Professor of Anthropology and Religious Studies at the College of DuPage, Glen Ellyn, IL; Michael Holmes, Assistant Professor of Biblical Studies at Bethel College, St. Paul, MN; Earl C. Kaylor, Jr., Charles A. Danan Professor of History, Juniata College; Douglas Moo, Assistant Professor of New Testament at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Deerfield, IL; Bradley L. Nassif, student at St. Vladimir's Orthodox Seminary; Alan Padgett, pastor of the United Methodist Church, San Jacinto, CA.

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