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A table of contents for *Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute* can be found here:

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The following Paper was then read by the Rev. T. M. GORMAN, M.A., the Author being resident in the United States :—

*THE THEORY OF UNCONSCIOUS INTELLIGENCE,
AS OPPOSED TO THEISM.* By Professor G. S.
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IN a previous paper read before the Victoria Institute, I had occasion to defend the principle, "*Ab cognito ad incognitum*" ("From known to unknown"), as one of those which govern all progress in knowledge, and which must control all our speculation. It is the principle of continuity in thought and in the objects of thought, parallel with the physicist's continuity of physical existence, and implied in the scientific postulate of the uniformity of nature. Positive science, proceeding on the indispensable basis of this postulate, testifies to the truth that, if knowledge is to advance, the newly-known, whatever its specific differences, must still be fundamentally of a piece with the old. The simplicities of being, and hence those of truth, are universal in their reach—such is the faith of science. This faith is confirmed in experience. Were it without foundation, all things would stand unrelated to each other, except in the mere fact of their existence, and orderly knowledge, science, would be impossible. Having, therefore, once fairly apprehended the simplest facts and laws of being, in any sphere of their concrete manifestation, the investigator goes on, using them as guiding threads in the labyrinth of existence, discovering and conquering new fields of scientific truth. Guided by the same principles, the philosopher, whose work differs from that of the man of "exact science" only in that it is less directly susceptible of sensible verification, seeks to arrive at the formulation of the most fundamental truths of being—truths which must be apprehended rather with the eye of the mind than with the eye of the body. It ought to be, but is not,

ridiculously superfluous to add, that the results sought by a true philosophy will not disagree with the facts of internal and external experience, since, the rather, the former must be an expression of the underlying truth of experience, what experienced fact should suggest and in its measure illustrate, and in which the various experimental sciences should find their connecting link and the element of their life. I argued, further, in the paper alluded to, that the surest elements of our real knowledge are furnished by self-consciousness, in the cognition of ourselves as spiritual agents. In the present paper, it will be necessary to bear these principles constantly in mind, using them as the touchstone of truth or falsehood in theory.

What is now to be discussed is the theory of unconscious reason, spirit, or intelligence (otherwise denominated also, or denominated as, force, rational power), as accounting in part or in whole for the facts of the universe. In what sense is the theory rationally intelligible? In what measure may it be objectively possible? What is the testimony of fact with regard to it? What place, if any, is, or may be, granted to it in the philosophy of Christian idealism?

Let us glance first at the history of the doctrine in question, premising, however, that the two following applications of the term "unconscious" are to be kept carefully distinct; first, as denoting the principle or being on which man and nature are supposed partly or wholly to depend; second, as covering those states, powers, possessions, or processes in the human mind (or the animal soul) of which the individual possessing them is not, but under appropriate conditions may become, conscious. The conditions, extrinsic and intrinsic, of self-conscious, spiritual existence, of conscious knowledge and will, have been a subject of study and discussion pre-eminently in modern times. The result has been an intensified, if not always a clarified and more adequate, sense of the reality and nature of those conditions as exhibited in the mental life of man. Traces of a theory of unconscious rational power in the history of ancient thought may therefore be expected not to present themselves in that definite form, or with that distinct reference to the standpoint of human consciousness, as now more fully understood, which is found in modern hypotheses. The traces, however, are unmistakable and numerous, amounting often in form to distinct statement, and confirming anew, in the matter of speculative theory, the dictum that there is no fundamentally-new thing under the sun. All the systems of strict pantheism or naturalism must necessarily contain, virtually, the doctrine of unconscious reason. The so-called God of modern pantheism,

the universal, omnipotent Reason, being substantially undistinguishable from the world, and attaining to self-knowledge only in man, and the "Nature" of naturalism, an equally impersonal abstraction, must of necessity be deemed, by those who believe in them, to do all the mighty works of the universe, not knowing what they do. Even materialism, in its less consistent forms (and when was materialism ever perfectly self-consistent? how can it be?), is found introducing the same principle in its unguarded utterances, practically merging itself (as in some ancient instances) in naturalism, or alleging (through the mouth of certain of its distinguished modern votaries) a natural "Instinct of Necessity," or that "Necessity, or the enchainment of causes in the world, is Reason herself."

The undisciplined and unenlightened fancy of the ancient Orient revelled in imaginings, serious and ingenious, but also often grotesque, concerning a universal and original nature, at once spiritual (or spiritual and material, or else transcending spirit and matter) and unconscious. Thus the absolute being of the Vedas is reported to be pure cognition, which yet neither knows nor is known. The Hindoo Kapila, in the Sankhya, tells of a cosmic nature which is at once unbegotten and all-begetting, which works rationally, as in view of definite ends, and yet unconsciously. It may be that the early theogonic and cosmogonic speculations of other nations expressed or implied a similar fancy, as in the divine Night of Egyptian belief, or the original Chaos of Grecian mythology.

We need not seek for vestiges of the doctrine in question in the pre-Socratic philosophy of Greece, partly because of the fragmentary nature of our knowledge of that philosophy, and partly because it was not until the time of Socrates and his disciples that the notion of mind and its functions became clearly and emphatically defined. In the system of Plato there is, on the one hand, the evident tendency and endeavour to raise the idea of God (the idea of Good) to the highest degree of abstract perfection. The good is the king in the realm of being (*i.e.* of ideas), the cause and distributor of all true being, to which it is itself superior; it is a thing ineffable. On the other hand, in the mythical and more popular (or, as he also terms them, the "probable") expositions of Plato, the position is firmly held, that the universe is the product and exhibition of mind, that God was good, and willed that the world should be as nearly as possible like Himself. To whatever conclusion the dialectical reasoning of Plato, carried out to its logical consequences, might lead, there is not the slightest reason to suppose that in his practical intention he looked upon

the Author of the universe, or His agents in the universe, as having anything less than the perfection of conscious intelligence or its equivalent. But the very different conception, of that in the endowments or innate possessions of the human spirit, of which to a great extent it generally remains wholly unconscious, is distinctly expressed in the Platonic theory of reminiscence. This teaches that "all inquiry and all learning are but recollection." The soul, in a pre-existent life, saw the forms of absolute being, in the company of the gods. All its present, real knowledge depends on the recollection of this earlier experience, and one of the main objects of Plato's dialectic is to aid this recollection. The term education is therefore, according to Platonic theory, strictly accurate: it denotes a process by which the unconscious wealth of the soul is brought out into the light of conscious possession. Nothing but the limitations of sense hinders this process.

Aristotle never tires of affirming that nature does nothing in vain. The controlling element in all natural causation, according to him, is the end in view, and if the end is sometimes not attained, this is owing to change or to material obstacles. But what is the being that has these natural ends in view? Aristotle teaches that there is a God (a first mover) on whom "heaven and nature depend." His nature is reason, and His activity is thought, contemplation. But it were degrading for Him to contemplate aught but what is best, and as this description applies to Himself alone, he thinks of nothing but Himself. Unmoved, He moves the world by that kind of attraction which the loved unconsciously and inertly exerts upon the lover. Nature is pervaded and moved by the endeavour to become like God. This indirect divine influence affects first and immediately the circumference of the world, in which it produces the most perfect, namely circular motion. It is not, then, God, who sits apart in isolated blessedness, who is conscious of the various purposes, the effort to realize which constitutes nature. They are not His thoughts, His purposes. Nor does Aristotle assume the existence of inferior divinities, super-human spirits, who have the work of nature in charge. It is true that the heavenly bodies are in his view of god-like nature, but so far are they from supervising the purposeful economy of the universe, that it is left the rather doubtful whether that most divine of all motions (revolution) in which they accomplish the natural end of their own existence, is not primarily the result of their "nature," and not of conscious intention on their own part. Nor is there any reason to ascribe to the "soul," which, according to Aristotle, is "in a certain way" present in

all things (in virtue, namely, of the "psychical heat"—the physical basis of "soul"—which is assumed to pervade all natural existence), the purposes which are executed in the world. It only remains for our philosopher to view the idea, the end, the notional nature of each organism, as also of the world at large, as in some way imminent in these objects, and to find in the idea (in Aristotelian language "form"*) the efficient as well as final cause of everything which concretely exists. And this he does. Living things he defines as those which have in themselves a principle of motion or rest. This principle is the form which they should assume and the idea which they should realize, and resting in which they have their definite or individual character. The form regarded as final cause, is immanent, exists "potentially" in matter, in this sense, that in all matter there is a *nisus*, a striving after the form which it should take on. It is true that in the Aristotelian system the lower form involves the higher, and the necessary condition (the logical, but not chronological *prius*) of all finite forms, is God, the absolute form, the form of forms. And as God is pure, thinking activity, so each natural form is fundamentally an ideal thing, a function of thought, the very notion of which is derived only from the contemplation of human consciousness. Nevertheless, Aristotle disconnects these forms, as above seen, from the divine consciousness, and in so far leaves them (as hypostatized abstractions) to shift for themselves, subject, however, to the orderly and harmonizing influence exerted upon them by the divine attraction. As forms and as being capable of experiencing a divine attraction, they are of god-like nature, and hence Aristotle can beautifully and truthfully say that "all things have in them something divine." But it is obvious that he is dealing with dangerous, not to say inherently absurd conceptions, when he treats of a rational nature working in the universe under the guise of separate (but organically related) forms, without providing a conscious, willing agent, in whose mind they originally and definitely exist, and under whose intelligent direction they attain to actual realization. "Nature," whose name is continually on the lips of Aristotle, is certainly not such an agent, for he uses this term only as a convenient symbol for the sum

* The Aristotelian "form" (*εἶδος*) is the Platonic "idea" (also termed *εἶδος*, though more characteristically *ιδέα*), stripped of that existence as an abstract entity, separate from concrete reality, which Plato attributed to it. It is the universal *present in* and giving life to the particular, the ideal in the real, mind in matter.

of natural agencies and existences, *i.e.* of potential and actual forms; and when, as is often the case, he seems to personify nature, his language is plainly metaphorical. He likens the agency of the final cause (form, idea, reason) in nature to that of art. As art works in view of an end, so also does nature. As art (in proportion to its perfection) works spontaneously, "without deliberation," so too nature. We can pardon much to the powerful mind of the former pupil of Plato, who, in opposition to the mechanical and atheistic philosophy of his day, did such valiant service in the defence of the doctrine of the ideal, as the fundamental and ruling, nay, more, the constitutive, element in the concrete universe. Yet it is evident that in his separation of the divine thought from the world, and in his practical treatment of reason (the ideal "form") as an agency independent of any clear relation to a conscious subject possessing and directly or indirectly controlling it, Aristotle early paved the way for the vague modern theories of pantheism or atheism concerning a so-called unconscious intelligence. If anything is to be said in his defence, it is that the question of the relation of the "idea," which is metaphorically said to work in nature, to consciousness could not have that significance for him, which it has for the anthropocentric philosophy of to-day, and in the light of the purified conception of God which we owe to the influence of Christianity. Notwithstanding the revolution in philosophy, through the Sophists and Socrates, whereby greater attention than before was directed to man, yet with Plato, and no less with Aristotle, the problem of prime interest was the ontological one. What is true being, was rather the question than what is the relation of natural phenomena (all of which, great and small, were held to possess a fundamental ideal aspect) to intelligent, knowing spirit. The fatal consequences of the failure duly to consider and answer the latter question, are seen in the fact that Strato, the second successor of Aristotle in the leadership of the Peripatetic school, was so far untrue to the teaching of his master, that he denied the existence of God, or identified God with nature, defined the latter as a universal force, operating with intrinsic and unconscious necessity, and sought to explain all things as resulting from the universal attributes of gravity and motion. Further, H. Siebeck (in his *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen*, Halle, 1873) has recently pointed out in detail and with demonstrative evidence, how the materialistic pantheism of the Stoics, on its physical side, was in the most important particulars the direct child of Aristotle's physics.

Unconscious thought in nature was affirmed by the Neo-Platonists. Says Zeller (*Philosophie der Griechen*, 2nd ed., iii. 2, p. 492) "Nature [in the system of Plotinus] is, it is true, in its essence, thought, yet not conscious thought, but, the rather, simple, formative activity, without conscious purpose"; or, if it possesses a kind of consciousness, Plotinus "compares it to that of a person in sleep." This conception of nature may be regarded as a fit correlate to the Plotinic conception of the supreme "One," the ineffable source of all existence, itself so transcending the categories of human thought, that neither definite being nor thought can be ascribed to it. God is superior to thought, nature is debility of thought, the last result of a series of involuntary emanations from Deity.

Passing over, now, the Scholastic Philosophy of the Middle Ages, the reveries of German Mysticism, and the attempts to revive various ancient systems of philosophy in the Renaissance period, in all of which ancient ideas reappear more or less profoundly modified by the doctrines of Christian theology, we find Descartes, the founder of modern speculative philosophy, assuming a double realm of existence, material and spiritual. The essential attribute of the former is extension, of the latter, thought. In the former all processes are mechanical, in the latter they are expressly declared to be without exception conscious, even though the thinking agent may not always remember to have been conscious of them. The two spheres of existence, wholly incommensurable, act upon each other by virtue of the Divine assistance. Properly speaking, neither matter nor created spirit has inherent active power. God creates, and by a constantly renewed creation preserves them both, according to Descartes, such as they are and in the relations in which at each instant they are actually found to exist. Everything depends directly on His omniscient will, and is, fundamentally speaking, in itself a dead, passive product of the omnipotent Deity. But this theocentric point of view disappears in Descartes' actual and detailed treatment of the definite contents of the universe (matter and mind, or extension and thought, and their laws), and by his practical admission of the possibility of an independent material realm, the scene of purely blind mechanical processes, entirely separated by nature from the influence of thought, because utterly unideal, he opened at the beginning of modern philosophy the door for the modern theories of pure materialism, in which God, the divine thinker, is dispensed with, and thought is swallowed up in mechanism. Strange inversion of the natural order of ideas! in which the relatively unknown

(matter, phenomenal existence, laws of succession and co-existence observed, with the aid of thought, through the external senses) is made the measure of that which is directly known (namely, personal, spiritual existence, thinking being), the former containing implicitly the latter, and so being virtually, as before indicated, unconscious reason herself! Of such nature, either by express admission, or at least in tendency, were the most of the theories which (under the concurrent influence of ideas borrowed from English and other sources) prevailed in the native country of Descartes in the third half-century after his death.*

Spinoza, the logical continuator of Descartes, remains true to the position of the latter respecting the inseparability of thought and consciousness. But having pantheistically identified the substance of the world with the divine substance, making finite extension and thought modes of the divine extension and thought, and denying personality (as involving limitation) of God, it only remains for him to view the thought of God as at once conscious and impersonal. But this combination of attributes is so incongruous, that the ordinary mind, trained in the logic of plain reason and experimental fact, refuses (because unable), in spite of the much-vaunted "geometrical method" of Spinoza, to admit its possibility. It is therefore but the utmost stretch of euphemism, if, in view of this logical absurdity of its conclusion, we term Spinoza's system "the very flower of philosophical mysticism," using the language of Hartmann, the modern protagonist of unconscious intelligence, who finds in the doctrine of Spinoza a mystical presentiment of the philosophy of "the unconscious"!

Locke, opposing Descartes' theory of innate ideas, simply

* Since Descartes identified conscious thought and spiritual or psychical existence, and felt obliged to deny the former to animals, he found it necessary to deny to them also the possession of any kind of a soul, and regarded them as naturalistically speaking, mere automatic machines. The student of French literature will recall the energetic protest ("in the name," as M. Littré remarks, "of common sense") which the doctrine called forth from the fabulist Lafontaine. After adducing, in one of his Fables, instances of reasoning in animals, he adds the following verse, in which it will be observed that he holds self-consciousness to be unessential for "thinking":—

“Qu'on m'aïlle soutenir, après un tel récit,
 Que les bêtes n'ont point d'esprit.
 Pour moi, si j'en étais le maître,
 Je leur en donnerais aussi bien qu'aux enfants.
 Ceux-ci ne pensent-ils pas dès leurs plus jeunes années ?
 Quelqu'un peut donc penser, ne se pouvant connaître.”

insists on the Cartesian principle of the inseparability of thought and consciousness. Since, he argues, it is as absurd to suppose that we think, without having knowledge of our thought, as to affirm hunger, without the sensation of hunger, or extension, in that which has no parts, it follows that, unless as children, or, in the majority of cases, as men, we are consciously aware of the so-called "eternal verities," "innate ideas," these verities and ideas do not exist in us. Locke's error lay in the narrowness of his field of view, and in his tendency to substitute actual consciousness for spiritual being. The soul was for him a blank tablet, possibly material, and its spiritual life consisted in the impressions written upon it, through the senses, and in reflection. Hence the tendency to regard the soul as that which at each moment of time is actually presented in consciousness, as a succession of experienced states, and not as an active principle, possessing a rational and organic nature, by which all its operations, and hence consciousness itself, are governed—a nature which, as being rational, is necessarily a "spiritual," implicit embodiment (as the concrete universe is a physical and explicit one) of those "eternal" truths, which are presupposed by—are necessary to the very conception of—reason, but which emerge into actual consciousness only when the soul, no longer passively yielding to the impressions of sense, actively directs her view to herself, to that which, on the one hand, is implied in her own operations and in the nature of reason, the mother of the soul, and on the other, is really exemplified in the whole universe, underlies it as its hidden meaning, its truth, and is more and more discovered and demonstrated in proportion as true science advances.

Natural history treats of the organic products of nature experimentally, descriptively, recording facts as they appear to outward observation, and with only a secondary, if any, reference to all which they imply, or to their final *rationale*. If Aristotle, as (in his *Physics*) a sort of natural-historian of the universe, contents himself too much with simply reading off and recording the fact of the presence of the "idea" (the final, *i.e.* by implication, the intelligent cause) in nature, without tracing up the idea to the mind which possesses and executes it, Locke illustrates the opposite danger. Proceeding from the narrower point of view of human psychology, restricting ideal life to the sphere of actual, experimental consciousness, and viewing the latter fundamentally on the side of its dependence on sense and organs of sense, he was obliged to make concessions to matter and mechanism, of which the sensational and (at least in their

tendency) materialistic philosophers of the following century, and their successors in the present one, failed not to take the utmost advantage.

Leibnitz sought to find the right middle course. It is especially important to have a correct view of Leibnitz's opinions, for Hartmann, the father of the "Philosophy of the Unconscious," which is now under discussion in Germany, says (*Philos. des Unbewussten*, 1st ed., p. 14, 6th ed., p. 15): "I gladly confess, that it was the reading of Leibnitz which first led to the investigations here recorded." The point of departure with Leibnitz, as with Descartes and Spinoza, is the conception of substance. He defines substance as being which is capable of action. (This is the view of all genuine idealism. Compare the definition in Plato's *Sophist*, p. 247, of being as "simply power." It is well also to remember how modern physics, in finding an expression for all concrete things in terms of motion, leads directly to the notion of force as omnipresent in the universe, which force a true philosophy can only conceive and explain, as having radically a spiritual origin, and in some way an ideal nature.) No substance has parts or extension. Each is a simple centre of action. The number of substances is indefinitely great. Each is called a monad. All monads are distinguished from each other by their different internal states. These latter are, in the lowest monads, elementary states of perception and volition (or "appetition"), unaccompanied by memory or consciousness. But, "there is an infinity of degrees among the monads, some dominating more or less over the others." In the central and governing monad of a plant, the internal processes and states, although ideal, are unconscious, and exhibit themselves in effect as "formative, vital forces" (*Ueberweg*). In the animal soul they are more distinct, and are accompanied with memory. This state is termed feeling (*sentiment*). To the soul-monad of man is added the faculty of reason, which perceives the necessary connections of thought and truth; whence man is said to possess a spirit.

Leibnitz distinguishes between "perception, which is the internal state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is the consciousness, or reflected knowledge, of this internal state, and is neither given to all souls, nor at all times to the same soul." The perceptions or "ideas" of the most inferior monads are obscure and "insensible." Those of God, who may be termed the primitive and creative Monad, are, on the contrary, all distinct and "adequate," and extend to all things. Man, occupying an intermediate position, has ideas ranging all the way from complete obscurity, through the

degrees termed "clear," and "distinct," up to, or at least approaching, that called "adequate."

Man, then, may have "insensible perceptions" or ideas. They are too "small" or too numerous to be separately noted, or, owing to the distraction of our attention from them or the complete suspension of attention (as in sound sleep), we are not aware of them. But all of them have their effect. In virtue of them, we may be said to "know many things" (for example, the "eternal truths," whose possession by man, Leibnitz defends against Locke), "of which we have never thought in the past, and may never think in the future." The importance of these "slight" (*petites*) or "insensible perceptions," both in theory and in practice, is estimated by Leibnitz as fundamental. They are, he affirms, as essential to the theory of spirit ("*pneumatique*," psychology in the very broadest sense) as are to physics the "insensible corpuscles" (the impalpable atoms) which it assumes. By them he accounts for our indeliberate actions and tastes. In so far as it is under their form that "general principles" are practically present to our minds, they constitute the "soul and connecting link of our thoughts." "They form the tie (*liaison*) which binds each being to all the rest of the universe." Each monad is in its internal state a "representation, from its point of view, of the whole universe." The soul of man, the monad of higher order, "in view of the variety of its modifications, should be compared to the universe, which, according to its point of view, it represents, and even in some sense to God, whose infinity the soul, because of its confused and imperfect perception of the infinite, but finitely represents, rather than to a material atom." "It may even be said that in consequence of these slight perceptions the present is full of the future, and laden with the past, that all things consent together, and that in the least of substances eyes as piercing as those of God could read the whole suite of things in the universe." Matter, as extended substance, is literally unreal, is purely phenomenal, and space and time exist neither as substances nor as attributes, but simply as "relations of order."*

It is to be noted that in this theory of Leibnitz there is no postulating of an unconscious principle to perform the work

* The above account of the doctrines of Leibnitz is founded principally on his *Monadologie*, *Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce*, *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement humain*, and *Réplique aux Objections de Bayle*. All citations, with the one exception indicated in the text, are from the four works here named.

of conscious Deity. Not even the central monad in an organism, be its internal processes conscious or unconscious, has power over that organism, for no created monad can act upon or be acted upon by another. It is God, who alone is the sufficient cause of all things. His mind, in which no ideas are obscure, is the "region" of the "ideal reasons" of all things, and it is He who has pre-established the harmony between mind and body, causing the latter to respond to the states and acts of the former. The whole system of Leibnitz is simply a system of concrete living idealism. Dead, brute matter, as popularly conceived, he justly rejects as an absurd, irrational quantity. Everywhere is action, life; and these are inconceivable for him without some sort of an ideal aspect. Hence the primary, monadic conception of substance as a metaphysical point, a centre of immanent action, all the changes of which have an ideal aspect, "the representation of plurality in unity," which Leibnitz defines as perception. The consciousness of perception, or apperception, belongs to monads of higher order, having practically at their service systems of inferior monads (*i.e.* bodily organisms), and even they possess this perfection imperfectly; for there remains always much in their spiritual endowments or their mental experience, which the limitations of their finite nature, or circumstances, prevent them from distinctly apprehending. Since the higher monad (the animal soul, the human spirit) may, demonstrably, have ideas ("perceptions") without discursively knowing it, Leibnitz is in so far justified by the nearest analogy in attributing "insensible perception" to the lowest monads. But the lower and more obscure the "intelligent" life of the creature, so much the more completely does he regard it as dependent, not only for its origin, but also for the law of its behaviour, on God, in whom the light of conscious intelligence is perfect.

Ueberweg (*History of Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 108) points to the possible or partial influence on Leibnitz of "Glisson, an English physician, and the author of a *Tractatus de Natura Substantiæ energetica, seu de Vita Naturæ*, London, 1672, in which motion, instinct, and ideas are attributed to all substances—and English Platonists, such as More and Cudworth, the latter of whom assumed the existence of a plastic force." Cudworth's doctrine of a "plastic nature," or a "plastic life of nature," is expounded in book I., chap. iii., of his *Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678). Deeming it evident that nature is under rational control, and regarding materialistic hypotheses as utterly insufficient to account for natural facts, Cudworth, the Christian theist, yet finds objections to the theory which would ascribe the

processes in nature to the direct agency of God. In some of these objections he is evidently more influenced by heathen than by Christian conceptions of God and His relation to the world. He seems inclined, like the ancients, to look upon the Supreme Being as having only an extra-mundane existence, and the divine omnipresence appears to be for him relatively an inoperative truth, of little practical value. There would seem also to be a forgetting of the words of Him, who said, "My Father *worketh* hitherto, and I work," and who affirmed that God, our "Father," cares for the birds of the air and the lilies of the field, and even descends to numbering the hairs of our heads; and also an insufficient appreciation of the literal truth of Paul's declaration, that it is in God that "we live, and move, and have our being." Cudworth cites approvingly the judgment of a pagan writer, to the effect that "it is not decorous in respect of God, that He should set His own hand, as it were, to every work, and immediately do all the meanest and triflingest things Himself drudgingly, without making use of any inferior and subordinate instruments." Moreover, he continues, it seems not so agreeable to reason, that nature should be quite superseded, "God Himself doing all things immediately and miraculously; from whence it would follow also, that they are all done either forcibly and violently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle of their own." (Here Cudworth plays directly into the hands of his materialistic opponents, in admitting that whatever God, the supreme source of universal law, literally and immediately does, is done "miraculously," "violently," "artificially." Furthermore, whatever an "inward principle" in nature might do, would, in the eyes of a strict materialist, be just as strictly miraculous, violent, and artificial. What the materialist professes to see, and all he admits, is matter and blind force acting "mechanically." Any ideal principle assumed as directing the actions of matter and its "forces," whether from within or from without, is in his view miraculous and impossible.) And lastly, Cudworth argues, that the "slow and gradual process" of things in nature, "which would seem to be but vain and idle pomp, or a trifling formality, if the agent were omnipotent," and also "those errors and bungles which are committed, when the matter is inert and contumacious," are evidences that the agent is not omnipotent; such an agent "could despatch its work in a moment" (an evident absurdity; the very conception of nature is that of a process in time, and this obviously could not be despatched "in a moment," *i. e.* practically in no time), and "would always do it infallibly and irresistibly." (Here again our author shows himself under bondage to the false

notion of God's relation to His creation, which infests the speculations of so many of the "advanced" minds in science and philosophy, the world over, up to the present day. As if God and the world were two independent beings, occupying different places in the universe, and could not come into any kind of contact without detraction, on the one hand, from the absolute blessedness or infinite perfections of Deity, and without disturbance, on the other, of the self-sufficient order of nature! As if "matter" and nature could even be, much less act, except, as St. Paul says, *in* and through God!) Hence Cudworth, with constant reference to the authority of Aristotle and Plotinus, postulates a "plastic nature," "which as an inferior and subordinate instrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of (God's) providence, which consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter." This nature is subordinate to a higher providence, which "sometimes" overrules it and supplies its defects. The plastic nature is a variety of "life," it is "art embodied in matter," acting "from within vitally and magically," and never at a loss what to do. But "as it doth not comprehend the reason of its own action, so neither is it clearly and expressly conscious what it doth." It "cannot act electively and with discretion." It has "a certain dull and obscure idea of that which it stamps and prints on matter," but this is far inferior to "animal fancy." The "plastic life" of nature is the "last and lowest of all lives," but "since it is a life, it must needs be incorporeal." Cudworth's theory is simply the reproduction of a Neo-Platonic theory in a Christian's "System of the Universe."

I must not take up space by further indications of the implicit or express presence of a theory of unconscious reason in the history of English thought. I will only remind the members of the Institute of Mr. J. J. Murphy's hypothesis of an "unconscious intelligence," similar in conception to Cudworth's plastic nature, and destined to perform about the same functions, as well as to relieve our Christian theodicy of certain burdens which, without this hypothesis, it is assumed that the former could not carry. (See Murphy's *Habit and Intelligence*, 1869, vol. ii., chaps. xxvii., xxxix., and the *Theistic Conception of the World*, by B. F. Cocker, D.D., LL.D., New York, 1875, pp. 225-235, where the internal contradiction in Mr. Murphy's views, and their unsatisfactory nature on other grounds, are briefly but forcibly set forth.) In an American account of the doctrine of evolution, I find a view similar to that of Murphy attributed to the English writers Morell and Laycock, whose works I have not now immediately at hand.

The recent animated discussions in Germany have led there

to a re-examination of the works of the great German thinkers of the past century, with a view to the discovery of traces of a theory of the "unconscious." Having already unduly protracted this historical sketch, I must be permitted to refer those who desire more detailed information on this part of the subject to the German of Dr. Johannes Volkelt, who, in *Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus* (Berlin, 1873), examines, pp. 44-77, the doctrines of Kant and Hegel. He shows how Kant, in his *Anthropologie*, alludes to unconscious mental representations (*Vorstellungen*), how his doctrine of the "forms of sensibility" (space and time) and of the "categories of the understanding," as *à priori* implicit possessions of the mind, antecedent to all experience, may be regarded as implying that these are originally unconscious, and how a similar implication is involved in his *Æsthetics*, his theory of genius, &c. Of the Hegelian system, Dr. Volkelt, himself an Hegelian, reaffirms the most common interpretation, namely, that it represents the universe as the gradual evolution of an unconscious, ideal principle ("the unconsciously logical," as Volkelt very abstractly terms it), which attains to self-consciousness only in man (and most perfectly, it may be presumed, in Hegelians of the school of Volkelt). (The latter, it may be remarked, does not point out the capital difference between the "unconscious" with Kant and Hegel, namely, that with the former it is confined to the finite spirit of man, while with the latter it is a predicate of the mind which inhabits the universe.) Hartmann, on the other hand, makes much of the authority of Schelling, in whose works (the mingled outcome of ancient philosophy, mediæval mysticism, and German thought), he finds the clearest expression, before his own time, of the unconscious in the world and in man. Hartmann has himself called forth defenders and imitators in plenty, who seek to explain the world without the aid of a personal God. I will name only two, Moritz Venetianer (*Der Allgeist. Grundzüge des Panpsychismus im Anschluss an die Philosophie des Unbewussten*, Berlin, 1874), and Ludwig Noiré (*Die Welt als Entwicklung des Geistes*, Leipzig, 1874). According to Noiré, the fundamental attributes of being are motion and sensation. These suffice him for the construction of the universe. The "unconscious" in the human mind, apart from the theory of the unconscious principle underlying and causing the universe, has occupied, and still occupies, the attention of psychologists and physiologists. It is sufficient at present to refer to Dr. Carpenter's theory of "unconscious cerebration" (see *Mental Physiology*, chap. xiii., and other authorities there cited), and to the writings of Helm-

holtz, Fechner, and other German investigators, and to such monographs as Dr. Ludwig Strumpell's on Dreams (*Die Natur und Entstehung der Träume*, Leipzig, 1874).

We come now to Eduard von Hartmann. An account of the life and "development" of this author, up to date, is furnished by himself in the first three numbers of *Die Gegenwart* for 1875 (Berlin: Paul Lindau, editor). Born February 23, 1842, he published his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, a heavy volume of 678 pages, in 1869. It will be seen that the work could not be precisely the fruit of the ripest meditations. The book at once attracted unusual attention and became immediately, in the "land of thinkers," the sensation of the hour. New editions followed each other in rapid succession, with additions, but "no changes," the sixth edition (1874) containing, with the index, 846 pages. (Seventh edition, enlarged, with preface and a supplement on "The Physiology of the Nerve-Centres," 2 vols., 1875.) Reasons for this extreme popularity may be found in the writer's unusually clear and facile style, and in his combination of idealism with what may perhaps be termed moral materialism. For in Germany the number of persons is, unfortunately, large, who, while they are too penetrating not to see that philosophical materialism (as a theory of the nature of things) is utterly superficial and untenable (the "mechanism" to which materialists reduce all, being, so far from opposed to teleology, the rather just what teleology implies, and denoting, as Hartmann himself forcibly points out in his critical work on Darwinism, not only etymologically, but also really and only, a system of means to ideal ends), are yet in bondage to a moral and religious scepticism, or to a sort of intellectual vanity, which largely blunts their spiritual and even their philosophic perceptions. Such persons welcome a theory which combines some sort of idealism with the negative results of religious criticism and of scientific research. The logic of the speculative portion of the *Philosophy of the Unconscious* is remarkably unlike the literary style, being neither clear nor cogent, but full of obvious fallacies. Hence the lament, among the more sober-minded Germans, at Hartmann's popularity, as at a sign of widespread degeneracy in the logical thought of Germany.

The title-page of the *Philosophy of the Unconscious* bears as a motto the phrase, "Speculative results following the inductive method of natural science." By this method the author naturally does not claim to reach results having apodictical certainty. He only claims the ability to show the overwhelming probability, amounting to practical certainty, of his conclusions.

And yet, notwithstanding the methodological proclamation of the title-page, the last part of the book is avowedly metaphysical, being entitled "The Metaphysics of the Unconscious," and containing, in the 6th edition, precisely 100 pages more than the two other parts put together! This ending, however, has in it nothing which need surprise any one who is conscious of the true import and conditions of the problem involved. The fundamental query with Hartmann is really, What is the nature of things? Now this nature can only be *known*, and not directly *seen*. The method of natural science is the result of the investigation of phenomena, of "things which do appear," and can only fulfil a secondary, confirmatory function in the inquiry concerning the fundamental truth or abiding reality of things, or, in other words, concerning the things which are not seen, but eternal. Here, as pointed out in my former paper, the true starting-point is man, self-consciousness, with all that it includes, and the true method comprehends experimental analysis and synthesis—the latter, which involves the firm grasp of rational principle, dominating but not distorting the former.

It must cheerfully be confessed that the first two-fifths of Hartmann's work are a powerful statement of the experimental argument for design in nature—only, the designer is here not God, but "The Unconscious." Under this name Hartmann points out the presence and agency of ideal causes in the development of organisms, in organic processes, in instinct, in the curative power of nature, in the human mind, in the love of the sexes, in feeling, in character and morality, in æsthetic judgment and artistic production, in the origin of language, in thought, in the origin of sensible perception, in mysticism, and in history. In all these cases the ideal agency is alleged to be unconscious, but *the argument at most only proves it to be unconscious to the subject in which its works are wrought*. Yet it is on the basis of the facts related in these chapters that Hartmann founds the experimental demonstration of the existence of "The Unconscious," a substitute for the personal God of Theism, an ideal abstraction, the source, sum, and end of all things, an ideal *quasi* substance, of which man and the universe are, not in any sense spontaneous, but strictly determined, necessary phenomena, in which latter, as its name implies, it works "unconsciously." This is the fundamental fallacy of our author. From the (partial) unconsciousness, of the finite phenomenon (the universe and its inhabitants) is inferred the total unconsciousness of its infinite cause! Because *we* are not

conscious of the operations which that entity *called* the "Unconscious" carries on in us, therefore that entity is itself unconscious!

The "Unconscious," we are told, is not subject to disease or fatigue, is independent of sense in its thought, does not hesitate and doubt (like Cudworth's plastic nature, it is "never at a loss"), being provided with a sort of intellectual intuition which enables it without reflection to foresee and provide for the end from the beginning. Hence, also, it never errs; it neither possesses (since it is without a brain!), nor has it need of, memory; in it will and idea exist in inseparable unity, so that as "nothing can be willed without being thought," so also "nothing can be thought without being willed." It is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and possesses perfect wisdom. This is that *homine majus* to which in all times and climes men have turned as to the constant source of their life. But it is not God. It is not personal, nor free, nor endowed with moral perfections. It is the purest abstraction, and the attempt to derive the world from it is the most patent attempt to combine natural realism with an utterly vacant idealism, which modern times have witnessed.

Hartmann had asserted,—namely, in the first edition of his work, p. 607, that before and after the world there was and will be nothing. This was calculated to impress a Philistine understanding, attached to the logic of common minds, and which had followed in good faith the author's account of the successive processes in the ante-cosmic "will," whence the universe was alleged to have resulted, as in flat contradiction with the implied sense of that account. Ante-cosmic processes would seem to imply, as existing before the universe, a real being of some sort, in which the processes could go on. But the fancied discoverer of contradiction would have shown himself at fault in not appreciating Hartmann's ideas, and in supposing that where descriptive language is used there must necessarily be something described. This is not disproved by the new form given to the passage referred to in the sixth edition, p. 724. Here we read that before and after the world there neither was nor will be "anything actual whatever, anything but passive (*ruhende*), inactive, self-included essence without existence (or, a nature without entity,—*Wesen ohne Dasein*)"; so that, after all, before and after the world is nothing, *i.e.* "nothing actual," only non-existing essence, or, as it is elsewhere termed, a "metaphysical essence." And this is the august source of the universe! The most extreme personifier of abstractions among the Neo-Platonists, when the

Greek mind had long passed the zenith of its virile power, did not, to my knowledge, reach any such extreme of nonsense as this. If the original One was made transcendent above all categories of human thought, it was because of a reverent and ecstatic feeling of the utter impotence of human language to express the blessed perfection of the Eternal. But here the modern announcer of a "new gospel" (as one of Hartmann's admirers has in substance termed him), the child of what the Germans term "the city of intelligence," out-doing the grossest fetish-worshipper, adores, instead of the living God, an abstraction utterly dead and without existence, possessing only a potential will and an inactive intelligence. And what is the attempt to explain the derivation of the world from such an abstraction but flying directly in the face of the favourite maxim of physical speculators, "*ex nihilo nihil*"?

And yet the motive of Hartmann in his speculation concerning the genesis of the world is in so far philosophically justifiable, as he aims to show the primacy of the ideal over the material. This view is expressed in the Bible in the assertion that God made the world out of nothing, *i.e.* there was no pre-existing material, co-eternal with God, out of which God could frame the world. First in the order of existence is spiritual substance, not material. But when we thus speak of spirit, we mean self-possessing intelligence, a rational agent, a supreme personality, however much, by reason of its exaltation above the limits of human personality, it may transcend the latter in degree and perfection. Unless the stream may be greater than the fountain, unless motion may exist without a mover, or an effect without a cause, philosophy must always insist that the Cause of all causes shall possess at least the equivalent of what is known to men as conscious personality. Now Hartmann, stripping off the conscious and personal elements, has nothing left but the abstract form of spiritual life, a potential will and a blank idea.

Will is conceded by Hartmann to be inseparable from idea. The ante-cosmic will was vacant, hence inoperative, hence no true will. Uneasily it sought to assert itself, but, having no ideal content, guided by no idea, its action could only be irrational. The will translates the ideal into the real, and so the will of "the Unconscious" forced the idea into reality, brought the world into existence by its own irrational self-assertion. This result once accomplished, the idea awoke to the necessity of self-assertion on its part, and set about to make the world as logical, *i.e.* as good as it may be. It were better that the world, the product of the illogical action of the will,

should not exist. But since it exists, the "idea" goes to work to redeem it from its evil. This it is that operates everywhere, as organic force, instinct, as the "inspiration in man," the founder of societies, &c. It develops on the earth the various species of animals in ascending series, to the end that at last consciousness may come into being with man. In human thought idea is emancipated from the embrace of will, and consciousness is "the surprise and confusion of the will in view of this emancipation" (!).

In the various consciousnesses of men the original (metaphysical, ante-cosmic) will is dispersed and robbed of somewhat of its tyrannical power for evil; for the exertion of will is followed, according to Hartmann, by a preponderance of evil (or pain) over good (or pleasure). Hence the benevolent "idea" (the logical element in the Unconscious) which seeks only the good of the world, can only seek by indirect means to destroy will, or, in other words, to bring back the world into its original nothingness. To this end the race of mankind is now progressing in the direction of a more perfect development of consciousness, *i.e.* to a more complete emancipation of idea from will or to the completed ascendancy of reason. When this end shall have been attained, it is presumed that the universal recognition of the pessimistic results of willing will lead to the final act in the drama of the world, the complete suppression of will, which is the same thing as annihilation of the world. (There is, in Hartmann's opinion, nothing in the concrete universe but force. But all force is will. Manifestations of force are acts of will. The annihilation of will is, therefore, the annihilation of the universe.) Then space, the creation of the will of the "Unconscious," will be no more; time will be no more, and not God, but the "metaphysical essence," which "inhabiteth eternity," will be all in all.

The speculative views of Hartmann (*rudis indigestaque moles*) are in part the result of the attempt to combine in one synthesis what is supposed to have been true in the philosophical systems of predecessors. Hartmann expressly intimates the belief that he is a truer Hegelian than Hegel himself. Schelling he reveres, and cites often with approval from his earlier works. Schopenhauer he would correct. But the positive (negative?) conception of the Unconscious and its speculative application are that on which he founds his special claim to originality. This conception he derives partly from the observation of well-known and admitted facts, and defends and amplifies on the ground of abstract arguments. The facts simply show that there is more reason in man and in all the

contents of the universe than he or they are conscious of. But these facts (the wonderful instincts of man and animals; unerring accuracy and perfect adaptation of means to ends in the whole ordering of the forces of the universe, &c. &c.) by no means show that the agent to which they point is unconscious, or possesses anything less than the perfection of conscious mind. It should be remembered that Hartmann is so impressed by them that he ascribes all events and all things to the "One Unconscious," utterly denying the reality of any subordinate agencies or forces. Thus, the soul of man is defined by him as "the sum of the activities of the One Unconscious which are directed upon one bodily organism." All things are but manifestations of the Unconscious. Now, I assert, and no remarkable degree of logical sagacity is required to perceive the justice of the assertion, that it by no means follows that because the manifestation is unconscious, therefore the agent which manifests itself is unconscious. It is just as simple in point of theory, and far more reasonable, to suppose that it is by the everlasting "I Am," the personal God of religious faith, that "the heavens drop down their dew," that "the inspiration of the Almighty giveth," not only to men, but also to animals, and in the broadest sense to all things, "understanding," as to ascribe all the wonders of creation to an unreflecting abstraction. To do this latter is really but to reintroduce upon the scene, under another aspect, the irrational conception of blind force, which materialists employ with such miraculous effect.

As to the arguments intended to prove the conceivability of unconscious ideas, and hence of unconscious spirit or "intelligence," the two following are the principal ones. First, we know experimentally of no consciousness which is not associated with a brain. *Ergo*, no consciousness is possible without a brain (*Ph. d. Unb.*, 6th ed., p. 391: "Cerebral vibrations, or, more generally speaking, material motion, is the *conditio sine qua non* of consciousness"). The simplest answer to this is that which Ulrici (*Gott und der Mensch*, 2nd ed., 1874, 1. Theil, p. 146) makes to the materialists, who regard the soul as a function of the body. If their arguments were correct, says Ulrici, then might we reason that "since nothing is visible without the presence of light or of a luminous body, therefore sight is only the function (effect) of light"! Because man's present consciousness depends on a brain, it does not follow that it always will, or that all consciousness depends on the presence of such an instrument. And further, positively, the considerations which render it probable that the human mind uses the brain, and is hence distinct from it, go directly to

favour the inference that an infinite mind not only might exist without a brain, but that, so far from needing one, it would be positively hampered and limited, *i.e.* rendered finite, by the presence of a brain.

The other argument reads as follows (*loc. cit.*, p. 392): "Material motion determines the content of an idea; but the attribute of consciousness is not necessary to this content, for the same content may, apart from the forms of sense [in which human ideas are clothed], also be thought unconsciously [which is but begging, on the basis of a previous defective induction, the very point in question. What we wish to know is, whether an idea (Hartmann's word is *Vorstellung*, representation) is, in any other than a metaphorical sense, possible without a conscious mind possessing it—whether that is a true "representation" which is not made to a mind that consciously perceives it]. But if, now, consciousness can be found neither in the content nor, as we have previously seen, in the sensuous form of the idea, it is not at all necessary to the existence of an idea [or "mental representation"] as such, but must be an accident, which may or may not be joined with the idea." Consciousness, then (conscious knowledge, possession of ideas), is not identical, whether in whole or in part, with either the form or the content of our ideas; therefore it is an accident. By parity of reasoning, I argue in reply: Sight is neither in the form nor in the content of the eye; hence it is an accident of the eye, non-essential to its due operation, natural function and use! There might be an eye which performed all the functions of an eye without seeing! The absurdity of this is doubtless obvious enough. Who needs to be told that although sight is neither in the form nor in the content of the organ of sight, yet the organ, the eye, is not an eye in any sense which makes it practically different from a clod of common earth, except as through it some one really sees? So an idea, psychologically speaking, is nothing but a dead unreal abstraction, except as it is an instrument of conscious knowledge to its possessor.

One of the admissions made by Hartmann in his second argument, it may be remarked in passing, destroys of itself all the force of the first argument. If the relation of consciousness to the forms of sense (in which the ideas of all brain-possessing terrestrial beings are clothed) is accidental, we may obviously, reversing the order of terms, say that the relation of sense to consciousness is accidental, or non-essential; whence the conclusion that consciousness (contrary to the assertion in the first argument) does not depend on the presence of a brain. For the brain, as a physical organ, is nothing but the chief

centre of all the organs of sense. If it be true, then, that sense is not intrinsically necessary to consciousness, neither can the brain, the organ of sense, be thus necessary.

To the sixth edition of his book Hartmann adds a chapter not contained in the first (the intervening editions I have not seen) on "The Unconscious and the God of Theism." It may be worth while to notice briefly some of the points made in it. On the first page of this chapter (535) the author declares: "It is not for me to prove that the unconscious, physical functions, which as such are sufficient for the explanation of all that needs explanation, are not, on the other hand, in the All-in-one [*im All-Einen*," i.e. in "The Unconscious"] conscious. On the contrary, those who would add to our hypothesis this supplement [the view that they are conscious functions] which is wholly valueless, and unnecessary for the explanation of the phenomena of the universe, must themselves furnish the proof of their doctrine." This is turning the tables on Theists with a vengeance. The self-complacency of the passage is certainly astounding. It has not been shown that "unconscious physical functions" are sufficient to explain what is to be explained. Take one example, our author's discussion of the origin of language. The conclusion is reached that language is the result of the operation of an unconscious social instinct, and not "the mechanical work of a conscious God" (1st ed., p. 232), and this conclusion is one of the premises from which the inference is drawn that the Being who is all in all, the first and the last, is unconscious. The facts are, following our author's account, these: an instinct, unconscious in man, accomplishing a certain result, but acting only as a secondary cause; and (as we learn in the metaphysical portion of the work) an original and Supreme Being, from whom the instinct proceeds, and who acts through the instinct, so that what the instinct is figuratively said to do, is really the work of this Being. (As above indicated, Hartmann makes man and the universe completely dependent on, simply manifestations of, this Supreme Being, "the Unconscious.") There are two distinct causes recognized: the secondary cause, in the present case the instinct, of which the beings in which it is figuratively said to operate are more or less unconscious, and the prime or real cause, an original being. The "unconscious physical functions" are the secondary causes, and when Hartmann says that they "are sufficient for the explanation of all that needs explanation," he simply contradicts himself, for they are in his own view but the modes of the manifestation of one supreme ideal cause, which is the true cause, and which there-

fore alone is adequate truly to explain the phenomena to be explained. Now, Hartmann may or may not consider the question whether what is unconscious in the effect (the secondary cause) is unconscious also in the (prime) cause. That depends on his own good pleasure. But he is not to be permitted to impose on others by so evident a sophism as that by which he impliedly passes from the unconsciousness of the former (the effect, the instinct in man) to the unconsciousness of the latter (the original being who causes and works through the instinct). This fallacy runs all through the chapter, and I shall not attempt to follow out all the indications of its presence. I will cite only one more instance. On p. 545 our author, arguing that we have no right to suppose that, because we, when we seek to accomplish a purpose, are conscious of that purpose, therefore the "Unconscious" (the God of natural and revealed religion) is conscious of His purposes, says: "We see, even in the case of individual instincts, that the individual looks out for its future, without knowing what it does, and we see likewise in the case of generic instincts, that the individual labours for the end of the genus, *i.e.* for individuals other than himself, without any suspicion as to who they are, for whom he torments and sacrifices himself." Here again the puerile sophism reappears; because the animal (or, as the case may be, man; speaking generally, the effect, the creature) is unconscious in some or all of its actions, therefore the original and universal cause is unconscious!

By a very familiar metaphor we quite properly term (not define) consciousness the light of the mind. The negative term "unconscious" then signifies simply the absence of mental light, an intellectual blank, or, really, positively, nothing. But the student of Hartmann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious" in its original form found that the "Unconscious" here treated of was far from being practically an ideal nonentity. Absolute "clairvoyance" was ascribed to it, perfect intelligence, a perfect and immediate intuition which rendered unnecessary for it the slow processes of discursive thought, and a universal presence and agency, this agency being repeatedly termed "providence," whether general or particular. Now, consciousness, as directly and immediately known to us, is the function of a finite spirit, and no sober theist, or, for that matter, philosopher, would ever think of ascribing to God a consciousness so hedged in with limitations as our own. Only, he would say, for obvious reasons, the "mental light" of God can in any case not be inferior to that of man but must be superior to it, indeed, absolutely perfect; and if he sought to form some feeble conception of it, it

would be by a process of idealization, proceeding from what is most nearly perfect in human consciousness. (*Ab cognito ad incognitum*. Hartmann follows this principle, only imperfectly. The notions of "clairvoyance," of "intellectual intuition" as opposed to discursive thought, &c., and even of the "Unconscious," are taken directly from the observation of human consciousness. It is not Hartmann who can lawfully bring against theists the charge of illogical or unjustifiable anthropomorphism!) Our supposed theist, then, seeking for a term drawn from human analogies, by which to designate the mental (spiritual) light of Him in whom "is no darkness at all," might well be supposed to make use of the word supra-conscious, designating thereby a consciousness and a mode of mental action absolutely transcending—but not opposed to—human consciousness, or the perfect, in opposition to what in us is feeble, finite, imperfect. It repeatedly occurred to the writer, while studying the first edition of Hartmann's work, and the opinion was repeatedly expressed by him, that it was the "supra-conscious" mind of Deity to which the author's inquiries and arguments pointed, and that by substituting in his pages the "Supra-conscious" for the "Unconscious," a large portion of his work would be turned into an impressive argument for the existence and actual, present agency in man and the universe of Him, of whom the prophet says: "For Thou also hast wrought all our works in us." On pp. 536, 537 of the new chapter above named Hartmann admits the propriety of this substitution. "We have seen," he says, "that this unconscious clairvoyant Intelligence is infinitely exalted above the processes of human consciousness. While the former is infallible in its purposeful action, instantaneously apprehending in its one view all ends and means, and in every instance including all requisite data in its clairvoyant vision,—the latter, proceeding by the way of discursive reflection, is lame, and goes, as it were, on stilts, is ever limited to one point, and depends on sensible perception, memory, and the inspirations of the Unconscious. We shall therefore have to term this unconscious intelligence, which transcends all consciousness, a *SUPRA-CONSCIOUS* intelligence." (The Italics and capital letters are the author's.) Elsewhere (p. 546), the process of knowledge in the "Unconscious" is termed "omniscient and all-wise intuition . . . of the positive nature of which we can affirm nothing, and can only say that it is exalted above that which we know as consciousness, *i.e.* that, *negatively defined*, it is *unconscious*, and that, *positively undefined*, it is *supra-conscious*." The antithetic balancing of phrases in the last clauses appears to have been intended merely

for the gratification of a rhetorical fancy. It is impossible to see how the term "supra-conscious" leaves the subject to which it is applied any more "positively undefined," than does the term "unconscious"; and, on the other hand, we have in effect the repeated and earnest assurance of our author that the former epithet is equivalent to a "negative definition." We know nothing, he more than once assures us, of the positive nature of the intellection of the "Supra-conscious," but we may be certain that it is "absolutely opposed" in kind to the conscious processes of the human mind. Surely, this is of the nature of negative definition. But, mere rhetorical criticism aside, does not this exchange of terms, this substitution of the "Supra-conscious" for the "Unconscious," make patent to every understanding the logical weakness (to say the least) of the "Philosophy of the Unconscious"? There is a fallacy in reasoning, which the ancients termed *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, where the conclusion reached differs from that for which the premises were professedly sought. I cannot help seeing an illustration of this fallacy in the case now before us. It existed in the earlier editions of the work under consideration, in which the word "supra-conscious" was not mentioned; so that the admission of this term into the last edition is but a result of the fallacy and, as it were, an index to it, and does by no means constitute it. The "Unconscious," of which we were to learn the "Philosophy," was named at the outset by a name which at once suggested the state known to us, and only conceivable, as mental darkness. In the "inductive" portions of the work, the physical and psychological facts and processes which were chosen to demonstrate the existence of the "Unconscious," were all instances of action in which the apparent agent, though acting, as the result in each case showed, "wisely," yet knew not what he (or it) did. The trustful reader, following with curious interest the "induction," would not be led to suppose that any other notion of the "Unconscious" was to be finally inferred, than that which the facts illustrated. Least of all would he expect this if he bore in mind the axiomatic truth, that the less cannot produce the greater, nor premises warrant conclusions which they do not virtually contain. How great, therefore, must be his astonishment on finding, as a "speculative result" of the whole inquiry, that the "Unconscious," far from suffering under a lack of mental light, apprehends "instantaneously in its one view all the means and ends" of the universe, and far from being without the knowledge of what it does, is all-knowing as well as all-wise! And this astonishment can only be increased

when we learn that, in spite of the exalted attributes ascribed to the "Unconscious Spirit," yet we can form absolutely no positive conception—hence no approximate, however imperfect, conception—of its internal state, or, in other words, of that which for it takes the place of human consciousness. Only, says our author (as if to tantalize us by taking back, just as we were about to receive it, all that was offered in the term "supra-conscious"), it is absolutely opposed to the conscious mental processes of the human mind. If these things be so, to what end was the long induction? was it necessary to heap up premise on premise of facts experimentally observable, to prove that which is not only not observable, but avowedly inconceivable? What sort of an induction is that which, instead of advancing from the known to the knowledge of the previously unknown, proceeds to the affirmation of that which is not only unknowable, but is also in nature absolutely opposed to the known; the conclusion being thus not only unlike, but absolutely opposed in kind, to the premises? Nay, in spite of all the floundering logical ineptitude of our author, as here disclosed, does not his case show that facts may prove themselves stronger than any preconceived conclusion and force the reasoner to bear witness to the truth? For the "Supra-conscious," to which Hartmann, notwithstanding his assertion of its unknowableness, ascribes such exalted attributes, is indeed that which man and nature not disclose, but to which they point. For the Christian theist may well be content to employ the above term to denote the internal state of that Divine Spirit, "whose thoughts are not as our thoughts." But he will remember that man is made in the image of God, and hence that the mind of man is, after all, an image however faint of the Divine mind. In the scale of animal life there are surely different degrees of "mind," the spirit of man far transcending all the rest. Yet all are akin, the lowest, which is most completely dependent on sense, in some sort imaging, however weakly, and pointing to the highest in the scale, the mind of man, which is least dependent on sense. So the spirit of man points to the Divine Spirit, which, however, it can no more completely comprehend, than can the lowest of animals the human mind. God and His creation are not unrelated, separate from and opposed to each other. They are akin. Were this not so, no argument from the latter, whether direct or indirect, positive or negative, to the former would be possible. Induction, as before affirmed, is only possible, when the unknown, which is to be learned, is in some sense of a piece with the known.

Notwithstanding his admission of the term supra-conscious, which properly signifies that which possesses not merely consciousness, or a bare equivalent for consciousness, but more and better than that, Hartmann employs it as an appellation for his Supreme Being not more than five or six times, and continues to make use of the expression "The Unconscious." This may not be of so much consequence after the explanations that have gone before. Yet this course savours at least of literary error, if not of an intention to deceive, for the word "unconscious" will continue naturally to suggest what it in the first instance and properly denotes; viz. that which, possessing some or all of the conditions of consciousness, is yet not conscious, *i.e.* is less than conscious—a sense far different from that admitted in the use of the term "supra-conscious."

In the chapter on the "Unconscious and the God of Theism," Hartmann repeatedly shows himself under the influence of an error which has unhappily confused the ideas of too many Christian thinkers. It is the error of thinking of the Infinite and Absolute solely under the negative aspect which is suggested by the composition of those terms. Thus "infinite form," we are told (p. 539), is the same as pure formlessness, and "absolute consciousness is identical with the absolutely unconscious." No! the terms infinite and absolute, apart from the meanings which they suggest to sense, express the perfect and the independent. Human consciousness, for example, is finite, *i.e.* restrained by the limitations of sense, and rendered in a thousand different ways ideally incomplete. An infinite or absolute consciousness is simply a perfect one, independent of all checks and limitations. But if infinitude, absence of limitations, means formlessness, then it is easy to see how the God of Hartmann should be, after all, as above indicated, nothing but a vain abstraction, "nothing actual whatever," not a living personal spirit, the true fountain not only of physical, but also of eternal life.

Hartmann regards human consciousness as resting in and supported by "The Unconscious," as, in fact, but a finite manifestation of the Unconscious. The best Greek philosophy, similarly, referred the pure reason in man to the Divine reason. The best thinker among the Apostles of Christianity asserts our inability "to *think* anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God." The most philosophical psychology of to-day (by which I do not mean that which is most purely speculative, much less fanciful, but that which is most comprehensive in its hold upon facts) reaffirms the same view. But this view is in Hartmann's estimation inconsistent with the

theory of a personal and conscious Deity. Were there in God an absolute consciousness, then, in consequence of the above view concerning the relation of the human to the Divine Spirit, we should, he says, necessarily expect the Divine consciousness so to "shine into" the individual consciousness, that "the individual would find himself completely illuminated by the absolute consciousness, and the latter would lie open to his view." But this, says our author, is contrary to experience. This reasoning seems too puerile to receive an answer. No one knows better or emphasizes more expressly, than Hartmann, the fact that the human consciousness is beset at all points with limitations. Being finite, how can it contain the infinite? being imperfect, how can it completely reflect the perfect? The human mind is, indeed, illuminated by the Reason, the Word of God, "which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." The light of the Absolute does shine into it, however faintly, and it catches, as in the far-off distance, glimpses of the "Absolute Consciousness." But the reasons why it does not fully take in, and is not thus practically identical with the latter, are so obvious, that one wonders that any writer should dare expect of his readers sufficient simplicity to be imposed upon by his facile ignoring of them. This is only less wonderful than the attempt to derive the light of human consciousness from the darkness of the unconscious.

Many modern speculators, and among them Hartmann, evince a painful fear lest any other philosophy than what they are pleased to term "Monism" should be received. The principle of the universe must be one, they say, and all things derivable from it. To this Christian idealism heartily assents. But Monism, we are told (p. 541), is utterly incompatible with the assumption of a conscious Deity. Such a being were necessarily a "transcendent God," separate from the world (Dualism), and not an "immanent" one, present in the universe, and related to the latter as substance to manifestation. Further, such a being could not be immanent in the world and in man "without a collision of consciousnesses." It will require but little reflection to meet these difficulties, and I may justly leave the task to the reader. I will only remark that it is, to say the least, interesting to find a metaphysician of Hartmann's pretensions fearing a "collision" between the finite and the infinite, the dependent and the independent, to the detriment of the latter (!); and, further, that the "God of Theism" is at once transcendent and immanent, being omnipresent, though we may rightly prefer, with Saint Paul, to say

that the world is immanent in Him,—“in Him we live and move, and have our being,” “of whom are all things, and we in Him.” God is the principle of the world’s being—the world has its nature from God—“in all things” (we are not afraid to say with Aristotle above) “there is something divine”—there is unity, not only in the nature and order of the universe, but also (be it said with reverence) in the world *and* God. Hartmann’s Monism, on the contrary, is the unity of an abstraction (a “metaphysical essence”) and reality. And the principle of this Monism, the Unconscious, has not the merit of that unity which consists in internal harmony, the merit of self-mastery, of oneness with itself—as is shown by the conflict within it between “will” and “idea,” which is alleged to account for the creation of this (in Hartmann’s view) thoroughly evil world.

This discussion of the Philosophy of the Unconscious has, however, gone already too far. Enough, I trust, has been said to indicate somewhat of its weakness, its absurdities, its contradictions. I will close with a few positive statements of opinions and points of view in regard to this whole subject, which, I think, sound philosophy requires us to maintain and which a true religious faith will heartily accept.

An idea is a living function, not a dead product. It is the function of active mind. Through it, possessing it, mind is said to know. An idea is thus an instrument of knowledge. This its relation to knowledge is essential to the definition, to the very conception of an idea. Its “content” is the real or fancied thing known in and through the idea. Its “form” is, that it is a part of the inward mental state and activity of the knower. Form and content of an idea, in this the primary sense of the term, are inseparable; so are idea and active, living, knowing mind. Through memory an idea seems, but only seems, to become a fixed inert product in, or possession of, the mind. In reality it is not that the idea is lying somewhere at rest in the mind, ready to be looked at and recognized when the owner pleases, but that the conditions necessary to our “having” it, or, more correctly, to our thinking it, are less numerous than they were before the occasion when we first thought it. But the actual reappearance of the idea on the inward scene of our mental activity is really a case of our actively thinking it anew. The original thinking of the idea was a removal of at least one of the original limits of our consciousness. The more ideas one thus has, so much the more are these limits removed. When we speak of ideas put into execution, outwardly realized, or recorded, we use the

word "idea" in a secondary, metaphorical sense. We have no more occasion to ask whether an idea, taken in this sense, is conscious or unconscious, than to inquire whether sound is cold or warm.

"Intelligence" is a synonym for "knowing." It differs among different beings, and in the same being at different times, both in degree and in the nature of what is known. In the lowest case of simple sensation, intelligence, if (as taking the word in its broadest sense, we must) we extend the word to this case, is confined almost exclusively to the feeling experienced. The being here is said to know its feeling, its sensation, without reflecting that it knows it. This is the poorest form of intelligence, but it is not conceivable without some feeble degree—a degree, perhaps, which would be inappreciable for us—of mental light. Man, whose mental life begins at this lowest step in the scale of "intelligence," rapidly ascends to the highest step of which we can have direct knowledge, when along with (*con*) knowing (*scientia*) goes consciousness, the knowing that *he* knows, and, in the last and highest resort, the knowing that *he* knows, or self-consciousness. All these stages must be implicitly contained in the lowest. Only in the highest are they explicitly, and then, even, only imperfectly, developed.

These data are taken from the sphere of "the known," from that which is observed or experienced; and if, as is believed, they are correctly stated, it follows that no intelligence is explicitly unconscious, while even the lowest possesses implicitly, or in germ, the attributes of perfect consciousness. In so far, however, as any "intelligence" can be said to be unconscious, it is only that lowest stage of sensation, which is illustrated in the embryonic mental life of man and in various degrees (through all of which man rapidly passes in the growth of his consciousness) in the different orders of the organic creation inferior to man.

What, more particularly, consciousness positively is, is known, and can be known, only through consciousness. First it exists, and then it asks, What am I? Consciousness reveals itself. It is known to us as a necessary attribute of our intelligence, or what amounts to the same thing, of ourselves as *persons*. For, when we call ourselves "intelligences," or "intelligent beings," we imply more than is expressed in the above literal definition of the word "intelligence." We are aware that knowing is but a part, and by no means the major part, of ourselves as spiritual beings. We not only know, we also act. Intelligence is itself an act or complicated series of actions, and points to a knowing, spiritual agent, of which intelligence is but one of the functions. Further, we are in our action self-possessing

intelligences, agents, who act in virtue of, and guided by, our conscious intelligence. Not only in our intelligence are we living, active agents, but also in our willing and in the concrete or actual realization of our voluntary purposes. Consciousness thus does more than to reveal itself and our ideas, it reveals us as living beings, willing and acting in conformity to our ideas. It discloses to us our inward life as consisting in a series of synthetic acts, of living acts, in which idea (intelligence) and will are, in proportion to the perfection of our spiritual beings, co-operant to an uninterrupted succession of definite ends. And we find these acts to be, not indifferently separable from each other, but indissolubly bound together in an order, which, when once fixed, is indestructible, and by their common relation to the one agent, whose identity throughout the whole series is manifested through consciousness. The latter, in other words, reveals personal identity, the self, the spiritual being. This being does not consist in thoughts, or in other mental functions, whether conscious or unconscious, for these are all acts, effects wrought by the agent-cause, and hence different from the latter. Besides, the identity of the being is continuous, while these functions are discrete, discontinuous. The consciousness of self alone reveals to us in anything like a direct manner what we are. It gives us our ultimate conception of being. From this, as from the known, we *must* proceed in any further inquiries respecting the nature of that which is not ourselves, be it above or below us. It is not claimed that this notion unseals the whole mystery of being. But it is to be maintained that it brings us nearer to the great secret, than any other one which is derivable from the sphere of human observation.

It is the mark, not of the sound logician or of him who follows most closely in his inferences the warrant of fact, but of the illogical and fanciful speculator, to separate facts or ideas from the places which alone they occupy in the grand synthesis of living reality, and to recombine them according to the unwarranted dictates of dogma or caprice. In the only sphere of being open to our direct examination—*i.e.* in the sphere of spiritual being, or, more exactly, of the human self—we find reason, intelligence, emotion, will, not as independent entities, nor as abstractions, but as living functions. Viewed otherwise than as such functions of a self, or personal agent, they lose their character, and can thenceforth only be spoken of figuratively. Thus we may speak of “reason” and “intelligence” abstractly, having in view the general ideas which the terms convey, just as we may, in like manner and with like direction of thought only to the abstract ideas expressed, say “arm,”

“leg.” But just as the real objects which these latter terms denote cannot, except to their destruction, be separated from their organic relation to the body which they serve, so reason, intelligence, will, vanish into nothingness when isolated from their living, functional relation to the personal subject or self which manifests itself and works through them. But self cannot be without consciousness. What sort of a self would that be which did not know itself? The very notion of self is that of an ideal, self-knowing subject or agent. He, then, who separates from their relation to a personal, self-knowing subject, the realities designated by will, reason, and intelligence, and ascribes them, in a form equal or superior to that in which they exist in man, to any other kind of subject, must be pronounced guilty of violating the laws of inductive inference, and of offering arbitrary violence to the facts of existence. The griffin or centaur of the Greek imagination was not more purely fanciful in its nature than is such an “unconscious intelligence.” To expect from it the functions of intelligence would be, as far as we can judge from experimental fact or by logical analogy, not less chimerical than to expect the waggon to start off and run like the horse, when the legs of the latter have been amputated and attached to the former.

Unconscious and unintelligent are practically equivalent terms. We must therefore agree with a writer in *Johnson's Encyclopædia* (New York, 1875, vol. i. p. 1675, *sub voce* “Evolution”), that “unconscious intelligence” is “certainly an unthinkable phrase, a ‘pseudo-idea,’ when proposed as the designation of an active power in nature.” The same may be said of the phrase “unconscious will,” which is but the equivalent, in idealistic phraseology, of the “blind force” of mechanical physics.

The world, according to Christian idealism, is from God, who is a spirit, and not from matter. Not only, therefore, do the conditions of our knowledge and the laws of investigation compel, but the very nature of the case as stated requires, that we proceed from our knowledge of spirit to the explanation of matter and physical force, and not conversely, like the materialists, from a fancied knowledge of the latter to a dogmatic decision as to what the former must be. Matter must be the product of spirit; why should we not say that it is a function of spirit? for certainly spirit is not the function of matter. If the real has its origin and life in the ideal, if “matter” be the product of spirit (the universe, the creation and handiwork of God), how can the former possess a nature wholly opposed to and incommensurate with the latter? No: not to insist upon

the logical contradictions involved in the conception of matter as an inert, substantive entity, and yet making itself known, manifesting itself to man by a power of resistance, which shows it to be not absolutely inert, we may assert that the admission of the conception makes Dualism, or the acknowledgment of the co-eternity of God and matter, well-nigh inevitable: for we may well question whether it is within the compass of omnipotence to create the absolute opposite of itself, any more than it can make two and two equal to five. I for my part prefer to hold that, as God created man in His own spiritual image, and as man is the microcosm, the sum and head of nature (as far as this planet is concerned), so his highest and truest, *i.e.* his spiritual being, represents that which nature, or—let us say it boldly—matter, germinantly is. Atoms, whatever else they may be, have, as I believe, an ideal or spiritual aspect, which is their fundamental and controlling one; and all force is reducible to will-power. This involves the imputation to “atoms of a germ of consciousness.” As compared with man, they are unconscious. But implicitly and germinantly they are conscious. Whatever orderly or intelligent things they, or any other creature inferior to man, may do without the consciousness of self, we have no reason to suppose that they do otherwise than in obedience to a law or laws originating with and enforced by God Himself.

Do we then identify God and the world? By no means. The world has its being in God, but is not God; it is of divine origin and nature, but not of divine essence. God is in principle independent of the world (transcendent), but in fact not separate from it (He is immanent in it, or rather it is immanent in Him); “He is not far from every one of us.” The world, on the other hand, is absolutely dependent on God as the principle or source of its being and of its continuance. The nearest approach in the world to a form of existence in any sense independent of God, is found in finite personalities, which possess a relative freedom of the will, but the perfect use and development of whose freedom consists in complete conformity to the will of God, perceived by the reason and heartily embraced in love.*

God is a perfect, personal spirit. We can have no conception, and we are not justified by the logical laws of scientific

* The continuity, as above defined, of God and the world is impressively illustrated for Christian philosophy in the central figure of Christianity, Jesus Christ, who is, on the one hand, the Son of Man, the very principle of our humanity and of the world's existence, and, on the other, the Son of God, “in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.”

inquiry in attempting to form one of a spirit which is not a self, a person. As such God was declared to the ancient Hebrews, to whom He was designated as the "I [personally] am," and not as the "It [impersonally] is." (Note that the expression "I am" is more comprehensive than "I think" or "I will." It implies all the attributes—including the ethical ones which "the Unconscious" of Hartmann does not possess—which belong to an intrinsically and morally perfect personality.) The human personality is but "a weak imitation" of the Divine personality. The former is limited by its dependence on sensible conditions and strengthened by its relation to God. The latter is independent of limiting conditions, and loses none of its absoluteness by the relations into which its perfect love leads it voluntarily to enter with the universe it has created. The former is not an original possession, but a gift from the Father of all spirits: "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?" The latter is the eternal and most essential attribute of the Supreme Being.

We devoutly, and no less philosophically, ascribe all things to God. Yet how few of us, when it comes to definite explanation, do not shrink from recognizing and proclaiming the divine agency, and dwell the rather on secondary causes! Nay, if God exists, we must not be afraid—reverently be it spoken—to make use of Him as a principle. He is the principle of principles. God's part in the universe is the only one worth thinking of. If others, with an unhealthy feeling of the world's wretchedness, allow their sense of the world's harmony and divine government to be obscured by the perception of those minor dissonances which, as in a grand symphony, do but swell the glory of the whole, and will hence have no personal God, let us, on the other hand, have no morbid fear of taking God's part. Let us not only, as in love and duty bound, ascribe to God all glory, but also, as reason and the results of true scientific investigation of fact imperatively direct, all power, an omnipresent agency as well among the mean as among the great things of the universe; "that God may be all in all."

The CHAIRMAN (REV. R. THORNTON, D.D., V.P.).—I am sure we must all feel deeply grateful to Professor Morris for his very able and profound paper, and we are also much indebted to Mr. Gorman for the admirable way in which he has read it. I would point out the especial value of the paper. The tendency of modern infidelity is to obliterate the personality of God. That is a direction in which all scepticism has been for a long time drifting. Of course the evidence of God's power and knowledge and

wisdom in the world, and the material universe before us, is such that if a person attempt to deny the personality of God, he is met at once by an appeal to the proofs of His eternal power and Godhead, invisible things from the creation of the world being clearly understood by the things seen. The fiction by which a personal God is got rid of is this: There is a force, we argue, which may be considered as the cause of all the phenomena around us: it is an intelligent force, too, because you cannot understand that a blind force should have brought into being the beautiful and orderly universe of which we are cognizant. But here the subtle sceptic comes in and says: "Yes, I grant it is an intelligent force, but it is an unconscious force": he eliminates the fact of consciousness. The paper has very well explained that "unconscious intelligence" is in fact a self-contradictory expression. Personality, like personal identity—as I long ago learned from my Bishop Butler—is consciousness, and consciousness is personality. The two are only different forms of the same thing. If, therefore, you eliminate consciousness, you get rid of personality, and if you eliminate personality, you get rid of consciousness; so that, in spite of the universe we see about us, we are, through this sceptical artifice, reduced to the necessity of either having no object of worship at all, or else of setting up a sort of ideal of our own, which would be represented by *nihil ex nihilo*. This is the difficulty we are reduced to by the course of sceptical argument at this time; therefore I think a paper of this kind of extreme value to this Institute, because it does very logically show the impossibility of maintaining the separation of consciousness from intelligence. If we have an intelligent First Cause or Force, there must be consciousness with that intelligence, and, as a necessary consequence, there must be personality.

Dr. IRONS.—I think, sir, we are all indebted to Professor Morris for introducing to our Institute this important subject. A great deal more of the same kind will be wanted. We must remember that this theory of an unconscious intelligence at the head of the universe is now agitating all the mind of Germany. We must not try to persuade ourselves that a theory, which has occupied an intelligent nation persistently for the last twenty years, is one in which there is absolutely nothing worthy of consideration. We should be only exposing ourselves if we were to cast such an imputation on the general action of the human mind on any subject. The present paper, however, contains some expressions which I am afraid some English readers will find it difficult to appreciate, especially as we have not been much accustomed in this country to the study of metaphysics. In Germany, on the other hand, this study is almost natural to them. In England we have even difficulty in getting the least attention paid to mental science. I am grateful to think that such an assembly as this has been able to listen so carefully

and intelligently to what has been read in so clear a way, and yet is in itself so hard. The doctrine then with which the paper deals is probably new to a large number of people in this country. It ought not to be so, because it is a most important doctrine. It reminds us, that there is a large variety of mental operations which go on, like the circulation of the blood in our veins, without our will and almost without our knowledge, and it is out of the contemplation of these operations, approached from a metaphysical and not from a scientific point of view, that this theory of unconscious intelligence at the head of the universe would seem to have taken its origin. Let me put the subject in a simple form.

Whoever begins to think at all, tries to compare his thinking with something external to himself. Every operation of the mind of an intelligent being ought to be rightly conducted; and we aim therefore to compare our thoughts more or less consciously with something outside of ourselves which we take to be right. If it were a mere lesson, we should compare our thinking about that lesson with what had been put to us by the teacher or the book we had been studying; but if the subject were something more than a lesson learned by rote—if it engaged the actual operation of our own mind, of its own force—then we see at once that unless we set up every one an independent authority on every subject for himself, there arises a necessity for some standard external to the individual, with which he shall compare his thinking. Such external or abstract truth is that “absolute,” as philosophers call it, which exists always. In a treatise which I had the honour of reading here as a sort of foundation some years ago, I pointed out that this was the antecedent of all philosophical recognition of truth—viz. there is something absolutely certain, apart from ourselves. But, if eternal reason, necessary truth, the really good, with which we try to compare our own thinking and actions, be indeed absolute, then the first thought of the inquirer might be, “wherein does this ‘absolute’ reside?” I endeavoured to show (as I said in my *Final Causes*) that eternal truth ultimately implied an eternal mind. For although unconscious intelligence may be predicated very truly as to the inferior and almost instinctive operations of an intelligence, it cannot be the ultimate source of all the truths which enter into all the thinking in the universe. There must be some being ultimately in which the absolute is formally found. Just as we say, “if there always had been nothing, there never would have been a universe”; so we know from the fact that there is a universe, and that we are beings in it, that something always has been. No one rejects the proposition, that because something is, something always has been. In the same way, the existence of consciousness proves that consciousness of some kind always has been. We cannot suppose a distinct consciousness anyhow to have arisen out of unconsciousness; as surely as we cannot suppose the uni-

verse itself to have arisen out of universal nothing. This obliges us, then in the last resort, to believe that absolute truths belong to a Necessary Being, and the eternal consciousness of the world to God himself—*i.e.* a conscious Being with whom is absolute goodness, absolute wisdom, absolute power, absolute truth, and so on. Thus much, then, for our philosophical foundation.

But, with respect to the sphere of unconscious intelligence, perhaps it may assist the discussion to make a few remarks. Almost every one is aware that a great proportion of his thinking goes on, as we said, from mere habit. We do not elaborate every process of thought on every occasion, after we have once arrived at the use of our inner power. Our mental action really is, to a large extent, as habitual as our bodily action, and it is only when we come to any *crux* in our mental action that we exert ourselves to compare what we are doing with an external truth. Let us, then, attain knowledge of any number whatever of ordinary processes, and we shall but arrive at the conclusions of habitual reason, and not reach the higher movement of that active reason which is consciousness. I hope I am intelligible on this point, because, although the subject is a difficult one, there is no reason why we should speak of it in difficult words, and I am trying to use the easiest, but at the same time, if possible, correct words. Unconscious reason is, thus, I say, impossible only in the ultimate resort. In our minds, as well as in our bodies, we are partly creatures of habit, and habit in the mind is unconscious reason. Our author, then, has wisely called attention to this part of a great subject.

We are indebted to Professor Morris not only (as I said) for bringing this subject forward, but also for the brief historical sketch he has given us; with which, however, I should be, nevertheless, obliged to find some fault, if there were time. It seems an ungrateful thing to do, but I find the statement of the author as to the theory of Descartes is scarcely such as I understand to be Descartes' view. Of the three forms of idealism, one of which only the author has referred to, all three recognize the reality of intelligence. I mean by the three forms of idealism, that of Kant, that of Berkeley, and that of Descartes. They all recognize the intelligent being as really existing, and they all of them hesitate to speak of the outer world, matter, or substance, as it is put in this paper. Kant considers the outer world, the phenomenal world, as non-existent, but as a sign of something existing beyond itself. This is the critical idealism of Kant; but the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley was of another kind. He said the whole universe of things consisted only of two classes—the perceiving beings and the perceived. For my own part, speaking as a Berkeleyan, I think that this is as simple a way of putting a great truth as we could well find. His view of the outer world was, that it was nothing but a series of phenomena upheld by the power of God,—constantly sustained, however,

whether in known action or perhaps in suspension. The sceptical idealism of Descartes seemed to leave no foundation at all, not even in the Divine will, for an external world. It reduced the outer world, practically, to a kind of phantasmagoria. Now we are bound, in these days, to make up our minds (even, for the sake of our own theology, if for nothing more) on this question of where we place God and His action in this world, and say whether we adopt one or the other of these three ideal philosophies; because we must come to some conclusion on the point. Even scientific men have arrived now pretty generally at the conviction, that the mechanical universe—the physical universe—has not, within itself, the power of its own activities. Originating force cannot be detected within the physical universe. They must come to this question of force at last. The question, perhaps, next before us is, whence, or how frequently, and in what manner, does force act? Is there but one force now setting everything in motion,—all the molecules, all the atoms, and so on?—or is every force—every minor force, every molecule, and every atom—endowed primarily with some unknown faculty, such as the paper tells us Leibnitz would have called a monad? or if monads are endowed with separate powers and faculties, are we to conclude that they are always acting, each in its own way, unconsciously or consciously? If they are unconscious forces, just doing the business for which the Creator first made them, are they constructed in infinitely various ways as a part of the fabric of the outer world?—or, are they all alike? Are they atoms of various kinds, or when set in motion have they any variety of action?—These are important questions affecting the character of phenomena, because some theories would represent God as close behind every atom and acting upon it every moment throughout space. Cudworth, it is said, opposes the notion, and, although Professor Morris does not say so, it is clear to me that that is not a worthy view to take of the action of God on the universe. Into the character of these atoms, and, perhaps, monads, our scientific men are now very earnestly and praiseworthy examining. Let us wish them all success; but while they are engaged in this analysis, let us ask them on their part to look with a little more respect on those who are engaged in the really higher work of the philosophy of this whole subject. (Hear, hear.) We are thankful to them for their prior, but inferior work. It is most useful; but we are anxious that they should know that there are thinkers as well as themselves, who will at length have justice done to the larger questions involved. We must not be content to be even with them, mere collectors of the dry facts of the universe, but should be anxious to understand them and put them together; and then give praise to Him who is the ultimate Author and Doer of Creation. (Hear, hear.)

One word as to the method of the writer of this paper. He sets out with the principle that we ought to proceed "from the known to the unknown" (p. 5th from end), and then asserts, that as we know ourselves, we must

proceed "from our knowledge of spirit to the explanation of matter and physical force" (p. 3rd from end). I am afraid there is something like a *petitio principii* here; for surely it cannot be said that we do "know ourselves" in the full sense that would be requisite to support such deduction. If we had Divine knowledge, such as must appertain to the Supreme, no doubt this knowledge would be absolute, enabling us to comprehend both spirit and matter. But surely it is far different. We have not the slightest conception of the mode in which our determinations or will in our inmost spiritual being affect the material organization of our bodies; nor do we know in what manner the perturbations which arise from the bodily structure affect the well-being of our very selves, *i.e.* our most intimate spiritual "Ego"; for a knowledge, *e.g.* of the properties of matter, albeit superficial, and by no means merely derived from inner consciousness, will often enable the physician to restore serenity even to the mind. I therefore fail to perceive that we have any power to proceed from our present knowledge of spirit (which knowledge is only most imperfect, and not absolute) to the knowledge of matter and physical force, which we only accept as fact. We do *not* always proceed in the author's sense *ab cognito ad incognitum*. At the last page but one I cannot follow the Professor's argument, nor understand how "matter manifests itself to man by a power of resistance, which shows it to be not absolutely inert." I never myself had any experience of such a power of *active* resistance in matter. The ink (to take an instance suggested) flows from my pen without any but accidental resistance. Indeed, it appears to me to be just such "*an inert substantive entity*" as seems to our author (same page) to involve in the conception of it a logical contradiction.—(I only wish the printers could put types together with as simple a submission to one's will!) I cannot understand how a professor of such large acquirements could indite such a sentence as the following:—"Atoms, whatever else they may be, have (as I believe) an *ideal or spiritual aspect*, which is their fundamental and controlling one, and all force is reducible to will-power. This involves the imputation to atoms of a germ of consciousness" (same page). Such a statement is utterly subversive of all chemical knowledge—knowledge which, up to a certain point, as I have observed, is unquestionable. We know certainly how atoms will act, what powers of attraction and repulsion they will exert under certain circumstances, and that with unerring certainty, and without the shadow of possibility of any choice on their part. There never is, nor can be, anything abnormal in the play of chemical affinities; but as soon as we get to *life* we have immediately and everywhere abnormal developments, explain them as we may. Moreover, wherever there is *a being who can will*, there is also possibility of error, and the choice of that which is not for the best. This is essential to free agency; and if it is *not* free, there is no willing at all, but fate. To will (whether it be attributed to "atoms" or men, or even higher

beings), can only be depended upon to choose always the right, when in some way identified with the nature of the only One who is Good, that is God Himself.—With these criticisms, I leave to others the more grateful task of appreciating and acknowledging all that is excellent in the very able paper now read.

Rev. W. H. HECKLER.—May I be allowed to bear my humble testimony to one statement made in this paper?—"Hence the lament amongst the more soberminded Germans at Hartmann's popularity, as at a sign of widespread degeneracy in the logical thought of Germany." In 1874 the 6th edition of Hartmann's book appeared. The stir caused by it in Germany was extraordinary. In conversing at that time with many professors of German universities, I found some considered that it was really a wonderful work, whilst others were of opinion that it was disgraceful; and I cannot help mentioning a remark made by a young friend of mine at Heidelberg. We were talking about the difficulty experienced by young German students in carrying on their studies. He said, "If I wanted to make money, I should write a book on the greatest absurdities I could think of, and it would be bought by every German." Now, I cannot help thinking that Hartmann has succeeded to a certain extent in carrying out my young friend's idea. It has been said to-night that the English mind ought to be better educated in reference to these philosophical questions. How is it that the Germans, as a rule, are all more or less well acquainted with these subjects? Whenever they meet with a book or paper on matters of this kind, they take it up, read it, and thoroughly digest it in their own minds. That is because their minds are early led to take a delight in the study of philosophical questions. I only wish that this paper, and others on similar questions, could be translated and sent over to Germany and circulated in large numbers, because the Germans, as a rule, would read them. I have often heard it said why the English people do not care to think, and that that is the reason that they do not take up these subjects; but this can scarcely be said of the better-informed, who, when they take them up, do so in a thoroughly practical manner. I congratulate the Society on Professor Morris's paper.

Rev. W. M. SINCLAIR.—When any one comes to a conclusion which is repugnant to our reason, we usually take the first opportunity of finding out the logical fallacy inherent in his argument. The logical fallacy committed by Hartmann lies in the use he makes of the word "monad." What he and his school pretend to say is, that the idea was originally in the atom; but what they mean to say is something quite different—that it was not there at all—that originally the whole was blind, and that it gathers its intelligence as it goes along—as it develops itself—one particle acting upon another, and thus creating harmony, unity, and completeness. Thus, by combining these two separate logical ideas, they deceive us into

the supposition that they are singularly logical. They look from their own standpoint, with all their experience at their disposal, and then they tell us that all this has had a blind beginning. It is as if a person looking at St. Paul's should fancy that it began to be constructed at the top, and was gradually built downwards to the foundation.

The meeting was then adjourned.

PROFESSOR MORRIS'S REPLY.

THERE is scarcely occasion for me to add anything to the foregoing discussion, except to express my grateful appreciation of the courteous reception accorded to my paper. I will simply offer a few remarks on one or two points raised in the course of the discussion.

The phraseology of metaphysical discussion is of necessity in a measure technical. It would be as unfair to demand that its terms should all be familiar to every one, as to require that (for example) Prof. Huxley, as a zoologist, should in a scientific discussion avoid the use of technical terms unfamiliar to those who have no knowledge of zoology, or that the chemist should abandon his exact terminology, and employ instead inexact circumlocutions or periphrases, which should involve only words included in the vocabulary of the romancer or journalist. I think it would not be difficult to show that one reason why England has not become a greater power in philosophy lies in the attempt of many of her best thinkers, from Locke's time till to-day, to gain in popular intelligibility at the expense of scientific accuracy. Philosophical investigation, properly carried on, is serious work, and not for mere display or for popular entertainment, and those who would engage in it must not shirk the labour of mastering the ideas which it involves, and the technical words which exactly express those ideas. Thus much, not in my own defence, but for the correction of the impatient prejudice which all of us, perhaps, at times feel against metaphysical discussions carried on in the language of metaphysics. On the other hand, it must be admitted as extremely desirable that fundamental truth in philosophy should be presented in as simple a garb as possible, on account of the all-important bearing of such truth not only upon opinion, but also upon life and conduct. He who, having the truth at heart, errs through needless obscurity in the presentation of it, will be thankful for any admonition or suggestion that may tend to the correction of his error, and will seek to profit thereby.

I am criticised by one of the speakers for inaccuracy in my representation of the views of Descartes. As far, however, as I can judge from the few remarks offered in support of the criticism, my fault must consist rather in the

incompleteness, than in the incorrectness of my account. It would consist in my omission to state that Descartes "seemed to leave no foundation at all, not even in the Divine will, for an external world," and that his "sceptical idealism" "reduced the outer world, practically, to a kind of phantasmagoria." Certainly, if my critic corrects me, it is in the phrases just quoted that he does it, for they contain all that he says on the subject. But in them he is manifestly expressing his own opinion as to the logical consequence of Descartes' view, and not the view of Descartes himself. Moreover, this opinion, it appears to me, might be based on my own account of the doctrine of Descartes. Since writing the paper under discussion, I have had occasion carefully to study the works of Descartes, and to prepare an exposition of his exact teaching. On comparing my statement in this paper with the independent results of the study referred to, I do not find any positive incorrectness in the former. I regret all the more that my critic, after intimating that my statement "as to the theory of Descartes" was at least not in agreement with what he "understood to be Descartes' view," did not state explicitly the point in which he supposed me to be in error.

I have not stated that, in following the method which proceeds from the known to the unknown, we proceed from a complete comprehension of spirit to a similar comprehension of matter. I maintained, and still maintain, that what knowledge we possess of spirit is more original and absolute than any fancied knowledge which we may seem to have of matter, however incomplete the former may be; and, further, that our ideas concerning matter are hypothetical (as every philosophical scientist admits), and must be framed, in as far as we attribute to matter any substantive existence at all, after the analogy (near or remote) of that which we directly know of ourselves as spiritual entities. In this I differ from Descartes, and avoid what I conceive, and have in my paper indicated to be, a dangerous error of his. I agree, on the other hand, in so far with Leibnitz and the greater number of philosophical idealists known to history, whether pagan or Christian. My critic seems to agree with Descartes in virtually admitting "as fact" (apparently inexplicable), the existence of really inert matter and blind force. Absolutely inert matter would be a substance which does nothing, which has no power; hence no power of resistance (such as is universally ascribed to matter—and it makes no difference whether you call this resistance "active" or passive), and which therefore manifests itself to us by no impression made by it upon ourselves. Such a conception I call logically absurd, because (among other reasons) it is in contradiction with the universal conditions of knowledge. From the point of view of positive science it is also false, since science knows nothing of matter apart from force. To prove, on the other hand, the irrationality of the conception of blind force (which conception my critic seems to admit), I can advance no arguments which are not virtually contained in the two papers which I have had the honour to present to the Victoria Institute. How the force called "chemical" is related to conscious will, I cannot exactly state. I maintain only that an exhaustive and exact analysis must

end by tracing it back to the intelligent will and power of a personal God. If the Divine agency, "invariable and without shadow of turning," is not incompatible with the so-called rigorous necessity of natural laws, I cannot see that my hypothesis is "subversive of chemical laws." If experience proves, as my critic admits, that unconscious ideality (an impersonal ideal nature) is possible, and that it acts with the wise and unerring certainty of fixed and divinely-given law, then there is nothing absurd in the attribution to atoms (chemically or otherwise considered) of an "ideal or spiritual aspect," as their fundamental and characteristic one. But I would not, from this impersonal though ideal quality of "force" and "matter," argue, like Hartmann, that God is impersonal. On the contrary, I cannot account for the less but by reference to the greater. The "unconscious" implies the conscious, from which it derives its own inferior nature, and receives the law of its action and being. Nor would I, as my critic virtually does, argue on the same ground, that force and matter are utterly unideal, and have nothing to do with spirit. For this would be at best but a guess, and seems to me opposed to all true principles of reasoning. Had my accomplished and indulgent critic paid attention to the distinction enforced by me in a previous paper* (on Final Cause) between real knowledge (of being) and phenomenal knowledge (scientific knowledge of co-existences and sequences), perhaps he would have judged my views less adversely, seeing that no argument from the latter (phenomenal knowledge) can overthrow the former. Our "chemical knowledge," it is quite true, is "up to a certain point," "unquestionable." But it is so only within the limits which circumscribe all *phenomenal* knowledge. It is "unquestionable" in all that it affirms concerning the appearances of things and the *laws* of their action, in as far as these laws are open to *sensible* observation. But it quits its proper sphere, and is absolutely valueless, when it is made the principal or only basis of inferences concerning the intrinsic nature of things. I consider my position the only tenable one for those who would not be landed in, what I deem, the inherent absurdities of a doctrine of universal mechanism. It is also the only one which, in my judgment, rests on a basis of anything like solid reasoning, whether deductive or inductive. The doctrine of the primacy of spirit over "matter," in the order and in the substance of human knowledge; and the other doctrine, that all created things bear the impress of the spiritual nature of the Creator, and in some degree, no matter how faint, by their own intrinsic essence, bear witness to that nature; these doctrines I hold to be fundamentally true, and of the highest consequence in any philosophy of theism. I must therefore stoutly protest against any tendency to make concessions to the dilettante, mechanistic philosophers of our day, by admitting that the knowledge of which positive Science boasts, is or can be primary, and that its mechanical conceptions and methods are to be accepted as fundamental and axiomatic in all philosophical inquiries. It is not that mechanism is false, or

* Vol. ix. page 176.

that, rightly understood, it is not the law of the whole created universe ; but rather that its principles are derivative and subordinate to a higher law of intelligence, by which latter mechanism is to be explained, and not intelligence by mechanism. In my reply to the discussion upon a previous paper (*Journal of Transactions*, vol. ix. p. 203) I expressed myself as follows :—"The error of scientific men too generally is, that they identify the results of their investigations in the region of the phenomenal with knowledge of the real. All positive science which is duly confirmed by observation, comparison, and experiment, is to be accepted as true. But this true science of the phenomenal is not to be confounded with science of the truly real, or of the true cause, the underlying truth of the real." I repeat these words as conveying a lesson suggested by the present discussion. I would only add a reference to Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, xi. 6, 12, where a wholesome warning is expressed against seeking in the reports of our sensible experience a criticism of ontological truth. Stripped of the local colouring which they receive from the *idola* of Aristotle's pagan mind, the words of this master contain a truth at once old and new, and worthy never to be forgotten.

I would, finally, more expressly call attention to two points indirectly implied in my foregoing remarks. First, that I do not say that all force is directly identical with conscious will. When I say that it is "reducible" to conscious will, I mean that it is derivable from it, and that in some way (however unintelligible to us) both it and "matter," in which it is said to reside, partake in some one or more of the attributes of ideal or spiritual existence. I do not identify the world with God. With the utmost strength of rational conviction, I acknowledge the unique divinity of the personal God of Christianity. But I would make the world in some sense His child, rather than a dead product of His creative power, utterly unrelated to the Creator. The other point is, that the alternative is by no means between variable "will" and "fate." A good will is invariable, and such surely is the will of God, which can show no change in that part of its government where unchangeableness is better—namely, in the government of the inorganic universe. For the ascription to atoms of an "ideal or spiritual aspect" does not imply that they are conscious personalities, capable of independent volition. Their whole action is, in the words of my paper, "in obedience to . . . laws originating with and enforced by God himself." Their action is, therefore, the expression of God's will, but not on this account subject to variation, nor (on the other hand) ascribable to "fate."

I now dismiss the subject with one supplementary bibliographical reference to St. George Mivart's *Contemporary Evolution*, in the first chapter of which some interesting facts are pointed out concerning the substitution, in certain directions of English thought, of the idea of "unconscious intelligence" for that idea of personal intelligence which is essential to all Theism.