

Caelius Aurelianus the Numidian physician writes *de iis tussiculis quae aliarum fuerint appendices passionum* Chronics ii 8, 114), and elsewhere he enquires whether certain things *passionibus fuerint appendicia*. These passages should I think be added to illustrate Dr Hort's argument.

Caelius Aurelianus came from Sicca in Numidia and is thought to have flourished in the 5th century, which (so far as it goes) supports Prof. Souter's theory that the Latin translation of Irenaeus is African and not particularly early.

F. C. B.

ST LUKE'S PREFACE; ἀσφάλεια AND παρακολουθεῖν.

THE 'Notes on St Luke's Preface' by Mr F. H. Colson, in the April number of this JOURNAL, are an interesting and valuable contribution to the discussion of this important section of St Luke's Gospel. Especially happy is his apt use of the famous preface of Livy, which states as neatly as possible two of the general aims that must likewise have animated the evangelist—(1) to produce a more trustworthy account of the events narrated, and (2) to improve on the literary form of his predecessors. Whether, in the selection and arrangement of his material and in the emphasis with which he directs attention to one or another aspect of the facts, St Luke was guided by further purposes, must in his case, as in that of Livy himself, be discovered by study of the whole narrative which follows the Preface.

Two points occur in Mr Colson's article which seem to me to permit additional discussion, in one case partly because of his reference to an article of my own.¹

I

Of the last clause of the Preface (ἵνα ἐπιγνῶς περὶ ὧν κατηχήθης λόγων τὴν ἀσφάλειαν) two interpretations have been defended. (1) The view more current in the commentaries is clearly stated by Plummer: 'Theophilus shall know that the faith which he has embraced has an impregnable historical foundation.' Under this view ἐπιγνῶναι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν is taken to mean 'know the sureness and certainty' of the facts or doctrines in question. St Luke's aim, then, is not to state these facts or doctrines, but to prove them. (2) Under the opposing view ἐπιγνῶναι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν is interpreted by the aid of Acts xxi 34, xxii 30 (γινῶναι τὸ ἀσφαλές; cf. Acts xxv 26) as meaning 'gain sure and certain knowledge', and St Luke's announcement of his aim will then refer only to an adequate statement of the facts or doctrines, not to any purpose of proving, by argument or otherwise, how certain they are.

¹ That Mr Colson refers to me as 'Prof. A. R. Ropes' gives me pleasure, for it is an unexpected testimony to the versatility of 'Adrian Ross'.

The latter of these two views seems to me to be commended by the analogy of the parallel expressions found in Acts. The phrase with the neuter adjective belonged to a plain sort of language, as the papyrus letters cited by Professor Cadbury shew, while the more formal (and rhythmical¹) τὴν ἀσφάλειαν was obviously better suited to the formal style of the Preface. And even apart from a certain reflective and modern attitude which seems to me to lurk in the former of the two interpretations, the second interpretation is simpler and yields a better sense. To say, 'I have written an accurate history in order that you may know that what you have already been told is correct', is, to my thinking, rather lame, and a far less natural close to the paragraph than, 'I have written an accurate history in order that you may have secure knowledge of the things about which you have been told.'²

But Mr Colson interposes that τὴν ἀσφάλειαν is an abstract noun, not equivalent to the concrete τὸ ἀσφαλές; he seems to hold that its proper sense is 'the quality of certainty'. If this is so, the former of the two interpretations is the only possible one.

Now nearly all Greek abstract nouns are capable of being used in some concrete sense. This hardly needs to be illustrated. The Greeks were not careful—even less careful perhaps than we are—to restrict the use of an abstract to the exact sense of a 'property', an 'action', or a 'state'. This is the case with ἀσφάλεια, as Mr Colson in part admits. He cites the senses of a 'military shelter' (that is, 'a place of security'), the 'bar' of a lock, a written 'guarantee', or 'safe-conduct'; and to these may be added 'safeguard' (Josephus *Ant.* iii 7. 5), 'way of safety', 'door of safety' (Thuc. vi 59. 2), 'secure structure' (Epict. ii 15. 8 ἐπικοδομεῖν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν), 'secure method' of reasoning (Xen. *Mem.* iv 6. 15 ἀσφάλειαν λόγου)—instances of a somewhat different nature but all of them concrete, as the full context in each case makes clear. Certainly nothing in the known *usus loquendi* distinguishes ἀσφάλεια from other abstract nouns, or tends to shew that it was limited to a strictly abstract meaning. There is no reason for assuming that it cannot be used with the same freedom as nouns of analogous meaning; and of such analogies there is no lack.

¹ Here, as elsewhere in this Note, I have used without specific acknowledgement the suggestions as well as the material offered by my colleague Professor H. J. Cadbury in *The Beginnings of Christianity* vol. ii pp. 489-510, and in his two articles on the Preface in the *Expositor* for June 1921, and December 1922. The latter of these articles, in which a large amount of fresh information is brought to bear on the problem, was doubtless not yet in Mr Colson's hands when his Notes were written.

² From the imitation of Lk. i 4 in Eusebius *Ecl. proph.* i 1 (Migne, vol. xxii) it is not possible to tell which of these two interpretations Eusebius gave to the passage in Luke.

'*Ἀλήθεια*, as Mr Colson allows, means, even when it stands by itself, 'the thing that is true'. *Πιθανότης* often means not 'persuasiveness', but an 'argument' which is persuasive; *πίστις* not 'trustworthiness', but a trustworthy 'proof'. Philo *Quis rerum div. heres* 60 (M. i 517) *ἐὰν δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ψευδεῖς πιθανότητες διελεγχθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν πίστειων*, 'if all the false plausible arguments be refuted by genuine proofs', combines these two words in one sentence. But in other instances the nouns owe their peculiar meaning, as does *ἀσφάλεια* in the case under discussion, to the character of the phrase in which they are used. Thus, *ἀκρίβεια* in Acts xxii 3 (*κατὰ ἀκρίβειαν τοῦ πατρῶου νόμου*) means 'exactitude' in the sense of 'exact observance', not 'the quality of exactness', and derives the application to 'observance' from the implication of the word *πεπαιδευμένος* which governs the phrase in which *ἀκρίβεια* is found. And closer still are cases where the abstract noun is the object of a verb meaning 'know' or 'learn'. In 1 Cor. xiii 2 we have *εἶδέναι πᾶσαν τὴν γνῶσιν*, where *τὴν γνῶσιν* means virtually *τὸ γνωστόν*; and an even more striking parallel is to be found in Antiphon *Orat.* i 13 (p. 112. 43 f), where, with reference to certain accused persons who had refused to produce their slaves for torture, it is said: *ἔφευγον τῶν πραχθέντων τὴν σαφήνειαν πυθέσθαι* (in Liddell and Scott's felicitous rendering 'to learn the plain truth').

This last case with *σαφήνεια* 'clarity' seems to go on all fours with Lk. i 4. To 'learn clarity', in the sense of 'gain clear knowledge', and to 'know certitude', in the sense of 'gain certain knowledge', seem completely parallel. It need not be said that 'ἡ ἀσφάλεια is the same as *τὸ ἀσφαλές*'; the point is that if the 'certitude' intended is that of the person who is to know, not the objective 'certitude' of the facts or doctrines, then the phrase *ἐπιγνῶναι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν* will mean about the same thing as *γνῶναι τὸ ἀσφαλές*, although the instruments of expression in the two phrases are somewhat different.

Of course in the phrase as thus understood, and the closely similar one with *σαφήνεια*, the accusative is not that of 'direct (external) object' but of 'internal object', which, as Goodwin remarks (*Greek Grammar*, § 159), is far more extensively used in Greek than in English. That the nature of this accusative has not generally been perceived by students may be due to the fact that they have ordinarily translated *τὴν ἀσφάλειαν* by 'the certainty', *die Gewissheit*, and then interpreted the rendering in the modern language in a manner dictated by the presence of the modern article.

In conclusion it may be worth while to refer to a passage Wisd. xviii 6, which does not seem to have been much used for illustration by the commentators on Luke. Here *ἀσφαλῶς εἰδότες* is an even plainer method of expressing the same idea, and makes a third in the series

of what seem to me virtually synonymous phrases. And it is an excellent illustration of how the mind of a Greek, when he associated 'security' with 'knowing', naturally turned to the security of the knowledge itself, rather than to that of something else which was in some way related to the knowledge.

II

Of wider bearing, but capable of briefer statement, is the other point. It seems worth emphasizing although it is not in all respects novel. Mr Colson is repelled, as most of us have been in the past, by the suggestion not infrequently made hitherto and now pressed home with great force by Professor Cadbury, especially in his later article in the *Expositor*, December 1922, that the word παρακολουθηκότι, Lk. i 3, is a claim on the author's part to having participated as an eye-witness in the events of his narrative. It is, in fact, hard to escape the force of the philological argument. Παρακολουθεῖν can hardly mean 'trace the course of' (R.V.), 'follow up', 'investigate'. A.V. 'have understanding of' is nearer, for the usage shews that the word, when it does not mean strictly 'follow', means 'have close contact with', and is often emphatically used to refer to the close contact of an eyewitness, or participator. This would be impossible (unless the claim were fraudulent) in the case of the Gospel of Luke, and an almost insuperable difficulty seems to arise.

Before entering on this question, however, we must turn to a difficulty in the Book of Acts which has rightly perplexed students, namely, that caused by the abrupt manner in which the 'we-sections' are introduced without warning or preface. Whether they were intended by the author to be understood as drawn from his own knowledge or as quotations from some one else's diary, the abruptness is equally inexplicable in a skilful writer who is conspicuous for the elaborate care with which he always introduces to the reader every successive personage of the narrative. With this purpose in view the names of the Apostles are repeated in Acts i 13; Barnabas, Ananias and Sapphira, Gamaliel, Stephen, Philip, Saul, Simon Magus, the eunuch of Ethiopia, Ananias of Damascus, Aeneas, Dorcas, Cornelius, Agabus (in his case, indeed, twice), Mark—to enumerate only some of the instances—all are given suitable introduction, so that the narrative moves on smoothly and without annoyance to the reader from meeting suddenly and without previous explanation an unknown and unexpected person in the story. Even James (Acts xii 17), who might seem to receive mention without due circumstance, has in reality been properly announced by the mention of the brethren of the Lord at the outset (i 14). The only striking exception is the 'we' of the famous sections. It is evident

that the analogy of formless works like the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah, or of a clumsy compilation like the history of Diodorus Siculus, furnishes no helpful parallel to this abruptness.

These two difficulties, both of them real and pressing, seem to me to be completely removed, for those who hold that the author of Luke and Acts was a companion of St Paul, by the observation that the Preface of St Luke is on every account to be taken as the preface to the whole work in two *logoi*, not to the Gospel alone. The writer of the preface had a perfect right to claim that for a long time back (*ἄνωθεν*) he had been a participator in these great events. That he writes *πρὸς* is no more than to say that he has stood near the centre of things, and is at the most a pardonable exaggeration. No one would suppose that he meant it with absolute literalness. 'A close relation to everything' he certainly had had in the considerable and intensely important period which his own knowledge covered, and this period he justly describes as 'for a long time back'—for, as Professor Cadbury says in his second article, that is the meaning of *ἄνωθεν*, not 'from the first' (as if he had said *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*).

It thus appears that this well-attested meaning for *παρακολουθεῖν*, together with the meaning proper to *ἄνωθεν*, give exactly what is needed to explain an otherwise inexplicable fact in the literary procedure of the accomplished writer of the first Christian history.

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MARK XI 27 AND PARALLELS.

IN the April number of the JOURNAL (vol. xxiv p. 317) Mr Cheetham says: 'For the method of countering an unreasonable demand by requiring a condition unlikely to be fulfilled by the opponent, we may compare our Lord's reply to the question in St Mark xi 27 and parallels: "By what authority doest thou these things and who gave thee this authority?" He answers by putting another question: "The baptism of John, was it from heaven, or from men?" which they cannot answer. Both these cases are instances of "answering a fool according to his folly".'

I have nothing to say as to Mr Cheetham's other instance (John ii 19). But to my mind this view of Mark xi 27 (which I suppose represents the ordinary belief) is very repulsive, and I fancy that it has scandalized many. I certainly remember one highly intelligent woman of my acquaintance, who put it to me as the one thing in the Gospel narrative which made her question our Lord's perfection of character. This method of dealing with a reasonable, or even an unreasonable, question seemed