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## *Editorial*

The last volume of the **Journal of the Irish Christian Study Centre** appeared in 1989. Its reappearance, almost five years later, signals the Study Centre's renewed commitment to making available to its members, and to the wider Christian public, both in Ireland and further afield, articles on a wide range of topics which show the interaction between Christian research and scholarship and the various academic disciplines, and articles which consider social and practical questions from a Christian perspective. Some will be based on talks or lectures given at events organised by the Centre (the articles by Professors Wolterstorff and Edwards in this issue were CS Lewis lectures) and others will be written specifically for the Journal. It is our intention to continue to publish articles of high quality which reflect the best in Christian thinking, and to encourage Irish Christians to produce work of this kind.

In encouraging Christian thinking and writing we wish to establish the Journal as a forum for discussion. Volume six, which is to be published later in the year, contains an interesting and challenging controversy on the nature of sociology and its relationship to Christian belief.

Our review section is intended not only to assess recent publications, but also to draw the attention of our readers to books of strategic interest to Christians in the different academic disciplines, in key areas of theology and biblical studies and in relation to issues of practical Christian living. Some of these books may be recent publications, some not.

JOHN GILLESPIE  
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## *The Art of Remembering*

*(The Seventh C. S. Lewis Memorial Lecture, 2nd March 1990)*

by NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF

Down through the ages the Christian church has both produced its own art and interacted with the art of others. The relation of the church to the images of art is thus complex. And let me make explicit, what is in any case suggested by my word, that here I will be speaking only about *visual* art. However, not only is the relation of the church to the images of art complex because it both produces its own art and interacts with the art of others. There is also complexity in the relation of the church to its own art. Some art produced by the church functions as icon, some as symbol, some as allegory, some functions to dignify the ordinary, some functions as memorial, and some functions as decoration, playful or serious. My own view is that though there is value in trying to see what is common in this diversity, full understanding also requires that we honour the diversity.

My aim here is to discuss one of the ways in which the art, in which the church expresses its faith, functions. I think that the mode of functioning to which I shall call attention is of fundamental importance in the life of the church, even though rarely discussed by theoreticians. Nonetheless, perhaps some of the other ways are just as important as the way to which I will be calling attention.

The Christian church is a community which is not only spread out across space but stretched out through time. It is stretched out through time because it has a tradition. A community has a tradition by virtue of handing things down from one generation to the next, and by virtue of the next generation receiving and keeping in mind what was handed down, in other words, by the next generation remembering what was handed on to them. Handing-on and social remembering are the two sides of the one coin which is tradition.

It will be useful to distinguish three components within what the church hands over and remembers. Tradition has, for one thing an *interpretative* component; that is, a component consisting of an interpretation of God and Jesus Christ, of the world and history and human experience and obligation. Central to this interpretative component is always a certain way of interpreting Scripture. But the interpretative component of the church's tradition, in all the diverse versions of that tradition, always goes beyond an interpretation of Scripture. Interpretation of Scripture is always caught up within a broader interpretation of reality and experience and responsibility, in one way or another grounding that larger interpretation. What is handed over and appropriated always constitutes a *vision of meaning*.

Beyond that, what is handed over and appropriated always includes a certain way of *expressing* the mode of interpretation, a certain way of embodying the vision of meaning. It incorporates a style of life—a style of thinking and feeling, a style of organizing institutions, a style of art and worship and recreation and comportment, a style of disciplining and expressing the emotions, a style of coping with disagreements. Perhaps I should here call attention to the fact that the interpretation and expression which the church hands on and remembers not only comes in many different versions—Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, Reformed, Anabaptist, Pentecostal, Pietist, etc.—but it is always influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by the interpretations of reality and expressions thereof current in general society.

There is yet a third component in the church's tradition. A mode of interpretation and a style of expressing that interpretation—these, though embedded in concrete life, are nonetheless abstract patterns. What the church also hands on and remembers is something concrete; namely, a story about the formation of the community and about its life: its triumphs and failures, its heroes and scoundrels, its joys and sufferings. The focus of this story which the church hands over and appropriates is on what God and the church, and old Israel as the predecessor of the church, have had to do with each other. Central to this part of the church's tradition is the story found in the Scriptures. It is true that the story of God's dealings with human beings which the church hands over and appropriates always goes beyond the narrative of the Scriptures—more explicitly so in Orthodoxy and Catholicism, less explicitly so in certain versions of Protestantism. Nonetheless, the story contained in the Scriptures is central in the

life of the church. That is so, of course, because the New Testament offers an identity-narrative of Jesus Christ; and a central to the life of the church is Jesus. The church is, in fact, the Jesus-party in history. In my discussion I want to focus on this concrete story component in the church's tradition.

We can begin by asking how, in fact, the church hands on its story of God's dealings with human beings. How is this part of what is remembered kept alive? In good measure by introducing narrations of the story into the life of the church. The Bible, among other things that it does, narrates the story; and the church places the Bible in the hands of its members. But also members of the community themselves, in all sorts of situations, narrate the story. The community tells Bible stories, and stories from the life of the church after New Testament times.

But there is another way; and this other way is made conceptually explicit in the church's celebration of the Eucharist. In the Eucharist bread and wine are brought forward; after certain words are spoken the bread is broken and the wine poured; and then the bread was eaten and the wine drunk. About all this it is said, at a certain point, that this is being done as a memorial or remembrance—in the original Greek, as an *anamnesis*. In short, a second, immensely important way in which the church keeps alive its memory of the story is by introducing into its life and environment memorials, or remembrances.

I can now make the suggestion I wish to develop: the artistic images which the church uses to express its faith function for it as *memorials*; their functioning thus enables the church to remember its story. That is, let it be said again, not the only way they function. But it is one important way. Many of the images of art which the church uses to express its faith function for it as does the Eucharist, namely, as a memorial which keeps alive the memory of the story.

But what is a memorial, a remembrance, an *anamnesis*? It will not do simply to plunge ahead and argue that visual art does function in the church as a memorial. We shall have to begin with some discussion of the concept itself.

I said that in functioning as memorials, works of art function for the church as does the Eucharist; for Christ is reported in the New Testament as saying that what he did with his disciples at his last meal with them before his execution should keep on being done *as a memorial of him*; always when the church celebrates the Eucharist it repeats these words. Perhaps a good place to start

our reflections then is with this question: What would Jesus have meant, and what would his disciples have understood him as meaning, when he said to them that they were to keep on doing this as a memorial of him?

There can be no doubt that Jesus was making use of a concept familiar to old Israel and used repeatedly in the Old Testament, the concept of, as it was called in Hebrew, a *zikkaron*. Repeatedly in the Old Testament we read that Israel was to keep alive the memory of its story by doing various things as a *zikkaron*, a memorial, and by introducing into its environment various objects which would function for it as a *zikkaron*, a memorial. Its way of life and its environment were to incorporate memorials.

Let us have before us a small selection of examples. Members of Israel were to keep their fellow Hebrews as slaves for only six years, setting them free in the seventh year, so as to remember that God redeemed them from slavery in the land of Egypt (Deut. 15:12-15). Members of Israel were to render justice to the sojourners, the fatherless, and the widows, so as to remember that God redeemed them from slavery in Egypt (Deut. 24:17-18). Members of Israel were to be content with the first gleanings of their crops, leaving what remained for the sojourner, the fatherless, and the widow, so as to remember that they were slaves in the land of Egypt (Deut. 24:19-22). Members of Israel were to keep the seventh day of the week as a holy Sabbath day, so as to remember that God brought them out of servanthood in Egypt: on that day, all Israel was to rest: free adults, children, servants, sojourners, and animals (Deut. 5:12-15). Members of Israel were to observe the passover as a memorial, so as to remember that they had been slaves in Egypt; in particular, they were to eat no leavened bread, so as to remember the day when they came out of Egypt (Deut. 16:1-12; Exodus 12:14-15; 13:3-10).

A striking feature of the Deuteronomic instructions to Israel, to do these various things so as to remember, is that the purpose stated is not, so as to remember that *your forebears* were delivered from Egypt, but so as to remember that *you* were delivered from Egypt. There is here an elision of intervening time. The elision is even more striking in the instruction concerning Passover observance found in Exodus (13:8): 'And you shall tell your son on that day, 'it is because of what the Lord did for me when I came out of Egypt.' The text which to this day is recited at the Jewish Seder feast includes the words, 'In every generation one ought to

regard oneself as though one has personally come out of Egypt.' I want to come back to this point about the elision of time when I apply this concept of a memorial to the art of the church.

What is the force of the instruction, *Do this in order to remember*, or alternatively, *Do this as a memorial*? This question confronts us with a question of procedure. Some scholars have argued or assumed that the concept of a memorial (*zikkaron*, *anamnesis*) is peculiar to the mentality of the ancient Hebrews, or perhaps more generally, to that of the ancient Semitic peoples. Central to their attempt to grasp the concept has accordingly been their looking at the biblical uses—this then being one example of the project of biblical word studies so popular during the last fifty years or so. Perhaps the best practitioner of this strategy has been Max Thurian, who was the theologian of the Taizé community (compare his *The Eucharistic Memorial*). Thurian's conclusion was that for a people to do something as a memorial of *X* is for them to do it so as to remind someone of *X*, in that way bringing it to the person's attention; and that the context of the biblical memorials is always the covenant between God and God's people. It may be to God's attention that the people wish to bring something; then the context of the memorial action proper, often expressed in words, will be that of blessing (thanking, praising) God for God's covenant fidelity, of which the memorialized event or person is an indication; and of interceding with God for God's continued blessing in the future. If, on the contrary, it is *the people themselves* that are to be reminded of *X*, then the memorial action will be done in the context of a renewed commitment to obedience, and the confidence or hope that the memorial action will effect God's blessing anew. Thurian was inclined to think that though some biblical memorials were oriented more toward God and some more toward the people, always there were traces of both orientations. If so, then for the people to do something as a memorial of *X* was for them to do it so as to remind God of *X* in the context of praising God for God's covenant fidelity and interceding for its continuation, and so as to remind themselves of *X* in the context of pledging fidelity to the covenant obligations and to effectuate God's blessing anew.

Fascinating and provocative though Thurian's discussion is, I do not find the underlying assumption plausible, that there is a peculiarly Hebraic (or Semitic) concept of a memorial. Thurian does, it seems to me, succeed in eliciting many of the features peculiar to those memorials mentioned in the Bible. But from the

fact that the biblical memorials have some peculiar features it scarcely follows that those features belong to the very concept there being used for a memorial—that something would not be a memorial unless it showed those features. We must distinguish between the claim that there is a peculiar biblical or Hebraic concept of a memorial, and the claim that the general concept of a memorial is applied in the Hebrew scriptures to memorials which have somewhat peculiar feature.

The linkage of memorials to remembering, and the fact that there seems little if any difference between the concept used in the Bible and called *remembering* in English translation, and the concept called *remembering* in present-day ordinary English, leads me to think that a memorial, that is, a *zikkaron* or *anamnesis*, is just a commemorative object, and that doing something as a memorial is simply doing it as a commemoration. In short, I suggest that our modern Western mentality is not *unlike* that of the ancient Hebrews in *not* having the concept of a memorial but *like* it in *having* the concept. For we have the concept of a *commemoration*; and this, I suggest, is the very same concept.

All sorts of things are done *in* commemoration, and all sorts of things are produced *as* commemoration: coins are struck, stamps are issued, fireworks are shot off, speeches are given, plays are performed, dances are danced, trees are planted, academic conferences are held, portraits are painted, processions are organized, cenotaphs are raised, mausoleums are constructed, cities are founded. We are, and want to be, remembering beings. In fact, though, we find ourselves to be forgetful beings; so we fill our lives with commemorations and commemorative objects. Or if we do not actually forget what we wish to remember, often we fail to keep it clearly in mind. Evidently something deep about us is revealed in the fact that we surround ourselves with commemorative objects and repeatedly engage in commemorative activities; something important would be lost if we ceased to do so. Commemorations pervade our way of life and pervade the environments within which we live our lives.

An act or object is commemorative only if done or made with a certain intent; and that intent is, in one way or another, to enhance memory. Commemorations are meant to produce the memory of something in someone, or intensify the memory, or keep the memory alive; or to bring the remembered entity actively before the mind for a while. In turn, we do this for a reason, the reason often being what is most prominent in the the situation.



By contrast, ordinary remembering works without a reason; it is just one of the functions of the mind. Especially prominent among our reasons for intending to induce or sustain or intensify memory, or to bring some memory actively before the mind, is the desire to praise or honour. We issue a coin in commemoration of the Emperor so as to honour the Emperor. I am inclined to think that if we look closely enough at commemorations we will always discern some element of honouring, though often, indeed, it is not what is most prominent. The Byzantines for generations commemorated the fall of Constantinople. The dominant mood was lament. But in their lament over the fall of the great city, were they not also honouring the city fallen? Nations commemorate wounds inflicted upon them so as to keep outrage alive, that justice may eventually be secured; but in so doing, are they not also honouring those who fell and the nation injured?

What is commemorated is never *simply* commemorated but is always commemorated *as* soandso. And for an assembly to commemorate, say, George Washington as soandso, it must believe he was that. Often what the *commemorandum* is commemorated *as*, in a commemorative act, is made explicit in writings, testimonial speeches, etc, which are comprised within the commemoration: 'We are assembled here to commemorate George Washington as ...' Other times, it will remain implicit in the background.

It follows that one group may commemorate a person or event as one thing, and another as quite a different thing. There may even be such distance between these that, though the *commemorandum* is the same, participants find it impossible, with integrity, to participate in a common commemoration. Often in the background of such disagreements will be the fact that the different communities embrace different stories of the same stretch of history. Members of the Reformed churches may commemorate the St. Bartholomew's Night Massacre as the greatest mass martyrdom of the Reformed people; members of the Catholic church may commemorate it as one of the greatest victories over heresy. It is not likely that they will share their commemorations. Blacks in South Africa may commemorate the Sharpeville Massacre as the epitome for innocent black suffering; Afrikaners may commemorate it as one of the glowing episodes in the attempt to stave off anarchy. They will do their commemorating separately. The division among Christians over the Eucharist is a paradigmatic illustration of this point. Of

course it is also true that some rituals done as commemorations manage to tolerate a rather wide diversity of understandings. This becomes especially clear when the *history* of the ritual is surveyed. The ritual gets established as a social practice; it continues on its way amid many disputes over interpretation. Continuity is threatened, however, when one party succeeds in getting its interpretation expressed by words *within* the commemoration, rather than being content to let it remain in the background.

It is also worth noting that always there will be some propriety, or purported propriety, in using a certain object or action to commemorate a particular *commemorandum*. What one does or makes to commemorate something is not a matter of arbitrary decision. If the aim is that Israel shall commemorate its release from the bondage of slavery in Egypt, then there is an obvious propriety in that being done by freeing one's slaves every seventh year. Perhaps there are other candidates for ways of doing it which are equally appropriate. But this will do.

Though what we in the modern world commemorate is mostly items, episodes and persons from history, this is not necessarily so. The thing remembered may have its place in some story of the community without the story ever having happened. Or the story as a whole may have happened but the event or thing commemorated may never have happened or existed. Thus it is that 'primitive' peoples commemorated elements from their mythology, and thus it is that the episodes which modern nations commemorate are often highly embroidered versions of historical episodes. Accurate history is often destructive of commemoration; conversely, the desire to commemorate often requires co-opting or exiling the historians.

Lastly, commemoration is radically different from simply keeping in mind or recalling. Commemorating requires doing something with one's body or making something with one's hands. Commemorating expands from one's way of thinking to enter one's way of living. Sometimes we find that others want to commemorate the same thing we do, and to commemorate it *as* that which we want to commemorate it *as*. So we join in a solidarity of commemorating. Typically our shared commemorating intensifies the solidarity and expands its scope. Our joint commemorating expresses, and intensifies and expands, community.

Commemorating helps to protect, against the acids of forgetfulness, what is worthy of honour and praise and lament and outrage. As we contemplate our future with each other, we see change and fickleness; to compensate, we covenant with each other. Covenants introduce a stability into the future which otherwise would not be there. So, in a similar way, commemorations introduce stability into what we carry forward from the past. Though what is commemorated recedes ever farther into the past, our commemorations keep its honored memory alive in the present. Covenants, looking ahead, introduce stability into a sea of fickleness; commemorations, looking back, introduce endurance into a sea of forgetfulness.

Given the importance, in the Jewish and Christian communities, of remembering the acts of God in history and remembering the prophets, teachers and saints by way of whom God specially acted, one can expect that commemorative objects and actions will occupy an important place in the lives of these communities. And so they do, except when remembering the story falls away in favour of immediately experiential, or abstractly theological or ethical, approaches to God. Once one begins to reflect on it, one sees that Christian lives are filled with commemorations of events and persons from the biblical story and from the story of the church. The Christian week, for example, with its 1+6 structure, is a commemoration, adapted from the Jewish week with its 6+1 structure. And very much in the Christian liturgy is done in commemoration, as are very many of the objects in the liturgical environment, commemorative objects. The New Testament itself says, as we have reminded ourselves, that Christ's followers should eat a meal as a commemoration of him. Down through the ages, prominent in the reasons for doing so has been thanksgiving, *eucharistia*. So as to thank God for what God has done in Jesus Christ, we commemorate Jesus by participating in a (ritualized) meal.

With this discussion of commemoration, memorial, *anamnesis*, *zikkaron*, in hand we can return to my suggestion that a great deal of the art produced by the Christian community functions for it as a memorial or commemoration of persons, objects, and episodes in the story of the community. The art I have in mind includes, but is by no means limited to, liturgical art. Over the last fifty years or so a good many writers, especially in the Anglican tradition, have felt an affinity between art, on the one hand, and the Eucharist, on the other. The concept they have

used so as to explicated this felt affinity has been that of *sacrament*. Taking for granted that the Eucharist is a sacrament, they have tried to show that art, or some art, is also a sacrament. In order to get the concept of sacrament to fit art they have invariably, so far as I can tell, drastically truncated it, with the consequence that to call the Eucharist a sacrament in this new stripped-down sense is no longer to say about it what Christians have traditionally wanted to say. It is no longer to say about it what Augustine took us to be saying when we call something a *sacrament*: that it effects the divine grace which it signifies. But the Eucharist is not only a sacrament; it is also a memorial—plus, indeed, much more besides. And my suggestion is that, in the full and literal sense, the Eucharist is a memorial and so too are very many of the works of art produced by the church.

Let me cite an example. Just recently, in the Museum of Fine Art in Brussels, I saw that great painting of Peter Bruegel (the elder) titled, *The Census at Bethlehem*. It represents the episode, narrated in the second chapter of Luke's gospel, of Mary and Joseph arriving at the village of Bethlehem so as to have their names inscribed on the census roll ordered by the Roman emperor. One sees Mary and Joseph in the foreground of the scene, Mary riding on a donkey being led by Joseph; back a bit, people are standing around a table waiting to have their names inscribed; and this all takes place among the buildings and activities typical of a 16th century village in Brabant. Has not Bruegel offered us here, by the composing of his picture, an commemoration of this important event in the pre-history of Jesus? Of course there are other dimensions and functions of this painting that one can take note of and reflect on. One can take note of its aesthetic qualities. One can take note of the ideas and feelings to which Bruegel gave expression. One can try to puzzle out the symbolism in the picture: is the contrast between old and new buildings, or perhaps that between decaying buildings and buildings under construction, to be interpreted as a symbol of the difference between paganism and Christianity? In suggesting that we think of this painting as a memorial, I am not proposing that we *displace* these other approaches but supplement them.

My reference to symbols in Bruegel's painting suggests that visual art can function as a memorial of episodes, persons, and objects in the Christian story without being representational art; it may be symbolic art, or a blend of the two. Crosses are memorials of the cross of Christ; typically they are more symbolic

than representational. The lamb in the altarpiece of Jan van Eyck in Ghent is a memorial of Christ; but it too is more symbol than representation of Christ. And the rooster atop the Reformed churches throughout Europe is a memorial symbol of the coming of light, that is, of salvation, into the world with the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Let me add here that not all symbols, not even all 'Christian' symbols, function as memorials, as commemorations. They do so only if they symbolize some concrete event or person or object from story or history. Many symbols, however, are of abstract entities; circles, for example, are often symbols of eternity. As such, they are not *memorial* symbols.

Theorists will ask how I understand the contrast I am using here between *symbols* and *representations*. I do not propose giving a full account here. But one aspect of the difference has to do with the fact that visual depictions differ from each other with respect to how many of their features are significant for determining what is being depicted and what it is depicted as. The difference between symbol and representation has to do, in part, with placement on this continuum. A visual depiction is more a symbol, the fewer of its features are thus significant; it is more a representation, the more of its features are thus significant.

Most crosses hanging in churches are, by this criterion, very much in the direction of being symbols of the cross of Christ. The colour, the texture, the size, the material—seldom are these to be interpreted as determining some specific kind of cross on which Jesus was crucified. By contrast, most of the lines and colours in Bruegel's painting function to determine the specific world which he projected; most discernible differences of paint on canvas would have meant differences in the world projected. The roosters atop Reformed churches are an interesting blend of symbol and representation, this on different levels. What are found atop the churches are, of course, not flesh-and-blood roosters but three-dimensional representations of roosters; difference in the sculptures do very much determine differences in the sorts of roosters depicted. But differences among the sculptures, and thereby among the roosters depicted, do not determine differences in what is symbolized. These rooster-sculptures all just symbolize the resurrection of Jesus.

I close by calling attention to what seems to me a fascinating feature of many of the representations which function as commemorations of events, persons, and objects in the Christian story. Let me approach the point I wish to make by noting that

the more an artist's depiction of something in the Christian story is a representation rather than a symbol, the more likely it is that the visual artist, with his or her imagination, will have to 'flesh out' what is given in the received narratives. When narrating the story of Joseph and Mary going to Bethlehem for the census, Luke does not mention the color of Mary's robe, nor whether Mary came riding on a donkey, nor whether Joseph's hair was graying, etc. Yet Bruegel, by way of his painting, has projected for us a world in which these matters are determined along with a host of others which in Luke's narration are not. Visual memorials of items and episodes in the Christian story, in so far as they are representations, invariably project for us a much richer and more detailed world-fragment than do the verbal narrations of the same items or episodes.

One issue which the visual artist, unlike the narrator, typically confronts when he or she proposes to compose a representation of some episode in the biblical story, is this: what setting is to be given to this episode? Of course the picture can be composed in such a way that the setting is pretty much obscured. But artists, if they have not followed that strategy, have almost invariably chosen one or the other of two other strategies: they have placed the episode in a setting typical of the time and place at which the episode occurred, as they imagine that to have been; or they have placed the episode in a setting typical of the time and place of the artist. Rembrandt, to the best of my knowledge, always adopted the former strategy: Christ and his contemporaries are dressed and housed in what a 17th century Dutchman supposed to be the garb and architecture of Palestine in the first century. Bruegel, in *The Census at Bethlehem*, chose the latter strategy. He set the census at Bethlehem in a contemporary village of Brabant. Bethlehem here *is* a village in Brabant.

The Rembrandt strategy is an invitation for us to imagine those things happening then and there, when and where they did. The Bruegel strategy is an invitation for us to imagine those things happening here and now. This much seems obvious and straightforward. But what is the significance of each of these two different strategies? What would lead one to choose one over the other?

The Rembrandt strategy feels the more natural to me. I am startled by the Bruegel strategy, arrested, led to ask: why would he do it like that? Why would he show Mary and Joseph coming

into a 16th century Brabantine village for the census called by Caesar Augustus? About the Rembrandt strategy I am not led to ask why he did it like that. I suspect this is because I share in the so-called 'historical consciousness.' I do my thinking in terms of a long sweep of human history: and I think of the episodes of the biblical story as occupying just one segment of that sweep, a segment which concluded roughly 1900 years ago. Between me and that segment there is a long historical gap: I am not the contemporary of the episodes which occur in that segment. When one thinks in this way, the Rembrandt strategy seems obviously appropriate. Of course I regard those episodes as remaining profoundly relevant to me; thus I wish to remember them. I welcome the memorials and narrations which enhance remembering. Yet the events which I remember are long past.

The Bruegel strategy deletes the temporal gap between the artist and the biblical episodes memorialized. The artist and the episodes become contemporaries. The original viewers of Bruegel's painting were invited to imagine Mary and Joseph coming riding into their village late one afternoon. Admittedly we who are immersed in the historical consciousness sometimes try to do something not entirely unlike such imagining. We try to imagine ourselves in the situation whose history we are writing or researching or reading; we try to imagine what it would have been like and would have felt like to have lived then and there. Some of our great historians are masters at enabling us to do this. Here too then the gap is deleted. But it is deleted in, as it were, the opposite direction. Instead of imagining Mary riding into one's village late this afternoon for the census which is going on, one does one's best to imagine oneself back in Bethlehem when, late one afternoon, Mary came riding into Bethlehem with her husband Joseph for the imperial census of ca. 4 B.C.

Once again, what is the significance of deleting the gap in the Bruegel direction? I don't think I fully know. But before I nonetheless make some suggestions, it may be helpful to note that the deletion of the gap also occurs in some of the hymns in which we sing of episodes from the Christian story. I suspect that the deletion as it occurs here is, for all of us, less startling than it is in the case of Bruegel's painting. Possibly that is because it is less clear whether we are to imagine ourselves then and there, or to imagine those actors he and now—though my own sense is that the latter is suggested more strongly than the former.

Here are some examples. We all know the first verse of Charles Wesley's hymn, 'Hark, the Herald Angels Sing':

Hark, the herald angels sing,  
'Glory to the new-born King.  
Peace on earth and mercy mild,  
God and sinners reconciled.'  
Joyful all ye nations rise,  
Join the triumph of the skies,  
With the angelic host proclaim,  
'Christ is born in Bethlehem.'  
Hark, the herald angels sing,  
'Glory to the new-born King!'

And here is a translation of the first verse of a Christmas hymn by Paul Gerhardt:

All my heart this night rejoices  
as I hear, far and near,  
sweetest angel voices:  
'Christ is born,' their choirs are singing,  
till the air everywhere  
now with joy is ringing.

The first verse of another hymn by Charles Wesley, this one an Easter hymn, goes like this:

'Christ the Lord is risen today,' Alleluia!  
Sons of men and angels say; Alleluia!  
Sing, ye heavens, and earth reply. Alleluia!

One imagines that when Wesley composed those lines, the old Latin carol, *Surrexit Christus Hodie*, was ringing in his ears. Its first verse, in English translation, goes like this:

Jesus Christ is risen today, Alleluia!  
Our triumphant holy day, Alleluia!  
Who did once, upon the cross, Alleluia!  
Suffer to redeem our loss. Alleluia!

It may be noted that it is characteristic of hymns in this liturgical present tense, as one might call it, to insert such indexicals as 'now', 'today', 'this night', 'this day', 'this happy morn', etc., as if to make doubly sure that we do not miss the point.

What is the point? Well, no doubt part of the effect - whether or not it is the point—is to give what happened then an immediacy for us. Rembrandt believed that the events of the biblical story remained profoundly relevant to him in the 17th century; that of course is why his memorial representations of them are so important a part of his *oeuvre*. But the Bruegel



strategy does not so much give one the feeling that those events remain relevant to us as the feeling that they are *happening among us*.

It is as if a different understanding of history is at work. Perhaps the understanding at work is the one described in the opening chapters of Erich Auerbach's *Mimesis* and in Hans Frei's *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*. It goes something like this. The story narrated in the biblical text is the *fundamental* historical reality, not merely one segment of a long sweep of historical reality of which no one segment is any more fundamental than any other. To understand the rest of history, we must relate it to that fundamental history by some such strategy as that of *type* and *anti-type*. The significance of a collapsing building in one's 16th century Brabantine village is (perhaps) that it typifies paganism; the significance of the building being erected in one's village is that it typifies Christianity. A woman riding into one's village on a donkey led by her aged husband typifies Mary and Joseph coming to Bethlehem; and a census in one's village typifies the census ordered by the Roman emperor.

It all seems very strange to us. But if this was indeed how Bruegel and his contemporaries were thinking, the use of the Bruegel strategy instead of the Rembrandt strategy for representing episodes from the biblical story would not have struck them as surprising. It would have seemed eminently natural. When artists today follow the Bruegel strategy, as they sometimes do, the effect is, by contrast, startling. For us the Rembrandt strategy is the natural one. Perhaps what occurred between Bruegel and Rembrandt was the birth of the 'historical consciousness'.

But let me return to my main point. The Christian community lives by hope and by memory. Both, however, are in constant danger of decaying. So the community tries to keep both alive. My suggestion has been that a great deal of visual art functions for the church as memorial of the persons, objects, and events of its story. It serves to keep alive the memory of the story by which the church lives.

## *C. S. Lewis: Imagining Heaven*

*(The Eighth C. S. Lewis Memorial Lecture, 15th February, 1991)*

by MICHAEL EDWARDS

This is a large and appealing subject, and I intend to travel through it slowly. I begin with the most obvious, with the fact that C. S. Lewis imagines heaven by calling 'Deep Heaven' the heavens of our own world, and by peopling this astronomic space with recession upon recession upon recession of fabulous creatures. Ransom, the hero of the space travel trilogy, meets many of these on Malacandra, or Mars, and on Perelandra, or Venus, while in the final volume earth itself, become Thulcandra, is invaded by a procession of planetary gods. The whole of what to us may be merely the star-lit blackness of the sky becomes for Ransom 'the fields of heaven', vibrating with life; a place rather than bare space. Voyaging to Mars, he 'wondered how he could ever have thought of planets, even of the Earth, as islands of life and reality floating in a deadly void. Now ... he saw the planets ... as mere holes or gaps in the living heaven—excluded and rejected wastes of heavy matter and murky air, formed not by addition to, but by subtraction from, the surrounding brightness'.<sup>1</sup> On the return voyage, he 'could not feel that they were an island of life journeying through an abyss of death. He felt almost the opposite—that life was waiting outside the little iron eggshell in which they rode, ready at any moment to break in, and that, if it killed them, it would kill them by excess of its vitality'.<sup>2</sup> It is a nice paradox, to subvert our customary way of seeing.

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1. *Out of the Silent Planet*, p. 44. For convenience I give throughout the page numbers of the paperback editions of Lewis's works, where these exist.

2. *Out of the Silent Planet*, pp. 170-71.

## Re-imagining the World

For one realizes that Lewis's first concern—and this may be surprising and even disconcerting—is to imagine heaven by re-imagining the world 'as it is'; to discover the invisible not behind but within the visible. The beauty and the diversity of this re-imagining, with its ability to create in the reader, or at least in this reader, the appropriate sense of wonder, or what Ransom himself calls 'severe delight' seems to me a major achievement.<sup>3</sup> For one thing, all the creatures Lewis devises give on to some kind of social or poetic or theological truth, and remain in the mind. One does not forget the main figures, such as the *sorns*, *hrossa* and *pfifltriggi*, the intellectuals, warrior-poets and craftsmen of Malacandra, nor the numerous 'redundant' beings like the singing beast of Perelandra, whose 'evident wish' is 'to be for ever a sound and only a sound in the thickest centre of untravelled woods'.<sup>4</sup> One is unlikely in particular to forget Perelandra's other Adam and Eve, to whom Ransom says, kneeling—but one needs to have followed the whole story to receive the power of his words, and to see why those creatures draw us so deeply: 'Do not move away, do not raise me up ... I have never before seen a man or a woman'.<sup>5</sup> Nowhere in literature do I know of descriptions of angels as strong, or at least as persuasive, as those of *Out of the Silent Planet* and *Perelandra*, or of the chapter 'The Descent of the Gods' in *That Hideous Strength*, when the angels of Mercury, Venus, Mars, Saturn and Jupiter pass through Ransom's house, with a counterpoint of effects, as in comedy, among the principals in an upstairs room and the lesser characters in the kitchen.

This act of imagination certainly succeeds, in that the cosmos appears as a result immeasurably more rich and alive. We know that Lewis was protesting in part against the so-called 'scientific' view of space as cold and arithmetical regressions of nothingness, a view summed up in the famous sentence of the *Pensées* which Pascal probably puts into the mouth of his hypothetical atheist: 'The eternal silence of those infinite spaces fills me with dread'.<sup>6</sup> He was also protesting against the habit in H.G. Wells and others—and more particularly against the sources of that habit—of assuming that extra-terrestrial creatures would necessarily be

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3. *Out of the Silent Planet*, p. 34.

4. *Voyage to Venus (Perelandra)*, p. 177.

5. *Voyage to Venus*, p. 190.

6. Fragment 201 in the Penguin edition.

monstrous. But has he deceived us, by mixing the fictive with the real? It is a complex question, but one that needs to be asked, even if I seem to be criticising Lewis when I have only just begun what is intended to be a celebration.

There is presumably no problem with the *eldils*: no problem, I mean, either for Christian belief or for literary logic. As planetary gods they repeat the mediaeval notion that the pagan Mars and Venus and so forth were dim visions of real powers, of angels or archangels, whose natures had been misunderstood and corrupted as they entered the imaginations of fallen men. Such is the theory, indeed which Ransom learns on *Perelandra*: the universe is one, 'a vast whispering gallery', and traces of deep memory reach us even now over an almost infinite distance, so that mythology is 'gleams of celestial strength and beauty falling on a jungle of filth and imbecility'.<sup>7</sup> This is perfectly clear, and coherent, though no Christian has to be persuaded by it, and even Lewis's prose view, as it were, his view outside story when he is speaking in his own name, is rather more tentative. He writes in a letter of 29 December 1958 that '*if* the angels (who I believe to be real beings in the actual universe) have that relation to the Pagan gods which they are assumed to have in *Perelandra*, they might *really* manifest themselves in real form as they did to Ransom.' Within story, however, as the tutelary angels of planets, the *eldils* whom Lewis invents for Mars and Venus belong to the same system of angelical government as the devil, whom Lewis considers, in both his story world and in the actual world, to be the temporary lord of Earth, 'the fallen Archon under whom our planet groans'.<sup>8</sup>

One senses in Lewis the storyteller, in fact, a strong will to believe what he is imagining. When Ransom stands before the *eldils* on *Perelandra* and thinks to himself, 'with deep wonder': 'My eyes have seen Mars and Venus. I have seen Ares and Aphrodite',<sup>9</sup> does not Lewis's writing pleasure depend on the conviction that one could actually have that experience? And does not our reading pleasure, if we are Christian readers, depend on the possibility that Lewis is right—not because we too might go to Venus and see the gods but because certain of the pagan deities might really be figures of angels and could one day become known

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7. *Voyage to Venus*, p. 187.

8. *Voyage to Venus*, p. 187.

9. *Voyage to Venus*, p. 186.

to us? Perhaps I am misunderstanding what Lewis means, in the same letter, by a 'supposal', and he is using the awe that we can imagine feeling on meeting Mars (a pure hypothesis) as an analogy to suggest the awe we should feel on meeting an archangel (a probable future event). Yet Ransom also wills to believe in the *genius loci*. Wandering in a cave on Perelandra and encountering a quite alien creature of 'insufferable majesty', he wonders if there might not be 'some way to renew the old Pagan practice of propitiating the local gods of unknown places in such fashion that it was no offence to God Himself but only a prudent and courteous apology for trespass'.<sup>10</sup> One sees from the last phrase that even if one rejects the speculation, there is still—and this is the force of so much of Lewis's writing—some truth and some lesson here to take away.

The real problem, if it is one, lies elsewhere. How are we to understand this reflection of Ransom's on Perelandra? 'He remembered how in the very different world called Malacandra ... he had met the original of the Cyclops ... Were all the things which appeared as mythology on Earth scattered through other worlds as realities'.<sup>11</sup> A later formulation of that same surmise<sup>12</sup> serves as epigraph to 'Forms of Things Unknown' in *The Dark Tower and other stories*—Lewis's story of astronauts encountering a Gorgon on the moon. We can assume that Lewis does not believe that there are sorcs on Mars or Gorgons on the moon; but then, what does he believe, since Ransom is not simply shown to be wrong. On the contrary: these are his thoughts on the journey back from Malacandra: 'if he had felt some such lift of the heart when first he passed through heaven on their outward journey, he felt it now tenfold, for now he was convinced that the abyss was full of life in the most literal sense, full of living creatures ... His brain reeled at the thought of the true population of the universe'.<sup>13</sup> 'Literal' is the word to notice. At the end of the story, in a letter supposedly written to the author, Ransom addresses him like this: 'If we could even effect in one per cent of our readers a change-over from the conception of Space to the conception of Heaven, we should have made a beginning'.<sup>14</sup>

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10. *Voyage to Venus*, p. 170.

11. *Voyage to Venus*, p. 39.

12. See *Voyage to Venus*, p. 92.

13. *Out of the Silent Planet*, p.171.

14. *Out of the Silent Planet*, p. 180.

Either, one might think, there really are creatures on other planets—not 'literally' sorns on Mars but literally something somewhere—in which case we can rejoice in a space transformed into a inhabited heaven; or there are not, so that as soon as we quit Lewis's fictions we find ourselves back once again in the star-strewn void. It is true that we might want to say that this very superfluity of the universe is a wonder and a revelation. It seems to serve no purpose other than the very lofty one of simply *being*. It has a size which not only shows us our own smallness but also suggests, what is far more important, something of the infinity of God's being and the exuberance of his creativity, the hyperboles of his limitlessness—his 'eternal power', indeed, 'and Godhead' (Romans 1:20). It does so, moreover, with a beauty which overtops even the sublime, and is quite other than our aesthetic categories. But Lewis wants us to see the universe as peopled, and whatever we think of the way he has tried to convey that sense of a space bursting with lives (by sometimes both requiring and disallowing a suspension of disbelief), we can surely agree that he is justified. Ransom reels at the thought of the true population of the universe, and if we are Christian, shouldn't we? We don't know *where* they are, nor very much *what* they are, but if we are still visited with the old belief, we do know that hosts of angels and archangels, of cherubim and seraphim, of thrones, dominions, principalities and powers, throng somewhere in the realm of heaven, and that Lewis's desire to imagine other forms of rational life is met in reality by the existence of 'all the company of heaven', of rank on rank of God's creatures. Lewis's fiction transforms, or gives another substance to, one's image of fact.

For the non-Christian reader, as also for the Christian, is there not a challenge to reconsider the vocabulary we use of the cosmos and the value-judgements that it implies? We talk of 'dead' planets, and of the interstellar 'void'. The stars themselves are 'mere' matter. To redeem the universe for human emotion we do not need to imagine deities, and the raining of influence. We need to see human life as one kind among many. No matter is 'mere'; each heavenly body has a life of its own; even the distance between stars is, on our scale, a miraculous magnitude. The universe does teem with life, and the further such life is from the life that we know, in us and around us, the more it takes us out of ourselves, places our 'I am' in a larger 'there is', and frees us into the generosity of being.

I have laboured the point deliberately since Lewis's first and somewhat unwonted way of imagining heaven is to imagine it as *here*. He places it in this world, by using the confusion, in English as in other languages, between 'heaven' as a quite other dimension belonging to God, and 'heaven' or 'the heavens' as the physical universe visible to us, in small part, as the night sky. The confusion, it seems to me, is itself suggestive, and not to be dismissed as mere mythical geometry, as the naive spatialisation of thought of those who have not yet come of age. Another way is that of the chronicles of Narnia. These too make use of pagan mythology, and more fully of fairy story, but they do so to create a parallel world existing alongside this one. The characters enter it by magic as the figure of grace, and although it is not heaven (it is not Aslan's own country) all the children who are admitted there know it to be better than this world. It stands between our life on earth and our future life in heaven, and it represents in part, as I understand it, the experience of heaven that we have on earth. But its main feature is the fact that one has to go there, and that the going is a rare and totally unpredictable gift.

Heaven as here; heaven as decidedly not here. Those are the two narrative ways, different and differently suggestive, in which Lewis imagines heaven, in the science fiction trilogy of 1938 to 1945 and the seven tales of Narnia of 1950 to 1956. (Whether he intended them or not, I am sure he was pleased by the power and centrality of the numbers 3 and 7 which govern the two series.) Those are also the two ways which I want to explore, and in considering, first, heaven as here, one can also glance at two further, specific means of proposing heaven as a present reality.

### **Heaven as Here**

The first describes heaven by conceiving a world without a Fall. Both Malacandra, which has nevertheless been struck by the devil from afar and includes a region without life, and especially Perelandra, whose first Man and Woman are in danger of a Fall but resist the temptation, are heavenly in the sense that there is no transgression, and God, or Maleldil, is everywhere present. They are the imagining of what it would have been like to live on an unfallen earth, in perfect communion with God, with each other, with the creation, with time; almost free of the sense of a distinction, and with no sense of a separation, between 'earth' and 'heaven'.

Lewis goes even further back, in *The Magician's Nephew*, to imitate the Creation itself, in Aslan's founding of Narnia. This is one of the major imaginative moments of the chronicles, as Aslan's ever-changing song brings into being a world much like our own yet with a gladness that one usually meets only in poetry or (even better) in certain moments of righted vision. Like the experiences of Ransom on Perelandra ('There was a exuberance or prodigality of sweetness about the mere act of living which our race finds it difficult not to associate with forbidden and extravagant actions'<sup>15</sup>), it impels one to re-read the opening chapters of Genesis, and enables one to recover something of the surprisingness, the delight, the ordered plenty, of a narrative whose grandeur has been considerably dignified for us by the weight of piety.

The ambition of Lewis's project, and also the perfection of his structuring of the overall story, can then be seen in the fact that, after the creation of Narnia, there follow in *The Last Battle*, the next and final book, its destruction and re-creation. There is an intimation here not of what it would have been like, but of what it will be like to live in a re-created world, in the 'new heavens' and the 'new earth' of the carefully worded promise (2 Peter 3:13), when the earth shall once again be heavenly. But only an intimation. The closing pages can only reach to the beginning of the new world and of the real story, and Lewis, like anyone else, 'cannot write' what will happen there.

The other way of suggesting heaven is to describe this world, or the story-world, as suddenly, even if quite mundanely, marvellous. After a great deal of time spent in the underground world of Underland, the children in *The Silver Chair* finally make their way back to the surface. Again, one needs to have read all the foregoing to get the force of their reaction; 'They had not only got out into the upper world at last, but had come out in the heart of Narnia. Jill felt she could have fainted with delight'. 'Jill rejoined Eustace and they shook one another by both hands and took in great deep breaths of the free midnight air'.<sup>16</sup> Heaven, or so the suggestion goes, is like coming out into real air.

This concentration on our own world comes partly from Lewis's unwillingness to think too much about what heaven will really be like. The unwillingness comes in its turn, first, from his

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15. *Voyage to Venus*, p. 32.

16. *The Silver Chair*, pp. 185, 189.



conviction that such thinking cannot lead anywhere. 'I wasn't at all questioning the life after death you know', he writes in a letter of 16 October 1960, 'only saying that its character is for us unimaginable.' The last word has a particular force coming from Lewis, who continues: 'The Bible seems scrupulously to avoid any *description* of the other world, or worlds, except in terms of parable or allegory'. So Lewis's own versions of heaven, without being specifically parables or allegories, will be adumbrations having their origin in this world. But he was also *wary* of thinking about heaven. What counts is the life now and for ever with God, and the idea of heaven can actually distract us, while our need for it may be wrongly motivated. In *Reflections on the Psalms*, he writes: 'Most of us find that our belief in the future life is strong only when God is in the centre of our thoughts; that if we try to use the hope of "Heaven" as a compensation (even for the most innocent and natural misery, that of bereavement) it crumbles away. It can, on those terms, be maintained only by arduous efforts of controlled imagination; and we know in our hearts that the imagination is our own'.<sup>17</sup> Note the suspicioning of the imagination, and also the persuasion that the future and the other world is most vivid when we are fully alive in the here and now. We are not to look for an after-life through disappointment with life, nor 'seek' another 'country' (Hebrews 11:14) from despair of this one.

And after all, although we talk of heaven as another world, don't we do so in part because of the inadequacy of speech and of human comprehension—or of the speech and comprehension of *fallen* humans? Since the physical universe is what we know, we assume that heaven is somewhere else, even though we also assume (rightly or wrongly) that it does not have the normal characteristics of a place: a number of dimensions and a passage through time. But the eldil of Malacandra tells Ransom that everywhere is the heavens, 'there is nowhere else', but that he is not 'here' on Mars altogether in the way that Ransom is.<sup>18</sup> One then recalls certain moments in the Bible when heaven is 'here', though not quite as we are. On waking from a famous dream of angels ascending and descending a ladder which reaches up to heaven and to God, Jacob says to himself, not that in the other dimension of dream he has had a true vision, but: 'Surely the Lord

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17. *Reflections on the Psalms*, pp. 39-40.

18. *Out of the Silent Planet*, p. 139.

is in this place; and I knew it not ... this is none other but the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven' (Genesis 28:16-17). Heaven brims over, as it were, from an experience in the mind to an actual place, somewhere between Beer-sheba and Haran. When Elisha's servant is afraid because of the Syrian army, Elisha prays for his eyes to be opened, 'and, behold, the mountain was full of horses and chariots of fire' (2 Kings 6:17). The mountain is real and located near the city of Dothan, and no less so are the fiery horses and chariots. And what of the Transfiguration? Jesus appears to Peter, James and John still not, I presume as he really is, but with a semblance much closer to his heavenly reality, as do also Moses and Elijah. The disciples are not given a telescopic vision of an event occurring in a distant elsewhere. Their eyes are opened so that they can see better and differently: so that they can glimpse the heaven which is nearer to us than anything else but also, because of sin, terribly and, but for grace, irremediably, distant.

One might also recall that in Matthew's gospel, the message of John the Baptist (3:2), of Jesus (4:17) and of the disciples (10:7), is that 'the kingdom of heaven is at hand', or 'is upon you' according to the New English Bible, or 'has drawn near' according to the Greek. (This is announced, to be sure, not as a new piece of theological information but as a reason for repentance.) The consequence of all this is that imagining heaven means attending, first, to the everyday earth, to the world in space and time that we have been set to inhabit: to '*this* place', since *this* is the house of God and *this* is the gate of heaven. It means, not beaming up to a totally different otherwhere but responding to, and indeed loving, what Lewis was still prepared to call the real. The real was neither something he suspected nor something rather dull and inferior to be tolerated grudgingly in the absence of, or on the way to, a superior world. He speaks with excitement of the real, and for reasons which are aesthetic as well as theological. In his talk, 'Is Theology Poetry?' he says: 'The contemplation of what we take to be real is always, I think, in tolerably sensitive minds, attended with a certain sort of aesthetic satisfaction—a sort which depends precisely on its supposed reality ... for the gravity and finality of the actual is itself an aesthetic stimulus.' I believe he is right, and that he knows something, incidentally, which in our own day the varieties of post-structuralism and post-modernism, and indeed all thinking which ends - not which begins

but which ends—by placing the word 'real' in inverted commas, cannot know.

I would add from my own experience something that others must realise better that I do: that what people who are not Christians call 'Christianity' or 'religion' is in no way a hopeful or even a convinced speculation about something more tenuous than the real—more marvellous, perhaps, yet less substantial—but that, on the contrary, any contact with God is an illuminating of reality such that everything outside that way of seeing, of believing, of sensing even, becomes unreal, part of the mere dream of the fallen self.

So heaven for Lewis is both other and the same. It is first, the real enhanced. Readers of *Perelandra* will remember the heightened sensations of Ransom as soon as he wakes on the new planet. He gets a mouthful of sea water: 'it was drinkable—like fresh water and only, by an infinitesimal degree, less insipid. Though he had not been aware of thirst till now, his drink gave him a quite astonishing pleasure. It was almost like meeting Pleasure itself for the first time'. He encounters the smells of the forest: 'To say that they made him feel hungry and thirsty would be misleading; almost, they created a new kind of hunger and thirst, a longing that seemed to flow over from the body into the soul and which was a heaven to feel'.<sup>19</sup> He still experiences hunger and thirst, not something entirely different, but his sensations have become more capacious than on earth. It is even said of the sweet and completely satisfying drink which is tasted in *The Voyage of the Dawn Treader* that it is 'real water', 'stronger than wine'.<sup>20</sup>

For Lewis imagines heaven as the world changed, as the more-than-real, as the really real. (This is also something which animates a great deal of poetry, including much that is not otherwise Christian. Is it perhaps the central *anima* of all poetry?) And this is accompanied by the conviction that it is *we* who shall know heaven, not some ghostlier version of ourselves, not some ethereal and disembodied soul. 'We shall eat of the tree of life', he says in 'The Weight of Glory' (surely one of the great English sermons), and the eating will be done by the whole man, including this risen body.

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19. *Voyage to Venus*, pp. 30, 36.

20. *Voyage of the Dawn Trader*, pp. 193, 198.

Lewis begins another sermon, 'A Slip of the Tongue', with the following anecdote: 'using the collect or the fourth Sunday after Trinity ... I found that I had made a slip of the tongue. I had meant to pray that I might so pass through things temporal that I finally lost not the things eternal; I found I had prayed so to pass through things eternal that I finally lost not the things temporal.' Lewis goes on, naturally, to criticise the mistake, as an unwitting disclosure of a secret dread which I dare say he is not alone in undergoing: 'I come into the presence of God', he says, 'with a great fear lest anything should happen to me within that presence which will prove too intolerably inconvenient when I have come out again into my "ordinary life".' Properly meant, however, the inverted prayer is surely a good one: a prayer that Lewis might endorse. Let me not so understand, or misunderstand, heaven, that I lose, if only temporarily, an earth and humanity which he intends not to abandon but to transfigure.

To meet the real, however, to know even the outer edge of reality in this life, is also (and this too the poets say) to encounter death. It is to discover the necessary supersession of the self and of its world as they are now. When Prince Caspian tastes the sea in *The Voyage of the Dawn Treader*, he says, 'That's real water, that. I'm not sure that it isn't going to kill me'.<sup>21</sup> It is as if reality and death were natural or supernatural allies, so that dying itself becomes real, and a cause for jubilation. When Eustace meets the resurrected Caspian at the end of *The Silver Chair*, he draws back, and says to Aslan, 'Hasn't he—er—died?' to which the comeback is this: "Yes," said the Lion in a very quiet voice, almost (Jill thought) as if he were laughing'.<sup>22</sup> Lewis is excellent at thus changing one's angle of vision on things, and he makes Aslan continue: 'He has died. Most people have, you know.' At the end of the chronicles of Narnia, on the final page of *The Last Battle*, this is how the children react to the thought that they might be dead: 'Their hearts leaped and a wild hope rose within them.'

### Heaven as not Here

But for those of us who are not dead, this transfiguration, this realising, of the universe, is painfully incomplete, and an attention to 'this place', though right for the time being, is not enough. We are still in history, and as Lewis writes in *Mere Christianity*, 'God

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21. *The Voyage of the Dawn Treader*, p. 193.

22. *The Silver Chair*, p. 203.

has no history. He is too completely and utterly real to have one'.<sup>23</sup> It is true that we are not God, and maybe had there been no Fall we should have experienced history nonetheless, only with no sense of limitation, of diminished reality. But there has been a Fall, and living in a fallen world we long for a world unfallen. Half-alive, we long for life. It is also true that this continues to be the earth which God made and sustains each day: if we do not desire it we cannot truly desire heaven. Yet equally, if we do not want the earth—despite our desire or perhaps precisely because of our desire—to change, we cannot claim that we know it to be fallen.

For what we have on earth is of course not heaven but glimpses of heaven. Ransom in the science-fiction trilogy can only experience 'heaven' for a length of time by leaving the earth altogether and travelling to the re-imagined planets of Mars and Venus. On his return, he is sick with longing. The children in the Narnia stories pass through a wardrobe, a painting, a door in a wall, into a more heavenly world having points of contact with this one. They gain access to another land and to a time which expands magically in the split second during which they are absent from earth. It is, in a way, a common idea, associated with shrines, with holy places: the sense of a sacred otherness which, though unfamiliar, impinges on the familiar. Although the children continue, moreover, to experience a sort of time, they do not really age, so that the reader enters a seeming timelessness, as a figure of the greater timelessness (if that is the correct word) of God and of heaven. It is an experience which Eliot had explored, and which one can know fitfully in prayer. It relates to what Lewis himself discusses at the end of *Reflections on the Psalms*. Commenting on the statement of St. Peter's that, not only are a thousand years as one day with God (as in Psalm 90:4), but 'one day ... as a thousand years' (2 Peter 3:8), he argues that the conception of 'the timeless as an eternal present has been achieved. Ever afterwards, for some of us, the "one day" in God's courts which if better than a thousand, must carry a double meaning. The Eternal may meet us in what is, by our present measurements, a day, or (more likely) a minute or a second; but we have touched what is not in any way commensurable with lengths of time, whether long or short. Hence

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23. *Mere Christianity*, p. 134.

our hope finally to emerge ...' The children too hope finally to emerge, but in the meanwhile they are continually thrust back into the every-day world of rooms and schools.

The ideal would be to pass through the glimpses of a heavenly, or haunted, earth into the fullness beyond: to come out on the other side. For Lewis, the longing for heaven is not that we should shuffle off this mortal coil and go elsewhere but that we should *enter*, and advance always 'farther up and farther in.' Again in 'The Weight of Glory' he says: 'At present we are on the outside of the world, the wrong side of the door ... We cannot mingle with the splendours we see. But all the leaves of the New Testament are rustling with the rumour that it will not always be so. Some day, God willing, we shall get *in*.' One finds the same spatial metaphor in *Perelandra*, when Ransom is yearning to return to Malacandra-Mars: 'I get the real twinge ... on hot summer days - looking up at the deep blue and thinking that *in there* ... there's a place I know'.<sup>24</sup> We should normally have spoken of Mars a being 'out' there; Lewis has one again overturned our perspective. Indeed, his metaphorical space is always surprising. The sermon continues: 'Nature is only the image, the symbol; but it is the symbol Scripture invites me to use. We are summoned to pass in through Nature, beyond her, into that splendour which she fitfully reflects. And in there, in beyond Nature, we shall eat of the tree of life.'

'In through', 'in beyond': these are most careful ways of describing the relation of heaven to an earth both fallen and capable of re-creation. But because that prepositional movement is precisely what, for the time being, we cannot achieve, we also feel pain. It is again, in part, a matter of aesthetics. 'The Weight of Glory' also says: 'We do not want merely to *see* beauty, though, God knows, even that is bounty enough. We want something else which can hardly be put into words—to be united with the beauty we see ... to become part of it. That is why we have peopled earth and air and water with gods and goddesses and nymphs and elves—that, though we cannot, yet these projections can, enjoy in themselves that beauty, grace, and power of which Nature is the image.' It is an interesting suggestion, and partly explains why, even in contemporary writing, we cannot get such creatures out of our minds. Hence what Lewis calls in the preface to the new and

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24. *Voyage to Venus*, p. 17.

revised edition of *The Pilgrim's Regress*, 'sweet desire'. It is an 'intense longing' characterised by the fact that though the sense of want is acute and even painful, yet the mere wanting is felt to be somehow a delight'. Indeed, it cuts across our ordinary distinctions between wanting and having. To have it is, by definition, a want: to want it, we find, is to have it'.<sup>25</sup> He returns to this in a much later letter, of 5 November 1954: 'All joy (as distinct from mere pleasure, still more amusement) emphasises our pilgrim status: always reminds, beckons, awakes desire. Our best havings are wantings.' One recognises the definition of joy in *Surprised by Joy*, and its even more haunting association there with distress: it is 'an unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction... and must be sharply distinguished both from Happiness and from Pleasure ... it might almost equally well be called a particular kind of unhappiness or grief.'<sup>26</sup>

So one needs another perspective on to death. It would be a cause for rejoicing if we could die and see God, but we cannot. Hence, though mercifully only at certain moments, the ache of exclusion. This is how Lewis phrases it in the letter just quoted: 'About death, I go through different moods, but the times when I can *desire* it are never, I think, those when this world seems harshest. On the contrary, it is just when there seems to be most of Heaven already here that I come nearest to longing for the *patria*.' Psyche was to say, in *Till We Have Faces*: 'It was when I was happiest that I longed most ... for death.'<sup>27</sup>

Lewis goes directly from this thinking about 'sweet desire' to his practice as a storyteller, and also to his reflection on narrative. In the essay 'On Stories', he homes to the specific power of story to create an otherness of imaginative atmosphere. He says of his boyhood reading of tales about 'Red Indians': 'I wanted not the momentary suspense but that whole world to which it belonged', and he sees the aim of science fiction as being not to suggest 'merely physical strangeness or merely spatial distance' but to realise 'that idea of otherness which we are always trying to grasp in a story about voyaging through space'. The point about a giant in a story is similarly not that he is a danger but that he is a giant. Yet there is no question here of mere escapism. On the

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25. *The Pilgrim's Regress*, pp. 7, 8.

26. *Surprised by Joy*, p. 20.

27. *Till We Have Faces*, p. 82.

contrary. One is only capable of fully appreciating this otherness if one can achieve something like it for oneself in the times and spaces of daily life: 'No man would find an abiding strangeness on the Moon unless he were the sort of man who could find it in his own back garden.' And he sees the otherness, as ever, not as a way out of life but as a way back into it, saying of a particular book: 'the whole story, paradoxically enough, strengthens our relish for real life. This excursion into the preposterous sends us back with renewed pleasure to the actual.' The book in question—and this is typical of Lewis's willingness to follow his admirations and his thought wherever they take him—is *The Wind and the Willows*.

The difficulty of story, for Lewis, is that while its theme is usually 'something other than a process and much more like a state or quality,' it is always in danger of losing the state or quality in the process, of dissipating the strangeness in the necessary successiveness of things happening. His explanation for this is that life is like that too. We are constantly looking forward to something, a homecoming, say, or reunion with a beloved, but it eludes our grasp: 'something must happen, and after that something else ... can any such series quite embody the sheer state of being which was what we wanted?' What we want is indeed to *be*, but we find ourselves moving through time, just as the imaginative otherness of story has to advance through the plot. Yet we have more chance in story than in life of capturing the elusive bird of being, and that is what stories are for: not to relieve us of the responsibility of searching in real life for the being, the otherness, the 'timelessness', that we know in imagination, but to show us something of what such a state would be like. Precisely because it is fiction and artifice, story can move slightly outside fact and nature.

As I said, the relation which Lewis is arguing between earth and heaven implies not that this earth is enough, nor that its evil demands that we go elsewhere but that the beauty of earth, the joy of life, are such that they call us 'in beyond' themselves to 'another country', to what Digory, finding himself in the re-created Narnia, calls 'more like the real thing'.<sup>28</sup> For Lewis, this involves imagining a world somewhere between the two, since he can neither be content with describing this world nor presume to

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28. *The Last Battle*, p.153



describe heaven. One sees here the Romantic Lewis, but also Lewis the Renaissance scholar and Lewis the Platonist. I should like to close by exploring those two contexts for his work, not so as to 'place' him but so as to see what we can learn.

The Lady on Perelandra finds it strange to 'think about what will never happen', but someone from Earth replies: 'in our world we do it all the time. We put words together to mean things that have never happened and places that never were: beautiful words, well put together. And then tell them to one another. We call it stories or poetry ... It is for mirth and wonder and wisdom... Because the worth is made up not only of what is but of what might be'.<sup>29</sup> In Lewis's usual way, with no assumption of authority (through eloquence or the signalling of momentousness) but with a simple vocabulary going about its work, he has surely offered a perfect apology for literature, and indeed for language. Words when they form patterns that intend beauty and order detach themselves ever so slightly from what is, so as to create another world—in Lewis's case Narnia, Malacandra, or Perelandra itself—which is not quite this one but stands to it in a relation of virtuality. One recognises the Sidney of *An Apology for Poetry*, commending true poets who 'borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be; but range, only reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be.'

Indeed, as one remembers the most famous passage in the *Apology*, which contrasts the brazen world of nature with the golden world of the poets, one realises how apposite Sidney's thinking is to Lewis's narratives. 'Nature never set forth the earth ... with so pleasant rivers, fruitful trees, sweet-smelling flowers' as the poets have done, or, one might add, as the poet in Lewis has done in his invented worlds. Lewis too has grown 'in effect another nature', whose purpose, as in Sidney, is not to lead away from nature as we know it but to conduct the reader back to the earth. Art leads us away from the earth so as to return us to the earth in its becoming, just as a belief in heaven makes the here and now not less but more desirable.

One remembers that the seven books of Narnia, although they lead eventually to heaven, lead also to England. In travelling to Narnia and then to Narnia re-created, the children come in the

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29. *Voyage to Venus*, pp. 93-4

final pages of *The Last Battle* (as does the speaker of Eliot's *Four Quartets* in the final pages of 'Little Gidding') to where they started, to 'the real England', the 'inner England' of which 'no good thing is destroyed'.

The Platonism of Lewis is equally clear. When Digory explains to the children, again at the end of *The Last Battle*, that the old Narnia was a shadow or a copy of the 'new Narnia', the 'real Narnia', just as England and our world are a shadow or copy of something in heaven,<sup>30</sup> he refers explicitly to Plato, and so places the whole series of the chronicles in part under Plato's aegis. 'Shadow' and 'copy' relate, moreover, to another word which teems over these pages, the word 'like', and it is here that I want to concentrate my final thoughts. Even within our own world, it is arguable—and poetry argues this—that we need 'like', we need comparison of one thing with another, not only so as to have a world, a totality rather than a number of discreet items, but even so as to have the individual thing with which we start. Only by placing it in relation to something else do we begin to see it. We come to know the world by a process of likening. (The etymology of the word also encourages one to say, rather surprisingly, that we come to know the world by liking it.) But 'like' is also the means by which we move beyond the world. It takes us out of our reality without merely projecting us into an absolute elsewhere. We can make story worlds and poetry worlds which are 'like' ours though different, and a Christian will explain this ability in part by the fact that another such world actually exists: that earth is 'like' heaven, and heaven 'like' earth.

One could add that the other way of exiting from this world, in time rather than in space, is by returning to origin, and there too one finds that the Bible comes to our assistance with a 'like'. The first humans are said to be created in the 'image' and 'likeness' of God (Genesis 1:26), and part of the implication of that origin seems to be that we have the capacity to liken, in and especially out beyond our world, because we carry likeness'within ourselves.

Do we not also desire at times to reach a point beyond likeness, to find a something so grounded that it has no need of similitude and so much itself that it does not continually surrender part of its reality by being compared? Once again the

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30. *The Last Battle*, pp. 153-54.

Bible has gone ahead of us, for as Aquinas said, although we are like God, God is not like us. God in Himself is the incomparable. 'I am God, and there is none like me', He says in Isaiah (46:9). 'Who in the heaven can be compared unto the Lord?' asks a psalmist; 'who among the sons of the mighty can be likened unto the Lord?' (Psalm 89:6).

'Like' is a small word from which one can derive a view of not less than everything. In pushing beyond likeness to the Being of God, Lewis is also careful to take to its proper extremity the otherness of the same. Heaven is not like earth in the sense that it is our world made dazzlingly better, since we are told that there will be 'new heavens' and a 'new earth' and we do not know what they will be like (any more than we know what we shall be like ourselves). So I shall close by moving from Lewis to St. Paul, for a comparison which he uses makes this perfectly clear, while also creating just that 'Romantic' sense of wonder of which Lewis so approved. The resurrection of the dead, Paul says in a famous passage which all readers of poetry and story can meditate, is like a wheat seed which turns, beyond all expectation, into wheat: the body is 'sown' in the ground as a natural body and is raised as a 'spiritual body' (I Corinthians 15:37-44). Heaven is like this world, our future bodies are like our present bodies, but only as a wheat field is like a sack of grain. That is why, as Lewis says, it is unimaginable. Living in the world we know and trying to imagine heaven is like living in world where corn existed only in the form of seeds and trying to imagine acres of wheat shining in the sun and swishing in the wind.

# *Christianity and the Social Market Economy in Britain, Germany and Northern Ireland*

by ESMOND BIRNIE

## **Introduction**

In the early 1990s the phrase 'social market economy' gained some currency in UK political discussion. The idea was first introduced by the Conservative Keith Joseph in 1975, then revived in the early 1980s by the Social Democrat David Owen, and was then used by Chris Patten, the chairman of the Conservative Party.<sup>1</sup> Elements of social market thinking are also implicit in the new look Labour Party. John Smith, when Shadow Chancellor, claimed Labour offered a modern mixed economy together with the welfare provision of the European Community Social Charter, in short, something close to the model of the West German economy.<sup>2</sup>

All political slogans require careful decoding to ascertain the underlying assumptions on which they are based and value judgments which they contain and it is especially important for Christians to do this. The concept of the social market economy is of peculiar interest given its links to Christian thinking in terms of both its origins and evolution and this article will attempt to ascertain how far it represents a Christian way of looking at the problem of economic policy making.

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1. Keith Joseph, *Why Britain needs a Social Market Economy* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1975); David Owen, *A Future that will Work* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984); and Chris Patten "The Power to Change", *Marxism Today*, pp. 20-23.

2. "Labour Closer to German Economic Model, says Smith", *Financial Times* (June 20, 1991).

## **German origins**

Some of the German social market theorists viewed the collapse of German democracy during 1918-33 as being caused by the failure of public attitudes and values to maintain the moral basis of a free market and a free society. In other words, they thought that a successful post-war economy would require a spiritual as well as a material change. Thus for Ludwig Erhard,<sup>3</sup> who was the Federal Republic's Minister for the Economy throughout the 1950s, and some economists like W. Ropke, the social market idea was a practical expression of their Christian faith; an attempt to develop an economic policy which was both right and workable.

The social market economy was conceived in part as an antidote to the failure of *laissez faire* capitalism (i.e. a free market economy with minimal government regulation) in Germany during the 1870s-1920s. It was also intended to be an alternative to the totalitarian economy which developed under the Nazis from 1933 onwards. The early proponents of the social market economy saw the post-1945 Soviet client regime of East Germany as continuing the horrors and evils of Hitler's central planning under a different ideological name. In reaching the conclusion that neither free market capitalism nor centrally planned socialism are socially desirable, the original proponents of the social market adopted a position similar to that taken by some Christian observers of economics within the English-speaking world.<sup>4</sup>

## **The German social market economy in practice**

When the social market idea was implemented in early postwar west Germany stress was placed on two key elements; the use of government regulation to promote competition and, secondly, the restraint of inflation. While these features have a certain resonance with parts of Mrs Thatcher's agenda in Britain during the 1980s, the Germans had their own peculiar historical reasons for this emphasis (a desire to avoid such past mistakes as the monopolisation of industry during the late nineteenth century and the hyperinflation of 1922-23). It should also be noted that the

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3. A collection of Erhard's speeches *Wohlstand für Alle* is published in English as *Prosperity Through Competition* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1958).

4. For example: J.P. Wogaman, *Christians and the Great Economic Debate* (London: SCM, 1977); and D. Hay, *Economics Today: A Christian Critique* (Leicester: Apollos, 1989).

avoidance of large monopolies and inflation are policy imperatives which could be endorsed by Christians.<sup>5</sup>

In fact the German social market economy idea differs substantially from the pro-market and generally right-wing political and economic viewpoint which was to become so important in America and Britain in the 1980s. For one thing, the German authorities have had a more consistent success in controlling inflation (it is much less clear whether the anti-monopoly policy retained its teeth). Moreover, there was greater recognition in Germany that an unregulated market economy does not necessarily achieve socially desirable outcomes; "Like pure democracy, undiluted capitalism is intolerable".<sup>6</sup> There was a recognition in Germany in the 1950s that we must go "beyond supply and demand"<sup>7</sup> and approach the economy as a means to an end rather than the end itself. Rustow hoped that the social market economy would be a "servant of humanity and of transeconomic values" and Muller-Armack envisaged an "irenic order".<sup>8</sup>

Such a willingness to subject economic performance to judgment by moral values should meet with approval within a Christian perspective but this begs the question of how far the social market economy (whether Christian or not) actually worked? Certainly much of Germany's postwar performance can be attributed to simple factors like the reconstruction boom. Some observers have argued that the social market economy idea played little part in the so-called economic miracle whilst others have claimed it was only rhetoric used by politicians to disguise the operation of market forces under a cloak of social respectability.<sup>9</sup>

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5. There would probably be little dissent to the proposition that Christians should be wary of all concentrations of power whether economic or otherwise. B. Griffiths strongly argues that inflation is a moral evil which Christian must oppose (*Morality and the Market Place* [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1982]) but Hay (*op cit.*) is more sceptical about this.

6. W. Ropke, *Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage* published in English as *A Humane Economy: The Social Framework of the Free Market* (London: Oswald Wolff, 1960).

7. This is the literal translation of the title of Ropke's book.

8. Rustow quoted in K. Zweig, *The Origins of the German Social Market Economy* (Adam Smith Institute). A. Müller-Armack, "The Principles of the Social Market Economy", *German Economic Review*, 3 (1965).

9. Significantly the critics have been found on both the Left (e.g. A. Gamble, "In Search of The Social Market Economy", *The Times* (July 21, 1987) and the Right (e.g. F. von Hayek, "What is 'Social'? What does it Mean?", *Studies in*

However, actual performance may still have been better than can be explained by the standard economic factors (e.g. investment or exports). In short, ideology and the idea of the social market economy did make a difference.

### **A Christian evaluation of the German social market economy**

This still leaves the question how far the social market succeeded as a distinctively Christian conception. The grounds for scepticism might include the fact that during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the conduct and objectives of West German macroeconomic policy became increasingly similar to those of policy in the USA and UK (though the German authorities were usually more successful).

A full evaluation of the social market economy must await the development of a Christian economic research agenda. This could be based upon the principles of economic ethics which have been derived from the Bible. Hay argues that eight major principles can be drawn from the New and Old Testament though he stresses that these are provisional and incomplete and must be susceptible to correction from Scripture itself.<sup>10</sup>

*Principle number 1:* people must use resources to provide for their existence but without waste or destruction.

*Principle number 2:* every person has a calling to use gifts and exercise stewardship.

*Principle number 3:* we are accountable to God for our stewardship.

*Principle number 4:* man has a right to work and an obligation to work.

*Principle number 5:* work is a means of exercising stewardship and everyone should have access to resources and control over them.

*Principle number 6:* work is a social activity involving cooperation.

*Principle number 7:* every person has a right to share in God's provision of basic needs.

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*Philosophy, Politics and Economics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967); and N. Stone, "A Word in Patten's ear about Political Humbug", *Sunday Times* (February 24, 1991).

10. Hay, *op cit.*

*Principle number 8:* personal stewardship does not imply the right to consume the entire output of the resources over which one exercises stewardship.<sup>11</sup>

These principles can be used to test whether the outcomes of the social market economy did realise part of the Christian vision of its founders. For example, the practice of co-determination was established whereby larger companies have worker representatives on their supervisory boards. This is closer to Christian ideals of stewardship and co-operative behaviour (Hay's Principles 2, 5 and 6) than the situation in Britain where both company law and economy theory regard the shareholder's interests as the sole legitimate concern of the company. Christian ideas of equity were reflected by use in the late 1940s and early 1950s of a general capital and property levy to redistribute resources to the millions of refugees who were then arriving from the east (Principle 7). It would be difficult to test whether in some general sense the fairness of postwar German society was greater than that of its British counterpart (Principles 4, 5, 7 and 8). There are problems in principle and practice in making comparisons of the extent of inequality of income in different countries. However, the available statistics do suggest that the total income of the poorest two-fifths of the West German population is a substantially higher proportion (52 per cent in 1978) of the total income of the richest one-fifth than is the case in the UK (40 per cent in 1986). Of course Christians might be more concerned to promote equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome (Principles 2 and 5). The extent of equality of opportunity is even more difficult to measure but it does seem

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11. M. Schluter and R. Clements, "Jubilee Institutional Norms: A Middle Way between Creation Ethics and Kingdom Ethics as a Basis for Christian Political Action", *Jubilee Centre Paper* (Oxford, 1989), argue that Biblically-derived economic principles are usually too abstract to provide practical guidance when policy priorities are in conflict. It is better in their view to use the Old Testament Law as a model which can be applied across the years to contemporary society once norms for particular areas of social, political and economic life have been extracted from that model. They argue that the norms they have identified are held together by the unifying theme of God's concern for the "relationist" performance of society (i.e. quality of human relationships). Particular emphasis is therefore placed on maintaining and strengthening the extended family. Perhaps the principles of Hay and the norms Schluter and Clements are less competitive than they are complementary.



likely that German society was more often perceived to be fair by its members than was the case in the UK.<sup>12</sup>

None of these points is meant to exaggerate the extent to which postwar German policy can be said to be Christian nor to minimise the extent to which the German social market economy failed to deal with problems of urban, regional and ethnic<sup>13</sup> deprivation. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the social market economy will pass what is now its greatest test; the challenge of fully integrating the 16 million citizens of the former East Germany into the political, social and economic life of a reunified Germany. On the positive side, western taxpayers have displayed generosity (albeit grudgingly) to the extent that more than half of the economic activity in the East is now funded by public money coming from the West.<sup>14</sup> On the debit side, it appears that while the westerners are supporting an increasing number of easterners on the dole, much less has been done to facilitate the exercise of stewardship in the East (Principles 2 and 4). The Western authorities have been criticised (by the OECD and the head of the German Cartel Office) for their policy of selling off the former Eastern state enterprises almost exclusively to West German companies. Inadequate opportunity has been given to the eastern managers and workers to operate employee-management buy-outs (Principles 5 and 6). It would be tragic if the east Germans found that not only does the centrally planned economy frustrate stewardship but so does a western market economy.

### **The contrast to Britain**

Whilst the German social market economy represents a very imperfect attempt to apply Christianity it is certainly superior to

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12. P. Lawrence, *Managers and Management in West Germany* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), claims that German workers were more likely than their British counterparts to view their society as meritocratic. S.J. Prais ("Vocational qualifications of the labour force in Britain and Germany" *National Institute Economic Review*, no. 98, pp. 47-59) argues that a widespread commitment to education amongst all sections of German society leads to that society having a much more 'middle class' character than is the case in Britain.

13. Though the excellent German system of post-16 industrial apprenticeships seems to be much better at integrating the immigrant population than its British counterpart which historically has had little to offer the low achiever and the non-academic.

14. "A nation unified and yet apart," *Financial Times* (July 1, 1991).

the thinking which has underpinned economic policy making in the UK. Since the mid-nineteenth century mainstream economic thought in the English-speaking world has viewed economic life as a process whereby individuals satisfy their wants (or “preferences”) for consumption goods, savings or leisure.<sup>15</sup> The success or otherwise of the economy in meeting these preferences is deemed the legitimate realm of economic analysis but any consideration of the moral justification of preferences or outcomes is viewed as lying outside the subject’s remit.

This indifference to moral and ethical concerns<sup>16</sup> has spread from the economic theoreticians to the attitudes and practices of British governments. Increasingly both the Conservative and Labour Parties have based their claims to power on their supposed competence as managers of the economy; the ability to deliver high and steady rates of economic growth. Thus, Right and Left have increasingly talked the language of individual self-satisfaction and neglected any appreciation of ideas of economic and social justice. The economy is thus treated as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end. That this position is at variance with Christianity is not surprising given that it represents the logical development of such nineteenth century ideas as utilitarianism which were conceived as replacements for traditional Christian social teaching.<sup>17</sup> For all its flaws the original German conception of the social market economy does have the great virtue of being free of many of these damaging secular assumptions.

### **Recognition that the market needs morality**

Not only did the German social market theorists stress that the market must operate justly, and be seen to be just, but they also

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15. Adam Smith (1776) viewed consumption as “... the sole end and object of all economic activity...” J. M. Keynes (1936) did not disagree with this sentiment.

16. Until at least the mid-nineteenth century economics was still regarded as a *moral science*. Utilitarian theory of *how* people behave was also viewed as a prescription of the way they *should* behave (i.e. to promote the “greatest happiness of the greatest number”). Thereafter the movement to positivism began; i.e. the analysis of what ‘is’ was to be separated from what ‘should be’. Economics was to be concerned with means, not with the ends to which those means might be applied (L. Robbins, *An Essay on The Nature and Significance of Economic Science* [London: Macmillan, 1935]).

17. Some of the early utilitarians such Bentham and James Mill were hopeful that their theory would supercede Christianity.

recognised that certain moral attitudes and behaviour were required for the successful operation of a market economy. For example, Erhard claimed, "The social market economy cannot flourish if the spiritual attitude on which it is based—that is the readiness to assume the responsibility for one's fate and to participate in honest and free competition—is undermined".<sup>18</sup> He feared that in the long run the relentless pursuit of consumerism or materialism would undermine this spiritual attitude. Röpke detected a tendency for market capitalism to be soul-destroying and therefore destructive of its own moral foundations.<sup>19</sup> He was alarmed by the growth of big cities and large companies which he feared would reduce cultural and ethical standards to the lowest common denominator.

However, the German social market theorists were not simply prophets of doom. They had a positive policy agenda which stressed small and medium-sized social and community groups, most notably the family, as a means to mitigate the ill effects of the market economy. They saw the value of what the sociologists call the "mediating structures" which lie between the individual and agencies of the state.

By recognising the need for morality to underpin the market, the Germans contrasted with some of the political right in the UK who "... appear totally blind to the extent a free market needs to be buttressed and regularised by a set of moral values. Ironically these values are undermined by the very operation of the free market"<sup>20</sup>.

### **Britain needs a social market economy**

Christian social action and reform will always have a piecemeal character because we cannot expect perfection before the New Jerusalem (Revelation Chapters 21-22). However, to the extent that the social market is closer to some of the Biblical principles of economic ethics than either the mixed economy consensus of 1945-79 or the Thatcherism of 1979-90, there is a case for a discerning importation and adaptation of the German model.

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18. Quoted in N. Barry, "Overall view of the German liberal movement", in A Peacock and H. Willgerodt (eds), *German Neo-liberals and The Social Market Economy* (London: Macmillan, 1989).

19. Röpke, *op. cit.*

20. F. Field in *Reponses to Robert Skidelsky on the Social Market Economy*, Social Market Foundation Paper no. 2 (London: 1989).

For example in any “Christian social market economy” the commitment to wealth creation would go alongside one to social provision. It would be recognised that, provided it operates within certain moral limits, the “... free market [is] something mainly beneficial and even [is] something given by God, like the state and family”<sup>21</sup> (see also Hay’s Principle 1). Competition would be promoted in order to attain responsible wealth creation by ensuring large companies (especially among the privatised utilities) serve the customer.

Everyone including the unemployed and the young should be given the ability to exercise a greater degree of stewardship (Hay’s principles 2, 3, 4 and 5). For example, the proposal to give 16-18 years old credits to buy training would be extended and upgraded in value. The damaging impact of long-term unemployment could be reduced by adopting the American system of workfare, where benefit is made conditional on doing some piece of work for either central or local government.

In order to realise the Biblical goal that basic needs should be within reach of all the population (Hay’s principles 7 and 8) the NHS would continue to supply most health care services “free at the point of use”. However, there would still be room for a debate as to how far health care provision, funded predominantly out of general taxation, would be more fairly and efficiently supplied if greater use were made of competition and decentralised administration.

There would be a much greater recognition that a wide range of government policies (e.g. on taxation, regional development, divorce and Sunday trading) impact upon the health and cohesiveness of the nuclear and extended family. In particular measures would be taken to educate people about the use of credit and the perils of personal indebtedness (this could be financed by a levy on the profits of the financial institutions).<sup>22</sup>

At the international level the UK would seek to realise the United Nations international aid target of one per cent of total national income. It would also be recognised that trade may be as important to the less developed countries as aid. Thus the UK would attempt to remove those parts of the Common Agricultural

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21. D.L. Edwards “Towards an Understanding” in D.L. Edwards and M. Allison (eds), *Christianity and Conservatism* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990).

22. A. Hartopp et al., “Families in Debt”, *Jubilee Centre Research Report no. 7* (London: 1988).

Policy and the Multi-Fibre Agreement which discriminate against products of Africa, Asia and Latin America.<sup>23</sup>

Overall, the social market economy would be “one embedded in social arrangements regarded as fair”.<sup>24</sup>

### **Northern Ireland needs a social market economy**

The idea of the social market has very particular relevance to Northern Ireland.<sup>25</sup> On the one hand, the continued existence of rates of poverty and inequality greater than those in Great Britain points to the need for a *social* market economy. On the other hand, the expenditure over several decades of huge sums of public money as part of industrial and social development policies has failed to create those conditions which would enable the local economy to generate those rates of economic growth which are required to reduce the levels of poverty and unemployment. By implication, Northern Ireland needs a social *market* economy; an economy where the market or private sector is sufficiently competitive on international markets to generate the resources required to fund social spending in the Province.

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23. Unfortunately any removal of the protection afforded by the MFA would be especially painful to Northern Ireland industry given its dependence on clothing manufacture (particularly shirts). However, quite apart from the greater needs of the Asian exporters, it is not in the general interest of Northern Ireland society to use a mixture of subsidies (paid for by the taxpayer) and artificially high prices (paid by the customer) to prolong the existence of low skill and low wage jobs. A progressive industrial policy would aim to shift Northern Ireland's industrial structure towards those activities which are sufficiently advanced to avoid Third World competition (see note 25 below and the last section of the text).

24. R. Skidelsky, *The Social Market Economy*, Social Market Foundation Paper no. 1 (London, 1989).

25. On the present state of the Northern Ireland economy see R. I. D. Harris, C. W. Jefferson and J. E. Spencer (eds), *The Northern Ireland Economy* (London: Longman, 1990). The costs, achievements and limitations of government policy are described in N.I. Economic Council (1991), “Economic Strategy in Northern Ireland”, *Report no. 88*. One of the strengths of the West German economy, a high level of productivity in manufacturing, is contrasted with a relatively poor Northern Ireland performance in D. M. W. N. Hitchens, K. Wagner and J. E. Birnie, *Closing the Productivity Gap* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990). Significantly, they claim that the German firms had the key advantage of favourable labour attitudes to work effort and industrial relations. Despite the much-vaunted work ethic, comparatively obstructive attitudes were evidenced in the Northern Ireland firms. Such negative attitudes could be combated by a more widespread adoption of Biblical attitudes to work and wealth creation.

There has long been a strand in Reformed thinking which has justified the creation of wealth as part of the fulfilment of the so-called Creation Mandate to mankind to be “fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1: 28; cf. Hay’s principle 1). In the Northern Ireland context the general Biblical warrant for wealth creation is reinforced by consideration of some of the practical results which flow from the failure to achieve such wealth creation. Failure to raise the productivity of the local economy and hence its competitiveness is likely to lead to unemployment and migration remaining at their present high levels and this would represent a social evil which should be condemned by Christians.<sup>26</sup> Secular analysis of the Northern Ireland economic predicament is usually pessimistic. As Christians we should certainly be realists. Yet we can also hope that improvements will occur if attitudes and thinking about the economy come to reflect Christian value judgment rather than secular ones (Deuteronomy 8:17-18) and perhaps the philosophy of the social market economy could be helpful in this respect.

### **Acknowledgements**

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26. Both because unemployment frustrates the exercise of stewardship and migration weakens the extended family.

## Essay Review

A.N. Wilson, *C.S. Lewis: A Biography*, Collins, 1990

***'The Red-Faced Ulsterman':  
A.N. Wilson on C.S. Lewis***

by JOHN GILLESPIE\*

When it was published in 1990, A.N. Wilson's biography of C.S. Lewis received an enthusiastic reception and considerable critical acclaim. It sold well in hardback and was subsequently issued as a paperback. This is testimony not only to the continuing popularity of C.S. Lewis and the absence of a thoroughly researched critical biography about him, but also to the reputation of A.N. Wilson as a novelist and biographer. It probably also had a lot to do with the aspects of Lewis' life on which A.N. Wilson concentrates.

Wilson is correct in observing the extent to which studies of C.S. Lewis have been distorted by the hagiographers. However, although his passages on the opposing camps of Lewis worshippers are amusing and to an extent enlightening, they are simplistic and melodramatic. He is very patronizing towards Wheaton College and somewhat spiteful about Walter Hooper's 'C.S. Lewis industry' (p. 302). Moreover he has forgotten about the distortions of Lewis' detractors. Almost thirty years after his death the name of C.S. Lewis is still capable of stirring considerable controversy, particularly among those with Oxbridge connections. What has been needed is a biography which gives a sympathetic but honest account of Lewis' life and critically assesses his intellectual life and concerns within that context.

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\* This essay review also appeared in *The Glass*, No. 8, Autumn 1993.

Regrettably, these are tasks that A.N. Wilson has signally failed to perform.

Despite this there are many good things about the book. Wilson, as one might expect, writes very well; he has clearly read almost everything that Lewis ever published, and has researched the Lewis papers and correspondence thoroughly. He has considerable admiration for Lewis' intellect and writings and has been moved by some works in particular. Moreover, having been a fellow at Oxford himself, his account benefits from the knowledge of the insider. His description of the reasons for Lewis not getting the Merton chair of English in 1947 (p. 208), for example, is particularly good, as are his accounts of the jealousy of his academic colleagues. He is also interesting in his presentation of Lewis' neo-platonic approach to Christianity and his lack of concern for the doctrine of justification by faith. However one comes away from reading the biography feeling that one has found out almost as much about A.N. Wilson and his opinions, likes and dislikes as about C.S. Lewis.

### **Lewis the Ulsterman**

For Wilson does not only like and admire Lewis, he also seems to dislike him as well. One feels that in Wilson's eyes one of the main problems is that Lewis is an Irishman and, worse still, an Ulsterman. Although his researches on Lewis' grandparents and parents are interesting and informative, his grasp of Northern Ireland society and politics both then and now seems so shaky as to undermine confidence in his judgement in other areas. One could overlook sentences such as 'What about Campbell College, the best school in Belfast?' when referring to 1904 (the school had only been founded shortly before and was competing with other more established and successful academic institutions) and slips such as 'Island Magee' rather than 'Islandmagee' are merely irritating. But his rather simplistic and stereotyped view of the extremely complex political situation in the province is disturbing. Northern Ireland is characterised solely in terms of a rather melodramatic sectarianism and bigotry.

This stereotyped attitude to the Irish is well illustrated in Wilson's description of the Professor of Poetry contest at Oxford. Lewis is roundly condemned for having backed a candidate and tried to help him win by canvassing vigorously on his behalf, rather than congratulated on his democratic instincts. For Wilson this appears to be 'bad form' which can be easily explained: 'This



was a situation which the Ulsterman in Lewis relished. For the time being, he ceased to be a cloistered academic and became once more the son of the police-court solicitor in Belfast, the city where the most popular political slogan at election times was vote early, vote often' (p. 157). 'In staunch Irish fashion, he laid on transport for Fox's supporters to be bused (sic) into Oxford on the appropriate days and rewarded them for their votes with meals and refreshment at Magdalen' (p. 158).

In Wilson's view this episode destroyed Lewis's chances of promotion. Apart from being an indictment of the pettiness of the academics concerned, it shows that Wilson is not beyond resorting to the same instincts of snobbery, caricature, and racism. Lewis broke the rules. For Wilson, he is politically incorrect, red-faced Ulsterman, coarse, contemptuous of the opposite sex, a heavy smoker who liked a drink. He did not conform to a certain kind of style. Worst of all, he was someone who thought he was right, and indulged in debate with a desire to argue his point vigorously and to win it.

He puts this approach down to the 'bogey of Lewis's Ulster background (which) lurked beneath the surface of his imagination, and rose when he was off his guard to make him brutal in manners, crude or illogical in thought' (p. 136). Further anti-Irish views are suggested by remarks such as 'the Ulster viewpoint' (p. 24); 'the broadest Ulster brogue' (p. 31); 'all his anti-English prejudice' (p. 33); and 'the diminutive French scholar Enid Starkie, a peculiar little Irish woman'. In the same category is the assumption of anti-catholicism: 'Lewis himself would have found it uncomfortable that he had been taken up by the Sovereign Pontiff in Rome' (p. 308) a remark rather out of keeping with views expressed in, for example, *Mere Christianity*. This tendency is what Tolkien referred to as the 'ulterior motive' (p. 136).

### **Lewis and Mrs Moore**

However, although an Irishman may cavil at Wilson's apparent racism, its major effect is to call his judgement in question. By far the most controversial aspect of the book is the charge that Lewis' relationship with Mrs Moore was something more than that of a mother and son relationship and that they had a lengthy secret affair. This claim, if true, should cause a serious re-evaluation of Lewis. However Wilson, instead of dealing with the issue head on and assessing the evidence carefully, indulges in considerable equivocation. Mrs Moore comes to form an important

narrative thread of the biography, yet it is a thread of inconsistent innuendo rather than of evidence, argument and proof.

Wilson concedes that there is a lack of evidence: "It would also be amazing, though no evidence is forthcoming either way, if Lewis' thirty-year relationship with Mrs Moore was entirely asexual" (p. xvi), but refers to Mrs Moore as 'a pretty blonde Irishwoman of forty-five' (p. 52) and then later suggests that a lack of evidence should not stand in the way of his theory: "the burden of proof is on those who believe that Lewis and Mrs Moore were *not* lovers—probably from the summer of 1918 onwards" (p. 59).

Similarly while saying "It is probably fanciful to cast Mrs Moore as Phaedra, or the P'daytabird as Theseus, but now Lewis was crossing the sea to see his father for the last time" (p. 110), he nonetheless continues his narrative as if it were true. And Lewis' conversion is not immune from innuendo: "It would be far too glib to suggest that he consciously made the second change, to adopt Christianity, merely to give himself an excuse to abandon sexual relations with Mrs Moore, whatever the nature of those relations had been" (p. 128). And then later he backtracks in saying: 'the relations he had with her were far more intense than those which most men have with their mothers' (233). When Joy Davidman comes on the scene he sees her "as a Mrs Moore substitute" (p. 256), and at the end he unequivocally states that "he had 2 liaisons with married women" (p. 304).

If there is no evidence, nothing should be said, and if there is, it should be looked at carefully. Why should the burden of proof be on those who will not accept such a view without evidence; and if it is fanciful or glib to characterize their relationship in a certain way, then why mention it at all? Wilson is, in turn, coy, condemnatory, direct, equivocal, question-begging and straightforward, but never produces anything convincing. There may very well be something in what he suggests, but more evidence is required.

### **The Freudian Lewis**

Similarly unsatisfactory in providing us with a guide to Lewis' life is Wilson's amateur Freudian sleuthing. His relationship with Mrs Moore is linked to his theory of "the quest for his lost mother" (p. xi) which is said to dominate his relations with women. This quest is further linked to his depiction of Lewis as a Peter Pan figure: "For there was no children's story more apposite to his life

than that of the little boy who *could* not grow up, and who had to win his immortality by an assertion of metaphysical improbabilities" (p. 26). So, indirectly, Lewis is criticized for his writing of fantasy and the happiness he found in such writing.

Wilson also makes much of the combat of between Lewis and his father (p. 26). Now there is clearly evidence that Lewis behaved badly, and he is surely right to criticize Lewis for his unjust and ungenerous attitudes, but does not succeed in showing that this antipathy came to structure his whole life.

Then there are further allusions to his sexuality, charges of sado-masochism, of bizarre sexual preferences and fantasies (p. 49), and further coat-trailing: "How far Lewis was able to indulge any of his sexual tastes must remain something of a mystery" (p. 58).

Apart from the unsatisfactory nature of his psychology, the biography itself seems to depend on the fallacy of assuming that there is a close relationship between the person and his works and that to understand one needs to know about the other. This rather old-fashioned view of literary biography could easily be cured by a dose of Proust's *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, or Lewis' book *The Personal Heresy*, for what is striking is that Wilson's attempts to describe Lewis fail to get to the heart of the man.

Indeed it is clear that Wilson, in concentrating on the more scandalous aspects of Lewis' life, yields to the temptation of treating biography like novel-writing, with narrative plots and climaxes which further seem to distort the work. He is overinfluenced by storytelling and the need for a narrative thread which he finds in his psychological tale of the lost mother/Peter Pan/rejected father/Mrs Moore/Joy Davidman sequence.

To pursue this course he must at times subvert Lewis' account of his life in *Surprised by Joy*. Whatever the justification for his doing so, it is scarcely plausible that his attempt at biography will be more authoritative. This approach means that even the positives of Lewis' conversion have negatives: "Lewis was most happy in Christian garb. There is no doubt that until he discovered this clothing (be it artificial carapace or 'the whole armour of God') Lewis was only half-formed as a writer, as a literary imagination, perhaps as a person" (p. 124).

### **Lewis and Myth**

If Wilson had spent less time on the more gossipy subjects his work would have been more illuminating. He is extremely good in

outlining the importance of myth in Lewis and his belief in true myth. He very accurately draws a line from Lewis' early reading, writing and fantasies as a child to his later enthusiasm for literature and his writing of the trilogy and the Narnia tales, correctly recognizing myth's part in Lewis' conversion and its centrality in his intellect and imagination.

For Wilson, Lewis' greatest achievements are his Narnia tales, on which his current popularity rests, and on his works of literary scholarship. He praises *Allegory of Love*, *A Preface to Paradise Lost*, *Poetry and Prose in the Sixteenth Century* the Oxford History of English Literature of the Sixteenth Century (excluding drama) and regards *The Discarded Image* as his most impressive book. In this context, the whole course of the relationship between Lewis and Tolkien is sensitively told and Lewis' role in encouraging Tolkien to produce *The Lord of the Rings* is duly acknowledged.

### **Lewis the Apologist**

However he then uses Lewis' love for myth to undermine respect for him as an apologist. According to Wilson, since Lewis came to Christianity through myth he did not, therefore, need intellectual justification (p. 166). Moreover he knew nothing of biblical scholarship. In consequence, since he was not an expert, a theologian, 'his excursion into the realm of religious apologetics' must be viewed with ambivalence (p. 162), (although such considerations do not seem to have prevented Wilson himself from writing on Jesus). He views him as a rhetorical trickster (p. 163). And he takes him to task for not liking the moderns even though it was they, of course, whom Lewis was opposing.

This aspect of his assessment of Lewis is clearly unsatisfactory. Wilson dismisses Lewis' thought without outlining it and certainly without refuting it. In addition, he too readily accepts that G.E.M. Anscombe's skirmish with Lewis at the Socratic Club in 1948 dealt a devastating blow to him at the time and stung him "back into childhood" (p. 220), and that it called in question his whole apologetic enterprise.

In short, Wilson does not give due weight to his apologetics. Whereas many people have first been attracted to his work through these writings, for Wilson they are not truly significant. Although he praises his analysis of Christian behaviour (p. 180), particularly in *Mere Christianity* and the *Abolition of Man*, he totally fails to take proper account of C.S. Lewis' influence other

than by caricaturing the opposing camps of Lewis followers. He seems more concerned about social considerations, being particularly disturbed by Lewis' "unfashionable views", that he was not a follower of Wittgenstein, for instance, as if fashion mattered where truth was concerned.

### **A.N. Wilson's Theology**

We have noted that Wilson himself emerges as one of the focuses of the book. His theological uncertainties certainly show through. He views the New Testament as a collection of old books not unlike the intellectual baggage of the mediaeval intellectual which say nothing clear-cut about the nature of Christ (pp. 164-165). One particular statement is revealing: "Since there is nothing in the universe to suggest that 'rational' explanations of life explain anything, the sceptic or mocker finds as much to disconcert him in the cult of C.S. Lewis as does the troubled believer" (p. 205).

Statements such as this are ironic, since he is expressing is just the kind of intellectual attitude that Lewis so despised and so consistently opposed. They suggest that for all his admiration and respect for many aspects of the man and his work, Wilson has signally failed to get to the intellectual centre of it, a centre which is not only a love of the imagination and of myth but of the conviction that myth became fact and that this belief, far from being a fantasy, is overpoweringly rational. Being unable to share Lewis' robust belief in Christian orthodoxy, possibly even fighting against it, he is unable to present it thoroughly and objectively. It is significant, in the light of his doubts, that he regards Lewis' excellent *A Grief Observed*, his most troubled, doubtling book, as the best thing he wrote (pp. 284, 286).

In 1991, a year after the book was written, A.N. Wilson is said to have lost his faith. In 1992 he published a controversial study of Jesus which has been characterized as a series of educated guesses based on a reread of all the 'liberal' theories of the early part of the century<sup>1</sup>. His love for controversy and self-publicity which characterized that and other works, is certainly evident in his study of C.S. Lewis. So is his lack of rigour. As Hunter Davies says "Mr. Wilson has always specialized in glorious generalisations, based on the slimmest of information, which is

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1. "Messing about with the Messiah", an interview with William Leith, in *The Independent on Sunday*, 13th September 1992, p. 23.

why his journalism is so enjoyable and his biographies so readable.”<sup>2</sup>

Wilson’s biography is probably an attempt, as other reviewers have suggested<sup>3</sup>, to debunk or demythologize Lewis. There is nothing wrong with that. However it is clearly unhelpful to set up an equally (if not more) fanciful countermyth. His biography is well worth reading not merely for the light that it throws on C.S. Lewis, but also as an illustration of a certain kind of biographical writing. It has something of the stamp of the dilettante about it. There is no rigorous intellectual engagement with the whole problem of God, with the question of truth, with literature and with ethical judgements—all questions which constantly preoccupied Lewis. Despite the many good things in it, *C.S. Lewis: A Biography* must be judged a failure.

Wilson has shown himself not enough of a literary critic to produce a critical biography, not enough of a psychologist to produce a psychobiography, not enough of a philosopher to critically assess his apologetics, too much of a novelist to resist putting in a narrative thread related to sexual tension and forbidden love and too ill at ease with the Christian faith and its claims to view Lewis’ apologetic efforts in an objective way. The definitive critical biography of C.S. Lewis remains to be written.

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2. “In bed with A.N. Wilson,” The Hunter Davies Interview, *The Independent*, 12th January 1993, p. 13.

3. See Anne Loades, “C.S. Lewis, A Biography”, *Literature and Theology*, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 1992, pp. 211-212; Virginia Stem Owens, “The Demythologized Lewis”, *Christianity Today*, Vol. 34, No. 9, June 18th 1990, pp. 43-45; David Porter, “C.S. Lewis”, *Third Way*, Vol. 13, No. 6, July/August 1990, pp.41-42 and Glenn Edward Sadler, “Revering and debunking a saint”, *Reformed Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 9, Nov. 1990, pp. 24-25.