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The Semantics of Biblical Language
as an Aspect of Hermeneutics

To understand the Bible and to communicate its message we need to know the meanings of the words it uses in their respective contexts: for from this biblical interpretation follows. The relation between word-meaning and interpretation is discussed in this thoughtful study, given in lecture form at the recent VI Symposium ("Communicating the Christian Faith Today", 22 May 1976)

Although the subject assigned to me is "the semantics of Biblical language", I take it that I am to approach this subject specifically from the standpoint of the conference theme "Communicating the Christian Faith Today". In order to do this, I have taken the liberty of adding a short phrase to my original title. The semantics of Biblical language will be considered *as an aspect of hermeneutics*. For although Biblical scholars have produced a number of studies relating to semantics, concerns about the communication of the Biblical message to modern man fall more readily under the heading of hermeneutics. The point may be illustrated by comparing two recent books by Biblical scholars. John F. A. Sawyer's book entitled *Semantics in Biblical Research* is an excellent but highly technical study which is of most value to the specialist in Hebrew or at least Old Testament studies.¹ By contrast, Robert W. Funk's book *Language, Hermeneutics, and Word of God*, whilst also remaining a technical academic study, primarily concerns the impact of Biblical language on modern man, and the problem of Christian communication.²

Does this mean, then, that the semantics of Biblical language is irrelevant to questions about communicating the Christian faith today? The main thesis of this paper is that considerations about semantics do indeed contribute positively to questions about the communication of the Biblical message, provided that they are viewed as an aspect of the broader problem of hermeneutics. To attempt to solve too many problems, however, simply through a study of Biblical semantics is to invite unnecessary disillusion with the whole subject.

I

I am using the term *hermeneutics* in the way in which it has come to be employed mainly in German and American theology since the late nineteen-fifties. Prior to that time, hermeneutics was used mainly in the traditional sense of rules for the right interpretation of Biblical texts. Thus it was virtually synonymous with principles of exegesis. More recently, however, especially with the work of Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling, hermeneutics has come to be viewed as a two-sided problem.³ It is the problem of bringing together on the one side the horizons of the Biblical writer or the Biblical text, and on the other side the horizons of the modern reader or interpreter. To take up the model suggested by the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, the task of hermeneutics is performed when there takes place a fusion or merging of these two sets of horizons, (*Horizontverschmelzung*).⁴ Or, again, to take up the category of 'worldhood' from Heidegger and Gadamer, understanding is achieved when the Biblical word strikes home within the modern reader's own 'world', and when the modern reader, in turn, stands within the 'world' of the Biblical text.

Ernst Fuchs shows how Jesus communicates with men on this basis through the language of the parables.⁵ Language about farming, business affairs, housekeeping, playing games, and so on, is not merely to provide vivid everyday illustrations of otherwise abstract truths. Jesus takes account of the fact that his hearers already live in a 'world' shaped by interests of this kind. By telling stories about everyday life on this level, Jesus himself enters their own world, and stands within it. This principle operates in the incarnation itself, in which Jesus comes to stand alongside men at the place where they already are. In the parables, then, Jesus creates and stands within a world which is the world of his hearers. But now to the picture part of the parable (Jülicher's *Bildhafte*) is added the content-part (*Sachhafte*). Values and judgments are brought within this world which shatter its existing horizons, and turn it upside down. The hearer finds himself standing in Jesus's world.

This principle operates, for example, in the parable of the labourers in the vineyard (Mt. 20:1-16). Jesus first enters into the world of the hearer. Some workers are hired at the beginning of the day, and work through the long hours of heat and weariness. Others are hired later and do less. Finally, those who were only too grateful to get any kind of employment do only an hour's work in the cool of the evening. When the time comes to settle up, these last find to their amazement that they receive a whole day's wage. The audience enters into their feelings of good luck and everyone wonders how much the first will therefore receive. Abruptly we hear

that they, too, get the same. The audience is appalled and indignant. From the viewpoint of the world of the labourers and the audience, the employer had infringed every natural and conventional notion of decency and justice. But at this precise point, Jesus shatters the conventional horizons of this world. When the vineyard-owner exclaims, "Do you begrudge my generosity?" (i.e. to those who have worked only for an hour), the audience begins to perceive that what is really at stake is God's verdict of sovereign grace on sinners, irrespective of their religious or moral achievements.

This is an example of effective Christian communication. However, the method of Jesus is uncovered not by semantics, but by what goes under the heading of hermeneutics. We see that Jesus does more than explain the meaning of grace as a concept. Such an explanation might well fail to grasp the hearer because it might never engage with his own existing horizons. Love, Fuchs points out, communicates by meeting someone *where he is*.^{6a} In the parables, Jesus so effectively enters the world of his hearers and so effectively draws them into his, that as Fuchs expresses it, the hearer sees "with God's eyes".^{6b}

Two thousand years, however, have elapsed since the parables were first spoken. Hence the impact of the parables of Jesus on the hearer today is not necessarily what it would have been on the original audiences. We may illustrate the point from Luke 18:9-14, in which Jesus tells the parable of the pharisee and the publican. To the first hearers, the pharisee was a good man. There are parallels in the Qumran literature and other Jewish sources to the genuine prayer of gratitude that the pharisee was not like other men. He was grateful that it was easier for him to maintain a scrupulous obedience to the law than it was for those in dubious vocations. He was grateful that God had put it into his heart to go beyond the normal legal demands of fasting and tithing, and do extra deeds of righteousness beyond what the law required. But Jesus unexpectedly turns this familiar world of values upside down. With shock and indescribable consternation the audience hears him say that it is the taxcollector, not the pharisee, who is justified. Conventional assumptions are shattered.

The modern hearer today, however, has precisely the reverse expectations. He expects the pharisee to be condemned, because two thousand years of Christianizing tradition have taught him that as a matter of principle, pharisees are bad. Thus, far from shattering the hearer's values and conventions, far from challenging the structure of his 'world', the parable becomes a harmless and homely illustration of something he always knew, namely that pharisaism is a bad thing. It has become a Victorian moral tale about the need for humility. It is no longer a profoundly disturbing proclamation of the sovereign judgment and grace of God, which makes every man search his heart with the sense that he has suddenly lost his bearings.⁷

It is now time to make a statement about the relative functions of hermeneutics and semantics within the context of the problem of Christian communication today. Hermeneutics takes account of *two worlds* and of *two sets of horizons*, those of the text and those of the modern hearer. Semantics, at least as the term has come to be used in Biblical studies, concerns *only the world of the ancient text*. Put more technically in the language of hermeneutical studies, it ignores the problem of the hearer's pre-understanding (*Vorverständnis*).

We may illustrate the kind of expectations which can be met by semantic studies by considering the book to which I have already referred, namely John F. A. Sawyer's work *Semantics in Biblical Research*. It is impossible to summarize the whole book in a few short sentences, for the argument is detailed and sometimes technical. We may select, however, two principles for consideration, which Sawyer uses.

Firstly, following the work of James Barr and others, Sawyer takes up Ferdinand de Saussure's fundamental distinction between synchronic and diachronic investigations of language. Diachronic linguistics is concerned with the history of developments in language, with how and why meanings change over a period of time. Synchronic linguistics is concerned with the investigation of language at one specific point in time. The linguisticians of de Saussure's day were too dominated by the diachronic perspective. In particular they were concerned to formulate laws of development. For example, the third person singular present indicative of 'to be' was *asti* in Sanskrit, *esti* in Greek, and *est* in Latin and French. Could laws be formulated which explained this kind of development, and also allowed linguistics to speculate about primitive languages? As a corrective to a one-sided approach, Ferdinand de Saussure insisted, "The linguist who wishes to understand a state (*état de langue*) must discard all knowledge of everything that produced it and ignore diachrony. He can enter the mind of the speakers only by completely suppressing the past."^{8a}

No scholar has done more than James Barr in his excellent and important book *The Semantics of Biblical Language* to apply the fruits of F. de Saussure's warnings to the handling of the Biblical text. Barr gives numerous examples of how Biblical scholars have quite wrongly assigned meanings to particular words in the Bible which these words possessed only hundreds of years earlier. The root meaning of a word (i.e. root in the historical or etymological sense) is not their 'real' meaning at a later date. I should not wish to say that merely because the English word "nice" is derived from *nescius* meaning ignorant, by "nice doctor" I *really* mean "ignorant doctor". Barr rightly declares, "The main point is that the etymology of a word is *not a statement about its meaning but about its history*."⁹

John Sawyer is no less concerned than Barr about the disastrous consequences of this very common misunderstanding about semantics for Biblical exegesis. For this reason, he argues, it is wise to avoid speaking about "the meaning" of a word such as 'salvation' in the Bible, or even in the Old Testament. The meaning of such a word, he explains, has often varied down the years of Israel's history. Even in terms of a single passage, he insists, the meaning of a particular word used by the original author may differ from that understood by a later editor or when it is quoted by another Biblical writer at a still later date.^{10a} We are now in a position to see two things. Firstly, it is clear that Sawyer's work on semantics brings greater precision into exegesis, secondly, it is equally clear that his work remains within the world of particular texts. Thus he concludes on this point, "Semantic ambiguity can be avoided by substituting for the question 'What does it mean?' the questions 'What did it mean in its original context?' or 'What did it mean in Babylon in the sixth century B.C.?' or 'What did it mean in Alexandria in the third century B.C.?' and so on".^{10b} On the one hand, semantic enquiry is indispensable for understanding the Biblical text with accuracy, faithfulness, and precision. On the other hand, the theme of this conference is communication *today*, not communication in sixth century Babylon, and relates more properly to the problem of hermeneutics.

The second principle used by Sawyer illustrates the general point more strikingly. This is the approach known as field semantics or sometimes structural semantics. It has had an increasingly important application in Biblical studies, especially at the hands of Erhardt Gütgemanns. Once again, the origins of the principle go back ultimately to Ferdinand de Saussure, although the immediate pioneer of field semantics is J. Trier.

To quote from de Saussure himself: "Language is a system of interdependent terms (French: *les termes sont solidaires* in which the value (*la valeur*) of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others ... All words used to express related ideas limit each other reciprocally".^{8b} The words used to denote various colours provide a helpful example. Where is the cut-off point between *red* and *yellow*? The question cannot be answered unless it is known whether the word *orange* also belongs to the whole field. In a field of colour-words which includes *orange*, *red* will be defined more narrowly than in a field from which orange is absent. De Saussure himself illustrated the principle with reference to a field of French words relating to fear. The semantic value of *craindre*, to fear, and *avoir peur*, to be afraid, would be affected if *redouter*, to dread, ceased to contribute to the whole field.

John Sawyer examines the semantic field of words which relate to the concept of salvation. This is necessarily a study in Hebrew lexicography, since many of the individual terms possess nuances in

Hebrew which would not appear if the same study were carried out on the basis of an examination of English texts. Thus he compares the distinctive roles played within the same field by eight different Hebrew words connected with the idea of saving or salvation: *hosia*, *hissil*, *azar*, *hilles*, *millet*, *pillet*, *pasa*, and *paraq*. Some of these words have extended meanings which are immediately recognizable in English. For example, *azar* often means simply 'help', *pasa* often means 'open', and *paraq* can mean 'rescue'. But as soon as we try to bring out their distinctiveness in terms of translations into another language, the real significance of the field approach is lost from view. In an illuminating statement Sawyer asserts, "Instead of defining a word L in terms of another language, it can be defined as associated with A, B, C (in the same language), opposed to D, influenced semantically by G because of frequent collocation with it in idiom I, and so on. *This is the most reliable method of describing meaning, and must precede translation, not follow it.*"^{10c}

Clearly the same two principles that we have already noted emerge from this approach in terms of field semantics. On the one hand, we see the indispensibility of semantics as a tool of exegesis and precision in Biblical studies. On the other hand, we see that semantic considerations leave us entirely in the world of the text itself. In Sawyer's words, it must even precede translation into English. In terms of *what* is to be communicated, semantics provides an invaluable tool. In terms of *how* a given meaning is to be communicated, semantics has clear limitations, and remains subsidiary to hermeneutics.

II

Before we explore some of the more positive achievements which can be reached through semantics we must first make two further points about the limitations of semantics. The limitations in question occur when semantics is understood mainly as a theory of reference, and when the word, rather than broader stretches of language, is viewed as the key to questions about meaning.

Firstly, there is a widespread tendency to equate semantics with studies of meaning that view *meaning as reference*. In some circles it is an academic convention to divide the study of semantics, or semiotics, into three areas. The first area is called *syntax*, and concerns the inter-relationship between signs, symbols, or otherwise-named units of language. On this basis, field semantics is perhaps more strictly a study in syntax, although it is also more than this. The second area is termed *semantics* in the narrower sense of the term, and concerns relations between words and their objects of reference. Logically it is concerned with denoting.

The third area is known as *pragmatics*, and concerns the use of the linguistic unit in life. Semantics is identified specifically with this second area by A. Tarski, Charles Morris, and Rudolf Carnap.¹¹ Thus W.v.O. Quine writes, "'Semantics' would be a good name for the theory of meaning were it not for the fact that some of the best work in so-called semantics, notably Tarski's, belongs to the theory of reference".¹²

The limits of this paper do not allow me to demonstrate the weakness of referential theories of meaning in detail. I have tried to do this in the course of my short study *Language, Liturgy, and Meaning*.^{13a} We may note, however, that in his later writings the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein drew attention to two points of weakness, among others. Firstly, it is plausible to imagine that young children learn the meaning of words by associating the sound of the word with the object to which it refers. Thus a child learns the meaning of *spoon* when his mother points to the metal object by his plate. This is the method of ostensive definition. If this is indeed how a child learns language we might well expect this principle to be of fundamental importance for Christian communication, because, as Schleiermacher insisted, the model of how a child learns to understand language is of basic importance of hermeneutics.¹⁴ Wittgenstein has shown, however, that the value of ostensive definition as a starting-point in communication is highly dubious. For if I hold up a pencil and say "this is *tove*" the ostensive definition may itself be understood in various ways. It *may* mean "this is a pencil"; but it may equally mean "this is wood", or "this is hard" or "this is round", or "this is one".¹⁵ Wittgenstein drily comments in another of his writings, "Point to a piece of paper — And now point to its shape — now to its colour — now to its number ... How did you do it?"^{16b}

The second problem about both theories of reference and also ostensive definition is that it only works *when we are thinking of certain types of words*. Wittgenstein writes, "If you describe the learning of language in this way, you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like 'table', 'chair', 'bread', and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties, and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself."^{16c} The unbeliever does not learn the meaning of such words as 'God', 'love', or 'salvation', by being shown observable objects to which these words refer. They draw their meaning *in the first place* from the role which these words play in the lives of Christian believers, even if this does not completely exhaust their meaning for the believer himself. As Paul van Buren puts it, "To examine the word (i.e. 'God') in isolation from its context in the life of religious people is to pursue an abstraction".¹⁷ Or to cite a very different author, the theologian Edward Schillebeeckx, "In my opinion, the relationship

with *lived human experience* replaces the criterion of objective verification or falsification which is used by many linguistic analysts, including Paul van Buren himself".¹⁸ (Of course, Schillebeeckx refers to an earlier view of van Buren's, before he had once more "changed his mind"¹⁹).

Closely bound up with the problem of reference is the danger of viewing the problem of meaning, and hence also of communication, *in terms of words rather than speech-acts* or longer stretches of language. The problem of the intelligibility of Biblical language does not turn on the problem of word-recognition. This can be illustrated from the language of the Fourth Gospel. In John 3:4 Nicodemus shows that he has misunderstood the meaning of "birth" as it has been used by Jesus. His problem, however, is not that he is unfamiliar with the usual meaning of 'birth', but that its meaning in these verses is conditioned by a soteriological context. It is the relation between the word and its theological setting that needs to be explained. Similarly in John 4:10-12 the woman of Samaria misunderstands the meaning of "living water", which in a domestic setting simply means "running water" or water from a spring: "Sir, you have nothing to draw with ... Where do you get that running (living) water?" (v.11). Later on in the same chapter Jesus tells his disciples that he has food to eat of which they do not know. When the disciples betray their misunderstanding by asking, "Has anyone brought him food?" Jesus explains the situation by replying "My food is to do the will of him who sent me" (4:32-34). Large stretches of the sixth chapter turn on misunderstandings about the meanings of "bread", "blood", "drink", and "come down". The problem, however, is not caused by lack of word-recognition, but by the use of these words in an unusual logical setting.

It is important to notice, however, that it is the very multiplicity of images that allows the reader to cancel off irrelevant meanings and to discover the transcendent realities to which these terms point, by taking, as it were, cross-bearings from them. Jesus is the light, but he is the light-of-the-world; he is the bread, but he is also the door, the shepherd, the word, and the way. *Together* they contribute to the total Christological perspective of the Fourth Gospel. What needs to be investigated is not the semantic value of the individual words, but the total impact of the whole Christological universe of discourse. The variety of words and meanings inter-relate with one-another to indicate which areas of application are now correct, now incorrect, now relevant, now irrelevant. *Together* they point to applications, or areas of meaning, which otherwise lie beyond the edges of our day-to-day conceptual map.^{13b}

Both of these two sets of considerations, however, bring us back to hermeneutics. This becomes especially clear in an

interesting essay by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur entitled "The Problem of Double Meaning as Hermeneutic Problem and as Semantic Problem".^{20a} He writes, "The first achievement of modern hermeneutics was to posit as a rule that one proceed from the whole to the part and the details, to treat for example a Biblical pericope as a linking".^{20b} As Schleiermacher showed, there is a sense in which we can understand the individual parts of an utterance or writing only when we understand it as a whole, although of course it is also true that an understanding of the whole depends on an understanding of the parts. Ricoeur continues, "In hermeneutics there is no closed system of the universe of signs. While linguistics moves inside the enclosure of a self-sufficient universe ... hermeneutics is ruled by the open state of the universe of signs."^{20c} For example, semantics may clarify certain meanings in the narrative of the exodus, but hermeneutics "opens into a certain state of wandering which is lived existentially as a movement from captivity to deliverance."^{20d} Hermeneutics brings about an engagement between the horizons of the text and the horizons of the reader. To quote Ricoeur again, semantics brings more precision into the task of interpreting the language of the text, but "at the price of keeping the analysis within the enclosure of the linguistic universe."^{20e} Ricoeur concludes that what *constitutes* the language which is to be interpreted can be investigated by structural or semantic analysis, but what this language "attempts to say" is matter for hermeneutics rather than linguistics.^{20f}

III

In the last part of this paper I want to argue that semantics can serve the task of hermeneutics by providing two things: firstly, it safeguards the *particularity* of Biblical texts, and thereby performs the valuable service of 'distancing' them from the interpreter's pre-understanding; secondly, it can provide a fresh *angle of vision* from which to view certain texts.

On the subject of the particularity of Biblical texts, we turn naturally to James Barr's great book *The Semantics of Biblical Language*.¹ I have space only to illustrate one feature of Barr's approach, and I therefore select his warnings against what he calls the illegitimate totality transfer. This occurs when the semantic value of a word as it occurs in *one context* is *added* to its semantic value in another context. This process is continued until the sum total of these semantic values is illegitimately transferred into a particular text.

For example, in some Biblical passages the Greek word *ἐκκλησία*, church, is described as the body of Christ. In others, it is regarded as the first instalment of the Kingdom of God. Yet again, in others,

it is viewed as the bride of Christ. In one sense, it might be legitimate to say that the church in the New Testament is all of these things. However, the illegitimate totality transfer occurs when the preacher who needs three points attempts to say that the meaning of church e.g. in Matthew 16:18 is (1) the body of Christ; (2) the bride of Christ; and (3) the first instalment of the kingdom of God. Barr successfully shows that this semantic error is committed not only by preachers but also by a number of Biblical scholars.^{9b}

Eugene Nida illustrates the principle as an axiom of semantics with reference to the two words 'green' and 'house'.²¹ 'Green' according to its context, may mean inexperienced, unripe, or the name of a colour. 'House' may mean dwelling, lineage, or business establishment. But when 'green' and 'house' occur next to each other in syntagmatic relationship, each conditions the semantic value of the other. 'Green house' cannot mean unripe business establishment. Yet, by analogy, we can imagine the preacher expounding the supposed 'riches' of each individual word of a Biblical text, ignoring the basic semantic principle that meaning is conditioned decisively by context. For the expositor and theologian this is a matter of honesty or sheer faithfulness to the particularity of the text.

We are now in a position to see how this serves the task of hermeneutics. We stated that the goal of hermeneutical endeavour was to secure a merging of horizons between the world of the text and the world of the interpreter. But the danger inherent in this process is that the interpreter will see the text only in terms of the categories and pre-judgments that he himself brings to it. We all know the Bible student who immediately interprets a text in terms of his own experience, very often with the result that the text says only what he wants it to say. The text, for this reason, needs also to be *distanced* from the interpreter.²² He needs to learn how to *distinguish* between his own horizons and those of the text, in such a way that *he respects the rights of the text to speak on its own terms*. Luther describes how the text may come as our *adversary*. It may attack our pre-conceptions, and thereby it speaks *afresh* to us. Semantics performs the invaluable role of providing an objective, even scientific, control which preserves the particularity of the meaning of the text, so that it may speak in its own right and on its own terms. It is not rendered innocuous by assimilation into some pre-packaged systematic theology of the reader, and thereby its challenge removed. Because it helps us to respect the rights of the text, semantics thereby serves hermeneutics.

Finally, the categories of semantics can illuminate Biblical texts by bringing their subject-matter to view from a *fresh angle of vision*. These categories include synonymy, opposition, types of vagueness, the analysis of metaphor, and the use of transformational techniques. I have discussed these in some detail elsewhere

in an essay entitled "Semantics and New Testament Interpretation" and I have also provided a more intensive examination of one particular passage in another article.²³

It is possible to distinguish, for example, between various types of semantic opposition. Paul uses the *opposition of complementarity* in his contrasts between grace and works. It entails a two-way exclusion, in which the assertion of one term involves the denial of the other, and *vice versa*. Erhardt Gütgemanns attempts to shed fresh light on Paul's contrast between "righteousness of God" and "wrath of God" in Romans I on the basis of this kind of semantic opposition.²⁴ However, there is also an *opposition of antonymy*, which involves only a *one-way* exclusion. Paul's language about the "good" man and the "righteous" man in Rom. 5:6-8 illustrates this. Might not the comparison between these two types of opposition bring Paul's language about flesh and Spirit into view from a fresh angle? Sometimes, the two modes of existence are described in terms of a two-way exclusion (Rom. 8:9, 12). At other times the relation is more complex (cf. I Cor. 2:6-16; 12:1-14, 40).

A third type of opposition is the *opposition of converseness*. 'Buy' and 'sell' stand in such a relation, for Smith *buys* a car from Jones, it may be said that Jones *sells* a car to Smith. However, 'buy' does not stand in this semantic relation to 'sell' when Paul says in I Cor. 6:19 that Christians are *bought* with a price. We cannot ask: who is doing the selling? The very inapplicability of this question in the light of the semantics of I Cor. 6:19 should warn us that Paul is using the word 'buy' in a sense different from that of everyday commerce. But if theologians had always been fully aware of this fact, they would not have asked concerning ransom theories of the atonement, "To whom was the price paid?"

We could go on to illustrate principles of synonymy in terms of interchangeability, and to explore other semantic categories. However, our purpose here is the limited one of indicating the role which semantics can play when it is used by the Biblical scholar in the over-all context of communicating the Christian faith today. I have tried to show that semantics does have important limitations, but that it can also serve as an invaluable tool when it operates within the broader context of hermeneutics. It achieves this firstly by providing a more precise tool for questions of exegesis and lexicography, secondly by distancing the interpreter from the text and allowing it to speak in its particularity, and thirdly, by enabling the interpreter to view the text from a fresh angle of vision. To take up Schleiermacher's statement about the hermeneutical circle, semantics helps the interpreter to understand the "parts" of the Biblical text in their particularity; hermeneutics helps him to grasp the subject-matter in its wholeness. Both are necessary for the task of communicating the Christian faith today.

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- 20 P. Ricoeur, *The Conflict of Interpretations - Essays in Hermeneutics* (Northwestern University Press, 1974) (a) pp. 62-78; (b) *Ibid.* p. 64. (c) *Ibid.* p. 65. (d) *Ibid.* p. 66. (e) *Ibid.* p. 72. (f) *Ibid.* p. 77.
- 21 E.A. Nida, "The Implications of Contemporary Linguistics for Biblical Scholarship", *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1972, 91, 86 (cf. 73-89).
- 22 On the category of distancing in hermeneutics, cf. H-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* pp. 258-67 and W. Wink, *The Bible in Human Transformation. Toward a New Paradigm for Biblical Study* (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1973), pp. 26-35.
- 23 A.C. Thiselton, "Semantics and New Testament Interpretation" in I.H. Marshall (Ed.) *New Testament Interpretation* (Paternoster Press, Exeter, in the press. Also "The Meaning of Sarx in I Corinthians 5:5: A Fresh Approach in the Light of Logical and Semantic Factors" in *Scottish Journal of Theology* 1973, 26, 204-28. I have also drawn on principles of semantics for Biblical studies in "The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings" in *Journal of Theological Studies*, 1974, n.s. 25, 282-99, and *Studia Evangelica VII (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, Berlin)*.
- 24 E. Güttgemanns, Ref. 1, pp. 87-93.

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