

'Limit your work that you may extend your influence. It is quality, not quantity, that tells. The work done by the worker in a healthful condition of mind and spirit, calmed and sustained by the consciousness of the divine approval and guidance, and which inevitably disappears in an atmosphere of hurry and bustle, is the work that is really fruitful of results that remain.'—*Idem.*

'In all the professions a man's first duty now is to renounce the ambition of becoming distinguished for activity; the temptation chiefly to be avoided is that of undertaking more than he can do in first-rate style. The quality of work must be improved, and to that end, if necessary, the quantity reduced. A higher, calmer sort of activity must be arrived at—economy in energy, expenditure without waste, zeal without haste.'—*Idem.*

'I beseech you not to waste in a few spasmodic efforts the strength and usefulness of years. I beseech you to regard the care of your health. . . . But within this limit work with life, with courage, with strength of purpose, with unfaltering faith in God.'—W. E. CHANNING—An Ordination Address.

'To seize the universal in the particular is the great heart of wisdom, and this is especially important to one who has to live amidst details.'—W. E. CHANNING—An Ordination Address.

'What is the secret of happiness? There is, I think, only one answer. The secret of happiness is self-surrender. Not self-extinction, for there can be no happiness in a mere negation. Not self-repression, for that is a difficult and painful process. No! but the consecration of our faculties in some congenial impersonal object, patriotic, social, religious, or artistic, which enriches our personality by making it typical of and continuous with something of permanent interest, human or divine, or both, and at the same time purges it of the poison of Egotism. The rivulet brawls and foams and frets so long as it is only a rivulet; it finds calm and clearness when it is merged in the wide brimming river. So with the soul of man when it merges itself in some great idea; with this difference, that in so doing it does not lose but find itself—as the greatest of teachers taught us long ago.'—'W. P.' in *Glasgow Herald*, October 19, 1912.

Apollinaris of Laodicea.

BY THE REV. DAWSON WALKER, M.A., D.D., PROFESSOR OF BIBLICAL EXEGESIS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM.

II.

WHAT was the distinctive teaching of Apollinaris, and how did it originate? Let us recall the general situation in a few words. The teaching of Arius had called into question the Divinity of Christ. In attempting to meet the very real difficulty: 'How can God be One and yet Christ also be God?' he had given an answer which in fact surrendered the Godhead of Christ. Arius had been the pupil of Lucian of Antioch, and, like him, seems to have combined the adoptionist theory of Paul of Samosata, with the Logos doctrine of the Eastern Church, and so arrived at the conception of a created but pre-existent Logos. All the energies of Athanasius and of those who supported him—amongst them Apollinaris—were

directed to the establishment of the Homoousion—the absolute Godhead of Christ. On this point, so far as the Catholic Church was concerned, the victory was won. Harnack, no very sympathetic critic of Athanasius, tells us that it was he 'who first arrived at the *contradictio in adjecto* in the full sense of the phrase';¹ which is Harnack's way of saying that under the leadership of Athanasius the Church was committed to the view that the man Jesus Christ is 'Very God of Very God.' The Christian Church, with Judaism on the one side and the Gentile world on the other, was compelled to formulate its idea of God. The result, achieved by a process of scriptural exegesis, per-

¹ *History of Dogma*, vol. iv. p. 46.

sonal spiritual experience, and speculative reflection, was the Christian doctrine of the Trinity—in the development and maintenance of which Apollinaris himself took a considerable part.

But, once the divinity of Christ had been vindicated, a further problem was bound to arise. If He was indeed the God-Man, in what way was the co-existence of Godhead and manhood in Him to be expressed? What was the mode of their inter-relation? Was the Logos, the Divine in Christ, merely joined with humanity, or absolutely transformed into it? Or, in becoming Man, had He transformed the human into the Divine; or, in deifying the human had He left its distinctive nature intact? Or, had He really not deified it at all, but merely associated it with the Godhead? Furthermore, how, from this point of view, were the statements about our Lord in the Gospels to be interpreted? Was it merely the flesh, the man, that was born of the Virgin Mary, or was the Logos born of her, together with the flesh? Who is it who suffers, who hungers, who thirsts? Is it man only—or the God-man? Who is it—on the other hand, who heals the sick, controls the forces of nature, forgives sins? Is it God only—or the God-man?¹ The demands both of scriptural exegesis and of philosophic reflection were insistent on these points. Is the Christ, for whom the faith and the hope of humanity are claimed as its Lord and its Redeemer, really two persons? Or, if He be one, how is the unity to be conceived and expressed?

This, or something like it, was the problem, of which Apollinaris propounded a solution. From what point and along what lines did he approach it? He approached it in the first instance as the sworn foe of Arianism and the determined upholder of the orthodox Nicene Faith. It was an element in the Arian conception of Christ, the Logos, that He was capable of change like other created beings (*τρεπτός φύσει ὡς τὰ κτίσματα*). They laid emphasis on the freedom of choice (*τὸ τρεπτόν*) of the Logos. They held that He was subject to growth and development, and that in every case wherein He chose the good it was the free act of a will that might conceivably have chosen otherwise. It was this mutability, this freedom of choice, in Christ which seemed to Apollinaris a wrong and indefensible conception. Two aspects in particular were open to objection.

¹ Cf. Harnack, *u.s.* p. 142.

It seemed, in the first place, to follow from this hypothesis of freedom, that 'the redemption effected by Christ was only the work of a finite being who made Himself redeemer by His own free act,'² and therefore was not really a redemption effected for the human race, so much as an example to it how it might redeem itself. As Harnack well expresses it: 'Everything that Christ had done for us, God must have done, otherwise it has no saving power. Everything that He did must be perfect, else it avails us nothing.'³ Zeal for the absolute divinity of Christ was here the nerve of the Apollinarian argument.

But, secondly, there was this further important aspect of the matter. So far as we are conversant with humanity, where there is freedom of choice there is, as a matter of fact, sin. No soul that is really human is wholly free from sin. Man's *νοῦς*, his intellect, is not only the organ of his free choice, it is the seat of his sinful instincts. And therefore in surrendering the changelessness of Christ we have surrendered His sinlessness as well.

And these two things, the changelessness and the sinlessness of Christ, in other words His absolute divinity, must, according to Apollinaris, be fully safeguarded if the effectiveness of His redeeming work was to be maintained. Christ was certainly, and admittedly, Man. It must in some comprehensible and convincing way be shown that He was also God. The Divine nature and the human must be shewn to co-exist in Him.

But here a further difficulty emerged. To Apollinaris a complete 'nature' was, in effect, neither more nor less than a 'person.' We have to observe carefully the confusion in terminology here involved; for it pervaded much of the subsequent thinking. The union of a complete Divine nature with a complete human nature was tantamount to the union of a Divine person with a human person. Such a twofold personality could not be acquiesced in as a final solution of the Christological problem. The Christian thinker who would understand Christ aright must devise some method of transcending it.

We have seen what the general conditions of the problem were. We have also seen how through the exigencies of Arian controversy it forced itself upon Apollinaris. Let us now try to follow a little

² Dorner, *u.s.* p. 360.

³ Harnack, *u.s.* p. 152.

more closely the track of thought along which he moved to the solution which he propounded.

Up to a certain point and on certain fundamental propositions he agreed with his opponents. With them he held it as axiomatic that two perfect things can never be combined in a unity; *δύο τέλεια ἐν γενέσθαι οὐ δύναται*. A perfect God and a perfect man can never make a uniform being. If a perfect God had been joined to a perfect Man, there would have been two, one Son of God by nature, the other by adoption. The combination of two wholes into one whole was unthinkable. It was the stultification of any idea of unity at all, and must at all costs be rejected. In this general attitude we trace the Antiochene tradition that had come from Paul of Samosata who was driven to conclude, as the result of it, that Christ was *ἄνθρωπος ἐνθεός*, a 'deified man.'

But Apollinaris, while accepting the general premisses, would by no means draw the same conclusion. His grasp on the Nicene Faith was too strong to permit that. To be absolutely human meant, for him, to be both free in choice and sinful in disposition. And humanity, so construed, could not be predicated of Christ. There was not only a metaphysical impossibility, but an ethical incongruity. To Apollinaris it seemed that to attribute perfect humanity to Christ was *ipso facto* to make Him imperfect. And so he arrived at the proposition that Christ is perfect with Divine perfection and not with human perfection.

He could not, then, accept the Antiochene definition of unity as formulated by Paul of Samosata and the Lucianists. What was his own? It is not difficult to see the line on which his thought must move. If Divinity and humanity cannot combine as two absolute wholes; if the Divine is certainly absolute and unmodified: then such modification as is necessary in order to make alliance with the Divine possible must take place in the sphere of the human.

Now, in order to understand his teaching on the point, we must here recall his view as to the constituent elements in human personality. He seems at first to have conceived that the constituent elements were twofold—soul and body. Later he modified this, and adapted the view, popularized by Plato, and appearing in the Pauline Epistles, that our personality is essentially threefold: body, soul, and spirit; the soul being the animal or

irrational life, in contrast with the higher controlling, self-determining element of spirit or rational life.

Now for Apollinaris this third highest element, the rational soul or spirit, was the distinctive determining element in human personality. Here lay the seat of self-determination, and so of personal distinction; here too lay that power of choosing which as a matter of fact, involved the possibility of evil choice. Here too, in humanity as known to us, lay not merely the possibility but the actuality of evil. Our rational soul, he said, is under condemnation. Where there is full or complete humanity there is sin. If Christ assumed human attributes in their entirety, He must have assumed human reasoning powers (*λογισμοί*), and it is impossible for these to be free from inherent sin.

If, then, the *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα* is necessarily the seat of sin, it cannot as such find a place in the perfect being of Christ. Something that is free from variability and liability to sin must take its place. That something is found in the Divine Logos Himself. At the Incarnation the Logos took to Himself an 'animal' soul and a human body, Himself taking the place of the 'rational soul'; in this way eliminating the element of mutability and possible sin. The Logos was a prevailing principle of holiness, supplying the place of that *νοῦς* which in Adam had fallen under the dominion of the flesh. In this way it seemed to Apollinaris that the sinlessness of Christ was secured, because the possibility of moral evil appeared to be effectually excluded from His human nature.

And not only so, but the desiderated unity of His Person was secured as well. The Logos could not combine with a rational human soul, because there would then be two self-determining centres, and so two wills, involving a permanent and unthinkable antithesis. But if the Logos did not combine with the 'rational soul,' but *supplanted* it, then you arrive at the sought-for unity. You have *one* centre of self-determination, one controlling principle and power, the Logos Himself, representing the perfect life and perfect will of God. In this sense, and in this way, 'the Word became flesh.' And the result of the Incarnation was not the union of two 'natures,' but a new and resultant one God made flesh (*θεὸς σαρκωθείς*). 'Neither man wholly, nor God wholly, but a mingling of God and man.' Or, in the phrase

originated by Apollinaris, and afterwards to become so famous, 'one incarnate nature of the God Word.' It is true that this idea of a new Divine nature as a result of 'mixing' seems to conflict with what was said above about the Divine remaining 'intact.' But it is only in appearance. The Divine element, the Logos, is there fully present, completely filling and animating the human elements with the higher life of God. It is the humanity that has suffered modification and alteration.

One criticism of this teaching is not far to seek, and may be expressed at once. It is that the Person of Christ as conceived by Apollinaris is open, so far as the human element in it is concerned, to the charge of unreality. If a human being consists essentially of spirit, soul and body, then a being who consists of Logos, soul and body, cannot in any real sense be called human. This criticism is to be emphasized partly because of its element of truth, and partly because the anticipation of it by Apollinaris gives the occasion for what is perhaps the grandest, most profound and most attractive element in his whole doctrinal position.

He finds the basis for it in certain well-known passages of New Testament Scripture. This is in entire harmony with his general practice; for he was above all an exact and careful exponent of the Bible. There is the familiar Pauline passage in which Christ is set forth as the second, the spiritual Adam.¹ There is the further Pauline passage in which we are told that this 'second man is from heaven.'² There is St. John's reference to 'the Son of Man which is in heaven.'³ There is, again, the Pauline conception of Christ as the one Mediator between God and Man.⁴ From a combination of the ideas here set forth, Apollinaris deduced the conception that the Logos, Who in Christ took the place of the rational soul, so far from being alien to humanity, was in reality its truest expression. The Logos, in other words, is not only the image of God, but He is also, from all eternity, the archetype of mankind. The Logos was from eternity destined to become incarnate—had in Himself from all eternity the 'potency' of the capacity for, the Incarnation. Which may almost be expressed by saying that there has always, from all eternity, been something of the human in the Godhead. And from this point of view the conception becomes intelligible that, so far from

humanity in the Person of Christ being unreal or incomplete, it is in Him for the first time that it finds real and complete expression. If the Logos was Himself the very truth of human nature, if He is more truly human than any individual of the species; if, so far from being foreign to, He constitutes rather the perfection of the humanity; if it was only when the Word became flesh that humanity reached its Divinely predestined goal, and our fallen nature was restored to its archetypal sinlessness—then indeed all charges of unreality, all suggestions of a mutilated humanity, fall completely to the ground.

It may fairly be questioned whether in the lifetime of Apollinaris, or ever since, this sublime and thoroughly scriptural conception has ever been treated with adequate justice and comprehension. It has been said, and not without reason, that it was a conception 'to which the Church of that time was not fitted to do justice.'⁵ It has also been said—with equal reason—that 'the recognition of the natural affinity existing between the human soul and God might have smoothed the way to a really satisfactory doctrine of the Person of Christ.'⁶

This, then, in a meagre, but I hope, intelligible outline, is the contribution of Apollinaris to the solution of the Christological problem. He wished to safeguard in the most absolute way two great truths: the Divinity of our Lord and the unity of His Person. And it will be readily admitted that in the solution which he offered, those two truths are unquestionably maintained intact; for him the one Christ was very God incarnate. It remains now to be seen whether his view of the Person of Christ did full and adequate justice to the humanity. Could the view that Christ, with Logos, soul and body, was more really and truly human than any other man, stand the test of full and exhaustive examination?

The answer of the Catholic Church, indicated first in the writings of various theologians, and finally expressed in conciliar enactment, was that the teaching of Apollinaris could not be accepted as a finally acceptable statement of the truth. What, then, were the reasons for which it was found to be inadequate?

It is interesting to observe that one great principle

¹ Ro 5¹²⁻¹⁹.

² 1 Co 15⁴⁷.

³ Jn 3¹³.

⁴ 1 Ti 2⁵.

⁵ Orr, *Progress of Dogma*, p. 180.

⁶ Bethune-Baker, *u.s.* p. 244.

which had animated Apollinaris in his construction of the Person of Christ formed the very nerve and motive power of the refusal to accept it. And that was the intense desire to maintain the reality and the effectiveness of Christ's work as Redeemer. In maintaining this he had rightly shewn that if the work of redemption is to be truly accomplished, it must be God's work; it must contain the flawlessness, the perfection which God alone can supply. Apart from this, it might be, at best, a worthy example; it could not be effective redemption. In reply to him, it was maintained that the rational soul, the spirit, is the most important, the most distinctive element (τὸ κυριώτατον) in our human nature. It is the very seat of our personality where our need for redemption is greatest. And therefore, that if Christ had not, in the sense that we have, a human soul, it put Him at once in a sphere remote from us, and placed him out of all effective relation to us. He could not be our Redeemer; He could not even be our example. Because, in the last analysis, He was not really human at all (οὐχ ὁμοούσιος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κατὰ τὸ κυριώτατον).

There was also the further point, to which allusion has been made, that it was precisely this part or element in our personality which is the seat of sin. The spirit, as well as the soul and body, must be the object of redeeming and restoring work. And, according to the thesis of Apollinaris, it was precisely the element wherein the need for redemption was greatest that had *not* been assumed by Christ. And, as Gregory Nazianzen said, 'what has not been assumed has not been saved.' If Christ's humanity was but partial, then His redemption was incomplete.

It was difficult also for the theory of Apollinaris to evade the charge of being really docetic in its character. It did introduce an element of unreality. To the plain man, at any rate, it meant, that while Christ *seemed* to be man He was not really so. If 'the Godhead without constraint swayed the manhood'; if Christ had really no human will to be surrendered voluntarily to the Father's will, then there could neither be growth nor probation in His earthly experience. On this assumption what intelligible meaning could be given to the words: 'Jesus advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and men';¹ 'in all points tempted like as we are, yet without

¹ Lk 2⁵².

sin'² It was on these, and other kindred passages, that the School of Antioch laid emphasis, in its strenuous maintenance of the fulness and reality of our Lord's humanity. The reality of Christ's human nature, it was felt, would be undermined and destroyed if the theory of Apollinaris should be carried out to its only logical issue.

So his teaching on the Person of our Lord was rejected and condemned. The Western Church rejected it in 377 A.D. and 378 A.D. in Synods held at Rome. It was rejected by the Second General Council of 381 A.D. In 375 A.D. he appears to have withdrawn from the Church, and his followers were formed into a separate communion. Between 388 A.D. and 428 A.D. various Imperial edicts were issued prohibiting their assemblage for worship, and they appear ultimately either to have rejoined the Catholic Church or to have swelled the ranks of the Monophysites.

What, then, are we to say of the work of Apollinaris and of the criticism to which his Christological teaching has been subjected? Much of his work, as we have already seen, was a contribution, valued by all, to the constructive process of Christian doctrine. He took a leading part in the defence of the Nicene Creed against the Arians; he largely helped in establishing the doctrine of the Godhead of the Holy Spirit. In fact, he assisted in no slight measure, in the formulation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. To have done as much as this was to render a great service to the thought of Christendom. But he was one of the first to see that this statement of the Christian doctrine of God, compelled the Church to formulate as well its doctrine of the Person of Christ. How was personality related to nature? Did the conjunction of Divinity and humanity in Christ mean that in Him a Divine person was united to a human person? On this great issue the teaching of Apollinaris was in harmony with the ultimate verdict of the Church. He rejected the idea that the humanity of Christ was 'personal' and so preserved the oneness of His Person. He was also at one with teaching subsequently accepted as Catholic, in finding the centre of Christ's personality in the Logos. The Word became flesh; God became man. The God Who became man was personal, the manhood which He took was impersonal. To speak of this here is to anticipate further stages of theological reflexion. It is only

² He 4¹⁵.

mentioned now to shew the wide extent of the agreement between Apollinaris and the views which afterwards were held as orthodox. Finally, it must not be forgotten that he was the author of the formula, 'One incarnate nature of the God-Word,' so emphasized by Cyril of Alexandria in his vindication against the Nestorians of the unity of the Person of Christ.

And what of the criticism upon his work? He attempted to define the manner of the union between the Godhead and the manhood in the Person of Christ. And if this attempt be written down a failure, it may at any rate be conceded that it was a splendid failure. And further, where he failed no other man has yet succeeded. No one of the opponents of Apollinaris was able to express the union in any satisfactory manner. And it may fairly be questioned whether his sublime conception of the eternal humanity of the Logos, in virtue of which Christ was not imperfect, but the first perfect man, has ever yet received its full measure of justice. If once it were admitted it destroyed the force of the criticism, that the Apollinarian theory destroyed the perfection of Christ's humanity.

This, at any rate,—the charge that his view impaired the perfection of Christ's humanity—was the ground on which the Church declined the teaching of Apollinaris. And in maintaining, in this decided way, the thought of the perfect humanity of Christ, the Church, as Harnack frankly

admits, did an inestimable service to later generations. For the aim of the Church, throughout all this period of intricate and complicated controversy, was not to furnish an exhaustive definition of the Person of Christ, not to provide a *rationale* of the Incarnation, but to maintain the absolute integrity of the fact of Christ as presented in the pages of Scripture; to maintain it intact in the face of the theories and speculations which professed to explain it, but really mutilated it in various ways. The mystery of Christ's Person was a challenge to the thought of the Early Church, as it is to our thought to-day. We may recognize and appreciate the consummate ability of an attempt such as that of Apollinaris to penetrate to the heart of the mystery and unfold its inner meaning. But we may thank God that the Church would accept no teaching, which even had the appearance of detracting from the Scripture presentment of Christ as perfect God and perfect Man. She could do no better service to succeeding ages than to hand down to them that Scripture presentment—unexplained perhaps, but intact in all its fulness. And we shall be wise in imitating the example which she set. Speculation is still occupied with Christ, and theories of His Person are submitted for an acceptance. For any help they give we may be grateful; but the Christ of Whom they speak, Whom we revere and worship, must be transmitted by us in all His fulness to the generations yet to come.

Literature.

IMMORTALITY.

THE University of St. Andrews invited Dr. J. G. Frazer to deliver the Gifford Lectures there in the session of 1911-12. He accepted the invitation, and lectured on *The Belief in Immortality*. The volume containing the lectures, together with twelve lectures on 'The Fear and Worship of the Dead,' delivered at Cambridge and repeated at St. Andrews, has been published by Messrs. Macmillan (10s. net). This volume, which is to be followed by another on the subject, contains an account of the belief in Immortality among the Aborigines of Australia, the Torres Straits Islands, New Guinea, and Melanesia.

Is the subject attractive? It does not matter what the subject is; in Dr. Frazer's hands every subject is attractive and absorbing. No doubt the day is come when everything belonging to religion, whether civilized or uncivilized, is of interest. And the ideas and practices of the Australian aborigines touching survival after death are sure to find readers in plenty, whoever writes about them. But we must remember that it was Dr. Frazer more than any man who brought that to pass. First his *Golden Bough*, with its amazing wealth of information and its unfailing charm of language, came to tell us how true it is that God has made of one blood all nations to dwell on all the face of the earth; and then it was easy for