

THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

'A BIBLE has immense advantages for those who can use it, but for the world at large it has its dangers.'

The sentence occurs in *The Greek Genius and its Meaning to us*, a book written by Mr. R. W. LIVINGSTONE, Fellow and Assistant Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and published at the Clarendon Press (6s. net). At the moment Mr. LIVINGSTONE is dealing with freedom of speech, which he recognizes as one of the elements of the Greek genius. The Greeks, he tells us, enjoyed freedom of speech beyond all other nations that have ever appeared upon the earth. And one of the reasons why they had such a unique enjoyment of freedom of speech was that they possessed no Bible. For 'a Bible has immense advantages for those who can use it, but for the world at large it has its dangers.'

Why should the Bible restrain freedom of speech? Mr. LIVINGSTONE does not tell us why it should do so; he tells us only that it does so. He answers our question by a historical example. It is the old and familiar example of Galileo. Mr. LIVINGSTONE tells the story over again in this way: 'The Psalmist had said that the sun "runneth about from one end of heaven to the other," and that "the foundations of the round world are so firmly fixed that they cannot be

moved." How then could Galileo maintain that the earth moves about the sun?' Thus the Bible restrained Galileo's freedom of speech.

It was a mistaken use to make of the Bible. We admit it. We have admitted it for a long time. And if a single example can prove a proposition, then for the world at large the Bible has its dangers. And so the question comes to be this: Is it better to have no Bible at all than to have a Bible which may be used to restrain our freedom of speech?

If we have no Bible, what then? Then, says Mr. LIVINGSTONE, we have no God. That is to say, we have no God worth calling God; we have no God that we can worship. It was his Bible, he says, that gave the Jew his God. The Greek, having no Bible, 'thought his gods out.' And even Mr. LIVINGSTONE, with all his affection for the Greeks, and with all his aversion to the Jews, admits that no man can truly worship a god whom he himself has thought out.

Well, the day is at hand when it will become necessary for every one of us to make up our minds whether, to use Mr. LIVINGSTONE'S language, we are to be Jews with a Bible or Greeks without one. The Greek takes a purely human attitude towards life. He assumes that man is the measure

of all things, and believes that even though the unseen may be there, still we can know our duty and live our life without reference to it. Are we to become humanists like the Greeks? 'That,' says Mr. LIVINGSTONE, 'is perhaps the biggest question of the day, the one most worth settling, the one which every man has to settle for himself.'

Now, if our minds are made up and we are to be humanists, we ought to understand that we are not making an experiment. We are humanists with our eyes open, with an understanding of what humanism can do for us. For the Greeks tried it before us, and they tried it with a whole-heartedness which can never again be surpassed in the history of the world. The Greeks lived their life in the present; they did not trouble themselves about the future. They lived among things seen; they did not concern themselves with the unseen. They said literally, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.' How did they find it work?

They found it worked comparatively well while things went well with them and while they were young. The Greeks enjoyed their youth. But they did not look forward with pleasure to old age. If we may judge from Greek literature, humanists approach old age lamenting the loss of youth's capacity for action and enjoyment. When age comes they say that they

. . . feel her slowly chilling breath invade
The cheek grown thin, the brown hair sprent
with grey;
They feel her finger light
Laid pausefully upon life's headlong train;—
The foot less prompt to meet the morning dew,
The heart less bounding at emotion new,
And hope, once crush'd, less quick to spring
again.

Nor does humanism serve better when sorrow comes. At the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War there was a public funeral for those who had fallen, and all Athens was there to

hear Pericles give the address over their graves. Before him in the crowd he could see those whose husbands, fathers, sons had fallen. What has he to say to them? What comfort can he bring? This is what he said: 'You know that your life has been passed among manifold vicissitudes; and that they may be thought fortunate who have gained most honour, whether an honourable death like your sons, or an honourable sorrow like yours. I know how hard it is to make you feel this, when the good fortune of others will too often remind you of the gladness which once lightened your hearts. The deepest sorrow is felt at the loss of blessings to which we have grown accustomed. Some of you are of an age at which they may hope to have other children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better. Not only will the children who may be born hereafter make them forget their own lost ones, but the city will be a gainer. To those of you who have passed their prime, I say: "Congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days; remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. Honour is the delight of men when they are old and useless."''

Neither in the prospect of old age nor in the presence of death does it do well to ignore the unseen and the eternal. How does it work in youth and manhood? How does it work in health and prosperity? Turn to the first chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans and you will find the answer. It is a chapter we have difficulty in reading now; yet no one who knows Greek or Roman literature calls it exaggerated. And what is the source of that immeasurable sewer of iniquity? The Greeks and Romans were without God and without hope in the world. And Mr. LIVINGSTONE tells us that they were without God and without hope *because they were without a Bible.*

Some account has already been given in THE EXPOSITORY TIMES of Messrs. Williams &

Norgate's 'Home University Library,' the first forty volumes having been noticed in one short comprehensive article. Other ten volumes have now been published. One of them has the title of *Conservatism*. Its author is Lord Hugh CECIL, M.A., M.P. That volume should have appeared earlier, for it is No. 11 in the list. But we know that Lord Hugh CECIL has of late had much to do. The publishers were no doubt glad to receive it at any time. Readers of it will be as glad as the publishers. But before we say anything about what this volume contains, let us discharge our duty and name the authors and subjects of the other nine books of the list.

Two of them are religious—*Nonconformity*, by Principal W. B. SELBIE, and *Buddhism*, by Mrs. Rhys DAVIDS. Two belong to language and literature—*Medieval English Literature*, by Professor W. P. KER, and *The English Language*, by Mr. L. Pearsall SMITH. One is historical—*The American Civil War*, by Mr. Frederic L. PAXSON, Professor of American History in the University of Wisconsin. Finally, four are scientific. There is a volume on *Psychology*, by that master of sane English psychology, Mr. W. McDUGALL, Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford. There is also a volume on *The Principles of Physiology*, by Emeritus-Professor MCKENDRICK of Glasgow; there is a volume on *Matter and Energy*, by Mr. Frederick SODDY of the same University; and there is a volume on *Agriculture*, by Dr. William SOMERVILLE, Sibthorpiian Professor of Rural Economy in Oxford.

These names and titles are surely attractive enough. But if not, the publishers are prepared to make them irresistible. For they offer two prizes, a first prize of twenty-five pounds and a second prize of five pounds, for the best short essay on any one or all of the ten volumes, the chief conditions being that the competitor shall be not more than twenty-five years of age on September 1, 1912, and that no essay shall exceed 2000 words. And now to Lord Hugh CECIL and *Conservatism*.

Lord Hugh CECIL has divided his book into two parts. Of the second part the first chapter is entitled 'Religion and Politics.' Let us turn to that chapter.

It begins with a demand for principles. Lord Hugh CECIL has much to say about principles. Instead of *Conservatism*, his book might have been called *Conservative Principles*. And he uses the word advisedly. He does not bluntly say that a politician of no principles is a politician of no principle. For he is in his study, writing calmly and courteously. But he does not hide it from us that that is his meaning. Men of Conservative principles, he says, have a standard of right and wrong to which they refer their conduct. Of men who have no such standard he would say, as emphatically as Lorenzo said of the unmusical, 'Let no such man be trusted.'

If, then, the politician must have a definite ethical standard, what is that standard? 'It needs little argument,' says Lord Hugh CECIL, 'to show that it must be that of Christian morals as revealed in the New Testament'; and he adds, 'This always has been and still is the position of all the different elements of which the modern Conservative Party is made up, and, indeed, of the vast majority of the people, to whatever political party they belong.' It is a memorable saying. What will the unbeliever make of it? If Christ is a mere man, if there is even some doubt of His earthly existence, how are we to account for the fact that twenty centuries of the history of the world have taken not one step in advance of the ethical principles which He inculcated? Here in the twentieth century is a politician—a politician, mind you, in search of a background against which to set his conduct in order that he may look at it clearly and judge it fairly—and he tells us that he can find no background comparable in elevation and integrity with the standard of righteousness contained in the Gospels.

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are politicians who do not adopt that standard. 'It is true,' he says, 'that in our time there is a disposition, not very definitely formulated but increasingly powerful, to claim a right to go behind the authority of the New Testament in morals, and to supersede it in favour of some other undefined standard.' 'But,' he says, and his words are well worth attending to, 'this tendency is not yet sufficiently strong to make it needful or useful to consider it at length in this place.'

And it makes the situation not less but more surprising when we are told that the direct teaching of the New Testament on matters of State 'is slight and even meagre.' The teaching of the New Testament is occupied with principles of conduct; it does not condescend to details. Why does it not condescend? Because that would have arrested its influence as a standard of authority within the first generation or two; and so the wonder is, How did Jesus, if He was a man, and only a man, know that that rock was there? Muhammad did not know. Muhammad never dreamt of its existence, and shattered his vessel upon it.

What has the New Testament to say about matters of State? Only three things, says Lord Hugh CECIL. First, the duty of obedience to the State is enforced. Next, the separation of things spiritual and things material is taught in the memorable 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' Lastly, 'the example of patient submission even to oppression is prominent throughout.' Lord Hugh CECIL sums up the teaching of the New Testament on political matters in this statement: 'Obedience is due to the authority of the State within its own sphere, but that sphere does not extend to purely spiritual matters.'

Now that statement runs out in two directions. It runs out in the direction of what is known in Scotland as 'the Headship of Christ'; and it runs

out in the direction of what is known in England as 'the Divine Right of kings.'

First, as to the Headship of Christ. It need not be said that Lord Hugh CECIL believes in an established Church. He believes in the establishment of the Church in England, and he believes in the establishment of the Church in Scotland. For he believes in 'the national affirmation of the existence of God and the moral responsibility to His judgment which attaches to men in their national, no less than in their individual acts'; and he does not see how that 'national affirmation' can exist apart from establishment. It must be confessed, however, that he does not make it quite clear what he means by establishment. It has nothing to do with endowment. For he discusses disestablishment and disendowment separately. What then, apart from endowment, is establishment? He says that establishment is necessary to the national recognition of religion, but he does not say in what ways, apart from endowment, religion may be nationally recognized.

On the Divine Right of kings Lord Hugh CECIL has less to say, and he says it more effectively. He has no doubt whatever that tyranny justifies resistance; it is recognized, he says, on all hands. And he claims for himself the right, as he concedes the right to every other person, to say what tyranny is. 'Within very recent years two important cases of actual resistance to the law have arisen, and a third still more important may arise in the near future. Nonconformists have refused payment of the education rate on the ground that it is inconsistent with their convictions to pay it; advocates of Women's Suffrage have riotously approached Parliament, have assaulted the police and used other acts of violence in order to bring home to public opinion the reality of their claim for votes for women; and the inhabitants of Belfast and the surrounding districts who are opposed to Home Rule have announced that in all the circumstances of the case they cannot consent to be placed under the government of

a National Parliament in Ireland, and that they are prepared for a temporary separation rather than consent to such submission.'

Lord Hugh CECIL has nothing with which to reproach the Nonconformists who refuse payment of the education rate. He has no fault to find with the advocates of Women's Suffrage who approached Parliament even although they did it riotously and assaulted the police. And it is evident that he thinks the inhabitants of Belfast will be within their right should they take measures for a temporary separation rather than submit to a Nationalist Parliament in Ireland. 'Cases of resistance,' he says, 'are likely to become more and more common. Nor are Conservatives better guides in this perplexity than Radicals. The most that can be said is that, on the whole, Conservatives would lean rather more to the side of authority than Radicals, although, as the case of Ireland shows, circumstances might arise strong enough to produce a reversal in the attitude of the two parties.'

Is the Old Testament worth presenting to the young? That question stood as the title of one of the papers read at a conference which was held in Cambridge in April 1912. The papers read at the Conference, edited by the Rev. N. P. Wood, M.A., B.D., have been gathered into a thin volume and published at the Cambridge Press under the general title of *Scripture Teaching in Secondary Schools* (1s. 6d. net). It is the Rev. F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON, D.D., Dean of Jesus College, who asks this question, 'Is the Old Testament worth presenting to the Young?'

Why is such a question asked? It is asked because of the difficulties that lie in the way of presenting the Old Testament to the young. There are four kinds of difficulties. They may be called moral, scientific, critical, and historical.

Dr. FOAKES-JACKSON puts the moral difficulty in this way. He says that even in its highest

aspect the morality inculcated in the Old Testament generally needs some qualification; almost every precept requires the 'But I say unto you' of Christ. Is it expedient, then, to begin with the Old Testament in giving instruction to the young? Is it expedient to include it in their curriculum at all?

The scientific difficulty is more evident. It begins with the first chapter of the first book of the Old Testament; and it is at least as serious there as it is anywhere else. Have we not, says Dr. FOAKES-JACKSON, to teach one thing in the geography lesson and another when we turn to the Book of Genesis? Is not most of the Old Testament built on absolutely false suppositions in regard to every discovery in science since the close of the Middle Ages? And the question is, Are we justified in troubling young people with early beliefs and guesses about the universe now demonstrably false?

The third difficulty is concerned with criticism. To the average conscientious teacher it is the greatest difficulty of all, and the most pressing. He believes it is the origin of all the rest of the difficulties. How easy it was once to teach such stories as Jacob's flight, Joseph and his brethren, or the Exodus, when you made a straightforward narrative out of your Bible. How difficult it is to teach these stories now. 'We are taught,' says Dean FOAKES-JACKSON, 'that there are three main stories of Jacob, each subdivided into contributions by different hands. How am I to explain that this patchwork narrative of one who is in one place a tribe and in another a tribal God, and only occasionally an individual, has a history worth any attention from a seeker after moral truth? It was easy formerly to see in Joseph an example of probity and virtue, of love of home and magnanimity, and to tell children how he, the favourite, was sold as a slave, and by his honesty and wisdom rose to be the chief man in Egypt, and the saviour of his brethren. But how are we to deal with him if Joseph is only a Rachel tribe, the story of his

temptation a popular Egyptian narrative, and his reconciliation to his brethren a treaty related in poetic form? Even if we do tell the story as it appears in Genesis, are we justified in ignoring J, E, and P, and all their manifold combinations? And as frankness would only end in boring and mystifying the children—surely it is better not to trouble them at all?’

The last difficulty is historical. A large part of the Old Testament is historical. Let us leave the early narratives of Genesis alone, says the distracted teacher, and let us teach the history that is in the historical books. But is it history? Are not the facts frequently subordinated to purposes of edification? Have the Old Testament historians any real conception of what we mean by history? The historians of the Old Testament are as often poets or prophets as they are historians. And the more prophetic they are, and even the more poetical, the more are they satisfied that they are fulfilling the purposes of true history. ‘To tell a boy that the historical books of the Old Testament contain a record which satisfies our ideas of history is to put him off the track altogether.’

Is the Old Testament worth presenting to the young, then? Dr. FOAKES-JACKSON believes that it is well worth. He believes that it is the more worth for the very reason that these difficulties are in the way.

For in the first place he holds it to be undeniable that the purpose of the Old Testament is throughout moral. It teaches morality, and it teaches it deliberately. In Greek or Roman history when we hear of a great man perishing miserably we are simply pained; but the fate of Saul moves us to indignation because we consider he did not deserve it. This difference of feeling is due to the fact that in dealing with the history of other nations we are satisfied with events; when we turn to the history of Israel we look for their moral interpretation. It may be quite true that the morality of the Old Testament is elementary. Dr. FOAKES-

JACKSON holds that it is the better suited to the young. Moral consciousness among men is a matter of development. Let boys begin with the morality of the Old Testament and they will come in time to appreciate and practise the morality of the New.

With the second difficulty, the antagonism between the Old Testament and elementary truths in science and geography, Dr. FOAKES-JACKSON is not greatly concerned. It is a difficulty that was formidable forty years ago; it is not formidable now. There was a time when it was supposed that the first chapter of Genesis must be confirmed by modern geology, or one or the other must go. That does not seem now to be felt, either by the scientist or the defender of Christianity. And all that the teacher has now to do is plainly to tell the class that the ancient Hebrews did not and could not possibly know what a later age has discovered, and that their ignorance on these points does not detract from the value of what they have to teach us on others.

But when he comes to criticism he comes to a subject of real difficulty. He seems to think, however, that much of the difficulty is due to the average teacher's ignorance of what criticism is, and what is the difference it has made to the teaching of the Old Testament. So he begins by telling us what are the general results of Old Testament criticism. He sets them down in the following six short statements:—

1. The Old Testament is a collection of documents of different periods put together in their present form at a comparatively late date, say, between B.C. 500 and 160.
2. What we call the Law of Moses contains the chief ritual, dietary and ceremonial Laws, together with the arrangements for the worship of Jehovah from the latest collection of Laws.
3. There is a primitive history, if not histories, of Israel, and a later one coloured by the presupposition that the priestly law was in force from an early time.

4. The most valuable contemporary evidence we have is to be found in the utterances of the prophets.

5. We are not on anything approaching solid ground till we reach the ninth century B.C., when Israel is brought into contact with Assyria; and before (say) David, we have to rely mainly on tradition for information about Israel.

6. The religion of Israel before the appearance of the literary prophets approximated more to that of the kindred nations than was generally supposed.

DR. FOAKES-JACKSON does not claim that all these things are proved. He claims only that they are 'fairly generally' accepted. On the assumption that they are true he proceeds to discuss how the Old Testament may be presented to the young. Now he has no sympathy with the teacher, or, we suppose, with the preacher, who boasts that on all occasions and under all circumstances he is prepared to tell the whole truth, though he certainly has no sympathy with the other type of teacher who is prepared to tell what he believes not to be true. He holds that it is a mistake for any teacher of the young, and, for that matter, of the old as well as the young, in teaching what he calls the whole truth, to blurt out views and theories which lead to a completely mistaken view of the matter.

Suppose he has to teach the Book of Genesis. He finds certain things in it which he cannot teach literally as facts. Again, he finds statements about the miraculous which he has difficulty in accepting. And in the third place he has to face certain critical views and theories. As regards the facts, he believes that he must be perfectly frank, especially when they conflict with scientific or historical truth. In respect to the miracles more caution is necessary. Yet the miracles of the Old Testament are less difficult than those of the New, and less depends upon them. Still he holds that the utmost caution is necessary in order that the teacher may avoid such pitfalls as the vague

assertion that miracles do not happen. Whether miracles happen or not is a philosophical, not a scientific question, and science must never be confounded with philosophy.

But the real difficulty is again with the critical theories. His method is to trouble none but the very best students with problems concerning sources. Nor does he think it desirable to say much even to them on these topics until they are in fair possession of the main facts of the Biblical story; and have also learned how to use them for their profit. 'For,' he says, 'the Bible is not merely a literary puzzle. If it were that, it would have been dropped long ago. It is God's message to His people, and when it ceases to be that, it is of little value to any one.'

And so Dean FOAKES-JACKSON comes to the last of all the difficulties which the teacher of the Old Testament has to deal with. Is the Old Testament history, or is it not? He believes that it is very much nearer true history than we are now in the habit of thinking. He takes the references in the Old Testament to warfare. He points out that not in a single instance does an Israelite judge or king use horses before the days of Solomon. The enemies of Israel have chariots and horsemen, but Israel never. The Canaanites from the earliest times have chariots of iron. The Philistines on Mount Gilboa press Saul hard with their chariots and horsemen. Yet not even David with all his prowess is said to have possessed cavalry. Never to have fallen into inconsistency on such a point as this is evidence to Dr. FOAKES-JACKSON that the Old Testament writers have claim to be considered historians.

In conclusion—but let us quote his words: 'In conclusion,' he says, 'I would make an earnest plea for the retention of the study of the Old Testament. We may feel the difficulties of teaching it keenly: but we hardly realise what we should lose by abandoning it. We should give up an appeal to the interest of the young which we could ill afford

to lose; for the stories of the Old Testament stir the imagination as nothing else in the world can do. We should give up that connexion with the ideas and feelings of the East which have so much to contribute to the right understanding of

the Christian faith. Above all, we should surrender the very key to the revelation of the New Testament, which was, and is, and always must be based upon the right understanding of the books of the Old Testament.'

The Dualistic Element in the Thinking of St. Paul.

BY THE REV. C. ANDERSON SCOTT, M.A., D.D., PROFESSOR OF NEW TESTAMENT EXEGESIS, WESTMINSTER COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

AN examination of the dualistic element in the thinking of St. Paul seems to be called for, in view of the double fact that it has very important bearing on the exegesis of several passages in the Epistles as well as on the theology of the Apostle in general, and that at the same time it has received quite inadequate recognition and treatment. The most cursory examination of the current handbooks and treatises on Paul and the Pauline theology will show how little place and weight are given to this element in his thought. And if some are prepared to say that it is overlooked because it is not there, they have good authority for their opinion. It will suffice to turn to the index to Professor H. A. A. Kennedy's valuable work on *St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things*, where we find this entry: 'Dualism, no trace of, in Paul.' In the text to which the index refers we find something not quite so sweeping: (p. 146) 'We see nothing in his writings to justify the hypothesis so frequently charged upon him, that he took a dualistic view of human nature'; (p. 329) 'It is altogether groundless to rear on this foundation the theory of a cosmic dualism in St. Paul.' With both of these statements we may heartily agree, and yet demur strongly to the opinion that there is 'no trace of dualism in St. Paul.'

For, quite apart from a 'cosmic dualism' or a 'dualistic view of human nature,' there is a dualism which consists in the recognition, whether in theory or practice, of a power or powers other than God, external to man, exerting influence over human affairs, and in some sense or degree independent of God. This definition is purposely made very wide: for there are many forms or grades of this dualism, each affecting a man's

thinking in a different way. We have to ascertain what traces there may be of dualism of any kind, and to estimate its character and its influence on the thinking of St. Paul.

Before examining the evidence of the Apostle's own letters, it will be well to mark the antecedent probability that he held a dualistic view of life; in other words, that there were certain sides of life, certain experiences which he interpreted by referring them to the action and influence of powers which were in some sense independent of, and even hostile to, God. The probability is very strong. Indeed, if Paul did not hold some such view, he would be at variance with the universal opinion of his time. For dualism was one of the three new factors which make their appearance in the later stage of the Old Testament history, and specially after the exile, Individualism, Dualism, and Pessimism. These three are closely connected, and together go far to account for the too long unrecognized gulf between 'Hebrew' and 'Jewish' thought.

The optimism regarding the future, which was the essence of the Messianic hope in all its forms, was simply the counterpart of a pessimism regarding the present which laid increasing hold on the Jewish mind. And this pessimism partly grew out of, and partly fostered, a dualistic view of things. But that view was religious, not philosophic, in its origin. The very intensity of men's belief in God led them, when faced by the hopeless situation of His people, to postulate a source for their present experience other than God. Because they despaired of the world that now is, they looked with increasing wistfulness for a world or age to come, a new heaven and a new earth. And they found a justification for their despair, as well as an