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
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remarkable. It has been carefully assigned to P wherever it occurs. But it once more strikes one as curious, and suggests some doubts whether the theory is correct, that the dry and formal post-exilic writer should have made use of a word which, save in Josh. xxii. 20, occurs only in poetry.¹ Then, in verse 22, assigned to J, we have the expression "breath of the spirit of life" (נשמת רוח חיים), which ought by rights to be found in the latest writer of all, because it combines J's expression, "breath of life" (ii. 17), and P's expression, "spirit of life" (vii. 15). Moreover, this passage very markedly recalls to mind P's language in Gen. i. 24, 25, as well as that of JE in Gen. ii. 7. In verse 18, again, we have the word נָבַר in the sense of prevail, in which it occurs four times in this passage. It only occurs in this voice and in this sense seven other times in the Old Testament. Of these one is Gen. xlix. 26 (where it is followed by לַעַי, as in vii. 19); and another is Exod. xvii. 17 (JE). We have thus another sign of unity of authorship in the Pentateuch, and yet one more point of connection between Jacob's song and the rest of the book in which it appears. I must reserve the examination of the diction of chap. viii. till a future occasion.

J. J. LIAS.



ART. II.—PROFESSOR CHEYNE ON DEUTERONOMY.²

THE school of criticism to which Professor Cheyne belongs is that of the "candid friends" of the "men of the Bible" and of Holy Writ itself. The guiding principle of candid friendship, announced long ago by Canning, that "black's not so black, nor white so very white," may be illustrated from various pages of "Jeremiah: His Life and Times." I will take one only from p. 23: "A fair-minded student is bound to say that Jeremiah and his opponents were both right. . . . The Baalim of the different cities and villages . . . were not necessarily, in the mind of the worshippers, 'other gods beside Jehovah'; and even when they were, their worship did not exclude that of Jehovah." But if so, Elijah and the Baal prophets were "both right," Elijah's exclusiveness (1 Kings xviii. 21) was unfounded, and Jehu's distinction in his massacre (2 Kings x. 23) was unmeaning. Then, how about Ashtoreth and the Asherah? Are they, too, mere synonyms or duplicates of Jehovah "in the mind of the worshippers"?

¹ In Numb. xx. 3 half a verse is severed from a coherent narrative because נָוִי is characteristic of P.

² "Jeremiah: His Life and Times."

And then, what becomes of the First and Second Commandments? Where shall we draw the line at which true religion ends and the false begins? Is not the confusion of all religious tests and the obliteration of all religious distinctions, so far as the Old Testament is concerned, consummated in the above sample? Jeremiah, we learn, was, when called, a young and self-distrustful man; may possibly have expected "that his readers would take his so-called visions as pure literary fictions"; was given to exaggeration, especially of his own failures, and to despondency of any success in his missions. He had a threefold call, but waited for "a sign from heaven," and recognised it in the invasion of the Scythians. He had a hand in the Book of Deuteronomy, and helped the "illusion" (not "delusion," remember) that it was a genuine work of Moses, as it unmistakably purports to be. At one time he went about preaching it, but recognised later that it, too, was a failure, and got beyond it. Habakkuk likewise "miscalculated." Thus, our critic enables us to sit on the shoulders of the prophets and see much further than they, and, in particular, to see that the idolatries of Judah were not "so black" nor the true religion "so very white" as prophecy paints them.

The theory that the Book of Deuteronomy was first written at or about the same time that the Book of the *Torah* was found in the temple by Hilkiah the priest is probably most widely known and most popularly commended by this work of Professor Cheyne, with its powerful appeals to feeling and to fancy. When the Elgin marbles, after being sunk and fished up again on their voyage from Greece to England, were unpacked before the eyes of the Dilettanti Society, Payne Knight, the classical art oracle of our grandfathers in the teens of this century, pronounced them to be Roman imitations of the time of Hadrian. Long and furious was the strife of critics and connoisseurs; it passed away at last in the universal homage of Europe to the genius and the school of Phidias, as shown in the established genuineness of these its products. With the present age and Deuteronomy the question is more complex, in proportion as a literary treatise of some fourteen thousand words is necessarily more involved than the purely objective series of a few torsos and friezes. But one need not hesitate to expect that, when the sieve and the alembic of the higher criticism have done their worst, and its critics have spoken their last word, the substantially genuine auto-Mosaic character of the laws, and the contemporary character of the record which imbeds them, will shine out all the clearer from the storm of controversy in which, perhaps for a generation, they will have been involved.

It will be impossible to even summarize in the course of this brief paper the various converging lines of argument on

which the affirmation of that Mosaic and contemporary character may be made to rest. It must here suffice to touch, however briefly, the chief supports alleged for the opposite opinion, and expose their insufficiency; and meanwhile, as regards the former or affirmative branch of the argument, barely to point to the grand and unique character of Moses himself, self-delineated in the most artless unconsciousness, but at fuller length and in more salient relief than most other characters of the Old Testament. Could such a conception have been due to the imaginative powers of a committee of priests and jurists *in facie Romuli*, in the decaying period of the Judæan monarchy? Of course, inspiration might at any time include such powers. But there is nowhere in the Hebrew record another instance of such self-portraiture *ex post facto*, and nothing but the most positive and cogent external evidence could induce us to accept it. To this may be added—nay, must be added now—the Tel-el-Amarna tablets; not so much in respect of their matter as of their form, style, and evidence of literary advancement a century or two before Moses became “learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians.” They have come to light since Ewald’s masterpiece of criticism and Dillmann’s masterpiece of commentary. It is not too much to say, and here it must suffice to say, that in the light of those tablets the entire field of controversy will have to be reviewed.

As “in the land of the blind the one-eyed is king,” so in the realm of criticism, where decisive arguments fail, men rely on slender presumptions. There is nothing, perhaps, to be said against them. Then the absence of weight on the other side is treated as though it added affirmative weight to them. The negative quantity does duty rhetorically, as if it were positive. This is, in fact, arguing from darkness to light, and its result is hardly less misleading than the attempt to draw from a negative premise an affirmative conclusion. This, therefore, must be marked as, strictly speaking, a fallacious method, prone to conclusions not of course demonstrably false, for certainty is *ex hypothesi* here out of reach, but untrustworthy. The minimum of presumption remains a minimum still; and if a writer of warm sympathies, active imagination, and rhetorical bias, proceeds to build upon it, the maximum of superstructure effectually masks the minimum of foundation, and we have a pyramid resting on its apex. To chill the warmth of sympathy and check the activity of the imagination is an invidious and repulsive office, nor have I here space to attempt it in detail. It must here be enough to caution the reader against “chambers of imagery,” enriching the rather bare wall of nude fact with idyllic and elegant vignettes of what may have been, and finding sometimes in the gaps of ruin a niche here and there for the statuesque of fancy.

There is, however, one chapter—the seventh—which approaches more closely than the rest to logical method, and with which I propose here to deal. It is rather copiously fringed with foot-notes showing the eminent authorities, chiefly German, whom the writer has followed, and therefore making little claim, if any, to substantial originality. This, however, on such well-travelled ground is no disparagement; rather, indebtedness is the condition of even approximate completeness. The late origin, *i.e.*, *temp.* Josiah, is the thesis maintained. It is the alleged proofs of it which this chapter proposes to exhibit.

1. "The evidences of the Deuteronomist's dependence on the Yahvistic narrative in the Pentateuch—written at earliest (Dillmann) in the middle of the seventh century B.C.," we are told—"are embarrassing from their very abundance." Then follow a number of coincidences, which evince, so far, agreement, but do not prove dependence, from Jacob's descent into Egypt to Balaam's baffled curse. It is, so far, just as likely that "the Yahvist" depends on Deuteronomy, or that both might depend on some older embodiment than either of the same tradition. But how about the many Deuteronomic deviations from or additions to "the Yahvistic narrative"? We are told "they only prove that our author derived his material from more than one source, his secondary authority being sometimes popular tradition, sometimes, perhaps, his own creative imagination." We are told there is "no reason why criticalness and sympathy should not be combined," and we hear of discoveries to be made by "a critical but religiously sympathetic spirit." We may, therefore, charitably surmise that the fulness of his sympathy led our critic to ascribe to the author (Deuteronomist) criticised that "creative imagination" which he himself so largely embodies. A mere cynic might suggest that the same substratum of sympathy lurks in the proverb which bids us "set a thief to catch a thief." But to return to "the Yahvist." If coincidence of facts mentioned in him and in Deuteronomy shows the latter's dependence on him, what else does it show in Hosea? where we read, "sand of the sea which cannot be numbered for multitude" (i. 10; Heb. ii. 1; *cf.* Gen. xxxii. 12), "Go with their flocks and their herds to seek Jehovah" (v. 6; *cf.* Exod. x. 9, 24-26); and grasp the ethical character of Jehovah, "His righteousness, judgments, loving kindness, mercies, faithfulness" (ii. 19-23; Heb. iii. 5; *cf.* Exod. xx. 6, xxxiv. 6, 7; Numb. xiv. 18); read of the sin of Baal-Peor in the wilderness (ix. 10, xiii. 1; *cf.* Numb. xxv. 3 foll., Deut. iv. 3), and of various incidents in the life of Jacob (xii. 3, 4, 12; *cf.* Gen. xxv. 26, xxxii.

24 foll., xxviii. 12, 19, xxix. 20, 28).¹ But Hosea, moreover, knows of a permanent prophetic ministry which forms the substratum, with frequent outcrop on the surface, of "the Yahvist narrative" throughout, and dating from the Exodus itself (vi. 5, xii. 10, 13). Again, the same "dependence," if so it be, on "Yahvistic" sources must be ascribed to Amos; for he refers to the deliverance from Egypt, to the giant stature of the Amorites cast out before Israel, and to the forty years' sojourn in the wilderness (ii. 9, 10, iii. 1, v. 25). He also knows of Edom as a treacherous brother (i. 11), ascribes to Jehovah the universal act of creation (iv. 13, v. 8), and a guidance of Israel by means of prophets (ii. 11, 12, iii. 7, 8b). He names the chief sacred places—Bethel, Beersheba, Gilgal—stamped with sanctity by events of the Yahvistic record, and, contrariwise, of Sodom and Gomorrah as a standard of desolation and an evidence of Jehovah's vengeance (iii. 14, iv. 4, 11, v. 5). He has also several references to such laws as are embedded in the same record, as of that of the Sabbath (viii. 5), that relating to clothes taken in pledge (ii. 8; cf. Exod. xxii. 26 foll.); and since he speaks of a "law and commandments" as notorious facts, and of the close and unique connection of Jehovah with Israel (ii. 4, iii. 2), it is reasonable to refer such incriminations to that law as a known standard. The same is true of his notice of judicial bribes as a means of extortion and oppression (v. 10, 12; cf. ii. 6, 7a, and Exod. xxiii. 1, 6, 8). Hosea also knows of a law, and that, too, as a written record, with Jehovah as its Author. His words even probably point to multiplied copies of that law, although this is less certain, and yet of the whole set aside as "alien" (viii. 12).² But whether this, or the copiousness of its precepts, or their weight and importance, be intended, is of secondary moment. The thing to notice is that Hosea knew of a written law for Israel, and of Jehovah as its Author, and that the higher criticism insists on rejecting Deuteronomy—and I suppose the entire

¹ Some of these passages are given to E by the critics, but their *consensus* as to priority of date between J and E is too precarious to make the distinction relevant to the argument here.

² The passage in the k'ri stands as follows, the k'tib having merely ו twice by error for א: אֶכְתִּיב־לּוֹ רַבִּי תּוֹרַתִי כְמוֹרָר נַחֲשָׁבוּ. The last verb throws light on the modal force of the first, as meaning, "I was writing from time to time." Thus, "thousands of my *Torah*" is literally the sense of the nouns. It may, of course, be conceived as regarding the *parts* as being manifold. But no one, I think, would resort to this secondary meaning unless driven to it. I use the word "thousands" above in the indefinite sense of "a great many." The Revised Version has, "My law in ten thousand precepts," with margin, "the ten thousand things of My law," "things" being necessary in English for a complete sense. The expression seems analogous to the familiar use in our own day, when books or pamphlets are reckoned literally by the "thousand."

"middle Pentateuch"—as forming any part of it. The same prophet (iv. 6) attests the "priest" as its keeper,¹ but "the knowledge" of it kept back from "the people,"² who "perish for lack" of it. The same relation of "law" and its "knowledge" to "priest" and to "people" is set forth with greater preciseness by Mal. ii. 7, and the helplessness of the people when law fails by Isa. v. 13, "My people is led captive for lack of knowledge." Whether the *Torah* was of equal bulk and range in the time of Hosea and in that of Malachi cannot be absolutely settled. But we establish the fact of a *Torah*, written, Divine in origin and authority, and yet set aside and despised, alike in both. Jeremiah carries us further yet (viii. 8), charging its professional students with perverting or corrupting its text. That this process had already begun on Deuteronomy, assuming it to have been then newly written, is incredible. It must relate to an older *Torah*, on the knowledge of which the wise men plumed themselves. It is worth adding that Hosea's "priest," who kept the law yet despised it, held a hereditary office. This is plain from the terms of his threat.

The argument, then, stands as follows:

The Deuteronomist, who mentions incidents found in the Yahvist, is dependent upon him.

But Hosea and Amos also mention incidents so found, and must be similarly dependent.

But the date of "the Yahvistic narrative" is "at earliest" 650 B.C.; also Hosea's date is apparently 780-730 B.C., or thereabouts, and that of Amos 760-750 B.C. Therefore, these prophets flourished and wrote a century or more before the earliest possible date for the narrative on which they are dependent—a rather distressing absurdity. The dependence is therefore unduly assumed in *every* case, Deuteronomy included.

We further read, "The fact that in Deut. xx. the lawgiver distinctly contemplates foreign conquests, brings down the date of the law below the period of David." This manifestly implies the repudiation of a predictive element in a law given by prophetic authority. Yet on p. 37 we are told, "Prophecy is simply the declaration and illustration of the principles of the Divine government, sometimes in the past, sometimes in the present, sometimes in the future." Does not, then, a Divine law illustrate Divine government? Or was war such an

¹ Exactly as appointed in Deut. xvii. 9 foll., 18; xxiv. 8; xxxi. 9 foll., 24 foll. Cf. also Lev. x. 11. This appointment is such a notorious fact, that in Jer. xviii. 18 the prophet's enemies throw it, as a proverb, in his teeth.

² Observe the article, "the knowledge" (*bis*), i.e., of God; cf. Jer. xxii. 16, xxiv. 7.

unheard-of novelty in human affairs that even a purely human lawgiver might not be conceived as *proprio motu* contemplating and regulating it? Criticism seems to assume the function of limiting the prophet's outlook into the future, of saying, "Thus far shalt thou see, and no farther," or even, as the argument here implies, of barring any such outlook at all—at any rate, when the prophet presumes to legislate.

But the curious fact, when we compare the text of Deuteronomy with Professor Cheyne's comment, is, that in some essential features it exactly contradicts those of the Davidic wars. In all the wars of David's earlier life he leads the host in person, and this is among the understood functions of royalty as contemplated by Samuel (1 Sam. viii. 20). The first king, Saul, leads the host from first to last, and perishes with his sons in so doing. He appoints the captain of the host—in Saul's case his own kinsman, Abner, and so, later, in David's case. Indeed, as soon as a king is on the field, the choice of all leaders, chief and subaltern, is from above by himself, and not from below by popular voice (1 Sam. xiv. 50, 52; *cf.* viii. 12, xvi. 21, xxii. 7). Now, with these strongly-marked features, contrast the utterly archaic and highly popular features of Deut. xx. The difficulty here is, how to make *any* king fit the situation at all. The priest, the officers, and the people, have all their functions; where is the monarch's, or even the chief captain's? Nor is there any word or phrase in the law of the kingdom (chap. xvii. 14 foll.) which assists us. The direction terminates with the "officers" (*shoterim*), who appear elsewhere to have only a civil status; and, according to the Authorized Version and the Revised Version, these are to "make captains of the armies to lead the people," or "captains of hosts at the head of the people" (xx. 9), unless, which is constructionally possible, the people themselves are to make them. The "officers" are, we know from xvi. 18, popularly elected. Thus, the entire basis is, so to speak, democratic, and the only chief functionary is "the priest"; and when we turn to the parallel of Phinehas in Numb. xxxi. 6, this is, at any rate, conceivable. But the whole is, if not out of harmony with military royalty, at any rate in need of much adjustment to harmonize it thoroughly.

But taken as ordinances for the time then present in Moses' day, with the recent precedents of Sihon and Og, who both are represented as the aggressors, and with whom the war is therefore extern (Numb. xxi. 23, 33; Deut. ii. 32, iii. 1), and, further, with the post of chief captain already filled by Joshua (Numb. xxvii. 16, 18, 21; Deut. iii. 28, xxxi. 3, 7, 8), the conditions fit the situation without the least strain. And with the monarchy left as a mere possibility in the future, *not* enjoined, the question of royal function in war is, by xx. 1-9,

left open with it. The "captains of hosts" to be chosen, if the Authorized Version and Revised Version are right, by the "officers" are, then, the chiefs of the tribal contingents who are always prominent in rudimentary war¹—more so, indeed, than the individual who leads the whole. We may reasonably take it that, with prophetic advice and authority always presumed, the needful adjustments, in case of royalty becoming an institution, would easily be made, and that the lawgiver was content so to leave it. Nor is the military the only function in which such adjustments would be required. And here one may notice how exactly one function of the law is reflected in the pre-monarchical period of Josh. iii. 2, 3, in the "officers passing through the host and charging the people"; and another in the proclamation dictated by Jehovah Himself to Gideon in Judg. vii. 3, "Whoever is fearful and afraid," etc.; while in the earliest monarchical war the king takes his command at the prophet's bidding against an extern enemy (1 Sam. xv. 3 foll.). We may notice also that when actually in the field under the earlier monarchy, it is still "the hosts" (plural) of Israel, as, indeed, also of the Philistines, presumably under their "five lords," that are spoken of (1 Sam. xvii. 8, 10, 23, 26), just as in Exod. vii. 4, xii. 17, 51; Numb. xxxiii. 1. This prominent distinctness of contingents, traceable under the Judges, as in the general summary of results (Judg. i.), where each tribe, or at most a pair (verse 3), seems pitted against its adversaries, in the case of Barak (Judg. iv. 6, v. 14, 15, 18), and in that of Gideon (vi. 35), was exactly what the monarchy tended to consolidate and efface. In the period of Josiah, the adoption of such a law as that of Deut. xx. 1-9, is clearly a gross anachronism. Indeed, its opening words, which imply that "horses and chariots" would *not* be found on Israel's host, by the emphatic assumption that on the enemy's they *would* be (xx. 1), is of itself contradictory to all the later monarchy's traditions of war—as much so as "captains of hosts" without *the* captain of *the* host.

But I venture with hesitation here to suggest that both the Authorized Version and the Revised Version are mistaken. The "princes" or "captains of hosts" could be no other than the chiefs of the tribes, who in every group of cognates or agnates—tribe, clan, sept, etc.—are always known and fixed, and in Israel too often mentioned to need here citation in proof. The notion of officers (or people) "choosing" them, and that on the eve of a battle, seems absurd. Each would be there

¹ Cf. Homer, "Iliad," iii. 9, *αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κόσμηθεν ἄμ' ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἕκαστοι*, i. e., each contingent or group under its *ἡγεμῶν*. In the "Iliad" there is properly no Greek commander-in-chief; the Atreidæ are the *δύω κοσμήτορε λαῶν*, i. 16, and Agamemnon's leadership in "Iliad," xi., is more like the *ἀριστία*, such as each noted chief by turn enjoys, e. g., Diomedes in "Iliad," v.

already with his own tribal host. That they, thus met on the field, should choose a joint leader in chief, is, on the contrary, highly natural, if not necessary. I believe the sense to be, "The princes of the hosts shall choose¹ a head (*berôsh*) of the people," *i.e.*, chief in command. See Judg. x. 18, where "people [and] princes," mustered in host, raise the question, "Who will begin to fight against the b'ne Ammon?" which means, "Who will lead the host?"—a question answered by the sequel of chap. xi., where Jephthah is induced to accept the post of danger by the offer of the permanent chieftaincy in Gilead (verses 8-11)—"The people made him head and captain (*lerôsh uleqatzîn*) over them." The same is suggested, but less precisely, the vehicle being poetry, in Judg. v. There verses 12, 13 express the fact that Barak, who had been left "a remnant" when his tribesmen were "led captive" earlier by Jabin or Sisera, was by Jehovah—*i.e.*, through Deborah's oracle (*cf.* iv. 6, 14)—preferred, and by the "nobles" and "the mighty" (= chiefs of hosts) accepted, as commander. This implies that, but for Deborah's influence, they would have chosen their own leader, as did the Gileadites in x., xi., and as I am supposing intended in Deut. xx. 9. But all this is utterly heterogeneous to the military customs of the monarchy from the very earliest. On the contrary, it is exactly suited to such a patriarchal republic as the book contemplates, with its roots everywhere either in the elders or in the tribesmen; and with the monarchy left, as a possibility of the future, to adjust itself all round with the traditions found existing at the time.

But, again, we are told, p. 72: "The law regulating kingship is proved by its contents to be later than the time of Solomon, whose dangerous tendencies are not obscurely alluded to." If the argument which we are examining went to show that the Book of Deuteronomy was a production of, say, Solomon's later years, or of his son's or any near successor's time, the remark would at any rate be plausible. Or if among the fourfold cases of idolatrous seduction we had found in chaps. xiii., xvii. 2-5, a place reserved for the corrupting influence of idolatrous wives upon the king, and for that of the king upon the people, or even for this latter only, there would be at any rate a harmonious relevance to the supposed contemporaneous facts. But why a legislator *temp.* Josiah, masquerading as Moses, should found himself upon facts foreign to both, and gathered from a royal experience about midway

¹ The verb פָּקַד, in sense of "choose," has here the construction often found with בָּחַר, *i.e.*, by בִּי following.

between them, and refer to an example so far antiquated, is not easy to explain.

Indeed, one sees at a glance that the three chief temptations of all Oriental monarchy—apart, that is, from warlike ambition—are pointed at in the king's supposed tendency to "multiply to himself horses, wives," or "silver and gold" (Deut. xvii. 16, 17). As regards wives, we find the tendency in Gideon and Abimelech, the early forerunners of constituted monarchy. Gideon is, in fact, the first known polygamist in Israel. The tendency to amass the precious metals also appears in him. But, however closely in respect of all three Solomon coincides with the type, there is one clause of the prohibition which seems fatal to any development of this law *ex post facto* from his royal excesses. It is, "Neither shall he cause the people to return to Egypt, to the end that he may multiply horses." For a king to contemplate the deportation of his whole people, and his remaining *solus*, the royal lord of steeds and cars, is, as Dillmann *ad loc.* remarks, of course absurd, and a section or colony of them must be supposed meant. And this points plainly to the policy of earlier Egyptian dynasties, from the migration and sojourn of Abram, through the occupancy of Goshen, and to the end at any rate of the reign of Amenôphis IV., during which Semitic settlers appear to have been welcomed in Egypt. To suppose Egypt a similarly open country at any time from the invasion of Shishak (1 Kings xiv. 25, 26) onwards seems absurd. But without such openness, how is the suggestion feasible? An alliance, political or matrimonial, between royal houses is a totally different thing, and no more involved Israelite settlers in Egypt than Egyptian settlers in Israel. Nay, before Shishak's time the individual refugees, dynastic or other (Jeroboam, Hadad), who found an asylum there *against* the Hebrew monarch, shows a tendency equally adverse. The policy of a Judæan party *temp.* Hezekiah to rely on Egypt for a chariot force, hired by a deportation of treasure (Isa. xxxi. 1-3; *cf.* xxx. 6, 7), points exactly the opposite way—not to the settling Jews in Egypt to become horse-purveyors, but to the reception of a fully-equipped armament thence.

If it be asked, How can we assume an Egypt still open at, or soon after, Moses' death? I answer that no such assumption is here made, but that Moses was in a position to know, and that modern critics are *not*. When we remember Josiah's anti-Egyptian policy, and his death in pursuit of it, the notion of such a law being promulgated in his time gains yet more in absurdity. It is just at the date which critics assume for their pseudo-Moses that any project of a Hebrew recolonization of Egypt becomes on historical grounds too extravagant to be soberly suggested.

A still more stupendous because ubiquitous anachronism would be, in Josiah's time, the laws for the extirpation of the native races, conceived in all the stern relentlessness of the Mosaic period. Solomon's precedents, personal and political, must have destroyed the possibility of such a policy ages ago. The notion of a real law-giver aiming at practical reform, and clogging his own way by such elephantine impossibilities, is an outrage on common-sense.

We are told, further, that "there are ideas expressed in Deuteronomy which can only have arisen at an advanced stage of religious development." But it is one express office of the Spirit to "announce things to come" (*τὰ ἐρχόμενα*, John xvi. 13). What else is the entire idea of the Apocalypse? (Rev. i. 4, 8, 19; iv. 1, etc.). And it is the same Spirit who "spake by the prophets" from first to last.

That the anticipation of religious ideas of the future is not limited by what is in the human sense "psychologically possible" is no mere theory, but a fact written broadly on the face of Christian theology.

Compare the "religious development" of the Pauline Epistles with that of the sub-Apostolic and post-Apostolic ages, as sampled, *e.g.*, in the "Epistle of Barnabas," in the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," in that once highly-popular work, "The Shepherd of Hermas," or where you will, St. Paul utterly dwarfs all their conceptions put together, and shoots centuries beyond them. Take him and St. John together, and it is no hyperbole to say that the whole ante-Nicene period fails to grasp their range and fill their outline.

On the contrary, the leading idea of this fascinating monograph is that in the mysterious compound of the Divine and human known as inspiration, and which resists analysis, the dominant factor is the human, and that human as controlled by its environment—a more subtle form of the old "leaven of the Sadducees," setting the *Zeit-geist* above the Spirit of God. It is consistent that Professor Cheyne should follow, as regards Isaiah, the lead of Stade and Geisbrecht, and adopt the "cock-sure" style of Wellhausen on many points on which a modest reticence would be more becoming, *e.g.*, that Jeremiah did not write until very late in his career. On p. 6 this is stated with a "perhaps," as regards the actual date of his commencing; but on p. 57 the fact is assumed absolutely, and made to account for something else. The impression left on a careful perusal will be probably that there are not a few short pieces written on the spur of the feeling of the moment as it arose (*e.g.*, Jer. x. 19-22, xiv. 7-9, xvii. 15-18, xx. 14-18), and left without matured arrangement.

But to return to Deuteronomy. It must have grown

between the vision from Mount Pisgah and the defilement of the Ge-Hinnom. Such a book was sure to grow ; but I do not believe, apart from the last chapter, that there is any reason to suspect above 2 per cent. as non-Mosaic in period. Various other features of the laws, censured as modern, could be shown, if I had space, to fit the Mosaic period better than the Josian. But I may perhaps be allowed to return to this hereafter.

On the language of the book, I have only time for two observations : (1) Its laws, in their persistent urgency in support of a central shrine, are, in effect, a polemic against what were known from Samuel's and Saul's time onward as "high places" (Heb. *bamah*, *bamôth*) for worship (see 1 Sam. ix., x.). In that sense the word occurs *passim* in the Kings and Chronicles. The *bamôth* form the *bête noire* of the reformers alike in Hezekiah's day and in Josiah's, in which Deuteronomy is supposed to have been launched, to promote their extirpation. Yet in those emphatic reiterations of injunction against their use and practice the word nowhere occurs. It is found in the great lyrics of xxxii. and xxxiii., but only in its primitive sense of "natural elevations." In every one of the older prophets, except Isaiah, the sin of the *bamôth* is, on the contrary, rebuked by the express term ; and Isaiah (xvi. 12) notices their use in Moab. If ever a negative argument can have weight, it is surely of vast weight here. It is as if our Poor Law statutes omitted the word "workhouse," or as if those of Walpole's time omitted the word "Excise." (2) The other point is rather an *argumentum ad hominem*. We are told that Jeremiah was a joint-author of Deuteronomy. In a later page occurs the remark that its Hebrew style is superior to and purer than Jeremiah's, and that the Aramaicisms frequent in him are in it rare ; and, if we except the lyrics, this, I believe, is wholly correct. It is singular that the gifted writer should not have perceived that the criticism on the style tends to disprove the attribution of authorship.

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ART. III.—THE INFLUENCE AND EFFECT OF MODERN SCIENCE ON CHRISTIANITY.

THERE can be no doubt that the advance in scientific discovery and knowledge has remarkably affected the religious faith of some who have pursued the study of Science, and attained to any high degree of knowledge of its laws ; and the publication of such discoveries, the formulation of scientific