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ARTICLE VIII.

BASIS OF THEISM.

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THERE are two very distinct sets of phenomena in the world, — those which pertain to matter and those which pertain to mind. They are interlocked in a great variety of ways. We make progress in recognizing this interplay, but are as far off as ever in resolving the one class of facts into the other; or in understanding how the constant transitions which take place between them are possible. We spend much time on the mechanism of the interchange, but its method escapes us.

There is a decided tendency which leads us, in our explanations of the world as one whole, to put foremost either the physical or the spiritual series. Our theories seem thereby to be more simple and philosophical. We may regard physical facts and laws as the omnipresent and ruling terms, and make spiritual facts dependent on them. Causation thus becomes absolute and universal. The present is wholly contained in the past, and as completely contains the future. If we are bold enough to make this explanation self-consistent, we have to do only with causes, which, as we trace them backward, become more and more physical in their expression. The world is translated into terms of matter and motion. The universe is simply itself, and is self-sufficing. It is to its very core physical.

We may reverse the process, and look upon physical activity as another form of spiritual activity. The two forms, it is true, are not convertible in our experience, and remain, in the

building process, forever distinct. Yet we can regard the physical fact as a product of the spiritual fact; rejecting the idea that the spiritual fact is the result of antecedent physical conditions. The universe thus becomes spiritual at its very core.

Any blending of these two views seems less satisfactory, less self-consistent, than either of them separately. The two lines of activity cannot run on independently of each other. The moment we begin to divide them, they fall apart utterly and lose interaction. We cannot unite them in pantheism or in monism, because our explanations become verbal, something which receives no light from experience; one of those occult dreams of phraseology whose intricacies we can thread only when the somnambulant state is upon us. Nor can we pass at random, in our theory of the world, from the one series of forces to the other. If we attempt it, we shall reach incoherent and conflicting results.

What we have now to consider is not which of these two theories is the sounder, the physical or the spiritual. We can bring to either of them a fairly distinct conception and some light from experience. Whichever we adopt, some heavy shadows will lie athwart the field and, at times, will make our steps timid and uncertain. There is a fallacy into which the mind almost inevitably falls, that of laying weighty emphasis on the strong parts of the theory it espouses, and light emphasis on its weaker portions; and of reversing this process when it considers a less familiar and less acceptable theory.

The present discussion is not to be regarded as identical with that which has so long lain between the materialistic and the idealistic tendency in philosophy. These two opinions do not involve a recognition of both sets of phenomena as forever distinct and valid, each in its own form, but are con-

stantly striving, either to bring mental phenomena under the same laws as physical phenomena, or to project outward mental impressions till they become the equivalents of physical facts. The present inquiry recognizes the separate nature of both sets of phenomena, material and mental, and then inquires as to their dependence on each other, and their common source. It is frankly dualistic in respect of contingent realities and phenomena, while asserting one only spiritual ground of the world. The theistic view affirms that the order of sequence, of genetic dependence, lies from intellectual to physical facts, and not the reverse; that the theistic conception is the most empirical and most rational outlook on the world.

The atheistic and theistic views we are to discuss are sharply opposed to each other. The one regards the world as a self-contained, physical structure; the other as a constant fulfilment of a spiritual purpose, informed with intellectual life. We shall let the weight of objection fall on the physical theory, apparently the more simple and lying in the direction of a great deal of current speculation.

It seems more natural to refer the wisdom of the world to an intellectual source. As the system to which we belong is one of evolution, it involves a starting-point; but a starting-point is normal to mind and not to matter. When we force our thought back to the period prior to the beginning, we are taught that, under either theory, the utmost stretch of vision still leaves us shut up in a horizon.

The salient characteristics of physical as contrasted with intellectual phenomena are, that the former are more permanent; they retain their identity and can be returned to as often as we please. The latter, on the other hand, are in rapid flow. Thought follows thought in continuous creation, and when we attempt to return to a previous state, we simply induce a de-

fective reproduction of it. Physical phenomena follow each other in fixed dependencies; mental phenomena succeed each other in a changeable way by inherent connections which spring up as a part of the very process of development.

When we come fully to recognize the causal dependence of physical facts, the contrast of the two series reaches its height; and the physical world, by its firm and intelligible movement, begins to encroach on the spiritual world, in so many ways inchoate and uncertain. It was a great stride in knowledge when the dependencies of physical events came to be regarded as complete, a suitable subject for study and control. It is not surprising that the mind leaped forward to the conclusion, here is the key of all events. The eternity of matter and force, each with unchangeable qualities, gave at once a predetermined form to all things. Nothing remained but to trace these relations. A philosophy of the world was abolished by the world itself.

When we study reflectively this theory it becomes less satisfactory. While it gives much, it leaves out much which is most significant. Even naked physical facts are not as perfectly explained as at first they seemed to be. We regard matter as a storehouse of powers, as eternal; yet the permanence of matter is apparent rather than real. The forms of matter are constantly changing. No succeeding stage repeats a previous one. Physical events are a river whose waters are perpetually borne forward and perpetually renewed. The chief questions we are tempted to ask about it are, Whence do these waters come? and Whither do they go? The most significant inquiries concerning this stream of physical events are, How do these various forms of matter come to be so endowed? How do they come to exist under such circumstances and in such quantities as to make a world, and give us a world's his-

tory? These interrogations receive no answer from a theory of causation. The results are certain; but, How came they to be certain? The intellectual secret of the world receives no solution.

Still more is this true when we come to physical forces. The equivalence of forces was regarded as a great discovery. It seemed a long step toward establishing the completeness of the world within itself. Yet this extension of causes fails also to cover the entire ground. While there is a fixed sequence in the way in which some forces follow each other, there are forces which are quite baffling. Gravitation is greater or less in amount according to the position of the bodies between which it acts. Put any matter in space, and its mere presence calls out a new attraction in all other bodies. Gravitation seems to be in no need of any medium, and to require no contact. It arises as spontaneously, and suits the case as exactly, as any spiritual activity. Moreover gravity is not exhausted by expenditure. The tides may dash on the shores for ages, and lose none of their force.

Of a like mysterious nature is the absorbent power of the atmosphere. The mechanism of the world is largely worked by means of it, but there is no expenditure in the process. All the vapor that has been lifted into the air and fallen from it as rain leaves it as fresh for its service as ever. The equivalence of forces is involved in the visible sequence of comparatively secondary phenomena. The great occult forces of nature submit themselves to no such law.

There are mingled with the causal phenomena we find in nature other phenomena whose relations remain unexplained. These phenomena put obstacles in the way of the physical theory which do not embarrass the spiritual theory. So far as causal relations make the world intelligible, and place it in

the hands of man, so far are they fitting constituents in a rational method. Reasons can include causes; causes cannot include reasons. .

As we pass onward in the world's history, comprehensive and supersensual relations increase upon us. Life is unintelligible as a physical fact. It is a plastic presence, a quasi-spiritual potency, having no known physical center, or attributes to which the fact of life can be referred. There is an active discussion of the doctrine of heredity. Theories are urged which strive to establish some physical centers with which it can be associated. If we accept the germ-plasm theory of Weismann, we cannot associate these germ centers with any such powers as to make the facts of inheritance intelligible to us. The most that we do is to affirm that these facts are connected with certain supposititious powers, and that here is a possible line of physical connection. We do not penetrate the mystery of inheritance, but inheritance is a controlling fact in the unfolding of life, and accomplishes its marvelous results beyond any known sequence of causes. We push our physical connections at this point farther than our knowledge entitles us to go, simply because we are subject to a predisposition to extend causes through the entire realm of facts. It is worth our while to study exhaustively the phenomena which accompany inheritance, because these phenomena disclose the lines of action which are being taken, and are themselves products or expressions of the movement, not because they themselves contain and measure the movement.

Much the same thing is true in connection with varieties. We are right in making much of natural selection; but natural selection presupposes varieties so distinct, so considerable, so suitable, as to give to natural selection the power of displacement. Yet this is nothing more than saying that the

new organism is able to do its work. The whole organic kingdom has grown up under this power of fresh production which appears in new varieties, and yet we are as far off as ever from explaining it under simple causation. The moment we lift up our eyes and look at the world as one whole, and its continuous, collective growth, we need something more than self-contained physical forces; we need an intelligent, propelling purpose at the very center of them. The wider, more intellectual relations of the world are unintelligible to us on a physical theory. Incidentally, also, life seems to set causation at defiance. The vital parent-power is spread without reduction through a thousand generations. It suffers no loss by expenditure. A spiritual theory is far more widely explanatory of events than are self-contained causes. By such causes we can secure a revolution, but hardly an evolution. Evolution accumulates the mystery as we approach the beginning or look forward to the end.

A just analogy of the relations of the spiritual to the physical world is that of ideas to words. Words have a permanent, physical existence. We may study them in their forms, modifications, and derivations. We may, as philologists, accumulate much information and some insight in connection with them. But we have not thereby entered the realm of literature. We have drunk but hastily and inadequately at the streams of thought and feeling which refresh every portion of that beautiful land.

From this glance at the gains and losses of the two theories, in considering the conspicuous facts of the physical world, we turn to some philosophical difficulties associated with them. The physical theory is not, as it is frequently thought to be, empirical. Empirical knowledge is derived from the facts with

which we are familiar. These give us the clues of things more remote. In our experience, matter never takes the initiative. It lies passive under the manipulations of mind, in the exercise only of those forces which constitute its primitive endowment. Purpose, contrivance, combination, are exclusively intellectual facts. The question of how the various forms of matter came into possession of their respective forces is not an empirical inquiry, but a theoretical one. Its subject-matter is wholly beyond experience. It concerns the presuppositions of experience; the rational presuppositions, not observed facts. We cannot infer from the fact that molecules are the products of atomic affinities, and have a definite structure, that these relations originate with matter, any more than we could infer that blocks of stone are predisposed to take on the dependencies which they sustain to each other in a cathedral. Our experience looks in an opposite direction. Whether the orderly, significant relations of atoms to each other are pertinent to matter, or the expression of mind through matter, is a purely theoretical inquiry. The physical theory is less directly based on experience, at this point, than is the spiritual theory. The spiritual theory is an extension of known dependencies into an unknown region. The physical theory is a complete reversal of these dependencies.

Science naturally and inevitably has its own metaphysic, but it is as truly and simply a metaphysic as any offered by philosophy. The scientist has no right to regard his apron as the fig-leaves of nature causally stitched together, and the apron of the philosopher as the merest cobweb, visible only in certain lights; they both belong to that inevitable weaving of the thoughts after we are through with things. Each must stand up for his theory as on the whole the most coherent explanation of the world. Each theory rests upon its rationality.

The physical theory, in the form of the absolute self-sufficiency of the world, if not irrational is unrational. It ignores reason. Ordinarily it simply assumes that attitude; occasionally, in the fullness of its confidence, it avows it. It discards the pursuit of reasons, under the term of final causes, and devotes itself exclusively to causes. Nor is this position one hastily taken; it is involved in the very substance of the theory.

It is quite in order to say that final causes, purposes, are often carelessly assumed in explanation of the world, and a persistent inquiry into causes thereby set aside. Only as we know the conditions can we hope to reach an adequate knowledge of their purpose. We can be sure of the purpose only through the lines of causation which lead up to it. Even if the purpose be correctly stated, we are not to wipe out by means of it a definite knowledge of the conditions through which it is fulfilled. If we do this, we miss the working plan of the world. Our theories collapse into loose conjectures. We have little participation in or power over the events which are in progress about us.

Yet to push forward to the goal to which the physical theory carries the mind is destructive of all true comprehension. If confusion and disorder were the result of those causes into which we inquire, then inquiries would soon be discontinued as without interest or profit. But constructive relations are so thoroughly included in the world, that any and every theory is judged by the degree in which it discloses them. Purposes are constantly inclosed in causes. If any process seems to work mischief, if any tendencies are destructive, if any forces still lie to one side of the general combining movement, these remain enigmas till the want of concurrence is in some way explained or removed. Every organ of animal life must sustain life, every function of the individual must stand in some rela-

tion to the general welfare. Indeed this is the very gist of natural selection. The world, in its own progress, rubs out all qualities that lack harmony. All this, rendered in familiar, intellectual terms, means a purpose and a plan. To avoid these terms, and turn attention from these facts, are certainly a weakness and inadequacy of method.

The physical theory strives to do all the work of the world with half of the resources of the world. The world embraces causes and reasons. Causes are the connections of physical facts; reasons are the connections of intellectual facts. These are commingled in every variety of way, yet each class remains of its own order. As an example of reasons, take the connections in pure mathematics. The several steps in demonstration follow each other through an intellectual union. They are not a succession of events united by causes, but of ideas inherently affiliated. The premises are not forces reappearing in the conclusions; the two owe their relations to each other to the comprehensive activity of the mind, bringing them together. There is no potency in their dependence other than an intellectual one. Mathematical knowledge, the purest and most absolute form of knowledge, is a philosophy, not a science. It is a knowledge of relations between conceptions, not of connections between facts. The more completely these relations are divorced from things, the more exact do they become.

We constantly unite causes to each other by the intervention of reasons. We wish to build a bridge. A series of causes prompts the desire. We form a plan. We study the strain of its several parts. A complex process of reasoning brings us to our final conclusion. A second series of causes is now set in motion, and the bridge is built. The success of the work will depend in part on the fullness and correctness of the reflective process which intervened. Human activity gives us

a web, two-ply. The weaving of the thoughts and the weaving of facts are united in a fabric which owes its excellency to both.

How true is this of history. History is both a philosophy and a science, a thing of reasons and of causes. We understand its events in the measure in which we apprehend the way in which these two have played into each other, and shaped each other. Those who undertake to exclude reasons by causes, to determine character by the conditions under which it is developed, give us very inadequate results.

Though in the physical history of the world causes are far more prominent than reasons, they do not shut out reasons. If they are made to do this, causes become so tenuous and discontinuous as to destroy comprehension. Weismann ridicules the tendency to connect by causation two events, as in birth-marks, which chance to have some superficial resemblance to each other. But is not the insistency of the mind in supplying, in all cases, a physical nexus which may possibly be a line of causes, a tendency of somewhat the same kind? An invisible, supposititious filament of causes, whose potency the mind can in no way conceive or employ, is made to do the most characteristic and subtile work of the organic world by virtue of an illusory mental process on our part. Germ-plasm becomes the vehicle of physical and intellectual forces, building up in due order the life of the world in a way that utterly confounds thought. And this obscure explanation is regarded as preferable to the obvious and familiar one of reasons. If there is such a connection, it is not intelligible. To crowd out the reasons of things and their coherent relations by such an impalpable theory is not knowledge. It is weaving a flimsy web which may have no governing force on the strong, impetuous current of facts.

Is it not better to say in reference to varieties that varieties constantly appear which are fitted to the changeable conditions of development, and are ready to play a specific part in it, than to say that accidental varieties arise in all possible directions, and that the more fortunate of them survive? Under such an explanation the chances are incredibly against any significant variety, and still more against one so complete and potent as not to be lost and overwhelmed by the multitude of fortuitous results with which it must contend. While we accept natural selection, why should we overwork it in this way? While we grant causes, why should we deny reasons? Can we give any other reason for this than an irrational predilection that leads us to accept a fortuitous combination of causes as preferable to a significant conjunction of reasons? This is to be irrational. The law of inheritance is made up of two opposed tendencies — transmission of the same energies, a modification of energies. The way in which these two parts of the law play into each other, giving at the same time coherence and change, is perfectly plain, is altogether rational. Any method of reaching this result by fixed causes is unintelligible.

The conditions which are the occasion of reasons are as capable of study, and as worthy of study, as causes. We need not suspend inquiry because we have recognized purposes. Purposes fulfil themselves under specific circumstances in definite ways and with an intelligible procedure. To insist on causes alone, and to insert them in unintelligible forms, is like affirming that lines of latitude and longitude are a part of the topography, not lines of relation let fall upon it. There are always ideas wider than the things we are considering, by means of which we translate these things into knowledge.

In a railroad yard the engines are constantly passing from track to track. Trains are made up and are coming and go-

ing. The switches adjust themselves as the trains approach. We do not insist that this opening and closing of switches is the automatic action of the engine. There stands the tower whose occupant puts order and safety into all movement. It is folly to insist that every adjustment is automatic because a portion of them are so. Mechanical connections have limitations both in themselves and in the intellectual purpose they subserve.

Such a hold, however, has this idea of causation gained upon some minds that what has now been said, on the side of reason, will hardly affect them. If many have an inadequate idea of causation and suffer their thoughts to play loose, is it not possible that some should have too absolute an idea of causation, and thereby take away the freedom of thought? Is not the mind capable in this direction as in other directions of unbalanced, ill-considered movement? There is one farther consideration which seems to establish this possibility beyond contradiction. This notion of universal causation is destructive of all thought. If the conclusions of scientists are, one and all, a causal series; if the opinions of philosophers are of the same nature, then the one series can have no advantage over the other series. Causes are always adequate to the effects they produce, and a complete explanation of them. One series of effects has no more solid being than another series. Truth disappears in the discussion, and facts only remain. There is no contradiction between facts, and no reconciliation between facts is called for; or if called for is possible. Truth is the conformity of our conceptions to the facts to which they pertain. That conformity we may long puzzle over; for one term at least, our own conception, is infinitely variable. When we have reached universal causation, we have swept away all

truth and reduced our reasoning process to an illusory shadow of a series of events.

Edwards's treatise on the will was a piece of acute self-stultification. Start with the notion of causation, identify reasons with causes, and the result is inevitable. The battle for liberty has been awkwardly fought. Men have identified freedom with facts of will more or less detached, and therefore more or less irrational and arbitrary. The seat of liberty is in the rational nature, whence volition issues. The power to reason means the power to construct and reconstruct coherent relations, and to stop short and go forward with the construction as the mind pleases. Thought is at the center, and by its own nature spontaneous. Herein it is contrasted with causation. Admit causal relations into the domain of mind, and that domain is lost. Volition is most free when it is most rational. Reason gives rise to the law to which it submits itself.

The human mind is capable of many incongruous opinions and inconsistent actions. Men may use reason to baffle reason, and liberty to make liberty of no avail. One may strive, therefore, to retain his own freedom of thought, his right to an opinion, though he has come to regard the world as a fixed self-contained fact. If he accepts the physical law as his own law, the discussion with which we have been occupied is brought to a close. The reasoning process itself has suffered a collapse. If he still, however, insists, in an instinctive way, on holding and defending conclusions, some further considerations arise. A world in which man is free and all else fixed, is an unintelligible, unworkable world. It is, in the first place, impossible to reach such an incongruity under evolution. The evolutionist is not at liberty to think lightly of any extensive product that has arisen under the processes of develop-

ment; to think lightly of that immense volume of human experience which is contained in spiritual beliefs. He might as well regard the instincts of animals as unimportant phenomena, a mere play of shadows about the physical facts. Deep and universal tendencies are not established at random. They are not a fungus growth.

Natural selection has, moreover, adopted these spiritual incentives as working parts in the program of human life. Races in whom the religious impulse has gotten the strongest expression have won dominion. Mohammedanism and Christianity have been, with their adherents, elements of power. A decay in faith has shown itself a decay in the life with which it is associated.

This selection has gone forward when spiritual faith has been connected with many superstitions fitted to reduce its value. The vital element in faith has still sufficed to shake off its own burdens and renew the race development. If a physical rendering of the world were the true rendering and a spiritual interpretation an illusion,— oftentimes a very costly illusion in the maladjustments it brings,— how quickly would natural selection abolish the burdensome lie, and put in its place the simple, plain doctrine of physical causes; and the more so as this doctrine contains so much truth and is, in so many ways, aidful.

The evolutionist may say, That is now being done. The assertion has no sufficient proof. There is now more varied, more vital, more defensible religious faith in the world than ever before. Unbelief, acute and unrelenting, has been a familiar fact in the history of the world. It has served to correct and refine faith, not for any considerable period to supersede it. The ultimate results of unbelief have been the reverse of what its disciples have expected they would be, of

what they should have been, if the movement were fundamentally sound. The defenses of belief have been simply rebuilt, and better built, as the fruit of all the attacks made upon them. The world's development has brought growth to belief, not to unbelief.

It is a defensible assertion that all the superstitions and irrational dogmas of the world have been a painful purgation of faith; precisely as it is a defensible assertion that men being as ignorant and slow of thought as they are, their incredible blunders and tedious delays have all marked out and trodden hard the path of progress.

If intelligent faith is at all what many suppose it to be, if it is true that the just live by faith, then the superstition which has been a medium of faith is a stage in a living process. It is plainly true that natural selection — a rational selection — is still acting on the life which springs from a spiritual interpretation of the world, correcting and compacting the beliefs incident to it. How can an evolutionist give sufficient weight to this broad and conspicuous fact, and still assert the invalidity of a spiritual theory, its erratic and confusing effect?

Our argument is for the moment proceeding on the supposition that man is spiritual, that he has to do both with causes and reasons, that reasons give him the power to handle causes, that causes by virtue of reasons are woven into human action, into a product of conduct and character strictly personal. Yet how incongruous is such a development, such a life, with a physical world that completely incloses it and is, to its last shred, one of causation; not a reason, not a personal relation, anywhere to be found in it. This difficulty the evolutionist should feel. The process has resulted in a product which absolutely transcends its conditions. The physical has given birth to the spiritual. Causes have passed over into reasons, and come into

subjection to them. It is not strange that to minds which have fallen under the dominion of the notion of causation, liberty seems an illusion. How can liberty be dropped into this great deep, this ceaseless ebb and flow of causes, and be otherwise than submerged? There is no agreement between a rational man and a physical universe. He becomes an imprisoned bird, beating his wings to no purpose on the bars of his cage. He is a poet taken for a madman and shut away from nature in a narrow cell and dismal courtyard. Sing as he will of the liberty of the world he cannot possess it.

Many are willing to confront this audacious, dreamy, spiritual temper with the inquiry, Can a sane man in this world of ours, on its predetermined path from eternity to eternity, expect or ask any consideration of his wants? In test of his attitude, is he really ready to pray for rain? Yet, if not daring to ask for rain, he can ask for nothing in the physical world. There is no distinction between the little and the large that will avail him. Causes are as complete and absolute at one point as at another. But if he can ask for nothing physical, for a parity of reasons he can ask for nothing spiritual. The spiritual is approached through the physical. The physical is its constant medium. Moreover, if the integrity of physical relations is so absolute, on what ground can we expect less independence in spiritual relations? We cannot divide between mind and matter, soul and body, and make them live by laws exclusive of each other.

How stands the balance of reason at this point between the two theories, the one physical, the other spiritual? In the one case we are not to pray, because all events are fixed. Neither wisdom nor goodness has any way in the world. In the other case we may pray, because all events remain flexible, have been shaped, and are being shaped, toward a purpose, a

purpose never lost sight of and constantly renewed. It is no more possible to prove that a petition for rain is inefficacious than it is to prove that it is efficacious. The question is simply one of the rational or irrational attitude of the mind in making the petition.

If the physical theory is to prevail, there should be no gaps in it, no weak points in its affirmation. If it fails to be absolutely continuous, it fails utterly. It can give no quarter to the spiritual theory. The spiritual theory, on the other hand, can give large acceptance to the physical theory. The extensive presence of causes is no embarrassment to the mind; quite the reverse. They give revelation, stability, power, to mental processes. An act of mind is ruinous to a chain of causes; chains of causes are links in the thoughts. The beginning of things and their consummation, and every step in the transition, must be equally fixed and firm under causation. Each element in the world must be physical, and equally so their relations to each other. Vital functions must be physical, and equally so the life itself. If prophet or poet or sage comes to the world, he simply comes out of the world, an empty bubble among its surging products. Prayer for rain, any prayer, is out of sorts with such a world. The effort by which one strives to fulfil a rational hope is equally out of sorts. For one coming as a bubble, the only sensible thing is to catch the sunshine, if there be sunshine, and burst like a bubble as attractions and repulsions take new form. We pointed out a little earlier in the argument a logical collapse in the physical theory. Here is a practical collapse. The muscles of action become weak and unserviceable. We may struggle for a moment if we give way to the instinctive desire for a higher life, but it is more consonant with wisdom to sink quietly, — the last scintillation of wisdom which has all along betrayed us but still in-

sists on being in with a precept at the end. The weight of reason, when confronted with the entire structure of the world and the full problem of life, would seem to be with the spiritual theory, in which our ideas are left to arrange themselves according to the inherent connections of thought.

Moreover, this human world has given rise to an ethical law, preëminently spiritual in its terms, which lies between men, and promises, by virtue of the very forces which have produced it, to grow in strength and unite men in one peaceful household. Thus the government of society is actually being taken out of the region of physical facts, and is approaching a solution by virtue of a balance of spiritual incentives. It is difficult, in so incipient and confused a state as that through which the spiritual world is now passing, to find a stronger proof than this, that it is a law unto itself. It is because men have not felt the force of facts, or seen the drift of events, that they have sought in such a weak way for Revelation. The real revelation lies in the trend of spiritual forces, often buried beneath the soil, often cropping out, but always the substance of things.

An allied consideration is the higher type of character and greater affluence of life which are associated with the spiritual theory. This is the fundamental proof of its correctness, and the unceasing reason of its adoption. A long induction in human experience sustains that theory as being nearest the truth which is most constructive, which shows most power in combining results in an harmonious product. This the spiritual theory does. It is only the despair of men that ever leads them to lose hold of it. The physical theory excludes the spiritual theory and brings to nothing a great variety of phenomena which arise under it. The spiritual theory gives easy admission to all the facts of the physical theory, and withdraws

assent only when they are hypothetically extended into regions which they fail to cover. It is then met by a presumption as familiar as its own and far more explanatory.

Physical inquiry has not only greatly enlarged the conditions favorable to our physical life; it has given a continuity, a steadfastness, and an intelligibility to the general spiritual procedure of the world which are of the utmost moment, as elements of thought and of action. Vague, fitful, and mystical impressions which beset a speculative spiritual interpretation have been forced back, and the growth of life has become practical and substantial. The physical facts through which we realize spiritual results and make them significant are attained, receive their due weight, and perform their appropriate functions. High types of character have arisen as the result of unflinching inquiry, resting all conclusions on a knowledge of facts. This attitude is itself a noble expression of faith, a conversion of the dross of knowledge into the gold of character. And the fact still remains that human life and character lose depth and scope under an exclusively physical presentation of the world. The unseen shrivels up and disappears. The things seen are temporal, the things unseen are eternal. Not only has a veil fallen between the two worlds, it has become like the heavy pad which, in a noisy city, deadens sound at the church door and cuts apart the sacred and the secular as things that are not to mingle. The region of hope, inexhaustible incentive, blessed images, and adequate consolation, is gone, and character, in all its subtler manifestations, suffers infinite loss. Such a loss must be manfully endured if truth requires it, but the fact that it is such an irremediable loss shows that we are mistakenly casting aside a complemental and reciprocal part of our very being. Our spiritual development claims an ele-

ment which has all along been with us, and shall increasingly be with us, till the light brightens into day.

A physical theory becomes ever more barren. The reverberations of the double universe—the two hemispheres in which we live—are lost. The remote and supersensuous influences needed to make human character germinate, push in patient endurance through the stiff soil, and open out into heroic achievement, wide fellowship, inspiring prophecy, are gone, and the world sinks back into unfruitfulness.

How plainly is this true in connection with immortality! Physical facts not only give no promise of immortality, they fill the world to the very horizon with phenomena of which no one has any fellowship with a future life. So far as they are concerned, such a life is utterly without locality, sequence, or suggestion. And yet without immortality the hopes and motives of life are fearfully shortened in. A future life, as the fulfilment of the present life, is a purely spiritual product. It is because we feel the embryonic movement of our spiritual powers that we predict this birth into new being. If the present world is permeated through and through with reasons, if causes themselves are only another, and, with all their permanence, a more transient, form of reasons, then the Indomitable Energy of the world is forever on the side of life. When the occasion comes He will provide for it, as easily and as naturally as He makes the flower, new or old, come into blossom. No matter how small and closely sealed may be the bud, it pours its whole soul into the light when the hour arrives.

The affirmation, The just shall live by faith, ceases to be a dogma, and stands for the hourly penetration of the thoughts of men by an Unseen Presence, the constant going forth of the affections, deepened and renewed in their own spiritual realm. The soul becomes as the thrifty tree in a sultry soil, that sends

its tendrils in search of that moisture which nowhere appears. The affirmation that a Divine Power and Presence stands at the center of physical and spiritual phenomena alike seems to be the most rational and explanatory conception we can form concerning the world.