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THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.
AN IRENICON.

BY PROFESSOR G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

IN current discussions concerning the inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture it is evident that many of the disputants are proceeding at cross-purposes. Not only do they see different sides of the same shield; but much of the language employed by them is understood by each in a sense different from that intended by the other. We are confident that more careful attention to the meaning of the terms employed on both sides will largely remove the main grounds of dispute between the mass of those who really revere the sacred word.

On the one hand, many who object to the doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture do not fully take into account the qualifications introduced, and the explanation of terms given, by its advocates, nor do they make due allowance for the limitations to the doctrine afforded by the processes of interpretation which all employ to some extent and admit to be lawful.

On the other hand, the advocates of inerrancy do not all of them see how nearly their liberal principles of interpretation bring their statement of the doctrine down to the level of that of the moderate members of the opposing party. Neither do all of the so-called liberal party seem to be aware

that, in magnifying the discrepancies of Scripture, as they do, they fall into the same error of extreme literalism which they charge upon the so-called conservatives. To put it concisely: The conservatives are inclined to be too literal in their interpretation of the texts which teach inerrancy, and liberal in their interpretation of the passages containing apparent errors and discrepancies; while the liberals tend towards too great rigidity in their interpretation of the apparent discrepancies, and too great freedom in their treatment of the claims of the Bible to inspiration and infallibility.

For example: Dr. Charles Hodge's full statement of the doctrine of plenary inspiration is by no means so rigid as many seem to suppose it to be. Thus, in his most formal statement of the doctrine he says: "They [the sacred writers] were not imbued with plenary knowledge. *As to all matters, of science, philosophy, and history, they stood on the same level with their contemporaries.* They were infallible only as teachers, and when acting as spokesmen of God. Their inspiration no more made them astronomers than it made them agriculturists. Isaiah was infallible in his predictions, although he shared with his countrymen the views then prevalent as to the mechanism of the universe."¹ (The italics here, and later, are ours to call attention to significant qualifying clauses.) Again, in his treatment of alleged discrepancies and errors, we find him saying, that "the *great majority* of them are only apparent, and yield to careful examination. . . . The marvel and the miracle is that there are so few of any real importance. . . . The *errors in matters of fact* which sceptics search out *bear no proportion* to the whole. . . . No sane man would deny that the Parthenon was built of marble, even if here and there a speck of sandstone should be detected in the structure. . . . *Admitting that the Scriptures do contain, in a few instances, discrepancies* which, with our present means of knowledge, we are unable satisfactorily to

¹ Systematic Theology, Vol. i. p. 165.

explain, they furnish no rational ground for denying their infallibility."¹

Dr. A. A. Hodge, also, when insisting that the Bible is "wholly the word of God," inserts a qualifying clause which has more significance than would be suspected by the casual reader. The books of Scripture, he says, are "wholly the Word of God, conveying, with absolute accuracy and divine authority, *all that God meant them to convey.*"² Again, in the joint article upon the subject by Drs. A. A. Hodge and B. B. Warfield,³ it is said, that "all the affirmations of Scripture . . . are without any error when the *ipsissima verba* of the original autographs are ascertained and *interpreted in their natural and intended sense.*"

Taking President J. H. Fairchild as a representative of the evangelical wing of the liberal party, it appears that, while he characterizes the theory of plenary inspiration as "that of *absolute* inspiration," he describes his own theory as "that of *essential* inspiration," and maintains "that there is *marvellous accuracy* even in the geographical and historical statements [of the Bible], and *marvellous wisdom* in reference to *all matters of science*—such wisdom as seems to imply *divine guidance; securing the use* of popular expressions such as are *always appropriate*, and the *avoidance of all technical terms* which imply a scientific theory."⁴ It should be gratifying to those who insist upon the formal doctrine of plenary inspiration, to see that one who professedly rejects their statement of it still maintains the same high reverence for the Bible, and the same confidence in its details, which is cherished by them.

With equal distinctness, also, do both parties reject the mechanical theory of inspiration. According to Dr. Hodge,

¹ Systematic Theology, Vol. i. pp. 169, 170.

² Commentary on the Confession of Faith, p. 55.

³ The Presbyterian Review, Vol. ii. p. 238.

⁴ Elements of Theology, p. 83.

"The Church has never held what has been stigmatized as the mechanical theory of inspiration. The sacred writers were not machines. . . . It lies in the very nature of inspiration that God spake in the language of men; that He uses men as his organs, each according to his peculiar gifts and endowments. When He ordains praise out of the mouth of babes, they must speak as babes, or the whole power and beauty of the tribute will be lost. . . . The sacred writers were not made unconscious or irrational. The spirits of the prophets were subject to the prophets. They were not like calculating machines which grind out logarithms with infallible correctness."¹ Upon this point President Fairchild's language is strikingly in accord with that of Dr. Hodge, even to that of the principal illustration: "The result then seems to be," he says, "that, in our use and application of Scriptures, whatever theory of inspiration we adopt, we are not saved from the necessity of the exercise of our own judgment, and from the uncertainty thereby involved. The Scriptures are not given us to be used in a mechanical way, like an algebraic formula, or a carpenter's rule; and even absolute inspiration could not secure to us such a use of the Scriptures. The two theories practically bring us to the same result, by somewhat different routes."²

A careful examination of these and other representative statements of prominent writers upon both sides of the question readily reveals the basis of much present misunderstanding. When Dr. A. A. Hodge says, that the Scriptures convey "with absolute accuracy . . . *all that God meant them to convey*," the qualifying clause throws the whole field open for criticism to determine just what information God did mean to convey. Likewise, when Drs. Warfield and A. A. Hodge say, that "all affirmations of Scripture . . . are without error," the sweep of their qualifying clauses should be carefully noted.

¹ Systematic Theology, Vol. i. pp. 157, 156.

² Elements of Theology, p. 85.

The affirmations are to be "interpreted in their natural and *intended* sense." Here, too, the whole field of criticism is thrown open. The definition is not closed. It remains to determine what is the *natural* and *intended* sense.

The difficulty of agreeing upon what is the natural and intended sense has a striking illustration in the recent controversy between Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Huxley over the first chapter of Genesis, in which the scientific man inferred the intention of the document from a narrow literal interpretation of the terms employed, such as would be legitimate only in dealing with a scientific treatise, while the statesman, from his larger familiarity with men and the literature of the world, interpreted the language more liberally. Evidently, the whole contention was largely over the definition of terms, upon which the distinguished writers from the different spheres of action and thought in which they had habitually moved, found it difficult, and we might say impossible, to come to an agreement.

The interests both of truth and Christian fellowship will be promoted if we note more carefully the significance of these limitations to the bald statements of doctrine concerning the inerrancy of Scripture.

1st. *The Doctrine is to be limited to the Autographs.*— In limiting their assertion of inerrancy to the original text, the conservatives have freed themselves from the acknowledgment of one kind of error by the frank acknowledgment of another kind of error in the Bible as we have had it for eighteen centuries, as we have it now, and as we are likely to have it to the end of time, for we are not likely ever to be able to reproduce the original text perfectly in all its particulars. All that the most enthusiastic textual critics can hope to do, is to reduce the textual uncertainty to an *inconsiderable* quantity, so that it may be disregarded without serious loss. It is important, also, for the liberal party to note in this connection that the most prominent leaders in the work of correct-

ing the text of the New Testament, including such scholars as Tischendorf and Tregelles, have held very high views concerning the inerrancy of the original text. Indeed, it has been these views which have emphasized to them the necessity of their work, and which have stimulated them in their arduous efforts to restore the text of the autographs.

The only advantage, in point of authority, which can be claimed by the advocates of the inerrancy of the autographs is that it may be easier to detect the mistakes of scribes than it is to determine the limit of error in any theory of accommodation. But really this contention would seem to relate to a very small difference over a matter which is far more theoretical than practical; for there are all grades of opinion in the world as to the uncertainty of the text both of the Old Testament and of the New; as there are all grades of belief concerning the extent to which, for rhetorical purposes, the truth respecting minor things may with propriety be disregarded in the statement and enforcement of the main point of a discourse. In both cases the extremists are readily recognized, while the main body of well-balanced and broadly educated people who are seriously struggling with the inherent difficulties, are really not far apart. One says there remains in the text a modicum of error which cannot be eliminated, and the other says there was an inconsiderable amount of error in the original documents, respecting subsidiary facts. But nearly all say that the great body both of the text and of the original statements are correct as we have them and that their true interpretation is determined "beyond a reasonable doubt"—a legal phrase with which we cannot conveniently dispense.

2dly. *Some Theory of Accommodation is held by All Interpreters.*—Supposing the text to be established for the most part "beyond reasonable doubt," and for the rest "upon a preponderance of evidence," it remains to determine what is the *natural* and *intended* sense, that is, what truth God

meant the words used to convey. And here, again, we shall find that many of the differences are greatly magnified by an undue rigidity of meaning imposed upon certain words by one party or the other. The theory which excites most alarm among many conservatives is that of "accommodation." And yet it is not difficult to see that, in order to defend the doctrine of inerrancy, conservative scholars themselves have to make large use of this very principle. The only legitimate claim which they can make to superiority in this respect is that they use the principle within more reasonable limits than others do, recognizing that, like a sharp tool, its very value is indicated in the fact that it must be used carefully. A few instances in which this principle is employed by both parties with satisfactory results will suffice.

In Matt. xiii. 32 Christ is made to say that the mustard seed is the least of all seeds. Now, if this is interpreted from a scientific point of view, as it would have to be if it occurred in a scientific book, it is a mistake, and so some would regard it, adducing it as evidence of the limitation of Christ's knowledge while on the earth. But, interpreted from a literary point of view, it is called a figure of speech, in which the superlative is used for the comparative,—a common rhetorical way of enforcing the main idea being to disregard the minute elements in a statement, so that attention shall not be distracted from the main point. In this view such an expression as "the least of all seeds" is in this connection a *breviloquence*, meaning, the least of all known seeds, or the least of all seeds with which we have anything to do or with which we are familiar. In catching the main idea, the mind has no time to pause and weigh the infinitesimal elements in the form of statement. In such a case it would be a serious rhetorical mistake to burden the sentence with the minutiae of exact scientific statement. Such a rhetorical mistake would be the worst kind of error, since it would obscure the main thought. The figure of speech is essential to the proper enforcement of

the divine thought through human language. The enforcement of the main point was what God intended to accomplish, and not our enlightenment as to a scientific fact.

The same principle is illustrated when Moses says that the coney does not part the hoof but chews the cud, which, if taken scientifically and literally, is an error, for the animal is not a ruminant, but belongs to a class (*Hyracidae*) whose teeth, like those of the rodents, have to be worn down and sharpened by constant friction. Otherwise they would grow to such length as to be uncomfortable. In accomplishing this necessary result, the coney moves his jaws as ruminants do in chewing the cud. As the manifest object of the passage is to designate the signs by which the cleanness or uncleanness of the animals is to be determined, nothing but what appears to the eye needs to be stated. Therefore, as, to the ordinary observer, the coney goes through all the motions of chewing the cud, the phrase "chewing the cud" means, in the connection in which Moses uses it, no more than *going through the motions* of chewing the cud; just as, to the astronomer, the phrase "the sun rises" means only that the sun appears to rise. In both cases there is a popular use of language which concerns itself merely with the appearance, and does not touch the question of the ultimate explanation of the phenomena.

There is here no chance for exact definition. Truth or error in the application of the principle is a question of more or less. The final appeal is to the common experience of men in the use of language where, as all must admit, the individual judgment has to be used. If the interests dependent upon determination of the exact meaning are of grave importance, the court would insist that the point must be proved *beyond a reasonable doubt*; while, if the interests dependent upon it are evidently of comparatively small account, a *preponderance of evidence* is all that is necessary.

In this connection it is important frequently to note the

extent to which we all assume the principle that the meaning of words is largely determined by the known nature of the subject. A familiar example appears in the word "bring." To bring a book implies the movement of it by physical force. To bring the prisoner implies, in most cases, only the application of the motives of fear. While to bring a friend to dinner implies the absence of both force and fear. In every case where the command is given, the one who executes the order obtains the true import of the command by reading between the lines. And yet every one sees that there is a "reasonable" limit to the application of this principle, and that great mistakes are frequently made by assuming that more is known about the subject than really is known. Indeed the difficulties of agreement as to the meaning of terms largely arise out of different assumptions as to our amount of present knowledge concerning the subject under discussion.

Due attention to these considerations will also show how it is that different views have arisen concerning the morality of certain things endorsed by inspiration in the Old Testament. In most cases the disputants have different definitions of right and wrong, and different standards for measuring external morality. Was it right for the children of Israel to exterminate the Canaanites? Those who say it was, do not mean thereby to imply that the extermination of rival nations is always proper, but they accept the command of God as an absolute indication of what it is right to do in a particular case where our wisdom is limited and his is infinite. Infinite wisdom is permitted to command us to depart from the ordinary rules of outward morality where finite wisdom would not be. All would unite in saying that various things commanded and permitted in the Old Testament are not the standard of action in a more enlightened age or in cases where man is left to determine his action from the limited range of his own foresight.

The same line of remark is proper concerning the differ-

ent views maintained respecting the imprecatory psalms. One party declares that the imprecations are wrong, and that the writers sinned in giving utterance to such sentiments as are there expressed. This view of the case, however, proceeds upon an interpretation which assumes that the imprecations were uttered in the low plane of personal spite and animosity, which everybody would call wicked. But those who defend the imprecations as worthy of an inspired writer do so from a higher plane of interpretation and from a broader field of ethical judgment. As a representative man whose success or failure is identified with that of the success or failure of the kingdom of God, the Psalmist's enemies are God's enemies, and no language or rhetoric is too strong to express the desire for their discomfiture. We too often obscure the fact that opposition to the kingdom of God is always made by individual men, and is directed against individual representatives of the truth who are fighting its battles. When treason is striking down those who uphold a nation's flag, the discomfiture of the traitors is likely to involve their death and to render their wives widows, and their children fatherless. From this there is no escape: the triumph of one army involves the defeat of the other. It is from this high plane of thought that the conservative party would interpret the imprecatory psalms, and they would maintain that from this point of view the natural and intended meaning is entirely worthy of the occasion. Nor is this view one which can be lightly passed by. It is one with which every broad-minded interpreter is compelled to reckon.

It would, however, be hardly fair to say that, because the principle of accommodation is acknowledged and used by all, therefore there is no reasonable limit to its use. Because there is difficulty in telling exactly when the day ends, and the night begins, it does not follow that we do not know the difference between day and night for all practical purposes. It is evident that this is clearly maintained by most of the

evangelical party who insist that there are some minor errors and discrepancies in the original statements of the sacred writers. In insisting that the errors are minor, and that they relate to matters which are outside the main objects of revelation, they practically bring their alleged discrepancies within the range of the principle of accommodation which even the conservative party freely uses. Clearly, therefore, it is not a matter upon which there can be an exact line of demarcation between the disputants. It is a question of *degrees* of difference. To all there is a border-line of uncertainty in which both are involved to some extent. When it is said that "the affirmations of Scripture of all kinds . . . are without *error* . . . when interpreted in their *natural* and *intended* sense," the determination of what is the "natural and intended sense" is in many cases such a difficult task that the conservative may well have much patience with the liberal if he seems in some cases to stretch the principle of accommodation unwarrantably. Whether or not he is amenable to reason, remains to be determined by a wide consideration of facts.

3dly. *Both Letter and Spirit are to be duly emphasized.*

—The broad principle of accommodation has innumerable specific applications which ordinarily pass under other names, and which might cover the whole process of scientific interpretation in which there is any departure from the bare literal meaning. Without more reflection than is ordinarily given to the subject, few are aware how seldom they interpret language literally. At first this seems to militate against the possibility of conveying any clear impressions of truth through the medium of words. Practically, however, the difficulty disappears when we come to see how thought is woven into the whole context and circumstances surrounding the individual expressions. The margin of error, like the "personal equation" of an observer, can usually be determined with a "reasonable" degree of accuracy.

It is curious, as well as instructive, to note more partic-

ularly under what different circumstances the conservatives and the liberals throw themselves open in both cases to the charge alike of undue literalism and of undue freedom in the interpretation of Scripture. As already indicated, the conservatives maintain their positions by a strict construction of the language of the Bible relating to its authority, and a free construction of passages which seem to contain discrepancies and error; while the liberals who preserve their respect for the Bible as the word of God, maintain their position by treating the discrepancies literally, and the passages which contain apparent endorsement of the doctrine of inerrancy, freely.

Professor William H. Green's treatment of the chronology derived from the genealogical tables in Genesis extending from Adam to Abraham presents one of the most noteworthy instances on the conservative side. The links in this chain seem, at first glance, to be so securely joined together that there is no escape from the conviction that the sacred writer has here committed himself to a definite and short chronology for the human race. So short is this, that it seems impossible to make it coincide with that furnished by the revelations of science and profane history. Yet Professor Green, after a full survey of the subject, thinks himself warranted in giving it a liberal interpretation which few would at first glance think to be possible. From Hebrew literary usage, and from the whole attendant circumstances, this eminent and conservative scholar comes to the conclusion that where we read in Genesis, "Seth was an hundred and five years old, and begat Enos," all that it necessarily means is, that Enos was descended from the heir to Seth who was born in Seth's one hundred and fifth year, so that any number of centuries which science or profane history may have evidence for demanding can be interpolated between these or any other two links in the chain.¹

¹ See *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xlvii, pp. 285-393.

And so one may take up all the alleged errors and discrepancies of the Bible, and find that they, one by one, yield to treatment, and may be made to disappear under the hands of a skilful interpreter. Some of them, indeed, yield with much difficulty, but the most are readily seen to be classed as errors and discrepancies only upon an interpretation which is by no means certainly shown to be correct.

The usual answer to the apologist who presents his explanations in detail is, that, while each difficulty may be plausibly disposed of singly, it is not probable that he is without error in every instance so that the cases are all explainable. In other words, it is held that the argument against inerrancy is cumulative, and it is not uncommon to hear the process of the apologist described as "treating the Scripture unworthily," or "doing violence to laws of language," or even, in plainer terms, as "wriggling" and "jugglery."

But who art thou, O man, who chargest thy brother with dealing subtly with the Word of God, and dost thyself labor long and hard to explain away the apparently plain letter of the New Testament in its endorsement of the historical character of the Old Testament? In view of the uniform deference paid in the New Testament to the teachings of the Old, and of the many specific statements concerning the historical character of some passages which are rejected from the category of historical writings by many critics, it is difficult for them to maintain their respect for the writers of the New without a process of interpretation which is even more intricate than that of the ordinary apologist for the Old. The readiness, for instance, with which a recent writer, in the face of Matt. xxii. 43, where Christ, in an argument quotes Psalm cx. as spoken "by David in the Spirit," can say that Jesus "*never*, in the proper sense of the words, expressed *any opinion* on these purely literary and historical questions" of the Old Testament, would indicate that, if the conservative scholar has to "wriggle" to explain the seeming discrepancies of the

Bible, the liberal scholar has to do the same in an even higher degree to maintain his respect for the New Testament writers while rejecting their views of the character of the Old Testament.

The truth is, that the charges of wriggling and jugglery which are too freely made upon both sides engaged in present controversies concerning biblical criticism, are most of them out of place. As already remarked, the argument upon each side is largely one of degree. The biblical harmonist succeeds so readily with the vast majority of the cases, that the presumption of success naturally goes before him to the remaining cases which are more doubtful, and he has plausible grounds for thinking himself warranted in believing that with more light and fuller information he could resolve them all. His hypothetical attempts to harmonize the seemingly inconsistent statements of extraordinarily trustworthy and well-informed writers, is not necessarily an instance of wriggling, but of the legitimate use of theory in attempting to arrive at facts; for it is but ordinary respect to the intelligence and integrity of a common historian to explain his seeming inconsistencies provisionally by a charitable hypothesis. Much more does it seem allowable to believe that an apparent mistake of such demonstrably accurate historians as Luke or the writer of the Fourth Gospel is explainable, if only we understood more fully either their language or the circumstances of the case.

Somewhat similar remarks may be properly made about what seems, to most people, the arbitrary efforts put forth to dismember and destroy the historical character of the Pentateuch; for the principles upon which the critics proceed are legitimate enough, and the mode of argument is proper. That some revision of the Pentateuch took place after Moses' death, all admit. The question is, whether the case is as strong as some recent critics think it is, and whether its proper historical character is to be discredited. The work of the

critics is not to be judged by piecemeal, but by its whole effect, and by the general reasonableness of the results as compared with the ordinary view. Neither should the fact, that, in apportioning out the Pentateuch to the several supposed writers of different ages, a great part of the work of the critics is narrow and arbitrary and unsatisfactory, be urged too strongly against their general good faith. The waters are deep, and a pretty long chain may be allowed to their anchor. But need of charity on his own part should bar the critic against too unsparing criticism of the methods of the ordinary apologist; for some of the questions at issue are beset with peculiar difficulties all around, and are not capable of demonstrative settlement, but must be determined by ascertaining upon which side the difficulties are most preponderant and most nearly insuperable.

At the present time, as always in the discussion of a subject so difficult of statement as that of the doctrine of inspiration evidently is, there are extremists on each side who manifestly go unreasonable lengths. On the one hand, there are those, both among the liberals and conservatives, who insist that the Ptolemaic astronomy and the creation of the world in six days of twenty-four hours each are distinctly taught in the Bible, and that absolute immoralities are advised by the Old Testament. The one party insists on the strict letter, in order to bring reproach upon the sacred writers, while the other insists upon it from a mistaken notion of what is real reverence for the Bible. But it is not with extremists that we are chiefly concerned.

We shall be greatly misunderstood if it be supposed that we are here making a plea for universal tolerance, or that we maintain that the truth is usually to be found by splitting the difference between two disputants. The truth is by no means always half-way between two extreme statement of a doctrine. It is usually much nearer one side than the other, and sometimes wholly on one side. We do not deny that there are

heresies respecting the Word of God which are to be rejected with great earnestness and vigor. On the one hand, there are wandering stars in the firmament whose centrifugal tendencies have become predominant, so that they have ceased to be obedient to the central forces of the system, while, on the other hand, there is much dead orthodoxy which knows only the centripetal forces, and has ceased to have motion or efficiency. But, touching the central doctrines of religion, there is much that cannot adequately be stated in single sentences, while the qualifying phrases introduced for explanation are likely to be understood differently by different persons. It is our purpose in a general way to utter and emphasize a caution against harsh judgments of one another for accepting or rejecting certain concise statements of doctrine which it requires a volume to unfold. The Bible is not such a concise statement, but a large book. One's belief is not so well determined by his acceptance or rejection of some creed of another's or even of his own manufacture, as by his larger attitude of mind as revealed in his broader and more general discussions. It is doubtful if assent even to the manifesto of the Presbyterian General Assembly at Portland in 1892 upon the inerrancy of the Bible would determine very definitely some people's views upon the question which is now most troubling the churches. With the definition which different persons might give to the terms used, the folds of that manifesto would seem ample to cover broad divergences of opinion. Of what avail is it for a man to say that he "holds that the inspired word *as it came from God* is without error," when he may reject a good part of the canon, and say that it did not come from God, and regard even that which remains as hopelessly corrupt in text? And what does it avail to say the Word is *without error*, when it is not known upon what principles he interprets the Word to find out its intent and meaning, and judge of its truth or error?

We have been deeply impressed recently with the extent

to which seeming differences of opinion are diminished by careful attention to the qualifying terms of each disputant, in noting the discussions of half a century ago between Dr. Charles Hodge and President Finney concerning the doctrine of original sin. On the one hand, Finney and what were then called the New School party stoutly insisted, that, although children are born without any actual guilt, they are still burdened with a physical depravity which makes it certain that their first moral act will uniformly be sinful; while Dr. Hodge and the Old School party insisted, that, "in virtue of the union, representative and natural, between Adam and his posterity, his sin is the ground of their [man's] condemnation, that is, of their subjection to penal evils,"¹ but, Dr. Hodge makes haste to add, that "the sin of Adam is *no ground to us of remorse*," and that there is *no transfer* of the *moral turpitude* of this sin to his descendants." To this Old School doctrine as so qualified, it would seem that the other party could have had little reason to object, for a sin which calls for no remorse, and to which no moral turpitude attaches, is scarcely to be distinguished from what the other party calls physical depravity.

The instances in which, as here, the qualifying word changes the meaning of the principal word are frequent. It is like the transformation of a noxious chemical element into an innocuous compound by the addition of another element. *Original* sin is not *ordinary* sin. So numerous are such instances that it is necessary to proceed with much caution before imputing great folly to a conservative's creed or attributing rank heresy to a liberal who declines to sign it. More attention to the infirmities of human reason and to the difficulties of making statements in human language so exact that the meaning cannot be misunderstood will enable the true Israel to draw closer together, and cause Ephraim and Judah to envy and vex each other less than they now do.

¹ Commentary on the Epistles to the Romans (Philadelphia, 1864), p. 279.