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ARTICLE X.
CRITICAL NOTES.

I.

SECOND TIMOTHY III. 16.

BY THE REV. PROFESSOR ISRAEL E. DWINELL, D.D.,
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THIS is a crucial passage. It is a Gibraltar commanding the entrance to the doctrine of inspiration of Scripture. He who holds that the Bible *contains* a revelation—things inspired by God—seeks to make this passage favor his idea. He who believes that the Bible as a whole *is* the word of God resorts to this for proof. So the battle rages about this passage.

The Received Version reads: "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable;" the Revision: "All Scripture given by inspiration of God is also profitable." The commentators are divided in opinion. Ellicott, De Wette, Van Oosterzee, Bengel, and many others, including those with higher views of inspiration generally, make *θεόπνευστος* a predicate, interpreting "all Scripture is inspired." Grotius, Rosenmüller, Heinrichs, Hofmann, Alford, and most persons with weak views of inspiration, make it attributive of *γραφή*. Of the ancient versions, the Peshito and the Vulgate omit the *καί*, and of course consider *θεόπνευστος* as attributive. Murdock's translation of the Peshito is: "All Scripture that is inspired by the Spirit, is also profitable."

In interpreting this passage, the first thing to be considered is the meaning of *γραφή*. According to the custom of that time, this word when applied to religious subjects among the Jews always referred to the writings of the Old Testament, though there is evidence that the term was beginning to be extended among the Christians to such of the New Testament writings as had then been produced and recognized as authoritative; for example, the apostle Paul, in 1 Tim. v. 18, says: "The *Scripture* saith, Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn," quoting from Deuteronomy, and then adds, quoting Christ's words recorded in Luke x. 7, "The laborer is worthy of his hire." Some of Christ's words, then, had already become *Scripture*. And in 2 Peter iii.

16, the writer, speaking of the Epistles of the apostle Paul, says, that there are some things in them which "they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the *other Scriptures*."

Though there are indications of a gradual enlargement of the scope of the word "Scripture" so as to include sacred writings of the New Testament, it almost always refers to the Old Testament. This is true of the word whether singular or plural. Of the fifty-one times in which it is used in the New Testament, with the exception of the two mentioned above, it refers exclusively to the Old Testament or some portion of it. This is the use which our Saviour made of the word. In fact, it almost seems as if in thought there were no other writings to be quoted. When he confronts Satan, in his temptation, in referring to the authority of what he utters, he merely says, "It is written;" "It is written."

The apostle speaks of Scripture equally absolutely—"The Scripture hath included all under sin." There is a significant passage in Rom. xv. 4, "*Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that through patience and through comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope.*" That must include all the contents of the sacred books, This is the passage which Meyer regards as explaining the meaning of *πᾶσα γραφή* in our passage, all Scripture being equal to "whatsoever things were written aforetime."

Πᾶσα γραφή means, however, not so much the whole Scripture, or all Scripture viewed in its totality, as every Scripture viewed in its individual or constituent parts.

This expression *πᾶσα γραφή* is immediately followed, without a copula, by *θεόπνευστος καὶ ὠφέλιμος*. The question is, Are both of these predicates? It is safe to say there is absolutely nothing in the Greek here used to hint that they are not. Further, if *θεόπνευστος* were intended to be attributive to *γραφή*, it should properly have the article *ἡ* before it. The law of the Greek language requires this. Buttman says: "An adjective without the article, standing either before or after a noun with the article, is predicative."¹ We have before us an adjective without the article, standing after a noun. The noun is without the article, it is true, but it has an equivalent, *πᾶσα*. Therefore the adjective should be interpreted adjectively, in the same way and for the same reason that *ὠφέλιμος* is.

Again, unless there is something to indicate the contrary, *καὶ* is naturally a conjunction connecting the two words. There is something

The first suggestion of this interpretation is supposed to have been from the absence of the conjunction *καί* in some of the early versions and some of the writings of the Christian Fathers. In modern times it seems to have been adopted, in some cases, for dogmatic reasons. But there is no doubt about the correctness of the text as it stands, no one questioning it.

Further, when we regard *καί* as an adverb, we leave the meaning still ambiguous. It may mean, "Any Scripture *inspired* by God is also profitable;" or "Every Scripture, being in point of fact inspired by God, is also profitable." Possibly some of the Revisers may have had this latter interpretation in mind in voting for the reading put in the text. While the majority have put "Every Scripture inspired of God is profitable" in the text, they have put in the margin "Every Scripture is inspired of God, and profitable," showing that there was no unanimity in the body. If those who believed that *θεόπνευστος* is used predicatively, had succeeded in having the phrase, "inspired of God," separated by commas from the rest of the passage, that punctuation would have indicated the fact. It would have read, in that case, "Every Scripture, inspired of God, is also profitable;" and that would mean "Every Scripture, being in fact inspired of God, is also profitable." But it is not so punctuated; and the punctuation indicates that *θεόπνευστος* is used as an attributive, limiting the meaning of *γραφή*. They may, however, some of them, have intended to interpret it in the other way, and voted for the Revision, though they failed to punctuate it in such a way as to indicate their interpretation. For this is the reading and the interpretation of Meyer. He argues in this way: "There is no reason for directing attention to the fact that the *whole* of Scripture is *θεόπνευστος*. There was no doubt on that point (*viz.*, that the *whole* of Scripture and not a part of it was inspired by God), but on the point whether the Scriptures as *θεόπνευστος* are *also* (*καί* serves to confirm) *ὠφέλιμοι*."¹

But such an interpretation does not harmonize with the apostle's habit of thinking and writing. It is too subtle and nice. He wrote right on, and put two predicates side by side in the same construction without hesitation, though logically the first might be the ground or reason, and the second the consequence.

Rev. Thomas F. Potwin shows in the *Independent*, of October, 10, 1889, that the apostle has a habit of using adjectives in pairs as predicates. He cites twenty-seven passages. Seven of these (Rom. vii. 12; xiv. 18; 1 Cor. xii. 30; 2 Cor. x. 10; 1 Tim. i. 15; ii. 3; iv. 9) are connected by *καί* and without a copula, as in the case before us. Yet in no one of these seven passages has any interpreter ever suggested that the first is an attributive, and *καί* an adverb, though, so far as the Greek is con-

¹In loco.

cerned, there would be as much reason for doing it in any one of the seven, with the exception of 2 Cor. x. 10, as in the passage in Second Timothy. So we not only wrench the Greek, but wrest the habit of St. Paul, when we make *καί* an adverb and *θεόπνευστος* an attributive.

Besides, we cannot imagine that a writer as bold and positive as the apostle, if he had wished to throw the contents of Scripture into two divisions, one of which he considered inspired and authoritative and the other uninspired and unauthoritative, or to suggest that any such distinction was to be made in thought, would have used Greek which, naturally interpreted, means that in this respect there is but one kind, and that it is all inspired. If he had desired to hurl his spear through a portion of Scripture as destitute of divine authority, he would have left no uncertainty about the direction and quality of the shivering lance.

The improbability of this is increased by the fact that no suspicion of the want of inspiration is cast by any other sacred writer on any integral portion of Scripture. We look in vain elsewhere for any suggestion of the sort. Clearly this passage should be interpreted in harmony with the habitual practice of the sacred writers, unless the Greek is positively inconsistent with such interpretation; whereas, in fact, the Greek itself requires this interpretation.

What this passage teaches, therefore, is the inspiration of Scripture in its constituent parts. It has reference to the objective fact—the inspiration of the books as books.

But while it does not directly state the inspiration of the writers or the method of inspiration, yet the word *θεόπνευστος* hints both. It hints that it was by a divine *inbreathing*. *θεός-πνέων*—God-breathing. This does not suggest a mechanical method—giving words, or even, necessarily, thoughts; but a method of spiritual suggestion and quickening, of co-working under and with the firm activity of man; a dynamic movement of God and man both, the two working jointly and inseparably to produce Scripture.

It is very much to be regretted that, in an age when there is so much disposition to question the authority of Scripture and weaken its claims, the Revisers should have failed to give clearly what we feel must have been the apostle's thought in this important passage.

II.

THE REVISERS AND THE GENERAL SUPPOSITION.

BY THE REV. GEORGE W. GILMORE, BROOKLYN, N. Y.,
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THE following study is submitted with all deference to the scholarly attainments of the body of men who revised the translation of the New

Testament, and with due appreciation of the difficulties of their task. It is acknowledged that principles may have guided them in dealing with the particular form of condition we are to discuss in this paper which to us are unapparent. It is possible that a subtle understanding of the text which has not made itself known to us was present to them; and that what looks like inconsistency and a lack of perception of the difference between future and general suppositions is really only a profounder knowledge of Greek syntax. If such is the case, we apologise in advance, and shall suffer, in the disapproval of scholars, the consequences of our rashness in questioning the accuracy of a part of their work. Hence we offer this examination with the desire to contribute to more accurate knowledge of the New Testament, and not in a hypercritical spirit of faultfinding.

Every student of Greek is aware that there are two kinds of conditional sentence in which the forms of the protasis may be exactly the same. These are what Professor Goodwin (whom we follow closely) calls the "vivid future" and "present general" suppositions. Both take $\epsilon\delta\upsilon$ and the subjunctive in the protasis; but the former takes a *future* form in the apodosis, the latter requires a present form expressive of continuance or repetition. It is evident, therefore, that when we find a protasis containing a subjunctive joined with $\epsilon\delta\upsilon$ we can determine whether it is future vivid or present general (in Hellenistic Greek also past general, since the optative is little used) only by noting the tense meaning of the apodosis. We must also take cognizance of the fact that temporal and conditional relative protases containing $\delta\upsilon$ can be and are to be classified under those forms of condition. One point further. It is a principle of classic Greek that "in ordinary protasis the (present) subjunctive refers to the future; if the supposition is *general*. . . the subjunctive is indefinite in its time:" and that "in ordinary protasis the (aorist) subjunctive refers to the future; in *general* suppositions. . . it refers to indefinite time represented as *present*."¹ That is, the sense of the condition is determined by the tense meaning of the apodosis. In other words, there is no ground in *classic* Greek for translating an aorist subjunctive in a general supposition by a future. We presume that it is reasonable to treat Hellenistic Greek as far as possible like classic Greek. That is, we are to assume that when a Hellenistic writer wrote a conditional sentence of the general form, he meant that, and not a future.

An examination of all the passages in the New Testament where are found instances of the present general supposition, shows that, when the present tense is used in the protasis, a present form has invariably been employed by the Revisers in translating it; but that the aorist has been translated by the present, the future, and the perfect definite. There is warrant, perhaps, for the employment of the last, in the fact that some

¹Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, §§ 12 and 20.

New Testament writers do not distinguish between the perfect and the aorist. The present is, however, the normal translation of protases of this form. But the purpose of this paper is to call attention to the fact that aorist as well as present subjunctive in general suppositions should be represented by a present form in English, and that there is no warrant in the construction for the use of the future; and that, if we find this form so translated, a mistake has been made. In the following twenty-one passages, the Revisers, following in the main the Authorized Version, have retained the future form in the Revised Version: Matt. v. 11; v. 32; xi. 6; xiii. 50; xviii. 5; xviii. 6; xix. 9; xxiii. 16; xxiii. 18; Mark iii. 29; ix. 37; x. 11; x. 12; Luke vi. 22; vii. 23; ix. 48; xi. 22; xii. 38; Acts ii. 39; 1 John iv. 15; 1 Cor. xii. 15.

Professor Goodwin, in a later section, says: "A present or past supposition is said to be *general*, when the protasis refers *indefinitely to anyone* of a series or class of acts, and not to a definite act or a definite series of acts. The apodosis must express a *customary* or *repeated* action or a *general truth*." It is noticeable that none of the instances cited by Professor Goodwin are translated by a future. We have already agreed that in this respect Hellenistic Greek is to be judged by the canons of the classic language; and that being so, we are driven by Professor Goodwin's statement of the principle to conclude that the translation of an aorist subjunctive in this kind of condition by a future is incorrect. Such a rendering does damage in two ways; it suggests to an English reader a reference to the future which is not in the original, and it presents an awkward incongruity between a protasis in the future and an apodosis in the present. It perplexes the Greek scholar reading the English version by suggesting a "vivid future" condition and then furnishing an apodosis in the present.

In Matt. xi. 6, the Revisers read, "Blessed *is* he whosoever *shall find* none occasion for stumbling." The immediate context is Jesus' reply to John the Baptist's inquiry, "Art thou he that cometh?" Jesus tells what had been, and then was going on—"the blind *receive* their sight, the lame *walk*, the lepers *are* cleansed," etc. (all presents). Then comes "Blessed *is* he," etc. Our Saviour here must be understood as making a statement good for all time, past and future, so that, considered either exegetically or grammatically, the present would better convey the meaning, "Blessed is he whosoever *findeth* none occasion of stumbling."

Taking another example, 1 John iv. 15, we read, "Whosoever *shall confess* that Jesus is the Son of God, God *abideth*," etc. John in that chapter is speaking of a state of things that had already begun to be and was to abide. Exegetically and on grammatical grounds, the rendering would be closer to the original, and more in accord with the context, if it ran, "Whosoever *confesseth*," etc.

¹ *Ibid.*, § 51.

Space will not allow us to examine at length each of the twenty-one cases cited above; but we are convinced that all of them can and in strict accuracy ought to be amended in the line here suggested. A most careful and painstaking study has convinced us that here, at least, faithfulness to the original has been sacrificed to a hesitation to change the tense of the Authorized Version. The Revisers have abundantly recognized the fact that the present in English faithfully represents the aorist subjunctive of this condition. (See Luke xii. 54; Matt. v. 46, 47; John vi. 44, etc.)

Why, then, have these futures been retained? Perhaps there is a pointer in Mark ix. 37. Here we have two conditions of the same form in the same verse, in one of which we have the aorist and in the other the present. The Revisers read, "Whosoever *shall receive* one of such little children in my name, *receiveth* me; and whosoever *receiveth* me, *receiveth* not me, but him that sent me." The change from future to present is an attempt to render the differences in the tenses in the Greek. But we have already seen that the apodosis determines the form of the condition, and Professor Goodwin is authority for the fact that a present condition is not translatable by the future. If this case proves anything, it proves the littleness of the difference between the aorist and present subjunctive in this form of condition, for both conditions can be "present general" only, and neither can be legitimately rendered by the future. If we turn to the parallel, Luke ix. 48, we find the aorist used in both conditions.

It is a fact to be noted that the most numerous occurrences of this translation of the aorist by a future are where we have indefinite relatives. Of temporal conditions so translated, we have three; of *ἐάν* alone with the subjunctive, four; but of indefinite relatives, fourteen. And this is the stranger from the fact that an indefinite relative being used should have suggested a general (or present) rather than a future rendering, for these pronouns lend themselves most readily to a general statement.

We should like to say a word on the translation by the perfect definite, but have already overstepped our limits. We suggest to those who are studying the New Testament—those who are teaching and those who are learning—that a careful examination of this matter be made; and if it be found that the ground taken by this article is correct, a little will have been contributed toward a more faithful knowledge of the letter of the Word.

III.

EL SHADDAI.

BY THE REV. THOMAS LAURIE, D. D., PROVIDENCE, R. I.

WHEN Abraham was ninety and nine years old, the Lord appeared unto him, and said, I am God Almighty; walk before me, and be thou perfect. Gen. xvii. 1; compare xxviii. 3; xxxv. 11; xliii. 14: xlviii. 3; xlix. 25. The Hebrew reads, "I am *El Shaddai*" and in our English versions is rendered as above; the new version here being precisely the same as King James' translation. Gesenius makes *Shaddai* a *plurialis excellentiae* from *Shad*, mighty, powerful; but the latter word is not found in his lexicon at all, though a word of the same form is rendered violence, oppression, also, desolation, destruction. He also derives *Shaddai* from the root *Shadaa*, which he translates to practise violence, to oppress, to destroy, to lay waste, to desolate. If this is the correct derivation of *El Shaddai*, then it does not mean the omnipotent God, but the destroying or desolating God, which is hardly a true description of Him who is Love.

We may take it for granted that the Hebrew can furnish no better derivation for the word; for, if it could, no doubt Gesenius would have discovered it. Let us then turn to the Assyrian, and see if we can obtain any help from that source. In that language *Shadu* means mountains, and *Shaddai* would be the regular adjective form; as, *Gimirraa* or *Gimirrai* from *Gimsiru* (Gomer), or *Mutsrai* from *Mutsur* (Egypt), Heb. *Mitsraim*; and if it is objected that *Shaddai* has the *d* reduplicated, while *Shadu* has not, it may be replied, that, in "The Inscriptions of Western Asia," iii, 14, 42, we find *Shaddai Martsu*, instead of the more common *Shadu Martsu* (a rugged mountain). This derivation is one proposed by Professor Friedrich Delitzsch, and Professor A. H. Sayce says of it: "It is possible that Professor Friedrich Delitzsch is right in proposing to see in

Assyrian *Shadu* the explanation of the Hebrew title of the Deity, *El Shaddai*. At all events, God is compared to a rock in the Old Testament (Ps. xviii. 2)." It is proper to add, however, that some Assyriologists doubt the correctness of this derivation.

But supposing it the correct one,—and as yet we have none better,—then the meaning would be, the God possessed of the characteristics of a mountain. And that the Assyrians associated the idea of a mountain with their great God, is manifest from the fact that Asshur, the head of

To understand this we must bear in mind that at first men did not possess the written word, to which we are indebted for our most precious views of God. Abraham, for example, had no part of Holy Scripture as it is now in our hands, unless, indeed, it might be some of the ancient traditions which Moses may have employed in composing his writings.

But feeling in their hearts that God was great, they could find no better illustration of that greatness than the great mountain which before their eyes towered up in massive greatness to the heavens. The idea of greatness found no more fitting representation in their thought than the mountains. Hence "great" was the adjective that suggested itself most naturally when speaking of them. See Ps. xxxvi. 6; Dan. ii. 35. Almost the same things might be said of the high mountains. See Deut. xii. 2; Isa. ii. 14; Ezek. xxxiv. 14. In this connection the utterance of the prophet (Isa. lvii. 15) is very striking: "I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit." Hence in their minds the great God was best described as *El Shaddai*.

Again, in their hearts they felt that God was all-powerful, and how could they better express this attribute of God than by picturing him as the being "who by his strength setteth fast the mountains, being girded with power" (Ps. lxxv. 6)? or "who overturneth the mountains by the roots" (Job xxviii. 9)? or "who weighed the mountains in scales" (Isa. xl. 12; compare Amos iv. 13; Nah. i. 5; Hab. iii. 10)? Certainly we have here a much better and more natural derivation of the idea of all-powerful, than to obtain it from the term denoting violence and oppression.

So those ancient saints felt that God endured, while man passed away; as it is beautifully expressed in Heb. i. 11, 12, "They shall perish, but thou continest; and they all shall wax old as doth a garment; . . . but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail," and how grandly this attribute is set forth by the aid of the mountains when the prophet chants (Hab. iii. 6), "He stood, and measured the earth: he beheld, and drove asunder the nations: and the eternal mountains were scattered, the everlasting hills did bow: (but) his goings were as of old!"

So also in ancient times of violence and wrong, God was felt to be the refuge of his people, and here also the mountains readily lent themselves to set forth this most precious view of God. Not only are a number of mountains represented as enclosing the dwelling, the abode of his saints

It is a delightful confirmation of this derivation of the term *El Shaddai*, that, even though the idea of righteousness is not directly suggested by the mountains, yet when the good man is cast down by the sight of abounding wickedness, and human appearances of goodness that turn out to be only appearances, he turns to God, saying (Ps. xxxvi. 6), "*Thy righteousness is like the great mountain*,"—vast, solid, and enduring through the ages.

It may be objected to all this, that worship on the mountains, and burning incense on the high places, are practices severely condemned in the Old Testament. Yes; when men "became fools and changed the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man, and of birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things," God reproached them for their folly, and sought to obliterate all traces of it from the land which he had set apart for himself. But the very fact that mountains were man's first temples, shows how intimately associated they were with the idea of God. It was on a mountain that God gave the law to Israel. It was on a mountain top that the temple was erected and vast substructures were built up to furnish a foundation broad enough for the structure; and, though the time is coming when neither in Mount Gerizim nor yet at Jerusalem shall men worship the Father, yet that does not forbid that, at the first, *El Shaddai* meant just as is here represented.

 IV.

DILIGO AND AMO.

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TURNING the pages of Augustine a few days since for another purpose, I chanced to fall upon the passage of the City of God, Bk. xiv. ch. 7, in which he discusses the relations of *diligo* and *amo*: Professor Ballantine has maintained¹ that there is in the New Testament no difference between the words *ἀγαπάω* and *φιλέω*, and² has specially commented upon the distinctions drawn by Trench, and applied to the passage, John xxi. 15-17. Trench grounded his whole distinction upon sugges-