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ARTICLE V.

STRONG'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.[1]

I. INTRODUCTION.

THIS is one of the most important contributions made in recent years to the subject of systematic theology. The book is rendered specially valuable by its methodical arrangement, its clear and condensed statements of the theological positions controverted or maintained, its judicious quotations from acknowledged authorities, and its abundant references to contemporary and standard literature. It thus well fills the place in one's library not only of a doctrinal statement, but of an outline of the history of doctrine as well. The value of the volume is greatly enhanced by an index well-nigh unexampled in fulness, occupying no less than 156 pages. Throughout the volume the author defends, with great clearness and vigor, the main positions of evangelical theology, especially as held among the Baptist churches, though it is doubtful if the majority of his brethren will go with him in his advocacy of the traducian hypothesis respecting the origin of the human soul.

After clearly presenting, in an introductory chapter, his views upon the definition, aims, possibilities, and necessity of theological science, and its relation to religion, the author devotes brief chapters to the Material of Theology and its Method. Having wisely chosen the synthetic method, the topics are treated in the following logical order:

"1st. The existence of God.
2d. The Scriptures a revelation from God.
3d. The nature, decrees and works of God.

[1] Systematic Theology: A Compendium and Commonplace Book, designed for the use of Theological Students. By Augustus Hopkins Strong, D. D., President and Professor of Biblical Theology in the Rochester Theological Seminary, Rochester: Press of E. R. Andrews. 1886. pp. xxix. 758. 7¼x4. $5.00. Sold only by the agent, O. W. Jansen, Rochester, N. Y.

4th. Man, in his original likeness to God and subsequent apostasy.

5th. Redemption, through the work of Christ and the Holy Spirit.

6th. The nature and laws of the Christian church.

7th. The end of the present system of things."

II. NATURAL THEOLOGY.

In regard to the existence of God the author holds that it "is a first truth;" that "logically" man's knowledge of God precedes and conditions all his observations and reasoning. A "first truth" he defines to be "a knowledge which, though developed upon occasion of observation and reflection, is not derived from observation and reflection" (p. 30). Such truths are characterized by their universality, their necessity, and their logical independence and priority. This position leads the author to say, "We cannot *prove* that God is, but we can show that, in order to the existence of any knowledge, thought, reason, in man, man must assume that God is" (p. 34). It may seem ungracious to begin the review of a book which is, on the whole, so admirable, with a criticism; but where there is so much to praise, we are permitted to speak with greater freedom of the imperfections which mar to some extent the beauty of the whole. We pause, therefore, to question the correctness of the position taken in the sentence just quoted; remarking, at the outset, that the author himself does not seem entirely satisfied with it, since at a later point he dwells at length, and with marked force and skill, upon what he calls the *corroborative evidences* of God's existence, and shows the inadequacy and error of all materialistic, idealistic, and pantheistic theories. If the existence of God were properly a "first truth," why this laborious attempt to strengthen our conviction of it? "First truths" do not need corroboration: we do not need to corroborate our conviction of the existence of space, or of such truths as that a part is less than a whole, that cause and effect are correlative, that space and time are illimitable, and that

benevolence is praiseworthy. Such truths call only for statement; not for corroboration. Man's knowledge of God's existence is not so direct as his knowledge of these truths, but is subsequent to his knowledge of himself, and is logically dependent upon it, and invites verification and corroboration, through the processes of scientific induction. The premises on which the rational process rests are, however, common to all men, and the conclusion is one which nobody can legitimately resist. Men are conscious not of God, but of themselves and their own states of mind. They know themselves to be feeling, thinking, planning, choosing, limited beings. They are obliged to account for their own existence. The only rational explanation of the existence of themselves lies in the assumption of an infinite, eternal Cause, corresponding in the qualities of his nature, to what men know to exist in themselves. This is a process of reasoning from result to adequate cause, made possible by the intervention of a first truth, namely, that every finite fact must have an adequate cause. This reasoning is not essentially a long process, nor is it in a circle. The rudest men, with most limited experience, cannot but enter upon it, and follow it to its conclusion. Still, the conception of God may be enlarged by the increase of one's experimental and scientific knowledge. Sir Isaac Newton was no more *certain* of God's existence when a man than when he was a boy, but his *conception* of divine attributes was enlarged by all his later study. In this view of the case we would not attempt to draw a hard-and-fast line between the cosmological, the teleological, what the author calls the anthropological, and the ontological arguments for God's existence, since they are all comprehended in a just view of the author's anthropological argument. Man is made in God's image. His own powers of thought, feeling, and will constitute the analogue or *vera causa* in the scientific argument by which the existence of the apprehended universe is explained. Such explanation is impossible, except upon the assumption of an Infinite Cause corresponding to the limited events of whose existence man has become conscious.

Dr. Strong's endeavor to show that God's existence cannot

be proved seems to us really to describe a process of reasoning. Thus: "Upon occurrence of the proper conditions, it [the knowledge of God] flashes upon the soul with the quickness and force of an immediate revelation" (p. 35). But the logical character of this process is not disproved, even if we should admit with the author, that it was not a *conscious* process of reasoning. For it is doubtful if we are conscious of any great part of the processes of our reasoning. When, for example, we see the familiar handwriting of a friend, few of us are conscious of any process of reasoning in attributing to its probable author the message it contains, and yet there is reasoning in the process, as any one would find were it necessary to bring the document into court. Nor can it be denied that the whole inductive process is based on mystery, and in its ultimate analysis seems on a superficial view to be scarcely anything but bare assumption. Indeed, so great is this mystery that the devout Abbé Gratry was led to regard every true induction as an immediate inspiration from on high. And we believe that the real basis of our confidence in the ordinary processes of induction respecting the course of nature rests upon a prior inductive conclusion, that nature is the created embodiment of Infinite Wisdom and Benevolence. The reason why men with the greatest logical power are often inveterate sceptics, while men of unwavering faith are often found among the unlearned, is doubtless due to the fact that logic is of no account when dealing with inadequate premises, and the trained logician is not above the danger of having his mind turned away from the real data of experience out of which the argument for the divine existence most legitimately springs.

III. THE BIBLE.

Of the chapters upon the Scriptures a Revelation from God we have little but unqualified praise. The definition of a miracle, though somewhat vague by reason of its comprehension, is, on the whole, admirable. "A miracle is an event palpable to the senses, produced for a religious purpose by the immediate agency of God; an event therefore which, though not contravening any law of nature, the laws of nature, if fully known,

would not be competent to explain." Dr. Strong's argument for miracles, though brief, is admirably conceived. The creation of so great a being as man, renders it antecedently probable that miracles will occur to supplement the many demands of his moral constitution which nature is inadequate to meet. "Miracles are the natural accompaniments and attestations of new communications from God." "In our arguments with sceptics, we should not begin with the ass that spoke to Baalam, or the fish that swallowed Jonah, but with the resurrection of Christ; that once conceded, all other biblical miracles will seem only natural preparations, accompaniments, or consequences" (p. 66). The prophecies of Scripture, also, by their vast amount, their unity in diversity, and their actual fulfilment, constitute an important means of verifying the supernatural claims of the sacred writers (p. 67).

The genuineness of the Christian documents is maintained with a clear comprehension of the legal principles of evidence pertaining to such matters. Those who dispute the genuineness of any of the books of the New Testament assume the responsibility of proving that they could have obtained their place in the canon by some natural process. Speaking of Second Peter, Jude, Second and Third John, the author states the case thus:

> Upon no other hypothesis than that of their genuineness can the general acceptance of these four minor epistles since the third century, and of all the other books of the New Testament since the middle of the second century, be satisfactorily accounted for. If they had been mere collections of floating legends, they could not have secured wide circulation as sacred books for which Christians must answer with their blood. If they had been forgeries, the churches at large could neither have been deceived as to their previous non-existence, nor have been induced unanimously to pretend that they were ancient and genuine (p. 76).

Here is the whole argument in a nutshell. The development of it in proper proportions depends not only upon one's acquaintance with the separate facts, but upon the possession of such a knowledge of human nature as shall secure to the reasoner a chastened and well-developed historical imagination. A proper knowledge of human nature, of its motives and tendencies, gives the scientific clew by which to interpret the meaning of the fragmentary historical documents which have been

saved from the wrecks of time. The author's treatment of the Myth theory of Strauss, the Tendency theory of Baur, and the Romance theory of Renan, is brief but adequate, as are his sections upon the genuineness of the Old Testament and the other topics in the chapter. The doctrine of inspiration is also regarded from the proper point of view, and the antecedent presumptions in the case are duly weighed so as to throw the burden of proof upon objectors.

Since we have shown that God has made a revelation of himself to man, the presumption becomes doubly strong that he will not trust this revelation to human tradition and misrepresentation, but will also provide a correct and authoritative record of it. The physician commits his prescriptions to writing; the Clerk of Congress records its proceedings; the State department of our government instructs our foreign ambassadors, not orally, but by dispatches. There is yet greater need that revelation should be recorded, since it is to be transmitted to distant ages; it contains long discourses, it embraces mysterious doctrines. Jesus did not write himself, for he was the subject, not the mere channel, of revelation. His unconcern about the apostles' immediately committing to writing what they saw and heard is inexplicable, if he did not expect that inspiration would assist them (p. 96).

The author properly maintains that inspiration is to be defined not by its method but by its result. It is a general term, including all kinds and degrees of the Holy Spirit's influence necessary to secure a permanent written standard of truth adapted to man's moral and religious needs. Such a standard we have in the Bible as the result of inspiration. This inspiration includes revelation, illumination, and the influence of a controlling providential supervision in historical collations. It needs but a clear statement, such as the author here gives, to dissipate a host of current objections to the true view. As the author expresses it:

Inspiration is neither natural, partial, nor mechanical, but supernatural, plenary, and dynamical (p. 102). Inspiration is verbal as to its result, but not verbal as to its method (p. 103). We do not yet see reason to give up our belief that the Bible, even in historical and scientific matters, so far as it commits itself to definite statements, and when it is fairly interpreted, is worthy of all credence. As to obscurities, "we may say as Isocrates did of the work of Heraclitus: 'What I understand of it is so excellent that I can draw conclusions from it concerning what I 'do not understand'." "If Bengel finds things in the Bible too hard for his critical faculty, he finds nothing to hard for his believing faculty" (p. 105).

With this clear and correct statement of principles, short work can, as already remarked, be made of the great mass of

objections to the Bible, and the student will do better to study carefully the ten pages devoted to them by Dr. Strong, than to read many elaborate volumes that could be mentioned specifically devoted to their solution. There is danger of becoming so engrossed in the details of a discussion that one shall lose the historical clew leading out of the labyrinth.

IV. THE NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.

In this part, again, we are compelled to speak with some degree of criticism. In the chapter upon the attributes of God a distinction is made between immanent and transitive attributes which tends, we believe, to obscurity rather than enlightenment. In his definition Dr. Strong says:

> The attributes of God are those distinguishing characteristics of the divine nature which are inseparable from the idea of God, and which constitute the basis and ground for his various manifestations to his creatures (p. 115). They are qualities objectively distinguishable from the divine essence and from each other (p. 116). The attributes may be divided into two great classes: Absolute or Immanent, and Relative or Transitive (p. 118).

This division is made to extend to what are commonly known as the moral attributes of God. Truth, love, and holiness are *immanent* attributes, to which veracity and faithfulness, mercy and goodness, and justice and righteousness, respectively correspond as *transitive* attributes. To justify this classification the author is compelled to speak of the truth of God as that attribute of his nature in virtue of which his being and knowledge eternally conform to each other. We are not sure that we see how that differs from what is included in the attributes of immutability and omniscience, and, if not, the mind is confused by the addition of a distinction without a difference. But it is in the attempted distinction between immanent and transitive holiness that the most serious confusion will arise. Immanent holiness is defined to be self-affirming purity, and this a purity not of choice but of substance. "God *is* pure before he *wills* purity" (p. 129). This distinction between immanent and transitive moral attributes leads the author to define goodness as "nearly identical with the love of complacency; mercy, with

the love of benevolence" (p. 138). Justice and righteousness also would seem to lose their moral qualities in God, since he "cannot but demand of his creatures that they be like him in moral character," and "cannot but enforce the law which he imposes upon them. Justice just as much binds God to punish as it binds the sinner to be punished" (p. 139). Again, in affirming that holiness "can in no way be resolved into love," the author really denies that God possesses moral character, and reduces the divine activity to the low level of necessitated sequences. He actually defines God's holiness positively as "purity of substance." The author endeavors to controvert the theory that holiness is a manifestation of love by stating the erroneous conclusions which he thinks are logically involved in it. The following is his attempted *reductio ad absurdum:*

> This principle that holiness is a manifestation of love, or a form of benevolence, leads to the conclusions [1] that happiness is the only good, and the only end; [2] that law is a mere expedient for the securing of happiness; [3] that penalty is simply deterrent or reformatory in its aim; [4] that no atonement needs to be offered to God for human sin; [5] that eternal retribution cannot be vindicated, since there is no hope of reform (p. 129).

A part of these conclusions we need not hesitate to accept if the words are used in their proper sense. But in saying that "happiness is the only good" we should wish to be understood as using the word "good" in the sense of *natural* rather than *moral* good, and happiness as referring to the highest blessedness of all being, of which God's is the infinite major part. There would be nothing derogatory to law in saying that it was an expedient to preserve and secure this highest happiness. But we would not say that "penalty is simply deterrent or reformatory in its aim" unless it were distinctly understood that the sweep of its influence extended to the whole universe, and not merely to the individual offender. The main object of penalty is to deter finite beings from sin by punishing the individuals who have sinned. This theory does not, as the author avers, imply that penalty is merely a device for the reformation of the individual offender, nor does it follow by any means from this theory that "no atonement needs to be offered to God for human

sin." On the contrary, the theory that benevolence is the sum of virtue involves the idea that God must treat things according to their relative value, else he would not properly reveal himself; hence, that in constituting the world as he has, God has not left himself at liberty to forgive sin without an atonement. Such forgiveness would misrepresent his character. Therefore if sin is to be forgiven the truthfulness of God can be vindicated only by an atonement. The necessity of this is not to be found in the nature of things, but in the nature of the universe as God has constituted it. We accept it as a decree of God. There is no trouble, therefore, under this theory, of vindicating the doctrine of eternal retribution, and we are surprised that, in the face of the able defences of eternal punishment made by the New England theologians from Edwards to Park, such an unguarded sentence should have fallen from the author.

The chapter upon decrees is among the best in the book. The author quotes with approval, as from Finney, the following statement: "The *knowledge* of God comprehended the details and incidents of every possible plan. The *choice* of a plan made his knowledge determinate as *fore*knowledge." But we note, in passing, that, on referring to the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for 1877, from which this quotation is made, this language is not that of Finney, but of Professor G. F. Wright, who is commenting on Finney. Dr. Strong has enlarged upon this idea with much discrimination. Thus he says:

> There are therefore two kinds of divine knowledge: (1) Knowledge of what may be—of the possible (*scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*); and (2) Knowledge of what is, and is to be, because God has decreed it (*scientia visionis*).
>
> God's decreeing to create, when he foresees that certain free acts of men will follow, is a decreeing of those free acts, in the only sense in which we use the word decreeing, viz. a rendering certain, or embracing in his plan. No Arminian who believes in God's foreknowledge of free human acts has good reason for denying God's decrees as thus explained, Surely God did not foreknow that Adam would exist and sin, whether God determined to create him or not. Omniscience, then, becomes *fore*knowledge only on condition of God's decree (p. 174).

This apparent conflict between man's free will and God's decrees is treated at greater length a little later on. As the author shows, even foreknowledge of events implies that those events

are in some sense fixed, so that the consistent position for one who denies God's foreordination is to deny his foreknowledge also. But we may hold to a *certainty* in the action of the will without maintaining that its action is controlled by *necessity*.

Man's freedom would be inconsistent with God's decrees, if the previous certainty of their occurrence were not certainty, but necessity, or, in other words, if God's decrees were in all cases decrees efficiently to produce the acts of his creatures. But this is not the case. God's decrees may be executed by man's free causation, as easily as by God's; and God's decreeing this free causation, in decreeing to create a universe of which he foresees that this causation will be a part, in no way interferes with the freedom of such causation, but rather secures and establishes it. Both consciousness and conscience witness that God's decrees are not executed by laying compulsion upon the free wills of men (p. 177). The difficulty is one which in substance clings to all theistic systems alike—the question why moral evil is permitted under the government of a God infinitely holy, wise, powerful, and good (p. 180). God does not decree efficiently to work evil desires or choices in men. He decrees sin only in the sense of decreeing to create and preserve those who will sin; in other words, he decrees to create and preserve human wills which, in their own self-chosen courses, will be and do evil. In all this, man attributes sin to himself and not to God, and God hates, denounces, and punishes sin. . . . God permits moral evil, because moral evil, though in itself abhorrent to his nature, is yet the incident of a system adapted to his purpose of self-revelation; and further, because it is his wise and sovereign will to institute and maintain this system of which moral evil is an incident, rather than to withold his self-revelation or to reveal himself through another system in which moral evil should be continually prevented by the exercise of divine power. . . . We must remember, however, that the decree of redemption is as old as the decree of the apostasy. The provision of salvation in Christ shows at how great a cost to God was permitted the fall of the race in Adam. He who ordained sin ordained also an atonement for sin and a way of escape from it. . . . This doctrine is one of those advanced teachings of Scripture which requires for its understanding a matured mind and a deep experience. The beginner in the Christian life may not see its value or even its truth, but with increasing years it will become a staff to lean upon. In times of affliction, obloquy, and persecution, the church has found in the decrees of God and the prophecies in which those decrees are published, her strong consolation. It is only upon the basis of the decrees that we can believe that "all things work together for good" (pp. 179-181.)

The fourth chapter of this part is devoted to the Works of God, or the execution of the decrees, in which the author defends the true idea of the creation as being a free act of God which, without the use of pre-existing materials, brings the universe into existence. He shows the untenableness of the theories of dualism, emanation, and necessary creation from eternity. The section upon the Mosaic account of the creation is specially commendable. He rejects the mythical, the hyperliteral and hyperscientific interpretations, defending with much

skill what he styles "the pictorial-summary interpretation," following in general the line of Guyot, Dana, and Gladstone, as recently presented in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA" (Vols. xlii. pp. 201–224; xliii. pp. 377–382). But he wisely premises,

> That we do not hold this or any future scheme of reconciling Genesis and geology to be a finality. Such a settlement of all the questions involved would presuppose not only a perfected science of the physical universe, but also a perfected science of hermeneutics. It is enough if we can offer tentative solutions which represent the present state of thought upon the subject. Remembering, then, that any such scheme of reconciliation may speedily be outgrown without prejudice to the truth of the Scripture narrative, we present the following as an approximate account of the coincidences between the Mosaic and the geological records. The scheme here given is a combination of the conclusions of Dana and of Guyot, and assumes the substantial truth of the nebular hypothesis. It is interesting to observe that Augustine, who knew nothing of modern science, should have reached, by simple study of the text, some of the same results. See his Confessions, 12:8—"First God created a chaotic matter, which was *next to nothing*. This chaotic matter was made from nothing, before all days. Then this chaotic, amorphous matter was subsequently arranged, in the succeeding six days;" De Genes. ad Lit., 4:27—"The length of these days is not to be determined by the length of our week-days" (p. 194).

The doctrine of creation is supplemented by that of preservation; creation being the initial act by which the universe was brought into existence, while preservation is that continuous agency of God by which he maintains in existence the things which he has created, with all their properties and powers. This is maintained in opposition to deism and the doctrine of continuous creation. Deism places God so far off that it tends to atheism, while the doctrine of continuous creation tends to pantheism. The doctrine of preservation is closely associated with that of Providence, which must be stated so as to apply to individual facts as well as to the system under which they occur, and so as to distinguish its effects from miracles and the ordinary works of grace. The importance of clear views here is enhanced by the fact that one's conception of these truths will determine his position with reference to the efficacy of prayer.

With the foregoing views concerning creation, preservation, and providence, one is free to hold that prayer, being an appeal to a personal and present God, whose granting or withholding of the requested blessing is determined by himself, induces the putting forth on God's part of an imperative volition to answer. This may result in "new combinations of natural forces, in re-

gions withdrawn from our observation, so that effects are produced which these same forces left to themselves would never have accomplished. As man combines the laws of chemical attraction and of combustion to fire the gunpowder and split the rock asunder, so God may combine the laws of nature to bring about answers to prayer. In all this there may be no suspension or violation of law, but a use of law unknown to us" (p. 216).

V. ANTHROPOLOGY.

The author's view of sin, its nature and origin, is of course dominant in his system, and is somewhat unusual at the present day. He agrees with the common Old School theology in reckoning two kinds of sin—sin in the nature and personal sin. Sin in the nature comes to us through the fall, and from this spring actual transgressions or personal sins. Thus he says:

> The allusions to sin as a permanent power or reigning principle, not only in the individual but in humanity at large, forbid us to define it as a momentary act, and compel us to regard it as being primarily a settled depravity of nature, of which individual sins or acts of transgression are the workings and fruits (p. 284). The stronger an evil disposition, or, in other words, the more it connects itself with, or resolves itself into, a settled state or condition of the soul, the more blameworthy is it felt to be (p. 285). When any evil disposition has such strength in itself, or is so combined with others, as to indicate a settled moral corruption in which no power to do good remains, this state is regarded with the deepest disapprobation of all (p. 286).

The author differs, however, from the prevalent Old School idea, in limiting sin to the acts or the state of the will or to those conditions which immediately proceed from it.

> All sin is voluntary as springing, either directly from will, or indirectly from those perverse affections and desires which have themselves originated in will. . . . The permanent state of the will is to be distinguished from the permanent states of the sensibilities (dispositions or desires). But both are voluntary because both are due to past decisions of the will, and "whatever springs from will we are responsible for." . . . Those evil inclinations and impulses which rise unbidden and master the soul before it is well aware of their nature, are themselves violations of the divine law, and indications of an inward depravity which in the case of each descendant of Adam is the chief and fontal transgression (p. 288).

The author still divests the sinful state of the essential element of voluntariness, when he attributes to the sinner ability only to evil and not to good. The sinful state, in his view, involves

such a commitment of the will as to set aside the possibility of right choice. Thus we read:

> Ability to fulfil the law is not essential to constitute the non-fulfilment sin. Inability to fulfil the law is a result of transgression, and, as consisting not in an original deficiency of faculty but in a settled state of the affections and will, it is itself condemnable. Since the law presents the holiness of God as the only standard for the creature, ability to obey can never be the measure of obligation or the test of sin (p. 289). The power of contrary choice which Adam had exists no longer in its entirety; it is narrowed down to a power to the contrary in temporary and subordinate choices; it no longer is equal to the work of changing the fundamental determination of the being to selfishness as an ultimate end. Yet for this very inability, because originated by will, man is responsible (p. 317).

No one would be disposed to deny man's responsibility for such inability, if it existed; the question is as to the obligation to make choices which there is no power to make, and as to the sin, in the sense of present blameworthiness, for failure to make the impossible choices. This question scarcely admits of discussion; the rational judgment of mankind is the only appeal. The clearer thought is, that the guilt of that past sinful determination by which the inability was contracted, still attaches to the man; but the present inability precludes present obligation to change the determination, and sets aside the sin as a present subjective fact. Still further, the assumption that there is any proper voluntariness in wrong-doing when there is no power to do right, is entirely unwarranted, and involves confusion of thought. Wrong-doing must be a free moral act, and implies power not to do the wrong. Power to do wrong, in the moral sense, without the power to do right, is unthinkable. There is no thought corresponding to the words. The author maintains with entire consistency the idea that, in order to the contraction of the first sin, there must have been freedom or power of contrary choice. Why should he fail to see that, in order to the continuance of the sin already entered upon, there must be the the same freedom, or power to the contrary? The true conception of the permanent determination in which sinful character lies, is that of permanent choosing, not of a choice made once for all and crystalized. A state of will is a state of constant willing; otherwise the man, in forming a determinative choice, ceases to be a moral agent. A sinful nature, in the sense conceived, which

makes necessary succeeding acts of sin, makes, at the same time, an end of all sinning. Placing this nature in a set of the will, with no power in the agent to change, sets aside the essential nature of will, and links the man in the chain of cause and effect, no longer a person but a thing. Moral character is not a thing determined, once for all, by a single free choice; it is controlled and permeated by that free choice, as an immanent, an abiding force. Apart from this fact character might as well be placed in any faculty or movement of soul or body as in the attitude of the will.

In common with all forms of Old School theology, the author derives our sinful nature from Adam, through the fall; but in his view of the *rationale* of this derivation, he departs from the more prevalent Old School ideas. In his conception of the relations of the individuals of our race to Adam, he is a traducianist, and holds that moral character is transmitted from the fountain-head by natural generation, like other qualities of human nature. Assuming that the Scriptures teach that the transgression of our first parents constituted their posterity sinners, he thus proceeds:

> Two questions demand answer,—first, how we can be responsible for a depraved nature which we did not personally and consciously originate; and, secondly, how God can justly charge to our account the sin of the first father of the race. These questions are substantially the same, and the Scriptures intimate the true answer to the problem, when they declare, that "in Adam all die," and "that death passed unto all men, for that all sinned," when "through one man sin entered into the world." In other words, Adam's sin is the cause and ground of the depravity, guilt, and condemnation of all his posterity, simply because Adam and his posterity are one, and, by virtue of their organic unity, the sin of Adam is the sin of the race (p. 308). By original sin we mean that participation in the common sin of the race with which God charges us, in virtue of our descent from Adam, its first father and head . . . There are two fundamental principles which the Scriptures already cited seem clearly to substantiate, and which other Scriptures corroborate. The first is, that man's relations to moral law extend beyond the sphere of conscious and actual transgression, and embrace those moral tendencies and qualities of his being which he has in common with every other member of the race. The second is, that God's moral government is a government which not only takes account of persons and personal acts, but also recognizes race-responsiblities and inflicts race-penalties; or, in other words, judges mankind, not simply as a collection of separate individuals, but also as an organic whole, which can collectively revolt from God and incur the curse of his violated law (p. 309). There is a race-sin, therefore, as well as a personal sin; and that race-sin was committed by the first father of the race, when he comprised the whole race in himself. All mankind since that time have been born in the state into

which he fell—a state of depravity, guilt, and condemnation (p. 310). We claim that the theory of Augustine,—that of a sin of the race in Adam,—is the only one that shows a conscious transgression fit to be the cause and ground of man's guilt and condemnation. . . . Inborn depravity is the cause of the first actual sin. The cause of inborn depravity is the sin of Adam. If there be no guilt in original sin, then the actual sin that springs therefrom cannot be guilty. There are subsequent presumptuous sins in which the personal element overbears the element of race and heredity. But this cannot be said of the first acts which make man a sinner. These are so naturally and uniformly the result of the inborn determination of the will, that they cannot be guilty unless that inborn determination is also guilty. In short, not all sin is personal. There must be a sin of nature—a race-sin—or the beginnings of actual sin cannot be accounted for, or regarded as objects of God's condemnation (p. 322).

The author calls his view the Augustinian theory, or the theory of Adam's natural headship, and thus briefly summarizes it:

It holds that God imputes the sin of Adam immediately to all his posterity, in virtue of that organic unity of mankind by which the whole race at the time of Adam's transgression existed, not individually, but seminally, in him as its head. The total life of humanity was then in Adam; the race as yet had its being only in him. Its essence was not yet individualized; its forces were not yet distributed; the powers which now exist in separate men were then unified and localized in Adam; Adam's will was yet the will of the species. In Adam's free act the will of the race revolted from God, and the nature of the race corrupted itself. The nature which we now possess is the same nature that corrupted itself in Adam—"not the same in kind merely, but the same as flowing to us continuously from him." Adam's sin is imputed to us immediately, therefore, not as something foreign to us, but because it is ours—we and all other men having existed as one moral person, or one moral whole, in him, and, as the result of that transgression, possessing a nature destitute of love to God and prone to evil (p. 328). Three things must be received on Scripture testimony: (1) inborn depravity; (2) guilt and condemnation therefor; (3) Adam's sin the cause and ground of both. From these three positions of Scripture it seems not only natural, but inevitable, to draw the inference that we "all sinned" in Adam. The Augustinian theory simply puts in a link of connection between two sets of facts which otherwise would be difficult to reconcile (p. 331).

The author considers the obvious objection that if we are responsible for the first sin of Adam, we must be also for all his other sins, and for the sins of later ancestors:

We reply that the apostasy of human nature could occur but once. It occurred in Adam before the eating of the forbidden fruit, and revealed itself in that eating. The subsequent sins of Adam and of our immediate ancestors, are no longer acts which determine or change the nature—they only show what the nature is. Here is the truth and the limitation of the Scripture declaration that "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." Man is not responsible for the specifically evil tendencies communicated to him from his immediate ancestors, as distinct from the nature he possesses: nor is he responsible for the sins of those ancestors which originated these tendencies. But he is responsible for that original apostasy which constituted the one and final revolt of the race from God, and for the personal depravity and disobedience which in his own case has resulted therefrom. . . . Imagine Adam to have remained innocent, but one of his posterity to have fallen. Then the descendants of that one would have been guilty for the change of nature

in him, but not guilty for the sins of ancestors intervening between him and them. . . . I am responsible for the downward tendency which my nature gave itself at the beginning; but I am not responsible for inherited and specifically evil tendencies as something apart from the nature—for they are not apart from it—they are forms or manifestations of it (p. 336).

The author distinctly recognizes the fact that if our nature took its determination to evil in Adam with no power to change to righteousness, then no man since Adam has had a personal probation; but this is to his thought an advantage rather than otherwise:

A probation of our common nature in Adam, sinless as he was and with full knowledge of God's law, is more consistent with divine justice than a separate probation of each individual, with inexperience, inborn depravity, and evil example, all favoring a decision against God (p. 339).

To the objection that we cannot repent of Adam's sin, and therefore it cannot be charged to our account, the author says:

The objection has plausibility only so long as we fail to distinguish between Adam's sin as the inward apostasy of the nature from God, and Adam's sin as the outward act of transgression which followed and manifested that apostasy. We cannot indeed repent of Adam's sin as our personal act or as Adam's personal act, but regarding his sin as the apostasy of our common nature—an apostasy which manifests itself in our personal transgressions as it did in his, we can repent of it and do repent of it. In truth it is this nature as self-corrupted and averse to God, for which the Christian most deeply repents.

God, we know, has not made our nature as we find it. We are conscious of our depravity and apostasy from God. We know that God cannot be responsible for this; we know that our nature is responsible. But this it could not be, unless its corruption were self-corruption. For this self-corrupted nature we should repent and do repent (pp. 335-336).

But while it is our duty to repent of race-sin, or the sin of Adam, the author affords a degree of relief in the assurance that original sin is not so heinous as personal transgression. How he reaches this conclusion, is not clear, since it is the sin of which the Christian chiefly repents:

Sin of nature involves guilt, yet there is greater guilt when this sin of nature re-asserts itself in personal transgression; for while this latter includes in itself the former, it also adds to the former a new element, namely, the conscious exercise of the individual and personal will, by virtue of which a new decision is made against God, special evil habit is induced, and the total condition of the soul is made more depraved. Although we have emphasized the guilt of inborn sin, because this truth is most contested, it is to be remembered that men reach a conviction of their native depravity only through a conviction of their personal transgressions. For this reason, by far the larger part of our preaching upon sin should consist in applications of the law of God to the acts and dispositions of men's lives (p. 348). We are warranted in the conclusion that, certain and great as is the guilt of original sin, no human soul is eternally condemned solely for this sin of nature, but that, on

the other hand, all who have not consciously and wilfully transgressed are made partakers of Christ's salvation (p. 357).

But if our participation in the sin of Adam was real and positive and wilful, it is difficult to understand how it can be forgiven without repentance, any more than personal transgressions can be. The whole force of the author's theory, as directed against federal imputation (which he rejects), lies in the assumption that our nature shared directly, voluntarily and responsibly in the sin of Adam. He examines the federal theory of imputation, and finds abundant reason for rejecting it in the fact that it provides no basis of reality in the sin which it imputes to Adam's posterity:

It impugns the justice of God by implying: That God holds men responsible for the violation of a covenant which they had no part in establishing. The assumed covenant is only a sovereign decree; the assumed justice, only arbitrary will. We not only never authorized Adam to make such a covenant, but there is no evidence that he ever made one at all. . . . Upon the federal theory, we are condemned upon the ground of a covenant which we neither instituted, nor participated in, nor assented to. . . . . Upon the basis of this covenant God accounts men as sinners who are not sinners. But God judges according to truth. His condemnations do not proceed upon a basis of legal fiction. He can regard as responsible for Adam's transgression only those who in some real sense have been concerned, and have had part, in that transgression. . . . . After accounting men to be sinners who are not sinners, God makes them sinners by immediately creating each human soul with a corrupt nature such as will correspond to his decree. This is not only to assume a false view of the origin of the soul, but also to make God directly the author of sin. Imputation of sin cannot precede and account for corruption; on the contrary, corruption must precede and account for imputation. . . . It only remains to say that Dr. Hodge always persistently refused to admit the one added element which might have made his view less arbitrary and mechanical, namely, the traducian theory of the origin of the soul (pp. 324-325).

This seems a terrible but just indictment of the theory of federal imputation. It is interesting to recall the fact that Dr. Hodge urges reasons of essentially equal weight against the theory of our author.

These are some of the words of the Princeton theologian in his Systematic Theology:

If human nature, as a generic life, a substance of which all men partake, became both guilty and polluted by the apostasy, and that generic humanity, as distinguished from a newly created and holy rational soul, was assumed by the Son of God, how can we avoid the conclusion that Christ was, in his human nature, personally guilty and sinful? This is a legitimate consequence of this theory. And this consequence being not only false but blasphemous, the theory itself must be false (vol. ii., pp. 60-61).

The assumption that we acted thousands of years before we were born, so as to be personally responsible for such act, is a monstrous assumption. It is, as Baur says, an unthinkable proposition; that is, one to which no intelligible meaning can be attached. . . . . We can understand how it may be said that we sinned in Adam and fell with him in so far as he was the divinely appointed head and representative of his race. But the proposition that we performed his act of disobedience is to our ears a sound without any meaning. It is just as much an impossibility as that a nonentity should act. We did not then exist. We had no being before our existence in this world; and that we should have acted before we existed is an absolute impossibility. It is to be remembered that an act implies an agent; and the agent of a responsible voluntary act must be a person. Before the existence of the personality of a man that man cannot perform any voluntary action. Actual sin is an act of voluntary self-determination; and therefore before the existence of the self, such determination is an impossibility. The stuff or substance out of which a man is made may have existed before he came into being, but not the man himself. Admitting that the souls of men are formed out of the generic substance of humanity, that substance is no more the man than the dust of the earth out of which the body of Adam was fashioned was his body. Voluntary agency, responsible action, moral character, and guilt can be predicated only of persons, and cannot by possibility be predicable of them, or really belong to them before they exist. The doctrine, therefore, which supposes that we are personally guilty of the sin of Adam on the ground that we were the agents of that act, that our will and reason were so exercised in that action as to make us personally responsible for it and for its consequences, is absolutely inconceivable (pp. 223-224).

The impartial reader will find it easy to conclude that each is right in rejecting the theory of the other, and will be satisfied to reject both theories. The suggestion is natural that when two such vigorous and independent thinkers, starting from the same assumed facts of human nature, find themselves driven to theories so conflicting, not to say far-fetched, improbable, and unreasonable, we may expect to find something wrong in their premises. Reviewing their assumptions of the helpless and enslaved condition of human nature, which require theories so extravagant to sustain them, we find ourselves warranted in rejecting the assumptions and the theories together. A juster view of the facts of human consciousness and experience would set aside all such artificial schemes.

As to the guilt and penalty of sin, the author presents the following views:

By guilt we mean desert of punishment, or obligation to render satisfaction to God's justice for self-determined violation of law (p. 345). Guilt is incurred only through self-determined transgression, either on the part of man's nature or person. We are guilty only of that sin which we have originated or have had part in originating. . . . We are accountedguilty only for what we have done, either personally or in our first parents, and for

what we are, in consequence of such doing. . . . The whole race fell in Adam, and is punished for its own sin in him, not for the sins of immediate ancestors, nor for the sin of Adam as a person foreign to us. . . . . This guilt, or obligation to satisfy the outraged holiness of God, is explained in the New Testament by the terms "debtor" and "debt" (pp. 345, 346).

By penalty, we mean that pain or loss which is directly or indirectly inflicted by the Lawgiver, in vindication of his justice outraged by the violation of law. . . The object of penalty is not the reformation of the offender, or the ensuring of social or governmental safety. . . . . Penalty cannot be primarily designed to secure social and governmental safety, for the reason that it is never right to punish the individual simply for the good of society (pp. 350-352).

True, it would not be right to punish a man for the good of society, in the absence of ill-desert. More than this, it would be impossible to punish such a man. You might heap upon him all manner of evil and hardship; it would be abuse and outrage, not punishment. But take away the bearing upon the public good—the well-being of the universe—and leave the guilt, would it be right to punish in such a case? Our author would say, yes; the practical judgment of mankind, apart from theological theories, would say, no. The man still deserves to be punished, and must deserve it forever; but desert of punishment is not alone a sufficient reason for punishment. It is the essential condition of punishment—that without which punishment cannot be; but it does not constitute the necessity of punishment. The holiness of God has indeed been offended, but the offence against his holiness is in the sin, not in the ill-desert. Punishment cannot remove the ill-desert, nor can forgiveness. The pardoned sinner is still ill-deserving, and will be after a thousand years in heaven. The author truly says that guilt or ill-desert is an objective fact; it belongs to the history of the man, and there is no power that can obliterate it or set it aside. If in itself it be a sufficient ground of punishment, then the punishment must endure forever, for no atonement, or repentance, or pardon, or punishment can set aside the fact of past sin, on which the ill-desert rests. It is as enduring as the man's personality. There must be a truer idea of the justice of God than that of meeting the ill-desert of sin, and this idea is fundamental in theology. That impulse of our moral nature which moves toward the punishment of an offender, and finds

satisfaction in it, is not the fundamental principle of justice; it is a sentiment, blind like all mere sentiments, and must be controlled by reason. It is a help in maintaining order in society, and in the moral universe; but it is a mistake to imagine that the satisfaction of this sentiment is justice, or that there is any propriety in satisfying it when the common welfare does not call for punishment. Guilt, then, makes punishment *proper* when other reasons make it *necessary*, and the true idea of guilt is *liability* to punishment, not *obligation* to it. This idea fully wrought into our theology would simplify many of its problems.

VI. ATONEMENT.

The author's view of the Atonement grows out of his apprehension of guilt as obligation to punishment, and his doctrine of the unity and common responsibility of the race. He adopts what he calls the Ethical theory, which he thus sets forth:

> The ethical theory holds that the necessity of the atonement is grounded in the holiness of God, of which conscience in man is a finite reflection. There is an ethical principle in the divine nature, which demands that sin shall be punished. Aside from its results, sin is essentially ill-deserving. . . . As there is an ethical demand in our natures that not only others' wickedness, but our own wickedness, be visited with punishment, and a keen conscience cannot rest till it has made satisfaction to justice for its misdeeds, so there is an ethical demand of God's nature that penalty follow sin. . . . It is a demand that cannot be evaded, since the holiness from which it springs is unchanging. The atonement is therefore a satisfaction of the ethical demand of the divine nature, by the substitution of Christ's penal sufferings for the punishment of the guilty (p. 410).

How the Saviour's death meets this ethical demand, in the divine mind, for the punishment of the sinner, is thus explained:

> The ethical theory of the atonement holds that Christ stands in such a relation to humanity, that what God's holiness demands, Christ is under obligation to pay, longs to pay, inevitably does pay, and pays so fully, in virtue of his twofold nature, that every claim of justice is satisfied, and the sinner who accepts what Christ has done in his behalf is saved.
>
> We have seen how God can justly demand satisfaction; we now show how Christ can justly make it; or, in other words, how the innocent can justly suffer for the guilty. The solution of the problem lies in Christ's union with humanity. The first result of that union is obligation to suffer for men; since, being one with the race, Christ had a share in the responsibility of the race to the law and the justice of God—a responsibility not destroyed by his purification in the womb of the Virgin. In virtue of the organic unity

of the race, each member of the race since Adam has been born into the same state into which Adam fell. . . . If Christ had been born into the world by ordinary generation, he too would have had depravity, guilt, penalty. But he was not so born. In the womb of the Virgin, the human nature which he took was purged from its depravity. But this purging away of depravity did not take away guilt, or penalty. There was still left the just exposure to the penalty of violated law. Although Christ's nature was purified, his obligation to suffer yet remained. He might have declined to join himself to humanity, and then he need not have suffered. He might have sundered his connection with the race, and then he need not have suffered. But once born of the Virgin, once possessed of the human nature that was under the curse, he was bound to suffer. The whole mass and weight of God's displeasure against the race fell on him, when once he became a member of the race.

Notice, however, that this guilt which Christ took upon himself by his union with humanity was: (1) not the guilt of personal sin—such guilt as belongs to every adult member of the race; (2) not even the guilt of inherited depravity—such guilt as belongs to infants, and to those who have not come to moral consciousness; but (3) solely the guilt of Adam's sin, which belongs, prior to personal transgression, and apart from inherited depravity, to every member of the race who has derived his life from Adam. This original sin and inherited guilt, but without the depravity that ordinarily accompanies them, Christ takes, and so takes away. He can justly bear penalty, because he inherits guilt. And since this guilt is not his personal guilt, but the guilt of that one sin in which "all sinned"—the guilt of the common transgression of the race in Adam, the guilt of the root-sin from which all other sins have sprung—he who is personally pure can vicariously bear the penalty due to the sin of all.

If it be asked whether this is not simply a suffering for his own sin, or rather for his own share of the sin of the race, we reply that his own share in the sin of the race is not the sole reason why he suffers; it furnishes only the subjective reason and ground for the proper laying upon him of the sin of all. His participation in the guilt of the race is the link of connection between his personal innocence and the bearing of the sins of the world. As in the imputation of Adam's sin to us there is a real union between us and Adam, and as in the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us there is a real union between us and Christ, so in the imputation of our sins to Christ there is a real union between Christ and humanity, which delivers that imputation from the charge of being a merely arbitrary and formal one, and explains both Christ's longing to suffer and the actual suffering which he endured (pp. 412-413).

This theory of the atonement seems to us unsatisfactory, not to say impossible, resting, as it does, on several misapprehensions. In the first place, the necessity for the atonement which it proposes, cannot be the real one. If the sinner's guilt, as distinguished from his depravity or wickedness, must be removed or cancelled, the undertaking is an impossible one. As before remarked, the author is correct in holding that guilt is an objective fact, springing from depravity, past or present, and belonging to the sinner's past history. Hence it follows that guilt can no more be obliterated or removed from the sinner, than can his past

history. The depravity or wickedness can be removed and pardoned, but the guilt must remain; and the sinner must be saved, if saved at all, in spite of that guilt. The ill-desert and unworthiness must remain, even after the sinner has been cleansed from his pollution and pardoned, and is rejoicing with the redeemed in the presence of God. But it is a mistake to suppose that the sinner's guilt needs to be removed. It is his depravity, not his guilt or unworthiness, against which God's just anger is kindled. If this depravity can be removed, and the danger to the universe arising from the pardon of the unworthy, be provided for, salvation is secure. There can be no anger or justice on God's part which will stand in the way. "God commendeth his love toward us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us." We may rejoice that there is no such impossible work to do as that which the author proposes.

But, again, if the sinner's guilt were to be removed, and God's righteous anger to be satisfied, the method which the author proposes is wholly inadequate. The author insists, with great force, that depravity or wickedness must be voluntarily contracted, and belongs necessarily to the person (or nature) contracting it. Now guilt is the objective result of that depravity, and can by no possibility be transferred to another person (or nature). It follows depravity as the shadow follows the substance. The wrath of God, which is supposed to call for punishment, can by no possibility fall upon any other than the depraved and guilty party. Punishment carries with it the divine condemnation; this is its essential element, and God's just anger cannot mistake its proper object, nor be appeased by the punishment of the innocent. But Christ is God's well-beloved Son in whom he was always well pleased. It would seem like blasphemy to conceive that God's anger could be appeased by the punishment of his Son, who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth. The author himself regards the arbitrary imputation of the sin of men to Christ as a monstrous misconception; yet he maintains that Christ, in taking upon himself

our nature, takes with it original sin and inherited guilt, and can ustly bear penalty because he inherits guilt. Of course he does not intend to charge sin upon Christ; but to the common Christian mind the logic of his system certainly drives him to this result.

Under the head of "Reconciliation of Man to God, or the Application of Redemption," the author presents the doctrines of Election, Calling, Regeneration, etc., taking essentially Old School ground. To this, his view of the set of the human will, which was assumed by the race in the fall, involving actual inability to righteousness, logically brings him. Thus he presents Election:

> Election is that eternal act of God, by which in his sovereign pleasure, and on account of no foreseen merit in them, he chooses certain out of the number of sinful men to be the recipients of the special grace of his Spirit, and so to be made voluntary partakers of Christ's salvation (p. 427). What God does, he has eternally purposed to do. Since he bestows special regenerating grace on some, he must have eternally purposed to bestow it—in other words, must have chosen them to eternal life. . . . This purpose cannot be conditioned upon any merit or faith of those who are chosen, since there is no such merit—faith itself being God's gift and foreordained by him. Since man's faith is foreseen only as the result of God's work of grace, election proceeds rather upon foreseen unbelief. Faith, as the effect of election, cannot at the same time be the cause of election (pp. 430, 431).

This apparent contradiction would disappear, if the author conceived of men as still possessing free-agency, and having the responsibility of responding, or refusing to respond, to the divine call and persuasion. In that case one of the antecedent conditions of election must inevitably be, the foreseen response of the creature. But as the man has no such power or responsibility, his action is naturally left out of account in the author's conception of the doctrine.

Of Regeneration he speaks as follows:

> Regeneration is that act of God by which the governing disposition of the soul is made holy, and by which, through the truth as a means, the first holy exercise of this disposition is secured. . . . It is God's turning the soul to himself, conversion being the soul's turning itself to God, of which God's turning it is both the accompaniment and cause. . . God changes the governing disposition—in this change the soul is simply acted upon. God secures the initial exercise of this disposition in view of the truth—in this change the soul itself acts (p. 447). We simply assert that the power which regenerates is the power of God, and that although conjoined with the use of means, there is a direct operation of this power upon the sinner's heart which changes its moral character (p. 453).

This idea of absolute impotency and inability, on the part of the sinner, until by the power of God he is delivered from that set and determination of the will assumed in the fall, colors and shapes the author's entire doctrine of salvation. On the contrary, the appeals which the Scriptures address to men have a very different tone. If our theoretical theology could be brought into harmony with this general Scripture method, it would be a great improvement.

VII. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

In the portion of the volume which treats of Ecclesiology the author, as might be expected, presents with skill and ability the rational, historical, and scriptural warrant for maintaining the independency of the local church. He defines the individual church as a "company of regenerate persons, who, in any given community, unite themselves voluntarily together, in accordance with Christ's laws, for the purpose of securing the complete establishment of his kingdom in themselves and in the world" (p. 495). The voluntary character of this society is emphasized in order to guard the organization against unregenerate membership, while at the same time it is insisted that membership is obligatory upon the conscience of the individual by virtue of Christ's commands, and in order to conform to his laws. The author combats the idea that the polity of the church is a mere matter of expediency, holding that the actual organization of the apostolical churches is of the nature of a permanent revelation of God's will upon that subject. With much reason, also, he maintains that the evils of strong ecclesiastical systems are manifest in the present divided state of the Christian world.

> There is no necessity for common government, whether Presbyterian or Episcopal; since Christ's truth and Spirit are competent to govern all as easily as one. It is a remarkable fact that the Baptist denomination, without external bonds, has maintained a greater unity in doctrine, and a closer general conformity to New Testament standards, than the churches which adopt the principle of Episcopacy or of provincial organization (p. 509).

In treating of the ordinances of the church the view is de-

fended that immersion is essential to baptism, that baptism in accordance with Christ's laws is essential to church membership, and that participation in the Lord's Supper should be permitted only to church members. These last two positions are essentially the same as those usually taken by all churches. The question of fellowship, therefore, comes back to the prior question, as to what is essential in the rite of baptism. As already remarked, our author maintains that, in order to make the rite conform to Christ's laws, the baptism must be by immersion, and must be voluntarily submitted to by the individual, thus ruling out the legality of infant baptism. It cannot be denied that those churches which hold, with the Baptists, that baptism of itself is not a regenerating ordinance, and at the same time emphasize the importance of securing a regenerate church membership, encounter some special difficulties in defending the practice of infant baptism. As this subject, however, has been amply treated in a previous number of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA by one of its present editors (vol. xxxi. pp. 265-299; 545-574), we will merely refer the reader to that discussion, which relates to the *subjects* of baptism rather than to the *mode*, since infants as well as adults may be baptized by immersion, and are so baptized by the Greek church. Upon the question of the mode our author defends his position by adducing (1) the meaning of the original word, (2) the use of prepositions with the word for baptize, (3) the circumstances attending the administration of the ordinance as recorded in the New Testament, (4) figurative allusions to the ordinance, (5) testimony of church history as to the practice of the early church. In this part of the argument the author receives more aid than the facts of the case really warrant from the too generous concessions of some recent lexicographers and commentators, who, though accepting sprinkling as a proper mode of baptism, have thought it easier to defend it on general principles than upon exegetical grounds. We are by no means so ready as are some of these to give up the exegetical argument, and, in conducting this, we submit that the true meaning of the word "baptize" must be determined mainly from its usage in

the New Testament, and not from its etymology or pre-Christian use.

Of course, we must admit that the *primary* meaning of *βαπτίζω* is immerse; but that does not prevent its having a *secondary* meaning of a very different character. The word "elder," primarily, has strict reference to age, but as applied to Baptist clergymen it has no reference at all to age, but only to a reputed wisdom and discretion which are the natural accompaniments of age. Now, we should feel it no small burden to be compelled to prove, as Dr. Strong must do, that this word "baptize" always means immerse in the New Testament. For example, in Luke xi. 38, the Pharisee who had invited Jesus to dine with him, marvelled when Jesus sat down with him that he had not first *baptized himself* before dinner (*ἐβαπτίσθη*; so also in Mark vii. 4). It certainly was not the custom of the Jews to immerse themselves before every meal. It is difficult, also, for us to believe that the authorities at Jerusalem would, in the last of May or the first of June, have allowed their limited pools of water to be used as a promiscuous bathing place to such an enormous extent as they must have been if the thousands converted upon the day of Pentecost were baptized by immersion.

The author also draws an argument in favor of immersion from the use of the prepositions *εἰς* and *ἐν* after *βαπτίζω*. But the use of these prepositions is notoriously of too loose a sort to allow much of an argument, as to the meaning of the verb with which they are connected, to be based upon them. *Εἰς* does, indeed, ordinarily follow verbs of motion, but in many cases it does not, or the idea of motion is supplied in some preceding verb; as, when Christ is said to have preached in (literally *into*) the synagogue (Mark i. 39), where the preposition is more properly connected with the idea, previously stated or implied, of his *coming* into the synagogue and preaching. Preëminently had the preposition *ἐν* suffered deterioration in Hellenistic Greek. This naturally follows verbs of rest, but in the New Testament it is sometimes joined to verbs of motion, as in Luke i. 17. It is hardly a full statement of the case to say, as our author does on page 524, that in Mark i. 5 and 8 "*ἐν* is to be

taken not instrumentally, but as indicating the element in which the immersion takes place." It would have been but fair to have noticed that the best texts omit the preposition in this case, while in the parallel passage in Luke iii. 16 (to which our author does not refer) there is no question about the absence of the preposition. This would make both instrumental datives; in which case they would be translated "baptized *with* water;" so also in Acts i. 5 and xi. 16. Instances are numerous in which it is clear that the preposition ἐν is often nothing more than the sign of the instrumental dative, as in Luke xxii. 49, where those who are about Jesus at the time of his arrest asked if they should smite with (literally *in*, ἐν) a sword.

The early substitution, which even our author admits, of sprinkling in place of immersion where outward circumstances rendered immersion impracticable seems to show that the water and not the mode of its application was from the first regarded as the essential element of the rite. Nor are we inclined to give much weight to the figurative allusions to baptism which our author adduces. The mode of burial in a tomb entered from the side and closed by a stone rolled up in front is so different from the form of burial now common that it would not be likely to suggest in itself the act of immersion. There are plenty of other reasons for these figurative comparisons besides those assigned by the Baptists.

On the whole, therefore, it seems to us clear that the New Testament has left us so much in doubt (1) as to the mode of baptism itself as practised by the apostolic church, and (2) as to the degree of emphasis it would lay upon the mode, that the strenuous manner in which our author insists upon immersion appears unwarranted, and is an occasion of unnecessary division in the body of Christ. Nevertheless, we heartily respect the loyalty of our Baptist brethren to what they conceive to be a positive requirement of our common Lord and Saviour, and must accept the responsibility of meeting fairly and squarely their exegetical arguments.

VIII. ESCHATOLOGY.

Dr. Strong's chapter upon Eschatology would be admirable for any time, and is especially so as adapted to correct the evil tendencies of the present. After stating the reasons for rejecting the doctrines of the annihilation of the wicked, of an intermediate state of probation between death and the judgment, and of any form of universal restoration, he defends the view that there is to be a final triumphal return of Christ to punish the wicked and to complete the salvation of his people; but that the period of millennial blessedness is to precede his advent. The ordinary orthodox views of the resurrection and the final judgment are also maintained. The closing paragraphs, in which he contends that the everlasting punishment of the wicked is not inconsistent with God's benevolence, and that the proper preaching of it is not a hindrance but an indispensable auxiliary to the success of the gospel, are peculiarly felicitous and convincing.

> In this life, God's justice does involve certain of his creatures in sufferings which are of no advantage to the individuals who suffer. . . . If this be a fact here it may be a fact hereafter. . . . God's treatment of human sin is a matter of instruction to all moral beings. The self-chosen ruin of the few may be the salvation of the many. . . . If the temporary existence of sin and punishment lead to good, it is entirely possible that their eternal existence may lead to yet greater good. . . . Benevolence in God may to the end permit the existence of sin and may continue to punish the sinner, undesirable as these things are in themselves, because they are incidents of a system which provides for the highest possible freedom and holiness in the creature through eternity. . . . If the doctrine be true, and clearly taught in Scripture, no fear of consequences to ourselves and others can absolve us from the duty of preaching it. . . . All preaching which ignores the doctrine of eternal punishment just so far lowers the holiness of God, of which eternal punishment is an expression, and degrades the work of Christ, which was needful to save us from it. The success of such preaching can be but temporary, and must be followed by a disastrous reaction towards rationalism and immorality. . . . The fear of punishment, though not the highest motive, is yet a proper motive, for the renunciation of sin and the turning to Christ. . . . It is not Peter or Paul, but our Lord himself, who gives us the most fearful descriptions of the sufferings of the lost, and the clearest assertion of its eternal duration (pp. 597-600).

But in a single article scant justice can be done to a book so comprehensive in its scope and so elaborately wrought out in its details as this of Dr. Strong's is. We hail with gratitude the publication of such works, even where we do not altogether

agree with the views of the author. The truest test of one's interpretation of particular passages of Scripture, and of the correctness of his statements of particular doctrines, is their ability to fit harmoniously into a system of theology. It is only when set in comparison with other interpretations and other portions of the truth that the deficiencies and excellences of particular views are brought into proper relief. No man should go before the public to advocate particular phases of doctrine until he has thought the subject through; so that his views shall be modified and tempered by the whole aspect of the case. Nearly all heresy springs from crudity of thought, haste of publication, and that perversity of human nature which too often prevents a writer from retracing his steps and acknowledging himself in any error.