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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

AND

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. XVIII.

MAY, 1848.

## ARTICLE I.

### THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.—A HISTORICAL ESSAY.

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#### Introduction.

The Pelagian controversy is concerned with the deepest interests of practical Christianity, the cardinal doctrines of sin and grace. The whole resolves itself at last into the question, whether redemption and sanctification are the work of man or the work of God. Before the time of Augustine, the doctrines of human freedom, of original sin and imputed guilt, and of the factors that enter into conversion, had not become the object of controversy in any proper sense. The church had other most weighty problems to solve; in particular she was called upon to maintain the divinity of Christ and the doctrine of the holy Trinity against all sorts of adversaries. These anthropological points accordingly remained still, as to doctrine, very indefinite. The Greek church in general leaned towards an anthropology, in which the freedom of man was made to take a very high place; while the Latin theologians, the African fathers, Tertullian and Cyprian in particular, laid more emphasis upon the corruption of the human nature, through the fall of Adam, and the necessity of divine grace. In the beginning of the fifth century, these different doctrinal conceptions were made to stand out, one over against the other in sharp and full contradiction. Pelagius became the immortal representative of a tendency, that has since continued to reveal itself under various forms

throughout the entire history of the Christian church, the fundamental anthropological heresy, which must always influence more or less all other parts of the Christian system.

Pelagianism, in its whole mode of thinking, starts from man, and seeks to work itself upwards gradually by means of an imaginary good will, to holiness and communion with God. Augustinism pursues the opposite way, deriving from God's unconditioned all-working grace, a new life and all power of doing good. The first is led from freedom over into a legal, self-righteous piety; the other rises from the slavery of sin to the glorious liberty of the children of God. For the first, revelation is of force, only as an outward help or the power of a high example; for the last, it is the inmost life, the very marrow and blood, of the new man. The first, consistently carried out, runs towards an Ebionitic view of Christ, and can see in him only a distinguished man, a virtuous sage, a prophet, but not properly a high-priest or king; the last here finds Him, in whom the fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily, and who is the principle of an entirely new spiritual creation. The first makes conversion a process of gradual moral purification on the ground of original nature; with the last, it is a total change, in which the old passes away and all becomes new. The first pleases itself with the dignity and energy of man; the last is lost wholly in the contemplation of the majesty and almighty grace of God. The first deals with the every-day understanding, reasons acutely and clearly, and is thus more popular; the other descends from the surface into the abyss of existence, brings forth the hidden treasures of knowledge from their mysterious depths, and is immeasurably more satisfactory in this way to *mature* thought. Pelagianism begins with self-exaltation and an undue estimate of its own powers, only to end at last in overwhelming self-delusion; Augustinism casts man first down into the dust of humiliation and self-despair, to raise him again on the wings of divine trust to the highest moral power; draws from him tears of penitential grief, in order that from his heart may stream forth afterwards the joyful praise of God's almighty grace.

Even if it should be supposed that Augustine, through the contradiction that stood in his way, and the inexorable consistency of his own dialectic mind, was carried into the opposite extreme, so as to venture on assertions which for the simple Christian consciousness are too harsh, and that seem to transcend the bounds of sober scriptural knowledge; there can be no doubt still, but that his position has the advantage decidedly of the other, in the way of greater depth, and richer experience, and fuller knowledge of the Scriptures, particularly the epistles of Paul.

We will, in the first place, bring into view briefly the personal *history* and *character* of the two men, who took the lead in the controversy, and are still known as the standing representatives of the opposite modes of thinking which entered into it; for the purpose of apprehending both systems genetically. In the second place, we will relate the *external history* of the controversy itself. Lastly, we shall represent, in three sections, its *inward form*, or the *points of difference* which it actually involved.

## I. Pelagius and Augustine.—Their Life and Character.

Of the outward life of Pelagius we know but little; this little however is characteristic. He was a monk from Britain, born about the middle of the fourth century. His original name is said to have been Morgan, which signifies, of the sea, or by the sea, corresponding with the sense of Pelagius in Greek. He gave himself much to the study of the Greek church writers. It is probable that the old British church sprang from the Oriental, and stood connected with it in some way. From the beginning, he showed much earnestness of life, and an active concern for his own improvement and that of others in his own way. He was regarded as an eminent Christian. Augustine, sharply as he opposed his system, if we except the well-founded charge of dishonesty, nowhere assails his personal character, but professes even to regard him with esteem and love. This speaks well for the nobleness of his spirit.

But this morality has no deep character, and was not the fruit of an active and rich living faith. It was natural virtue, baptized with the water, but not with the fire of Christianity; such a virtue as we often meet with still in monasticism, consisting in legal ascetic exercises, victory over sensual appetites, the avoidance of all gross outbreaks of sin, discipline of the will and self-mastery, full of self-righteousness, and perhaps also, unconsciously, of spiritual pride. This morality rests mainly in externals. It proceeds not from a real change of the inmost mind, from the force of that humble love, which stripped of all self-reliance casts itself unreservedly upon the mercy of God. Pelagius had no fiery sensuality to contend with probably, as Augustine had; he was not called to pass through such mighty conflicts and decisive crises. His life was quietly developed in its own direction, he was happily successful in repressing all tendencies to gross sin, and in securing a certain capacity of moral self-government; but this precisely served to increase his high opinion of the power of the will, his confidence in himself. He had the monkish imagination,

that man is able, in the pursuit of perfection, (an object within his reach even in this world,) to go beyond what the law requires at his hands; since he voluntarily assumed the vows of poverty, obedience, and celibacy. As a bishop once quoted that great word of Augustine: "My God, grant unto me what thou requirest, and require of me what thou wilt,"[1] Pelagius became excited; he thought the freedom of the will endangered; he was not able to rise to the conception, that the fountain from which the moral law comes, is that from which must flow also the power that is needed for its fulfilment. In short, the morality of Pelagius was dissevered from faith, which was in his view for the most part only such a dead belief as is contended against by James. It is characteristic of all Pelagian tendencies, of Rationalism for instance, that they undervalue doctrine and faith, and place the substance of Christianity in its moral precepts. The sermon on the mount, accordingly, and the epistle of James, are in their view of far more weight than the discourses of the Lord as given by John or the epistle to the Romans. It commences with that, which properly can be only a consequence. Pelagianism stands in close consanguinity with Rationalism, although Pelagius did not carry out his system to this point. Rationalism is simply the form in which Pelagianism becomes at last theoretically complete. The high opinion which the Pelagian holds of the natural will, is transferred with equal right by the Rationalist to the natural reason; and as the first feels able to dispense with the assistance of grace in the work of moral improvement, so the last holds itself equally competent to advance in the knowledge of divine things without the light of revelation. The divinity of Pelagianism, so far as its practical tendency may require it to have any, is rationalistic; the morality of Rationalism is *out and out* Pelagian.

St. Augustine's life is wholly different from that of Pelagius. On first view, the latter seems to have the advantage of greater purity and more undisturbed harmony, whilst the former is known to have passed through great errors and sins, before he found his Saviour. But only he who can fall very low, is capable of rising also very high. Augustine, after his conversion, stands out as a wonderful monument of God's redeeming mercy for all ages. He is not only the leading genius of the church of his time, but unquestionably one of the deepest and most influential theologians, if not indeed the very greatest, since the days of the apostles. Only such men as Anselm, Luther, Calvin can at all stand in comparison with him, and in one point he is certainly far superior to the Reformers; in this, namely, that both

[1] Da, Deus, quod jubes, et jube quod vis.—Confess. X. 29.

the Catholic church and the Protestant are accustomed to bow before him with equal reverence. He is not only the principal founder of the Catholic system, as it stood in the Middle Ages, but at the same time through his deep speculations on sin and grace, in a certain sense the originator also of that movement which lies at the bottom of all modern history.

We cannot, of course, enter here into the particulars of his most interesting life. We have only to do with it so far as it seems to be necessary for a full and organic understanding of his views on sin and grace, as the theoretic reflection of his practical experience.

Augustine, born A. D. 354 at Tegaste in Numidia, was the son of a heathen father and of a Christian mother, the well known Monica, who accompanied his life as a protecting genius with prayers and tears, and must be counted amongst the brightest specimens of pious women. The grateful son has erected a monument to her in his celebrated "Confessions," which none can contemplate without edification and deep emotion.

In his childhood, under the care of such a mother, Augustine received deep religious impressions, too deep ever to be entirely eradicated. His heart, he says, sucked in the name of the Saviour with his mother's milk, so that nothing, which was quite without this name, however learned and attractive it might have been, could at any time take full possession of him. In his youth, however, particularly during his studies in the high school of Carthage, he was drawn aside from this path, and fell into sins of the flesh, which he himself afterwards confessed to God and to the world with unfeigned humility and repentance. Thousands of honored men have fallen much deeper, without the courage or sincerity to make a like confession. At the same time his mind was carried away by the errors of the Manichaeans, with whom he held communion for nine years, and ultimately sunk into the arms of skepticism, as taught in the philosophical school of the New Academy.

Still during his alienation from God, he had strong aspirations for something better. The most beautiful sentiment in the beginning of his "Confessions:" "Tu nos fecisti ad te, et cor nostrum inquietum est, donec requiescat in te," expresses his own experience. His heart, although the seat of unclean passions, was truly restless; it could not live without the most intense love, but felt all along, that it had not yet found the right object. His mind was continually and everywhere, except in the right place, seeking the truth, the solution of the mystery of man and his Maker. It wandered from one branch of learn-

ing to another, it entered deeply into the different systems of philosophy, to return more dissatisfied and thirsty than before.

In this unfortunate state he went to Europe; first to Rome, afterwards to Milan, called thither as a rhetorician, under very flattering prospects, highly recommended and respected for his extraordinary talents. There it was, that by the grace of God he found his Saviour again, never more to lose him. Different causes led to his ultimate conversion. The study of the Platonic and New-Platonic philosophy delivered him from the dualism of Manes and the emptiness of skepticism, while it filled his mind once more with confidence in truth and with a longing after the ideal world. As with many Greek fathers, it served as a bridge to faith. Two things, however, he missed in this lofty system, love, which builds on the ground of humility, and the name of Jesus, without which the world is a chaos. Of greater service to him was his acquaintance with Ambrose, the celebrated bishop of Milan, whose eloquent sermons he went to hear, first out of curiosity, but by and by from a sense of real want. He made him acquainted with the true doctrine of the church, the depositary of Christ's life and of all-saving truth. Thirdly his mother, who had followed him from Africa, was offering prayers and intercessions for her dear son day and night. Finally, the reading of the Bible, to which Ambrose pointed him as the infallible rule and fountain of the doctrines of the Catholic church, particularly the earnest and thorough study of the epistles of Paul, accompanied by prayer and meditation, decided the conflict.

Theoretically he was now sufficiently convinced of the truth of Christianity, although his views continued to be still for a time, as his earlier writings show, too much tinctured with Platonism: but practically he found his passions stronger than his knowledge, and had to fight as severe a battle, as hero ever fought, the battle between the will of the flesh and the will of the spirit, which Paul describes in the seventh chapter of his epistle to the Romans. It ended with the exclamation: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord. There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit."

In his thirty-third year Augustine, after many wanderings, was baptized, together with his illegitimate son, by Ambrose, to the great joy of his mother and the church. He returned to Africa, spent three years in retirement, and was then against his wish elected presbyter first, and afterwards bishop of Hippo Regius, (now Bona), where he

labored for the cause of Christ till his death, A. D. 430. Without any hierarchical spirit, he became, by his gigantic mind and deep-rooted piety, the leader in all controversies of the time, the spiritual head of the African and of the whole church, and through his profound writings the source of inestimable light and comfort to all ages and climes since.

If we now view this short outline of his life in its relation to those doctrines, which are emphatically stamped with his name, we must admit, that he was peculiarly qualified, not only successfully to overthrow all those erroneous systems, through which his own mind had passed, particularly Manichaeism, the last and most dangerous form of the Gnostic heresy spread all over the primitive church, but also to set forth those deep views on man's fall and Christ's redemption, which characterise his opposition to Pelagianism. It is an abominable heresy to say: Let us continue in sin, that grace may abound. But it is nevertheless a fact, that God in his infinite wisdom employs the former sins and errors of his servants, to make them more humble in themselves and useful for their fellow men. Paul was better fitted to attack the legal righteousness of the Pharisees, because he had been himself a zealous defender of the law against the followers of the gospel. The more sincerely and deeply Luther had been attached to the Roman Catholic religion, the more powerful and successful became afterwards his opposition to it. Thus Augustine's licentious youth opened to his view the abyss of human corruption, while the remembrance of it afterwards taught him humility, the ground of all sound piety. In all his writings, he throws his life away, as it were, to find it again in Christ alone. The knowledge of sin is the indispensable condition of the knowledge of grace. This he had experienced, in spite of his unworthiness, beyond human expectation and calculation. No wonder, that he abounds in gratitude to his Saviour, and is inexhaustible in describing and praising his infinite mercy, and refuting those errors, which attack its majesty and power.

## II. External History of the Controversy.

In the beginning of the fifth century, A. D. 409, we find Pelagius at Rome. There he composed his Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, in which he disclosed indeed his particular tendency, but not in such a way as to create attention. The controversy broke out publicly, in the first place, through Celestius, one of his disciples.

The native country of this man cannot be determined certainly. He had been for some time an advocate at Rome; but through the in-

fluence probably of Pelagius, who became acquainted with him there, relinquished this situation for the monastic life. He was much better suited than his teacher, to become a public champion. He was still in the bloom of manhood, while Pelagius stood on the threshold of old age. His former employment, moreover, had trained him to be a dialectician and a polemic; whereas Pelagius was fond of peace, yielded easily his own convictions even, and altogether troubled himself but little in regard to the theory of his system.

In the year 411, the two like-minded friends betook themselves to Africa. They passed through Hippo, but did not find Augustine at home. He was just then in Carthage, on the business of the Donatists. Pelagius wrote him a very polite and respectful letter; to which Augustine returned a friendly answer, though not without adverting to the great importance of the true doctrine concerning sin. Pray for me, he said, "that God may make me to be in reality, what you take me for already." Pelagius travelled soon after to Palestine. Celestius remained in Carthage, and applied for the situation of a presbyter, strangely enough, in the very region, where, by reason of the vast influence of Augustine, he had most cause to expect opposition.

Celestius, by his talents and his ascetic zeal, gained himself many friends; but his opinions soon brought him into trouble. The deacon Paulinus of Milan, who happened to be in Carthage at this time, gave notice of him to the bishop Aurelius, and appeared subsequently as his accuser, in a council held here in the year 412. He was charged with seven errors, said to be found in his writings: 1. Adam was created mortal, and would have died even if he had not sinned. 2. Adam's sin injured himself only, and not the human race. 3. Children come into the world in the same state in which Adam was before his fall. 4. Neither does the whole human race die in consequence of Adam's fall, nor the whole human race rise again in consequence of Christ's resurrection. 5. Even unbaptized children are saved. 6. The law leads into the kingdom of heaven, in the same way with the gospel. 7. Even before the coming of Christ, there were men without sin. Of chief account were the second and third propositions, which were closely connected, and became afterwards the main subject of controversy.

Celestius gave evasive answers. These, he said, were questions of school speculation, that did not touch the substance of faith, and in regard to which different opinions were found in the church. As, however, he would not consent to retract the declarations laid to his charge, the synod shut him out from the church communion. He

betook himself immediately to Ephesus, where he became presbyter.

Augustine had no part personally in these transactions. As, however, the Pelagian doctrine found still many adherents even in Africa, he wrote as early as A. D. 412—415, several pieces against it, though as yet with respect and forbearance.

In the meantime, the controversy broke out also in Palestine, where Pelagius now resided. He found there much more favor; for the oriental church was not yet affected by the Augustinian mode of thinking, and held fast both the conceptions of freedom and grace, without entering into any very close account of their mutual relation. Nor did the opposition to Pelagius spring at all from the oriental church itself. But there happened to be at this time two Western theologians in Palestine. In the first place, Jerome of Bethlehem, a man of great learning indeed, but passionate, quarrelsome and inconstant. He had been an enthusiastic admirer of Origen, but joined himself afterwards, in the *Origenistic* controversies, to his bitter and intolerant opposers. It struck him now that he could derive the views of Pelagius concerning freewill, and the goodness of man's nature, from the influence of Origen. He felt himself personally affronted by Pelagius besides, as the latter had assailed some of his writings. He wrote against him accordingly, though at first without giving his name. With Jerome lived also at this time, engaged in completing his studies, a young Spanish ecclesiastic named Paulus Orosius, a most devoted follower of Augustine.

In an assembly of his clergy held by bishop John of Jerusalem, A. D. 415, this Orosius appeared against Pelagius, making it known that a council at Carthage had condemned Celestius, and that Augustine had written against his errors. Pelagius answered evasively and contemptuously: "What care I for Augustine!" Orosius was of the opinion, that one who could show such disrespect towards *the* bishop, to whom the whole North African church stood indebted for its restoration—referring probably to his settlement of the Donatist controversies—deserved to be excluded from the communion of the entire Christian church. But John took the accused into his protection. Though he was only a monk and a layman, he made him take a seat among his presbyters, and appeared openly as his friend. Even the assertion of Pelagius, that man may easily obey the commandments of God so as to become free from sin, he was content to let pass, on his allowing, in the most general terms, that the help of God was needed for the purpose. After much talk, backwards and forwards, it was resolved that the matter should be laid before the Roman bishop

Innocent, since indeed both the contending parties belonged to the Western church. In the meantime, they must forbear all further attacks on one another.

A synod held that same year, in December, at Diospolis in Palestine, under the presidency of Eulogius, bishop of Caesarea, turned out more favorably still for Pelagianism. The points of accusation were unskilfully presented. Pelagius was able to help himself by ambiguous expressions, and went so far as to condemn doctrines of Celestius, which were also his own, not indeed as heresy, but remarkably enough, as nonsense and folly. The synod did not go far into the subject, and without understanding it fully declared the accused free from heresy. Jerome was right, when he styled it *synodus miserabilis;* but Augustine spoke truly also, when he said: "It was not the heresy which was there acquitted, but only the man who denied the heresy."

The matter took a new turn, when it came before the Roman see. Two synods, one at Carthage and another at Mileve, (now Mela,) in the year 416, condemned anew the Pelagian error, and made a report of their action to pope Innocent. A third more confidential letter was addressed to him by a number of the African bishops, among whom was Augustine. Pelagius also forwarded to him a letter, with a confession of his faith, which however were received later. Innocent understood the controversy, and also his own advantage by its means. He commended the Africans for laying their cause before the church of St. Peter, to which all the affairs of Christendom of right should be referred, and declared at the same time his full approbation of the sentence they had passed against Pelagius, Celestius, and all their adherents.

Not long after this, however, A. D. 417, Innocent died, and was succeeded by Zosimus, probably of oriental origin. Celestius appeared personally at Rome, and was enabled, by his written and oral explanations, to satisfy Zosimus. He was diffuse, like Pelagius, in setting forth his orthodoxy on other points, represented the points which were really at issue to be mere scholastic questions of little or no weight, and stood ready, if he had erred, to be corrected by the judgment of the Roman bishop. Zosimus, who, as it would seem, had no theological judgment of his own in the case whatever, addressed now a strange letter to the African bishops, in which he blames them for not having considered the subject properly, and for pretending, in such questions of vain curiosity, to be wiser than the sacred Scriptures. He gave his decided testimony, at the same time, to the orthodoxy of Pelagius and Celestius. The letter of the first, it was

said, had filled the hearers, when read, with great joy, moving some even to tears, in sympathy with his unmerited wrongs. There was no passage in it, that did not make mention of God's grace and aid. Finally, he begged the bishops to submit themselves to the authority of the Roman see.

The Africans, however, were too sure of their cause to yield to so weak a decision, which stood besides in palpable contradiction to that of Innocent. On the contrary, at a synod held at Carthage, A. D. 117, they entered a respectful but decided protest against the judgment of Zosimus, and gave him to understand that he had allowed himself to be imposed upon by the indefinite expressions of Celestius. At a general synod held in the same city, the following year, the bishops, upwards of 200 in number, set forth their opposition to the Pelagian error, in nine canons, answerable in full to the Augustinian view. They succeeded also in obtaining a rescript against the Pelagians, from the emperor Honorius. All this had its effect on Zosimus. About the middle of the year 418 accordingly, he addressed a circular letter, (*epistola tractoria,*) to all the bishops of the East and West, in which he pronounced an anathema against Pelagius and Celestius, who in the meantime had withdrawn from Rome, and declared his agreement with the decrees of the council of Carthage, on the doctrines of the corruption of human nature, baptism and grace. This the Italian bishops were compelled to subscribe, and eighteen, for refusing to do so, were deprived of their places. Several of these subsequently changed their mind, and were again restored; but the most distinguished among them, Julian of Eclanum in Apulia, continued firm till his death, and in his banishment defended his principles, with the greatest determination, particularly against Augustine, to whom he attributed all the misfortune of his party. Bishop Julian stands before us the most acute and systematic among the Pelagians, and the most formidable of Augustine's adversaries; a man, who for his talents, his moral deportment, and his unflinching fidelity to his own convictions, is worthy of all respect; but who at the same time, it must be confessed, cannot be vindicated from the charge of violent passionateness and haughty presumption. We find him, A. D. 429, in Constantinople; by order of the emperor, however, he was required to leave the city. He is said to have died, A. D. 450.

Of the subsequent life and death of Pelagius and Celestius, we have no information, farther than that the latter was about the year 429 driven out of Constantinople.

Thus was Pelagianism, as early as about the year 420, externally crushed; although it continued still to have its scattered adherents in

Italy till near the middle of the century, so that the Roman bishop, Leo the Great, found it necessary to charge the bishops strongly, that they should not receive any Pelagian into the communion of the church, without express recantation. At the synod of Ephesus, in 431, Pelagius was placed in the same class with Nestorius; and it must be owned, that they are not without a certain kind of affinity.

In looking back now upon the whole controversy, we find it to be more than the offspring of mere passion and violence. It contrasts favorably with the oriental controversies, in this respect, that no unworthy intrigues prevail in it; the ardent and pure zeal of a great man for the most important truths of the gospel occupies the foreground, and wins the victory at last for its own good cause.

The external discomfiture of Pelagianism, however, would have been of small account, if it had not been inwardly overcome, at the same time, by the weapons of the spirit, and the force of true science enlisted in the service of faith. This was accomplished through Augustine, who has thus secured to himself the highest merit, as regards theology and the church. To the consideration of this we now come.

## III. Inward History of the Controversy.

The sources for understanding the doctrine of Pelagius are his own writings, which have been accidentally preserved among the works of his adversary, Jerome. 1. His *Commentary on Paul's Epistles*, of the year 410; it has been somewhat changed indeed by Cassiodorus, but still betrays its author on every page. 2. An ascetic letter to the nun Demetrias, (*Epistola ad Demetriadem,*) on virginity. 3. His confession of faith, (*Libellus fidei,*) addressed, in 417, to the Roman bishop Innocent I. 4. To these must be added various extracts from other lost works, preserved in the counter-writings of St. Augustine. Of the writings of Celestius and Julian, nothing more has come down to us than some fragments in the same way. Augustine himself wrote a great many tracts against Pelagius and his adherents, between the years 412 and 428. The most important are, "*Of the Spirit and the Letter,*" 412, "*On nature and grace,*" 415, "*Of the grace of Jesus Christ,*" 418, "*On Original Sin,*" 418, and in particular six books "*Against Julian,*" 421.

The points of controversy were not handled indeed in systematic order, as in general seldom happens in such discussions. Still there is clearly at hand on both sides a system in fact, involving a close internal connection of the doctrines brought under debate, which our exposition here requires us to bring into view. The controversy em-

braces the three articles of man's *primitive state, fall* and *redemption*; his entire relation to God therefore in the three stages of his historical development, which are also repeated in the life of every individual. We have to consider accordingly, 1. The doctrine of freedom and the state of innocence. 2. The doctrine of the fall of Adam, and of sin, in particular, original sin and imputed guilt. 3. The doctrine of grace and redemption. We might add also the *doctrine of predestination*, which Augustine regarded as a necessary consequence in the end of his doctrine of sin and grace. But this point we shall pass over, as it is not, after all, essentially involved in the opposition to Pelagianism, and would require us, if thoroughly discussed, to go beyond the bounds of our present subject. We will present first the views of Pelagius, and then in opposition to them those of Augustine, interspersing suitable critical observations to make the whole more clear.

### § 1. *The Doctrine of Freedom and the Primitive State.*

Pelagius held the original state of man to have been substantially the same with his condition at the present time, so that what was true of Adam before the fall is to be regarded as still of force in the case also of his posterity. Here we have at once a grand fundamental error of the system. Adam, he taught, was created by God with reason and freedom. Freedom is the highest good of man, his honor and glory. It consists in the ability of doing good or evil, equally complete on both sides. It is always free to us, says Pelagius, to do either one or the other, since both are always in our power; we possess the power of free choice, equally enabling us to sin or not to sin. In virtue of this ability, man may produce either the flowers of virtue or the thorns of vice. Such was the freedom of the primitive state, and such also is our freedom still. "We say, that man has power always either to sin or not to sin, that we may allow to him always the possession of a free will." So much with regard to the spiritual constitution of the first man. In reference to his physical condition, Pelagius taught that death is a natural necessity, and that Adam therefore would have died without sin. Where the Scriptures seem to declare the contrary, he understood them to speak of moral corruption or eternal damnation.

We see from this, that Pelagius conceived of freedom only as the power of choice, *liberum arbitrium*, and never went beyond this its lowest stage. But this indeterminate middle point between good and evil is one that must necessarily be transcended. By the act of

choice, the man goes beyond it, and determines himself in favor of one or the other; and every new act serves to confirm him in the direction taken. The formal power of choice ceases to be simply formal; acquires real force, and so overthrows itself more and more, in proportion to the moral development of the subject. The sinner becomes the slave of evil, the good man a child of God, who in the end is no longer able to choose and do evil, because he *cannot* have any such *will*. True freedom, therefore, as recognized in the holy Scriptures, is self-determination to good, and to good only, and so of course becomes identical in the end with moral necessity. Such power of choice as leaves the man just as much inclined to evil as to good, is in itself an imperfection, that shows already a removal from the original goodness of the creature. Man may possess this indeed, in his present state, in things of inferior account; but where precisely it comes to a life question, the radical change is his nature itself, he shows himself bound by reason of sin. His present state is one of slavery; not Hercules at the forks of the road, but Hercules on the highway of evil. Pelagius knows only the two contraries, free choice and constraint; and his freedom of choice is without past or future, externally and internally dependent on nothing, a continual *tabula rasa*, that may take meaning at its own pleasure every moment, but only to fall back again after each single act to the indeterminate and undeterminable character it had before. Whilst Pelagius thinks to elevate man in this way, he binds him fast in fact to the starting place of his proper life. Nay more, he makes the essence of morality, a good disposition, to be impossible. Virtue and vice, according to his abstract conception of freedom, can consist only in single good or bad actions, that have no inward connection, and affect not the power of choice on which they depend. An atomistic morality, however, is no morality whatever.

The other point, namely, the view taken of death, which Pelagius sundered from all connection with sin, shows also the superficial character of his thinking. One that understands not the bitter fountain, cannot make right account of the stream that flows from it. The view leads besides to an unworthy conception of God, since it makes him to be the author directly of death, with its gloomy train of pains and sicknesses and evils of every kind.

AUGUSTINE has a much higher conception of Paradise, involving of course the possibility of a far deeper fall. The original state of the human race is viewed as of the same nature with the state of the blessed after judgment; only with this difference, that the first is to be compared to the germ, the second to the full grown fruit. According to Augus-

tine, man came absolutely faultless from the hand of his Maker, the true masterpiece of creation. He possessed freedom to good, reason for the knowledge of God, and also God's grace—by which is meant here, not exactly in its proper sense indeed, the divine assistance, without which no creature can continue in good. His relation to God was that of joyful and complete obedience. So also the relation of the body to the soul. There was as yet no lusting of the flesh against the spirit. "Tried and assaulted by no intestine war, Adam enjoyed in that happy place full peace with himself." With this inward state corresponded also the outward. It was not only a spiritual, but also a visible paradise for the senses, without sickness, pain, or want of any sort.

Still this state was only relatively perfect; in its kind, namely, as a child may be perfect in the character of a child, but yet is formed to become a man, or as the seed answers fully in itself to its own idea, but must become a tree. Only God is unchangeable and absolute in his being; man is subject to development in time, and by this of course to alteration also and change. The gifts which have been mentioned were bestowed upon him simply as powers, which included in themselves the possibility of a twofold development. Adam might proceed in a straight line, his nature unfolding itself harmoniously in undisturbed union with God, so as to attain gradually to a state of perfection; but it was possible for him also to fall away, and to come thus into a process of a different kind, in which his life should be developed only through the deep contradictions of sin. The mind included in itself the possibility of becoming incapable of error, the will the possibility of becoming incapable of sin, and the body the possibility of becoming incapable of death; and all this must have actually followed, in the case of *regular* evolution or growth. But this possibility was still only possibility, which for this very reason carried in itself the possibility also of the contrary.

Let us observe more closely the possibility of sin. Augustine distinguishes between "posse *non peccare*" and "*non posse* peccare." The first is *hypothetical freedom* from sin, which may however strike over into its opposite, the slavery of sin. This potential freedom belonged to Adam before the fall. The second is the absolute incapability of sin, which pertains to God, the good angels, and the saints made perfect. This, according to Augustine, is the *true freedom*, the glorious liberty of the children of God. "If the Son make you free, ye shall be free indeed." Freedom thus—and this is an essential point of difference between him and Pelagius, containing at the same time a most profound truth—is not a state of indecision between good and evil, but of decision in favor of good, and identical with moral neces-

sity. It is that state of the will, in which it *can* no longer do evil, because it *will* not, the *beata necessitas boni*, the direct opposite of the state of man before regeneration, or of the slavery of sin.[1] Freedom and grace are for Augustine corresponding conceptions. The more grace, the more freedom; and so also the reverse. The will is free in proportion as it is sound; and it is sound, in proportion as it moves in its true life element, in God, and obeys him from its own inmost impulse. *Deo servire, vera libertas est.* This great word deserves to be well considered by those, who confound the precious name of liberty with its satanic caricature, unbridled licentiousness, and in their blindness call themselves free, while they are the wretched slaves in fact of their own lawless self-will.

The case is similar also as regards the impossibility of death, on the part of the body. Augustine distinguished here again between "posse *non mori*," and "*non posse* mori." The last, denominated likewise *immortalitas major*, is the attribute of God, and of the saints after the resurrection, and so of course the negative expression only for eternal life. The first, *immortalitas minor*, is the capacity of immortality, which however is capable also of being corrupted, and so changed into mortality. This was the state before the fall. Adam had it in his power, by continuing obedient to God, the true centre of his being, to choose the *non posse peccare* and *non posse mori*; but he had power also not to will such choice. This power of not willing came not directly from God; for the same fountain cannot send forth at once sweet water and bitter; but it lay involved in the power of willing, as a possibility that should have been *negated* by the free volition of man. The possibility, however, was not thus neglected, but became actual, and this was the fall, the introduction of evil. We stand here before an abyss, a transcendent fact we may call it, which no thinking can fully fathom. It belongs however to the proper conception of evil, that it is unfathomable, contradiction itself indeed, the very negation of all reason and all sense.

Such is a connected representation of the statements of Augustine,

[1] Comp. also *De Civit. Dei*, l. XIV. 11, where there is no reference to Pelagius: Arbitrium igitur voluntatis tunc est vere liberum, cum vitiis peccatisque non servit. Tale datum est a Deo; quod amissum proprio vitio, nisi a quo dari potuit, reddi non potest. Unde Veritas dicit: *Si vos Filius liberavit, tunc vere liberi eritis.* Idque ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: Si vos Filius salvos fecerit, tunc vere salvi eritis. Inde quippe liberator, unde salvator. Augustine's doctrine on this most difficult subject is far from being satisfactory at all points and admits of great improvements; but it contains the germs of a reasonable as well as scriptural theory on liberty. The *historical* character of our Essay, however, forbids us to enter more fully into this question, which we cheerfully leave to more competent hands.

in different places, on the subject of the primitive state. It agrees essentially both with the idea of a holy God, who can create only what is good, and with the idea also of man, as a creature, made in the image of God, but capable of change. It must be acknowledged, however, that our excellent church father is often too much inclined to an *empirical* delineation of the paradisiacal blessedness, which goes beyond the simple statements of the Bible, and fails to make a proper distinction at times between the original state, which we are to think of as the innocence of childhood, and the state of moral maturity or manhood, bringing thus the beginning and the end too near together.

Setting aside, however, some rather too brilliant pencil strokes of speculative fancy, the view of Augustine is certainly the only one here that can be regarded as sound and true. For we have in it a real, living beginning, in which the whole present and future is comprehended, the possibility of a perfectly sinless harmonious development, and the possibility at the same time of the fall and redemption, and which is already a prophetic mirror also of the blessedness beyond the grave. Pelagius recognizes no true beginning, and so accordingly also no progress, no fall, no redemption, as will appear from what is to follow.

### § 2. *The Doctrine of the Fall and its Consequences.*

Pelagius admitted indeed that Adam had sinned. It belonged of course to the very nature of free choice, that he might choose evil. But this fall of the first man was, in his view, a single isolated fact, just like the actual sins committed by other men, and in truth a very small offence. Julian compares it to the inconsiderate fault of a child, that allows itself to be blinded by some tempting object of sense, but is sorry afterwards for its disobedience. Hence also it had no further consequences. The power of free choice was not lost by it at all. It might turn again, the next moment, towards good. And just as little did it affect the understanding or the condition of the body.

According to this then there is *no original sin;* but every child is still born into the world in the same state, in which Adam came from the hand of his Maker. Man is born without virtue as also without sin, but with the capacity for both.[1] Only this much Pelagius would

[1] *Pelagius in August. De Pecc. Orig.* 14: Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis; capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni, nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur; atque ante actionem propriae voluntatis, id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit.

allow, that Adam, by transgressing the divine command, had set a bad example, which exerts a more or less pernicious influence upon his posterity. Celestius says, sin is not born with man, it is not a product of nature, but of the will.[1] The question he holds to be, whether sin is a matter of necessity or of free will. In the first case, it would not be sin; in the second it may be avoided, since the will is simply *liberum arbitrium*, the power of choice. With the denial of original sin, is rejected also of course the idea of imputed guilt. Such imputation of a foreign sin appeared besides to Pelagius, irreconcilable also with the justice of God.

On the nature of sin, Pelagius expresses himself no further than this, that he places it in the influence exerted upon the will by the *senses*. He has no conception properly of sinfulness, but only of single sins.

Here again, we have the same superficial, atomistic style of thinking, as before. In the first place Pelagius has no idea whatever of a general human life, an *organism*. Adam is for him an individual simply, like other men, and nothing more. His fall accordingly was that of an individual only, not that of the human race, as comprehended at the time in his person. Men are connected with one another only in an outward way, independent of one another, a mere living sand-heap. What is done by one therefore has no necessary influence upon another, every one commences the history of the human race as it were again from the start. This is perfectly atomistic, and utterly overthrows the idea of all history, and of everything like progressive development. Those passages of Paul in which he contrasts Adam and Christ as the two great representatives and progenitors of the human race, have for Pelagius no meaning. Where however no first Adam is admitted in the sense of Paul, as the bearer of the whole human race in its natural constitution, and so of course no original sin and imputed guilt, there also no second Adam can find room, no Redeemer of the human race, no imputation of the merit and righteousness of Christ. Pelagius has no power to conceive of the general as united with the individual and single. Christ also, then, for the system to be consistent, must have been a mere individual, whose life, death and resurrection, have no universal significance, reach not into the depths of the organic general life, but possess at best the force on-

[1] *Symbol. Fragm.* 1: In remissionem autem peccatorum baptizandos infantes non idcirco diximus, ut *peccatum ex traduce*, (that is, peccatum naturale,) firmare videamur, quod longe a catholico sensu alienum est. Quia peccatum non cum homine nascitur, quod postmodum exercetur ab homine; quia non naturae delictum, sed voluntatis esse, demonstratur.

ly of a moral pattern or *good example*. Pelagius has no knowledge of a productive principle of development, but of a dull unprogressive routine merely of every day events.

Still further, Pelagius knows sin only as isolated, atomistic acts of the will. But now every act is referable to an inward state, from which it springs, and works back again on the same. Sinful actions suppose an inclination of the mind to sin, a certain sinful propensity therefore already at hand, and contribute to form an evil character; as virtuous actions, on the other hand, point to a good fountain, and tend to make the character also increasingly good. Of such a sinful *habitus*, however, Pelagius has no knowledge; whence also original sin must appear to him as nonsense; for this is in fact simply the disposition of the will to evil, induced by the fall, as propagated by natural generation in virtue of the essential unity of the human race.

It is something false, finally, to place the essence of sin in sensuality, or the undue power of sense. This is only *one* form of sin, of secondary character besides, as having respect mainly to the body. The deepest nature of sin is spiritual, in the form of self-love, *egoism*, falling away from God, affecting to be like God.

We come now to the doctrine of AUGUSTINE. The primitive state of man included in itself the possibility of sin, and this formed the imperfection of that state. This possibility passed into fact; how or why, is necessarily incomprehensible, since evil never has a sufficient ground, like good; it is *unreason* itself. Adam fell not without temptation from without. That angel, who in his pride had turned away from God and towards himself, tempted man, whose upright state was itself the object of his envy. He addressed himself first to the woman, as the weaker and more credulous party. The sin of Adam consisted not essentially in partaking of the fruit, for this in itself was neither evil nor hurtful, but in *disobedience* to the commandment of God. "Obedience was enjoined in that command, as the virtue which is for the rational creature the *mother*, as it were, and *guardian* of all virtues." The principle or root of sin, on the contrary, was *pride*, *self-seeking*, the desire of the will to forsake its source, and to become a source for itself. This pride went before the outward act. "Our first parents became first secretly bad, so as then to fall into open disobedience. For it could never have come to an evil work, if an evil will had not gone before. This pride preceded even the temptation of the serpent. If man had not begun previously to please himself, the devil could have had no power over man."

The fall of Adam appears the more aggravated and worthy of punishment, when we consider, first, the height on which man previously

stood, the divine image in which he had been created; and then the simple and easy character of the command he was required to fulfil, in the midst of the abounding plenty of paradise; and lastly, the terrible penalty with which he was threatened on the part of his Creator and greatest Benefactor.

Augustine, we see, passes from the appearance to the substance, from the surface into the deep. He stops not with the outward act, but fastens his eye first of all on the inward mind that lies at the ground of all actions.

We pass now, however, to the *consequences* of the first sin. The more aggravated this sin seems to Augustine, the more momentous and terrible must be the results which flow from it, not only for Adam himself, but for all his posterity. The consequences are all alike penal inflictions of a righteous God, who has associated reward with goodness, but by the same law punishment also with sin. They are comprehended generally in the word *death*, taken in its widest sense, as Paul says, The wages of sin is death. So the death threatened, Gen. 2: 17, must be understood to include all evils, both of body and soul. Severally, Augustine reckons the consequences of sin under the following points, of which the first four are negative in their character and the others positive:

1. The loss of freedom, which stood originally in a positive inclination and love towards good, including also indeed the possibility of evil. In the room of this has entered the hard necessity of sinning, the slavery of evil. "The will, which with supporting grace would have become a fountain of good, was turned, by forsaking God, into a fountain of sin."

2. Darkness in the understanding. Man had the ability readily and easily to learn and rightly to comprehend truth. Now, however, knowledge is not clear, and can be obtained and communicated only with severe toil.

3. The loss of God's grace, which qualified man to do the good that freedom willed. By not willing it, he threw away also this ability, so that if he should even now will what is good, he has lost the power to do it.

4. The loss of paradise. By reason of the connection that holds between man and the rest of the creation, the influence of the fall is felt also on this, bringing wild disorder and mysterious terror into the life of nature. The paradisiacal peace has vanished from the earth. It brings forth thorns and thistles according to the divine curse, and in the sweat of his brow man is doomed to earn his bread.

5. Concupiscence, or the lusting of the flesh against the spirit.

Thus God punishes sin with sin—a proposition which Julian held to be blasphemous. Originally the body was as cheerfully subject to the spirit, as man himself was to God. There was but one will. But by the fall, this beautiful harmony is destroyed, and in place of it has come in that dualism and contradiction, which Paul describes particularly in the seventh chapter of his epistle to the Romans. The insurrection of the spirit against God, is followed by its natural punishment in the insurrection of the body against the spirit. This concupiscence, therefore, is what Paul denominates σάρξ in the bad sense. It is not the sensual part of man as such, but its predominance over his higher nature.[1] Though, indeed, Augustine was rather inclined, in his zeal for a free spiritual life, to bring even the lawful appetites of the body, hunger and thirst for instance, as taking the form of violent desire, into some remote connection at least with the fall.[2] Julian derived the strength of sensual desires from the original animal nature of man. Augustine answered him, that the superiority of man over the animal consists precisely in the full supremacy of reason over sense, so that his sinking in this view to a level with the animal must be regarded as a divine punishment. Concupiscence then, is not any more than the σάρξ of Paul, something merely corporeal, but has its seat full as much in the soul, without which no lust can be felt. We have already seen indeed, that Augustine places the essence of sin in self-seeking or *egoism*. We must assume then a contradiction in the soul itself, a lower, earthly, self-seeking impulse on one side, and a higher tendency related to God on the other.

This is the general sense of *concupiscentia;* the struggle of the lusts collectively both of body and soul, against the divine authority of the spirit. Frequently, however, Augustine uses the word, according to the sense of related terms, in the narrow signification also of unlawful sexual desire. This came in with the fall. The proof of it he finds in the shame of our first parents; which could not refer simply to their nakedness as such, as this was nothing new to them, but must be viewed as a sort of recoil from the sense of fleshly lust; something good, therefore, in and of itself, the conscience so to speak of the body, but called forth by unlawful desire, and a disturbance of the proper harmony between body and soul. Would there have been then no propagation, without the fall? There would have been cer-

[1] Not *sentiendi vivacitas*, but the libido sentiendi quae nos ad sentiendum sive consentientes mente sive repugnantes appetitu carnalis voluptatis impellit.—*C. Julian.* l. IV. § 66.

[2] Quis autem mente sobrius non mallet, si fieri posset, sine ulla mordaci voluptate carnali, vel arida sumere alimenta, vel humida, sicut sumimus haec aëria?

tainly. But in such a form, that reason should have had complete rule over sensual desire. Propagation would have been the product of pure will and sacred pious love, in which shame would have had just as little place, as in committing seed to the motherly bosom of the earth. But now desire tyrannizes over the spirit, as Augustine had learned by bitter experience in his earlier years. From this sinful element in the act of pro-creation, he derives the pains and sorrows of parturition, as indeed they are represented in Genesis to be the consequence of the fall and a part of the divine curse. Had man continued pure, the race would have been propagated, according to Augustine, without any labor or pain on the part of the woman.

6. Physical death, with its train of diseases and bodily pains. Adam was created indeed mortal, that is, with the possibility of dying, but not liable to death. By regular natural development, the possibility of death would have been at last changed into an impossibility, and the body gradually spiritualized and clothed with glory, without passing through any violent process or experiencing even the infirmities of old age. Instead of this, man is now subjected to the bitter necessity of dying. As the spirit chose of its own accord to forsake God, so must it now forsake the body also. It is well remarked, however, by Augustine, with deep meaning, that not merely the act which sunders soul and body, but the whole life of man as a sinner is throughout a process of dying. Death begins already with the pain that accompanies birth and the first cry of the infant. Thus the threatening of the Lord: "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," at once went into effect; for although our first parents still lived many years, they began notwithstanding even then to grow old and die. "Life consists now in an uninterrupted movement towards death, and no one is allowed to stop even for a moment, or to relax his gait, but all are forced to move as with one step, each urged onward exactly like the rest. For he whose life has been shorter, has lived for this reason no shorter day, than he whose life was longer; and those who require more time for death, travel not on this account more slowly, but perform only a longer journey."

7. These consequences of Adam's sin now extend, not merely to Adam himself, but to all his posterity. This brings us to the conception of *original sin* and *transmitted guilt*, which require to be handled somewhat more fully.

We have considered Adam's sin thus far as the act simply of an individual. It has, however, according to Augustine, still another aspect, which is of vast account for his system, and forms a main difference between him and Pelagius; namely, Adam possessed a *generic* character.

He is the progenitor of the whole race, not merely *a* man, but *the* man, in whom already all other men were organically and potentially at hand, as the tree in the seed. For this reason, the fall of Adam is the fall of the *entire race*. In him sinned the human *nature* as such, and so of course all who have part in it;[1] with the exception of Christ, who was not conceived with sinful lust. The corruption of the root reaches forth into the branches; through the *genus* are initiated at once all the individuals it includes. The same holds as regards guilt. All men come into the world as sinners deserving of punishment, and, under sentence of death, inherit from their progenitors the consequences of the fall. They are *massa perditionis*. This is the *peccatum originale*, the *vitium hæreditarium*, the inborn sinful propensity of nature, the disposition to evil, from which of necessity all actual sins must proceed.

This original sin and guilt, Augustine teaches still further, propagates itself in natural generation. The generality, first lodged in Adam, unfolds itself into a succession of individual existences, that grow forth from one another organically. As, however, sin is not something physical, but primarily and essentially spiritual in its nature, the question rises, what theory concerning the origin and propagation of *souls* is adopted in Augustine's system. He brings forward, as is known, three such theories. 1. *Traducianism*, (from *traducere*, to draw out,) taught, that souls are produced by the act of generation, and so of course through human agency, the agency besides of the body. This theory was decidedly favorable to the doctrine of original sin, and had been adopted accordingly by many Western theologians, from the time of Tertullian, in support and explanation of it. 2. *Creationism*, (from *creare*,) takes the ground, that souls are created at birth immediately by God, and so joined with the body. This view was held by Jerome, who appealed in favor of it to the uninterrupted working attributed to God, John 5: 17. In this case, to hold fast the doctrine of original sin, it must be assumed that the soul, which can proceed from the hand of God only in a pure form, becomes sinful by its connection with the body, that springs from natural generation. 3. *Pre-existentianism*, which was derived from Plato and adopted by Origen, affirms that souls have already existed, before coming into their present state, in another world, and either de-

[1] *De peccatorum mentis et remissione*, l. III. c. 7. In Adam omnes tunc peccaverunt, quando in ejus natura illa insita vi, qua eos gignere poterat, adhuc omnes ille unus fuerunt. *De corrupt. et gratia* 10: Quia vero (Adam) per liberum arbitrium Deum deseruit, justum judicium Dei expertus est, ut cum tota sua stirpe, quae in illo adhuc posita tota cum illo peccaverat, damnaretur.

scend of their own accord now into bodies at birth, or are sent into them by God.

Augustine rejects decidedly only the last view, in the form in which it was held by Origen, as making the soul to be imprisoned in the body, for the expiation of sins committed in its pre-existent state and in some other world. On the other hand, he wavers between the first two views, as the Scriptures leave the subject indeed uncertain. He wishes to hold fast the idea of constant creation on the part of God, but to hold fast also, at the same time, the organic connection of soul and body. He looks upon the whole question as belonging to science and the school, rather than to faith and the church, and makes a confession of ignorance, which for a man of his speculative genius, involves no small self-denial. "Where the Scriptures," he says, "give no sure testimony, the human mind must refrain from deciding one way or the other. Had it been necessary for man's salvation to know more on the subject, the Scriptures no doubt would have said more."

We must now pass over to the arguments, on which mainly Augustine grounded his doctrine of original sin and guilt as now explained. We notice first those of a *positive* character.

1. Among scriptural passages, he presses especially the words, Rom. 5: 12, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, which the Vulgate translate erroneously, *in quo* omnes peccaverunt. As Augustine understood but little Greek, he confined himself commonly to the Latin Bible, and referred the *in quo* to Adam, (the ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου in the beginning of the verse,) whereas it must either be referred to the proximate word θάνατος, or more correctly be taken as a neuter. But it would be now the height of folly, to reject, on account of this exegetical blunder, the whole Augustinian theory. The doctrine of original sin may be deduced from a multitude of other passages, (for example, Ps. 51: 7. Gen. 3: 21. John 3: 6. 1 Cor. 7: 14. Eph. 2: 3,) and the parallel which Paul draws, Rom. 5: 12 ff. compared with 1 Cor. 15: 45 ff., between Adam and Christ as the two great progenitors of the human race, whose image we bear, gives exactly such a view of the organic relation of the first man to his posterity, as necessarily leads to the same result. The name "Adam" signifies in its original sense, *Man*, generically considered, and is used in Genesis accordingly with the article, contrary to what is common in the case of proper names; as Gen. 1: 27, "God created *man* (*the* Adam) in his own image, in the image of God created he him, male and female created he *them*." The clause ἐφ' ᾧ, (to be resolved into ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὥστε,) should be interpreted probably "for that" or "because that," and indicates that

universal sinfulness is the ground of the universal prevalence of death. This comes in the end substantially to the same thought.

2. Augustine found again a weighty argument for his doctrine in the fact of *infant baptism*, as practised in the church with the form, "*for the remission of sins*," and in connection with various ceremonies, exorcism in particular, implying that the child had been previously under the dominion of demoniacal powers. For as the child, before waking to self-consciousness, could have no actual sin, the forgiveness must have respect in this case immediately to hereditary sin and guilt. The Pelagians now did not reject infant baptism, and they ascribed to it also something more than a merely symbolical signification; they were in this respect far more under the influence of catholic tradition than their system could consistently allow. But still the baptismal form, "for the remission of sins" could have no meaning for them except in the case of adults, since they held that children came into the world without sin. The only force they could allow to infant baptism, would be that of ennobling and improving in some way a nature which was in itself already good. Hence, also, the doctrine which had come to prevail in the African church since the time of Cyprian, that infants dying without baptism are lost, appeared to them something shocking, as it converted God into an arbitrary tyrant. Pelagius would not indeed himself positively assert that they are saved, since our Lord in his conversation with Nicodemus declares baptism with water and with the Spirit to be the indispensable condition of an entrance into the kingdom of God; but of this much he was sure, that as innocent beings they could not be subjected by a righteous God to punishment (*quo non eant, scio, quo eant nescio*). Augustine replies to this, that there is no middle state between salvation and perdition, but different degrees only of one and the other. One must be either in communion with God and so in a state of salvation, or out of such communion and so in a contrary state. Augustine was undoubtedly the more consistent here on the ground of the biblico-ecclesiastical formula of baptism. In no case may we affirm infants to be saved on the ground of their own innocence, without the intervention of Christ's merit; since this would contradict the fundamental proposition of the gospel, that out of Christ there is no salvation. The Pelagians, to have been consistent, should have rejected infant baptism, and adopted the *baptistic* principle, that the apostolical formula, "for the remission of sins," is designed only for the baptism of adults. The belief, however, of the apostolic origin of infant baptism was then universal, and no one could venture therefore of course to propose any alteration of this form.

3. The testimony of the Bible and the church is confirmed by experience. As soon as the man wakes to self-consciousness, he finds in himself already a tendency to evil. Yea, even in the suckling are to be seen traces of self-will, pride and disobedience. The further the man advances in his moral development, the more clear it becomes to him that this disposition is something really evil and deserving of punishment, and not simply a limitation, for instance, in his finite nature. In the same way, also, we find even the child subjected to evil, to sickness, to death. It does violence to every right idea of God, to suppose this the original order of life. No, God must have created man without fault, and with a tendency towards good. The feeling that the human nature is not what it ought to be, pervades humanity as a whole. Augustine quotes in one place a passage from the third book of Cicero's Republic: "Nature has shown herself towards man not as a mother, but as a step-mother, since she has placed him in the world with a naked, frail and weakly body, and a mind that is anxious under burdens, dejected with all sorts of fear, indisposed to exertion, and inclined to enjoyment; yet we cannot fail to perceive a certain divine fire, that continues to glow in the heart, as underneath a heap of ruins." Cicero found fault with the work of nature. "He saw well the fact, but not the cause of it; for he had no conception of original sin, not being acquainted at all with the holy Scriptures."

To these positive arguments must be joined others of a negative character; that is, such as consist in the refutation of objections, raised partly by the Pelagians, and in part by Augustine himself in the dialectic development of his theory. The most important are the following:

1. If original sin is propagated by natural generation, it must be a *substance*, and then we fall into the error of the Manichaeans. Not so, replies Augustine; all nature is in itself good, so far as it is nature; evil is only the corruption of nature, a vitiation brought into its proper constitution.

2. If evil be not thus substantial, we might expect that the baptized and regenerate, in whom its power has been broken, would beget sinless children. The law which holds in the propagation of sin, should hold also certainly for the propagation of righteousness. But regeneration does not become complete in this life, in such a way as to exclude absolutely the action of sin. So in natural generation; the agency is not that of the regenerated spirit, but that of nature under the influence of concupiscence. "Regenerated parents pro-create, not as sons of God, but as children of the world." Augustine appeals also to analogies, particularly to this, that the wild olive grows from the

seed of the good olive, although the difference between the two trees is very great.

3. But if the pro-creation of children is not possible without fleshly lust, does it not follow that marriage must be condemned as bad? No; as nature is in itself good, so is also marriage, and the pro-creation of children that goes along with it. It is established in the opposite relation of the sexes. The blessing, "Be fruitful and multiply," the declaration "A man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh," etc. flow from the state of paradise itself, and are not nullified by sin. The fleshly concupiscence is something that has come in since, which now indeed cleaves as an accident to the subject, but does not still overthrow the blessing of marriage. It becomes the duty now indeed of the regenerate, to bring this concupiscence into subordination, so that their children shall become at the same time children of God, that is, regenerate in Christ. Desire in this form Augustine terms, with reference to 1 Cor. 7: 3 ff., "a pardonable offence."

4. It contradicts the righteousness of God, to punish man for the sin of another; we are accountable only for sins, that are the act of our own will. This objection is very natural from the position of Pelagius, and has very clear force if we assume, with him, that the relation of Adam to his posterity is wholly external, and think of the imputation of his sin and guilt as a mechanical reckoning to their account of an isolated act merely, altogether foreign to their own lives. The same is true, as regards the imputation of the merit of Christ. So soon, however, as we think of humanity as a whole, and see in Adam the representative of the human nature, the bearer of his entire posterity, as Augustine does, the objection falls to the ground. But Pelagius, by reason of his abstract intellectual tendency, was not able to rise to this conception. At the same time, moreover, we have no right to sunder original sin abstractly from that which is actual. In the judgment of God, who always views the whole at once, the first takes in the last from the start, as the necessary form of its manifestation. Augustine and the older protestant theologians failed to lay sufficient emphasis on this point, and could not meet the objection in hand, therefore, with a full and satisfactory refutation. An abstract separation of original and actual sin, however, is entirely against his philosophical system, and involves, in fact, a transition to the atomistic position of Pelagius.

The corruption of sin then, according to Augustine, is universal, comprehending the race as well as individuals, grounded in the constitution of the will, extending from this to single actions, and from

these again reäcting upon the first, making every man the object of God's punitive justice. Still the corruption is not so great, as to have altered the substance of man, and destroyed his capability of redemption. This would have been the Manichaean error, the direct opposite of the Pelagian, which overthrows his *need* of redemption. "That is still good," says Augustine, "which deplores the good that is lost; for if some good were not left behind in our nature, sorrow for departed good could not be its punishment." Even in sin itself, the law of God is not wholly obliterated (Rom. 2: 14); and in the lives of the worst men there are some good works. But these contribute in no way to salvation. They are not truly good; the fountain is disturbed; "the virtues of the heathen are splendid sins." This seems a hard saying; and Julian endeavored to show its absurdity by drawing it out into preposterous consequences, which, however, serve only to show that he could not understand it. "If the chastity of the heathen," he said,[1] "be no chastity, we may as well say also that the body of an unbeliever is no body, that the eyes of the heathen cannot see, and that the grain which grows upon the fields of the heathen is no grain." Augustine, however, is altogether right, if we look to the principle of life, the inward mind by which it is ruled; and all, in fact, turns on this; it is to this he continually refers, never stopping, like Pelagius, in the outward deed, the mere matter of the action separately considered. What is not of faith is sin. The root, the impelling motive of all good actions, is the love of God, shed abroad in the heart, which to the unregenerate is altogether wanting. Thus, for instance, in his ingenious work on the City of God, Augustine shows happily that the fundamental character of the Romans was *egoism*. This produced at first, as the love of glory, those deeds that are so glorious in the view of the world, sacrifices for freedom and patriotism, in one word the old Roman virtues; subsequently, however, with the dissolution of all morality after the destruction of Carthage, the vices also of ancient Rome. Still he leaves room for the consoling supposition, that God may have had even among the heathen an elect people, whom he drew to himself by the mysterious operation of his Spirit, "true Israelites, not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." So also the Alexandrian fathers saw solitary rays of the Logos shining in the darkness of paganism; only they made by no means so clear a distinction between Christian and not Christian.

Thus all glorying on the part of men is excluded. Man is sick, even unto death, out of Christ; he is, however, capable of redemption and cure; and in proportion to the greatness of the disease, is

[1] In Aug. Opus imperf. I. c. 27.

the greatness of the physician also, and the adorable fulness of the universal remedy, redeeming grace. This now claims our consideration.

### § 3. *The Doctrine of Grace and Redemption.*

Pelagius distinguishes in the idea of the good three elements, ability, will and being. The first belongs to nature, the second to freedom, the third to the act. Ability, or the power of good, what may be styled moral capacity, is grace, and comes from God, in the way of necessary natural endowment; forming thus the foundation for will and being, without, however, making them necessary in the same way. These, will and being, depend wholly upon man.[1] For example: "the power of seeing with our eyes depends not on ourselves, but, on the other hand, it does depend on ourselves whether we shall see well or otherwise."

This would seem to make revelation entirely superfluous. Pelagius, however, affirms no such consequence. Along with the natural ground, which we may denominate moral capacity, he assumes also the accession of auxiliary grace, showing its force negatively in the forgiveness of sin, and positively in the strengthening influence of instruction and example. This is revelation, both as law and gospel. "In the case of one who is not a Christian," he tells us, "goodness is found in a naked state, without help; but with the Christian, it is made complete by the assistance of Christ." Still more plainly: "At first men lived righteously according to nature, afterwards under the law, and finally under grace (the gospel). When the inward law (conscience) was no longer sufficient, the outward law came. Then again, when this (the Mosaic law), by reason of the preponderance of sinful habit, was no longer sufficient, help must be sought in the lively force of nature as exhibited for imitation in the example of the Lord."

This grace, Pelagius teaches further, must be merited, since God otherwise would be unrighteous. "The heathen are subjected to judgment and damnation, because notwithstanding their free will, by which they have it in their power to attain to faith and to merit God's grace, they make an evil use of the freedom they possess; Christians, on the other hand, are worthy of reward, because by the proper use of their freedom they merit the grace of the Lord and keep his commandments."

[1] *Pelagius in August. de gratia Christi* c. 4: Primum illud, id est posse, ad Deum proprie pertinet, qui illud creaturae suae contulit, duo vero reliqua, hoc est velle et esse, ad hominem referenda sunt, quia de arbitrii fonte descendunt.

This passage implies, besides, that the grace of revelation is not absolutely necessary. Moral capacity and freedom are of themselves sufficient for fulfilling the divine commandments. The grace of the gospel is not that which first makes it possible to do good; it only renders this more easy. Celestius accordingly affirmed quite consistently: *gratiam Dei non ad singulos actus dari.* Being closely pressed on this point by Augustine, Pelagius did indeed pronounce an anathema on those who deny the necessity of the grace of God in Christ, at every moment and for every action; but this was an admission forced from him in controversy, which was not in keeping with his own premises.

Since Pelagius had so high an opinion of the moral nature of man, as to consider the grace of Christianity useful only, not absolutely indispensable, we need not be surprised at his declaration, that there were men even *before* Christ, who, by a proper development of their moral powers, and the right use of their free will, had lived in perfect holiness. In his Commentary on Rom. 5: 12, he says that the word "all" designates only the majority of men, without including the righteous few, such as Abel, Isaac and Jacob. In his book on free will, he made use of the superstitious veneration which already prevailed for the Virgin Mary in favor of this assertion, and made it a necessary part of piety to look upon her as free from sin.[1]

These views serve fully to expose the superficial character of the Pelagian thinking. We have in the first place the same atomistic tendency, which we have found already sundering Adam from his posterity, an act of the will from other acts, and also from the state of the will; separating here too, with like abstraction, ability from will and being, so as to derive one entirely from God, and the other two entirely from man. But moral ability, the power of virtue, holds not beside and beyond the will and its acts, but in them; it is not something finished and complete, but is to be unfolded and advanced by exercise and application; so that man also is concerned in its production. On the other hand, will and being are not to be excluded from ability and the divine coöperation. It comes out here that Pelagius is properly a *deist*, who denies the permanent creating activity of God, nay, in the end, his efficient omnipresence itself. He conceives of the world and of man as a clock, which, after it has been fixed and

[1] *Aug. de natura et gratia contra Pelagium*, § 42: quamdicit (Pelag.) sine peccato confiteri necesse est pietati. He employs also the argumentum a silentio, inferring that the righteous whose sins are not mentioned in the Scripture, were free from sin: de illis quorum justitiae meminit (Script. Sacra), et peccatorum sine dubio meminisset si qua eos peccasse sensisset.

wound up by God, runs on without his help by the independent force of its own machinery. God's relation to it is that of an inactive spectator. Such an abstract separation of God and the world is something still much worse, because more lifeless and godless, than pantheism, which confounds them both together. Declarations like these: "In him we live, move, and have our being," "Without his will not a sparrow falls to the ground, but even the very hairs of your head are all numbered," "God works in us both to will and to do," "We will come unto him and make our abode with him," "I am the vine, ye are the branches; whoso abideth in me and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing;" these and such like glorious and precious declarations of Scripture, we say, have, from this deistic position, no meaning whatever, but must be resolved into mere oriental figure and hyperbole. In the controversy itself the difference was not indeed carried back to its deepest ground, in this view of the relation between God and the world, the Creator and the creature; Jerome, however, had some sense of it, for he charges the Pelagians, in one place, with denying the absolute dependence of man on God, and brings against them the word of Christ, John 5: 17, concerning the uninterrupted working of God.

It stands equally bad with the Pelagian view of Christian grace. This is sunk to a mere outward help, and resolves itself at last into doctrine and example. It is thus in fact nothing more than "the finger board on the way of life." That Christianity includes doctrine, and that Christ is our example, admits of no doubt. But however much we may make of such doctrine and example, they by no means exhaust the import of our religion. Else would Christ not be specifically different from Moses, Socrates, or any other virtuous sage, and so could not be our Redeemer. The main fact is rather, that in the character of God-man, as prophet, priest and king, he is the author of a new creation, and has imparted to humanity a higher life; that he not only operates upon believers from without, but lives and moves in them as the principle of their spiritual existence. Of this, Pelagius had no apprehension. What siguifies the proclamation of a new doctrine, or the exhibition of a lofty example, if to men pining under the dominion of sin there be not granted at the same time power to follow them? Solon, Pythagoras, Socrates, Seneca, Confucius, with all their practical wisdom and moral rules, could not still convert the world. Augustine may well say: "Would that Pelagius might acknowledge that grace, which not only promises us the riches of future glory, but produces faith and hope in regard to the same; a grace that

does not merely exhort, but inwardly inclines also, to all good; that does not simply reveal wisdom, but infuses also love to it."[1]

When, finally, Pelagius teaches, that grace must be merited, and that it is imparted to us, accordingly, after the measure of our natural virtue, he overthrows thus its proper nature altogether. Grace and merit mutually exclude each other. "To him that worketh," says Paul, "is the reward not reckoned of grace but of debt; but to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness," (Rom. 5: 4, 5). "By grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God; not of works, lest any man should boast," (Eph. 2: 8, 9).

We see here the comprehensive importance of the controversy. Pelagianism robs Christianity of its specific dignity, the gospel of its all renovating life, Christ of his divine nature; and leads thus by necessary consequence to the system of naturalism and rationalism, by which the very foundations of our most holy faith are undermined. Since, however, it has no right conception of sin, this is the only result that could be expected. If human nature be not corrupt, and free will prepared for every good work, we need no Redeemer, to begin all anew, but simply a reformer to improve what is at hand, and salvation becomes properly the work of man.

If Augustine had done nothing more than to overcome, negatively and positively, this fundamental heresy, he would be entitled for this alone to the everlasting gratitude of the universal church.

The doctrine of Augustine. He comes in a two-fold way to his peculiar view of redeeming grace. In the first place, by rising upwards, according to the law of antithesis, from the view he takes of the utter incapacity of the unregenerate man for good. The greater the corruption, the more mighty must be the principle that brings relief. The doctrine of grace is thus simply the positive counterpart of the doctrine of sin. Secondly, he reaches the same result, by descending from his conception of the all-efficient, all-pervading, presence of God, in natural and still more in spiritual life. Whilst with Pelagius God and the world, after the work of creation, are deistically sundered from one another, and man placed on an independent footing, Augustine, before this controversy even, by reason of his speculative spirit and the earnestness of his own experience, was deeply penetrated with a sense of the absolute dependence of the creature upon the Creator, in whom we live, and move, and have our being. Still, this sense of the immanence of God in the world has with him no pantheistic form, leading him to

[1] De gratia Christi. c. 10.

deny God's *transcendence* and independence of the world. He holds the right medium between deism and pantheism, under the guidance of the holy Scriptures and the spirit of the church. In the very beginning of his Confessions, he says beautifully: "How shall I call upon my God, my God and my Lord? I must call him into myself, when I call upon him; and what place is there in me into which my God may enter, the God who has created heaven and earth? O Lord my God, is there then anything in me that may contain thee? But do heaven and earth, which thou hast made and in which thou hast made me, contain thee? Or inasmuch as whatever is would not be without thee, does it follow that thou art contained in all? Since then I also am, why do I pray that thou shouldst come into me, who would not myself be, if thou wert not in me. I am not still in hades, and yet even there thou art. For if I should make my bed in hell, behold thou art there! I would not be therefore, my God, I would not be at all, unless thou wert in me. Yea, rather I would not be, if I were not in thee, of whom are all things, by whom are all things, in whom are all things. So is it, O Lord, even so!" In short, man is nothing without God, and all in and by God. This fundamental feeling could not fail to urge our church father into all the doctrines which he has so profoundly asserted and unfolded in opposition to Pelagianism.

Grace is above all, according to Augustine, the power of a divine *creation* in Christ, renovating man from within. Its operation holds first, negatively, in the remission of sin, by which the way is thrown open for communion with God; and then, positively, also in the communication of a new principle of life. As we have inherited from the first Adam our sinful and mortal life, so the second Adam also implants in us, by the Holy Ghost, the germ of a sinless and immortal life, from God and in God. Positive grace works then not simply, as according to the view of Pelagius, from without, by instruction and exhortation, upon our understanding; but descends into the centre of our personality, and imparts to the will, at the same time, power to obey the truth which is taught, and to follow the pattern exhibited by Christ.[1] Augustine styles it, hence, an *inspiratio bonae voluntatis atque operis*;[2] also, *inspiratio dilectionis*.[3] The unwilling it meets to make him willing; the willing it follows after, that he may not will in

[1] Non lege atque doctrina insonante forinsecus, sed interna et occulta, mirabili ac ineffabili potestate operari Deum in cordibus hominum, non solum veras revelationes, sed bonas etiam voluntates, (*de grat. Christ.* c. 24).

[2] *De corr. et grat.* 3. [3] *C. duas epp. Pelag.* IV. 11.

vain.[1] In short, grace is the marrow and blood of the new man; from it proceeds all that is truly good and divine; and without it we can do nothing that is acceptable to God.

From this fundamental idea of grace, the particular characteristics ascribed to it by Augustine, in opposition to Pelagius, follow as natural consequences.

It is, in the first place, absolutely necessary to Christian virtue; not something by which it is facilitated merely, but the *conditio sine qua non* of its existence. It is necessary "for every good disposition, for every good thought, for every good word of man, at every moment." Without it, the Christian life can neither begin, nor continue, nor become complete.

It is, again, undeserved. Grace would be no grace (*gratia*), if it were not gratuitous, *gratis data*. As man can do nothing good without grace, he is, of course, also not in a state to merit grace, which itself would be something good. "What merit could we have at the time, when we did not yet love God? That we might obtain the love with which we should love, we have been ourselves loved when this love was still not ours. We could never have been able to love God, had we not received such love from him who first loved us, and because he loved us first. But what could we do that is good, without such love? Or how should we not do good, with such love?" "The Holy Ghost operates where he will, and does not follow merit, but first causes it to exist." Grace accordingly is imparted to man, not "*because* he is already a believer, but *in order that* he may become a believer; not *because* he has merited it by good works, but that he may *thereby* be qualified for good works. Pelagius reverses the natural order, by putting the cause for the effect and the effect for the cause. The ground of our salvation can rest only in God himself, if he is to remain fully absolute. Augustine appeals to examples of pardoned sinners, "where not only no good deserts, but evil only, had gone before." So to the case of the apostle Paul: "Alienated from the faith which he sought to destroy, and violently influenced against it, he was suddenly, by the superiority of grace, converted to faith, and in such way that he was not only transformed from an enemy into a friend, but from a persecutor also into a bearer of persecution for the sake of that faith which he had himself once persecuted. For to him it was granted by Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake." He appeals further to the case of children, who without volition, and so without previous merit of the

[1] Nolentem praevenit ut velit, volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit, (*Enchir.* c. 32).

will, are incorporated by holy baptism into the kingdom of grace. His own experience, finally, was to himself, at least, an incontrovertible argument, for the free and boundless mercy of God. When in other places he speaks, notwithstanding, of desert, he refers to good works which the Holy Ghost works in men, and which God rewards out of grace, so that eternal life is grace for grace. "Since all our deserts of a good kind are God's gifts, God crowns thy deserts not as thy deserts, but as his own gifts of grace."

Grace, still further, is irresistible, as proceeding from the almighty will of God.[1] This consequence unfolded itself with Augustine in the course of the controversy; it is so closely connected, however, with the doctrine of predestination, that it cannot be judged of thoroughly except in this connection.

Its operation, again, is progressive or by degrees. Grace overthrows all the consequences of the fall; but in regular order, corresponding with the gradual evolution of the believer's life. It is a tutoress, who accommodates herself wisely and lovingly to the existing wants of her pupil. Augustine gives to these different stages of grace, appropriate particular names. First, it overcomes the rebellious will, and produces a lively longing after redemption. This is *gratia praeveniens* or *praeparans*. Secondly, it creates faith and free will towards good, as *gratia operans*. Thirdly, as *gratia coöperans*, it wrestles, along with the liberated will, against the remaining power of evil, and brings forth good works as the fruit of faith. Finally, it enables the believer to continue in good on to the end. This is the *donum perseverantiae*, the only sure criterion of the elect.[2] "We call ourselves elect or children of God, as we so style all whom we see leading, as regenerate persons, an evidently pious life. But only then are we in truth what we are called, when we persevere in that on whose account we have our name." So long, then, as any one continues to live, no sure judgment can have place with regard to him in this respect. Perseverance even unto death, that is, on to the point where the danger of falling away ceases, is grace in the most emphatic sense; "since it is more difficult to possess this gift than any other, although for him, to whom nothing is hard, it is as easy to impart this as that."

As regards, finally, the relation of grace to freedom, they by no means exclude each other, though they seem to do so. For we have

[1] Divina gratia indeclinabiliter et insuperabiliter agitur (voluntas humana). *De corr. et grat.* 12.

[2] Putting the three last stages together he says: Coöperando perficit, quod operando incipit. Ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus coöperatur perficiens (*De grat. et lib. arbit.* § 33).

already seen, that Augustine takes the idea of freedom commonly in its highest form, as will for the good. This is here still defective, being obstructed by the action of remaining sin. But in the state of glory all possibility of evil will be at an end, and moral freedom will thus become complete, and like the freedom of God.[1] Since now man, according to Augustine, is in consequence of the fall incapable of good, freedom in this higher sense is itself a gift of grace, and its development runs parallel with the revelation of grace in the process of sanctification. We may say thus, that in his system freedom is the subjective correlate of objective grace. He appeals for illustration to the relation of the eye to light. "As the eye of the body, even when most sound, can see nothing without the light of day, so man also cannot live aright without grace from above. . . . The eye is sufficient for itself not to see, that is, for darkness; but to see with its light, it requires the help of the clear light from without." "Both, believing and willing, are the work of God, inasmuch as God disposes man to them; but both are also the work of man, since neither the one nor the other can take place without our coöperation." This, by the way, is not in full agreement with what he says of the irresistible character of grace. The union of freedom and grace, Augustine finds in love, which is at once objective and subjective, passive and active, being apprehended and apprehending at the same time.

In the way of brief retrospect, we may reduce Augustine's doctrine, as now unfolded, to the three following points of view: 1. The primitive state—immediate union of man with God, childlike innocence, pure germ and presupposition of all that should follow, possibility of a sinless and also of a sinful development. 2. The state of sin—rupture with God, condition of bondage, dominion of death, with a longing, however, after redemption. 3. Redemption or grace—higher union with God, virtue conscious of itself through conflict, liberty of the children of God, attended here still indeed with the remains of sin and death, but absolutely complete in the next world without the possibility of relapse.

So far those reformed churches in which the authority of Calvin reigns, can follow in all material points the doctrine of Augustine. But it belongs to his peculiar character besides, though not properly as any part of the Pelagian controversy, that all these evangelical views of sin and grace are closely joined in him with a strong church

[1] *De corr. et grat.* 33: Prima ergo libertas voluntatis erat posse non peccare, novissima erit multo major, non posse peccare. On the distinctions in Augustine's conception of liberty, see *J. Ritter*, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Th. VI. S. 348 ff. and *J. Müller*, *Der Lehre von der Sünde*, Bd. II. S. 36 ff.

feeling; and here we meet the catholic element of his system. Though grace, accordingly, be wholly supernatural in its origin and nature, it still does not work magically or abruptly, but through the medium of the actually existing Catholic church and its institutions. Out of the church there is absolutely no salvation, but in it are deposited all saving powers, in the form, as it were, of real flesh and blood. In particular he ascribes to baptism, taken of course in the closest connection with the word and the Holy Ghost, an importance and force, that come into conflict in some measure with his own doctrine of election, and have been only partially admitted in the Protestant church. It is for him, emphatically, the sacrament of grace and regeneration, by which the guilt of sin is taken away, and the life of Christ implanted in the soul.[1] He makes salvation absolutely to depend upon it, although he cannot avoid allowing an exception in favor of the thief on the cross, and of such martyrs as without their own fault were prevented by death from being baptized. In these cases, the baptism of blood supplied the place of the usual rite. From the doctrine of the absolute necessity of baptism sprang as a natural consequence, the tenet affirming the damnation of all unbaptized children, as actually pronounced by the council of Carthage in the year 418; it is remarkable, however, that this passage appears only in a part of the manuscripts.

As in the whole system and personal character of Augustine then, so particularly also in the doctrines now reviewed, two distinct tendencies evidently prevail, a catholic and a protestant. The Roman Catholic church, on which he has exerted an incalculable influence, held fast the *churchly* and sacramental element, and carried it out so *one-sidedly*, that not only the doctrine of predestination, which never came to any general symbolical acknowledgment in her communion, but gradually also the doctrine of the exclusiveness of grace in the work of conversion and sanctification was abandoned; so that, if not in theory yet at least in practice, Pelagianism was again admitted into the Roman communion, as though the temporary favor shown towards it by pope Zosimus had carried in it a deep prophetical meaning. Along with the Tridentine and Jesuitic tendency in the Roman church, however, there has been and is still to some extent a Jansenist party, adhering with simple attachment to the Augustinian doctrines, though

[1] *Ep.* 98. 2: Aqua exhibens forinsecus sacramentum gratiae, et spiritus operans intrinsecus beneficium gratiae, solvens vinculum culpae, reconcilians bonum naturae, regenerant hominem in uno Christo, ex uno Adam generatum. *De pecc. mer* I. 39—abluti per sacramentum—ac sic incorporati Christi corpori quod est ecclesiae, reconciliantur Deo, ut in illo vivi, ut salvi, ut redempti, ut illuminati fiunt.

without a will to carry them out on either side in the way of further development.

The Orthodox Protestant churches took up once more Augustine's opposition to Pelagianism, that is, the evangelical element of his system, in its whole force, and turned it against the abuses of the papacy as they prevailed at the time. They incorporated his doctrines on the primitive state, original sin and hereditary guilt, in all essential points, into their symbols. As regards the doctrine of grace, however, we find a difference, not so much in the way of deviation as of further development. Augustine's representation labors under a double defect. In the first place, the doctrine is held predominantly under an objective form; it does not unfold sufficiently the process of salvation, especially the nature of faith and justification. The last is not with him a declarative act, as with the reformers, but is confounded with the idea of making righteous, or sanctification. On this side, the Lutheran church has partly modified and partly carried forward his doctrine, in the evangelical protestant spirit, even to the point indeed of an abstract disjunction of justification from sanctification; at the same time, however, in the Form of Concord, excluding his doctrine of predestination. In this last respect she approximates towards the church of Rome, as attempting a middle course between Augustinianism and Pelagianism; witness the Synergism of Melanchthon, which was indeed condemned by the same Form of Concord, but has found, notwithstanding, many defenders among the Lutheran theologians. Luther, who is known to have been a decided predestinarian, stands in this respect in a similar relation to his church with that of Augustine to the church of Rome. The Lutheran church stands nearer than the reformed to the Roman in this also, that she has retained the Augustinian doctrine of baptism, and so substantially the sacramental element of his system. The same is true of the English Episcopal church, at least as represented in her Book of Common Prayer. The other defect of Augustine's system lies in his doctrine of predestination; inasmuch as it stops in the infralapsarian view, half-way, while yet the premises on which it is made to rest lead by necessary consequence to supralapsarianism. This point, the reformed church of the Calvinistic confession has taken hold of with special emphasis, at the expense, however, of the *churchly* sacramental element, pushing it out with bold consequence to the most rigorous extreme; while the German Reformed and English Episcopal churches, which are not so fully under the doctrinal influence of Calvin as the French, Low Dutch and Scotch, feeling deeply the difficulty of the problem, have wisely left it open to individual freedom, as a question for solution hereafter,

when the ripening spirit of the church may yet succeed in explaining the relation of the divine and human activity, more satisfactorily than has yet been done by most symbols, by whose premature determinations one or the other side is always made to suffer.

It is precisely this remarkable union of two apparently conflicting tendencies which forms the ground of the peculiar greatness of Augustine, and of that widely extended influence he still continues to exercise over the whole Christian world. Both tendencies, the *churchly*, sacramental, objective, or in one word catholic, and the evangelical, *spiritualistic*, subjective, in one word protestant, have in themselves deep truth and immense living force, as is shown conclusively by all church history. But both have also their peculiar dangers. The first, *one-sidedly* carried out, conducts to Romanism, with all its errors; the second, developed in opposition to the church, runs over easily, through the medium of abstract supernaturalism, into absolute rationalism; and these two extremes then, as usual, again meet each other. The church without Christianity is a body without a soul; Christianity without the church is a soul without the body. The conception of man, however, includes one as well as the other, contents and form together; the two sides can stand also, only so far as each, though it may be unwillingly, has part in the other. The truth holds in the organic and indissoluble union of both; and now to accomplish this, and so, in the spirit of Augustine, to transcend his own still defective system, yea, to surmount the whole *antipodal* development thus far of Catholicism and Protestantism, by the exclusion of their respective errors and a living, inward reconciliation of their truth—this, we say, appears to be the grand task and mission for the church of the present and the future.

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## ARTICLE II.

### TOUR FROM BEIRÛT TO ALEPPO IN 1845.

By Rev. W. M. Thomson, Missionary at Beirût. [Concluded from No. 17, p. 23.]

*Oct. 25th.* About 2 o'clock last night we were waked up by some horsemen sent by the governor of Sâfetâ to demand who we were, and what was our business. They at first talked loud and impudently,—wondered how we dared to enter their country without permission, etc.