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of them. It is not one of the least of your grounds of consolation, (although our earthly part is thereby the more cast down,) that you have spent a portion of this life with a companion, whose society you joyfully hope to regain, when you are done with earth. Remember also that your companion has left you the example of a happy death.—But if our chief consolation is in the providence of God, through which our troubles conduce to our happiness, and if he only separates us from those we love, in order to unite us with them again in his heavenly kingdom,—then your religion will lead you to acquiesce entirely in his will.—May the Lord alleviate the pain of your loneliness by the grace of his Spirit, guide you and bless your labors.”

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## ARTICLE V.

### PLATO AND THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY.

By Prof. T. D. Woolsey, Yale College.

*Plato against the Atheists, or the tenth book of the Dialogue on Laws, accompanied with critical notes and followed by extended dissertations, etc. By Tayler Lewis, LL. D., professor of the Greek Language and Literature in the University in the City of New York. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1845.*

It seems strange, if we take into view the intrinsic value of Plato's *Laws* and the difficulties attending upon the text and explanation of this work, that so little labor has been bestowed upon it by scholars. Ast's,<sup>1</sup> we believe, is the only separate edition since the invention of printing; and the editors of the general text of

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<sup>1</sup> Published in 1814 at Leipsic. It is well known that this same learned man in his *Platon's Leben und Schriften*, published in 1816, after his study upon the *Laws* was over, maintained and endeavored to show that this treatise was not written by Plato, although quoted as such by Aristotle (e. g. in *Politics* 2.3). We must own that such an opinion, setting aside this strong historical evidence, seems to us astonishing. The style indeed is peculiar—far removed from the artistic elegance of Plato's most finished works, although somewhat like that of *Sophists* and *Politicians*; some of the opinions and modes of presenting truths may be peculiar also; but he who can doubt, after reading the work and receiving the general impression of it into his mind, that it is Platonic and that it is Plato's own, must, we think, be far gone in literary skepticism.

Plato furnish us either with no commentary or with a very brief one. Nor are we much better off in regard to translations. Schleiermacher went no further than the *Republic*; and we know of no other translator, besides Cousin, who unites scholarship, a philosophical spirit and familiarity with the Platonic dialogues to such a degree as to secure confidence in his interpretations.

The relation between the *Republic* of Plato and the *Laws* is one about which not a little difference of opinion has existed. A speaker in Cicero's treatise *De Legibus*, near the beginning, uses the following language: "quoniam scriptum est a te *de optimo reipublicae statu*, consequens esse videtur ut scribas tu idem *de legibus*: sic enim fecisse Platonem illum tuum, quem tu admiraris, quem omnibus anteponis, quem maxime diligis." The opinion involved in these words that the object of the *Republic* was to show the best form of polity is implied also in the prevalent Greek title *πολιτεία*, and is embraced by many writers of note. If we take this ground it must be supposed either that Plato changed his views before composing the *Laws*, or what is more natural and is usually believed, that he regarded the form of polity in the *Republic* as of hopeless attainment on account of its perfection, and intended in his later work to bring down his scheme of government to the level of ordinary human nature. The one would thus be a *Eutopia*; the other an improvement on the *Cretan* and *Lacedemonian* legislation. Others hold that the views of government in the *Republic* were never meant to be realized and were introduced only to illustrate the nature of *politics*. Mr. Lewis goes so far as to say, in his first *Excursus*, that "a misconception of the end and scope of the *Republic*, or as it should be more properly styled, the dialogue on the nature of right and righteousness (*περὶ δίκαιόν*), has subjected the name of Plato to great reproach. He has been charged with maintaining in the fifth book of that dialogue, sentiments which, if carried out, would result in the utter overthrow of all the domestic relations. A defence, had we space for it here, might be derived from the peculiar parabolical or allegorical nature of that work, and from the evident absence of any design that it should serve as the model of any actual existing polity."

In our judgment this view expressed by Mr. Lewis is not entirely defensible. We believe him to be in the right against those who, like Cicero, consider the best polity to be the end of the *Republic*. Its true aim, as we conceive of it, is to set forth the nature of righteousness, whether in the individual or in the State,

and more particularly in the individual. With this it begins and closes. Socrates wishes to reach the idea of righteousness, which, when beheld on the small scale of one man, is found to elude his grasp, by viewing it on the large scale of a State, and of its different classes of inhabitants. The great is for the small; or rather both are for something which is neither great nor small,—the underlying idea in both. It is as if one should draw a large equilateral triangle by producing two sides of a very minute one and uniting them by a line parallel to the third in order the better to show a child what was the nature of such a figure. Those who are familiar with the trichotomy in the Republic, will perceive why we have chosen this illustration.

But we cannot admit that Plato did not look on his model-state as a desirable and a good thing; nor can we free him from blame for his doctrine of the community of wives, and his permission of falsehood. This great philosopher somewhere regards the state of the mind in dreams as morally right or wrong. Had his theory been merely an ideal one, we should say of it, with far less severity than this rigidly Christian rule of his own contains, that he was accountable and guilty because of the immoral element in his dream of a perfect government. The theory, however, is more than ideal. According to the well known words of Plato, if kings were philosophers, or philosophers could become kings, it might be realized. Why else is so much time spent in the latter part of the fifth book in showing that such institutions, as we have spoken of above, would be salutary to a State; and that the reason why existing politics departed so much from Plato's model was that politics and philosophy were divorced from one another. The truth is that Plato, like modern socialists—though with infinitely more excuse—did not get a clear abiding sight of the corruption of human nature. The evil in civil society, therefore, was assigned by him to ignorance and to bad institutions; and its cure lay in philosophy teaching wisdom and devising a better framework of human intercourse. Even the family state, which Christianity looks on as fundamental for the moral training of our race, must be superseded by another system, in which parents and offspring should not know one another, but it should only be known in general, that a certain class of parents had given birth to a certain number of children. In this way Plato hoped to shut out whatever is exclusive and separating in family feeling and domestic life, to make men less selfish by making the notion of parent and child more general and abstract; just as in other com-

munities the spirit of covetousness is to be ejected by abolishing property and holding all things as a joint stock. He by no means undervalued the tie between parents and children, but idly hoped by artificially mending God's institution to extend and ennoble it. When, however, he shaped his legislation into a scheme more likely to be realized, he was content to follow nature in making the parental relation sacred, as other legislators had done before him.

There is a passage of the fifth book of the Laws, where Plato seems to refer to the objectionable features of the Republic with approbation, as being parts of the best system, and explains why he views them with so much favor. After saying (p. 739) that the form of polity which he is explaining holds the second rank in regard to perfection, he goes on to mention what he conceives to be the most perfect polity. It is one in which the principle of the old saying, *κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων*, prevails to its utmost extent; where *wives and children and goods are common*, where the notion of private and separate property is banished from society, and even things necessarily personal become common in a certain sort, as the operations of the eyes and ears and hands; where all persons praise and blame in the greatest possible unison, being delighted and grieved by the same objects. Whatever laws thus produce as complete a unity in the State as possible, surpass all others in respect to virtue; and such legislation is the highest end which one can propose for himself. A State so governed, if perchance gods or the children of gods do anywhere inhabit it, is one where happiness reigns. It must be made the exemplar in our polity, to it we must look, and bring our institutions into the closest resemblance to it. From views like these it is plain that the destruction of selfishness in society was the aim of Plato, and that he thought to gain his end by overturning, among other things, the relations of the family, and abolishing private property.<sup>1</sup>

A considerable part of the Laws is taken up with general views of a moral or political nature, introduced by way of advice and admonition, as prefaces to the more important heads of legislation, with the purpose of breathing the spirit and general notions of his code into the mind of the reader before he proposes his details. In the tenth book Plato has reached that part of his criminal code which relates to violations of religious order. Impious words and actions, he says, never proceed from one who holds divine beings

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Aristot. Politic. 2. 3, who recognizes the identity of the system in the Republic and that in the Laws. See also Plat. leges 7. p. 806.

to exist, but from one who has fallen into either of these three errors: that of not believing in the existence of gods, or of denying their providence, or of affirming that they can be propitiated by sacrifices and vows. For the sake of such persons, and especially of young men misled into atheism by the sophistry of the day, he introduces a long prelude to his legislation on the being, and providence of the divinities. And this argument, which occupies nearly the whole of the tenth book, is the more interesting and valuable, because it is the only place where Plato professedly and at length offers his proofs upon these cardinal subjects.

It must strike every one on reading this book, that Plato speaks like the rest of his countrymen, of the *gods*, in the plural number, without being very careful to draw a line between the Supreme ruler whom he elsewhere recognizes, and those inferior deities, who in one of his works, are said to have been produced by the superior, like the souls of men. How shall we explain this and his treatment of the popular religion in general? Was it fear that led him to this course, or did he accommodate his language to notions which he knew he could not alter; or did he believe in the literal sense, as he says in the tenth book of the *Laws* that *πάντα πλήρη θεῶν*.

Some of the Fathers, who fancied that he was acquainted with the doctrines of the Old Testament, and were struck with his noble expressions concerning God, attributed to him so much knowledge on divine things, that they were compelled to impute his heathenish passages to an unworthy motive. Such accusations, for example, are made by Eusebius,<sup>1</sup> and by Theodoret in his excellent "Cure of Hellenic maladies." The latter says that Plato plainly stood in dread of the Athenian populace, and of the errors with which they were infected. And in proof of this he alleges the inconsistency between a noted passage of the *Timæus*, where Plato seems willing to receive the whole Pantheon handed down by tradition from the children of the gods and by law and usage established, and those parts of the second and third books of the *Republic* where his moral nature rejects with abhorrence the poetical mythology of Greece.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Euseb. *Demonstr. Evangel.* lib. 3. (p. 129. D. ed. Colon. 1688), *θεῶν—ὄν πάντα φιλοσοφῶν εἰς μόνος ὁ Πλάτων εἰδὼς εἰς πάντα ἐκφέρειν ὡμολογεῖ μὴ τολμῶν.*—Theodoret. lib. 3. p. 43. ed. Sylburg. and lib. 2. p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> The passage in *Timæus* (40. D) to which we allude, is quoted several times by Eusebius, and he finds in it on one occasion (*Praepar. Evang.* 13. 1.) derision of the Greek theologians. But as far as we can see, it has no marks of the Socratic irony, and is capable of only a literal interpretation. One might

This opinion we cannot regard as probable. On every side we find arguments against it. It is opposed to Plato's honest love of truth on the one hand; and to his reverence for tradition in the absence of positive and certain knowledge relating to God and nature, on the other. Why again should he write the parts of the Republic where he inveighs against the popular mythology and speak so often of the divine being, as far above all things, if he was afraid of a prosecution for heresy? Why did he, to whom philosophy and not the State was the centre of life, if he dreaded the hemlock of Socrates, return to Athens at all after his first retirement? The Athenians cared more for their democracy than they did for their gods: why then did he, who on the supposition was such a coward, write so boldly in Gorgias and in the eighth and ninth books of the Republic, against the principles and the practices too of the Attic commonwealth? How, finally, could he with such apparent honesty and consistency have approved of punishing heresies in religion, if laws against heresies deterred him from propagating the most important truths, and led him through fear to countenance mischievous falsehoods?

A theory which would reconcile the different expressions of Plato and do justice to his honesty and consistency would have the following outlines; which our space forbids us to fill up, and which, we trust will carry their own evidence with them to readers who have formed a conception of the mind as well as the opinions of the philosopher. 1. His notion of a supreme God was somewhat transcendental, and being aware of this he must have felt the difficulty of bringing it down to the level of the popular mind. Not that he made God an idea, as some have thought: or went to the length of some oriental philosophers, who ascribed only essence to God, divesting him of all quality and relation; but he at least taught that while accurate knowledge of ideas was difficult for man—true opinion being the limit to which most men can go—the idea of God was the last to be reached of all. Well therefore might he say in a celebrated passage, (*Timæus* 28. C), *τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐ-*

be tempted with Stallb. (*Praef. to Politicus*, p. 112) to suppose that Plato's daemons were merely the "rays of the divine intelligence diffused through various parts of the universe," that is the divine attributes or more prominent relations hypostatized. But this notion seems to be too modern for Plato, and I know of no proof that he entertained it. It may be seen clearly expressed in the words of Lutatius, a scholiast on Statius, which are quoted by Lobeck (*Aglaophanus*, p. 598.) Compare a passage from Plutarch's treatise *De Ei* apud Delphos, cited in the same work, p. 712.

ῥόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγει, and teach with a very unprotestant spirit, in the twelfth book of the *Laws* (966. C), that while the guardians of the State—his ordained clergy—should be required to understand the truth about the gods, the mass of the citizens might be allowed simply to give their assent to the faith by law established. 2. His view of God taken in connection perhaps with the imperfections in the visible world, may have disposed him to confine God to the intelligible world and to introduce a set of mediators between the Supreme and the lower universe. Hence it may be that in the *Timæus* (41. A onwards) the created gods are set to work to make the human frame and whatever else is capable of decay, (69. C). 3. Plato's mind was by nature prone to believe in spiritual causes, and to look with reverence upon the tradition of the olden times. While therefore he revolted at the fables of the poets, he may readily have believed not only in gods tenanted the stars but also in others whose agency and character mythology had distorted. All this, like his cosmogony, was only probable in his view; we are not to suppose that the theology and physics of Plato stood on the same ground of certainty before his mind as his ethics and dialectics.<sup>1</sup> But receiving it as probable and being persuaded that religion lay at the foundation of the State, and that his doctrine of the supreme God could not reach the mass of men, he might reasonably content himself with proving in general that divine intelligences presided over human affairs. At least we are compelled to feel that those writers, who refer the marks of polytheism in Plato to mere policy, have not duly taken into account the position of a believing mind, surrounded by traditions and a mythology which are revolting to its moral feelings: it cannot run into atheism from its very nature: it cannot shake off tradition entirely, owing to its faith and reverence. It will therefore make a compromise so to speak, with its circumstances, and incline not wholly to reject the religion of all past time, when divested of the more exceptionable features.

Plato approaches the argument for a divine intelligence with a kind of reluctance, and as if forced to it by the mischiefs, which the irreligious writings of the sophists had wrought upon young men. Human nature should need no such proof. The disease of atheism indeed always will appear in some minds, but no one contracting it in youth carries it with him to old age and the end of life. Hence, bad as it is, it is less deeply rooted than the de-

<sup>1</sup> Comp. *Timæus* 29. C—D.



nial of providence and the ascription of undue influence to sacrifices and vows. The atheistical doctrine derives its force from false impressions in regard to mind and body. It starts with ascribing the greatest and most beautiful of things to nature and chance, to the mixture and union of blind elements, by which all things, even including animals and the mind itself, were generated. The mind thus produced gave birth to the arts, some of which, as that of legislation, are built on an unnatural, and untrue basis. Legislation in turn gave birth to the gods,—who differ with the laws of different States,—as well as to the shifting forms of moral beauty and justice. This theory must be overthrown by a truer view of nature, which putting the soul and all its kindred first in order of time, shall assign to what is vulgarly called nature a lower and posterior place. The proof of the divine existence is drawn from the subject of motion, *κίνησις*, which term includes changes of place, form and state in bodies, and the movements of minds. In the order of nature something which moves itself and other things, must be prior to that which can only move other things, and finds the beginning of its own motion out of itself. This self-moving or vital power belongs to what we call soul, which must therefore be prior to body destitute of such a power. And in the same way all the properties of soul must be prior to those of body.<sup>1</sup> It must then be the cause of all things, good or evil; and must regulate the heavens.

It will be seen that the idea of creation out of nothing no more enters into these views than into the common argument for a designing cause from the marks of design in nature. The interesting inquiry now arises, did Plato believe in a creation out of nothing, or did he like other physical inquirers of antiquity conceive of this as something impossible? Mr. Lewis, in a long Excursus upon the maxim, *de nihilo nihil*, has examined this point, but seems to have arrived at no certain conclusions. "It is by no means clear," he says, "that the eternity of matter was ever held by Plato.<sup>2</sup> Some *ἀρχή* or principle seems to have been in his

<sup>1</sup> Plato's words are these when literally rendered, (896. D): "characters and manners and wishes and reasonings and true opinions and attention and memory must have existed prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies since the soul is prior to the body." At the close he seems to mean that mind must be the cause of these properties of particular bodies: that is, that the reason why one is as long as it is, etc. involves the antecedent existence of some mind. But what is intended by *ἐπιμέλεια* before the generation of things?

<sup>2</sup> Note 50. But in Note 17, he says: "It seems to us perfectly clear that in every sense of the word, as used by modern philosophy, he held matter to be junior to soul."

mind as the origin of matter, which was not matter; and yet something separate from the Deity and existing with him before the formation of the outward universe." But "in a passage of the Sophista, Plato speaks of a creation by the direct act of God, and that, too, from things which before were not."

Upon no part of philosophy could we more wish for a clear expression of opinion from Plato—a profession of faith not wrapped up in magnificent words and in a mythic dress—than upon this. It is this obscurity and vagueness, whether in his views or style, which has led philosophers to opposite sides in interpreting his doctrines. To mention but one or two opinions. Cudworth takes the ground that Plato teaches a creation out of nothing, while Mosheim and most writers since his day go over to the other side. Ackermann maintains that he held that while the world came from God, God was never without the world. Stallbaum contends that so foolish and absurd a thought as the eternity of matter was quite foreign to Plato's way of thinking, and seeks to remove the appearance of such a doctrine from the Timæus. To us it seems likely that Plato conceived of matter as an eternal principle by the side of God. But then it was a principle in a very different sense from that in which God and ideas were principles. It was not the cause of the reality and essence of outward things, but was rather to be classed itself with non-existences. To it was to be ascribed that there could be outward things, but the perpetual flux and the necessary imperfection of outward things were due to it also. Plato nowhere gives it the name which it afterwards bore, and contents himself with describing it as without form or quality, endued with a capacity of putting on every bodily form like the materials in the carpenter's hands. With such a view of matter, it is scarcely more strange that Plato felt no necessity of referring it to a cause, than that we feel none in respect to time and space.

The passage of Sophista, where Mr. Lewis finds creative agency ascribed to God, must receive, as we think, another explanation. In that place Plato speaks of animals, plants, and inanimate organizations existing in the earth, as caused by God to come into being, when before they were not (*γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα*). This is introduced as an instance of the *ποιητικὴ δύναμις*, the definition of which is given in the words *ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι*. This power thus mentioned is divided into human and divine, so that men are said to create in the passage just as much as God is. Nothing more then can

be intended than *generation*<sup>1</sup> implying elements or substance previously existing.

Having shown that soul is prior to body and the cause of all movement, Plato puts the question, Whether one soul is a sufficient cause or more than one. In answer he says we must not start with less than two, the one beneficent, the other able to do things of a contrary kind. The beneficent, endowed with reason, which is a divine thing,<sup>2</sup> guides all things aright and towards happiness; the other destitute of reason brings about the opposite result, 896. E—897. That the rational and virtuous kind of soul bears sway through heaven and earth and the whole circuit of things rather than the other is proved by the order and system of the world, which are akin to those of reason. Afterwards he says (906. A), that heaven (*τὸν οὐρανόν*, i. e. the visible world) is full of many good things, and many evils, which last<sup>3</sup> are the more numerous, and that hence an eternal struggle arises, demanding surprising vigilance. For our allies we have the gods and daemons, whose possessions we are. We are destroyed by injustice and unbridled passion united to want of reason; and are saved by righteousness and self-restraint in alliance with reason,—virtues which have the vital forces of the gods for their abode, though a little of them may also be found dwelling in us here below."

These passages are remarkable, because they have the look of teaching something like dualism; a theory rather oriental than congenial to the Greek mind. In this manner Tennemann and C. F. Hermann have understood them.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Lewis is of the same mind, and finds traces of this dualism in other passages which have eluded our notice. "We have here presented," he says, "that grand defect in Plato's theology, which mars by its presence almost every part of his otherwise noble system. It is

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Xen. Mem. 2. 2. 3. οὐς [i. e. παιδας] οἱ γονεῖς ἐκ μὲν οὐκ ὄντων ἐκείησαν εἶναι.

<sup>2</sup> Here (897. B) there is much less MSS. authority for θεὸς ὄσα than θεῖον ὁρθῶς. But the great variations in this place throw suspicion even on θεῖον.

<sup>3</sup> εἶναι—πολλῶν μετὸν ἰγαθῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, πλείονων δὲ τῶν μὴ. In this passage τῶν μὴ can only be τῶν μὴ ἰγαθῶν; which is the more natural, because ἐναντίων is the same as μὴ ἰγαθῶν. These words cannot be made to mean things neither good nor bad.

<sup>4</sup> See Tennemann's *Gesch. der Philos.* 2. 230. 1st ed. and C. F. Hermann's *Gesch. u. System der Platon. Philos.* 1. 552 and note 739. The latter author says that the tenth book of the Laws "eröffnet den Blick in einem ganz andern Dualismus als der des Timæus ist," by which I conceive him to intend a dualism in which God and an irrational *psyche* are the principles instead of God and *hylé*.

most clear from this and other passages in his dialogues, that he held the doctrine of two uncreated principles or souls, the one good, or the benefactor, as he styles him, the other evil." This principle he finds alluded to in the *Timæus*, as the source of wild and confused motion, before harmony was brought into the world by its builder. As however no personal existence is there ascribed to the source of disorder; and as this disorder existed in visible things, it may be that Plato there speaks of matter endowed with the power of irregular motion,—of a chaos in short, just like that of many other cosmogonies—than that he speaks of a malevolent soul.<sup>1</sup>

Cousin endeavors<sup>2</sup> to smooth away the difficulties which these passages contain, by regarding the hypothesis of two principles as a point of departure for the question, whether a good or a bad principle governs the universe. If there is disorder and evil in the world, Plato would reason, a bad principle must reign in it; if order and wisdom, a good. As the latter is true we must reject the hypothesis of two principles, which was admitted for a moment. This however is not a satisfactory adjustment of the case, for Plato affirms that there is actual evil in the universe, though it may not be predominant. There must then be one or more evil souls though, not predominant. And indeed Cousin does not know what to do with the second of the passages, that in 906. A; in which place, if we interpret it of a moral dualism, there is a tone of despair utterly unlike Plato's general mood of mind.

Plutarch, near the beginning of his treatise 'on the procreation of the soul according to *Timæus*,' gives still another explanation, which deserves to be mentioned. After affirming that God made the essence neither of soul nor of body, but having these principles furnished to his hand, merely introduced order and reason into them, he goes on to find supports for this tenet in some of the Platonic works, and among the rest in the first of these passages. "Plato," says he, "in the *Laws* speaks of a soul without order and malevolent, which is soul in itself. It partook of mind, reason and harmony to become the soul of the world."<sup>3</sup>

If there is any justice in Plutarch's explanation, we might sup-

<sup>1</sup> We must certainly, if this be true, suppose an inconsistency between these two works in regard to motion, as on the supposition in the text the primordial matter was in motion.

<sup>2</sup> In Vol. VIII. p. 470 of his translation of Plato.

<sup>3</sup> See § 6. 2. and 7. 4 of Dübner's edition, Paris 1841. The same opinion occurs likewise in the fourth of the Platonic questions.

pose that Plato finally rested in the notion of a substance existing prior to bodies out of which they were formed, and of another out of which souls were formed. The maxim *de nihilo nihil fit*, if received by him, might lead him to this result, provided he considered souls essentially different from bodies, as he doubtless did.<sup>1</sup> Now the existence of evil and that of motion were to be accounted for. The first he found for a long time in matter—in the necessary departure of generated things from their ideal type. But as matter was merely passive, he sought for an active principle, the cause of motion and of evil both. This he found in that primeval *soul-mass*, which, being destitute of reason, could of itself exert only a disorderly and misdirected energy of desire. Out of this substance human souls were made and derived from it their capacity to go astray. This theory might be called, as it regards the causes of good and evil, a kind of dualism, and as it regards fundamental causes in general, a theory of three principles.

For ourselves, not knowing of anything, which by clear interpretation can be construed into dualism in Plato, we feel constrained to explain these words in consistency with what is elsewhere taught by him concerning the origin of evil being found in matter. He was thinking in both passages of evil in the visible world and especially among men. The classes of souls doing good and evil,—for *ψυχῆ* in the first passage may be a collective,—are the divine on the one hand, and the soul of the world and human souls on the other. The causes of evil in the world cannot lie in the contrary impulses of two hostile gods, as Plato expressly says in *Politics* 269. D; but in the fact that the world,—and the like is true of men,—although an animal and endowed with intelligence, yet because it partakes of a body, is liable to change and disorder.<sup>2</sup> To these souls, so connected with matter, belong false opinions and all the causes of unhappiness. To aid them in overcoming evil—and here probably the notion of human souls was especially in Plato's mind,—God has so arranged the system of things, as to throw the weight of his providence and government on the side of good. In the second passage, where it is said that heaven or the visible world abounds with good and evil but with the latter more, and that a ceaseless struggle is kept up, he was thinking particu-

<sup>1</sup> The soul of the world in *Timæus* (p. 35) is compounded in a way which we confess we do not understand. One of the parts, according to Stallbaum, is derived from the primitive matter, out of which bodies were framed. Others give very different explanations.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Stallb. *Prolegom.* in *Politicum.* p. 106.

larly of mankind. Not that good and bad beings are fighting over us and for us,—for no malevolent *person*<sup>1</sup> superior to man, unless it be the mundane soul, is known to Plato,—but that in our race and in the world, and it may be in the soul of the world, good and evil are in conflict. The evils especially thought of are denoted by what follows: “injustice and unbridled passion, with want of reason destroy us.” Thus explained, the sentiment is parallel to that in a fine place of *Theaetetus*: “It is not possible to destroy evils, for there must *ever be something opposed to good*; nor can they find their seat among the gods, but they, of necessity haunt our mortal nature, and the place of our abode. Wherefore we must try to flee hence and go thither, as soon as we can. And thus to flee is to be assimilated in the greatest possible degree to God; and to be assimilated consists in becoming righteous and holy in the possession of wisdom.”<sup>2</sup>

The argument against those who deny a divine providence is one of the noblest and best parts of Plato's works. It begins, as the remarks upon the atheistical spirit in general began, with the fundamental cause in human experience for such a malady of unbelief. A nature akin to the divine, leads men to receive a divine existence; but the sight of vice prospering inclines them to doubt, whether any care is exercised, at least in small matters, over human affairs. When they see the “prosperity of the wicked,” “they say, how doth God know, and is there knowledge in the Most High.”

This argument starts from the vantage ground of the first. If God is good, he cannot neglect what he ought to attend to, for that we feel to be a vice. If he is powerful and intelligent, he cannot neglect from impotence or ignorance. Nor is it hard for God to take care of the small. To attend to the small is not like seeing and hearing the small. The latter is difficult to sense; the former easy for reason. Nor is it indifferent whether God is mindful of the small or not. For the great cannot exist without the small. All the parts of the system are for the whole in the great art of universal government just as in human arts. Neglect anywhere therefore is injury to the whole. In the system the general good and the particular are made to coincide; and particulars are so controlled

<sup>1</sup> Some of the fathers understood these passages of evil angels. See Euseb. *Præpar. Evang.* 11. 26, who compares what is said of an endless battle with St. Paul's words: “We wrestle not with flesh and blood,” etc.

<sup>2</sup> *Theaetet.* 176. A.

by general laws, which they themselves help to carry into fulfilment that character determines destiny, vice and virtue work out their own recompense.

Near the end of this argument Plato breaks into a sublime strain not surpassed by anything in all his works. "Boast neither shalt thou, nor any other who has attained to such an unhappy character of having escaped from this justice of the gods:—justice which they who established it established, as the highest of all kinds of justice, and which ought entirely to be revered. For thou shalt never be lost sight of by it. Thou art not so small as to hide in the depths of earth [and be lost sight of], nor mounting on high shalt thou fly up to heaven [and be lost sight of there]; but thou shalt receive thy due reward from the gods, either whilst thou stayest here, or in the realms of Hades, when thou hast passed thither, or when thou art conveyed to a more dreadful place still. And the same thou mayest judge of those, whom thou hast seen become great from small by unhallowed deeds, or whom by conduct of that description thou supposedst to have been made happy from being miserable; and therefore thoughtest thyself to have discovered in their history, as in a mirror, that there is no divine providence over all things, because thou knewest not how the contribution paid by them goes to the help of the general system."<sup>1</sup>

The notion of those who thought that the gods might be rendered placable by sacrifices and vows is despatched in a few words. Any superintendent, who should be induced by a bribe to inflict the administration of justice, would commit a most obvious wickedness. But this is just the conduct, which this opinion imputes to the gods. Acting so they would act like dogs, who should take a portion of the wolves' plunder, and leave the flock to destruction, or like a pilot who should be led by libations and incense to overturn a vessel with its crew; or like a driver at the games, who should accept of a gift from the other party, and play the victory into his hands. The very idea is monstrous,

<sup>1</sup> A word or two on this passage. *Ei* before *ἄλλος ἀτυχῆς* is wanting in Eusebius, and therefore omitted by Ast and Stallbaum. The construction is certainly far easier without it. *Ἀτυχῆς* seems to denote infelicity of character. With *οὕτω μικρὸς ὢν*, and what follows, supply in thought *ὥστε ἀμεληθῆναι*. For *αὐτῶν τιμωρίαν* Ast reads after Eusebius *σαυτῶ τιμωρίαν*, but *αὐτῶν*, i. e. *θεῶν*, is preferable. *διὰ* in the two compound verbs denotes passage across, or over from the earth to Hades, etc.

and he who clings to such a doctrine deserves to be called of all impious persons the worst and the most impious.

These views are truly admirable, and occur, even more strikingly expressed, in the second book of the Republic. Had they been united with an understanding of what was meant by sacrifices and vows, of that acknowledgment of ill-desert or of dependence, that seeking for forgiveness or for aid, and that hope in the clemency or the benignity of God which these religious observances contain, Plato would have been as near to the Christian system as a large part of the Jewish people. But with all his penetration and moral feeling, he did not fully appreciate the efficacy of prayer, nor recognize a communion of the heart with God much beyond the contemplation of divine beauty and perfection, nor give the need of pardon and help their due place. Man was to become good by philosophy, and if bad, within the reach of cure, must suffer until his badness should be obliterated by suffering, which was the proper medicine of depravity.

The few closing pages of the tenth book contain the penal code for crimes against religious faith; and are of a nature, only not severe enough, to please the followers of St. Dominic.<sup>1</sup> The preceding discussion had brought a threefold division into crimes against the gods; and each sort of crimes may be again subdivided according as the person committing it had been led astray by error of judgment, being naturally mild and conscientious, or by the unbridled passions of an aspiring soul. A person of the first description must pass five years in the house of discipline, and then, if his error of judgment shall not have left him, suffer death; one of the other description must be committed for life to the central prison, and when he dies, have his body cast out beyond the bounds of the territory. And in order to suppress superstition and the impiety of those, who think that the deities may be propitiated by religious rites, it is ordained that no private religions shall be endured. Every person who wishes to sacrifice must go to the public priests who know what order and rules of purity such services require. They must lead in the prayers, and the sacrificer with such friends as may accompany him must follow their form.

These words give us no new legislation of Plato's own, but

<sup>1</sup> The following words sound like a regulation of the Spanish inquisition. 909. A, "During this time let no one of the citizens be with them except the members of the night-council, who are to converse with them for their admonition and the salvation of their souls."



are built on the general principles of the Greek States with regard to religious observances. It was a maxim that the state-religion was necessary to the safety of the State,—a maxim handed down from the old times, when faith was reposed in the protective gods, and not weakened in its force when the bad results of philosophical atheism upon the morals of young men were sufficiently tested. The Greeks allowed their comic poets to turn the gods into ridicule; and no wonder, for the epic poets had supplied the materials for that ridicule. But when a man came to the denial of the gods of his country he trod on dangerous ground. New gods might be introduced, but secrecy in religious rites was dreaded partly perhaps on superstitious grounds, but chiefly because the unions formed at mysteries or rites foreign of origin might be dangerous to the State. Plato however seems to have gone further than any State in seeking to abolish all private religious rites whatsoever.

In regard to the *text* of Mr. Lewis's work—which by the way is printed so far as we have noticed with great correctness—we quote the following words from his introduction. "We have followed [the text] of Bekker and Ast, who hardly differ at all either in words or punctuation. Wherever there has been a departure from them the reasons are assigned mainly in the shorter notes. The critical means within our power have been very limited, and we therefore in this department ask indulgence for any errors, which we have committed."

We believe that in Ast and Bekker, Mr. Lewis possesses the most important critical helps to be met with excepting the edition of Stallbaum. (Leipsic, 1821—5.) Of these editors Ast used the various readings of two manuscripts and had a pretty plentiful supply of his own conjectures always on hand; Bekker collated for the Laws seven manuscripts and has given the results with that usual brevity of his, which sometimes leads into doubt rather than certainty; and Stallbaum in a lucid manner gives the readings of as many more, some of which however were previously known. A number of passages seem to be restored to their integrity by this last editor, and his various readings are an important aid for one who would solve some of the problems which the bad text of the Laws presents.

The plan which Mr. Lewis pursues is this. After an introduction and a statement of the argument, the text appears accompanied by copious foot-notes, which take up about eighty pages; and then succeed extended notes and dissertations which fill about

three hundred pages more and relate to some of the principal points of Platonic philosophy and theology.

In the foot notes, which are occupied chiefly in illustrating and explaining the text, Mr. Lewis shows some of the best properties of an interpreter, such as the power of seizing upon the connection of thoughts and of unfolding it in clear language to the reader. Mr. Lewis loves Plato; and he loves him for his inculcation of moral truth and his believing spirit; and for these reasons he wishes to make his readers love him also. Hence he is neither a sleepy nor a merely philological interpreter. He finds a great deal of meaning in his author; more sometimes in words and phrases probably than Plato meant to convey; but it is better, if we may thus express ourselves, to repeat and make more intense every vibration of the original mind than only to give forth a weak and brief sound. The defects we have found in these notes are chiefly of a philological character. A number of difficulties and peculiarities of style are left untouched; some few speculations rest on questionable ground; and some explanations show a want of skill in developing the construction even when the general sense is well understood.

We add here some remarks which have occurred to us in examining a portion of Mr. Lewis's notes and those few of his Ex-cursuses which relate to his explanation of the text.

Page 14, end. 890. A.<sup>1</sup> "The article would seem to be required here before *ἐλκόντων*." "It seems to refer to *φασκόντων* above." The subject of *ἐλκόντων*, is not the same as that of *φασκόντων*, but it is either *young men* or a general word like *men* or *persons*, and therefore suppressed by good usage. It is not the sophists of whom *ἐλκόντων* is spoken, but their disciples, and this participle contains the cause of the seditions.

Page 16, line 12. 890. D. Mr. Lewis remarks that "there is a harshness here in consequence of the sudden change from the participle to the indicative mode *κέκτεται*. This however must be rendered as though it were *κεκτημένα*, if indeed this is not the true reading." As the manuscripts give no other reading, and as the supposed transition is known to the Greek writers, there is no reason for altering the text. But if we understand the passage, there is no transition here. The two predicates are *οὐ χαλαρά τέ ἐστι* and (*οὐ*) *κέκτεται*. The sense, which Ficinus, and still more Cousin seem to have misapprehended is this: "But if

<sup>1</sup> We have added the pages of Stephanus for the sake of readers who may wish to compare other editions.

thus addressed to masses of men, are they not difficult to follow, and do they not moreover possess enormous prolixity?" The answer of Clinias shows that hardness to be understood by the common man (*τῷ δυσμαθεῖ* there, *τοῖς ἀνθρώποις* above) and a long discussion are feared. Ast's version, therefore, otherwise good, of *ξυνακολουθεῖν λόγοις* *persequi oratione*, is inadmissible. That expression relates not to the difficulty which the legislator finds of expressing himself, but to the difficulty which the citizens find of following what he says.

Page 21, line 3. 892. D. "The common reading is *εἰ καθάπερ*. We have ventured to make the change [to *καθάπερ εἰ*] from the exigency of the place and on the authority of Stephanus." But Stephanus merely offered a conjecture, which the MSS. do not confirm. The exigency of the place requires *εἰ*, *whether*, after *σοπεῖτε*, as much as it does *εἰ, ἴφ*, before *ἔδει*. As the sentence is constructed, *καθάπερ* seems to embarrass it, but was inserted on account of the comparison, which is not fully expressed. The construction without *καθάπερ* is clear if *εἰ, ἴφ*, is supplied. "Think whether,—if we three had to cross a river—and I made a proposal,—I should seem to have reason in what I said." Does not *καθάπερ* imply something like this: "Think whether *I shall seem to have reason in what I say*, just as, if we had to cross a river, etc.—I should seem to have reason in what I said." The thought for which *καθάπερ* is inserted follows in the next words *καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν*, etc.

Page 26, 9. 894. C. *Τίνα προκρίναμεν*. The editor here says that "it is evident that *ἄν* should be supplied." As there are numerous examples of the optative in a simple interrogative sentence without *ἄν*, it is better to follow the MSS. See Hermann de particula *ἄν*, 3. § 5.

Page 30, 16. 896. B. We are unable to see any attraction in this passage, and cannot perceive the justice of the extended remarks upon it on page 203. *Πολλοστῆν* violates no grammatical construction, nor could any other form of expression stand as well in this place. If we just supply the nominative *πολλοστῆ* in thought, all will be clear. The word is to be taken twice; once in the relative clause, and once with *τοσοῦτων*, and in one or the other instance good usage would suppress it.

Page 40, 10. 999. B. Mr. Lewis prefers Böckh's emendation, *εἰθ'* for *εἰθ'* to Ast's *εἰσθ'*. But as *ὁμολογῶν* is found in five of Bekker's MSS., and three Florentine ones of Stallbaum, it is, we think, on the whole, to be preferred to *ὁμολογεῖ*, and then Ast's cor-

rection ἰσθ' follows by inevitable necessity. For the rest, ἰσθ' beginning a sudden interrogation, is quite as strong as the *stea* of indignant questioning.

Page 42, 13. 899. D. *Συγγένηα* here and p. 44, 8, is no doubt relationship. *Πρὸς τὸ σύμφυτον τιμῶν* cannot be to a natural honoring, but to honor something akin to you, or towards that which is akin to you, viz., to honor it.

Page 43, 6. 900. A. *Ἵσας*, inserted after *ταράττει τὰ νῦν*, on the authority of Eusebius and two Florence MSS. by Stallbaum, will bring order into this sentence. It is wordy and careless in its structure, like the talk of old men. To make two sentences of it, is to make Plato repeat the same identical thought, not by way of explanation, but as if he were saying something new. *Ἰδῶν* denotes observation in general, which is divided into that suggested by the reports of others (*ἢ αἰσθόμενος*) and that derived from one's own eyes. (*ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης*, etc.

Page 44, 2. 900. A. *Δῆλος εἰ μέμφεσθαι*. "A peculiar Graecism," says Mr. Lewis, "equivalent to *δῆλόν ἐστι σέ μέμφεσθαι*." But *δῆλος εἰ μέμφεσθαι* is not Greek. The construction is *δῆλος εἰ εὖν ἂν ἰθίλων μέμφεσθαι*. "It is clear that you cannot consent to blame."

Page 44, 8. 900. B. *Πᾶθος* cannot, we think, be in apposition with *τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα*, but, if a part of the text, must be taken with *ἐπὶ μείζον*. "In order that your present opinion may not grow into a more considerable or pronounced state of feeling leading to impiety."

Page 44, 9. We see no so very great strength of meaning in *ἀποδιοπομψήσασθαι*. It is found both before and after *καθήρασθαι*, as being nearly synonymous. It is used (Laws, 9. 877. E), in just the same way as *ἀφοσιώω* in Laws, 9. 873. B. 874. A. Its verbal is used by Phrynichus (p. 306. Lobeck) as the opposite of *φητίον*. The *metaphor*, however, as the word is here used, gives the passage an intensity of meaning.

Page 46, 14. 900. E. *Καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν*, etc. The editor justly finds fault with Ast's construction, but his own seems not to be unobjectionable. The sentence will have none of that complication which he gives it, if we take *προσήκειν* and *μετόν*, (i. e. *μετόν εἶναι*, comp. Soph. Electr. 469), as parallel, and supply *εσαυτῶν*, the antecedent of *ἔπειτα* with *τῶν*. *Τῶν* then refers to both *αἰσχροῖα* and *καλά*. "And we will affirm that of the things mentioned, so many as are bad pertain to us, if they do to anybody, but

that the gods have no share in any such things (i. e. *φλαύρων*) great or small."

Page 46, 5. It might be added in support of *συνεξετάζομεν*, that Eusebius has that reading. (Praepar. Evang. 12. 52.) But *συνεξετάζομαι*, which has the authority of the MSS. in its favor, can be borne with, if taken as a participle.

Page 48. 3. 901. A. The editor here supplies *θεός* as the subject. But against this there are serious objections. It is not in the near preceding context, and the author names *τόν γε θεόν* first a few lines below. But worse than this, it is unmeaning. The sense would be, "such a deity would be to us all, i. e. in our opinions, indolent, careless and lazy, etc." Such a deity as what? Either such a one as is indolent, careless and lazy, which is nonsense, or such a one as is vicious, which is not necessarily true. Apparently the text is imperfect. Ast supplies *μισητός*, and Ficinus may have found a similar word in his authorities, since his version is *odio nobis habetur*. But this does not explain the answer. Possibly the word of Hesiod, *νεμσητός*, with another reference to him, may be wanting after *ἡμῖν*. The sense is, "a person, if indolent, careless and lazy, one whom the poet declared to be just like dock-tailed drones, would be to all of us [an object of indignation, as he says]." To which Clinias replies in a common formula, "and very correctly too." To this the answer is, "then we must not say of God, at least, that he has a character of that very sort that he himself hates. The words *ἀντὸς μοῖσι* contain an allusion to Hesiod's words, *τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νεμσεῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες*; and *πᾶσις ἡμῖν*, if that, and not *πᾶς ἡμῖν*, be the true reading, alludes to *θεοὶ καὶ ἀνέρες* in the same passage.

Page 50. 3. 901. B. *Ποῖω δὴ*;—answer *λέγομεν*. Better as Eusebius has it, *ποῖω δὴ λέγομεν*;—answer *ἢ διαφέρων*, etc.

Page 52. 11. 902. A. The reading from Eusebius preferred by Ast and Stallbaum, *τοῦ γιγνώσκειν* instead of *τὸ γιγνώσκειν*, seems to suit the ensuing context best. The sense is, "what remains but the opposite of knowing," (i. e. not knowing that they ought to attend to *all* such things). With the vulgar text, which the editor retains, the sense is, "what remains but that they know the opposite;" and it must be confessed that a good sense can be derived from this reading.

Page 52, 13. 902. A. The construction of this sentence might be made clear by remarking that two forms of expression, both common after words of *saying*, are used together: *λέγοντα ὡς ἀνοοῦντας*, and *λέγοντα γιγνώσκοντας οὐ ποιεῖν*.

Page 53. 7. 902. B. We prefer *ὥσπερ* the vulgar reading, which Mr. L. retains, to *ὡσπερ*, Ast's and Stallbaum's reading, which is found in one MS., in the margin of another, and in the version of Ficinus. *Ὠσπερ* denotes merely comparison; *ὥσπερ* contains an argument from the greater *τὸν οὐρανόν*, to the less *τὰ θνητὰ ζῶα*.

Page 54. 6. 902. D. *ἰατρῶ δῆ*, etc. Mr. Lewis gives a far better construction to this sentence than Ast does. We are surprised that he can hesitate for a moment as to the question whether *προσεταιγμένον* can be ever used as an impersonal absolute.

Page 55. 11. 902. E. We see no use for the mark of a broken sentence at the close of this passage, and we doubt if the structure be anacoluthous, common as that structure is in these books of the Laws. Supply, if anything, not *εἶναι* but *ὄντα* with *φανλότερον*. In *τὸν δὲ θεόν, δὲ* has its usual place after a parenthesis, and may mark contrast likewise. The construction proceeds thus. "Let us not think that God, inferior to mortal workmen,—that God, I say, takes no care of things small, but [does take care] of the great." In this sentence *μᾶ τέχνη* is beautifully contrasted with *σοφώτατον*, the single art of human artists with the boundless wisdom of God.

Page 57, 2. 903. A. In separating *ὀρθῶς* from *μὴ λέγειν* and assigning it to another speaker, the editor is obliged to give to *μὴ λέγειν* the sense of "saying nothing to the purpose," which he affirms to be common in Greek. We wish that he had given one example, for although *μηδέν, οὐδέν, λέγειν* are often so used, we are not aware that the other formula occurs with this sense. *Ὁμολογεῖν μὴ λέγειν* can only mean, we believe, *to own that he does not talk, or to promise not to talk*. The same words with *ὀρθῶς* have the sense desired, viz. *to own that he is not right in what he says*.

Page 57, 10. 903. B. *συντεταγμένα* cannot mean, "so arranged as to cooperate with the universal guardian," but *arranged together in a system*.

Page 57, 14. 903. C. *ἀπεργασμένοι*. This word seems to us incapable of receiving the sense of *appointing* or *constituting* an officer, as Mr. Lewis understands it. But the meaning is not clear. If *τέλος* could denote *perfection* here, we might translate thus: "having brought about perfection even to the ultimate division, i. e. having carried perfection into things the most minute." Cousin's version is something like this.

Page 58. 6. 903. C. The reading of Eusebius, approved by Stephanus, Ast and Stallb. *πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ζυγνείων βέλτιστον*, *referring*

them, or making them all aim together at a common good, seems to us much better than the vulgar text, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυτταίνον βελτιστον, which the editor (on p. 291) prefers, and which has indeed the manuscripts in its favor. For besides the harshness of συτταίνων κοινῇ instead of εἰς, ἐπί, or πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, the highest good, which is aimed at and is only a result, is awkwardly said here to aim or tend. For the active use of συτταίω comp. Gorg. 507. D, Republic 591. C, ὁ γὰρ σοφὸν ἔχει πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ξυτταίνων βιώσεται.

Page 59. 7. 903. E. We think that the editor has well comprehended the scope of this difficult passage, in note 53—far better indeed than Cousin; yet there are several points in his explanation of it which do not satisfy us. We have strong doubts about ἔδαρ ἐμψύχον,—cooling water, not frozen, as he has it,—which is only an emendation of Cornarius. ἐμψυχον, animated, is favored by ἐμψύχονος πράξεις just below, and by 895. C (ἐὰν ἴδωμεν etc.). In his version of τῆς . . . κοσμησεως he neglects the article; nor is it possible to supply μετασχηματισματα here. To make sense as well as grammar we seem obliged, with Ast, to supply τὰ before τῆς, which had also occurred to the writer. The sense is, "the altered arrangements"—i. e. the changes of arrangements—"would be endlessly numerous."

Page 60. 6. 904. B. Ἄγαθόν after ἀφελείν deserves to be expunged, as wanting in four Florence MSS. and in Eusebius; and as hurting the sense, which is "and that whatever good there is pertaining to the soul naturally tends to benefit, and evil to injure."

Page 61. 8. 904. B. We like the view given in note 57 that σμικρότερα τῶν ἡθῶν is contrasted with μείζων δὲ δὴ ψυχῆ, and that πλείω δὲ is a subordinate member of the first clause. This had also occurred to the writer. But the words μείζων, μεταλάβη, have scarcely a shadow of manuscript authority and must give way to μείζω, μεταβάλη. The meaning however will not then be essentially altered. The principal divisions of the sentence still begin with 1. smaller traits of character when they change less, and when they change more and for the worse; 2. when the soul undergoes greater changes, i. e. when its leading or larger traits of character are altered. In the latter part of the passage, the mention of some better place immediately after that of a "place surpassingly excellent and altogether holy," together with the use of the aorist μετακομισθεῖσα are difficulties which trouble us, and which the editor does not remove. As for the rest, Mr. Lewis

will compare very advantageously with Cousin in translating this intricate passage.

Note 4, p. 99. Mr. Lewis thinks that *οἱ παλαιότεροι* (on page 5, 886. C) must refer to some productions older than the *Iliad* and the *Theogony*, probably to the Orphic poems. But as the words mean nothing more than the oldest of the poets and prose writers mentioned; and as Plato proceeds to speak of compositions to which the *Theogony* exactly answers, this interpretation is needless. Whether the Orphic forgeries were received by Plato as genuine or not, cannot be determined from the slight reference to them in his works. Nor would his opinion weigh much on a matter of historical criticism against that of Herodotus, Aristotle and a host of others, who brand these productions as impostures of the Pythagoreans. But if the *Theogony* of Orpheus were genuine, it cannot be made out that the hymns were known before the second century of our era. These remarkable poems seem to have grown like the epistles of Ignatius, until the worthy old Thracian became something of a Neoplatonist.

Page 118. "The Athenian [speaker in the *Laws*] who undoubtedly represents Socrates." We cannot agree with this. The Athenian in the *Laws* is quite an abstraction without that playful irony and many of those delicate traits, which are so delightful in the Platonic Socrates. The scene moreover is laid in Crete, where Socrates, according to dramatic propriety, should not be. Perhaps the absence of the conception of his master from this work will account for its inferiority, in form and life, to the other Platonic dialogues. The soul of Plato's world is here wanting, notwithstanding the extreme weight and importance of the subject-matter.

Page 262. The speculations here pursued at length "on the peculiarities of certain negative forms of Greek verbs," seem to be unnecessary, when one considers, 1. that such verbs are not derived from the primitives directly, but in the third degree, *through* or *as if from* some privative adjective, of which the derived verb expresses the meaning in the active,—the appropriate voice,—as *ἀμελέω* of *ἀμελής*. 2. That this is true of all composition except with prepositions, as well with *ἐν* or *πολύ*, as with *ἀ* or *δυσ*. There are a few middle forms commencing with the privative *ἀ*, and as many with *ἐν*. For the middle of the primitives, when they are found, there is a good reason in each case.

Page 302. *αἰὼν* is here derived, after Aristotle, from *αἰεῖ ὄν*, and *αἰεῖ* "from *αἶω*, *αἶω* or *ἄημι* signifying primarily *to blow*, *to breathe*,



secondly to live, to pass or spend one's time. *ἄω* seems also to be related to *αἴω*, to feel life, to be conscious, from whence some would derive *αἰών* in the general sense of existence. Homer uses *ἄω* or *αἴω* in the second of the above meanings, as in the *Odyssey* 3. 151 and 490. Because this verb is thus used in several places of the *Odyssey*, in connection with *νόξ*, some lexicographers absurdly render it to sleep. It is however only thus employed because by night the flow or succession of time becomes a matter of distinct observation and consciousness more than by day. Hence, as the context shows, it is generally used of wakeful and anxious nights." One is tempted to regard these remarks as a bit of pleasant irony against the philologists, like the Platonic *Cratylus*. As however some may think that the author is in earnest, we will just remark that the derivation of *αἰών* given above, seems to be forbidden, among other reasons, by the laws of formation within the Greek, which would require the *τ* of *αἰών* to be retained, and by the cognate languages which have the same root in a simpler form, showing *ων* to be a mere ending; (*aerum*, in Latin, for instance; *ewa*, in High German,) that *ἄω* never means to live, to pass or spend time; that the *αἴω* referred to and occurring once in Homer, (*Iliad* 15. 252,) means probably to breathe, breathe out; that so respectable a critic as Buttmann, in his *Lexilogus*, (No. 67,) gives *ἄσσαν* the sense of *schlafen*; and that though *αἴω* probably means no more than to rest at night, or pass the night resting, yet of the seven passages where it occurs, in two only can wakeful nights be thought of. In *Odys.* 16. 367 it is used where resting by night ashore is opposed to sailing until morning, and in *Apol. Rhod.* 4. 884, it is found in a most general description of going to bed: *τῆς ἐνι* (i. e. in their ground-beds) *δαισάμενοι νόξ' ἄσαν ὡς τοπαροῖθεν*. It is a cognate of *ἰάω*, which occurs (*Odys.* 19. 340) in the expression *ἀύπνοος νόκτας ἰανος*, and yet in *ἠήρετον ἕπρος ἰάεις, ὕστατος ἕπρος ἰάουσης* (*Hymn. in Ven.* 177, in *Merc.* 289). Even *εὔδω* is used of simple rest without sleep in *Odys.* 15. 5. These are small matters, and it is irksome to dwell upon them; but Plato teaches us, in the text which Mr. Lewis has edited, that the great cannot exist without the small, and that large stones, according to the masons, do not lie well in their places without little ones.

The greater part of the work before us is taken up with remarks, suggested by Plato's text, but pursued to a length and branching off into topics which required another place besides the foot of the page. If any person on first noticing the great

extent of these remarks should think that they were irrelevant, he would find himself much deceived: they grow, to a considerable degree, naturally out of the text; they tend to make it intelligible; and the reader who is fond of Plato will find them none too long. These discussions chiefly aim at a comparison between the Scriptures and Plato; at illustrating portions of his philosophy; and at applying his views to the correction of some wrong principles and modes of thinking, which are supposed to prevail in the present age.

There must ever be points, in which moral systems, the most remote as to the place, time and manner of their origin, resemble one another. But the resemblance between the Scriptures and the works of Plato has seemed to multitudes, since the origin of Christianity, to be of an intimate kind: otherwise Plato would not have been supposed to borrow from the Old Testament, and such devout minds as Marsilius Ficinus and Henry More would not have felt a powerful attraction towards the Athenian philosopher. Nor is the resemblance hard to be accounted for, though we reject the notion that Plato visited our fountains. For besides his near connection with Socrates, his own mind, in which were united imaginativeness, quick moral susceptibilities, logical power, and philosophical intuition, was preëminently fitted to see and receive that part of religious truth, which lies open to the reason of mankind.

But in drawing such a parallel a writer is in danger of being partial and one-sided. If it is our professed object to find points of union between two favorite authors, we have a double liability to be warped in our judgments. We cannot bear to think that the differences between those whom we love are great, and we wish to make out our point as well as we can. And in the same way those who aim exclusively at unfolding the differences between two authors, one of whom perhaps they dislike or are afraid of, are apt to place them at a far wider distance from one another than the truth will warrant. In all such cases some of the following considerations ought to be borne in mind.

In the first place, it is very plain that the true relations of two authors or of two systems are not known until we know both wherein they agree and wherein they differ. Thus for instance, if we are told that the supreme God of Plato is a being of boundless perfections who exercises a watchful providence over men; that human nature is felt by Plato to be in disorder and that the great aim of his philosophy is to restore and purify it; that for

the purpose of renovating it, he would raise up a body of good men and found a State on better principles; that he had a believing spirit and a reverence for the old and the traditional; that he held to something like a divine influence on the minds of certain men;—when we hear of these and many such things, which are in harmony with the Scriptures, we must be gratified, we must admire, we may feel that such accordance is to be explained only on the ground that both systems are rooted in the truth: but then to judge of the relations of the two we must take into account likewise that Plato's God is somewhat too lofty for human nature to behold, although probably not a *creator*; and is separated practically from us by mediating intelligences also called gods; that Plato held to the existence of a soul of the world, and of human souls formed before the formation of material things and passing through a multitude of bodies; that man being evil only through ignorance and bad circumstances, he would restore him to goodness by intellectual means, and by outward institutions in which the virtue of the mass would be little more than civic; that he could allow of deception, and conceive without disapproval even of the family state being destroyed; that he judged the improvement of the individual to be the chief foundation of punishment:—at these and many unchristian or not Christian things must we look,—to say nothing of the truths of positive revelation such as the object of the death of Christ,—in order to strike the balance in our judgment as to how near Plato approaches to the Scriptures. If when we first looked only at the beautiful and bright parts of that philosophy which arose in “the olive grove of Academe,” we thought that

“ that bright tower all built of christal clean  
*Panthea*, seemed the brightest thing that was”

when we look again after the comparison we shall say

“ But now by prooffe all otherwise I ween :  
 For *this* bright city that does far surpass  
 And *this* bright angel's tower quite dims that tower of glass.”

We do not intend by these remarks to accuse Mr. Lewis of throwing out of view the differences between Plato and the Bible. This is by no means the case. We refer the reader to the note “on the defect of Plato's theology in regard to the doctrine of atonement and the necessity of an expiation”, and to the remarks on his Pelagian views of human nature, for the proof that Mr. Lewis is alive to such differences even in very important

points. But what we mean to say is this : that when a man sets out with the object of finding parallels between a favorite heathen author and the Scriptures, he necessarily conveys to the reader false ideas of the relations between the objects compared,<sup>1</sup> if he does not change those relations by putting a higher sense upon the heathen author than his words will warrant.

In the next place, in the very points where two authors or systems resemble one another there may be found great practical differences between them ; as great indeed as between glass and diamond. When the witch in Spenser creates a perfect counterfeit of the fair Florimel, all the knights are deceived and put upon a wrong pursuit ; but the substance of the false lady " was purest snow in glassy mould congealed," and a " wicked spright" took the place of a soul.

As an example of this let us take Plato's soul of the world, which has been compared to a divine providence. The first from under which this tenet appeared in Greece seems to have been that of a general vital energy running through all things, acting not according to the designs of intelligence but according to certain necessary laws. This view of a part of the Ionic school, was received by the Pythagoreans, if we have a right impression of the matter ; but in a greatly modified form. In their hands this vital energy became a divine intelligence controlling all things, which dwelt in the centre of the universe and from which human souls were emanations. So far God and the world were confounded or united together ; but by and by Anaxagoras with his doctrine of a divine mind, separate from the world, and introducing order and harmony, made a new era in philosophy. The doctrine of Anaxagoras had a considerable influence upon the opinions of the Socratic school ; but the doctrines of the Pythagoreans also helped to shape the system of Plato, and it seems to have been from these two sources that he derived the dogma of a supreme divine intelligence on the one hand, and the soul of the world on the other. Now what is there here really resem-

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<sup>1</sup> Comp. Note 60, where Mr. Lewis shows " that many of Plato's thoughts are capable of being fairly accommodated to a spiritual sense higher than the author himself had intended to convey," and closes with advising preachers " to read the Bible in close connection with our philosopher and they will understand Plato better than he understood himself." If this is anything more than a strong expression of enthusiastic admiration, it puts an " elasticity" of import into Plato, something like that which certain writers have given to the word of God to make it suit their theories.

bling the Christian providence. If he conceived of a God exercising providence over his works, as far as that doctrine of providence was concerned, the soul of the world was superfluous. If he did not, he separated providence from God and gave it to another being. If man could be brought to believe in a soul of the world, ever present and intelligent and perfectly good yet distinct from God, it is plain that such a belief would practically thrust God out of the world by bringing something divine between men and him. It is worthy of remark that this soul of the world is made little of in the Platonic system, great as was the part which it played in the system of the Pythagorizing Neo-platonists.

So, too, the State of Plato has been compared to the Christian church; and there are, certainly, points of resemblance between them. Both are unities in which each member performing his right part, lives for all. Both have a class of guardians selected for their fitness to perform the office, and educated in the study of truth and of God. But how great the difference. In the one, men are to be made good by the study of wisdom. In the other, doing the will of God and doing good, are the key to wisdom itself. In the one, the common people are to obey and mind their business; and hence this system is praised the most loudly by those who would have the private Christian believe on authority and submit implicitly to his priest. In the other, there is no common people. All Christians belong to the aristocracy, for they are kings and priests unto God. In the one, destruction is necessary according to some fatal law. In the other, perpetual progress ends in the heavenly state. The one must have a certain form, that it may begin its activity: it is the product of reforming philosophy. The other is a vital energy: it is leaven, that penetrates into all forms of government and all states of society.

Perhaps nothing in Plato is more noble and scriptural than his idea of loving God, expressed in the *Symposium* and elsewhere, and the confidence that God will always help the good man, which he manifests towards the close of the *Republic*. In this latter passage he almost falls into the same language with St. Paul: "We must conceive this of the righteous man, whether he is afflicted with poverty or disease or any other seeming evil, that all will at last turn into good, either in this life or after he is dead. For surely *he* is never neglected by the gods, who zealously seeks to become righteous, and who desires, by studying virtue, as far as it is possible for man, to be assimilated to God." We admire

and revere the mind in which such thoughts could dwell. But when we consider that the love of God is the love of the beautiful and the good, as showing itself in the contemplations of theoretical philosophy; and that Plato's righteous man is not so much one whose transgressions are forgiven, whose sin is covered, as one who by studying truth has purified himself into virtue; we compare such philosophy to the 'cold flame' of which Pindar speaks, and would prize it, with all its beauties and glories, below one confession of sin or one prayer for divine aid.

A number of the Excursuses are principally taken up with illustrating portions of the Platonic philosophy. The method of explaining any system of dogmas by means of notes, has in it this necessary imperfection: that some parts of the system must be omitted because they are not alluded to in the text, and that thus, the connection being lost, the other parts cannot be understood in their true relations. Perhaps, however, no portion of Plato's works, so small in extent, suggests a greater number of references to his system, than this which Mr. Lewis has edited. There is also this advantage attending the method here pursued: those who study the text will find it necessary to read the remarks in these longer notes, in order to gain full possession of the meaning. They will thus reach a certain point of knowledge which will be far from contenting them; and having the appetite sharpened to know more of a philosophy which appears in specimens as one of surpassing beauty, will not rest until they find out what that philosophy is as a whole, and in a methodical arrangement. We trust that the present editor, after awakening that spirit of inquiry, will take measures to satisfy it. If he pursues the plan mentioned in the introduction, of editing another of Plato's dialogues with an accompaniment of remarks on the doctrine of ideas, it will be no doubt of great service to inquirers in this branch; but, if we may offer our advice, a better course still would be to give to the public Plato's views in a scientific form and with the requisite proof-passages.

Mr. Lewis shows in his remarks a great familiarity with the works of Plato, a fearless independence in ascertaining for himself what are the doctrines of the philosopher, and a most ardent attachment, involving some partizanship, to the leading features of the system. He unfolds his views with great ability, and not without much reflection. The present work is to be regarded as the result of long examination untrammelled by authorities, and the expression of mature judgment. Mr. Lewis seems to possess

a highly philosophical mind, in which the moral element is duly combined with the metaphysical. To physical inquiries he seems averse, and looks on them with suspicion as beginning or ending in atheism. But a system like that of Plato, in which God and the good are the end of science, and which places the ethical in a far higher rank than that science occupies which has to do with phenomena, has high claims for him, and finds in him a congenial mind. As specimens of the ability of Mr. Lewis to handle the Platonic philosophy, and of his peculiar manner, we recommend to the notice of our readers the remarks on the doctrine of the four elements; on the philosophical use of *εἶμι* and *γίγνομαι*; on the question, do all things flow; on the Platonic doctrine of the evil principle, especially those on *ἀνάγκη* at the end of note 31; and of a moral sort those upon *ἀνδρεία*, and the four cardinal virtues. The most prominent faults we have noticed are a desire to make that absolute which is in its own nature relative, and a disposition to speak with too much severity or contempt of those who differ from Plato or from himself. Thus on page 167, we find the following strange remark. "The velocity of the hour-hand of a watch, that revolves once in twenty-four hours, is the same as that of the earth on its axis." But this is changing the definition of velocity. Everybody knows that such an hour-hand would describe the same arc in the same time with the earth. But that is not, according to the acceptation of that term, velocity. The end of the hour-hand has one velocity; and any other point in its length another. So, too, in regard to *αἰών* and time, (No. 55,) there is truth in the representation that "God fills his own eternal now," but yet we are compelled to believe that in the view of God's mind, the death of Christ took place before his resurrection, and that the fulfilment of the promise to Abraham was posterior to the promise itself. On page 165, Mr. Lewis says, that "Playfair and others seem to have greatly bungled in their efforts to amend by substituting a far more complex idea for this old and perfect definition of Euclid" [of a straight line]. But the mathematicians will tell us, that Playfair gave a new definition because Euclid's could not be made the basis of mathematical reasoning. Nothing can be deduced from it, they say, and Euclid deserted it himself, when it came to be applied. Mr. Lewis is particularly hard upon Aristotle. There is an old Platonist who says, that "of all who differ from Plato, the Peripatetic differs the most." The one he compares with an animal of the earth, the other with a bird of heaven (Euseb. *Præpar. Evang.* 15. 4). And thus the Academy

has always looked with contempt or dislike upon the Lyceum. But Mr. Lewis is in some respects severer yet. He says (note 26), that "Aristotle was never careful to do Plato justice; although it would be easy to show—the modern declamation to the contrary notwithstanding—that their philosophy was substantially the same; the main difference arising from the Stagirite's studious care to adopt, in many cases, a different phraseology, for the purpose of creating the appearance of a wider disagreement than really exists, and from his continual disposition to pervert and distort Plato's real meaning. His misrepresentation here, whether wilful or not, arises," etc. And a little below, "We have likewise an example of the gross manner in which Aristotle misstates Plato in another assertion." "One cause of Aristotle's misconception may have been his own unsound definition of motion." We had supposed, in reliance on the word of Aristotle himself,<sup>1</sup> that he thought there was a difference between himself and Plato on so important a matter as the doctrine of ideas, and that he regarded Plato as one for whom he felt a friendship. If misconception, then, really existed, we should deem it involuntary, arising from the different structure of his mind, and his different principles of thinking. But no. His system, it seems, was about the same as Plato's, and to produce the appearance of a difference he changed his own terms and perverted Plato's meaning. Surely a judgment of this kind is a harsh one towards the dead or the living.

We subjoin a few miscellaneous observations that have occurred to us in reading the notes. On page 108, it is stated that the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras "was only another name for the physical truth of things in which the Atheist contends there may be science on his hypothesis, as well as on any other.—It might be regarded as the instinct of the universe working in the great whole." Final causes "were studiously excluded from his philosophy."—"He seems to have been a regular priest and poet hater." There is, we think, some injustice done here to Anaxagoras and his merits as a philosopher. As for final causes, no one of his school or his time thought of them. The problem to be solved was a physical one. He was as far then from studiously excluding moral causes as the people of the fourteenth century were from excluding America from their thoughts. Anaxagoras, we grant, conceived of a *νοῦς*, limited in its agencies, and of materials in which all the future properties of things lay, and speculating as a physical philosopher, it is not likely that he thought much about the moral attri-

<sup>1</sup> Eth. Nicom. 1. 6.



butes of his supreme intelligence. But he ought to be gratefully remembered who separated *σοῦς* from all things else,—a separation, perhaps, without which neither Socrates nor Plato could have been what they were. When he put an end to the reign of chance and of necessity, when he introduced a mind possessed of the knowledge of past and future, and standing apart from the materials to be reduced into shape and order,<sup>1</sup> he brought one element into Greek philosophy, which was of unspeakable importance—the rudiments of a doctrine of a divine soul distinct from the world, and of a point of time when that soul brought all things into order and beauty.—That the friend of Euripides hated poets needs evidence.

Page 124. We had thought that in the lines of Prometheus,

ὦ πάντων  
Αἰθήρ κοινὸν φῶς εἰλίσσων,

(v. 1090,) there was allusion to nothing more than the revolution of the sun in the sky; but Mr. Lewis thinks that “the poet clearly regards it [the aether] as the source of vision, and seems to have held respecting it something like the modern undulating theory of light. At least we can make no other sense of *εἰλίσσων*, which in connection with *αἰθήρ* and *φῶς* suggests at once to the mind that waving or enlarging spiral motion, which the air undergoes in the propagation of sound; and which, in the theory referred to, is supposed to take place in that universal fluid, whose vibrations or undulations give rise to the phenomena of vision.” If this be so, the naturalists would do well to study the old poets, for no doubt something not yet known may be elicited from them. But what shall we say to the sun,

Θοαῖς Ἰπποισιν εἰλίσσων φλόγα—(Eurip. Phoeniss. 3.)

or to Artemis, as the moon-goddess,

Τὸ λαμπρὸν εἰλίσσουσ' ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φῶς—(id. Iph. in Aul. 1571),

or to Ares as a planet,

παραγία κύκλον εἰλίσσων  
Αἰθέρος ἐπταπύρους ἐν τεύρεσι.—(Hom. Hymn. in Mart. 6.)

On page 175, amid some valuable remarks on the very important distinction between *εἶμι* and *γίγνομαι* in their strict philosophical use, (which is however, as might be expected, not always strictly observed just as in the case of *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος*,) we read the follow-

<sup>1</sup> See especially the eighth frag. in Schaubach's Collection, and comp. Ritter. Gesch. der Phil. 1. 311 seq.

ing: "Even the etymological origin of these two verbs may, without any extravagance of fancy, be supposed to betoken the vast difference between them. The primary elements of the one (*εω, ε, ει*), are found in the most aethereal of vowels. The other (*γασ, γ*) has for its ultimate radical the hardest, and we might almost say, the most earthly of the guttural mutes." Unfortunately for this theory the radical part of *εἶμι* is *ε̄σ*, so that the Doric *ἔσω*, and *essentia*, with the serpent's hiss contained in them, represent the root better than *εἶμι* itself, and far better than *οὐσία*, which have felt the influence that sweeps over generated things, and been departing from their primitive type since the earliest times, so that the noun has lost all vestige of the radical syllable. Nay it is more than probable that the vowel itself was originally *α*. And is not the name of *ideas* themselves derived from an act of one of the senses? Is not *γέρος*, which is now and then a synonym of *εἶδος* (comp. Sophista 253. B) from this very root which is allied to all instability? We should hardly have noticed this, were it not a sample of a number of instances in which the author, led astray by perverted ingenuity, has disregarded facts and looked beyond what lay at his feet in search of something more profound.

On page 234 the editor says, "We have every reason to believe that Plato meant no more by his soul of the world whether in respect to the universe or to its particular parts than Cudworth intends by his famous plastic nature, to which in some places he seems inclined to ascribe a species of obscure animate existence." But we need an explanation how this is consistent with passages in Plato in regard to the soul of the world with which the editor is familiar. In *Politicus* (269. D, a passage once before cited) it is called an animated thing and endowed with *φρόνησις* by its framer, (*ζῶον δὲ καὶ φρόνησιν εἰληχὸς ἐκ τοῦ συναρμόσαστος*), and in *Timaeus* we find it said that the world was composed by uniting reason to soul and soul to body, (30. B).

On page 236, the editor quotes a passage from the *Troades* of Euripides, (890 seq.) beginning *ὦ γῆς ὄχημα καὶ πῖ γῆς ἔχων ἔδραν*, with the remark that he does not "know which to admire most, the philosophy or the poetical beauty of these remarkable lines." The last part of the verse is applicable, he thinks, only to "a soul which, although pervading, is also at the same time above and distinct from the world or universe which it moves; for *γῆ* here is evidently to be taken in this large sense." But what authority is there for giving this latitude of meaning to *γῆ*? The line we

have quoted is understood by the writer of the scholia first made known in 1821 to refer to the *aether*; and so, Forster on *Phaedo*, (p. 390) and Valckenaer had already interpreted it. Although we will not affirm that this is the sense, (and to do so would be the more dangerous on account of the loose and unsettled nature of the poet's views,) yet it well accords with another passage from a lost play of Euripides, which runs as follows: "Thou seest that boundless aether which on high, with humid arms embraces earth around, *τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τὸνδ' ἡγοῦ θεόν.*" In the third line—*Ζεὺς, εἰτ' ἀνάγκη φύσος, εἰτε νοῦς βροτῶν*,—if the latter part means *reason such as man's*, something irrational was contemplated by the first clause, so that the poet seems to be at a loss whether a blind law or reason guided the world.

On page 253, the author thinks that when the goodness of the gods is spoken of (p. 51, 901. D, *ἀγαθοὺς τε καὶ ἀρίστον ὁμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πέντε ὄντες*,) the appeal is made to the moral sense. "Plato," says he, "does not hesitate to appeal here to the consciences even of his supposed opponents, and therefore he says *πέντε ὄντες*, *all five of us*, namely the three parties to the dialogue and the two imaginary disputants who speculatively deny a providence." But it is clear, we think, that there is no reference to the intuitions of the moral sense whatever. The imaginary opponents are supposed to have been present during the former argument, and to have been forced by Plato's logic (see p. 34,) to admit that a good soul governed the universe.

We will only add one remark on the meaning of the phrase *καθ' ἕπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί*, (p. 60. 904. A,) in which the editor translates *κατὰ νόμον* by "according to the decree of fate (*fatum*) on which their existence depended." In this he follows Ast, and with that editor defends his version by *κατὰ τὴν τῆς σίμαρμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον*. (p. 61, 7. 904. C.) Ficinus seems to have been troubled by the place; since his rendering "*neque tamen aeternum esse, qua lege Dii sunt*," departs widely from the sense of the text; and yet mention is made of no variant in the MSS. Cousin's French is "*comme les vrais dieux*," as if there had been no *κατὰ νόμον* in the passage. If we are not deceived, the meaning is nothing more than *the gods who are pronounced by law to be such, the established objects of worship*, i. e. *τοιούτοι θεοὶ οἷους φησὶν ὁ νόμος*. (See p. 15. 9. 890. B.) How *νόμος* even in the singular without some restricting word can be understood of a *fatal necessity*, or of a *law of their nature as originally given them*, we do not see. The view of Mr. Lewis in opposition to that of

other interpreters that *καθάπερ* in this passage relates not merely to *οὐκ αἰώνιον*, but to *ἀνόλεθρον δὲ . . . ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον*, when taken in connection with the passage of Timæus which he cites, is very ingenious, and deserves most respectful consideration.

It is an object which Mr. Lewis has much at heart in these excursions, to correct some false views and oppose certain wrong tendencies which seem to him to be prevalent in our day. On this subject he speaks as follows, in the Introduction.

"We believe that in this age there is a peculiar call for a deeper knowledge of Plato. Some acquaintance with his doctrine of ideas seems needed as a corrective to the tendency, so widely prevalent, to resolve all knowledge into an experimental induction of facts, not only in physical, but also in ethical and political science. 'If the Good, to adopt our author's own style, is something more than pleasure or happiness, either present or anticipated—if the True is something higher than past, present or future facts—if the Beautiful is something more than a generalization from pleasing individual sensations—if the Just and the Right involve inquiries far above those endless logomachies, and questions of casuistry, which form the main features of modern ethics—if the State is a reality transcending a present aggregation of flowing and perishing individuals—if Law is a spiritual power distinct from the muscular force of a majority of present wills—if God is something more than gravitation, or the eternal development of a physical fate, which is only another name for an eternal succession of inexplicable phenomena—if there is a real foundation for the moral and religious, as distinct from, and not embraced in, the *natural*, or, in other words, if penalty and retribution are terms of far more solemn import than the modern jargon about physical consequences—then surely it is high time that there should be some disturbance of this placid taking for granted of the opposing views; then surely should Plato be studied, if for no other purpose, as a matter of curiosity, to see if there may not possibly be some other philosophy than this noisy Baconianism, about which there is kept up such an everlasting din, or that still more noisy, because more empty, transcendentalism, which some would present as its only antidote. In place of all this, we want the clear, simple, *common sense* philosophy of Plato, commending itself, when rightly understood, to all the *κοινὰί ἔγνοιαι*, or universal ideas of the race, in distinction from that miscalled common sense which is only the manufactured public opinion of the moment—a philosophy most religious—most speculative, and yet most practical—most childlike in its primeval simplicity, and yet most profound."

And after a few words he speaks in these terms of the tendency towards atheism in the present age.

"He who thinks most deeply, and has the most intimate acquaintance with human nature, as exhibited in his own heart, will be the most apt to resolve all unbelief into Atheism. Especially will this be the case at a

time when physical science, in league with a subtle pantheism, is everywhere substituting its jargon of laws, and elements, and nebular star-dust, and vital forces, and magnetic fluids, for the recognition of a personal God, and an ever wakeful, ever energizing special providence. Theism, we admit, is everywhere the avowed creed, but it wants life. It is too much of a mere philosophy." — "We want vividness given to the great idea of God as a judge, a moral governor, a special superintendent of the world and all its movements, the head of a moral system, to which the machinery of natural laws serves but as the temporary scaffolding, to be continued, changed, replaced, or finally removed, when the great ends for which alone it was designed, shall have been accomplished. Just as such an idea of God is strong and clear, so will be a conviction of sin, so will be a sense of the need of expiation, so will be a belief in a personal Redeemer, and so will follow in its train an assurance of all the solemn verities of the Christian faith, so strong and deep, that no boastful pretension of that science which makes the natural the foundation of the moral, and no stumbling-blocks in the letter of the Bible will for a moment yield it any disquietude. There is a want of such a faith, as is shown by the feverish anxiety in respect to the discoveries of science, and the results of the agitations of the social and political world. This timid unbelief, when called by its true name, is Atheism."

It is a noble aim to seek to reform the errors of our time; and the aim is the nobler, the more vital these errors. The means too by which the bad tendencies of the reigning philosophy are to be met and checked, have something lofty in their nature. They are the inculcation of that philosophy which rises above sense, and fixes its eye on immutable verities; which sees the masses of generated things perish and assume new forms beneath its feet, while above it lie the pure region of moral truth and the throne of infinite goodness. This philosophy too claims to be more nearly allied to Christian truth than any other, and doubtless such a claim must be allowed to it, at least before every ancient system; since it actually led numbers into Christianity in the first ages, and held in common with Christianity the doctrines that the soul is immortal, and that there exists a God of boundless perfections, who is the highest object of science. These and other elevating truths were the means by which many were called away from a direct contact with the corruption of the early centuries, and put in training for admission into a higher school. There is no doubt, moreover, that the study of Plato, by its *unmaterializing* influence would have a most desirable effect upon our own age and country. And if we descend from the essence of the Platonic philosophy to the form and manner in which it is conveyed to us, the advantage to the taste, of reading such ex-

quisite productions as many of the dialogues and more particularly the Republic, is a good of no small value. The moral traits too of the Platonic Socrates, his humility of judgment, his gentleness and good nature, his constant desire to know the truth, his superiority to show and pretence, tend to make one not only love him, but love and wish to have the character which is so attractive in him. For these among other reasons we are advocates for the study of Plato, and believers in its happy results.

But those who are smitten with the beauties of Plato ought ever to remember that his was a system imperfect and limited, necessarily one-sided, sometimes chiming in and sometimes making discord with Christian truth. We have already spoken on a part of this subject. We will here add, before closing, a thought or two on certain tendencies which ought to be taken into view in connection with the admiration which we may be disposed to feel for the great Athenian philosopher.

And first Platonism in some degree unfits its adherents for active life. It is the glory of Christianity that it leads men to *do* something, that it carries them out of themselves in labors for God and mankind. There have been all over the world, for ages, theosophies, which have aimed to bring the soul to God by begetting internal purity through the contemplation of virtue. But they could neither operate effectually on mankind, nor have they done much to their votaries besides shutting them up in the solitude of their own thoughts. Platonism, in common with all these systems, puts the contemplative before the active, gnosis before love. Its idealism separates its adherents from the mass of men, and inclines them to complain of the present. Hence its audiences have ever been few, especially among those practical nations which have had the most influence on the destinies of mankind. Now it may be asked, granting that all this is true, is it not desirable to have an antidote to the excessively practical spirit of the present day, which runs forward into action before it has any capital-stock of principles to sustain it. We admit that such an antidote is desirable; but there is danger, too, that the antidote will become the only food of those who use it. The mischief is, that we are likely to have one-sided practical men, or one-sided men of the Platonic sort; men who, like Plato himself, have more faculty of seeing the evils of society, than of mingling with and improving it.

The only other remark we will make is, that physical science is a most important handmaid even to religious truth, and that there is danger of its being undervalued. Socrates began a new

impulse in philosophy by turning his attention away from physical science to the study of the human mind. This new direction was of inestimable service to science; but it seems as if a certain narrowness was imparted by it to the Platonic school, which has ever adhered to that body. Few, we believe, are the names and small the success of natural philosophers belonging to the Academy. They have usually looked on the study with dread or contempt, either as leading to atheism or as employed about transitory and particular things. But here again the one-sided tendency is unfortunate. At least it may well be doubted whether physics and metaphysics can be understood fully when disconnected, and whether the observation of events and of nature is not as essential even to a true theology as the intuitions of reason. Is not every general process in nature a contribution to our knowledge of God? Could the essential excellence of justice convince us that God was just, if we did not discover here on earth precisely such a system of imperfect justice, as is possible in a probationary state? Is not the fact open to our observation that "the earth is full of the goodness of the Lord" as necessary to satisfy our minds as are the original convictions of our reason upon that subject?

But it is said there is a decay of faith at the present age. The leaning is towards materialism. There may be truth in this, but we may doubt whether the cry on this subject is not too loud, as long as we see the numbers of devout naturalists who flourish in these times, and especially as long as we see that it is a most religious age, full of hope and full of effort for the spread of Christianity. This certainly does not look like the increase of atheism and unbelief.

We would wish then to see a milder spirit than many now exhibit, shown towards the reigning philosophy. It has made known a multitude of particulars calculated to throw light on the wisdom of God, and to fill the mind with wonder and reverence. It is an humble philosophy: so far from boasting that it has opened the inner chambers of nature, it only claims to have just reached the threshold. If charged with not having the nature of true science, which is concerned with the absolute and the invariable, it quietly replies, that however that may be, it has treasured up a store of facts and of laws, if they may be called so, for future generations and younger philosophies to use. If accused of being noisy, it may urge that however loudly its achievements may be talked of, it is not noisy in its own nature. Its path is along the still valley and on the hills, where the solitary flower and the lonely

crystal have their abode; its communion is with the silent stars; it evaporates its liquids, and analyses its compounds in noiseless experiments. It may have tendencies which need to be resisted, but it is nevertheless not to be despised as a helper in acquainting us with God.

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## ARTICLE VI

### ROMAN SLAVERY.

Translated from the German of Dr. W. A. Becker, Professor in the University of Leipzig. By J. O. Lincoln, Prof. of Latin in Brown University.

[The following article is a translation from a learned work of Prof. W. A. Becker, entitled "A Manual of Roman Antiquities," now in course of publication in Germany. The first Part appeared in 1843, and is devoted to the subject of Roman Topography. It consists of two minor parts, the first embracing the sources of information, and the literature of the subject; and the second, the Topography itself. Accompanying this Part are a Plan of the City, prepared under the personal direction of the author, and four Plates, illustrative of the Fora, the Capitol, Fragments of the Capitoline Plan and Roman Coins. This Treatise on Topography has attracted great attention in Germany; and has been the subject, for the most part, of very favorable criticism; and even its severe reviewer, Prof. Preller of Dorpat, in the *Jena Journal*,<sup>1</sup> concedes to it the highest distinction in this department of labor, and calls it "the most useful Manual of Roman Antiquities." This review has elicited a rejoinder from the author, which has appeared as a Supplement to the First Part of the Manual, under the significant title of "A Warning," and, we fancy, will effect the author's purpose, of clearing the lists of all antagonists, who are not duly armed and equipped for the contest. The controversy involves the merits of what may be called the Italian and the German schools of Roman Topography; and Prof. Preller, a distinguished laborer in classical Archaeology, having spent the winter of 1843—44 in Rome, and prosecuted his topographical investigations in habits of daily intercourse with Canina and with the scholars there associated

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<sup>1</sup> *Jena Allgem. Liter. Zeitung*, 1844, Nos. 121—127.