

Theology on the Web.org.uk

Making Biblical Scholarship Accessible

This document was supplied for free educational purposes. Unless it is in the public domain, it may not be sold for profit or hosted on a webserver without the permission of the copyright holder.

If you find it of help to you and would like to support the ministry of Theology on the Web, please consider using the links below:



Buy me a coffee

<https://www.buymeacoffee.com/theology>



PATREON

<https://patreon.com/theologyontheweb>

PayPal

<https://paypal.me/robbradshaw>

A table of contents for *Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_sbct-01.php

Aspects of the Religious Situation in Ukraine*

NIKOLAI MITROKHIN

During my stay in Kiev in May 1999 the political elite was shaken by the news that Patriarch Filaret (Denisenko), leader of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (UOC–KP), had been assaulted when visiting Maryupil' in the Donets'k region on 30 April. The arrival of this patriarch, who had been anathematised by the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), had been met with many well-organised protests mounted by clergy and laypeople of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP). These protests had ended up in a brawl on a plot of land which Filaret had come to consecrate for the building of a new church. The few security guards present were unable to shield the head of the UOC–KP from physical contact with the noisy Maryupil' protesters, who first emptied a bucket of 'holy' water over his head and then started to beat him over the head with it. In the process they tore off his *klobuk* and *panagiya* and broke his crozier. This event evinced such a strong reaction because it rekindled memories of the fears many had expressed several years ago that a religious war might erupt in Ukraine.

The religious situation in Ukraine is radically different from that in Russia. The main difference is that in Ukraine there is no single confession with a monopoly on the spiritual nurture of an historically Orthodox population. There are three 'pure' Orthodox churches rivalling for the souls of Ukrainians: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP) which according to figures dated 1 January 1999 has 7911 parishes, 6568 priests and 105 monasteries¹; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (UOC–KP) which has 2178 parishes, 1743 priests and 17 monasteries; and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) which has 1022 parishes, 543 priests and 2 monasteries. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), also known as the Uniate Church, has 3198 parishes, 2161 priests and 73 monasteries. This church submits to the authority of the Vatican, but has preserved the Orthodox Byzantine rite. The Roman Catholic Church has also retained a presence in Ukraine, which has increased significantly in recent years, with 751 parishes, 401 priests and 33 monasteries. Protestantism has become widespread in Ukraine, with 4870 registered communities: this denomination has also recently become a political force.

The complex religious situation in Ukraine means that Kiev is unable to control

*A shorter version of this article was originally published as 'Nekotoryye aspekty religioznoi situatsii na Ukraine', *Russkaya mysl'*, no. 4276 (1–7 July 1999) and no. 4277 (8–14 July 1999).

what happens in the regions. The role of the State Committee for Religious Affairs is confined to the gathering of statistics. The registration of parishes and the distribution of land and property are in the hands of the local authorities. How and where particular churches flourish is determined by the ethnic and confessional features of particular *oblasti* and even *raiony*.

Regional Factors in Religious Life

Ukraine, whose present borders were fixed only in 1954, is currently divided into three regions. The south-eastern region includes Russian or russified Ukrainian populations along the left bank of the Dnepr river (Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donets'k, Luhans'k and other *oblasti*), Malorossiia (Odesa, Kherson and Mikolaiv *oblasti*) and the Crimea. The central region includes land to the right bank of the Dnepr, which became part of the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century, including Kiev, Cherkasy, Khmel'nyts'kyi, Zhytomir, Vinnytsa, Kirovohrad and Dnipropetrovs'k *oblasti*. The western region includes lands which at various times were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland and Romania and which were firmly incorporated into the Soviet Union only at the beginning of the 1950s. These include Galicia (L'viv, Ternopil' and Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblasti*), Volynia (Rovno and Volynia *oblasti*),² and Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi *oblasti*.

The situation in the south-east is the simplest. These lands became part of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the eighteenth century and Orthodoxy was the dominant religion here. The ethnic composition of the region and the pro-Russian attitudes of its population mean that the UOC-MP feels totally secure here: it enjoys the support of the local authorities and actively withstands attempts by rival denominations to become established in the region. Protestant churches are strong in the large industrial areas, where the majority of the inhabitants of the region live (in Donets'k and Zaporizhzhia *oblasti* the number of Protestant congregations now almost equals the number of registered Orthodox communities³ (304 and 355; 176 and 221 respectively)). According to Viktor Elens'kyi, chief editor of the journal *Liudyna i svit*, the majority of the 350,000 Protestants in Ukraine live in the south-eastern region.⁴ In addition, south-eastern Ukraine was most heavily influenced by communist and atheist propoganda, so the level of religious culture among the population here is much lower than that of other regions. It is only in the last two or three years that the number of registered religious organisations (1.6 per 10,000 population at 1 January 1998)⁵ has begun to approach that of the central region (2.9 per 10,000), a number far exceeded in western Ukraine (9.6 per 10,000).

In central Ukraine the position of the UOC-MP remains strong, although it is under pressure from a number of directions. The UOC-KP and the UAOC, because of their appeal to the nationalist sentiments of Orthodox Ukrainians, have been quite successful in gaining support for their belief that the creation of an independent local church is essential. Despite the fact that the combined number of UOC-KP and UAOC parishes does not exceed that of parishes belonging to the UOC-MP in any of the central regions, the gap between them is much smaller than in the south-east.⁶ The sharp rise in the number of Roman Catholic parishes is another factor having a serious impact on the religious situation in the central region. Forty per cent (335) of the Roman Catholic parishes in Ukraine are concentrated in three of its 25 *oblasti*: in Vinnytsa, Zhytomir and Khmel'nyts'kyi. This even exceeds the number of Roman Catholic parishes in the traditionally 'Polish' *oblasti* of Galicia, which has 224 parishes, or 28 per cent of the total.⁷ Even though the number of Roman Catholic

parishes is five or six times lower than the number of Orthodox parishes there is an important qualitative difference. Roman Catholic parishes offer regular services in Ukrainian and when necessary in Polish and Russian,⁸ they have well organised programmes of religious education and their priests are well trained (for the moment the majority come from Poland). These factors have led to the establishment of fairly large, active parishes whose congregations include not only Poles but native Ukrainians and occasionally Russians, as in Kiev for example.⁹ All of this means that Fr Wiesław Stepien, secretary to the Kiev–Zhytomir diocese, can present Zhytomir as an example of a ‘typically Catholic region’,¹⁰ where the number of practising Catholics (that is those who regularly attend Sunday mass) is higher than the number of practising Orthodox (even though in terms of the number of baptisms the latter predominate).

The most complex situation is in western Ukraine. This is the region with the highest level of religious culture¹¹ and where the influence of the traditional confessions is most strongly felt. L’viv, the capital of Galicia, is the second city in Ukraine in terms of its religious significance. In the Soviet era the authorities were too afraid either to close or destroy churches because such actions evoked real mutiny. Petitioners from villages where churches had nevertheless been closed would travel regularly to the Council for Religious Affairs in Kiev for years with requests that they be reopened. They would argue that ‘our neighbours think we are idiots because we do not have a church’, an argument which they considered irrefutable.¹² For many years western Ukraine was a rich source of both funds and personnel for the Moscow Patriarchate and its loss of influence in this area remains a very sore point.

In terms of denominational affiliation the region can be divided into two parts. In three *oblasti* of Galicia the Greek Catholic Church predominates,¹³ with 2875 parishes compared to 1807 Orthodox.¹⁴ In two *oblasti* of Volynia as well as in the Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi *oblasti* the Orthodox Church predominates. Moreover the situation in each *oblast’* differs from that in its neighbouring *oblast’*.

In Galicia Orthodoxy is represented only by the UOC–KP and by the UAOC. It is in this region that these churches have their core support. In 1998 Bishop Nikolai (Grokh) of Ivano-Frankivs’k (UOC–MP) described the situation to me in somewhat anecdotal terms: ‘when Filaret (Denisenko) needs funds, he comes to us’.¹⁵ In the Volynia, Rovno and Chernivtsi *oblasti* parishes belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate predominate, although the influence of the Kiev Patriarchate is also strong: around one third of Orthodox parishes are affiliated to the Kiev Patriarchate or to the UAOC. It is a feature of these regions, despite their proximity to Galicia, that there are hardly any Greek or Roman Catholic parishes. In Zakarpattia the situation is the reverse. There are hardly any UOC–KP parishes in the *oblast’* and the 500 or more parishes belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate have to coexist with 299 parishes belonging to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (which are part of a separate Mukacheve diocese directly administered by the Vatican, bypassing Galicia), 84 Roman Catholic parishes and 317 Protestant congregations.

It would be possible to spend a great deal more time examining the reasons behind the confessional diversity of this western Ukrainian region, but we will confine ourselves to a discussion of the influence of Galicia on the religious situation in the country.

Galicia and the Split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy

As we noted above, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is the most influential

confession in Galicia. Despite its size it is possible that this church might have remained primarily an organisation of religious significance had it not played a particular role in the development of the Ukrainian 'national idea' (the Greek Catholics have only one or two parishes beyond the borders of Galicia and Zakarpattia). During the whole of the nineteenth century Galicia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and it was the Greek Catholic Church, in the absence of an educated elite, which developed, consolidated and sustained the 'spirit' of the Ukrainian (or at that time the Rusyn) people.¹⁶ Valentin Moroz wrote in *Khronika soprotyvleniya*, one of the most famous *samizdat* publications of Ukrainian nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s:

The Ukrainian revival in Galicia: it was priests, not teachers, who played the lead role here! The teacher was a civil servant and was in constant fear of being sacked by the authorities. Most Ukrainian cultural activists came from the ranks of the clergy. The parish priest often came in for justified criticism, but we mustn't forget that the Ukrainian movement depended on him. We can state quite confidently that the main bastion against the colonisation of Galicia was the Ukrainian Church.¹⁷

It was those coming out of Galicia who played a fundamental role in the dissemination of the idea of Ukrainian statehood and were the main driving force behind attempts to realise these ambitions. Although the nationalist movement of the western Ukrainians was in the end put down by the Soviet authorities through mass repressions and deportations, fifty years on all had returned to their homes and western Ukraine had once again become the standard-bearer of Ukrainian identity (however much barely-concealed annoyance many living outside the region may express at such claims).

Between the years 1946 and 1989 the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church survived in the form of underground communities, including monastic communities,¹⁸ as well as covertly in the guise of legally existing parishes which appeared to belong to the Moscow Patriarchate. At services held in such parishes the names of Uniate bishops forced to lead a semi-legal existence would still be remembered in a whisper during the prayers. However the effects of fifty years of leading a double existence and of having its priests trained at the Moscow and Leningrad Theological Seminaries have left their mark on the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine. When in the new conditions of religious freedom parishes were faced with the choice of remaining Orthodox or returning to the Unia, a fairly large number of priests and parishioners decided that they would remain Orthodox and refused to submit to the pope. However, their political views meant that they did not want to submit to the Moscow Patriarchate either.

This vacuum which opened up in 1990 was filled by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, formed by a group of well-known priests in L'viv and led by Patriarch Dmytrii (Yarema).¹⁹ It is this church which has come to present the greatest threat to the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, since unlike the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church it has a uniquely republic-wide appeal. Priests in central Ukraine were very unlikely to transfer their allegiance to the Greek Catholic Church, but the idea of an independent Ukrainian church gained a much wider currency. The idea of autocephaly was supported mainly by parish priests, the 'white clergy' who were influenced not only by their personal views and by the financial prospects (the establishment of a new church would inevitably lead to a weakening of vertical links and consequently lead to greater financial independence in the parishes), but also by the

views of their parishioners, who in 1990–92 were very hostile towards Moscow. The ‘black clergy’, the monks, who by entering the monastery had renounced worldly ideas, including that of national identity, did not approve of the idea of autocephaly. For them this kind of independent initiative was an infringement of canon law.

However, the UAOC, despite the controversy surrounding its very existence, was more of a potential than an actual threat to the Moscow Patriarchate during the first years of its existence in 1990–92. Being by its nature a movement of the white clergy it did not command sufficient authority and organisational resources. The situation changed when at the end of 1991 Metropolitan Filaret (Denisenko) of Kiev and Galicia, head of the UOC–MP,²⁰ decided to exploit the idea of autocephaly. He had several powerful trump cards at his disposal. He had the support of the leadership of this suddenly independent country, who very much liked the idea of ‘an independent church in an independent state’. He was also able to exploit the complex situation in western Ukraine by promoting the idea of the ‘death of Orthodoxy’ on a republican scale if the UOC–MP was not speedily accorded the status of autocephaly. His personal standing was also an advantage because it allowed him to formulate the request for separation from the Moscow Patriarchate using the appropriate conventions.

As it turned out, Metropolitan Filaret did not succeed in his attempts to gain the status of autocephaly from the Moscow Patriarchate. He was forced instead to establish an independent church which was ‘uncanonical’ in legal terms. The lack of support from the ‘generals’ of the church – the bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church,²¹ whose position determined the conduct of rank-and-file clergy, especially in central Ukraine²² – played a decisive role in the crushing of his aspirations. However, Filaret was able to play his trump cards almost to the full. Thanks to the support of the presidential administration²³ and right-wing political organisations (whose electorate was again the population of western Ukraine) the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, founded by Metropolitan Filaret, joined forces with the UOAC. A significant number of western Ukrainian priests (including practically all the priests in Galicia) were provided with a way of avoiding submitting themselves to the Moscow Patriarchate whilst still apparently remaining within the law. We should not ignore the personality of Metropolitan Filaret himself, who commanded sufficient authority in Ukraine to be able to become the leader of a large, independent church, even if uncanonical, in sharp contrast to the clearly marginal leaders of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

Canonical and Uncanonical Churches – the Possibility of Unity

The hierarchs of the UOC–MP understand that Galicia has now fully escaped their influence and they no longer nurture any hopes of its return. As far as the ‘Filaret parishes’ in other regions are concerned the priests of the Moscow Patriarchate are of the unanimous opinion that ‘people do not go there’ and that these are fake parishes created through the collaboration of ‘Benderites’ (Galician exiles) with the local authorities. Their understanding of the situation is thus that there is no one for the UOC–MP to join. ‘Anafema’ (their name for Filaret, who was anathematised by the Bishops’ Council of the ROC in 1997) and his followers should return the churches and monasteries seized from the Moscow Patriarchate and repent.²⁴

When Patriarch Filaret of Kiev and All Rus’–Ukraine discusses the potential for unity among the churches he immediately starts to use political platitudes:

In Ukraine the process of forming a local church is taking place There are left-wing forces in Ukraine who are not interested in bringing about a stabilisation of the situation The formation of a united church is a matter of primary importance for the state. ... At first the Russian Orthodox Church was not canonical either, but later it was recognised all the same The Moscow Patriarchate created a schism in Ukraine because if it loses the Ukrainian church its role in world Orthodoxy will be diminished. ... The state should facilitate the creation of a national church. Parishes which do not want to join a national church should *temporarily* (author's emphasis) form themselves into an Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine. We maintain the same nationalist position as the Greek Catholics: there are moves towards unity. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was created with the agreement of the Soviet authorities to rival the Greek Catholics in western Ukraine.²⁵

Patriarch Filaret could have achieved much by continuing to work within the parameters he had been used to operating in during the Soviet era (he was head of the Ukrainian Exarchate from 1968). He understands patriotism to be the expression of unquestioning loyalty to the authorities ('Someone was afraid that Metropolitan Nikodim (Rotov) and I would make negative statements about the authorities when we were abroad, but they need not have been – we were patriots'²⁶); he has a wide-ranging 'statesmanlike' approach to the problems encountered by officials at all levels.²⁷ It is no coincidence that even Leonid Kuchma, who at the beginning of his presidency was pro-Russian, in time began to treat Filaret with great piety. However, my impression is that Filaret does not fully understand that the independent Ukrainian state is being built according to new principles and that the unification of the churches will not happen by presidential decree, however much this may be desired by some politicians.²⁸ The Ukrainian administration has already understood perfectly well that it must earn investment transfers from the World Bank and admission to European institutions and that one of the simplest ways of doing this is to demonstrate that the rights of its citizens, including their religious rights, are observed.

The UAOC leads a rather sorry existence, to the extent that the church is now barely taken into consideration when the relative significance of Ukrainian religious institutions is assessed.²⁹ Its nominal thousand or so parishes are unable to finance their own patriarch properly: he received a *Russkaya mysl'* correspondent in an office with a threadbare rug on the floor and complained about his family's financial difficulties.³⁰

According to then Patriarch Dmytrii (Yarema) the unification of the church can be achieved only on the basis of autocephaly, but Russians could be permitted to organise their parishes into separate dioceses or even into an Exarchate under the aegis of the Kiev Patriarchate. In 1994–95 Patriarch Dmytrii took steps to unite the UAOC with the UOC–KP a second time (a move much favoured by the authorities). He entered into an agreement with the then nominal head of the UOC–KP, Patriarch Volodymyr (Romaniuk). Under this scheme, both patriarchs would step back to make way for a new patriarch, either Metropolitan Ioann (Bondarchuk) (who was the first and last of the ROC bishops to transfer to the UAOC), or Metropolitan Andrii (Abramchuk). However, soon after this agreement had been reached Ioann was killed in a car accident and then Patriarch Volodymyr himself died.³¹ Patriarch Filaret has made it very clear that 'until a single united church (including parishes belonging to

UOC–MP – author’s note) is created no force will oust me from my post’.³²

In actual fact the few hundred UAOC³³ parishes in Ukraine are subordinate only to themselves, or at most to the rural dean, and this state of affairs suits them perfectly. Unification with any other church would impose certain obligations upon them, which they demonstrate no burning desire to fulfil.³⁴

Even the Greek Catholics have been discussing the possibility of creating a single Local Ukrainian Church. Fr Oleks Petriv, secretary to the Bishops’ Conference of Galicia, put forward a plan on behalf of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in an address to an international conference on the theme ‘religion and society – factors for change’ which took place in Kiev in May 1998. His proposal was that the Ecumenical Patriarch acknowledge the canonicity of both the UOC–KP and the UAOC, that the Moscow Patriarchate grant autocephaly to the UOC–MP and that the pope recognise the ‘right’ of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church to establish its own patriarchate. It was obvious that this proposal was completely unrealistic, if only because it appeared to be an attempt to bring about the first stage in the future creation of a single universal Christian church.³⁵ It is worth mentioning if only to demonstrate that messianic ideas are just as popular in Ukraine as they are in Russia.

The absence of a dominant confession with any realistic prospect of maintaining a spiritual monopoly in the religious life of Ukraine means that all religious organisations feel relatively at ease. As one of the leaders of a large Protestant congregation commented to me, ‘Thank God this isn’t Russia. For the time being the Orthodox are so busy arguing among themselves that they’re not bothered about us.’

General Problems in the Life of the Churches

Of course endless divisions and conflicts over church buildings are not the only features of religious life in Ukraine. People come to church to have their children baptised, they get married and mourn their dead. Old churches are being restored and new ones being built. Programmes of catechisation and evangelism are under way and religious literature is being produced in large quantities. It is this everyday, run-of-the-mill activity that presents the most serious problems, which in the long term are far more important for the churches than interdenominational conflicts.

Every denomination encounters its own problems arising from the peculiarities of its own internal structures or its own dogmas, but there are also general problems, which affect every denomination. These problems arise mainly out of the legacy of decades of Soviet atheism.

The first problem is the low level of religious culture among the people, especially in the central and south-eastern regions. Historically Orthodox, Catholic or Protestant populations in their millions have lived through decades without churches. Although the great majority would call themselves believers, they do not have the habit of going to church. They will go just once a year, at Easter; and they do not know how to conduct themselves there. It is going to be a big task simply to teach these people, who are believers ‘in principle’, that they should attend church regularly on Sundays.

The various denominations attach different levels of importance to the question of religious education. Catholics and Protestants devote their main energies and resources to it; the Orthodox, however, satisfied with their numerical superiority, prefer to direct their financial resources to the restoration of churches and conduct religious education on an *ad hoc* basis. (This does not rule out the activism of a few enthusiasts.) The Orthodox (UOC–MP and UOC–KP) have one Sunday school to every four parishes; the UAOC has one to every three parishes; the Roman Catholic

Church, the All-Ukrainian Union of Evangelical Christians/Baptists and the Adventists have one Sunday school to every two parishes; and the All-Ukrainian Union of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals) has the highest number of all – 559 Sunday schools for 874 congregations. The difference in the approaches of these denominations is also even more apparent if one compares the number who attend these Sunday schools with the potential number of students. On average around 50 attend Sunday school from the Orthodox parishes,³⁶ which is of course a tiny proportion of the overall number of children of Orthodox believers.³⁷ Catholics and Protestants consider the religious education of both children and adults to be of primary importance and family attendance at Sunday services and Sunday school afterwards is more or less compulsory for members of their congregations.

This low level of religious culture among the adherents of the traditional confessions also gives rise to the problem of ‘shamanism’ (superstitious belief). People go to church without any real understanding of the meaning of what is happening there and believe that putting some money in the collection plate and watching certain rituals take place will make their daily lives easier. For example, a child will be baptised not in order that it will become a new member of the church, but so that it ‘won’t cry at night’. Priests observe that the largest congregations at Easter are not present during the Easter Vigil or at the procession, but on Easter morning when the ‘*kulich*’ (Easter cakes) are blessed.

Shamanism takes many forms. Some Catholics of Polish extraction were upset when the bulletin of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine was published in Ukrainian. They saw Catholicism as a Polish religion, not a Ukrainian one. The Protestant churches are experiencing protracted conflict between the old and the new generations of pastors. The ‘old men’ cling rigidly to the forms of service which were established back in the 1920s even though they do not fully understand them because of the absence of Protestant theology during the Soviet era, while the younger generation want to use the more innovative practices of foreign missionaries. In Orthodoxy ‘shamanism’ takes the form of religious devotion to a particular priest who has been singled out as special, leading to the phenomenon of ‘following false elders’ (*‘Izhestarchestvo’*).

This struggle against superstitious belief and the religious education of the population are possible only if there is a high level of education among the clergy. At present in Ukraine the standard of theological education is generally low and this is the second most important problem currently causing concern to the leadership of the main denominations in Ukraine.

In the decade 1988–98 the number of religious communities of all denominations in Ukraine increased more than threefold – from 6179 to 19,780. The number of registered Orthodox communities increased two-and-a-half times – from 3980 to 10,387. Protestant congregations increased threefold – from 1614 to 4914. Catholic parishes increased sevenfold, from 103 to 732.³⁸ The churches were forced to consecrate men who in religious terms were poorly educated (although it should be said that 90.4 per cent have a secondary school diploma at least)³⁹ in order to keep up with the demand for priests that this rate of growth had created. The Catholics were the only exception – they invited clergy from abroad (mainly Poles). The Greek Catholics, too, benefited from the fact that a fairly large number of expatriate priests returned from abroad. In the five years between January 1993 and January 1998 the number of clergy of all denominations rose by 82 per cent, reaching 17,798. In January 1998 there were 8152 Orthodox priests (or 45.8 per cent⁴⁰) and 6596 Protestant ministers (or 37.1 per cent).⁴¹ However, the religious educational institu-

tions were unable to provide adequate education for these new clergy. As a result, according to statistics provided by Viktor Bondarenko, chairman of the State Committee for Religious Affairs (*Derzhavnyi komitet u spravakh relihii*), the number of priests in the UOC–MP with intermediate and advanced level theological training had fallen from 71.1 per cent in 1990 to 50.8 per cent in 1998. In other words, half of the priests belonging to the largest Ukrainian church, which has the most extensive provision for theological training, have not even completed an extension course in theology.

The quality of the theological training on offer is still very low. In the UOC–MP the situation is as follows. Until late 1989 there was only one theological seminary for the whole of Ukraine, in Odesa, and quite a large proportion of seminarians (mainly from the western dioceses) studied at the Moscow or Leningrad seminaries. When the Kiev Theological Seminary was opened in September 1989 (an Academy was added in 1992) the number of seminarians rose sharply.⁴² Now there are 1324 students at the Kiev Seminary and Academy alone and a further 950 are students in Odesa, Pochaiv, Kharkiv and Luts'k. However, in Kiev only 547 students are engaged on a course of full-time study: the remainder are external students who at the most spend two or three weeks a year on residential courses at the seminary. Moreover the Kiev Academy and Seminary are experiencing a severe shortage of teachers: rector Mykola Zabuha states that 'we have 102 tutors on our staff, but half of them are in parishes because there is such a demand for priests. The seminary relies on a staff of five, including the rector and his deputy.'⁴³ This gives a fuller picture of the situation. Understandably, in such conditions it is impossible to provide future priests with adequate training to equip them to deal with the new relationships between church and society and between church and state and to enable them to play an active role. As the rector says, 'the Catholics rely on their instructions, but we live by the Holy Spirit'.⁴⁴ The seminary has made few alterations to the curriculum which was followed in the Soviet era, apart from material on the new religious denominations.

Despite this the Kiev Academy and perhaps the Odesa Seminary may be considered as the vanguard of theological education in Ukraine. If anything, the theological establishments belonging to the other denominations in Ukraine are in an even worse state, including the provincial institutions of the UOC–MP.⁴⁵ For example, expatriate Greek Catholic priests who have returned to Ukraine have removed practically all the home-grown graduates of the 'Soviet' theological institutions from their posts as heads of dioceses and lecturers in theology, despite the fact that many of them had better qualifications and credentials. The main criterion now being applied to gain entry into a seminary has become not the applicant's knowledge, but whether or not he belongs to a family which suffered during the repressions or a family with a tradition of producing priests.

Sending priests to train abroad might have alleviated this acute problem. However, in the period 1989–93 nearly all the denominations which sent theological students abroad to study soon discovered that most of them either tried by all means available to stay in the West, or if they returned proved completely incapable of adapting to the local conditions.

In 1993–97 the number of Orthodox seminaries increased from 15 to 30, and the number of students from 2850 to 4544 – an increase of 59.4 per cent; in the same period the number of Protestant seminaries increased from 12 to 38, and the number of students from 567 to 6533 – a nearly twelvefold increase. Despite the continuing increase in clergy the number currently in training is still lower than the number

required. The ratio of priest to parish in the Orthodox Church now stands at 0.8 to each parish; while in the Protestant churches the ratio is 1.3 ministers to each congregation.⁴⁶

The third problem faced by all the denominations is that of church property. When the only official Orthodox Church in Ukraine was the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, available to Orthodox and Greek Catholics alike, there were few problems over property. In the best cases there would be just one church open in a village, and all the believers would worship there. Following the emergence of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church from the underground, and the creation of the UAOC and subsequently the UOC–KP, the problem of church property soon became acute, especially in western Ukraine. In cases where the believers in a given village were of one mind and were able simply to choose whether to remain in the Moscow Patriarchate or transfer their allegiance elsewhere the problem was easily resolved. However, in many cases conflicts arose. Some parishioners would continue to see themselves as Orthodox, others as Greek Catholics, and then they would try to divide the church building between them, sometimes resorting to the use of force and the involvement of the local secular authorities. Not all cases were attributable to the ‘requisitioning’ of church property by the Moscow Patriarchate: a significant number of conflicts over church buildings erupted between communities belonging variously to the UOC–KP, the UAOC and the Greek Catholic Church.

The situation more or less stabilised around 1996. This was not achieved by the proposal made by the secular authorities in December 1993 that the churches should adopt a system of designated service times to meet the needs of each community in order to resolve the conflict – this had only aroused people’s passions all the more. Instead the building of new churches by the more active parishes and the ending of the activity of many ‘fake’ parishes have eased the conflict. Despite the fact that according to Viktor Elens’kyi there are 359 churches remaining where the conflict has still to be resolved this bears no comparison to the situation in 1991–92, when there were more than a thousand churches over which conflict raged.⁴⁷ Churches built before the Soviet era and returned to believers (very few remain which have not been returned) became the property of the ‘victors’, who had the support either of the majority of the villagers or the local authorities – their views often coincided. The ‘losers’ had to build their own churches. It is very costly to build a church, and so places of residence, shops or cinemas were usually converted for church use. In many villages, let alone in regional centres, many different churches are now functioning. However, the number of open churches still lags behind the number of registered communities. Despite the fact that in 1997 the number of churches increased by 769 (of which 374 were new buildings) the ratio of buildings to congregations still fell to 66.6 per cent compared to 67.5 per cent in 1996. The situation is best for the Orthodox communities at 72.9 per cent (76.7 per cent for the UOC–MP, 77.6 per cent for the UOC–KP and 60.7 per cent for the UAOC). As far as the western region is concerned, where the situation stabilised itself earlier, the ratio of church buildings to congregations stands at 84.5 per cent.⁴⁸ Perhaps this is explained by the fact that if a Protestant community has to make do without a church building for two or three years it manages very well by meeting in homes or rented buildings, but if an Orthodox community lacks a building, if only for a period of two or three years, its morale soon begins to fall. This is compounded by the fact that a priest is not usually sent to a parish without a church on the grounds that the parish ‘will not be able to maintain him’. As noted above, there is a shortage of priests in

any case.

One of the more unusual features of the religious situation in Ukraine is the predominance of close family ties or clan links among priests. When one first meets almost any priest or minister, it soon becomes apparent that he has many colleagues among his brothers, uncles and nephews. These families usually come from western Ukraine. There are villages around the Pochaiv Monastery of the Caves and in Zakarpattia, for example Iza near Khust, where dozens of priests, all of whom are native to the area, come for church festivals from all over the CIS. In some dioceses a particular family or territorial clan more or less runs everything. It is difficult to say whether this is a good thing or a bad thing for the church. On the one hand, the existence of any dominant clan may lead to corruption and the abuse of both power and resources; on the other hand, a clan member bears an additional burden of responsibility and may therefore be less inclined to make arbitrary or politically-motivated decisions.

Another common feature of all the Ukrainian denominations, which for some reason they prefer not to mention, is their active missionary work in the countries of the CIS, especially Russia. Protestant communities, from the *inistiativniki* to the Pentecostals, are the most actively involved: they travel with their huge families into the farthest reaches of Russia or Central Asia to establish new congregations or revive old ones. Orthodox parishes in Ukraine send priests to Russia; they might not be the most active but they are dependable. In many Russian dioceses Ukrainian priestly clans have existed for decades and in others, like Barnaul, they emerge following the appointment of a Ukrainian bishop. Just as the Moscow Patriarchate has its parishes in Ukraine, so too the Kiev Patriarchate is opening its own parishes in Russia.

The Secular Authorities and Religion

Trying to establish a close link between the religious and the political situations in Ukraine is not a useful line of enquiry; nor is trying to analyse the internal politics of the country from the perspective of the rivalry between the various Ukrainian denominations. Ukraine, like Russia, is a modern secular state which has left the conventions of the seventeenth century, when religious identity was synonymous with political and often national identity, far behind.

The existence of a large newly-independent state naturally draws the political elite towards the idea that it needs to have its 'own' church. First, there is the syndrome of 'rejection', essential in the process of acquiring and affirming national or state autonomy. Second, there is the growing conviction that since all other European Orthodox states address the 'problem of spirituality' on an independent basis, why then is Ukraine still dependent? The UOC-MP, the largest confession in Ukraine, is now facing the need to confront this powerful imperative which is currently driving nearly the whole of the Ukrainian political elite. Stiffened in his resolve by the advice of Metropolitan Filaret, President Kravchuk tried putting crude administrative pressure on the parish councils and diocesan administrations of the UOC-MP, but was thwarted by the fact that neither the believers nor the administrators wanted to recognise the UOC-KP. Since Ukraine was a quasi-democratic state and the authorities did not have the option of using the law enforcement agencies to back them up, they were forced to abandon their plans.

The second phase, which began several years ago, unfolded more gradually. The secular authorities and those in competition for the souls of believers (primarily the

UOC–KP) proposed that the UOC–MP continue as a separate structure but that it request autocephaly – in other words full independence from the Russian Orthodox Church. Of course there are those within the UOC–MP itself who would support the idea of autocephaly. For example, in August 1997 a group of priests from the Volodymyr–Volyn’s’kyi and Kovil’ dioceses sent a letter to Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) expressing the view that it was essential for the church to gain autocephaly.⁴⁹ Their bishop, Simeon (Shostats’kyi), supported them and continues to do so.⁵⁰ Feodosii (Dikun), metropolitan of Poltava, a well-known figure, also supports the formation of a canonical patriarchate in Kiev. Some high-ranking clergy at the metropolitan’s residence in Kiev are also known to be in favour of autocephaly. Although at the end of 1996 the Holy Synod of the UOC–MP stated that it was not essential for the church to be granted autocephaly, in time this may change.⁵¹ The longer an independent Ukraine exists, the harder it will be to explain to believers (especially in the central regions) why they must still submit to the authority of Moscow, especially as Orthodoxy came into Russia through Kiev and the Crimea.

When some politicians continue to express the view that the existence of churches on Ukrainian soil which have their ‘administrative centres’ outside the country (that is the UOC–MP, the Roman Catholic Church and some Protestant denominations) is not normal, counteraccusations of nationalism and of the politicisation of religion are often made. However, these denominations find it harder to justify themselves when their priests and monks serving in Ukraine start making political statements in favour of this or that foreign state. It is not only members of the UOC–MP who overstep the mark in this way. Some Polish priests have celebrated mass with the Polish flag on the altar, arousing protests from Catholic Ukrainians, who have brought Ukrainian flags to mass in response.⁵² Nevertheless, the majority of complaints are made about priests belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate.

Fears in Ukraine that Russia may revive its imperial ambitions are not entirely groundless and therefore the well-known ‘imperialist’ views of some priests in the Moscow Patriarchate give rise to the accusation that there is a ‘fifth column’ at work in Ukraine. Some Russian politicians have also played their part in reinforcing this fear. For example, I attended a lecture on 22 April 1999 given by Kirill Frolov, an expert at the Institute of the Diaspora, entitled ‘Orthodoxy in the Countries of the CIS’. When describing the situation in Ukraine, the speaker repeatedly used such phrases as ‘our man’, ‘a metropolitan with firm pro-Russian views’ and ‘we have defended Ukraine’. He praised one of the bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate who had left Ukraine declaring that he did not know Ukrainian and had no wish to learn it. Those present at the lecture supported the ‘anti-Ukrainian’ position of the speaker, including the well-known Orthodox culturologist Vladimir Makhnach. One might be inclined to dismiss meetings like this as games played by marginal Muscovite chauvinists, were it not for the fact that the Institute of the Diaspora is headed by Konstantin Zatulin, consultant on politics in the CIS to many leading Russian politicians, including presidential candidate Yuri Luzhkov.⁵³

Even if we leave aside a discussion about the alleged existence of a ‘fifth column’ and the legacy of imperialism, Ukrainian and Russian politicians generally have a limited understanding of the situation on the ‘religious front’. Of course some marginal political organisations with links to one or another denomination do exist, but their influence is limited. Despite the fact that various priests as well as two bishops of the UOC–MP campaigned in the March 1998 parliamentary elections, only one minister, V. Shushkevich, pastor of the charismatic ‘Word of Life’ Church in Donetsk, was elected to parliament.⁵⁴ The Party for Regional Renewal (*Partiya*

regional'nogo vozrozhdeniya), which had Bishop Pavel (Lebed'), abbot of the Kiev Monastery of the Caves, second on its electoral list and the backing of the UOC-MP, did not even poll one per cent of the vote.⁵⁵ Other parties with a religious orientation failed to poll the four per cent of the vote required to win seats in the Rada, even if all their votes were added together.⁵⁶ The main political parties represented in parliament just use vague, meaningless slogans such as 'spiritual renewal', aimed at attracting the largest number of votes. Nevertheless, despite the vagueness of such slogans, the main political parties all have relatively clear positions on the religious issue. The 'rightists', who collect most of the votes in Galicia, generally support the UOC-KP at the national level;⁵⁷ the 'leftists', whose core support is in the south-east, support the UOC-MP. Various denominations also have their supporters within the executive (Bishop Pavel (Lebed')): 'we have support both at the municipal level and within the presidential administration'⁵⁸), but the details of such relationships are closely guarded.⁵⁹ For example, during my visit to Ukraine I twice in three days bumped into Valeri Babich, who had failed to get elected as mayor of Kiev, when visiting Bishop Pavel and Hrihorii Komendant, head of the Ukrainian Union of Evangelical Christians/Baptists.

The situation that developed during the Kiev mayoral elections mirrors the situation on a regional level. At local elections priests advise their parishioners to vote for a particular candidate in line with the local situation and not according to the political preferences of the church hierarchy. It is natural to support the local leadership first of all, as well as all possible 'donors'. Priests who put themselves forward as election candidates typically appeal in their manifestos not to the voters' faith, but to their pockets. The voters remember the aforementioned Shushkevich exclusively as someone who promised to put up pensions. Father Dimitri Sidor, leader of the Society of Carpathian Rusyns and a well-known Orthodox priest in Zakarpattia, is also no exception to this rule: religious issues occupied tenth, eleventh and twenty-second places in his manifesto.⁶⁰ Some 60 priests⁶¹ were returned in the local elections, of whom 36 were UOC-MP, 12 UOC-KP, six UGCC and four UAOC.⁶² Two Pentecostal ministers and one charismatic pastor were also elected.

It is interesting to note the increased level of involvement of the Protestant communities in the regional elections (Protestant ministers as well as ordinary members of their congregations, not as easily identifiable, have been elected to *oblast'* councils). This is explained primarily by their concern for their own security. It is virtually impossible to put pressure on a congregation which has its own regional deputy, whatever the motivation of the state authorities. In the future, once the foundations of religious freedom have been firmly laid, it is possible that the role of Protestant activists in politics will increase. Various Protestant organisations, especially the charismatics, already enjoy some influence among the political and business elites. In January 1998, for example, more than 50 deputies in the Supreme Rada signed a petition to the Ministry of Internal Affairs requesting that it cease its persecution of a Nigerian-born charismatic preacher.

For the time being, the local authorities have complete freedom to act in the religious sphere and as a rule reflect the majority local opinion and govern according to their own understanding of the local conditions. In the east the UOC-KP often encounters refusals to register its parishes and all manner of obstructive behaviour on the part of the authorities. In the west the L'viv city council repeatedly ignores 'advice' from Kiev regarding the allocation of a plot of land to a parish belonging to the UOC-MP. Meanwhile in Cherkasy the local mayor actively favours the Baptists.

Another factor influencing the religious situation in the regions is the existence in

some areas of compact ethnic communities, some of them with their own religious organisations. Before the Second World War the largest of these was the Jewish community, but following the Holocaust and the mass emigration of the early 1990s this community no longer has a serious impact even at regional level. Moreover, Judaism has very little influence on modern urban Jews. Relatively large communities exist only in Kiev, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovs'k.

Islam exerts some influence among the Tatars in Crimea. According to sociological surveys 11–13 per cent of the population of Crimea have identified themselves as Muslim.⁶³ At present 209 out of the total number of 258 Muslim communities registered in Ukraine are in the Republic of Crimea. Activists in the Crimean Tatar movement have pressed for the revival of traditional Islamic structures as one of the most important symbols of their life before deportation.⁶⁴ However, attempts to create political parties along Islamic lines have not been successful.

The Hungarians, who make up a significant part of the population of Zakarpattia, have established about 100 parishes of the Transcarpathian Reformed Church. There are large communities of Orthodox Greeks, Bulgarians and Moldavians (Romanians) in the Donets'k, Odesa and Chernivtsi *oblasti*.

Problems Specific to the UOC–MP

The UOC–MP, which is the largest denomination in Ukraine, is experiencing serious problems arising from its one-dimensional approach to its parishioners, to the administration of dioceses and parishes and to the complexities of life in modern Ukraine.⁶⁵ In effect the UOC–MP combines at least three separate churches: one which supports the idea of autocephaly to a greater or lesser extent, concentrated in the central and western regions; one which is the obvious and only officially recognised church of Russians and Ukrainians in the south-east and parts of the central region; and an ethnic Russian church concentrated in Crimea, the Donbass, Malorossiia and ethnic Russian parishes in central and western Ukraine. Or, to put it another way, the identity of the church is firmly fixed in the east, but the body of the church, the majority of its parishes, is closer to the centre and parts of the western region.

There are opposite extremes within the church. Archbishop Illarion (Shukalo) of Donets'k said at a press conference on 7 May 1999 that because of protests from the Union of Orthodox Citizens (*Soyuz pravoslavnykh grazhdan*) he was not able to use the words 'Ukrainian church' in his sermons but was obliged to say 'our church' instead. At the same time in the Ivano-Frankivs'k or L'viv dioceses only a handful of the few dozen remaining UOC–MP parishes continue to mention the patriarch of Moscow in prayers, because many believers will not tolerate any mention of the word 'Moscow'.⁶⁶

This multifaceted character of the UOC–MP, which is the product of a complex regional situation, gives rise to serious difficulties in its relationship with the world around it. What may be acceptable to the ears of parishioners in a Moscow Patriarchate parish in Volynia will often be completely unacceptable to a parishioner in Odesa, and vice versa. When sermons or lectures are directed to local audiences at diocesan level everything goes more or less smoothly. However, the head of the church and the Holy Synod need considerable diplomatic talent in order to produce official church pronouncements at the national level which satisfy everyone: the community of believers in all its diversity, government officials and public opinion.

For the time being the UOC–MP leadership has resorted to the simple policy of remaining silent. It is extremely rare for Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan), head of the UOC–MP, to make any significant public statements or to give interviews. Accusations made against the church by its competitors or critics are ignored. If it transpires that a representative from one of the ‘self-appointed’ patriarchates is likely to be present at a particular gathering the Moscow Patriarchate representative will simply not attend. The official UOC–MP spokesman in recent years has usually been Bishop Pavel (Lebed’) of the Kiev Monastery of the Caves. He is undoubtedly an intelligent and hardworking man, but he is at times unnecessarily blunt. A very sparse amount of unofficial information, usually in the form of insults directed against the ‘schismatics’, appears in ‘his’ secular newspapers, *Nezavisimost’* and *Region*. The rude and suspicious attitude of many of the UOC–MP bishops and clerics has earned the church the reputation among religious experts and journalists in Ukraine of being the most closed denomination. Ludicrous situations have arisen. A press conference held in Kiev on 7 May, at which I was present as one of four journalists, played a recording of the attack on Metropolitan Filaret in Maryupil’, in the Donets’k diocese of Archbishop Illarion (Shukalo), which did not exactly show the latter in a very positive light.

Another significant problem being encountered by the UOC–MP is the presence of a fairly large, if fairly unstructured, movement of laypeople against the episcopate. This movement is to a large extent initiated and sustained by parish clergy, and although at present it does not appear to have a single leader (at any rate this author is not aware of one) it has already succeeded in making its aims and motives clear.

In Ukraine, as in Russia, a Russian Orthodox bishop is an extremely distant figure for the ordinary believer in the parish, as well as for the priest. The bishop is surrounded by his retainers and it is not easy to gain access to him, even on issues of importance; and trying to do so often involves rudeness, humiliation and bribery. Usually people are resigned to this, but in recent years the number of known conflicts between priests or Orthodox believers and their bishops has risen sharply. In Ukraine alone there are tense situations in the Simferopol’, Ivano-Frankivs’k and Odesa dioceses. As a result of conflicts of this kind bishops have been removed from their posts in Donets’k in 1996, in Khust in 1998 and in Sumy in 1999. However, in many cases it is more a question of a subconscious dislike of bishops, rather than open conflict, and this finds its expression in quasi-sectarian mass movements⁶⁷ which are artificially centred around a particular issue, such as ‘ecumenism’ or ‘identity codes’, and which accuse most if not all bishops of ‘betraying Orthodoxy’.

The ‘political wing’ of these mass movements, which also exist in Russia but on a smaller scale, is often formed by ‘Orthodox brotherhoods’ (*pravoslavnyye bratstva*). These movements of ‘churched laypeople’ emerged at the end of the 1980s and their influence peaked in 1991–93. However, the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods (*Soyuz pravoslavnykh bratstv*), their central organisation, was dissolved in 1994 by the church hierarchy, which was concerned about the extreme politicisation of these movements and about the fact that they could not easily be controlled from above. Local brotherhoods were placed under the authority of diocesan administrations; those which refused to submit to this were put outside the church and nearly all of them disbanded. However, a group based in Russia, led by Konstantin Dushenov, former press secretary to the deceased Metropolitan Ioann (Snychev) of St Petersburg, is now making serious attempts to revive this movement. This group’s newspaper, *Rus’ pravoslavnaya*, accuses practically the whole of the episcopate of the ‘heresy of ecumenism’ and is distributed free of charge to monasteries and

dioceses. Archbishop Illarion and Bishop Pavel have spoken angrily about this publication's efforts to destabilise the situation in Ukraine. Their concern shows that the UOC–MP sees this is a particularly serious issue,⁶⁸ and all the more so because the Kiev metropolitanate is unable to offer its parishioners any alternative publication. Its main mouthpiece, *Pravoslavna hazeta*, is published only in Ukrainian and is very dull.

From 20 to 40 Orthodox brotherhoods and sisterhoods (depending on the source) belong to the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods in Ukraine. It is difficult to determine how many of them actually exist and how many are just nominal. The brotherhoods have proimperialist, antiecumenical and often antisemitic political views. In effect they are organisations of the Russian diaspora in Ukraine and not truly organisations of believers as their names would suggest. Inside the church, with limited support from rank-and-file priests, they oppose the episcopate, which they perceive to be 'ecumenically minded'. The L'viv diocese is an exception, where the brotherhoods more or less function as a diocesan administration. Even during the parliamentary elections the brotherhoods called on their members to vote not for the Party of Regional Renewal (*Partiya regional'nogo vozrozhdeniya*), which promoted the interests of the UOC–MP, but for the Greens.

In 1997–98 the brotherhoods and the 'antiepiscopal' movement mentioned above made a joint stand over the issue of identity codes. The tax police had started to introduce a unified system of identity coding using a series of individual numbers arranged in sets of three which according to some priests added up to the figure 666, the 'number of the Beast'. Most bishops saw no difficulty with this system, but among lay believers it evoked a reaction bordering on hysteria. Rumours began to circulate that if a believer accepted an identity code, even if he was unaware of its 'satanic' nature, he would immediately fall into the 'Kingdom of the Antichrist'. According to those preaching the imminence of the Apocalypse, the next step would be to insert microchips into people's bodies in order to direct and control every aspect of their lives. These microchips would receive their 'instructions' through a system of satellites. Of course the driving force behind this grand design was none other than the Rothschild Banking Corporation. The activists said they had been forced to take action because of the passive attitude of the bishops: 'since our bishops continue to remain silent on this issue, God Himself has commanded us, ordinary Orthodox believers, to act decisively and without delay, while there is still time and matters have not gone too far.'⁶⁹ Unofficial leaflets and anonymous letters were circulated around the parishes, explaining the cunning devices of the 'dark forces' at large. The Holy Synod in Kiev and the Chancellery of the Patriarchate in Moscow were inundated with appeals from parishioners stating that they did not wish to be assigned an identity code. They also received an onslaught of visitors asking the church authorities to give them some sensible explanation of what was happening. Somewhat belatedly, the Holy Synod realised the scale of the movement, which was affecting above all the most 'reliable' dioceses in the south-east,⁷⁰ and issued a statement on 3 June 1998. This was prepared by Bishop (now Archbishop) Avhustyn (Markevich) of L'viv and Drohobych, official priest to the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods. It stated that believers were free to choose whether or not they would accept identity codes but that the Holy Synod saw nothing sinister in them. At the same time the Orthodox theologian Deacon Andrei Kurayev, a man respected by the brotherhoods, was spurred into action. Apparently at the request of the Kiev Patriarchate he wrote a pamphlet entitled 'Is the mark of Antichrist being distributed in Ukraine?',⁷¹ which explained that there was nothing to fear from the issuing of

identity codes and that the real Antichrist would have to be someone acknowledged as the Messiah by the Jewish people. Orthodox believers should pray and not wage war against their bishops. Ten thousand copies were printed at the beginning of 1999, effectively bringing the debate to a close. By May the issue of identity codes had already become a distant memory.

A third problem faced by the UOC–MP concerns effective administration and in particular the issue of church finances. The absence of clear, precise written instructions on the obligations of priest or bishop in a given situation has led to various abuses by both parties. In effect, both the bishop in his diocese and the priest in his parish are left to their own devices, striving to ensure that as little money as possible is diverted upwards and that as much as possible is allocated downwards. It is impossible to resolve this through purely administrative means such as issuing more detailed instructions or disciplining an individual. First, those for whom such instructions were written would have to be convinced that they ought to observe them, not a simple matter given the current confusion concerning church personnel. Second, conditions in Ukraine today are such that any harsh measures adopted against a priest might simply prompt him to transfer to another jurisdiction. In western and central Ukraine there are quite a few dioceses where the bishop cannot state with any degree of certainty how many parishes he has: he cannot be sure whether a priest or a dean whom he has probably not seen for two or three years will still acknowledge him as his bishop. For example Archbishop Serhii (Hensyts'kyi) of Ternopil' and Kremenets' admitted when describing the situation in his diocese in May 1998 that 'I cannot give you the exact number of parishes within my diocese. It is impossible to say which church one deanery actually belongs to. The dean belongs to the UOC–MP and to the UAOC, and he is also a priest in the neighbouring Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi diocese of our Ukrainian Orthodox Church.'⁷² It is virtually impossible to 'smoke out' schismatic priests from the church, especially if they have the support of their parish. In Donetsk diocese a war has been raging for several years now with a certain Yurchik, parish priest at one of the churches in Maryupil', who announced that he was setting up his church as the centre of an independent 'Gothic Church' (*Gotskaya tserkov'*). The community is small, the priest has a dubious reputation and the diocese enjoys good relations with the local authorities, but the diocese is having no success in its attempts to get the church back.

Future Prospects

The potential for the development of the religious infrastructure in Ukraine has still not yet been fully exploited. The number of the various religious groups continues to grow and although the rate of increase is gradually slowing (in 1988 there were 6179 registered communities; in 1994, 14,556; in 1998, 19,780; and in 1999, 21,215⁷³) more than a thousand new religious communities are still being registered annually.⁷⁴ The majority belong to the traditional denominations. The most rapid development will continue to take place in the south-east, where the traditional denominations have previously been weak. Here, as has been noted above, the number of communities can increase two- or three-fold before they reach the average number of registered communities for the country as a whole.

Understandably, the major task in the next ten years for these newly-formed communities, and for a good many old ones, will be to become properly established. They need to find priests, build churches and establish educational institutions. It is only once they have reached this stage that the Ukrainian churches will be able to

consider further developments such as mass catechisation, counteracting the effects of 'shamanism' and exerting a real influence on the political life of the country. Only once they have overcome the burden of the Soviet legacy on the organisational level will they be able to devote their energies fully to the task of religious service and education to which they are called.

It is difficult to predict whether this religious education will be effective, or whether the traditional denominations will be able to regain the position they occupied in society before the revolution. As part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine in the twentieth century went through a programme of enforced and extensive modernisation, involving huge costs in human terms. This brought about a fundamental change in the demographic and sociological profile of the country. According to these indicators, Ukraine (like Russia) is now similar to the developed countries of Europe. It has a predominantly urban population (72 per cent), which is relatively highly educated, with many opportunities for individual advancement (vertical social links). The level of religious culture, if one understands this in terms of weekly church attendance and the influence of the clergy, is relatively low in such modern states.

The short interval of 1990–93, which saw an extremely high level of interest in religion and when the authority of the clergy was unshakable, has now passed. People have begun to realise that 'priests are people too' and not angels incarnate, and that membership of the church is not simply a right but that it imposes certain obligations. Just as it would be impossible to return to the Soviet era, so too it would be impossible to recreate the religious 'boom' brought about by *perestroika*. Priests who now live in an era when they can no longer expect the devoted and unquestioning loyalty of their parishioners will either have to go out to the people, or will have to come to terms with the sad fact that they are just part of the 'cultural heritage', with no influence in society.

The main source of conflict between church and state at the beginning of the new century has shifted from the political to the economic sphere. State officials have fortunately realised the danger of meddling in issues of faith and interdenominational relations. The tax authorities, in their search for new sources of income to supplement the permanently empty state purse, will be forced to look to the income of the religious organisations. For the time being they are not making any concerted efforts to do so, because a large proportion of the Ukrainian economy functions in the shadows and the churches are not the most profitable organisations which need to be brought under the financial control of the state straight away. However, this situation is bound to change in the future. The annual turnover of the largest denominations in Ukraine is already reaching millions of dollars, although no denomination (at least none of the Orthodox churches) has produced a budget, even a sketchy and approximate one, since Ukraine gained its independence. Even the compilers of financial information submitted to the tax authorities are perhaps unaware of the extent to which this information has been fabricated. More than 90 per cent of the money passing through church organisations is in cash and there is insufficient accountability and control even at parish level.

Will the divided Orthodox churches ever unite? Many people would like them to, but this is unlikely to happen in the near future. Parishes will probably continue to unite, transfer or divide at the local level, but generally the situation appears relatively stable. Of course the UOC–MP needs to resolve the complex question of its own position and the contradictions within the church resulting from Ukraine's status as an independent state. The most obvious way forward (although not the only one) would be for the church to gain autocephaly. Meanwhile, the UOC–KP faces a

different question, more personal but no less problematic. The church is still led by one man, Metropolitan Filaret, who also founded it, and is totally dependent on his physical condition (or at least so it appears to the outside observer). Who will be his protegee? What will happen to the church when Filaret is no longer able to lead it?

If the UOC–MP and the UOC–KP are unable to overcome the centrifugal tendencies within their internal structures, it is possible that a large number of Orthodox churches in the western and central regions will form themselves into loose ungovernable associations. Such associations, with the status of ‘canonical’ or ‘national’ churches, would give formal legitimacy to local congregations, but their influence on the internal life of these parishes, and on their finances in particular, would be virtually nil. Such a situation would lead inevitably to a growth in the influence of parish councils, for nature abhors a vacuum, and the power of the clergy would be contained, if not from above, then from below.

Notes and References

- ¹ All statistics from the Ukrainian State Committee for Religious Affairs. Source: ‘Relihiini orhanizatsii v Ukraini stanom na 1 sichnia 1999 roku’, *Liudyna i svit*, (Kiev), no. 1, 1999, p. 24.
- ² Most of Volynia became part of the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, but became part of Poland in 1921, when the border ran along the Zbruch river. Interregional borders in modern western Ukraine do not always correspond to historic divisions, but this is of little significance in our discussion of general tendencies.
- ³ The statistics available (see ‘Relihiini orhanizatsii v oblastiakh Ukraini, Kievi ta Krymu (stanom na 1 sichnia 1999 roku)’, *Liudyna i svit*, no. 1, 1999, pp. 28–31) in a regional breakdown give only the total number of religious organisations (parishes, monasteries, missions, brotherhoods and educational institutions). It is not possible to extract figures on parishes alone. When referring therefore to ‘parishes’, or ‘congregations’, in particular regions we refer to the total number of religious organisations, which is probably 7–8 per cent higher than the number of parishes.
- ⁴ Of this number around 50,000 are Jehovah’s Witnesses, 50,000 are Pentecostals and 30,000 are Adventists. The remainder are Baptists, of whom 120,000 belong to the All-Ukrainian Union of Evangelical Christians/Baptists, led by Hrihorii Komendant. One of the most acute problems faced by Protestants at present remains that of mass emigration to the West, mainly to the USA and Canada, especially for the old-style groups. According to Elens’kyi, the average size of a Protestant congregation is 60–65 and there is a tendency for this number to decrease given the rise in the general number of churches. According to Komendant, in the UECB 10 per cent of congregations have more than 200 members, 40 per cent have 100–200 members and 45 per cent 50–100 members. Large congregations are mostly found in regional centres and in towns and some villages in western Ukraine. It is these congregations which attract the most new converts. Source: Author’s interview with Hrihorii Komendant, 8 May 1999. Author’s archive.
- ⁵ See V. Bondarenko, ‘Religioznaya situatsiia na Ukraine i perspektivy yeye razvitiia’, *Relihiia i suspil’stvo v Ukraini: faktory zmin (Religiya i obshchestvo na Ukraine: faktory peremen)* (proceedings of an international conference) (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Kiev, 1998), pp. 15–16.
- ⁶ In Dnipropetrovs’k *oblast’* and in Kiev the gap between the number of parishes is already minimal: 283 and 200; 93 and 86 respectively.
- ⁷ The postwar forced mass repatriation of Galician Poles is an important factor here. However, ‘soviet’ Poles, who had lived in fairly compact groups in right-bank Ukraine since the eighteenth century, were not subjected to deportation.
- ⁸ At the end of May the Roman Catholic Church even posted a Russian-language website: www.rkc.lviv.ua.

- ⁹ According to Wiesław Stepien there are a potential 100,000 Catholic worshippers in Kiev. At present there are six Roman Catholic parishes in the city, attracting a total of 10–15,000 people every Sunday. In the main Roman Catholic cathedral there are services in Ukrainian, Polish, Russian and English. Source: Author's interview with Fr Wiesław Stepien, Kiev, 10 May 1999. Author's archive.
- ¹⁰ *ibid.*
- ¹¹ In Galicia, Bukovina and Zakarpattia at least 90 per cent of the population describe themselves in sociological surveys as believers. In Volynia this figure is lower, but is still notably higher than the Ukrainian average of 65–68 per cent. See 'Vidlunnia podii 1997-ho', *Liudyna i svit*, no. 1, 1998, p. 9.
- ¹² Author's interview with V. Elens'kyi, editor of the journal *Liudyna i svit*, Kiev, 5 May 1999. Author's archive.
- ¹³ According to sociological surveys 59–70 per cent of the population over the age of 16 call themselves Greek Catholics. In the country as a whole only 6–7 per cent of the population of Galicia state that they are Greek Catholic believers. 'Vidlunnia podii 1997-ho', *Liudyna i svit*, no. 1, 1998, p. 10.
- ¹⁴ If the number of Orthodox congregations is smaller than the number of Greek Catholic congregations by approximately one third, the actual number of Orthodox congregations is significantly lower. The split among the Orthodox has led to the emergence of several different Orthodox communities in the same village, or even in the same church.
- ¹⁵ Author's interview with Bishop Nikolai (Grokh) of Ivano-Frankivs'k, Ivano-Frankivs'k, June 1998. Author's archive.
- ¹⁶ See R. Khots', 'Ukrainskaya greko-katolicheskaya tserkov' mezhdru natsionalizmom i ekumenizmom', in Mark Smirnov (ed.), *Dia-logos: Religiiya i obschestvo 1997: Al'manakh* (Istina i zhizn', Moscow, 1997), pp. 351–366; and V.N. Savchenko, 'Vostochnaya Galitsiya v 1914–15 godakh (etnosotsial'nyye osobennosti i problema prisoyedineniya k Rossii)', *Voprosy istorii*, no. 11–12, 1996, pp. 95–106.
- ¹⁷ V. Moroz, 'Khronika soprotivleniya', *Natsional'ny vopros v SSSR: sbornik dokumentov* (Suchasnist', New York, 1975), p. 161.
- ¹⁸ See for example 'Ya vyris u tserkvi' (interview with Bishop Mikhail Koltun of the Zboriv diocese of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church), *Liudyna i svit*, no. 1, 1998, pp. 33–35.
- ¹⁹ Yarema was in favour of the return of the Uniates into the Orthodox fold and as a layman had belonged to Gavriil Kostel'nik's 'Initiative Group' which in 1947, with the support of the NKVD, convened the L'viv Sobor, which then announced the unification of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church with the Moscow Patriarchate.
- ²⁰ Until October 1990 the governing body of the Moscow Patriarchate was called the Ukrainian Exarchate and was run, at least in theory, by Moscow. After the establishment of the UOC (by decree of the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church on 25–27 October 1990) it was accorded independent status and the right to direct its own affairs. However in structural terms the church as before belongs to the ROC. At its services (at least in parishes where it is still possible) Patriarch Aleksii II is prayed for as the head of the church and bishops of the UOC participate in the Bishops' Councils of the ROC.
- ²¹ According to Elens'kyi, Filaret's problem is that he prefers to adopt the 'trampled flower' approach to personnel matters. In other words there is never a number two, three or four in the church. Filaret occupies the top five positions and all the other bishops bring up the rear together. Filaret therefore often finds himself without the support he needs within the church when the 'pawns' start to mass against the 'king'. In 1992, out of the 20 or more bishops who at that time belonged to the UOC-MP, only two bishops, Andrii (Horak) and Yakiv (Panchuk), stayed firm for Filaret. There were a few waverers, as well as those who had at first declared their support and then retracted it. The UAOC had only one legally consecrated bishop at its disposal – Bishop Ioann (Bondarchuk).
- ²² In the south-east, as noted above, the mood has always been more pro-Russian. It has not been possible to convince rank-and-file priests and parishioners of the need for an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. For example, after Archbishop Lazar' (Shvets) of

Odesa declared his support for the UOC–KP in 1992 diocesan clerics and seminarians from the Odesa Theological Seminary drove him out of his residence and refused to allow him back in. (Later Archbishop Lazar' announced that he had been mistaken, and he is now the ruling bishop of the Simferopol' diocese.) See N. Mitrokhin and S. Timofeyeva, *Yepiskopy i yeparkhii RPTs* (000 Panorama, Moscow), 1997, p. 324.

²³ For example on two occasions Leonid Kravchuk made requests for the granting of autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church (in 1992 to Patriarch Aleksii II and in 1993 to Patriarch Bartholomaios of Constantinople).

²⁴ For the differing viewpoints see: V. Anisimov, *Istinny lik filaretskogo patriarkhata* (a three-part collection of articles and documents), part 1 (Poslednyaya gran', Kiev, 1999), 128 pp.; Fr Dimitri (Rudyuk) (ed.), *Neppravda moskovskikh anafem* (Kiev, 1999), 471 pp.; and A. Gubar, 'Patriarkh Filaret i polnota Ukrainskoi tserkvi', *Pravoslavny tserkovny kalendar' na 1999* (UPTS–KP, Kiev, 1998), pp. 97–103.

²⁵ Author's interview with Patriarch Filaret of the UOC–KP, Kiev, 7 May 1999. Author's archive.

²⁶ *ibid.*

²⁷ For details on Filaret's views on various religious and social issues, see Filaret (Denisenko), 'Rozhdestvo Khristovo i yego ontologicheskoye znacheniye dlya chelovechestva', *Pravoslavny tserkovny kalendar' na 1999* (UPTS–KP, Kiev, 1998), pp. 71–96.

²⁸ For example, the Commission for the Unification of the Churches at the Supreme Rada, chaired by Liliia Hryhorovych.

²⁹ Metropolitan Ihor (Isichenko) of Kharkiv, the chancellor and the main apologist of the UAOC, is well known throughout the republic. Some Kiev religious experts call him a 'virtual metropolitan'. He actively cultivates relations with the media to ensure that the UAOC position on key issues reaches the public, but at the same time even according to official figures there are only ten parishes belonging to his church in the Kharkiv diocese. Former minister of justice Serhii Holovatyi is the political protector of the church.

³⁰ The number of parishes in all UAOC dioceses is falling, with the exception of the L'viv diocese, which is the 'historical homeland' of the church.

³¹ Author's interview with Patriarch Dmytrii (Yarema), Kiev, 6 May 1999. Author's archive.

³² Author's interview with Patriarch Filaret (Denisenko), Kiev, 7 May 1999. Author's archive.

³³ According to Elens'kyi the figure is around 600. Author's interview with Elens'kyi, 5 May 1999. Author's archive.

³⁴ For more details on relations between the Orthodox churches see: O. Kudlai, 'Mizhpravoslavnyi konflikt v Ukraini: pozitsii storin', *Liudyna i svit*, no. 5–6, 1998, pp. 2–8.

³⁵ Oleks Petriv, 'Perspektivy ekumenizma s tochki zreniya UGKTs', *Relihiia i suspil'stvo v Ukraini: faktory zmin*, pp. 134–35.

³⁶ I arrived at this figure on the basis of statistics from the Vinnytsa, Volodymyr-Volyn's'kyi, Simferopol', Kharkiv and Chernihiv dioceses.

³⁷ Adult attendance at Sunday schools is an additional phenomenon. According to surveys I conducted in dioceses of the North Caucasus, which have a similar level of religious culture among the Christian population, adults made up one sixth of the total number of Sunday school pupils. See Nikolai Mitrokhin, 'Pravoslaviye na Severnom Kavkaze', *Faktory etno-konfessional'noi identichnosti v postsovetskom obshchestve* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow, 1998), pp. 40–41.

³⁸ Statistics from the Ukrainian State Committee for Religious Affairs. Source: 'Dynamika zbil'shennia relihiinykh hromad v Ukraini: 1988–1998 rr.', *Liudyna i svit*, no. 1, 1998, p. 32.

³⁹ However, at least two of my interviewees, belonging to different churches (the UOC–MP and the UGCC), independently stated that many priests in their churches were former tractor drivers. They were evidently referring both to their occupation before entering the priesthood and to their level of education (basic secondary).

⁴⁰ It is curious that the proportion of Orthodox priests compared to 1993 fell from 51.3 per cent at the same time as the proportion of Protestant ministers rose.

⁴¹ Bondarenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19.

⁴² For every place at the Kiev Theological Seminary there are between 3 and 6.5 applicants. To alleviate this situation it was decided to take entrants no younger than 20 (so that they did not use the seminary as a means of avoiding military service). The drop-out rate during the course is very low – 10 per cent – and there is a possibility of resuming the course. A significant number of students come from former military academies which have now closed, and many are children of teachers. There are few children from clergy families, although many students are related to priests. Source: Author's interview with Mykola Zabuha, rector of the Kiev Theological Academy, Kiev, 7 May 1999. Author's archive. In this way the fairly high general level of education among seminarians compensates for the not very high standards of teaching of theological subjects. The students can study material not covered by the teacher independently.

⁴³ Author's interview with Mykola Zabuha.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵ Perhaps the situation is better in the Roman Catholic Church, which has three seminaries in Ukraine (in L'viv (120 students); Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi (100 students); and Kiev (31 students)). However, these seminaries have so far not produced any graduates (the course lasts six years) and I was unable to obtain any independent assessment of them, so I do not consider it possible to discuss the quality of the education offered there.

⁴⁶ Bondarenko, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷ This was recorded in a memorandum on the rejection of force in interdenominational disputes, mediated by the State Committee for Religious Affairs and signed by nearly all the main denominations in 1997. According to the Ukrainian press, this memorandum has not been very effective, but nevertheless it did impose specific obligations on the churches. The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations at the State Committee for Religious Affairs, which includes the vast majority of religious communities (92 per cent), has since 27 November 1996 acted as a mediator in interdenominational conflicts. The nature of the interrelationship between denominations in this Council and in other interchurch organisations is a subject for a separate analysis.

⁴⁸ Bondarenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20.

⁴⁹ A conference was convened to debate this issue at the initiative of deans in the Volodymyr-Volyn's'kyi diocese and of many in the Rovno diocese; it took place at the Pochaiv Monastery of the Caves. An appeal signed by 190 priests and 350 laypeople declared that 'the UOC should not have to ask anyone for anything' and stated that the Bishops' Council of the UOC–MP which took the decision in 1996 that the church did not need to request autocephaly had not sought the opinion of the western dioceses. Bishops Serhii (Hensyts'kyi) of Ternopil' and Avhustyn (Markevich) of L'viv, well known for their firm pro-Moscow views, arrived to placate the deans. They told conference delegates that 'the archbishops will sort it out between themselves' and thus brought the discussion to a close. Petro Vlodek, rector of the Luts'k Theological Seminary, is well known among the clergy of the western region as a UOC–MP apologist for autocephaly.

⁵⁰ 'The diocese of Volodymyr-Volyn's'kyi is not alone in believing that the granting of autocephaly would resolve many problems, including that of schism within the church ... I do not think that autocephaly is a sin if it is achieved through canonical means.' Author's interview with Bishop Simeon (Shostats'kyi), Kiev, 7 May 1999. Author's archive.

⁵¹ According to rumours among high-ranking clergy in the UOC–MP, in 1998 the bishops of the church were surveyed on the issue of autocephaly. Out of 37 only five were firmly convinced that autocephaly was not necessary: Metropolitan Agafangel (Savvin) of Odesa; Bishop Serhii (Hensyts'kyi) of Ternopil'; Archbishop Onufrii (Berezovs'kyi) of Chernivtsi; Archbishop Ionafan (Elens'kyi) of Sumy; and Archbishop Ioanykii (Kobzev). Even if such a survey did not in fact take place, the rumour is in itself significant.

⁵² Author's interview with religious expert N. Kachan, Kiev, 9 May 1999. Author's archive.

⁵³ See for example K.F. Zatulin and A.N. Sevast'yanov, 'Rossiisko-ukrainsky dogovor: obman veka', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 26 January 1999.

- ⁵⁴ From the 'Gromada' Party. According to Elens'kyi, when party leader P. Lazarenko was prime minister another charismatic pastor was his adviser on spiritual matters.
- ⁵⁵ Before the elections this party broadcast film footage on television showing Fascist storm-troopers and parades of the Ukrainian National Self-Defence Organisation (*Ukrains'ka natsional'na samooborona*) (UNSO) with a voice-over promising 'we will liberate you from the terrors of nationalism'.
- ⁵⁶ The 'Forward Ukraine' (*Vpered Ukraina*) Bloc, which included the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (*Ukrainskaya khristiansko-demokraticeskaya partiya*) and the Christian People's Union (*Khristiansky narodny soyuz*), polled 1.74 per cent of the vote. The Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine (*Khristiansko-demokraticeskaya partiya Ukrainy*) polled 1.3 per cent and the Republican Christian Party (*Respublikanskaya khristianskaya partiya*) polled 0.54 per cent. Source: 'Relihiia i tserkva v Ukraini: berezen', *Liudyna i svit*, no. 4, 1998, p. 29.
- ⁵⁷ For this reason, incidentally, many priests in the UOC–KP who did not have a good chance of getting elected did not even stand as candidates.
- ⁵⁸ Author's interview with Bishop Pavel (Lebed'), Kiev, 7 May 1999. Author's archive.
- ⁵⁹ The extent of such interrelationships can be judged by such oblique indicators as which individuals were granted church awards by Patriarch Filaret of the UOC–KP to mark his 70th birthday celebrations on 24 February 1999. (Ironically enough, these nearly coincided with the jubilee of Patriarch Aleksii, which fell on 23 February.) Those receiving awards included: V.P. Gorbulin (secretary of the Ukrainian State Security Committee) and his deputy; M.V. Glady (vice-premier); A.A. Omel'chenko (mayor of Kiev, known to be sympathetic to Filaret) and two of his deputies; M.V. Korniyenkov (deputy minister of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs); L.A. Lisichenko (chief editor of Ukrainian state television); people's deputies I.V. Drach, A.S. Matviyenko and I.R. Yukhnovsky; Yu.V. Kolesnikov (president of the 'Ukrintergazbud' company); Yu.I. Zbitnev (president of the 'Yevrogaz' company); S.A. Farenik (chief executive of the 'Ukrgazbud' company); A.V. Gubar (head of public relations at the 'Natfogaz Ukrainy' company and author of articles supporting Filaret); S.M. Arzhevitin (chief executive of the 'Azhiu' Bank, where Filaret is rumoured to keep his funds); V.A. Boguslayev (president of the Interregional Association of Manufacturers and director of 'Motor-Sich'); A.A. Sugonyaka (president of the Ukrainian Banking Association) and A.K. Golubchenko (president of the All-Ukrainian Union of Metallurgists). It is noticeable that Filaret has surrounded himself with supporters mainly in Kiev (of the 29 who received awards, only two came from the provinces – from Ternopil' and Volynia). 'Nahorodi v den' yubileiu Sviatiishoho Patriarkha Filareta', *Pravoslavnii visnyk*, no. 1, 1999, pp. 42–43.
- ⁶⁰ He was forced to withdraw, however, following pressure from the diocesan administration.
- ⁶¹ Priests were elected as follows: 6 to *oblast'* soviets, 7 to municipal soviets, 30 to *raion* soviets and 18 to village soviets. Practically all the priests elected are from western Ukraine: 19 in Zakarpattia, 14 in L'viv, 5 in Volynia and 4 in Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblasti*. In central Ukraine from one to three priests were elected per *oblast'*. In the south-east virtually no priests were elected. A. Shuba, 'Religiya i politika v ukrainskom obshchestve', *Religiya i suspil'stvo v Ukraini: faktory zmin*, pp. 63–64.
- ⁶² *ibid.*
- ⁶³ Fewer than one per cent of those surveyed in Ukraine as a whole stated that they were Muslims. See 'Vidlunnia podii 1997-ho', *Liudyna i svit*, no. 1, 1998, p. 10.
- ⁶⁴ For more details see S. Chervonnaya, 'Islam v Krymu: istoriya i srovennost'', *Liudyna i svit*, no. 3, 1998, pp. 2–9.
- ⁶⁵ According to Elens'kyi, the heterogeneity of the UOC–MP membership makes it impossible to analyse in accordance with standard sociological methods. In many regions the number of parishioners stating that they belong to the UOC–MP increases noticeably – by 15 to 16 per cent – if mention of the 'Moscow Patriarchate' is removed from questionnaires, but in Crimea, for example, it is the reverse. Many regard themselves as members not of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church but of the Russian Orthodox Church. 'Vidlunnia

podii 1997-ho', p. 10.

- ⁶⁶ 'Whether or not the patriarch is mentioned depends mainly on the individual regions within our dioceses and even on individual parishes within a given region. In places he is remembered as "our great and omnipotent father, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus"'; in some places the word "Moscow" is omitted; in others he is remembered as "our great and omnipotent father, Patriarch Aleksii II"; and in some parishes he is not remembered at all. The patriarch gave this his blessing when he visited Pochaiv in Ukraine.' Author's interview with Bishop Simeon (Shostats'kyi).
- ⁶⁷ These are mass movements only in the context of a fairly narrow group of so-called 'churched' ('*votserkovlennyye*') laypeople – that is, people with a high level of religious culture who attend church regularly, and who are also described as 'Orthodox society' ('*pravoslavnyaya obshchestvennost'*').
- ⁶⁸ '*Rus' pravoslavnyaya* is a product of those sects I talked about earlier. I do not even read it, it goes straight onto the fire. They are also servants of the devil ... the staff on this paper are Komosomol members, sent by the Masons to destroy the church. This newspaper should be renamed *Rus' sataninskaya*.' Author's interview with Bishop Pavel (Lebed').
- ⁶⁹ *Kodirovaniye – podobiye 666* (Poslednyaya gran', Kiev, 1998), p. 64.
- ⁷⁰ I have at my disposal a whole set of documents compiled in 1998 by the secret Crimean Society for the Defence of the Purity of Orthodoxy (*Krymskoye obshchestvo zashchity chistoty Pravoslaviya*). Its founders claim that this society has at least 1500 members and that 'when the archpastor and his deans are replaced the number of our members will increase significantly'. One document states that 'In Russia and Ukraine a movement of healthy forces to defend Orthodoxy has begun. A public appeal in the Donetsk region (the article 'God is betrayed by silence' ('*Molchaniyem predayetsya Bog*')), and an appeal by Orthodox brotherhoods, clergy and parishioners in the Luhans'k-Starobils'k diocese (the article 'Preserving the church' ('*Sokhranit' tserkov*')) – around 8000 signatures and other societies – prove that this is the case.' The same package contains extensive 'compromising material' about Archbishop Lazar' of Crimea and Simferopol' and about the 'priestly clans' of the diocese.
- ⁷¹ A. Kurayev, *Dayut li na Ukraine pechat' antikhrista?* (Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev Metropolitanate, Kiev, 1999), 40 pp.
- ⁷² Author's interview with Archbishop Serhii (Hensyts'kyi) of Ternopil', Ternopil', May 1998. Author's archive.
- ⁷³ 'Dynamika zbil'shennia relihiinykh hromad v Ukraini: 1988–1998 rr.', p. 32; 'Relihiini orhanizatsii v Ukraini stanom na 1 sichnia 1999 roku', p. 27.
- ⁷⁴ The rate of growth is fairly stable: more than 1000 communities are registered annually (in recent years there has even been a small increase). However, in percentage terms, compared to the number of already registered communities, this number is gradually decreasing, from 20 to 5 per cent.

(Translated from the Russian by Suzanne Pattle)