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PLATO'S THEOLOGY.

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Plato once said: "I am thankful to heaven for four things: that I was born a man and not a brute; a male and not a female; a Greek and not a barbarian; and a citizen of Athens in the days of Socrates." What did the philosopher mean when he said, "I thank heaven"? What conception did he have of heavenly powers? What was his notion of deity?

It is the purpose of this paper to answer this question, first of all in the language of Plato himself. In quoting from his writings the effort has been made to follow the chronological order and to exclude all statements that are made only to be refuted.

I begin with his "Apology" for Socrates.

"You say that I am an atheist. You know that I believe in daimons, but daimons are either gods or the sons of gods and nymphs. How can I deny the existence of gods when I believe in the existence of sons of gods?"

"Chaerepho went to the god at Delphi and asked whether anyone was wiser than I. Pythia answered, 'No.' This answer is the cause of the calumnies against me. But what did the god mean? for I know that I am wise neither in great things nor in small. The god cannot have lied. That would be wrong for a god. I conclude that he means that I am wiser than other men because they, while knowing nothing, think they know, but I know that I do not know. God alone is wise and in this oracle he estimates human wisdom as little or nothing.

"I would sin gravely if I should, for fear of death or any other thing, desert the post where God wishes me to remain. It is the greatest disgrace not to obey a superior, whether god or man. If you should be willing to release me on condition that I would hereafter give up the pursuit of philosophy, I will answer: 'I love you, nevertheless I would rather obey God than you, and as long as I live I will not cease to philosophize.' This is God's will. No greater good has happened in this city

than this worship which I have rendered to God, for I constantly go about persuading your youth and your old men to care first not for the body, nor for money, but for the mind. I teach that virtue does not come from money, but money from virtue. This duty I will not give up, no not if I should die many deaths. Know this that if you kill such a one as I am, you will not injure me as much as you will yourselves. Beware lest you sin against God. Perchance someone asks: 'Why do you not remain silent?' But this question is hard to answer. For if I should say that 'That would not be obeying God,' you would not believe me."

Plato continues the same subject in his "Euthyphro": "Melitus accused me, because I want men to think of the gods in a manner which is worthy of men and of gods. According to the vulgar opinion, the gods quarrel among themselves and they love and hate just and unjust, honest and base alike. If we should say that that is holy which all the gods love it would be replied that holiness is loved by the gods because it is holy, and not holy because it is loved by them. We cannot regard the worship of the gods as we do the service of a slave for his master. The slave looks for a reward for the useful service which he renders his master, but what useful service do we render the gods by our vows and sacrifices in return for all the good things we ask from them?" Plato discourses on prayer in his Alcibiades: "If you and the city act justly and soberly, you will please the gods. If you look at the divine and bright you will know yourselves and do right. If you look at the undivine and dark, you will do like things and not know yourselves. Wickedness becomes slaves. Virtue becomes the free. We are not fit to address ourselves to the divine power until we know enough of his nature to know what we owe him. What that nature is I will not examine to-day. We must wait patiently until someone, either a god or some inspired man, teach us our moral and religious duties and remove the darkness from our eyes.

"The Spartans pray simply that they may obtain honor and good and they have had more continuous prosperity than the Athenians. The gods honor wise and just men more than they

do numerous and costly offerings. I pray for special advice as to what good I should do. I think life would be intolerable without such communications. If properly approached the gods will give premonitions and warnings so as to enable one to keep out of the way of evil and to walk in the way of good. That is all I dare to pray for. The gods are not moved by costly more than humble sacrifices, for they consider the circumstances of the offerer and whether he is just and wise. If one does not know goodness, the knowledge of other things will be rather hurtful than beneficial to him."

In "Meno" he adds: "Health, honor, riches, power are not virtue but vice unless accompanied by temperance, justice and piety."

In his "Protagoras", Plato gives the germ of his argument for the *likeness of the human soul and the divine*. Since man shares in the divine nature, he alone of all animated beings, believes in the existence of gods, and undertakes to establish altars in their honor. In "Phaedrus", he elaborates the same thought." It is necessary to know the truth concerning the soul, both divine and human. Every soul is immortal. There is no origin of a first principle, for there is nothing from which it can be made. If there were, it would not be the first principle. What has no origin has no end. The divine is beautiful, wise, good and all else which can be said like that. Envy stands outside of the circle of the gods. God planned all things so that they should be as nearly as possible like Him. It seems to me, O Phaedrus, a great thing to call anyone wise, and proper only in reference to God. Before we part, it is proper that we pray. O dear Pan, and as many other gods as are worshipped here, grant that I may be beautiful within, and may all I have without be congenial with it.

"May I esteem as rich none but the wise. May I have only so much money as a sober man would carry. Should we pray for anything else, O Phaedrus?" To which Phaedrus answered: "Pray for the same things for me, for friends have all things common."

"When the pure soul departs from its body it takes with it nothing that pertains to the body. By philosophy and by

meditation upon death, it attains to the divine nature, which, like itself, is immortal and wise, and then it enjoys every kind of felicity.

To attain to the nature of the gods, one must depart philosophizing and be wholly pure. True philosophers abandon all bodily lusts, and do not yield to them. True philosophy is a continual preparation for death, to wean and separate the soul from the body. The soul's pursuit of truth is perpetually stopped by little pleasures, pains and necessities of its companion, the body. Truth is eternal and the soul that is addressed by truth must be eternal also. What all assent to is self-evident and must have been learned in a previous state of existence. Do you know of unwritten laws, O Hippias, those that are equally valid everywhere? Who do you think gave those laws? If there is something which eternally knows and something which is eternally known, if there is the beautiful, the good and the true, these things do not all seem to be like a flowing stream."

Plato praised the *contemplation of beauty* in his "Symposium". "No one of the gods philosophizes or wishes to become wise, for he is wise. The soul, by the steps of science and philosophy, reaching the contemplation of divine beauty itself, enjoys the highest happiness, counting as trifles all human matters such as gold, silver, pomp, and whatever else is commonly made most of, even food and drink being neglected for the contemplation of beauty alone, to behold nothing but that and yet be perfectly satisfied."

Plato tells of *creation and the demiurge* in his "Timaeus". "Feelings and virtues are mortal. Nothing but pure knowledge belongs to divine perfection. God is eternal, ineffable, supreme. I am not able to explain the generation of the gods and the formation of the world. In such matters one must accept tradition. As the gods were created by the demiurge, so they created men, planting a soul in the body. The primary gods, the earth and the stars, were generated by the demiurge and they generated the other gods. The demiurge being good and desiring to make everything else as good as possible, transformed chaos into cosmos. He planted in its center a soul to

pervade all its body, and in the soul he put reason so that the cosmos became animated, rational, divine. Necessity produced generation without beginning or end, and intelligence introduced order into generation. It is difficult to find the maker and father of all things, and having found him, it is impossible to speak of him to all.

When God had determined to make all things good and to allow no evil, he found everything agitated, but he restored the disorderly to order, as he thought that that was the better way. It is not right and never was right to make anything that was not most beautiful, but the best of all is intelligence. However, intelligence cannot exist without a mind, so he put intelligence in the mind, and the mind in the body.

So he thought the effect would be the most beautiful. So he made this world alive and intelligent, and guarded it by divine Providence."

Plato mentions *eternal punishment* in his "Phaedo." "We are in a prison until God delivers us. The soul is the cause of the life of the body and cannot die.

Men are the slaves of the gods. They are our keepers and we are their flocks. There will be a state of eternal rewards and punishments, where and what no man can tell. Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius; do not fail to pay the debt."

Plato mentions *the goodness of the gods* in the "Republic." "If we would become a friend of God, who is perfect, we must become like him. God is good and cannot be the cause of evil to any man. The multitude says the gods are to blame for everything. Men do not blame themselves for wrong, but they blame fate and the gods, anything rather than themselves. But God is not to blame for human errors and sufferings. The gods are good. No myth should be taught which gives a different impression. Falsehood is odious both to gods and men. The true heavenly philosophy and a people in possession of it may have existed in the past or may now exist in some obscure part of a barbarian or oriental land or may at some future period be revealed to the rest of the human race.

The daimon is a manifestation of the divine will rarely if ever vouchsafed to any man. God is perfect goodness and he

must never be represented as the author of evil. The gods dispense only good things. Suffering they send, but only as healing penalty or as a real benefit. Is not god really good, and must we not thus ever affirm? He does no evil neither can he be the cause of anything evil. The good cannot, therefore, be the cause of all things, but only of those that are good, of few things, for our good things are fewer than our evil things."

Plato deals with *the relation of God to evil* in "Theaetetus". "No god is malevolent to men, neither would I act malevolently in anything.

It seems impious to me to admit the false or to reject the true. God is never unjust, but always most just. And there is nothing like Him but a most just man. Knowledge of this is true wisdom and virtue. It is impossible for evil to be wholly extirpated, for it is always necessary for good to have its opposite. Evil cannot find place with the gods, but it necessarily passes around in mortal nature and in inferior regions. For this reason we ought to strive to flee hence as quickly as possible, for flight is to be like god and likeness to him is to be just, holy and prudent."

Plato maintains in "Sophistes" that *the universe originated not in chance, but in intelligence.*" All animals and plants and whatever grows from seeds and roots, whatever inanimate things are in the earth, and things that can or cannot be liquified, have proceeded from no one else than God. We should repudiate the teaching that nature by a certain automatic force and accident brought forth these things without the aid of reason and divine wisdom."

Plato refers to *the eternity of matter* in his "Philebus". "If pleasure is not the supreme good neither is that mind of yours. Socrates answered: That may be true of my mind, but not of the divine mind. Is not a just and holy man always beloved of the gods? Now that we approach the question whether the universe was generated or whether it was eternal, we ought to invoke the gods that whatever we say may be first of all according to their minds, and then be consistent with our nature."

Plato appears as an *Agnostic* in his "Parmenides": "The per-

fect form of cognition must belong to the gods if it belongs to anyone. They cannot know the truth relating to us which belongs to our cognition any more than we can know the more perfect truth that belongs to them. They are not our masters, neither are we their servants. They can in no way correlate with us, and we can in no way correlate with them. Their cognition does not correlate with individual objects like us. They do not know us.

"A man may reasonably maintain either that there are no gods, or, granting that they exist, that they are essentially unknown by us. The gods are produced by art, the art of the law-giver. Therefore, there are different gods everywhere, according to the laws which the different nations have received. As we give ourselves up to the worship of nature absolutely, we slough off the ideas of religion which we have inherited." In "Politicus", Plato *denounces the poets* for their debasing view of the gods. "The poets debase the nature of the gods in many ways, feigning that it is different from what it really is. We ought to think of God as good and harming no one. He cannot possibly injure anyone, but he is rather the cause and author of all that is profitable and pleasing.

All right things proceed from him. The world is a living, intelligent subject, having mind as well as body, and is the image of its maker.

We must not suppose that two gods with opposing purposes hold sway in it. In the intelligible world the idea of goodness exists, and, when it is seen, it must be regarded as the cause of all things that are right and beautiful. It creates in the visible world light and the source of light, and in the intelligible world it produces truth and mind. Do not be surprised if those who have progressed so far as to see this do not care for human affairs but prefer to live above always. God inflicts punishment on criminals to improve them,

He is truthful and he never deceives men whether they are asleep or awake."

In the "Laws", Plato discusses *divine providence and retribution*: "It is for us to regulate and lay down the law in conjunction with the Delphic oracle to determine what festivals shall

be held and to what divinities it will be best for the state to offer sacrifices. The twelfth month is sacred to Pluto. We should not feel ill-will toward Pluto, but should rather honor him as the god kindest to the race, for it is not better for the soul to be connected with the body than to be separated from it. Let us invoke his aid in the construction of our state; may he hear us and, when he has listened to our request, may he kindly and propitiously come to our assistance, that he may jointly, with us, arrange the state and the laws. Two things give dignity to man. He is an animated being, and, of all animated beings, he is the most religious. God is the best measure of all things, far better than man. The wise man is god-like and God's friend. The stars are bodies of individual gods.

The demuirge is not the highest divinity; the highest is a soul that rules over gods. Greeks and barbarians all believe in gods. Some men absolutely deny the divine existence; others say that God does not care, and still others maintain that he cares for physical but not for moral affairs. It is commonly said that the great God and the universe and the causes of things are not proper studies for youth, but I claim that such studies are profitable to the state and well pleasing to God. It is necessary for the world to be ruled by a soul. By one soul or by many? Megillus says, by many; but the stranger from Athens says, by two, one good and one bad. Wherever there is order, beauty and constancy in the midst of change, so that all things obey the same laws, there prudence, wisdom and the other attributes of a beneficent soul prevail. The very circuit of the heavens demonstrates that a good mind presides over it, but the universe is not all governed by one being, for evil cannot be referred to God. God who, according to the tradition of our forefathers, holds in his hand the beginning, the middle and the end of all things follows the right path in ruling the world. He is accompanied by law, by which the despisers of divine laws are punished, and which those who would be happy worship with humble minds. Let us therefore follow God that we may be like him. Let us do those things which are pleasing to him, cultivating every virtue but regarding as unlike God and as an enemy of God every man who is intem-

perate and unjust. Being such as they are, carelessness, negligence and other reprehensible traits of character must be far removed from the gods. Since the gods see and know all things, since they have full power to do all things, and are good besides, it is impossible for them to be negligent and inert. The gods can never be corrupted by the gifts of men. Who and what are they? They rule the whole heavens. Those who think that the gods will grant permission to men to be unjust on condition that they share in the rapine, treat them as dogs, to which the wolves leave a part of the sheep as a reward for being permitted to ravage the flock. The gods are the greatest of all guardians. As guardians of the best things, of virtue forsooth, they would be worse than dogs if they betrayed justice for the sake of sharing in the profit of injustice. This judgment of the gods no man can escape, neither by hiding himself in the depths of the earth nor by taking wings to fly to heaven. Hence it appears that the gods do not neglect the affairs of men, neither do they administer them unjustly.

“It is no easy thing to establish altars and divinities, and to introduce new rites and new gods. No one should attempt to change or unsettle anything which has come from Delphi, Dodona, or Ammon, or which ancestral traditions have recommended to us on the authority of a divine afflatus or of supernatural appearances. There must be no innovation in religion, unless all the magistrates, all the people and all the oracles give their assent to it. Men ought to be imprisoned, and, if not thus amended, they should be put to death if they are atheists, or if they deny that the gods produce all things, or if they believe that the gods can be appeased by prayers or sacrifices. The gods do the best they can to insure the triumphs of virtue over vice throughout the world. The gods may inflict punishment on the undeserving, but they can in no case remit the punishment of the guilty. A prayer for such remission is treacherous cajolery.”

Thus far I have quoted from Plato's writings in chronological order. I will now give a brief resume of his views. The nature of God was a theme so recondite that Plato announces it only to defer its discussion, and ex-

presses the hope that someone, either a god or some inspired man, will teach him religious duty and remove the darkness from his eyes. He tells of a soul like man, a soul that is not moved, but moves all things, a soul without beginning and without end, the world's soul, the soul in the center of the universe pervading it all, and making the world animate, rational, divine. This soul was made by the demiurge. The demiurge found matter in a chaotic state under the sway of blind, erratic necessity. The demiurge was good and he brought order out of confusion, cosmos out of chaos. He framed earth, sky and the other gods. He made the world not from envy, but out of kindness. Being the best himself, he made it the most beautiful. Nothing came into existence accidentally or automatically, but everything was the product of intelligence. The demiurge and the world's soul rule over all the gods. The dignity of man consists in his possession of a soul, and his supreme act is the contemplation of the world's soul.

The gods only are wise; they do not become wise, for they are wise. Knowledge belongs to the gods; feelings and virtues are mortal. The form of cognition by the gods is perfect, and yet they do not know us any more than we know them. A man may reasonably maintain that the gods are unknown. They do not correlate with individual objects like men. No god is harmful or malevolent or unjust to any man. The highest type of justice is found in the gods. Only just men are like them. The recognition of this fact is the highest wisdom. The gods are true; they never deceive men, whether sleeping or waking. They are the authors of everything profitable, pleasing and right.

In the intelligible world the idea of good exists and is seen to be the cause of all righteousness and beauty. It creates light and truth. The gods love holy actions because they are holy. The god at Delphi cannot lie. A just and holy man is always beloved of the gods. They are the pilots and the shepherds of men. They are faithful and cannot be bribed to betray their trusts.

They wish no evil. The multitude blames the gods for evil, but they are not to blame for man's errors. They do no evil,

but only good. Evil is not grounded in the nature of the gods. More events are evil than good, therefore only a few of them can be attributed to the gods; the rest must be referred to other causes. The universe cannot be governed by one power, for evil cannot be referred to God. To Megillus' suggestion that there may be many powers, the stranger from Athens replies: "There are only two, one evil and one good". Yet we cannot suppose that there are two gods swaying the universe with opposing purposes.

Evil cannot be wholly extirpated. There can be no evil where the gods are, but here it must always be. For goodness must always be accompanied by its opposite. Hence we must desire to flee from evil and from the world, for flight will bring us to God.

The gods punish the wicked forever, where or how no man can tell. The greater sinners are detruded into lower regions. No sinner can escape from punishment. The gods may punish the undeserving, but they cannot remit the punishment of the guilty.

Such are the speculations that Plato offered to philosophers, but alongside of them are statements that appeal to the unthinking masses. From these we learn that the philosopher patronized the altars and oracles of his country.

New and strange gods were not tolerated by Plato, but he proposed to punish with death those who refused to join in the national sacrifices. Practically his chief merit was as reformer of public worship, for he favored the exclusion of all traditions that ascribed evil conduct of any kind to the twelve gods of Greece.

He believed in an overruling Providence in all the affairs of men. In this particular he made his chief advance over the teachings of earlier philosophers, who had attributed to blind necessity what he traced to intelligence. Moreover Plato besought the Athenians to imitate the Spartans, who, he said, were so prosperous because they prayed only for that which is honorable. He reminded his fellow-citizens that the gods look not at costly offerings, but at honest hearts. He compared the

gods to administrators, to shepherds and to pilots, who would not betray the great interests entrusted to them.

The question naturally arises as to the sources of Plato's knowledge of the character of deity. He knew the myths of Homer and Hesiod. He traveled in Egypt, where he may have acquired the learning of the Egyptians, and may have conversed with Sekuphis, the Jew, as Plutarch relates. Aristophanes, his contemporary, knew of the Jews, for he calls them from the first word in Genesis, "Berishiti". The latter prophets refer to Greece, and the Jews had been dispersed over the earth two centuries before Plato's day. Nevertheless, there is no allusion to Holy Scripture in Plato's writings. Plato may have received old traditions of Babylon through Phenicia, Crete and Asia Minor, and later ones from Persia, whose armies had overwhelmed Greece before Plato was born. Their conception of the god of darkness and of the god of light had become known to the inquisitive Greeks. Had not Xenophon, a school-fellow of Plato's, accompanied the ten thousand Greeks on their way to Persia in the famous Anabasis? Plato knew the works of Herodotus, who was inspired by the thought that all history is determined by the moral government of the world.

Plato knew the teachings of Anaxagoras, who described the seeds of things as lying mingled without order, until the divine spirit—simple, pure, passionless reason—set the unarranged matter into motion and thereby created out of chaos an orderly world.

Plato knew the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the unity, pre-existence and transmigration of souls, and who found in numbers the principle of harmony both in the physical and in the moral world.

Plato knew the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the unity of nature, as well as the opposing view of Heraclitus, that all things are in a state of flux.

Plato was a refiner of silver, but of silver that he had not discovered himself. Every truth that he uttered concerning deity had been uttered, not so elegantly or so fully, yet distinctly uttered by other Greeks before his day.

With the help of his daimon, Plato's teacher was not able

to announce a single new truth concerning deity. Between his great teacher, Socrates, and his great pupil, Aristotle, Plato's intellect was sharpened to the utmost. He was very fond of discussing theological questions, especially in his latest work, "The Laws", but there were certain limitations of his mind in handling divine themes. I will not dwell upon his support of polytheism, of his practical acceptance of the twelve gods of Greece, for it may be said that he was legislating for the masses and thought that it would be dangerous for them to lose confidence in their gods.

Let him be praised for expurgating Greek myths and Greek poems of all that attributed immoral conduct to the gods.

I will not dwell upon the praise which he bestowed upon the oracles at Dodona and Thebes, for that may be explained in the same manner as an accommodation to public superstition. But when we turn away from idols and oracles, and confine our attention wholly to his philosophical speculations, we discover there certain limitations of Plato's mind. He starts with Socrates' lesson that knowledge is of universals. He classifies everything under some type; each group has an archetype, an idea which pervades it and controls it; the idea of the group or class is not only the model, but also the cause of the individual members of the class. Ideas are thus species or genera. The classes he makes at first are of all kinds, artificial as well as natural, imaginary as well as actual, negative as well as positive. These ideas are the sole principle of causation and the one object of true knowledge. Ideas exist, but the world is only a passing shadow and reflection of ideas. Ideas were the bridge that Plato constructed to connect the immovable unity of Parmenides and the limitless plurality of Heraclitus. Ideas are logical concepts personified and hypostatized. The particular object derives its nature and very existence from the group idea. In the "Republic", ideas appear to be created, but in "Timaeus" they are represented as uncreated and eternal. The unconscious, mythical personification of ideas became complete in the assertion that movement, life and reason belonged to them. In "Parmenides" and "Sophistes", Plato modifies his ideas in two particulars. He drops the idea of evil, of in-

justice, and of all negations as well as the idea of relations and of other imaginary classes of objects. He also separates absolutely the idea from the particular object. The idea of good, for instance, was before and above, but not in gods or men. The gods are personifications of natural objects and forces. The idea is bloodless and soulless, a thought without feeling or will, thus lacking two of the three elements that constitute a person. The idea of the good is equivalent to intelligent order in the physical world, to what is now called natural law, without any mixture of moral purpose. Plato knew nothing of the immanence of ideas in the sensible world.

The doctrine that ideas exist before but not in things was assailed by Aristotle. As Grote says: "Plato started difficulties in the negative dialogues, and, being unable to solve them, he made his escape in a cloud of metaphor. He mistook logical phantasms for real causes". Jowett agrees with Grote, for he observes that Plato was aware of the vacancy of his own ideal, the idea of good. F. C. Bauer thinks that Plato is lacking in the sense of the unity of the divine and the human, but Archer-Hind finds in the "Timaeus" matured pantheism, in which personal immortality recedes into the region of myths. Martineau wonders that Plato betrays so little consciousness of the fact that God and good can be identified by the intermediate concept of mind, but Paul Shorey says that Plato reaches the concept of the good by a wholly different train of ideas from that which led him to God, and that it is an idle problem to identify the idea of good and God.

In his ascription of goodness to deity, Plato refers to the symmetry and order which he observes in the world.

In his ascription of justice to deity he had in mind inexorable law. He expresses the hope that some people somewhere, or some man some time, may know more about divine things.

The apostle tells us that the Gentiles feel after God if haply they might find Him. Plato, most gifted of Gentiles, felt after God, but did he find Him? The apostle declares that that which may be known of God is manifest, even His eternal power and godhead. Did Plato see clearly the invisible things by the things that are made? He has no thought of an incar-

nation, of a Messiah, of the Son of God. He sometimes speaks of deity as an administrator, a pilot, even as a shepherd of men, yet he knows nothing of the real and vital relation of the soul of man to God. He knows nothing of one dead made life for all, or of one holy made sin for all. The use of sacrifice was so perverted in his day that he utterly rejected the thought of propitiation.

Naegelsbach explains that Plato's speculations could not become a religion not merely because the masses are incapable of speculation, but also because religion, unlike speculation, rests on facts.

The three questions: "Is there a God?", "How can man get rid of sin?" and "What happens after death?" Plato tries to answer, but he is not sure of the testimony of conscience, and he has no objective facts. Blackie passed this severe sentence on Plato: "He denied freedom, annihilated the individual and turned society into a machine, abolishing the family as the great social monad."

The last observation which I wish to make relates to the *limitation of the human mind* in the direction of speculations concerning deity since the days of Plato. If we examine Spinoza and Kant, the greatest thinkers of modern times, we find that they suffer from the same limitations as Plato. Spinoza, in his theologico-political treatise, speaks of the essence of God as the real subject of speculation, and of the contemplation of the divine essence as filling us with love for Him. But what is the divine essence in which Spinoza so much delights. It is substance without an attribute of wisdom or mercy. He has no confidence in prayer, identifies divine providence with self-preservation, reduces sin to opinion and confounds regeneration with knowledge. An examination of Kant's "Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason" shows that the author as a boy was trained by his Scotch father in the Holy Scriptures. Spinoza knows less of deity than Plato knew, and if Kant knew more it was not because of his keener intellect, but because he made good use of the volume of revelation. If Spinoza and Kant, the intellectual masters of the world, discovered nothing new concerning deity, who will presume to solve the problem?

Harvard names its school of philosophy after Emerson, but what can be expected of Emerson where his teachers so completely failed? E. Howard Griggs lures us on with the idle hope that what apostles and prophets have seen is nothing to what men of to-day may see by intuition.

It would be a thankless task to strike out of modern philosophical writings the sentiments that are borrowed from Holy Writ. The Bible has scattered so much light that consciously or unconsciously philosophers syncretize. If we subtract from the sum of present-day knowledge of deity the amount contributed by the father of philosophy, the remainder must be reckoned the contribution of the inspired apostles and prophets. If we deduct from Spinoza's "Tractate" and Kant's "Critique" what these writers borrowed from Plato, the remainder will equal exactly what they borrowed from the Bible.

An examination of Plato is an examination of the mind of man, and his limitations are man's limitations. He determined what the human intellect can ascertain by the observation of the universe and by reflection on its own nature concerning the attributes of God. Plato frequently admits that the task is too great for him or for any other man.

His change from monism to dualism, and from ideas to ideal numbers, shows that he was conscious that the foundations of his system were not secure. Cicero noticed that Plato, after producing many arguments and examining a question on every side, left it undetermined. His dialogues are negative, his philosophy is a tragedy. "As sad as Plato", the comic writers laughed, and was not he, the incarnation of the wisdom of this world, sad because he could not by searching find out God to perfection?