laetus aspicias, atque haec omnia obumbres [lege obumbret] sancti Filii tui Spiritus, ut quod ex hac tua benedictione acceperimus aeternitatis gloria consequamur', where, though the Holy Spirit is mentioned in close connexion with the munera supraposita altario, no mention is made of the res sacramenti, and our thoughts are carried off from the 'he that eateth Me' to dwell on the 'he shall live by Me'. In like manner, but still more forcibly, the Post Secreta of the fifth Sunday Mass (654: 315 D) says 'Offerimus tibi . . . hunc panem sanctum et calicem salutarem, obsecrantes ut infundere digneris Spiritum tuum Sanctum edentibus nobis uitam aeternam regnumque perpetuum conlatura potantibus'.

It is not in contravention of Dr Feltoe's main thesis that I submit these considerations to his judgement and to that of other theologians, but rather the contrary. I do not pretend to suggest, for I certainly do not think, that he is mistaken in suspecting that the tendency to use strong and definite words on the subject of the Real Presence is first seen in Gallican, as contrasted with Roman, sources; but that transformatio is not one of them; my contention being (i) that the tradition of its employment with a eucharistic reference is Roman, not Gallican; (ii) that when thus employed it has a distinctly different sense from that of conversio and mutatio, and (iii) that it is to be regarded as a metaphysical formula connoting either the exhibition of unseen verities by attributive τύποι in analogy with St Jerome's transfiguraui for μετεσχημάτισα, or else the replacement of one τύπος or set of τύποι by another, the second factor of the word having always a sense strictly akin to that of forma in St Jerome's forma futuri for τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος and of St Leo's forma when he styles the priesthood of Melchisedech a forma praecedens of the everlasting priesthood of our Lord and Saviour.

MARTIN RULE.

THE LAMBETH ARTICLES. II.

The original propositions, as they stand in Articuli Lambethani, read thus:—

- (r) Deus ab aeterno praedestinavit quosdam ad vitam, et quosdam ad mortem reprobavit.
- (2) Caussa efficiens Praedestinationis non est praevisio fidei aut perseverantiae aut bonorum operum aut ullius rei quae insit personis praedestinatis, sed sola et absoluta et simplex voluntas Dei.
- (3) Praedestinatorum praefinitus et certus est numerus, qui nec augeri nec minui potest.

- (4) Qui non sunt praedestinati ad salutem, necessario propter peccata condemnabuntur.
- (5) Vera, viva et iustificans fides et Spiritus Dei sanctificans non exstinguitur, non excidit, non evanescit, in iis qui semel eius participes fuerunt, aut totaliter aut finaliter.
- (6) Homo vere fidelis, id est, fide iustificante praeditus, certus est, certitudine fidei, de remissione peccatorum suorum et salute sempiterna sua per Christum.
- (7) Gratia sufficiens ad salutem non tribuitur, non communicatur, non conceditur universis hominibus, qua servari possint, si velint.
- (8) Nemo potest venire ad Christum nisi datum ei fuerit, et nisi Pater eum traxerit, et omnes homines non trahuntur a Patre ut veniant ad Filium.
- (9) Non est positum in arbitrio aut potestate uniuscuiusque hominis servari.¹

The Lambethani left (1) as it stood. Hutton, Andrewes, Baro, and F. G., all allow that the article is correct, though the three latter find it incomplete. F. G. says, 'Si per primum quosdam intelligantur credentes, per secundum quosdam, increduli, lis hic non intenditur'. Baro, more cautious, would by the second quosdam have us understand incredulos, atque in peccatis contumaces ad mortem. These cautions are really uncalled for. The prevalent lay opinion of to-day probably is that predestination is a vain invention of the theological mind. In the sixteenth century predestinarianism was universally accepted. The question was not whether or no some were predestinated to life and the others reprobated to death, but why some were reprobated. So staunch an opponent of Calvinism as Andrewes can express his full belief in predestination and reprobation. Accordingly he writes on this article:

1 If these propositions are thus rightly set down, and if Strype's version of the amended articles is correct (taken from a MS in the Burghley collection, which seems to be the MS presented to Lord Burghley by Whitaker on his departure from Lambeth), F. G. must have overlooked or disregarded several verbal changes made by the Lambethani. In (2) Strype reads 'insit in personis' for 'insit personis'; in (3) 'numerus est' for 'est numerus'; in (4) 'propter peccata sua damnabuntur' for 'propter peccata condemnabuntur'; in (5) 'viva, iustificans' for 'viva et iustificans', 'extinguitur' for 'exstinguitur', and 'aut finaliter aut totaliter' for 'aut totaliter aut finaliter'; and in (7) 'si voluerint' for 'si velint'. For our knowledge of certain other most important changes made we are indebted wholly to F. G., to whom also, I believe, we are indebted for Andrewes's comment on the articles. I imagine that neither Andrewes nor Baro was aware of what the original propositions had been; and if so, they must have been somewhat hampered in their endeavour to understand the amended articles. F. G. was better equipped. I am not as yet prepared to argue the question whether he gives us an incorrect copy of the original propositions, or passes over some changes made by the Lambethani.

'Esse apud Deum in aeterna illa sua sive praescientia dicere libeat sive scientia, qua videt quae non sunt tanquam ea quae sunt, praedestinatos quosdam, quosdam reprobos, extra controversiam esse arbitror. Scripturae verba sunt, πρὸ καταβολη̂ς κόσμου, id est, ab aeterno, scilicet, elegisse Deum nos; et cum elegisset, praedestinasse. Ouos vero non elegit et eligendo approbavit (ut electionis natura est 1) reprobasse.' He adds that the causes of predestination and reprobation are different, and, unless this is granted, he would have added to the article, 'aliter praedestinatos illos, nempe per Christum, aliter hos reprobos, nempe propter peccatum'.2 But since the second article speaks of the cause of predestination to life, this was not the place to add the causes. article, perhaps, has offended many in that it allows at all of reprobation from eternity. It did not for that offend Andrewes. The Book of Articles, it is true, does not mention reprobation; though, of course, as Andrewes would have acknowledged, it virtually confesses reprobation from eternity in article XVII. The Lambeth Articles were intended by the archbishop for esoteric use by the Vice-Chancellor and the Heads of Houses of the University of Cambridge, as he explicitly told them.8 The position was really this. They asked for his sanction to check any one who should contradict the doctrine of reprobation altogether. He could not refuse that request without seeming to contradict the XVIIth of the XXXIX Articles. The fact is, then, that as regards the fundamental question in dispute between the 'Calvinists' and their opponents, whether reprobation is or is not irrespective, this article determines neither way; and we have yet to see whether that question is anywhere determined in the series.

I cannot but think that the second proposition was so written that it might be drawn to speak of the cause as well of reprobation as of predestination to life. As to what is the cause of reprobation the Cambridge authorities and Whitgift were not agreed, and the former may have wished to attain their end by a side wind. If so they were disappointed. The Lambethani amended their proposition, making it read: 'Caussa movens aut efficiens praedestinationis ad vitam non est praevisio fidei, . . . sed sola voluntas beneplaciti Dei.' The article is thus definitely made to deal only with the causes of predestination to life.

F. G. finds the negative part of the article at any rate correct. It is

³ Endorsing Calvin *Instt.* iii 23 § 1: 'Multi quidem ac si invidiam a Deo repellere vellent, electionem ita fatentur ut negent quenquam reprobari; sed inscite nimis et pueriliter, quando ipsa electio nisi reprobationi opposita non staret.'

² Contradicting Calvin: 'Neque alia de causa nisi quod ab haereditate quam filiis suis praedestinat, illos vult excludere.'

⁸ ii 282.

⁴ Foxe Acts and Mon. fol. 1505: 'Predestination is as well to the Reprobate as to the Elect, Election pertaineth only to them that be saved.'

in accordance with Augustine, 'Praedestinationis causa quaeritur et non invenitur'. Baro, too, is content. Nor does Andrewes contradict it, though he writes a gloss, 'Verissimum Dei per prophetam verbum est, Tantummodo in me auxilium tuum, id est, nec a quoquam auxilium nisi a me, nec a me quicquam nisi auxilium: verissimum et apostoli, Quis discernit' id est, a Deo solo habere nos quo a reliquis discernimur'. His writing 'nec a me quicquam nisi auxilium' is uncalled for, the article not saying anything of the cause of reprobation. There is nothing 'Calvinistic' in the doctrine that the moving or efficient cause of predestination to life is 'sola voluntas beneplaciti Dei'.

Here, if anywhere, was the proper place to set down the cause of reprobation. But the archbishop had already expressed to the Vice-Chancellor and the Heads of Houses his opinion on that point, and he is not invited by them to do it again. In the circumstances the silence of the articles on this point is a surrender on the part of the Heads of Houses to the archbishop's opinion. There is nothing in the article to hinder the reassertion of Barrett's sixth position. The suggestion it makes, that there are various causes of predestination to life, is distinctly non-Calvinistic.

On (3) F. G. comments: 'Verissimus est si de praescientia Dei intelligatur quae nunquam fallitur. Non enim plures vel pauciores servantur quam Deus praesciverit.' The number is certain because it is foreknown, not foreknown because it was first ordained who should be saved, who not, irrespective of what particular men might prove to be. Andrewes and Baro would have 'Deo' interpolated after the phrase 'praefinitus et certus'; but the framers cannot have intended to say that the number was known to any one but God, and the interpolation would leave the article where it stood. No doubt the first framers meant that God's eternal irrespective choice of some and rejection of others necessitated each man's fate. To forbid this interpretation what is wanted is an explanation of 'nec potest'. A very similar proposition was discussed by the Council of Trent, 'The predestinated cannot be condemned, nor the reprobate saved'. The proposition was by no means universally condemned.1 It was true, some said, in a compound sense, but damnable in a divided. 'God governeth and moveth everything according to its proper nature, which in contingent things is free, and such, as that the act may consist together with the power to the opposite; so that with the act of predestination, the power to reprobation and damnation doth stand.' Their logic, Heylin tells us. was ill understood; and no doubt further explanation is called for. in the Irish articles of 1615: 'God from all eternitie did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe:

yet so, as thereby no violence is offred to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the libertie nor the contingencie of the second causes is taken away, but established rather.' Ussher, or whoever framed the Irish articles, may have derived this opinion from Jerome Zanchius; but it is older than that. One asks how can these things be? The Lambethani would have answered, because God's foreknowledge determines his election, which Zanchius and his English followers would have denied. They cut the root, not in saying that the number, whether of the predestinate or of the reprobate, is fixed and cannot be increased or diminished, but in making God's absolute will the sole cause of reprobation. The framers of the Cambridge propositions were cunning enough not to introduce the reprobate into this article. Not that it need have made any difference. The article, then, is common ground.

From (4) Hutton would delete 'necessario'; for then minus offenderet. Andrewes writes: 'Qui non est inventus scriptus in libro vitae (i. e. praedestinatus) missus est in lacum ignis... id est damnatus est; damnatus autem proculdubio propter peccata sua; quis enim hoc negabit? Atque id necessario, si sic loqui placeat; sed necessitate ex hypothesi, non absoluta; i.e. (ut articulus ipse se explicat) propter peccata, ideoque quia peccarunt, non autem ideo quia non sunt praedestinati.' He suggests the substitution of 'certo' or 'sine dubio' for 'necessario', as being more patristic words.

I think it probable that F.G. was better acquainted with the writings of the extreme predestinarians than was Andrewes. They granted that it was 'propter peccata sua' that the reprobate would be damned; but they denied it was 'propter peccata sua' that they were reprobated. Accordingly F.G.'s interpretation of this article is fuller than Andrewes's. 'Si hanc thesin et priorem interpreteris, ut et peccata et damnationem necessitate quadam ex ipsa praedestinatione deducas atque ex ea fluere existimes, aperte Augustino, Prospero, Fulgentio, &c., contradices, et cum Manichaeis Deum peccati auctorem necesse est facias.'

It does not seem to me that either Andrewes or F. G. has got to the root; and the former, I think, has a little confused himself. The proposition is another such as the last. It is true in a compound sense, but damnable in a divided. It was meant to speak of a nexus of necessity, not, as Andrewes would have it, between sin and damnation, but between reprobation and damnation; and the *Lambethani* so accepted it. The nexus, however, was not causal. Reprobation was damnation foreseen. The reprobate must of necessity be damned because God's foreknowledge was infallible. This proposition, like the last, is really common ground to the two parties.

Here, if anywhere in these first four articles, we are to find the doctrine of irrespective reprobation. Andrewes and F.G. allow that

the proposition is not incorrect, 'quia statuit Deus non remittere peccata nisi credentibus' (F. G.). Foreknowledge determined the decree; and the immutable decree necessitated the damnation of *increduli*. But in the article the cause of reprobation is ignored.

At (5) the series comes to deal with the nature and functions of faith and of the indwelling Spirit of God.

For 'in iis qui semel eius participes fuerunt' the Lambethani substituted 'in electis'. F. G. thought the change so modified the original proposition that in the amended article 'nihil minus quam Whitakeri sententia probata est'; which is true. At the same time, though the article is now common ground, it is no less open to perversion than either of the two last. It is damnable in a divided sense, to the man who argues, 'Do what I will, faith and sanctification will be found in me at the end'. The Lambethani did not mean to allow that any particular man might assume himself to be of the elect, or they would not have erased the original phrase. Here, at any rate, they have shewn their hand clearly, and they thereby justify the interpretation I have put on their two earlier articles.

Andrewes says: 'Certe nemo unquam dixerit (credo) fidem in electis finaliter excidere.' He would have it understood that this is 'ex privilegio personae, non rei'. The root of the matter is that the nexus,—just as much one of necessity in this proposition as in the last,—is not causal. Some are reprobate because it was foreseen that they would not persevere in faith to the end, not necessitated to fall from faith because not elected.

Andrewes admits that faith in the elect 'non posse amitti totaliter'. We must understand that to mean 'non ita amitti ut non sit locus revertendi unde exciderunt'. So also Baro. Whitgift had asked the Heads of Houses 'To say that electorum fides potest deficere totaliter against what article of religion established in this Church, is it? That it is a matter disputable, and wherein learned men do and may dissent without impiety'. He may have had in mind the different meanings that might be given to the word totaliter. The Lambethani seem to me to have meant, 'either finally or even for a time utterly'. It would be harsh to wish to contradict this to prevent a fatalistic perversion.

In (6) the Lambethani changed the phrase 'certitudine fidei' into 'plerophoria fidei'. F.G. asserts that some of the members of the conference wished the substitution to be 'plerophoria spei'; but, by their absence when the point was decided, they lost their purpose. The phrase 'plerophoria fidei', he says, 'non designat plenam et absolutam certitudinem, qualis 'est scientiae vel principiorum fidei, sed minorem quendam certitudinis gradum, quippe cum etiam in iudiciariis et forensibus probationibus usurpetur'.

Andrewes admits that 'qua certitudine certus quis est, se vere fidelem esse, aut se fide iustificante praeditum, eadem certum esse de salute sua per Christum'. We have not, however, the same assurance of something conditional, e.g. 'If thou call, thou shalt be saved', as of a categorical statement, e.g. 'God is almighty'. F. G. agrees, and comments further, the faithful is assured of the remission of his sins for the time being, hereafter of that and of his salvation, if he remain faithful ['si Christo ad finem usque adhaeserit', Baro], 'Credit enim fidelis se credere, et credit credentem servatum iri'. Nay more, 'Credit etiam perseveraturum se'; but with a somewhat different assurance, founded partly on God's promise, who will not suffer him to be tempted above that he is able, partly on the sincerity of his own intentions for the future. Andrewes would have this assurance called $\pi\epsilon \pi o i\theta \eta \sigma \iota s$ rather than $\pi i\sigma \tau \iota s$. 'Non haesitet, sed assensum suum ad alteram partem contradictionis determinet.'

We know that the archbishop was in agreement with F. G. and Andrewes as to the meaning of the word 'certitudo' in this connexion, and of the phrase 'certus de salute'. We may therefore be sure that the article was admitted in their sense.

The last three of the Cambridge propositions were no doubt meant to assert that grace was denied to the reprobated because he was reprobated, and that without regard had to his infidelity. But seeing the archbishop had pronounced that the doctrine of irrespective reprobation was false, the *Lambethani* had a right to admit these articles much as they stood, but in another sense.

In (7), however, they substituted 'Gratia salutaris' for 'Gratia sufficiens ad salutem', F. G. says, 'ut plane appareat loqui eos de ea gratia, quae est actu ultimo salutaris sive actu efficax, seu quae per se, non addita nova gratia, salutem operatur'; whereas the word 'sufficiens' in this connexion always means, 'non quod sit efficax, vel per se actu operetur salutem, sed quod sufficiens sit ad salutem ducere, modo homo non ponat obicem'. He would make 'gratia salutaris' to be 'gratia consummans'. I doubt if he is right. Andrewes seems to understand by 'gratia salutaris' what is called in the formularies of Elizabeth's day and earlier 'gratia Dei, quae per Christum est', or 'Gratia Christi, seu Spiritus Sanctus qui per eundem datur', or simply 'gratia Dei', or 'gratia data', sometimes even 'Spiritus Christi'; in fact, the grace received in baptism, or the Holy Spirit. This, says Andrewes, is

Art. IX. Art. X (1553). Art. X. Art. XVI. Art. XVII. It hink the Lambethani may have had in mind Titus ii II ἡ χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ [ἡ] σωτήριος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, a passage which justifies their proposition that 'gratia salutaris' is not granted 'universis hominibus', e.g. not to the Jews who rejected Christ. The word salutaris is uncommon in the reformation formularies. It VOL. XII.

offered to all, 'per homines autem ipsos stare quod oblata non conferatur'. F. G., however, remembers that this grace 'non conceditur, sed ne offertur quidem universis, cum sint plurimi (utpote pagani, &c.), quibus Evangelium nec interna nec externa voce praedicetur'.

It seems to me that the Lambethani, after rejecting the original phrase as having a Calvinistic savour, accepted the bait offered them in the phrase 'universis hominibus'. They have no idea of contrasting praedestinati with reprobati as such; but are opposing vere fideles or iustificati to pagani, &c. They mean to say, without faith in Christ there is no 'gratia salutaris'. It is another way of saying what is said in article X (1563): 'Ea est hominis post lapsum Adae conditio' &c., and in XVIII: 'Sunt et illi anathematizandi qui dicere audent, unumquemque in lege aut secta quam profitetur esse servandum, modo iuxta illam et lumen naturae accurate vixerit: cum sacrae literae tantum Iesu Christi nomen praedicent in quo salvos fieri homines oporteat'; which the earlier formulary (1538) expressed thus: 'Damnamus Anabaptistas, et alios, qui sentiunt Spiritum Sanctum contingere sine verbo externo hominibus per ipsorum praeparationes et opera.' Whitgift was well aware what he was saving when he wrote that he knew his articles to be sound doctrines, uniformly professed in this Church of England, and agreeable to the Articles of Religion established by authority, and yet that the doctrine of the Church of England did in no respect depend upon Calvin and the Calvinists. He held the doctrine of no grace without faith very strictly, and contradicting Hooker said, 'Papists overthrow the foundation, both by their doctrine of merit, and otherwise many ways. So that, if they have, as their errors deserve, I do not see how they should be saved'. Hutton wished 'si voluerint' deleted, that the article 'minus offenderet'. But the authorized articles acknowledge the existence of a will to be saved even in those that profess a law or sect, and the first part of the Homily on Salvation quotes St Augustine, 'whether thou wilt or no, that work that cometh not of faith is naught'.

The article then is common ground to Papist, Calvinist, and the Church of England. All deny that saving grace is a universal gift. We only move off common ground when we ask to whom is grace denied. The Calvinist said it was denied to the non-elect. Nor was election confined to the Church.² Zwingli writes, for example, 'Nihil restat, quo occurs, however, in the 1538 series. Article VIII has 'cuius beneficium sit ut veram salutaremque poenitentiam agamus'. The same articles speak of 'fides iustificans' as 'salutifera' in that 'habet spem et charitatem sibi individue coniunctas, ac etiam studium bene vivendi'.

¹ Isaac Walton, Life of Hooker.

² Non omnes, qui aqua baptizantur, consequi eo ipso gratiam aut donum fidei, sed tantum electos, Articuli Visitatorii (Francke, App. p. 119): Hardwick.

minus inter gentes quoque Deus sibi deligat, qui observent et post fata illi iungantur; libera est enim electio eius'. The articles of the Church of England commit themselves to 'praedestinatio et electio nostra in Christo'.2 Hence Cranmer could say, 'To that eternal salvation cometh no man, but he that hath the Head Christ. Yea, and no man can have the Head Christ which is not in his Body the Church', and as a rider to the article (XVII) on predestination and election comes article XVIII, 'Sunt et illi anathematizandi qui dicere audent, unumquemque, &c.4 It does not now concern us to enquire whether Whitgift's statement of the Roman doctrine of justification is correct or no. The judgement of the Council of Trent on the denial of grace was that 'etsi Ille pro omnibus mortuus est (2 Cor. v 15), non omnes tamen mortis eius beneficium recipiunt; sed ii duntaxat, quibus meritum passionis eius communicatur'; for 'nisi in Christo renascerentur, nunquam iustificarentur, quum ea renascentia per meritum passionis eius gratia, qua iusti fiunt, illis tribuatur'.5

Hutton wished (8) deleted as being the equivalent of (7). Andrewes, Baro, and F. G. all struggle to eject 'Calvinism' from the article, with little success, I think, because they fail to see in what sense the Lambethani accept 'omnes homines'. Andrewes and Baro explain 'ut veniant' to mean 'ita ut veniant'. F. G. says, 'non omnes trahuntur tractu ultimo'. The Lambethani meant to say that 'pagani, &c., non trahuntur, i. e. non convertuntur ad fidem et invocationem Dei'. In regard to them God's purpose is suspended. They are left for a time in their unbelief. The fact is patent; but the responsibility is with Hence the Church may pray: 'O Merciful God, who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, nor wouldest the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be converted and live, have mercy upon all Jews, Turks, Infidels, and Hereticks, and take from them all ignorance, hardness of heart, and contempt of thy word; and so fetch them home to thy flock, that they may be saved among the remnant of the true Israelites.' Amongst the contemners of God's word Whitgift would have included Papists, for their doctrine of merit. In the article the cause of heathen infidelity is ignored.

Andrewes's comment on (9) is, 'Non est positum aut in libero arbitrio cuiusquam nisi per Filium liberato, aut in potestate ullius nisi data illi

¹ Opp. ii p. 371 (Harold Browne).

² Art. XVII.

³ Works iv p. 510.

⁴ In the Irish Articles this XVIIIth article of 1563 is brought into one section, entitled Of the communicating of the grace of Christ, with a version of articles VII and VIII of the Lambeth series. This article reads, 'Neither is there such a sufficient measure of grace vouchsafed unto everie man whereby he is enabled to come unto everlasting life'.

⁵ Canones et decreta Conc. Trident. Sess. vi c. 3.

desuper.' Baro is content to supply 'naturali' after 'potestate'. This is the meaning of the article, if we understand 'uniuscuiusque hominis' to mean, as it should, 'of every one, Christian or heathen'. Andrewes allowed the word 'hominis' to escape him.

It seems strange to me that these three phrases, 'universis hominibus', 'omnes homines', and 'uniuscuiusque hominis' should all along have been supposed to include only the baptized. The framers of the series did not venture to ask the Archbishop to sanction what their friends abroad were saying, that the non-elect, who were passed by without regard had to their future sins and impenitency, were predestinated to continue to the end without grace. The doctrine of the articles, no doubt, makes the heathenism of the fathers to be visited on the children; but it is not fatalistic, or 'Calvinistic'.

It seems to me little less than monstrous that Whitgift, because he sanctioned the Lambeth Articles for a particular use in the University of Cambridge,1 should to this day be accused of hoping 'to bind the Church of England to the narrowest and most repulsive form of I think I have shewn conclusively that the Calvinistic doctrine'.2 fundamental proposition of the doctrine of absolute predestination, irrespective reprobation, is not to be found in any article of the series; that the derivative doctrines of the indefectibility of justifying faith, the absolute assurance to the faithful of remission of all his sins and of his salvation, the denial of saving grace to the reprobate, are not to be found there either. I think I have further shewn that the propositions contained in the archbishop's articles are in absolute agreement with his own expressed opinions. He regarded the charge against Barrett as one of impiety. Barrett had according to the Heads impiously detracted from God's part in the salvation or damnation of men. The Lambeth Articles are a statement of what must be conceded to the Heads of Houses who claimed that the work was wholly God's; and I say that no more was conceded than the archbishop guided by the Book of Articles was bound to concede.3

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¹ Whitgift to the Vice-Chancellor and the Heads of Houses ii 282: 'The propositions nevertheless must so be taken and used as their private judgements; thinking them to be true and correspondent to the doctrine professed in the Church of England, and established by the laws of the land: and not as laws and decrees'; i. e. I take it, the private judgements of the Vice-Chancellor and the Heads.

² S. R. Gardiner *History of England*, 1603-1642, vol. i p. 153. I might quote such judgements *ad libitum*.

³ Whitgift's letter to Nevill of December 8 is often quoted as evidence that he was as Calvinistic as the Heads. He begged Nevill to desire the Vice-Chancellor 'to use the said propositions, as there might be no publication thereof, otherwise than in private. For that indeed his meaning was to let them understand he did