

Greek Christian Literature, students would be his debtors thankfully. This small volume contains the Apologies of Quadratus and Aristides, the Epistle to Diognetus, and the Didache. The selection has been made by Dr. Bruce McEwen of the University of Edinburgh. The text has been carefully corrected throughout.

To the study of Robert Browning, which is yet in its infancy, Professor Thomas R. Lounsbury, L.H.D., LL.D., of Yale, has made a notable contribution. It will not be acceptable to those who practise idolatry with Browning. For there is criticism in it, and sometimes sharp criticism. There is criticism of Browning's poetry, and there is criticism of Browning himself.

But what is the book? It is a study of *The Early Literary Career of Robert Browning* (Fisher Unwin; 4s. 6d. net). Now it is the early career that is puzzling. Why was there so much hesitation in recognizing this man's genius? And why are there so many contradictions and questions of fact in respect of his life and work? Professor Lounsbury corrects many mistakes that have been made, solves difficulties, and reconciles contradictions. And especially he gives us clearly to

understand why the recognition was delayed so long—or rather why it came, and then departed for a time. Yes, it is a notable contribution to Browning literature. _____

The Rev. E. J. Hardy, M.A., who will still be recognized as the author of the sensational book *How to be Happy though Married*, has been travelling in what has been called the Near East. And he has had his Bible with him on his travels. And now, under the title of *The Unvarying East* (Fisher Unwin; 7s. 6d. net), he has published a book which may not make the sensation of his first volume, but which ought to be very popular; a book in which he has given an account of the scenes he has visited and of the passages in the Bible which he has found illustrated by these scenes. It is a book of illustration more than of exposition, and contains plenty of anecdotes, old and new, Western as well as Eastern. Scenes, incidents, and anecdotes are brought together in chapters under such heads as Agriculture, Beasts and Birds, Business, Celebrated Cities, and the like, an arrangement which has made the scientific value of the book more than it would otherwise have been, and takes nothing away from its pleasantness.

The Message of Rudolf Eucken.

BY THE REV. J. DICK FLEMING, D.D., PROFESSOR OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, AND LECTURER IN PHILOSOPHY, MANITOBA COLLEGE, WINNIPEG.¹

II.

As we have seen, Eucken's new metaphysical principle is that there is a realm of spirit, a real independent spiritual reality, not the product of the natural man, but communicating itself to him as the deeper reality of himself and the totality of nature. 'That a new totality of life, a primary creative power fashioning the world, makes its presence known to us—this is the cardinal principle on the attainment and vivid realization of which all

truth of thought and life depends.' This eternal spiritual world, in which we increasingly participate, is the inward invisible soul of things that penetrates and sustains the visible; it is the deeper reality of which nature is but the surface, or prophecy.

To some this cardinal thesis of Eucken will be too vague to be intelligible; to others it may be startling as a bolt from the blue. I cannot here explain the philosophical connexion of this view of spiritual reality with Plato and Plotinus, with Kant's doctrine of phenomenal nature, with other activist theories, and particularly with Green's doctrine of an eternal consciousness realizing itself in the human soul under time conditions. I must

¹ The following corrections should be made in the first part of this paper:—P. 249^b, l. 18, 'mankind' for 'manhood'; l. 3 (from bot.), 'proved' for 'placed'; p. 250^b, l. 13 (from bot.), 'depreciating' for 'deprecating'; l. 7, 'attitudes' for 'altitudes'; p. 251^a, l. 15, 'immanent' for 'Immanuel.'

be content to show how Eucken applies it in various spheres; for, after all, the value of such a view will depend on its power to explain and justify the nobler conceptions of life, and to unify the facts.

We are specially interested here in his application of this positive idealism to the problem of religion.

In its classical epochs, religion has always shown itself as an immense propelling power in human life, lifting men to a higher, supernatural world of the spirit, and so transforming and renewing the worldly relations. Spurred on by life's contradiction and unrest men have sought to lay hold of a deeper life in fellowship with the Divine. Religion has always stood for a negation of the finite, and a new affirmation of deeper spiritual reality. It has thus created a reversal of all life's values; and consequently it has either been accepted with deepest conviction, or has awakened the most lively opposition; bringing, therefore, not peace but a sword. This is most clearly seen in Christianity, the religion of religions, where we have a deeper negation of man's natural life as one of weakness and frailty and sin, and at the same time a more strenuous affirmation of rest and blessedness in God. But the history of its progress reveals the problem of religion—how, namely, to realize the Divine life under temporal conditions, without destroying the time-values and without curtailing the spiritual life. We know that the problem was not solved by the Church of the Middle Ages. There we see, on the one hand, the Christian monk giving up the problem in despair and retiring within himself to a life utterly weak and ineffective; and, on the other hand, the Christian ecclesiastic dragging down heaven to earth, clothing his faith in anthropomorphic and mythological forms and dogmas, and materializing the spiritual till it is lost in the magical. How pettily human are the prevailing conceptions of God! how sensuous the ideas of reward and punishment, of purgatory, heaven, and hell! What a strange combination of other-worldliness and worldliness, in which the truly spiritual and Divine are well-nigh extinguished! Nor did the Reformation solve the problem: it was too much under the dominion of the system it condemned to distinguish clearly what was substantial. And modern life has, largely because of this failure, turned to independent paths. We can see this practical dissolution of faith in the earlier Deistic systems which set God outside of the world of nature, or in

a Pantheism which only found a place for God by identifying Him with nature, and finally in the present-day naturalism which finds no place for God at all, but sets forth nature in its bareness as the only infinite reality with which we have to do. As we have seen, such a standpoint cannot be finally accepted; indeed, it only appears tolerable because it clothes its nakedness with high-sounding phrases about the progress of humanity, or the elevating power of reason; because it clothes itself with confused thoughts, borrowed (so far as they have a meaning) from the very religion it decries. But that does not imply that we are to go back to the past, and rejecting the truth on which realism stands, to put on the old garments of an effete faith. The time rather calls for a new attitude to life, in which what is true in realism shall have its place, and for a revival of what is substantial in Christianity in forms appropriate to present-day life. 'Religion will never win the indispensable simplicity, the victorious power of conviction necessary, if it does not speak to us in the thought, feeling, and even language of our time, but binds the present inflexibly to the past. When much in the old forms of religion has become to us anthropomorphic, or even mythological and magical, can we shut our eyes to the fact; dare we do so in the true interest of religion?' The Christian world is fighting to-day a losing battle, just because it has pitifully failed to distinguish the substance of religion from its temporal forms, and indeed often put the forms in place of the substance. It does so when it attributes an unchanging Divine value to its doctrines and practices, and puts the Divine life of the spirit in the second place. It does so when it acts on the principle that doctrine or intellectual creed is the basis of Christianity, and so the basis of the Church. It does so when it proclaims that it possesses the final expression of truth—as though such finality were attainable by man. By such anachronisms the Christian Church is standing in the way of its own progress, is concealing the real absolute virtue that lies in it. What is the true kernel of Christianity? It is a life redeemed and renewed; it is the welling up within man of a new depth of spiritual life, which liberates him in the measure he enters into it from the evil and sin of the world, and ennoble his entire life-interests. This spiritual life is no product of nature, or the natural man with his likes and dislikes, but the emergence of a new Divine spiritual reality in

him—a reality that is both fact and task; fact in so far as it represents eternal reality, and task in so far as it has to be more and more completely assimilated. Why is this not recognized? Because we are still bowing down to the worship of idols—the worship of forms and doctrines that are at best the outgrowths of religion, and so of secondary value. And it will surely help us in the modern problem of extracting the substance from the old forms, if we make it clear to ourselves that the spiritual life in all its forms is no mere private matter, but the true influx of a higher reality into our life; and if against the superficial realism which holds to the immediate realities we present this spirit-life as the deeper reality of which nature is but the veil.

And not only will this new conception of spiritual realism enable us to discriminate between substance and form in religion, but it will enable us to transcend the petty anthropomorphisms in the conception of God, which prevent religion from exercising its full power in modern times. The common conception of God as an external Creator, a particular person with attributes of the merely human kind, can scarcely be justified from the modern standpoint, which interprets nature from within, and so is bound to regard such anthropomorphism as mere mythology. It is true that the same scientific type of mind equally regards the spirit-life in man as a mere shadowy reflexion of what is material and sensible. But it is here that we can take our stand. Instead of wasting our strength in defending conceptions that we all recognize more or less to be mythological and childish, we can take our stand on the independent reality of the spirit-life as the very substance of all reality, and as the presupposition of science itself no less than of morality and religion. The particularity of being we ascribe to God when we speak of His personality corresponds to the particularity or petty human side of our own life, which it is the very object of religion to enable us to transcend. The more we find our true life in the world of spirit, the less we consider the merely human and individual side of our life, and the more we become one with the totality of the life of spirit. In other words, if we use personality in the common sense, then the religious life is the entrance into an impersonal, a self-denying life. If we still apply the conception of personality to God, we must attach some higher meaning to personality, and think of

God as the perfect concentration and fruition of that spiritual life, which also finds partial concentration in our lives, so far as they are lifted above the mere particular into the universal life of the spirit. If the religious life implies the losing of our petty selfhood in God, why should we ascribe this petty selfhood to God Himself? Eucken admits, indeed, that those who have the Divine within them will necessarily ascribe a centre of personal life to the source from which their life springs. In general, however, it seems best to define God, as the absolute life of spirit, the transcendent self-sufficing spiritual life that is the foundation of all reality—the life in which we ourselves share in the measure that we rise by our decision and our activity above the merely human and natural interests. From this standpoint, too, the problem of God's transcendence or immanence, between which we stand hesitating to-day, will receive its true solution. For the Divine spiritual life assuredly transcends nature and is superior to the world, and yet is active as the basal reality of the world itself, and finds growing realization in us; and so the long debate between dualism and monism is solved.

Eucken applies the same conception to morality, art, science, politics—to all the different spheres of life, and tries to show how it serves to co-ordinate all the departments of life, and reveals a unity of striving within all the diversity. It must suffice here to show how, as he claims, his view serves to unite the truth and to save us from the error of the various types of present-day life, which he has already analyzed. It will conserve the substantial truth of the old religious standpoint, and yet readily harmonize with all the veritable achievement of modern science, and so will set religions on a broader and more assured basis. It can recognize the truth that lies in naturalism and in the socialistic standpoint, in so far as they emphasize that man's problem lies here, and not in an imaginary other world; but, on the other hand, it will call us to contend earnestly for the deeper spiritual values. And, again, this positive idealism stands so far side by side with the old idealism in its elevation of spirit above nature. But whereas the old idealism tones down the distinction it has made by its optimistic view of nature as entirely subservient to spirit, the new idealism will side rather with the religious point of view in asserting more firmly the opposition between the natural and the spiritual.

Nature is not simply, as the optimist thinks, the pure and undiluted manifestation of the spiritual and rational. The evil of the world is not solved by a few fine phrases—as when it is said that if we could place ourselves at some higher standpoint, we should see that all was very good. We do not stand at that high altitude, and neither does the optimist; and we cannot accept such hypothetical imaginations as reality. Neither religion nor philosophy has solved the enigma of evil, as it stands in the double question, 'If God is, whence the evil; and if God is not, whence the good?' The only solution possible is the practical one—leaving the negation standing, to press on to the deeper affirmation—namely, that beneath this world of nature there is the deeper reality of the spirit, which is able to lead us on to a triumphant and inexhaustible life. That some problems are declared to be at present unsolvable is quite in accordance with the activistic faith which Eucken holds. For if the mental life is but one aspect of the whole movement of the spirit, and that is a continuous and progressive movement of assimilation of the Divine, no absolute philosophy can be attained. 'Since,' he says, 'since in the end the truth of thought depends on the essential content of life, thought must get rid of the idea that at a given moment it can reach conclusions that are final for all time. Though it must necessarily insist on a truth which transcends time and possesses absolute stability, the stability of this truth does not lie in man, but in the spiritual life itself; and if man, as grounded in the spiritual life, must in some way or other participate in this truth, to work it out to a complete possession is a high goal to which we can only slowly approximate.'

But enough has been said to show the fundamental positions of Eucken's philosophy. His main constructive position lies in his positive idealism, in his conception of the life of spirit, as not a mere secondary product of nature, or even of human effort, but as the universal underlying ground of reality, the spirit-heaven in which we share in our science and art and philosophy and all genuine work, and still more profoundly share in our religious life. Whether we accept the position or not, Eucken must be recognized to have brought together and co-ordinated under his leading principle many aspects of truth. In philosophy he explains by it the apparently *a priori* element of knowledge, and solves the long contro-

versy between rationalist and empiricist; in ethics he finds a new light cast by his principle on freedom, and what idealist ethics calls the 'universal self'; while in religion he finds the principle most fruitful in ridding the life of faith of hampering traditions, and setting it on a new and stronger basis.

The other fundamental view lies in the activistic doctrine that runs through all his writings—the general view, namely, that it is not our philosophical or theological doctrine that determines the life, but the life that determines the doctrine. The intellect has to take a more modest place than it has hitherto occupied; it must stand not apart or above the other movements of life, but side by side with the rest. Reason is no isolated factor, working in a region abstracted from the other life-activities; wherever it is productive of new truth, it is conditioned by the movement of life as a whole. As Eucken puts it: 'Thought gets its determinate character, its clear aims and sure methods from the whole of life. It is conditioned by life's movement and progress; and all hope of advance rests on the hope of a further deepening of life, the awakening of new powers. It is not the mere knowing, but the movement of the whole life which renders progress possible. It is true, however, that this life includes knowledge; it is not a life opposed to knowledge, and appealing (as the Pragmatist thinks) to supposed practical needs in opposition to it.' This activism is not a new doctrine so far as theology is concerned; we all know to-day that theology is the outcome of the religious life, and not its foundation. But Eucken applies the same thought to philosophy, and in his exposition of philosophical systems he shows how everywhere a true philosophy has been the expression of the life of the philosopher, and also of the life and spirit of his age. And he applies it to theology far more thoroughly than we are generally disposed to do. We think that we have adopted the principle that Christian doctrines are the outflow, and not the originating spring of the Christian life; but, in fact, intellectualism in preaching widely reigns. Dr. Hatch's Hibbert Lectures on the Influence of Greece on the Christian Church are devoted to prove this very point. When we imagine that eloquent rhetoric is going to save men's souls, or that the basis of conversion lies in some intellectual dogma; when we make more of intellectual assent than of moral earnestness; when

we put belief in Christ's Divinity above practical fellowship with His Divine Spirit, or belief in the Atonement above the power of the Cross; or when we insist on uniformity of doctrine as essential to the unity of a Church; when we thus emphasize belief rather than life, and doctrine more than reality,—we are chargeable with intellectualism and hiding Christianity behind a screen. And while Eucken would hardly admit Dr. Hatch's assumption as to the valuelessness of metaphysics, he would, I think, agree with him in his final word:

'Though you may believe that I am but a dreamer of dreams, I seem to see—though it be on the far horizon—the horizon beyond the fields which either we or our children will tread—a Christianity which is not new but old, which is not old but new; a Christianity in which the moral and spiritual elements will again hold their place, in which men will be bound together by the bond of mutual service, which is the bond of the sons of God; a Christianity which will actually realize the brotherhood of man, the ideal of its first communities.'

The Pilgrim's Progress.

BY THE REV. JOHN KELMAN, D.D., EDINBURGH.

The Second Part.

From the House Beautiful to the House of Gaius.

In this section Bunyan appears to have tired of the elaborate and artificial style which has disappointed the reader of the earlier pages of this part. He falls back on his own mother-wit again, and the writing is both natural and good. Part of the reason for this may be found in the fact that here the interest again centres round characters rather than curious incidents, and so brings the author back to human nature, where he is always most at home. A striking and beautiful example of the combination of the two centres of interest is found in the description of the Valley of Humiliation, which stands by itself as one of his masterpieces.

The Curiosities of the House Beautiful.

We have still a little time to linger among such quaint fancies as those to which we have already become accustomed, before we take the road again and reach the more strenuous thought.

1. *Eve's apple*—that curiosity that has cost so dear—is first shown. Much has been debated about the moral quality of knowledge, from the days of the Prometheus legend down to Marlowe's and Goethe's *Faust*. Christiana little knows how long a controversy she is epitomizing in her little sentence, 'Food or poison, I know not which.'

The mere moralist and preacher would have been so impressed with the importance of knowing sin when one sees it, that he would have drawn a different remark from this good woman. But the humanist in John Bunyan, here or elsewhere, guides him to the exact and universal truth of human nature. Only, some touch of Puritan conscience apparently insists upon the side-note, 'A sight of sin is amazing,' lest the reader might be led to share Christiana's doubt.

2. *Jacob's ladder* is the next sight, with the side-note, 'A sight of Christ is taking.' No further explanation is given, which might explain the connexion between Christ and the ladder. Nor is any needed, for the limestone terraces of the Bethel hills, which presented so long ago this great gift to the religious imagination of the world, told of a connexion between earth and heaven. But that which assured the connexion and established it eternally for man was the Incarnation and the humanity of Jesus Christ. This seems to have been in His own mind when He told Nathanael that 'Henceforth ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending on the Son of man.' It was an aspect of the Saviour which was peculiarly congenial to John Bunyan. Apart from its bright appeal to fancy, it illustrates his delight in all devices for getting from earth to heaven. It is like one of those perplexing impulses, 'sudden to start