

of death, and deliver those who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage.

One advantage of the view now stated is that it does not require us to assume that the writer misunderstood or altered the meaning of the *Βραχύ τι* of the Psalm, taking it in a temporal sense = "for a little while," while it is properly an adverb of degree = "only a little." According to our view, the two clauses, "made lower than the angels," and "crowned with glory," do not refer to two successive states through which our Lord is regarded as passing, the states of humiliation and exaltation, but to two aspects of His earthly life.

The view now stated seems to do more justice to the expression "We *see* Jesus crowned," than that so ably advocated by Professor Bruce (*Expositor* for November 1888), who refers the "glory and honour" with which Jesus is crowned to "His appointment to the honourable and glorious office of Apostle and High Priest of our

profession." The glory which belongs to Him in virtue of His filial relation to the Father is, according to the statement of John, a thing which we *see*; the glory which we see reveals the relationship. But can it be said in the same sense that we *see* the glory which belongs to Him in His official character as Apostle and High Priest? Moreover, the glory of which the 8th Psalm speaks, the glory to which man as man is destined, is certainly the glory of Divine Sonship, a glory which can be attained by sinful men only through the suffering and death of the Incarnate Son.

There would have been no difficulty about the passage if the writer had said: We see in Jesus the Son of God become man, that He might taste death for every man. But he puts the same thing in a different form: We see in Jesus man crowned with the glory of Divine Sonship, that the man who is thus crowned might taste death for every man, and so by the grace of God bring "many sons" to glory.

The Teaching of our Lord as to the Authority of the Old Testament.

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THE TWO ARGUMENTS.

WE have now before us the two theories as to the composition of the Old Testament and its appearance in its present form. Both theories relate more particularly to the historical portions, and of these pre-eminently to the earlier books,—as it is upon these books, and the inferences that appear deducible from their structure, that controversy assumes its most emphasised form.

Into this controversy we must now enter; but it can only be on general and broad issues, the critical discussion of details being out of place in addresses of the nature of the present. All we can hope to do is to obtain a clear view of the two estimates that have been formed of the nature of the Old Testament; to weigh carefully the general arguments which may be advanced on either side; and finally, to set forth clearly the reasons which may appear to justify us in accepting one, and rejecting the other of the two views of the Old Testament

that have now been placed circumstantially before us. This is a case, it will be observed, in which there can be no compromise in any real sense of the word. Each view may derive some useful details from the mode of development adopted in the view to which it is opposed; some results arrived at by the one may be accepted by the other, but there is clearly no common ground. On one side we have historical tradition, on the other literary criticism and analysis. Each must justify itself by its appeal to the facts and circumstances of the case, and by its claim to give a more reasonable and probable account of them than can be given by the other, and reason and common sense must be the arbiters. It is, however, by no means easy in such intricate and complicated questions so to state the matter that issue may fairly be joined upon it, and the argument conducted in a manner that will be intelligible to the general reader. Still the attempt must be made.

Perhaps, then, the simplest mode of conducting

the controversy will be this: to narrow the arguments by maintaining the truth of two propositions, the one relating to a comparison of probabilities, the other to an alleged fact. If both can be maintained, we shall have good grounds for coming to a distinct decision on the merits of the case. Argument will have been heard on both sides in two forms, and the grounds on which the judgment is arrived at will be laid out fairly and openly.

We will then, having the two views before us, put forward two general arguments for maintaining the Traditional view as it has been set forth in the foregoing address. One of these arguments shall form the subject of the present address; the other and more conclusive argument will be set forth in the addresses that will follow. These two arguments may be briefly gathered up in the two following statements:—

A. That the Traditional view is intrinsically more probable than the Analytical view.

B. That the Traditional view can, with every appearance of probability, claim the authority of our Lord and Master, Jesus Christ.

The first of these statements, into which we may now at once enter, suggests at the very outset some sort of general comparison between the two views, without which we can hardly appreciate the more detailed considerations that will follow. Any careful comparison will be found to show that the two views differ (*a*) in the fundamental presupposition on which each rests; (*b*) in the general character that each presents of the Old Testament history; (*c*) in the design and purpose which each view seems unmistakably to indicate as pervading and conditioning the history.

(*a*) Of these three fundamental differences, we have already alluded to the first. It is this momentous difference,—that the Traditional view presupposes the supernatural and miraculous, and deals with its manifestations without any apparent consciousness that they could ever be supposed to suggest untrustworthiness in the narrative. In the Analytical view, as we well know, it is utterly different. Some of the advocates of this view, as we know from their own language, assume from the very first a naturalistic basis, and regard the miraculous as the most certain indication of the unhistorical and untrustworthy, or, as the newly-coined phraseology describes it, of idealised history. Others adopt more modified views, and either minimise, as far as trustworthiness will seem to

permit, the miraculous occurrences mentioned generally in the Old Testament, or, at any rate, dispose of the first eleven chapters of Genesis as a product of mental activity, not yet distinguished into history and poetry, or, in other words, as *mythical*.

As this last is one of the assertions of the modified Analytical school, let us briefly consider it.

Mythical, in any ordinary sense of the word, these chapters certainly are not. That they contain ancient, and, as their characteristics appear to indicate, trustworthy traditions, we may feel disposed to admit; nay, we may go so far as to believe that they were committed at a very early period to writing, and, not improbably under two forms, were, with other early documents, in the hands of Moses, and were used by him in the compilation of the Book of Genesis. This we may admit, and for this there would seem to be some amount of evidence. Nearly all the most important matters in those chapters have appeared in similar forms in the traditions of some ancient nations,—but with this striking and most suggestive difference, that the Hebrew record alone maintains, and in every particular is permeated by, an unchanged and unchanging monotheism, and further, alone puts forward a true ethical conception of sin and its consequences.

What we have, then, in these remarkable chapters is a manifestation of a selective inspiration, under which it may be, in the first instance, the Father of the Faithful bore away with him from Chaldæa the early and truthful form of the primeval tradition—a form that, at a later period, under the providence of God, was to pass under the inspired revision of that first great prophet, who wrote of his Lord, and to whom we owe these earliest pages of the Old Testament.

To speak of them as mythical is misleading, and, however ingeniously explained away, inconsistent with the generally-received meaning of the word.

But to return. We have shown that the Traditional view and the Analytical view differ in their fundamental presuppositions. That they should also differ in the general character they present of the Old Testament history, and of the ultimate design which they ascribe to it, seems to follow almost as a necessary consequence. It will be well, however, briefly to illustrate each of these further particulars, as they prepare us, from the very first, to recognise the essential and funda-

mental differences between the two views which we shall afterwards more particularly set in contrast.

(b) According to the Traditional view the character of the Old Testament history is perfectly natural and simple. It begins with what may be termed the preliminary and prehistoric. It speedily passes into family history, presenting each leading character with a freshness that seems to tell of contemporary recording, and of a studious preservation of archives, which the growing consciousness of a great and divinely-ordered future seemed age after age more distinctly to prescribe. The family history in the fulness of time passes into national history; the laws that are to bind the nation together are enunciated, and afterwards supplemented, when the entry of the nation into the promised land seemed to require final additions and enhancements. The stream of national history is still represented as flowing onward, but under just such limitations as the tribal separations and the apportioned settlements in a newly-occupied and hostile country would be certain to involve. So, for four hundred years, the national history reflects the existing state of the national life, and we have in the Book of Judges just the brief and epitomised record which seems exactly to correspond with the circumstances. With the establishment of the monarchy, we pass into a different stratum of the national history. The contemporaneous nature of the record becomes again more patent and defined, and the history of the Covenant people more completely answering to the character which is to be traced throughout of simplicity, fidelity, and truth. Such at least is the character which the Traditional view seems to present to us of the Old Testament history.

But it is otherwise when we pass to the Analytical view. The character of the history presented to us is widely different. The simplicity which we have seemed to trace in it disappears. In its earlier portions it is, according to the theory, highly composite. In its succeeding portions it has become, we are assured, remodelled, interpolated, and rehandled; and we have no longer to do with the various elements of the unfolding story of a nation, but, almost exclusively, with the efforts of a priestly party, which, at a late period of the national history, were all concentrated on representing the past as authenticating the present,—a present when national independence was fast ceasing to exist.

(c) And if the character of the history, under the two views, is thus widely different, so obviously will it be with its purpose and design. Under the Traditional view the whole object of the narrative is to set forth the history of the Covenant people, and God's dealings with the nation from which, as according to the flesh, the Saviour of the world was to come. Under the Analytical view all this becomes subordinated to the one dominant principle of establishing the Priestly Code, and consolidating priestly authority. All the history of the past has to be modified accordingly; its deep and persistent purpose becomes clouded, if not obliterated, and a purpose placed in the foreground which tends to alter our whole estimate of the essential character of Old Testament history. These considerations alone would seem sufficient to lead us to decide in favour of that estimate of the Old Testament history which the Traditional view seems distinctly to embody. We must not, however, forget that against this Traditional view, plausible as it certainly is, and maintained as it has been from the very time when the Old Testament canon was closed, there are objections which cannot be overlooked,—objections to the reality of the force of which the Analytical view owes in great measure the reception it has met with. These objections have emanated, comparatively in recent times, from the critical investigations of some of the most acute and disciplined minds in Europe, and must claim from every candid reader of the Old Testament a full and attentive consideration. This, however, must be borne in mind, that some of the early objections made to the Traditional view do not apply to the rectified form as specified in the second paper. For example, in the Traditional view in its unmodified form, Moses was regarded as the inspired writer of the whole of the Pentateuch. This was distinctly invalidated by the almost certain fact that two or more narratives, different in style and phraseology, *must* be recognised in Genesis, and *may* be recognised, to some extent, in the books that follow. This, in the rectified Traditional view, is admitted, as far as the Book of Genesis is concerned, and Moses is claimed only as the compiler of it from pre-existing materials, those pre-existing materials being of very ancient date, bearing unmistakably the indications of a divinely-inspired selection, and as we have already said, having been probably brought by Abraham from Chaldæa. On this and similar objections, important as they were

at the time, we need not now dwell any further. We have simply to acknowledge that here not only was modern criticism right, but that we owe to it, in this particular, clearer views of the structure of one portion of the Old Testament.

I. But it is otherwise when we deal with the other leading objections against the Traditional view, which we must now fairly consider.

1. It is maintained that large portions of the ritual and ceremonial laws which we find, especially in Leviticus and Numbers (of Deuteronomy we shall speak separately afterwards), cannot possibly owe their authorship to Moses, that they are far too minute to have formed a part of the desert legislation, and must be referred to a much later period of the national history.

In this objection there is plainly considerable force—a force which any candid mind must feel when reference is made to such a solemn portion, for example, of the Mosaic legislation as that which is described as the Book of the Covenant, containing as it does the words spoken by God (Elohim) to Moses with associated judgments (Ex. xxi.—xxiii.), read in the hearing of the people (chap. xxiv. 7), and solemnly accepted by them (*ib.*). In this Book of the Covenant we certainly find, in apparently close connection with the Decalogue, judgments containing, not only matter of great moral and religious importance, but precepts that we might at first sight regard as of a very trivial nature. How are we to account for such an association, and that too in a portion of Scripture where we might *à priori* expect to find nothing but what was of fundamental significance? Two answers seem to suggest themselves:—the one, that these apparently trivial matters are specified as illustrations of the wide ethical bearing to which the primary commandments were to be understood to extend; the other, that the apparently incongruous elements were really additions made at a much later period, at one of the so-called re-editings or revisions through which it is admitted in the Traditional view that the Pentateuch and other historical books did probably pass.

Without attempting to decide between these two forms of answer to the objection, this certainly may be said, that there does not seem anything unreasonable in the supposition that later observances, ritual and ceremonial, may have been annexed to the fundamental Mosaic ordinances,

and that the Law Book, especially in its less important details, may have grown, as we know the Psalm Book did grow, in the later period of Jewish history. The objection above alluded to is certainly of considerable force, but it does not lie beyond the reach of what may be fairly regarded as reasonable and probable explanation.

2. A second important objection is also to be recognised in the apparent fact that, in the long period that ensued between the entry into Canaan and the times of the earlier kings, we find no traces of the observance of regulations of the Mosaic law even in those particulars which seemed to be prescribed with great legislative stringency—as, for example, the appearing before the Lord at the three great festivals.

The general answer seems reasonable—that when we take into consideration the circumstances of the occupation of Canaan, and the utterly different state of things between the national union of the wilderness and the sharply-defined local separations in Canaan, we may realise, not only how likely it was, but even how certain it was, that many laws would remain in abeyance, and would only pass out of that state when the national union became again more of a reality; and when, by the establishment of a theocratic centre, the necessarily suspended ordinances could by degrees be put into use and complied with. In regard of the particular law above alluded to, it is certainly very worthy of notice that in the chapter in Leviticus (xxiii.) in which mention is made of the great festivals, they are spoken of as “holy Convocations,” without, however, any indication of pilgrimages to some one appointed place being included in the expression. Here again the objection, though at first sight of a serious nature, becomes greatly modified when such an absence of any mention of a definite locality and other circumstances of the case are taken fully into account. Much more might be said, but the nature of these addresses does not permit us to enter far into the details of these complicated questions. Let this particular objection be urged in the strongest possible form, this answer will always remain — that there is nothing inconceivable in divinely-guided legislation taking into its purview a period and a state of things in which its regulations both could be, and would be, complied with. It was “by a prophet that the Lord brought Israel up out of Egypt.”

3. A third general objection to the Traditional view, whether in its rectified or its unrectified form, may also be alluded to. It is the very broad and sweeping objection that the Old Testament history is so honey-combed with anachronisms, contradictions, repetitions, and inconsistencies of every varied form, that a view of its composition such as that which is embodied in the Traditional view must at once be set aside by every critical student of the Old Testament as utterly outworn and untenable.

That it is so regarded by an increasing number of foreign critics, and by some English writers, must, we regret to say, be frankly admitted; but it may be fairly said, on the other side, that the more the Old Testament history is carefully and impartially considered, the more plain does it become that the tenor of the objection we are now considering is not in harmony with the true facts of the case. The true facts of the case are as follows: first, that only a very small proportion of the alleged anachronisms and contradictions has really been proved to exist; and secondly, that assuming as a fact that such a proportion does exist, its presence can very reasonably be accounted for. Let us remember that we have recognised in several cases the existence of ancient documents out of which the history has been compiled, and further, scattered through all the earlier books, the presence of explanatory and illustrative notes, some of which may have been inserted at a very early period. The process of compilation and the nature of some of the notes will help largely in accounting for the appearance of several of the more patent anachronisms and contradictions. Repetitions must be expected where two or more ancient records were before the compiler, and where the combination was effected in some cases by a simple juxtaposition of the documents, rather than by that critical fusion of the contents which we now associate with the idea of carefully worked-out history. Lastly, let it be remembered that the narrative of the Old Testament has obviously passed through the hands of a few successive editors, and that it would be simply contrary to all experience not to find that such procedures had imported some amount of divergences and inconsistencies. When we take into account all these circumstances connected with the sacred narrative, our surprise must be, not that we seem to find these alleged difficulties in certain portions of the

history, but that the number of the difficulties which may claim to have a real existence are really so few.

II. But we must now pass to the other side of the controversy. Hitherto we have considered the more important objections that have been urged against the Traditional view. We may now proceed to consider a few of the leading objections to the Analytical view of the Old Testament.

1. The first objection we have to urge is a general objection which has been fairly expressed by Professor Ladd when he reminds us that the modern theory we are now considering "leaves the earlier formative and fundamental periods of the history of Israel almost completely without a literature, in order that it may concentrate all the productive energies of the nation in the age of Ezra."¹ We are permitted to believe that there were some floating records, Jehovistic and Elohist, in the days of the early kings; but when we inquire how far we can rely upon them as containing trustworthy information, either as regards early history or early legislation, we are told by one leading representative² of the Analytical view that we cannot regard such a history as that of Abraham and the Patriarchs, even in its principal facts, as truly historical, on account of the pure and elevated religious views that are found in it; and, in effect, by another³—that the laws that really belong to the Mosaic age are so few as to bear no comparison with the general bulk of the legislation. Now against such views the objections seem really insurmountable. Can we possibly set aside, as we are invited to do, the vivid history of the Patriarchs as mythical, or as the product of conflicting traditions, simply because they involve pure ideas of inward religion and spiritual piety? Or again, can we conceive it possible that the countless laws and interlying history which we have been accustomed to associate with the Mosaic period were, after all, simply due to the productive activity of an age separated by wide centuries from the time of the alleged facts? Is it too much to say that thus to crush into the period of the Exile this really vast amount of fabricated legislation and rewritten history is so preposterous as to constitute an objection which the very circumstances of the case must show to be not only valid and reasonable, but practically insuperable?

¹ *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture* (T. & T. Clark), i. 531.

² Kuenen.

³ Wellhausen.

2. Closely allied with this objection is a second of scarcely less force and validity, viz. that the Analytical view obscures, almost to obliteration, the work, influence, and even the very personality, of Moses. According to the Traditional view, Moses is not only the divinely-commissioned leader of the people, but is throughout the watchful and inspired legislator, speaking with the authority of God, enunciating during the long period in the wilderness laws not only for the varying circumstances of the present, but, with prophetic foresight, for the whole future of the Covenant people—laws which, even when they were enunciated, might have been dimly felt to be applicable only to distant days and utterly changed circumstances, but were to form the chart, as it were, of national development. In the Analytical view, on the contrary, Moses passes almost into a shadow, and his legislation into a few primal laws and a few covenant obligations. He is admitted to have conducted the Exodus; for this, in the face of the utterances of the early prophets, modern criticism dare not deny, but this is practically all that is left to us of one whom all the traditions, history, and literature of Israel regard as the great prophet who was the founder of the national greatness, and whom every law, rightly or wrongly, claimed as, under God, its author and origin. The actual Moses of the Analytical view is some unknown person or persons who lived ages afterwards in the declining days of the Exile. Does not common sense itself protest against such an absolute inversion of all historical testimony and all historical credibility?

3. A subsidiary objection of the same ultimate tenor as the foregoing is involved in the refusal to recognise Deuteronomy as owing its authorship, in anything like its present form, to him who speaks in it, in its opening chapters, in his own person, and whose words and ordinances it professes to record—Moses the man of God, whom the Lord knew face to face. This refusal is now assumed far too hastily and too triumphantly to be so patently justified by the whole character of the book as scarcely to need any argument. It is admitted that the substance may have been Mosaic, and even that some ancient written documents *may* have formed the basis of this vivid and remarkable work; but that it was constructed or, as the phrase runs, “dramatised” by some unknown writer in the days of Josiah is

one of those “established results” of modern criticism which it is deemed to be simply hopeless to deny. In a word, no other belief is to be open to us than this—that Deuteronomy is simply a republication of the law, some six or seven centuries after its first publication, made by this unknown writer “in the spirit and power of Moses, and put dramatically into his mouth.”

The objections to such a view are clearly overpowering. In the first place, the claims that the book itself makes as to its authorship are too distinct and too numerous to be set aside in any other way than by ascribing conscious fraud to the republisher, and a deliberate misuse of the name of the legislator. Early in the book, Moses is described as declaring the law that follows, and appears in the first person as the narrator of the marvellous and providential story. Towards the close the same statement is reiterated. Nay, more, it is expressly said that Moses wrote the foregoing law and delivered it unto the priests and unto all the elders of Israel, and the statement is repeated in language even more definite and precise. Written the words were, and written “in a book”; and the words that were written embodied the covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel at the close of their long wanderings in the wilderness. And then, as if it were to authenticate all, Moses adds his sublime parting psalm, and concludes with his benediction on the tribes that were then about to enter into the long promised heritage. If any words can conclusively connect a book with its author, these words are verily to be found in the Book of Deuteronomy. If these words are not the words of Moses, then it is only by literary jugglery and a real misuse of words that the unknown writer can be cleared of the charge of representing his own words as the *ipsissima verba* of another, or, to use plain terms, of conscious fiction. The importance and especially serious nature of these considerations will be seen in a later address.

4. Other objections in details may easily be added, such, for example, as the really preposterous conception that the elaborate description of the Tabernacle was simply due to the imagination and invention of the legislator of the Exile, or that the writer of Chronicles deliberately falsified the Books of Samuel and Kings, when the supposition is

certainly as reasonable as it is charitable that this much maligned writer was only guilty of using other sources then extant which might have differed in details from the Books of Samuel and of Kings. Objections of this nature to the assumptions of the Analytical view might be multiplied almost indefinitely, but in an address such as the present we can only notice the broader and more striking objections, and so we may close with an objection which, if not applicable to all the supporters of the Analytical view, may yet be urged very strongly against one of the two main supporters of this unproved and unprovable theory. The objection is this—that the elimination of the purely predictive element from the prophets of the Old Testament, and the resolution of what is commonly understood as prophecy into sagacious calculation of what might probably take place, is absolutely irreconcilable with the numerous instances in which the prophet does plainly, to use a prophet's own words, tell of events "before they spring forth."

This objection few will deny to be of a most real and most valid nature. If we are to deny the existence of the purely predictive element in the prophets of the Old Testament, we must be prepared to deny the existence of any bond of ethical unity between the two Testaments. Messianic anticipations become an illusion, and the teaching of the dear Lord Himself fallibility and error. We are in the dreary realm of absolute naturalism. It may be said that few in this country are prepared to follow the Leyden professor to such lengths as this. We may hope that it is so. There are, however, it is to be feared, tendencies to minimise the predictive that may be traced in many of the writings of our own country. We are told, for example, that the predictive knowledge is of the issue to which things tend.¹ This it certainly is, but it is much more than this. And it is this "much more" that we may often perceive to be consciously or unconsciously minimised, until, of the two elements of all genuine prophecy, the ethical and the predictive, the second becomes more and more evanescent. It is, in fact, only an illustration of that anti-supernatural current of thought which is now stealing silently but

¹ *Lux Mundi*, p. 346.

steadily into the theology of the nineteenth century.

Such are some of the leading objections which may be urged against the Analytical view. When compared with the objections against the Traditional view which have been already specified, it will be admitted, I think, by any one who will candidly consider the two classes of objections, that the objections against the Analytical view are of a more fundamental nature than those that have been urged against the Traditional view. The latter class rest more on difficulties in detail; the former on difficulties in regard of general principles. On such matters, however, minds will differ to the very end of time. Where definite proofs cannot be obtained and only probabilities balanced against probabilities, the individual writer can do little more than express his own deliberate judgment. That judgment will certainly be biassed, the bias being due to the extent and degree of the recognition of the supernatural. Each side claims to have cumulative evidence in its favour. Each side claims the right of rectifying former opinions. To this last-mentioned claim no objection can be made; but this certainly may be urged, that the rectifications on the part of the supporters of the Analytical view are far more continuous and persistent than the rectifications made by those who are advocates of the Traditional view. Such continuous rectifications, however, ought not to be found fault with, still less ought they to be made the subject of controversial banter.² They are, at any rate, honest admissions of over-hasty generalisations, and, as such, deserve to be respected. The effect, however, is unfavourable to the acceptance of the principles to which they are applied, and suggests the doubt whether finality has yet been arrived at, and whether present results, about which so much undue confidence has been expressed, may not undergo still further rectifications.

Putting all these considerations together, we seem justified in expressing the strong conviction that the thesis which we have endeavoured to maintain in this address has been maintained, and that the Traditional view is intrinsically more probable than the Analytical view.

² As in Cave, *Battle of the Standpoints*, pp. 44 sqq.