the too familiar labours of interpreters on the riddle of the book, the proffered solution came upon me as the egg of Columbus. One difficulty after another vanished, the further I read; the darkest passages caught a sudden light; all the hypotheses of perplexed interpreters—of 'proleptic visions,' 'historical perspectives,' 'recapitulating method,' 'resting stations,' 'recreative points,' 'unconscious relapse into purely Jewish ideas'—melted away at once; the complex Christology of the book, hitherto a veritable *crux* for every historical critic, resolved itself into simple elements."

This theory of the composition of the Apocalypse Dr. Martineau accepts unreservedly. "In this generous tribute to his pupil," he says, "Harnack does not, in my judgment, over-estimate the convincing effect of his analysis."

But let us listen to the judgment of one whose right to speak on such a subject is not inferior to that of any living scholar. "Such a history of a Jewish Apocalypse," says Dr. A. B. Davidson, "is unexampled. Further, there could be no thought of the Apostle John in connection with the book. The authorship of the Presbyter, mentioned by Papias, is a purely modern conjecture. We should have to conclude that the Christian editor gave out the whole with the design that it should be taken for the work of the Apostle John, and that his deception succeeded. This is a strong assumption, considering that the book was probably known to Papias. Again, the Christian editor appears to adopt the Jewish views of the rest of the book, *e.g.* the earthly reign of the saints over the nations (ii. 26 with v. 10, xx. 4). When we take into account the known opinions of Papias, Justin, and Irenæus, and fancy to ourselves the various complexions of faith, the crosses, as we might say, between Judaism and Christianity that must have existed in the earliest times of the Church, we hesitate to admit that a Christian could not have written the whole book. And to mention only one other point: the theory gives no account of the parallelism between the book and our Lord's eschatological discourse."

The review of Vischer's essay, from which we have quoted, was contributed by Dr. Davidson to the first number (November 1886) of the *Theological Review and Free Church College Quarterly*. This is one of the ablest journals of the day. Its review department, in particular, has been conducted with singular judgment, every number containing the results of such scholarship and literary form as are associated with the names of Dr. Bruce, Dr. Davidson, Dr. Dods, and Dr. Salmond.

We are glad to see that its sub-title is now to be removed and its scope widened. Henceforward it is to contain critical reviews only, but they are to be contributed by the foremost scholars in all the evangelical Churches, and to cover not only the current theology, but also philosophical and general literature, so far as it bears upon theology and religion.

This is a most needful, and, under skilful and generous management, should prove a most successful enterprise. And we believe that it will be managed both skilfully and generously. Its editor is to be Dr. Salmond, of Aberdeen, and its publishers, Messrs. T. & T. Clark, of Edinburgh.

"I."

By Professor Sir G. G. Stokes, Bart., M.P., President of the Royal Society.

I have chosen for the subject of my lecture a word of only one letter, a word which is constantly in the mouths of us all. Simple as the word is, there is a great deal contained in it, and, I doubt not, you are wondering what branch of the subject I am going to take up. There are many that I might take up, but I will confine myself to one. I mean to confine myself to the question: "What is it that personal identity depends upon and consists in?"

Now it is very often easier to ask a question than to answer it, and I cannot pretend that I am able to answer that question myself. "Well," perhaps you will say to me, "what is the use of bringing before us a question that you tell us you cannot answer yourself?" Well, I think it is sometimes not without its use. It may happen that we are called upon by authority, or what we have a right to regard as authority, to accept such and such a statement. Perhaps we say within ourselves: "If that statement is true it must be brought about either in this way or in that way, or perhaps some third way." I will call these ways "A," "B," and "C." "Well," perhaps we think, "how can it be brought about in the way 'A'? Here is a very great difficulty; I do not see how to get over it. Let us try 'B.' Here is another great difficulty, and so perhaps for the third." And then perhaps we may say within ourselves: "We have tried all possible ways of conceiving how this asserted statement can be brought about, and they are all beset with such difficulties that we cannot

accept the statement." But perhaps it may be that you have not tried all the ways, and that there may be some other way conceivable by which the asserted statement might be brought about which is not subject to those great difficulties that we have seen the other modes to be subject to, and which is such that, although we are very, very far indeed from being able to say that the asserted statement is brought about in that way, still we may be able to say: "I do not see why it should not." What is the effect of that? It leaves us open to consider the evidence on which we are called upon to accept the statement first made to us; to give it fair and calm consideration.

Now, as I said, I cannot answer myself the question which I have proposed to you, but I will endeavour to place before you some thoughts bearing in that direction which I have found to be helpful to myself, and which possibly may be of some help to some of you.

Now, as regards personal identity, let us first consider it with reference to others. Well, one great evidence of identity is that of continuity of change. Take the case of a person growing from youth upwards. If we take him at the age of two, and at the age of twenty, there is a very great difference. But, instead of taking so long a jump, let us take him from year to year, or month to month, or day to day, or hour to hour, and we see that there is a great deal of continuous change in him, and we infer from that that it is the same individual all through; and that is one great means, and perhaps the principal means, that we have of judging of the identity of others than ourselves.

Suppose that a mother were parted from her child while he was still an infant, and saw no more of him, and heard no more of him, till he grew up to man's estate. Suppose she then were brought into his presence—she would not know that he was her child, because there is a lack of that tracing of continuity by which otherwise the thing would be evident. But this mode of determining the identity of being applies also to a tree, which grows up from a little thing until it becomes a great tree. But when we speak of our own personal identity, and our own being, we have other evidence, we are conscious of other evidence than that of mere continuity. Many of us probably recollect some isolated, perhaps trivial, circumstance or circumstances, which occurred in our early childhood, some little incident remains fixed on the memory when all between has vanished. We cannot trace continuity of thought in that case, and yet we are perfectly certain of our own identity, that it was our own selves to whom, years ago it may be, that incident occurred.

Well, this consciousness of personal identity involves memory, and memory involves thought. What is thought? On what does it depend? We know that to a certain extent thought, as we experience it, depends upon the condition of the brain. In the case of a faint, the supply of blood to the brain is greatly reduced, and for a time thought is in abeyance. And it is exceedingly curious how completely one's consciousness, when the faint is over, joins on to one's consciousness before it took place. It may be that events have occurred around us, that the circumstances have changed altogether as regards our surroundings, between the time when we ceased to be conscious and became conscious again, and yet by our own consciousness we should not know that any time at all had elapsed. Well, although thought is connected with the brain apparently, as we know it, we must not too hastily jump to the conclusion that it involves nothing more than the action of the brain. Now, what suppositions have been made with respect to it?

First, there is what I may call the materialistic hypothesis. According to this, thought depends upon certain molecular changes going on in the brain, just very much as walking depends upon the exertion of the muscles of our body. Now, although, as I said, thought, as we know it, is very, very intimately connected with the state of the brain, still there are, as I conceive, very great difficulties in the way of such a supposition as that. I have spoken of a faint. A faint may last for some time, and during that time the functions of the body must go on, or the person would die. They go on, no doubt in a reduced and enfeebled state, yet they must go on, and, consequently, at the end of the faint the body is not in quite the same condition as it was at the beginning. Again, every night we are unconscious—at least it is to be hoped we are all of us—for some hours together of what takes place. But all this while the heart has been going on beating, and we have been breathing, and the functions of the animal frame have been going on, and there must have been a considerable change taking place; in fact, perhaps we fell asleep after having had a meal,—a light meal, and perhaps we may awake feeling hungry, and yet a period of unconsciousness has elapsed. The transition between consciousness and unconsciousness is by no means so sharp in sleep as it is in a faint, as I know by experience; but perhaps you do not all know by experience what a faint is; still, I can answer for it from my own experience, and I dare say some of you can from yours. I recollect reading somewhere or other of a bricklayer's labourer, who, I think, was going up a ladder and speaking, when he got knocked on the head by a falling brickbat. He was rendered unconscious; of course he was taken home: he remained unconscious a considerable time—I do not recollect what time—perhaps some hours, possibly a day or two. Well,

when he came to, he completed the sentence that he had been speaking when he was struck. Now, it is very difficult to understand how all this could be if thinking, as we know it, though involving some action of the brain, depends upon nothing else than the action of the brain, because the brain and the various tissues of the body must undergo a certain change; there is a constant supply of nutriment derived from the food, and waste of tissues, and yet there is no trace of this change in the joining together of the thought after the interval of unconsciousness with the thought before. But there is, I think, still greater difficulty in the way of what I have called the materialistic hypothesis. I hold my hand before me; I can move it to the right or to the left as I please; I am conscious of a power which I call will, by the exertion of which I can choose whether I shall move it to the right or to the left. Now, according to the materialistic hypothesis, everything about me is determined simply by the ponderable molecules which constitute my body acting simply and solely according to the very same laws according to which matter destitute of life might act. Well, then, if we follow up this supposition to its full extent, we are obliged to suppose that, whether I move at this particular moment of time—4.25, on the 30th March—my hand to the right or to the left, was determined by something inevitable, something which could not have been otherwise, and must have come down, in fact, from my ancestors.

Now, I confess, this seems to me to fly so completely in the face of common sense that I cannot understand how any one could frame such an hypothesis, except it be on the assumption of this axiom: That everything about us depends solely and simply upon the action of the ponderable matter which constitutes our bodies, and the environment about us, acting according to the physical laws belonging to dead matter.

Well, now, may it not be that that axiom is fallacious, and that common sense is right after all, and that there is a something about us, constituting what we call will, but the origin of which we are unable to describe?

I will take an example or two of certain entities about us, which phenomena lead us to admit the existence of, but which our senses, our five senses, do not give us any immediate cognizance of. What is the condition of space between the solar system and the distant stars? There was a time when it was supposed to be an absolute void. What is light? Now, I am not going to give you a dissertation about the theory of light, but I will just say that now-a-days there is overwhelming evidence from its phenomena that light consists of a tremulous or undulatory movement propagated in a certain medium, as we call it, which must exist between our eyes and the most distant luminary from which light proceeds. This medium is commonly called the luminiferous ether. But this is an entity, so to speak, of which we have no direct evidence—no *direct* evidence, mind—by the action of our five senses. We are led to believe in its existence on account of the wonderfully simple manner in which it explains the phenomena. Take another illustration. Suppose there was on this table an iron pillar. You might see the sort of pillar, and perhaps might see there was something wrapped around it. Well, I lay my hands on it. I feel nothing; nothing particular appears to be going on. Yet it might be that, if instead of simply laying my hand on that pillar, I had some iron tacks in my hand, these would go jumping about as if they were alive. I am supposing that this pillar is a pillar of soft iron, and the thing running round it is a wire through which is an electric current, interrupted at intervals. We know such a current produces in the neighbourhood of this electro-magnet, as I will now call it, what I will call a magnetic force, and yet we are not connizant of that through our feelings. It is only indirectly that we get evidence of such a force, and we get that through the motion of the iron tacks in our hands. Well, then, these are simple examples of the existence, as we have every reason to believe, of certain entities about us which are not directly cognizable by our senses. Hence it seems to me that there is but a slender foundation for the assumption that everything about us—sensations and thoughts—depend simply and solely upon the action of the ponderable matter which constitutes our bodies. So much for that theory.

Well, then, there is another theory, which I will call the psychic theory. According to this, man consists of body and soul, the body being that mass of ponderable matter which we see, and touch, and feel, and the soul being that on which—and I think in this theory, taken in its extreme form, it is supposed on which alone—thought depends. Now in this theory, taken as I say in its most extreme form, the supposition frequently made is that the soul is rather hampered than otherwise by its union with the body, that it would be freer to act, to think and exercise its proper functions, if it were separated from the body altogether. Well, that theory, in the form in which I have presented it to you, as the most extreme form, is subject to very great difficulties also. The more vigorous our health, the more active as a rule are our minds. In illness the mind is often very much enfeebled. Again, let us suppose, as in the case of our bricklayer's labourer, that a man receives a blow by which he is rendered unconscious. If thinking depends upon something to which the body is rather a hindrance than a help, it is very strange indeed that that should retard the action of his thoughts. According to this supposition, the blow has only got to be somewhat harder till the head is smashed altogether, and the man is

killed, then the thoughts are rendered more active than ever.

Again, take the case of drowning. Many persons have been so far drowned that they have lost all consciousness. They have been brought out apparently dead, yet by proper means they have been restored. The interval of time was to them one of unconsciousness. This is not so rare. I knew two persons myself who had been in that condition, and perhaps more persons whom I have met may have been in it without my knowing it. Well, then, that theory, like the former, is open to very grave objections. Those who hold this theory—many of them—suppose that the soul is innately, by its very nature, immortal. The first theory is held, or at least is leaned to, by several scientists who have been very much in the habit of attending to the laws of ponderable matter, and perhaps are disposed to make the field of their investigations encroach on subjects which do not properly belong to it. The second of these theories that I have mentioned has been more held by persons belonging to the religious world. Yet this is a theory which is rather of the nature of a philosophical speculation than of a proposition deduced from Scripture.

Now perhaps you may think me rather strange for saying that. I will just read you a short extract from a book written by a well-known divine, not yet a bishop but a bishop-designate—I refer to Dr. Westcott, the Bishop-Designate of Durham. He says on page 6 of a work of his entitled *The Gospel of the Resurrection*, "Not unfrequently we substitute for the fulness of the Christian creed the purely philosophic conception of the immortality of the soul, which destroys, as we shall see hereafter, the idea of the continuance of our distinct personal existence." A bishop whom I know well wrote to me, in reply to a letter which I wrote to him, that in his parish sermons which he preached before he was a bishop, he had pointed out that the dogma of the immortality of the soul was rather a philosophical theory than a part of Christian doctrine. Another bishop, whom I also know, wrote to me expressing himself in such a manner that showed that he was perfectly willing to accept as not belonging to—as not any necessary part of—the Christian faith, that same dogma. And yet another bishop whom I know told me that he avoided in his sermons speaking of the immortality of the soul, because he was not satisfied that it was taught by Scripture.

Well, what do we rather learn from the teaching of Scripture? In Scripture man is spoken of as consisting of body, soul, and spirit. Now what are we told respecting spirit? Take the very first chapter in the Bible: we meet with the expression that God breathed into man's nostrils, after he was formed, "the breath of life, and man became a living soul." Now, I do not want you to assume that this is to be taken as a literal physical description, but rather probably it was intended as a more or less general idea of the relation of the different parts of man to one another, and of God's relation to man. Here we find "the breath of life"—I do not know Hebrew, but the same word in Greek signifies "breath" and "spirit." It is spoken of as a sort of energy, the interaction of which with the material organism produced a living being. It is represented, therefore, not so much as a living thing, but rather that which lay at the very basis of life, something deeper down even than the very thought itself.

(*To be concluded.*) p 261

The Expository Times Guild of Bible Study.

REPORT ON EXPOSITIONS OF PHIL. II. 5-11.

BY THE REV. PRINCIPAL MOULE, M.A.

1. Exposition by "J. E." The style is clear and pointed, as by a hand practised in composition and expression. The introduction is somewhat too lengthy, discussing with rather more fulness than needful *in an exposition*—the preliminary topic of the moral benefit of an ideal. And, in general, the writer deals with the passage more as *discoursing upon it* than *expounding it* (which I take to be the special programme of the "Guild"). Thus his study of the rich and pregnant wording of the passage in its details is (for exposition) too rapid and general; for instance, there is scarcely any notice of the difficulties and interest of the phrases, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο and ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν. Turning briefly to the inculcation of the *doctrine* of the passage, I have, in general, nothing but commendation. But I should have been glad to see more emphasis thrown on the very remarkable illustration afforded by the whole passage of the vital connection between doctrinal truth and Christian life. On the whole, this paper is a forcible and attractive *discourse* on some main aspects of Phil. ii. 5-11, but not what I should understand by a *study* of it.

2. Exposition by "T. J. W." This is a most careful, painstaking study of the passage, phrase by phrase, after the manner of notes in a plain commentary, with spiritual remark and application intermingled. I have read it with interest as (if I do not mistake) the work of a young Bible student well trained in knowledge of the English Bible, and accustomed to note accurately what stands there. I have one or two points to criticise, however. P. 2, a quotation (quite in point) is given from the Catechism; but this is then reasoned *from* as if a Scripture