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A table of contents for *The Expositor* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_expositor-series-1.php

THE APOSTLE PAUL'S HYMN OF LOVE (1 COR.
XIII.) AND ITS RELIGIOUS-HISTORICAL SIG-
NIFICANCE.

PART V. THE THIRD PART OF THE HYMN, 8-12,
AND THE CONCLUSION, 13.¹

THE third part of the hymn (vers. 8-13) returning to the comparison with the gifts, treats of the eternal nature of love.² Because love is something perfect and absolute (ver. 7: four times πάντα), it never ceases,³ whilst the gifts partly are done away with—as is the case with prophecies and knowledge—and partly cease of themselves (so Glossolalia).⁴

¹ [Some notes, enclosed in square brackets, have been added in process of translation to attain clearness.]

² In ver. 8 it is probable that the better-attested and more difficult ἐκπίπτει (not πίπτει) should be read (in ἐκπίπτει the passives which follow are heralded): further we must prefer προφητεῖαι (only B has the sing.) and also the unusual γνώσεις (with AD^b F^r G 17. 47 Tertull. [but not Itala], Gregor. Nyss.) because it is in fact necessary. In ver. 11 the evidence is evenly balanced in respect of the position of the thrice-repeated ὡς νῆπιος (before or after the verb). The fact that γὰρ before ἀπτι is lost in old MSS. is easily explained, likewise the very old addition of ὡς before δι' ἐσώπτρου, which is found already in Clem. Alex., Tertull., Origen (ὡς ἐν ἀβύγματι also occurs). It would be necessary to retain ὡς if the addition could not be easily explained, whereas the loss would be almost incomprehensible. Clem. Alex. scarcely ever gives ἐν ἀβύγματι (except Exc. ex Theodoto 15), s. Paedag. I. 6, 36; Strom. I. 19, 94; V. 1, 7; V. 11, 74; but still it is assured.

³ The indicative [present] ἐκπίπτει is here purposely chosen instead of the future. [The translator, inserts "present," omitted apparently by a slip in the original.]

⁴ The Apostle lacked the finer feeling for the Greek language in a high degree, otherwise he could never have written in ver. 8 καταργηθῆσονται . . . πάσονται . . . καταργηθῆσονται (also the repetition of καταργ. in vers. 10 and 11). The thought prescribed the change in the second, and the repetition in the third place, and that sufficed for him. Clem. Alex. (*Quis*

From this point of his exposition onwards the problem of knowledge arises before the Apostle, and does not release him until the end. First it is still prophecy, knowledge, and speaking with tongues (ver. 8), then knowledge and prophecy (ver. 9), then (vers. 11 and 12) knowledge alone—a clear proof that at last this alone is in question. We feel from his words how deeply painful to him is the recognition that our knowledge is imperfect and therefore incapable of duration. The mood which dominates him is not that of Socrates with regard to ignorance, but rather something like that of Faust, only entirely directed towards the knowledge of God; but as a foil it has the triumphant cry, "Love never faileth," and this contrast gives to the final words of the Apostle their incomparable charm, and then, and only then, brings the hymn to its climax. Ways of knowing¹ and ways of prophesying cease, because we possess them but partially, and because it is a law that what is partial comes to an end with the advent of what is perfect. To the mind of the Apostle, which is bent upon the entire and absolute, partial and perfect knowledge do not stand in the relation of parts and whole. The image which he uses for their relation shows rather that he judges the former as something childishly inauthoritative, which therefore is not to be taken seriously, and which has to give way not to entire knowledge but to an entirely different kind of knowledge.²

Very finely chosen are the three words *λαλεῖν*, *φρονεῖν*

dives, 38) writes as a correction: *προφητεῖαι καταργούνται, γλώσσαι παύονται, ἰδέσεις ἐπὶ γῆς καταλείπονται*. [This note seems out of keeping with Part VI. Here the repetition of the verb is treated as a literary fault; but in Part VI. Dr. Harnack points out that the effect of the Hymn largely depends on the repetition of certain dominant words to express dominant ideas.]

¹ The *ἐκ μέρους γινώσκωμεν* (ver. 9) makes it necessary to read *γνώσεις* in ver. 8 (see above). Of *γνώσεις* the Apostle would not have said that it ceases. (See the following.)

² The fact that the Apostle has opposed to "*ἐκ μέρους*" not "*τὸ πᾶν*"

and λογίζεσθαι, as the degrees of a climax.¹ Our φρονεῖν also, nay even our λογίζεσθαι in the present, are, judged in the light of what is to come, childish, and have no eternal significance. Godet, however, goes too far in his explanation when he refers λαλεῖν to the speaking with tongues, φρονεῖν to prophecy and λογίζεσθαι to knowledge; for the reference to prophecy cannot, except in an artificial way, be introduced into the term φρονεῖν.

It is also remarkable that the Apostle does not say: "When I became a man what was childish ceased," but "when I became a man, I put away childish things." They had become hollow and unreal to him. Such, therefore, is the attitude of the Apostle towards knowledge and the other gifts which he possesses in the present—he would like to put them aside as quite insufficient if only that which is perfect were already come! This attitude is already, as Godet rightly recognises, expressed in ch. i. 7: "So that you may not feel yourselves lacking in any gift, while you await the revelation of the Lord" (ὥστε ὑμᾶς μὴ ὑστερεῖσθαι ἐν μηδενὶ χαρίσματι, ἀπεκδεχομένους τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τοῦ κυρίου). That was indeed in reality not the attitude of the Corinthians, but Paul, in the opening part of several of his letters, pictures the communities as being what they ought to be.

Very pessimistic is the Apostle's view of what we can know of God and profane things. The reason for this appears in ver. 12: because in this earthly life (ἄρτι) we see only "by means of a mirror, in a riddle." We should transport the Apostle into the modern or the Hellenic world of thought, if

but "τὸ τέλειον" shows his opinion of the relation of the knowledge of the present to the knowledge of the future, which indeed only becomes quite clear in ver. 11 ff.

¹ [This paragraph and the next are one long footnote in the original German.]

we were to think here of general world-knowledge or of a theory of knowledge which confesses that we know things only in images or actually within the limits of specific sensuous perception. The sorrowful lament of the Apostle does not refer to things but only to God and His ways;¹ that is made quite clear by the words: "but then from face to face." They would have to run very differently if it were a question of knowledge of the external world. But when we have ascertained this, we may be allowed to add that there is here an identity of attitude, however different be the ways in which Paul and the Hellenic philosophy would face the problems of thought; and further, that the Hellenic philosophy, too, had in that age become more and more a philosophy of religion and a longing after God, so that it did not so much strive after the knowledge of the reality of things, but, like the Apostle, after the knowledge of the divine "from face to face."

What knowledge it is to which the Apostle aspires, and which he contrasts with the knowledge δι' ἐσόπτρου² ἐν

¹ Still it is surely intentional that βλέπομεν has no object, and every one feels the reason for it.

² It is an old dispute whether these words are to be translated "by means of a mirror" or "through a (dim) glass"; but this dispute should not have arisen. To deviate (with Tertullian) from the certain meaning ἐσόπτρου=mirror, is inadvisable, and besides, Clem Alex. remarks on this passage (*Strom.* I. 19, 94): δι' ἐσόπτρου=κατ' ἀνάκλασιν, through reflection which makes the image obscure. Only in ourselves and our brothers do we, according to Clemens (thus only indirectly), become aware of God. Clemens cites in this connexion the Apocryphal saying: "Thou hast seen thy brother, thou hast seen thy God," (εἶδες τὸν ἀδελφόν σου, εἶδες τὸν θεόν σου). However, we need not confine the mirror to ourselves and our brothers. Paul is surely thinking also of the reflexion of God in nature and history.—The image of the mirror which the Apostle uses has nothing to do with Sap. Salom. vii. 26: "For wisdom is the reflection of eternal light and the mirror of the activity of God" (ἀπαύγασμα γάρ ἐστιν [Wisdom] φωτὸς αἰδίου καὶ ἑσοπτρὸν ἀκηλίδωτων τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας), and absolutely nothing with Ode Salom. 13 ("our mirror is the Lord; open the eyes and look upon it in him") and the alleged logion of the Lord in an alleged epistle of John (de mont. Sina et Sion 13: "For we also who believe in Him see Christ in ourselves as in a mirror. As

αἰνίγματι,¹ he has expressed not only by the words "from face to face," but still more clearly by the words: "But then I shall know as I also am known."² What an intimate part he takes in this sentence is shown already by the change from the 1st person plural to the 1st singular, even though we may call the "I" typical. In verse 11 already he had (after ver. 9: we) spoken in the 1st singular; but in verse 12a he had gone back to the plural. Now (ver. 12b) he again speaks in the singular. The speech becomes a confession and the expression of the most personal and certain hope which rules him. For this he finds *γνώσομαι* not strong enough. Our language unfortunately cannot well render the contrast. ἄρτι γινώσκω . . . τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώ-

God Himself instructs us and warns us in a letter of John His disciple to the people: See Me in yourselves in the same way in which any one of you sees himself by looking into water or into a mirror" ("Nam et nos qui illi credimus Christum in nobis tamquam in speculo videmus, ipso nos instruente et monente in epistula Johannis discipuli sui ad populum: Ita me in vobis videte quomodo quis vestrum se videt in aquam aut in speculum"). James i. 24 is also quite different. On the other hand Theophil. ad Autol. I. 2 may be quoted, although the ground of the comparison is of a different sort: "When there is rust in the mirror the face of the man cannot be seen in the mirror. So also when there is sin in the man, such a man cannot contemplate God." (Ἐπὶ τῆς ἐσόπτρου, οὐ δύναται ὁρᾶσθαι τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῇ ἐσόπτρῳ. ὅπως καὶ ὅταν ᾖ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐ δύναται ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος θεωρεῖν τὸν θεόν).

¹ The object as such cannot be described as a riddle, still less can ἐν αἰνίγματι be in any way understood locally; on the contrary it indicates as much as δι' ἐσόπτρου the manner of contemplation: we perceive, as a glossator says, "in problems and images and similitudes (ἐν ζητήμασι καὶ εἰκόσι καὶ ὁμοιώμασι), which indeed give suggestions but admit of no certain interpretation. The old African Latin (see also Tertull.) has preserved "in aenigmate." Irenaeus (IV. 9, 2) writes: "Through a mirror and riddles" (per speculum et per aenigmata). Tertullian explains (adv. Prax. 14) "in aenigmate" = "in imagine." The Apostle's expression is decided by Num. xii. 8: "I will speak to him mouth to mouth" (στόμα κατὰ στόμα λαλήσω αὐτῷ, ἐν εἰβει καὶ οὐ δι' αἰνιγμάτων).

² Godet's explanation that βλέπει δι' ἐσόπτρου refers to prophecy and only ver. 12b to knowledge is untenable; for obviously [ver. 12b says the same without metaphor which is metaphorically expressed in ver. 12a. If the meaning were different, that must clearly appear. For the rest Godet's explanation is only a further deduction from his false explanation of ver. 11 (see above). This verse, too, has only to do with knowledge. At best we may regard prophecy as included.

σομαι.¹ Το ἐκ μέρους is opposed not only as in verse 10 τέλειον, which leads beyond πᾶν, but the Apostle reaches out still higher : " I shall know even as I am known," that is, as God knows me,² so I shall know Him (and His ways). Such is, therefore, the aim after which the marrow of his soul sighs, but which at the same time he holds as the surest hope. No hope can aspire more boldly. The knowledge from face to face is the knowledge after the fashion in which God knows. How much Paul lives in the problem that is presented by the relation of our knowledge of God to God's knowledge of us, is shown by several places in his letters.³ But in this passage there is no reference to love ; rather do knowledge and love appear as two entirely separate things, just as in the description of love in verses 6-7 nothing was named which had to do with love. It is different with John (on this point see below).

Τότε πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον . . . τότε ἐπιγνώσομαι—when this τότε shall come to pass was stated with unmistakable clearness in v. 10 : when the parousia of the Lord will put an end to this earth and with it to all that is imperfect (ὅταν ἔλθῃ τὸ τέλειον),⁴ not before. [In accordance with this the statement νυνὶ δὲ μένει ἀγάπη finds its explanation. The sense is : in this temporal life, in which we have only partial

¹ With regard to γινώσκειν and ἐπιγινώσκειν compare Moulton, *loc. cit.*, p. 113.

² Some have thought that the aorist is remarkable and have been led by it to the assumption that Paul wished to say : " As I was known, namely, at the time of my conversion." But it is difficult to see why the Apostle should have been thinking of this special, although fundamental, event. The aorist is far rather descriptive, and used without reference to time. (s. Moulton, pp. 134, 135 f.)

³ See Gal. iv. 8 : νῦν δὲ γνόντες θεόν, μᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. 1 Cor. viii. 2 f. : εἰ τις δοκεῖ ἐγνωκέναι τι, οὐπω ἔγνω καθὼς δεῖ γινῶναι (our verses form a gloss to these words) : εἰ δὲ τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν, οὗτος ἐγνωσται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (this thought is foreign to our passage). Heinrici contributes a remarkable parallel from Philo Cherub. to the first half of the Apostle's thought : When we live we are known rather than know (ὅτε ζῶμεν . . . γνωρίζομεθα μᾶλλον ἢ γνωρίζομεν. I. S. 197 ed. Cohn).

⁴ Compare Dr. Lepsius's article on the Apokatastasis or Restitution of all things, in a recent number of the *EXPOSITOR*.

and uncertain knowledge, which some time will be done away, we nevertheless possess something unchangeable, therefore of absolute value, namely love.

Only because this thought hovered before the Apostle's mind could he here associate faith and hope with love. But even thus they come unexpectedly; for their introduction is not prepared in any way.¹ The reason that they are mentioned can therefore only be that the Apostle wished to express the thought: "Of all our present possessions, love is the most valuable." The emphasis rests, therefore, on ver. 13b: "Love is the greatest of them."

But another difficulty arises here. How can the Apostle say that at this time only faith, hope and love remain—surely the gifts, too, remain? Here there is, in fact, a contradiction which cannot logically be quite cleared away, but which is psychologically quite comprehensible. A possession like the gifts which, as the Apostle has regretfully confessed, makes only a partial, childish knowledge possible, is in reality no real possession.²

But in contrast to them remains something which is not partial and childish, on which, therefore, we can rely, namely faith, hope and love. This does not mean that to the two first, as to love, the saying *οὐδέποτε ἐκπίπτουσιν* may be applied—for *ἐλπίς βλεπομένη οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλπίς* (Rom. viii. 26), and the same applies to faith—but that their case is different from that of the gifts; for the change from faith and hope to the perfect is fulfilment, but the change from the gift-

¹ At this point, then, we may find fault with the hymn from the standpoint of strict compactness. In such cases exegetical logicians are in the habit of simply expunging the verse, or else suppose that something has been lost. Here, so far as I know, no such proposal has been made. [The statement in the text, also, is reconsidered and to some extent modified in Part VI.].

² Irenæus paraphrases very finely (IV. 12, 2): "Omnibus ceteris evacuatis manere fidem, etc.": compare II. 28, 3: "Reliquis partibus destructis hæc tunc perseverare, quæ sunt fides, spes et caritas."

knowledge to perfect knowledge is a break ; for the former is done away, and the new comes to take its place. In this sense, the Apostle, condensing his thoughts and leaving out a middle term in the speech, speaks of the remaining of faith, hope and love, in order then to come to the conclusion which he wished, namely, that among these also love was the greatest. It is the greatest—that, too, we must supplement—because it is perfect and permanent not only through anticipation like faith and hope, but it passes over unchanged into eternity : “ Love never ceaseth.”¹

Finally it should be noted that the Apostle has embraced the three ideas, faith, hope and love, by an emphatic τὰ τρία ταῦτα.” The assumption that he is contrasting them with the triad, glossolalia, prophecy and knowledge, is petty, especially as he does not further concern himself with faith and hope. But the association of the three is certainly intended to express the exclusive value of these three virtues : nothing in this earthly life can be placed beside them. The Apostle has also said elsewhere that Christianity is comprehended in them.² Who brought forward this great device of the Christian religion ? Paul himself ? We do not know. John and Ignatius have not repeated it—they connect faith and love, but hope plays no part with them³—but Polycarp (ep. 3) and “ Barnabas ” (c. 1) have reproduced it, and from the end of the second century onwards it became through the reading of the Pauline epistles a Church formula, until Ambrosius combined the three Christian virtues with the four antique ones in his ethics and thus created catholic syncretism around this principal point.⁴

¹ See Thess. i. 3, 5, 8 ; Col. i, 4 f.

² Compare Clemens Alex., *Quis dives*, 38 : Μένει δὲ τὰ τρία ταῦτα, πίστις, ἐλπίς, ἀγάπη· μείζων δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἀγάπη ; καὶ δικαίως πίστις μὲν γὰρ ἀπέρχεται, ὅταν αὐτοψία πεισθῶμεν, ἰδόντες θεόν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀΐζεται τῶν τελείων παραδοθέντων.

³ Clemens Rom. (c. 58) places faith and hope together like a formula.

⁴ The statement—“ But now remaineth faith, hope, love ”—sounds as if the

PART VI. THE LITERARY QUALITY OF THE HYMN.¹

We should not be so bold as to attempt to exhaust the religious and moral content of this hymn. It must be felt. We may try to investigate the charm of the form and of the style, and to discover their secret.

Amongst all the writings of Paul, this hymn ranks highest in respect of its form.² It offers the most sublime and strongest aesthetic charms, and it is worth while to reflect upon the means by which Paul has obtained such effects. Poetry, in the strict sense, the hymn, indeed, is not, but "speech": therefore the designation "hymn" is not quite correct. Like the eighth chapter of Romans it gushes forth freely, which, however, does not exclude the use of simple artistic means. Rhythm and poetic form flowed from enthusiasm—an obvious proof that the deepest contemplation and sensibility became, by inner necessity, poetic in their expression. Lastly, it is the subject matter which in its powerful expression gives the effect of perfect poetry.

In the first place the mere plan is unsurpassable. The hymn is divided into three parts, and a final verse: the indispensableness of love (vers. 1-3), the nature and effect of love (vers. 4-7), the eternalness of love (vers. 8-12). Each part has its particular scheme; but in all the parts the highest effects are obtained by the excellent choice of words, by the powerful simplicity of the syntax and the combined means of antithesis and repetition. Here we are not taking into

Apostle were using a well-known expression; in that case it would be easier to explain why the connexion in the passage with which we are dealing is, as has been already stated, not irreproachable. But the assumption is not absolutely necessary. Resch's attempt (Agraph² in the Texts and Researches, vol. 30, p. 153 ff.) to prove the saying to be a logion of the Lord has not been successful. J. Weisz (p. 320) thinks it necessary, from the assurance with which Paul has advanced the statement, to infer an authoritative saying.

¹ [This Section is a single footnote in the German original.]

² s. Joh. Weisz, p. 311 f.

consideration the use of delineating and descriptive adjectives, except in the first verse.¹ The whole effect rests on the verb (in German that cannot unfortunately always be reproduced) and thus the hymn receives the most lively inner movement as well as certain statuesque dignity. This paradoxical interlacing lends the piece its mysterious aesthetic charm. What poet has here equalled the Apostle? The arrangement of the words, too, supports the effect in pre-eminent fashion; it could not be improved in any of the verses.

The three parts are quite differently handled. The first, which is introductory, begins most solemnly, and its three subdivisions are strictly parallel and symmetrically worked out, yet, nevertheless, in such a way that by their subject matter they form a climax: (1) Glossolalia (ecstasy); (2) all prophecy, all knowledge and the highest power of faith; (3) self-sacrificing action. The thrice-repeated sentence: "ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω" appears each time as an antithetic secondary clause, and thus the inference is drawn. The first time with ironic sharpness, which goes through marrow and bone: "Tongues of men and angels—a booming brass and a clanging cymbal!" What a contrast! Instead of heavenly voices, the raving sounds of a hollow instrument! The two other times, however, after a broad exposition in the protasis, the highest effect is attained in the apodosis by brevity: οὐδὲν εἶμι—οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι." Like blows with a club, these words strike down all possessions and all titles to fame, which claim to be accepted without love. At the same time the "I" which dominates all this part enhances the credibility of the sayings, so that no contradiction is possible. He who speaks thus has experienced it.²

¹ [See above in Part III. p. 393.]

² [A further motive causing the variation in the hymn between the use of first and third person singular, is stated by Sir W. M. Ramsay, *Pictures of the Apostolic Church*, p. 232.]

The second part, again, begins solemnly : *ἡ ἀγάπη* is repeated thrice in the first sentence when the three fundamental qualities of love—long-suffering, kindness and freedom from envy—are introduced. But then the poet restrains himself no longer ; when the heart is full the mouth overfloweth ! Out of the fullness of his idea of love he pours forth words in deepest excitement to express the being and nature of love—first only in negations, but these already have the effect of great maxims, and they close with the sublime thought that love stands beside the highest thing that exists, namely truth. But even with this the poet has not exhausted himself. A four times repeated “ *πάντα* ” is contrasted with the eightfold “ *οὐκ* ” and gives the most complete expression, in a powerful sequence, to the absoluteness of love. The language becomes more and more entrancing, the thoughts seem to stumble over each other ; but they only seem to do so—every word stands firmly in its proper place. The ecstasy is ecstasy of intellectual apprehension, *ἐν νοί*.

The poet alters the tone as he prepares to utter the final saying. With three impressive words he places the principal thought as theme at the beginning : “ *ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε ἐκπίπτει*.” But immediately the tone of enthusiasm becomes apparent, and this is reflected in the double change of the plural and singular (vers. 9 and 12*a* plural, vers. 11 and 12*b* singular). Certainly the “ I ” is not individual but typical ; but still the change has a great effect. In three sentences following each other asyndetically, the Apostle contrasts the ephemeral nature of prophecies, tongues and knowledge with the eternal nature of love : it is not with love as it is with the gifts ! *Καταργηθήσονται* dominates his verse and continues in verses 10 and 11. But in verse 9 *ἐκ μέρους* becomes the catch-word and reaches over into verses 10 and 12. The 11th verse is decided by the five times re-

peated *νήπιος*, and the 12th finally by the very effectively repeated contrast of “*ἄρτι*” and “*τότε*,” and also by the antithesis: “*δι' ἐσόπτρου . . . πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον*,” and *γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους . . . ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπιγνώσθην*.” [Note the effective use of the three tenses, which crown the preceding antitheses: “*τὸ ἐκ μέρους . . . τὸ τέλειον*” and “*νήπιος . . . ἀνήρ*.”]

The final verse, by a diversion full of genius brings yet another climax. Inasmuch as the word *μένει* resumes again from the positive side the words *οὐδέποτε ἐκπίπτει*,” faith and hope appear here on earth instead of knowledge, which cannot hold its place beside love. They can hold their place, but greater than them is love. The Apostle could not have ended more effectively.

PART VII. THE POSITION OF THE HYMN IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION.

It is important and instructive to attain clearness with regard to the position of this sublime poem in the history of religion. It is not a psalm like those of the Old Testament or like the lately discovered Odes of Solomon; Paul has not gone there for his model. Rather does the hymn stand entirely apart by itself; for there is, so far as I know, nothing like it in profane literature either. But has it any religious-historical significance? “Modern” scholars will try to find one in “the tongues of angels” and “the clanging symbol”; gladly do we leave them to their investigations. The really important thing is what the Apostle says about love and knowledge, and what relation it bears to Hellenism, as for example to Plato.¹

¹ Agape and Eros had originally nothing in common with one another; but as early as the first century agape grows beyond the idea of *caritas* and takes on fundamental characteristics of eros. In the second century the problem of “agape” and “gnosis” is common.

I. We must begin with the most certain fact—love and knowledge have nothing to do with one another in this hymn. Neither does love lead to knowledge nor knowledge to love.¹ That results forthwith from the fact that love here is “*caritas*” and nothing else. That is obvious not only for the first two parts of the hymn, but also for the last part. Just because of this Paul places love in the closing verse not with knowledge, of which he has just been speaking, but with faith and hope, thus with religious-moral virtues; and just because of this, in the description of love in the second part, there is no mention of knowledge.

II. Present knowledge and future knowledge the Apostle feels simply as contrasts. It may seem not to be so when he calls the former partial knowledge; but according to him it is not the entire which is opposed to the partial, but the perfect, which is something quite different from the sum of parts. Present knowledge, according to him, is a childish thing, which is not improved by completing it, but which has to be done away altogether; for it sees only reflected pictures, the understanding and explanation of which remain a riddle. Therefore: no bridge leads from the partial to the whole; neither does the Apostle feel any impulse to increase this partial knowledge. Because he regards it as a worthless possession he would rather strip it off, just as, when he became a man, he put away childish things.

III. Valuable knowledge, namely, the knowledge from face to face, the full knowledge—as God knows—is not to be expected till that which is perfect has come, that is, when (through the second appearance of Christ) this temporal life suddenly comes to an end.²

¹ In c. viii. 1, Paul confronts the two (love and knowledge in the present), and comes to the bitter conclusion that whereas love edifies, knowledge puffs up. With regard to another relation between the two which immediately after comes under discussion, see below.

² [See the paper of Dr. Lepsius on the *Apokatastasis* in *EXPOSITIO* 1011.]

With these thoughts Plato and the Greek idealistic philosophy of religion (we do not speak here of later developments of Neo-Platonism) have simply nothing to do; they are opposed to them. Not a single word more is required to prove that. Paul appears here not as the disciple, but as the opposite pole to Plato and the Greeks. They place love and knowledge in one category as *amor intellectualis*; Paul separates them. They recognise indeed a knowledge which increases step by step, but all knowledge is qualitatively identical; Paul denies that. According to them, present knowledge, in spite of its incompleteness, is the best thing in the world; Paul is far removed from this belief. Finally, they know nothing of a future event by which that which is perfect will suddenly appear, but of a gradual emergence of the spirit from the bonds of the sensuous to a higher being. There can be no doubt Paul is a Jew and will have nothing to do with the knowledge of the Hellenes.

But still all is not yet said, rather there remains yet another point of the highest importance, and it brings Paul and Plato together. The contemptuous judgment of the value of knowledge applies only to the present, partial knowledge. As soon as the Apostle thinks of perfect knowledge he judges quite otherwise. In trembling emotion and in ardent impulse he contemplates it: the best thing in the world, the best in this temporal life, is love, but the absolutely best, for which his soul longs, is perfect knowledge, the knowledge from face to face, the knowledge in which "I know as I also am known." This knowledge, as has already been said, has nothing to do with love; but yet it is a point of some importance that he is led to it when he is thinking about love, and in another passage of the same letter (viii. 3) he goes yet a step further: "If any man love God, he is known of Him." Here, also, he does not indeed say "he knoweth God," but still it is the preparatory step to that combination.

The knowledge from face to face is the highest goal—is it not Plato whom we are listening to? Further, if knowledge at its highest point has for its object simply the last, namely the divine nature, is not that too Plato? Finally, when the Apostle in this connexion designates present knowledge as knowledge in a mirror, is that not a confirmation of the Platonic origin of the guiding thought?

But caution is imperative. The apologist Theophilus says in one place, repeating the learning of the schools, that the word “*θεός*” is derived as much from “*τεθεικέναι*” as from “*θέειν*.” We smile at this double etymology; but in the history of religion of the Hellenic age, there is often question of double origins, nay, we may say that only those ideas and institutions which had a double root survived and finally conquered (namely in catholic Christianity, which is the conclusion of the universal development); all others lost vitality.

Catholic Christianity is a formation out of two converging and finally concurrent lines, of which one, starting from the prophets, runs its course by way of the later psalms in the later Jewish development (comprehending the earliest Christian), the other in the development of the Greek philosophy of religion (comprehending the nature of the mysteries). But the two lines are not only convergent and finally in the third and fourth centuries concurrent; but already also during their course side-lines diverged from the principal lines, and these became intertwined with one another.

If we apply this insight to the problem that lies before us, there can be no doubt that the recognition of perfect knowledge as the highest thing was developed in the Jewish line too, and likewise the conviction that the highest knowledge and everything that is highest is nothing else than the knowledge of God.¹ Therefore it is possible that Paul did

¹ See Matt. xi. 27.

not first borrow this view from Platonism. Even the unusual tone in which the longing after knowledge is expressed by him is not necessarily Hellenic. His *πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον, οὐκ ἐν αἰνίγματι* (see above) has quite sufficient basis in the saying in Numbers xii. 8. And from this source even the *δι' ἐσόπτρου*, which at first gives quite a Platonic impression, can be sufficiently explained.

Compare

Numbers xii. 8.

στόμα κατὰ στόμα λαλήσω
αὐτῷ, ἐν εἶδει καὶ οὐ δι'
αἰνιγμάτων.¹

I Cor. xiii. 12.

βλέπομεν ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν
αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον
πρὸς πρόσωπον.

The different expressions *στόμα κατὰ στόμα* and *πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον* are explained by Paul's having read the Hebrew text (הַפִּי לְפִי הַפִּי) and having begun the sentence with *βλέπομεν*. The Hebrew word הַפִּי both he and the LXX in agreement and correctly have rendered by *αἰνίγμα*. Thus, the Pauline *δι' ἐσόπτρου* corresponds to the phrase *ἐν εἶδει*. The Hebrew text has the word הַפִּי; at one stroke this word explains both the *βλέπομεν* and the *δι' ἐσόπτρου* of Paul; for הַפִּי means not merely "sight" and "what is seen"¹ (thence "countenance," "form"), but also "appearance" as distinguished from reality, and finally "mirror" (Exod. xxxviii. 8). Thus Paul retained the word which he read in the Bible verse that he had in his mind. This fully explains the origin of the image—Paul longs to see God in the same way as it was once promised to Moses, and every recourse to Greek sources becomes unnecessary.² But be-

¹ This is preceded by *καὶ εἶπεν* [ὁ θεὸς] *πρὸς Ἀαρὼν καὶ Μαριάμ· Ἀκούσατε τῶν λόγων μου· ἐὰν γένηται προφήτης ὑμῶν κυρίως, ἐν ὄραματι αὐτῷ γνωσθήσομαι καὶ ἐν ὅπῃ λαλήσω αὐτῷ· οὐχ οὕτως ὁ θεράπων μου Μωυσῆς· ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ οἰκῇ μου πιστὸς ἐστίν· στόμα κατὰ στόμα κ.τ.λ.*

² The Hebrew text of Num. xii. 8 is certainly not in order. If it is said in xii. 8 that the prophets will (only) see הַפִּי God, but Moses from mouth to mouth הַפִּי, then הַפִּי cannot be right, since the word cannot

cause of this we need not deny that a Greek philosopher too could have chosen the word ;¹ Plato would certainly have acclaimed it as a sublime testimony of his own special philosophy. Two lines of world-history converge here.

But would Plato have understood the *ἐπιγνώσκομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην* too ? He would probably have understood it, but differently from the Apostle. For Paul it is not only the expression of completest knowledge, but at the same time the confession of being sheltered in the all-knowing God. This *ἐπεγνώσθην* gathers its meaning from c. viii. 3 : *εἰ τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν, οὗτος ἔγνωσται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ*. But Plato would have understood much better the saying that love rejoiceth not in injustice but in the truth. "Truth" is for Paul "the designation of the new religious and metaphysical view of the world taken by the Gospel, but also the principle, at once religious and ethical, which it is necessary to bow to and to obey, so that injustice is irreconcilable with truth" (J. Weisz). But just this is also Plato's conviction.

Here there is, in spite of the greatness of the difference, the deepest point of unity. It is not to be sought [in the saying about the mirror, but in the fact that that thought is common to both, and in the fact that the Apostle, in reflecting upon love and recognising it as something imperishable, is led at all to the question of knowledge. Love and perfect knowledge, according to him, have nothing to do with each

be used differently in two succeeding sentences (probably no importance should be attached to the difference in punctuation). Therefore, the reading פִּי־וְעַל־פִּי which only removes the difficulty in } does not help much. Probably we should read with Paterson אֶחָד בְּכֹרֶת ; if Paul read thus his dependence on the passage in Num. is perfectly clear. But however we may correct the text, it is obvious that the *δι' ἐσώτηρον* of Paul was originated by אֶחָד , just as *ἐν ἀνιγμῶν* was originated by בְּחִירָת ; parallels from Philo, etc., are therefore superfluous.

¹ We may ask also if Paul would have been able to bring the old saying, by means of an alteration apparently so slight, to an expression so much more sublime, if he had not breathed Greek air.

other, but yet they have for the Apostle one thing in common—the Eternal.

The direction which the Apostle takes here and also in the connecting of faith and hope with love, proves, however, still further that his idea of love is specifically different from the Stoic one. The Stoic idea rests upon rational considerations about the equality of men and appears as the rational activity of the reasonable knowledge about the condition and end of man. To the Apostle, too, such considerations are not unknown¹ but his idea of love has not sprung from this. For Paul love, even as love for one's neighbour, is inseparable from the love of God; from it and with it, love, although entirely *caritas*, receives being and kind; but the converse, too, holds good; in and with the love for one's neighbour the love of God and religion itself are given.

The final verse proves this; Paul could not, while speaking all through the hymn about love for one's neighbour, have brought in faith and hope at the end, if love had not been for him inseparably bound up with the love of God, and an indissoluble unity with it. This view, prepared in the Old Testament, can be traced back to Jesus Himself.

Thus the Stoic love of humanity and the love which Paul means are very different things; but here it is again the same as in the case of the valuation of perfect knowledge—in that age there were, with regard to the idea of love, two converging lines, the humanitarian-stoic line and the theistic-Jewish line. During their development a certain interchange took place. Even in Hellenism there enters into the humanitarianism a strong religious element; in illustration we might quote Epictetus. But Paul, in the hymn, moves solely on the latter-named line; it was only later that the two lines ran together.

¹ See Rom. i. 19 ff., ii. 14 ff.; Acts xvii. 22 ff. Here the Apostle has learnt from the Stoa.

John has gone a step beyond Paul in the direction of Plato ;¹ he has brought love and knowledge nearer to one another on Christian ground. But before following this up we must note that in the principal question John remained a faithful disciple of Jesus and Paul's companion in faith. What is common to both of them is the fundamental idea of love, as John also understands it. According to him, too, love of God and of one's neighbour are so related, or rather are such a complete unity, that they are interchangeable. "We know that we have passed out of death into life because we love the brethren" (1 John iii. 14). "He that saith he is in the light and hateth his brother, is in the

¹ Clemens Romanus, inspired by 1 Cor. xiii., composed about the year 95 a hymn to love, which, however, especially as it plagiarises in several passages, cannot be compared to Paul's hymn. It lacks depth and real feeling ; it seems like a confused mosaic without higher value. It is remarkable that Clem. Alex. (*Strom.* IV. 18, 111 f.) comments on both hymns together, and betrays nothing of the fact that that of Clemens Romanus is a very clumsy affair beside that of Paul. The hymn runs as follows :

"Let him that hath love in Christ fulfil the commandments of Christ. Who can declare the bond of the love of God ? Who is sufficient to tell the majesty of its beauty ? The height whereunto love exalteth is unspeakable.

Love joineth us unto God ; love covereth a multitude of sins ; love endureth all things, is longsuffering in all things. There is nothing coarse, nothing arrogant in love. Love hath no divisions, love maketh no seditions, love doeth all things in concord. In love were all the elect of God made perfect ; without love is nothing well-pleasing to God :

In love the Master took unto us Himself ; for the love which He had towards us, Jesus Christ our Lord hath given His Blood for us by the will of God, and His flesh for our flesh and His life for our lives (Lightfoot)."

Ὁ ἔχων ἀγάπην ἐν Χριστῷ ποιῶσάτω τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παραγγέλματα.
τὸν δεσμὸν τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ θεοῦ τίς δύναται ἐξηγήσασθαι ; τὸ μεγαλεῖον τῆς καλλονῆς αὐτοῦ τίς ἀρκετὸς ἐξεκείνῃ ; τὸ ὕψος εἰς ὃ ἀνάγει ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνεκδιήγητόν ἐστιν.

Ἀγάπη κολλᾷ ἡμᾶς τῷ θεῷ, ἀγάπη καλύπτει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν, ἀγάπη πάντα ἀνέχεται, πάντα μακροθυμεῖ· οὐδὲν βάνανσον ἐν ἀγάπῃ, οὐδὲν ὑπερήφανον· ἀγάπη σχίσμα οὐκ ἔχει, ἀγάπη οὐ στασιάζει, ἀγάπη πάντα ποιεῖ ἐν ὁμοιοῖα· ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ ἐτελειώθησαν πάντες οἱ ἐκλεκτοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ· διχα ἀγάπης οὐδὲν εὐάρεστόν ἐστιν τῷ θεῷ.

ἐν ἀγάπῃ προσελάβετο ἡμᾶς ὁ δεσπότης· διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην ἣν ἔσχεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν ἐν θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν σάρκα ὑπὲρ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν.

darkness even until now ; whose loveth his brother abideth in the light " (I. ii. 9). " Hereby know we love, because He laid down His life for us : and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren " (I. iii. 16). " Whoso shutteth up his compassion from his brother in need, how doth the love of God abide in him ? " (I. iii. 17). " If we love one another, God abideth in us, and His love is perfected in us " (I. iv. 12). " He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen, and this commandment have we from Him, that he who loveth God love his brother also " (I. iv. 20). " By this shall all men know that ye are My disciples, if ye have love one to another " (John xiii. 35).

That is the love which Paul, too, means in his hymn ; even when John places *μῆνεiv* and *ἀγάπη* together we are reminded of him. But, again, it is the same knowledge which Paul means when John says in I. iii. 2, " We know that we shall be like Him ; for we shall see Him even as He is." But John goes far beyond Paul when he writes (I. iv. 7 f.) : " Let us love one another, for love is of God ; and every one that loveth is begotten of God and knoweth God ; he that loveth not knoweth not God ; for God is love." There the idea that love is a metaphysical and " gnostic " principle is announced ; it has its root in the birth from God who is love, and its fruit is the knowledge of God. Further, however, according to John, love fills up the gap caused by the fact that in the present we are unable to see God : " No man hath beheld God ; if we love one another God abideth in us " (I. vi. 12) ; nay in iii. 12 it is said : " He that doeth good (i.e. loves) is of God ; he that doeth evil hath not seen God." If, according to John, God is love, and the whole state of Christianity appears to be comprehended in the saying " Abide ye in my love, even as I abide in the love of the Father " (xv. 10), then love is here " the almighty

love, which cares for and bears all things " and which includes also the knowledge of God.

But although John's line converges more strongly to Plato than does that of Paul, there is still a great deal lacking to a real approach between them ; for the formula that knowledge develops itself step by step from the lower knowledge and passes over into love, is still quite unknown to John. It is to be found first in Valentinus and Clemens Alexandrinus. John stands essentially on the Jewish-theistic line, and his idea of love has nothing to do with the Hellenic Eros, the Amor intellectualis. But he has prepared the way for the latter to penetrate into the sphere of Christian thought, because he has united " to love God " and " to know God," nay, has said that they are one.

PART VIII. CONCLUSION.

From John we return to our hymn. Wherein its religious-historical significance rests, may now be said in a few words. In the midst of a culture which in its highest aims was intellectually inclined, and at the same time was occupied with mysteries and sacraments, Paul has given expression, in an entrancing manner and in a language which all could understand, to the fundamental idea of Jesus about love of one's neighbour. Love, namely the love of one's neighbour, is the best thing in the world because it is permanent and eternal ; it stands above all gifts and knowledge that we may attain to, and it has its place beside, nay above the religious virtues, faith and hope. Simple, uncoloured morality is thus revealed as the being of religion itself. Religion is, as with Jesus Himself, brought down from heaven into what is human and necessitous, without losing its divine nature. Fundamental sayings of Jesus have here received a programmatic form born of the deepest experience

of life.¹ Caritas is placed in the centre as the essence of the new religion.

Dilectio summum fidei sacramentum, Christiani nominis thesaurus, quam Apostolus totis viribus Sancti Spiritus commendat: such are the words in which Tertullian, *de pat.* 12, has rightly written of Paul's hymn. The development of the essence of the Christian religion has indeed struck out other paths; some have determined not to do without metaphysics, and the Christian philosophy of religion has mixed up amor intellectualis with caritas. But, if it has never been forgotten in the Church that caritas—and only that—is the Sacramentum fidei, then, beside the sayings of Jesus, it is Paul's hymn which has chiefly been the cause of this. Through it and with it caritas has victoriously held its place as the principle of religion.

And Paul—as he was not naturally a Hellene, so he never became one! Who can wonder at the fact, long since remarked, that amongst the numerous ideas which he made trial of—his speculative theology and psychology reduces itself to that—there were some which had sprung from Hellenic ground and were descended from the mysteries? But these ideas also the Apostle would not have received, if they had not been connected with knowledge that he already possessed by virtue of his Jewish-religious education. He never left this sphere, which indeed was transformed by his Christian experience, but was never given up, and he could never acquire anything Hellenic which did not already possess points of contact in the religious and theological tradition with which he was familiar. The Apostle of the Gentiles always remained, so far as he was not a Christian, a

¹ Jesus, too, speaks of those who prophesy and of those to whom spirits are subject and to whom that is of no use. The sum of the commandments is for him the love of God and one's neighbour, and beside the active manifestation of the latter, the former has very little place.

Jew. That he did remain a Jew, although he so energetically began the process of transferring the new religion into the Greek world, was the source of his strength, and secured him his permanent place in history. His own personal career was wrecked by this attitude ;¹ but that his ideas remained effective far beyond the age of Hellenism, is owing first of all, not to the Hellenic element which is sparingly enough mingled with them, but to the strength with which the Apostle was able to announce afresh the old God of the Jews as the Father of Jesus Christ and to place love in the centre.

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¹ See my *Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, Heft IV. (1911), pp. 28-62.