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*FURTHER STUDIES IN THE EPISTLE OF ST.
JAMES, CHIEFLY SUGGESTED BY DR. HORT'S
POSTHUMOUS EDITION.*

JAMES i. 5, *εἰ δὲ τις ὑμῶν λείπεται σοφίας, αἰτείτω παρὰ τοῦ διδόντος θεοῦ πᾶσιν ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, καὶ δοθήσεται αὐτῷ.* H., with the A.V. and R.V., here interprets ἀπλῶς by the English "liberally," "graciously," and quotes many passages in which a corresponding sense attaches to the cognate adjective (ἀπλοῦς) and substantive (ἀπλότης). In my note I went too far in denying that the adverb ever bears this meaning. H. instances Polyb. xxxii. 14 (Scipio resolved) *πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἄλλοτρίους τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἀκρίβειαν τηρεῖν, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἀπλῶς χρῆσθαι καὶ δικαίως;* and we should probably give an ethical force to the same adverb in Prov. x. 10, *ὃς πορεύεται ἀπλῶς,* "he who walks in singleness of heart." But H. himself allows that, in the passage which presents the nearest verbal parallel to this text of St. James,¹ "ἀπλῶς is not ethical at all, but retains its common classical meaning, 'absolutely,' i.e. (in this connexion) without a substantial equivalent." H. adds that, in St. James, the need for adopting this, the logical meaning, is removed by the sufficient evidence for "graciously," and further that it is excluded by the contrast with "upbraideth."

A single instance can hardly be considered to prove the point, when it is a question of probabilities, and H. only provides one instance of the meaning "graciously." I am rather inclined to think that St. James here had in mind such words as we may read in Matthew v. 45, "Your Father which is in heaven maketh his sun to rise upon the evil and

¹ *Εἰ δὲ ἀπλῶς διδόντος λαβεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον, πῶς οὐ πλέον ὅτε μὴδὲ προίκα,* "If it [is] unwise to accept an unconditional offer, how much more a mere bargain." Himerius, *Eclog.*, v. 19.

the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust," with which we may compare Acts x. 34, xiv. 17, xvii. 15 foll. ; Luke vi. 35 ; Isa. lv. ; Philo, *Alleg. M.* i. 50, φιλό-δωρος ὃν ὁ θεὸς χαριζεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς μὴ τελείοις, *Hermas Mand.* ii. 4, πᾶσιν ὑστερουμένοις δίδου ἀπλῶς, μὴ διστάζων τίνι δῶς ἢ μὴ δῶς, πᾶσιν δίδου. This passage from *Hermas*, who was certainly acquainted with our Epistle (see my *Introduction*, pp. lxxxiv. foll.), might seem to be written to explain the ἀπλῶς of St. James, which, thus explained, may be taken to represent a higher degree of the quality implied by Dr. Hort's interpretation.

It may, however, be objected that, though the blessings of nature are given to all without distinction, it is not so with the blessings of grace. In ch. iv. 3 we are told (1) that "we have not, because we ask not," and again (2) that "we ask and receive not, because we ask amiss," and in i. 6 we are told (3) what it is which makes our prayers unavailing, viz. our want of faith, our doublemindedness. But might not a similar objection be made to the phrase πᾶσιν διδόντος (which *Hermas* makes use of as explanatory of ἀπλῶς), and also to μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, since we are told in Matthew ix. 20 τότε ἤρξατο ὀνειδίζειν τὰς πόλεις . . . ὅτι οὐ μετενόησαν, and in Mark xvi. 14, ὀνειδισεν τὴν ἀπιστίαν καὶ σκληροκαρδίαν (of the Eleven). As God gives unconditionally, so we have examples of man asking unconditionally in the prayer of Socrates (*Xen. Mem.* i. 3. 2), εὐχετο πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τὰγαθὰ δίδοναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδόμενος ὅποια ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν.¹

¹ It may be well to add here some further quotations from Heisen's thesaurus in illustration of ἀπλῶς, *Aelian V.H.* ix. 32 (speaking of the statue of Phryne erected by the Greeks) οὐκ ἐρῶ δὲ ἀπλῶς τοὺς Ἕλληνας . . . ἀλλ' οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀκρατέστεροι: *Plut. Vitae* p. 90 (of Solon's legislation), οὐ μὴν ἀπλῶς τὰς δόσεις ἐφήκεν, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ νόσων ἕνεκεν κ.τ.λ. In relaxing the old law of inheritance Solon did not allow the estate to be unconditionally distributed in presents, but only under special circumstances. The word occurs also in *Wisdom xvi. 27* τὸ ὑπὸ πυρὸς μὴ φθειρόμενον

I. 7, 8, *μη γὰρ οἰέσθω ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος ὅτι λήμψεται τι παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου, ἀνὴρ δίψυχος, ἀκατάστατος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ.* In my edition I have followed the R.V., translating, "For let not that man think that he shall receive anything from the Lord; a double-minded man, unstable in all his ways," taking *ἀνὴρ δίψυχος* as in apposition with *ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος*, the doubter of the sixth verse, which forms the subject of *λήμψεται*. H., on the other hand, understanding *ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος* of the man who lacks wisdom in ver. 5, makes *ἀνὴρ δίψυχος* the subject to *λήμψεται*, translating, "Let not that man think that a man of two minds, unstable in all his ways, shall receive anything from the Lord." The reasons assigned by H. for his interpretation are (1) that the obvious way of setting aside the last person (i.e. the waverer of ver. 6) and pointing back to the person before him (i.e. *ὁ λειπόμενος σοφίας*, of ver. 5) would be, in Greek, the use of the pronoun *ἐκεῖνος*. But the following passages will show that the use of *ἐκεῖνος* is not limited to such references, but is often employed for emphasis, as in Mark xiv. 21, *οὐαὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ δι' οὗ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδίδοται· καλὸν αὐτῷ εἰ οὐκ ἐγενήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἕκενος*: Matthew xii. 45, *γίνεται τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκεῖνου χεῖρονα τῶν πρώτων*: John i. 6, *ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ Θεοῦ, ὄνομα αὐτῷ Ἰωάννης· οὗτος ἦλθεν εἰς μαρτυρίαν, ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός, ἵνα πάντες πιστεύσωσιν δι' αὐτοῦ. οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος τὸ φῶς,*

ἀπλῶς ὑπὸ βραχείας ἀκτίνας ἡλίου θερμαινόμενον ἐτήκετο (when it was just warmed by a faint sunbeam), 2 Macc. vi. 6 *ἦν δ' ὅσπερ σαββατίζου ὅσπερ πατρίους ἑορτὰς διαφυλάττειν, ὅσπερ ἀπλῶς Ἰουδαίων ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι* (nor absolutely to confess that he was a Jew). Pricæus, in *Criticis Sacri*, quotes *ἀπλῶς σοι προσφέρεσθαι* from Antoninus (without further reference) for the meaning 'generously.' It occurs in xi. 15 *ὡς κίβδηλος ὁ λέγων, ἐγὼ προήρημαι ἀπλῶς σοι προσφέρεσθαι* (but this should have been stamped upon his brow), *ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀπλοῦς καὶ εὐμενὴς ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασιν ἔχουσι τοῦτο*, where I prefer the meaning 'straightforwardly.' This also seems to me the best translation in two other passages of Ant. iii. 6 *ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἐλαῖ τὸ κρείττον καὶ τούτου ἀντέχου*, and iii. 16 *ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀδημόνως καὶ ἐθθῆμως βίει*.

ἀλλ' ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός: Mark vii. 20, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πορευόμενον, ἐκεῖνο κοινοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον: John xii. 48, ὁ λόγος ὃν ἐλάλησα, ἐκεῖνος κρινεῖ αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. In the parable of the houses built, one on the rock, the other on sand, which closes the Sermon on the Mount, both are referred to as ἡ οἰκία ἐκεῖνη; by way of heightening the contrast between them. In the present case I think the reader would naturally interpret ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος of the man spoken of in ver. 6: it seems to me unnatural to put the warning intended for the waverer into the mouth of him who lacked wisdom, and whose rôle in the argument comes to an end when he has connected ver. 4 with ver. 6 through λειπόμενος and αἰτείτω. I think, too, that Alford rightly questions whether the writer would have introduced a rare word like δίψυχος as the subject of a new clause. If it is merely added in apposition to the preceding ὁ διακρινόμενος, a clue to its sense has been already given.

H.'s next argument is derived from St. James' use of the word ἄνθρωπος, which occurs six times in the Epistle, but 'nowhere with a trace of reproach.' But is there no reproach in ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ (ii. 20)? Elsewhere we read ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἀνομίας (2 Thess. ii. 3), ἄνθρωπος φάγος καὶ οἰνοπότης (Matt. xi. 19), see also Jude 4 παρεισεδύσαντινες ἄνθρωποι ἀσεβεῖς, 2 Peter iii. 7 εἰς ἡμέραν ἀπωλείας ἀσεβῶν ἀνθρώπων. H. maintains that, wherever ἄνθρωπος occurs in St. James, it is in emphatic opposition to other beings, here to the Lord, in ii. 20 to devils, and probably also in ii. 24. We may allow this characteristic of the word in iii. 9 καταράμεθα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς καθ' ὁμοίωσιν Θεοῦ γεγονότας, but I think there is something arbitrary in the distinction between ἀνὴρ and ἄνθρωπος which H. makes in his notes on the passages where the words occur. For instance, in the note on i. 8 he insists that ἀνὴρ is wholly without emphasis, while of πᾶς ἄνθρωπος in i. 19 he says the

expression is "not equivalent to *πᾶς* standing alone, but calls our attention to every one of the human race, that race which is God's offspring, endowed by Him with a portion of His own light." On the other hand, of *ὀργή ἀνδρός* in the next verse, he says, "It is not exactly the broad distinction of human, as against divine wrath (which would require *ἀνθρώπου* or *τῶν ἀνθρώπων*), but a single man's anger, the petty passion of an individual soul." On *τέλειος ἀνήρ* in iii. 2 the note is, "*ἀνήρ* cannot have the sense that *ἄνθρωπος* would have had 'one showing the perfection of humanity': it is simply 'one that is perfect.'" On iii. 8 *τὴν δὲ γλῶσσαν οὐδεὶς δαμάσαι δύναται ἀνθρώπων* H. offers two renderings, "The tongue no one can tame—no one, that is, of men" (which I consider to be the true rendering, reminding us of Mark x. 27 *παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ Θεῶ*); but prefers "No one even of men, even of those beings so highly endowed, of whom he had just been speaking."

In my note on i. 8, I have distinguished between St. James' uses of *ἀνὴρ* and *ἄνθρωπος*, as follows: *ἀνὴρ* is generally accompanied by some characteristic epithet, such as *διψυχος*, *μακάριος*, *ὀργή*, *κατανοῶν*, *χρυσοδακτύλιος*, *τέλειος*, while *ἄνθρωπος*, as a rule, either stands alone, or is accompanied by some quasi-pronominal word, such as *ἐκεῖνος*, *πᾶς*, *οὐδεὶς*. This agrees fairly with the use in the LXX., the Gospels and the Acts, while, in the other Epistles, *ἀνὴρ* is generally opposed to *γυνή*.

In dealing with synonyms, however, it is not only necessary to ascertain their different shades of meaning, at any given period of their development, by comparing the passages in which they occur: we must also endeavour to trace back the later meaning to its original. It is plain, to start with, that the concept "human being," expressed by *ἄνθρωπος* and *homo*, is a more general term, has a wider extension and a narrower connotation than the word *ἀνὴρ*

or *vir*, which excludes the woman, the child and the slave, and stands for the head and protector of the family, being supposed to possess the qualities which belong to that position, courage, endurance, self-control, forethought, etc. These qualities are often known by names derived from the word for "man," as *virtus*, *ἀνδρεία*. Hence we read in Herodotus (vii. 210) πολλοὶ μὲν ἀνθρωποὶ, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄνδρες; hence the citizens of Athens were addressed as ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, the early Christians as ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί. Hence, I think, we have μακάριος ἀνὴρ in i. 12, in consequence of the manly quality of endurance by which that blessing had been won (ὅς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν). So we read of ὀργὴ ἀνδρός because, as Plato tells us in his *Republic*, anger is the raw material of courage. In iii. 2 ἀνὴρ is joined with τέλειος probably because the word ἀνὴρ implies full age (as in 1 Cor. xiii. 11). "In Homer it is used chiefly of princes and leaders, but also of free men, though, to mark a man of rank, a qualifying word is mostly added, as ἀνὴρ βουληφόρος, ἀνὴρ βασιλεύς. In later Greek ἀνὴρ was commonly joined with titles, professions, etc." (L. & S. s.v. ἀνὴρ). Perhaps this may account for the phrase ἀνὴρ χρυσοδακτύλιος in ii. 2, for ἀνὴρ προφήτης used of Christ in Luke xxiv. 19, for φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ in Plato, *Phaedo* 95 c., ἀνὴρ μάγος in *Axiochus* 371. Such complimentary additions, like our "Mister" or "Esquire," soon lost their meaning, as we may see from the comic ἄνδρες θεοί, and such phrases as πᾶς ἀνὴρ, which scarcely differs from πᾶς τις.

There is a similar degradation of ἀνθρωπος from its highest mark in Psalm viii. 4, in which the Son of Man stands above all other created beings, as the image of God, till it becomes used as a contemptuous term for a woman or a slave, especially in the vocative ὦ ἄνθρωπε. While used, like ἀνὴρ, of the title or profession, it does not in general add dignity (though we find ἀνθρωπος βασιλεύς in Matt. xxii. 2), but

the reverse, as in *ἄνθρωπος γόης*. Both lines of degeneration meet in the *ἄνθρωπος ἁμαρτωλός* of John ix. 16 and the *ἄνηρ ἁμαρτωλός* of Luke xxiv. 7.

I. 17, *πᾶν δῶρημα τέλειον ἄνωθεν ἐστὶν καταβαίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων, παρ' ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι παραλλαγή*. This verse establishes the truth of ver. 13, that God tempts none. "It is good, good of every kind, that flows from Him." The contradiction involved may not be strictly logical, since it leaves it possible that evil also may proceed from Him (see Isa. xlv. 7). In my edition I have called attention to the probability that we have here a poetical quotation, in which strict logic is out of place. H. follows Erskine's interpretation: "Every giving is good and every gift perfect from its first source, descending etc." But gifts may be bad, as well as good, e.g. Pandora or the Trojan Horse. H. is therefore obliged to explain that St. James must mean by "every gift" every gift of God, which is really assuming the point at issue. Nor can I think that *ἄνωθεν* is to be understood here as in Luke i. 3, when we have two other passages in this Epistle (iii. 15, 17), where it is allowed that *ἄνωθεν* can only mean "from above."

Uses of ἐνὶ and ἐνεστι.

Ἐνὶ is simply the Ionic form of the preposition *ἐν*, but often stands for *ἐνεστι*, both in the earlier and later stages of Greek, just as *πάρα*, *ἄνα*, *μέτα*, *πέρι* are used, with inverted accent, for *πάρεστι*, etc. Its simplest use is to denote the position of one material object within another, as in *Odys.* x. 45 *ἄργυρος ἄσκῳ ἐνεστιν*, *Herod.* vii. 112 *ἐν τῷ (οὐρεῖ) χρύσεια ἐνὶ μέταλλα*, *Xen. Anab.* v. 3, 11 *ἐνὶ δὲ τῷ κερῷ χώρῳ καὶ ἄλσῃ*. A derivative use is that which denotes feelings or faculties existing in a person, as in *Il.* xviii. 53 *ἐμῷ ἐνὶ κήδεα θυμῷ*, *Od.* xxi. 288 *ἐνὶ σοὶ φρένες οὐδ' ἠβαιαί*, *Thuc.* ii. 40 *ἐνὶ τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν*

ἐπιμέλεια, Diphilus *Synt.* ἀγαθὸς βαφεὺς ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ παιδίῳ, Luc. *Tox.* 35 μεγαλουργὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἀνδρείον ἔνι οὐδέν, Aristoph. *Nub.* 486 ἔνεστί δῆτα σοὶ λέγειν ἐν τῇ φύσει ; λέγειν μὲν οὐκ ἔνεστ', ἀποστρεῖν δ' ἔνι, Soph. *El.* 527 (Clytemnestra avows that she slew her husband) τῶνδ' ἄρνησις οὐκ ἔνεστί μοι ("it is not in me to deny it"), *El.* 1031 (Electra dismisses her sister with the words) ἄπελθε· σοὶ γὰρ ὠφέλῃσις οὐκ ἔνι, to which Chrysothemis replies ἔνεστιν· ἀλλὰ σοὶ μάθησις οὐ πάρα (where ἔνι, ἔνεστιν and πάρα have much the same force), Herod. vi. 109 ἐν σοὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἢ καταδουλώσαι Ἀθήνας ἢ—, where ἐν σοὶ ἔστιν has the same force as ἔνι σοὶ, "it lies in you." Epict. *Diss.* ii. 21. 7 ἔνι τε καὶ τῷ ζηλοτύπῳ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, *Test.* xii. *Patr.* p. 733 ὅπου γὰρ ἔνι φόβος τὸ σκότος ἀποδιδράσκει, *Acta Xanthippiæ* (in James, *Aprocr. Anecdota*, p. 70, Camb.) λεγέτω ὁ κυρὸς τὸ ὄναρ, καὶ ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔνι διάλυσις ἐν αὐτῷ (if it affords any key to its interpretation). The third use of ἔνι is where it denotes not the presence of one material object in another, or the relation of thought or feeling or faculty to a living person, but the relation of fact or thing, whatever it may be, to the nature of things in general, the order of the world, or some other abstraction, where the verb is often impersonal, as in Isocr. *De Pace*, p. 187, ἔνεστι δ' ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πράγμασιν ἡμᾶς τυχεῖν τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης. "In such a state of things it is included as a possibility (involved as a necessity), that we should obtain this honour." The words ἔστι, ἐγγίνεται, ἐνδέχεται are similarly used. I think scholars have sometimes been too ready to assume that this was the only possible use, even where the verb was personal, and where a simpler meaning gives all that is required. Thus L. & S. translate ἔνεσται χρόνος (Thuc. i. 80) "time will be necessary," where the literal "there will be an interval of time" gives the thought more exactly. Again, in Soph. *El.* 527, which I have cited above, and in

all similar cases, they translate *οὐκ ἔνι* or *ἔνεστιν* by "It is impossible," where "it is not in me" seems truer to the Greek. In Plato, *Phaedo*, 77 E, *ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῶν παῖσι*¹ (referring to Socrates' words spoken just before on the childish fear of death, *δοκεῖς δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παιδῶν*) L. & S. say that *ἔνι* means "possible." As this passage is also adduced by Hort in support of his theory that *ἔνι* "adds a playful irony ('perhaps it is not impossible that even amongst us, etc.),' and can never become a bare equivalent of *ἔστιν*," it may be well to give Stallbaum's quotation from Themistius (*Orat.* i. 13), as showing that the latter understood it in the manner objected to by Hort: *ἔστι γὰρ τις ἐν ἡμῶν οὐ παῖς, ὡς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλ' οἷόν τις εὐγενῆς νεανίας.*

I proceed now to examine the passages in which *ἔνι* occurs in the N.T. and to give my reasons for dissenting from renderings supported by the combined authority of two such scholars as Lightfoot and Hort. The passages are Galatians iii. 26-28 *πάντες υἱοὶ Θεοῦ ἔστε διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλληγν, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλευθερὸς, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θηλύ· πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἰς ἔστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.* Lightfoot explains this in terms with which I entirely agree. "In Christ Jesus ye are all sons, all free. . . . The conventional distinctions of religious caste or social rank, even the natural distinction of sex, are banished hence. Ye are all one man, for ye are all members of Christ." Where I disagree, is in the note which follows on *οὐκ ἔνι*, "'there is no room for,' 'no place for'; negating not the fact only but the possibility." I see no reason why we should not keep the ordinary meaning of the word *ἔνι*. "In the body of Christ distinctions disappear, Jew is not, Greek is not." What more is needed? If we will go out of our way to

¹ Compare the lines of Diphilus quoted above.

introduce the idea of impossibility, we must change the personal to the impersonal construction, *οὐκ ἔνι Τουδαίων εἶναι οὐδὲ Ἑλληνα τὸν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. St. Paul repeats in Col. iii. 9-11 with slight variation what he had said in the Epistle to the Galatians, and Lightfoot gives the same explanation as before.

The next example of *ἔνι* occurs in 1 Corinthians vi. 5, where St. Paul blames the Corinthians for appearing before Gentile courts, and asks whether the Church is so entirely wanting in wisdom, that they could find no man who would be able to act as an arbiter in cases in which Christians were concerned, *οὕτως οὐκ ἔνι ἐν ὑμῖν οὐδεὶς σοφός, ὃς δυνήσεται διακρῖναι ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ*; Lightfoot nowhere touches on this passage (though, in his note on Gal. iii. 28, he cites James i. 17 as an instance of the denial of a possibility); but Hort refers to it in his note on James, and gives to the simple question "Is there no one among you who could act as an arbiter?" what seems to me the artificial and exaggerated shape, "Is it impossible that there should be among you, etc." He ends his note with the words, "There is no reason to think that *ἔνι* ever becomes a bare equivalent of *ἔστιν*." I should rather say that, wherever *ἔνι* is accompanied by a pleonastic *ἐν*, as in many of my citations, there *ἔνι* may be replaced by *ἔστιν*. Compare the quotation from Herod. vi. 109 given above.

We have still to consider the passage from James i. 17 *παρ' ᾧ οὐκ ἔνι παραλλαγή*. Here *ἔνι* is personal, having for its subject *παραλλαγή*, "In the father of lights there is no variation." This would be perfectly regular if *παρά* were replaced by *ἐν*. We have seen a similar irregularity in Soph. *El.* 1031, where Chrysothemis replies to her sister's taunt, *σοὶ γὰρ ὠφέλησις οὐκ ἔνι*, with the retort, *ἔνεστιν. ἀλλὰ σοὶ μάθησις οὐ πάρα*. This use of *παρά* is not uncommon in the O.T., and is explained by Hort from the Hebrew

instinct of reverence, which preferred the expressions "in the presence of God," "with God," to "in God." He instances Psalms xxxvi. 10 *παρὰ σοὶ πηγὴ ζωῆς*, Psalm cxxx. 7 *παρὰ τῷ Κυρίῳ τὸ ἔλεος καὶ πολλὴ παρ' αὐτῷ λύτρωσις*, etc. See the following quotation from Job, where *μετά* is equivalent to *ἐν*.¹

It may be worth while to cite here the instances of *ἐν* and its equivalents in the O.T. Job xxviii. 14 Ἄβυσσος εἶπεν οὐκ ἔνεστιν (αἰ. ἔστιν) ἐν ἐμοὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ θάλασσα εἶπεν οὐκ ἔνεστι μετ' ἐμοῦ, Sirac. xxxvii. 2 οὐχὶ λυπὴ ἐνὶ ἔως θανάτου φίλος τρεπόμενος εἰς ἐχθράν; "Is there not in it (friendship) a grief unto death, a friend changing to hatred?" 4 Macc. iv. 22 (where *ἐν* is impersonal) "He heard that the report of his death caused the greatest possible joy to the Jews (ὅτι ὡς ἐνὶ χαίροιεν).

J. B. MAYOR.

¹ On the construction of verbs compounded with prepositions, see Winer, *Gr.*, pp. 529-540.